CHAPTER II

BRIEF STUDY BY COUNTRY

A. UGANDA

GENERAL LOCATION

The Republic of Uganda is located on the East African plateau bounded

on the east by Kenya, Sudan on the north, the Democratic Republic of the Congo

on the west, Rwanda on the southwest and by Tanzania on the south. It

averages about 1100 metres (3,250 ft) above sea level, and this slopes very

steadily downwards the Sudanese Plain to the north. However, much of the south

is poorly drained, while the centre is dominated by Lake Kyoga, which is also

surrounded by extensive marshy areas. Uganda lies almost completely within the

Nile basin. The Victoria Nile drains from the lake into Lake Kyoga and thence into

Lake Albert on the Congolese border. It then runs northwards into Sudan. One

small area on the eastern edge of Uganda is drained by the Turkwel River, part of

the internal drainage basin of Lake Turkana.

Lake Kyoga serves as a rough boundary between Bantu speakers in the south

and Nilotic and Central Sudanic language speakers in the north. Despite the

division between north and south in political affairs, this linguistic boundary

actually runs roughly from northwest to southeast, near the course of the Nile.

However, many Ugandans live among people who speak different languages,

especially in rural areas. Some sources describe a regional variation in terms of

physical characteristics, clothing, bodily adornment, and mannerisms, but others

claim that those differences are disappearing.

BOUDARIES

Uganda, a landlocked country in east-central Africa, situated north and

northwest of Lake Victoria, has a total area of 236,040 sq km (91,136 sq mi), of

which 36,330 sq km (14,027 mi) is inland water. Comparatively, the area

occupied by Uganda is slightly smaller than the state of Oregon. It extends 787

km (489 mi) NNE–SSW and 486 km (302 mi) ESE–WNW. Uganda has a total

boundary length of 2,698 km (1,676 mi).

HISTORY

Uganda was one of the lesser-known African countries until the 1970s

when Idi Amin Dada rose to the presidency. His bizarre public pronouncements -

ranging from gratuitous advice for Richard Nixon to his proclaimed intent to raise

a monument to Adolf Hitler - fascinated the popular news media. Beneath the

facade of buffoonery, however, the darker reality of massacres and

disappearances was considered equally newsworthy. Uganda became known as

an African horror story, fully identified with its field marshal president. Even a

decade after Amin's flight from Uganda in 1979, popular imagination still insisted

on linking the country and its exiled former ruler.

But Amin's well - publicized excesses at the expense of Uganda and its

citizens were not unique, nor were they the earliest assaults on the rule of law.

They were foreshadowed by Amin's predecessor, Apolo Milton Obote, who

suspended the 1962 constitution and ruled part of Uganda by martial law for five

years before a military coup in 1971 brought Amin into power. Amin's bloody

regime was followed by an even bloodier one - Obote's second term as president

during the civil war from 1981 to 1985, when government troops carried out

genocidal sweeps of the rural populace in a region that became known as the

Luwero Triangle. The dramatic collapse of coherent government under Amin and

his plunder of his nation's economy, followed by the even greater failure of the

second Obote government in the 1980s, gave rise to the essential question, -

"What went wrong?"

At Uganda's independence in October 1962 there was little indication that

the country was headed for disaster. On the contrary, it appeared a model of

stability and potential progress. Unlike neighboring Kenya, Uganda had no alien

white settler class attempting to monopolize the rewards of the cash crop

economy. Nor was there any recent legacy of bitter and violent conflict in Uganda

to compare with the 1950s Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya. In Uganda it was African

producers who grew the cotton and coffee that brought a higher standard of
living, financed the education of their children, and led to increased expectations

for the future.

Unlike neighboring Tanzania, Uganda enjoyed rich natural resources, a

flourishing economy, and an impressive number of educated and prosperous

middle-class African professionals, including business people, doctors, lawyers,

and scientists. And unlike neighboring Zaire (the former Belgian Congo), which

experienced only a brief period of independence before descending into chaos

and misrule, Uganda's first few years of self-rule saw a series of successful

development projects. The new government built many new schools, modernized

the transportation network, and increased manufacturing output as well as

national income. With its prestigious national Makerere University, its gleaming

new teaching hospital at Mulago, its Owen Falls hydroelectric project at Jinja--all

gifts of the departing British--Uganda at independence looked optimistically to the

future.

Independence, too, was in a sense a gift of the British because it came

without a struggle. The British determined a timetable for withdrawal before local

groups had organized an effective nationalist movement. Uganda's political

parties emerged in response to impending independence rather than as a means

of winning it.

In part the result of its fairly smooth transition to independence, the near

absence of nationalism among Uganda's diverse ethnic groups led to a series of

political compromises. The first was a government made up of coalitions of local

and regional interest groups loosely organized into political parties. The national

government was presided over by a prime minister whose principal role

appeared to be that of a broker, trading patronage and development projects--

such as roads, schools, and dispensaries--to local or regional interest groups in

return for political support. It was not the strong, direct ideologically clothed

central government desired by most African political leaders, but it worked. And it

might reasonably have been expected to continue to work, because there were

exchanges and payoffs at all levels and to all regions.

UGANDA BEFORE 1900. Uganda's strategic position along the central

African Rift Valley, its favorable climate at an altitude of 1,200 meters and above,

and the reliable rainfall around the Lake Victoria Basin made it attractive to

African cultivators and herders as early as the fourth century B.C. Core samples

from the bottom of Lake Victoria have revealed that dense rainforest once

covered the land around the lake. Centuries of cultivation removed almost all the

original tree cover.

The cultivators who gradually cleared the forest were probably Bantu-

speaking people, whose slow but inexorable expansion gradually populated most

of Africa south of the Sahara Desert. Their knowledge of agriculture and use of

iron technology permitted them to clear the land and feed ever larger numbers of

settlers. They displaced small bands of indigenous huntergatherers , who

relocated to the less accessible mountains. Meanwhile, by the fourth century

B.C., the Bantu-speaking metallurgists were perfecting iron smelting to produce

mediumgrade carbon steel in preheated forced draft furnaces--a technique not

achieved in Europe until the Siemens process of the nineteenth century. Although

most of these developments were taking place southwest of modern Ugandan

boundaries, iron was mined and smelted in many parts of the country not long

afterward.

Early Political Systems

As the Bantu-speaking agriculturists multiplied over the centuries, they

evolved a form of government by clan chiefs. This kinship-organized system was

useful for coordinating work projects, settling internal disputes, and carrying out

religious observances to clan deities, but it could effectively govern only a limited

number of people. Larger polities began to form states by the end of the first

millennium A.D., some of which would ultimately govern over a million subjects

each.

The stimulus to the formation of states may have been the meeting of

people of differing cultures. The lake shores became densely settled by Bantu

speakers, particularly after the introduction of the banana, or plantain, as a basic

food crop around A.D. 1000; farther north in the short grass uplands, where

rainfall was intermittent, pastoralists were moving south from the area of the Nile

River in search of better pastures. Indeed, a short grass "corridor" existed north

and west of Lake Victoria through which successive waves of herders may have

passed on the way to central and southern Africa. The meeting of these peoples
resulted in trade across various ecological zones and evolved into more

permanent relationships.

Nilotic-speaking pastoralists were mobile and ready to resort to arms in

defense of their own cattle or raids to appropriate the cattle of others. But their

political organization was minimal, based on kinship and decision making by kin-

group elders. In the meeting of cultures, they may have acquired the ideas and

symbols of political chiefship from the Bantu-speakers, to whom they could offer

military protection. A system of patronclient relationships developed, whereby a

pastoral elite emerged, entrusting the care of cattle to subjects who used the

manure to improve the fertility of their increasingly overworked gardens and

fields. The earliest of these states may have been established in the fifteenth

century by a group of pastoral rulers called the Chwezi. Although legends

depicted the Chwezi as supernatural beings, their material remains at the

archaeological sites of Bigo and Mubende have shown that they were human

and the probable ancestors of the modern Hima or Tutsi (Watutsi) pastoralists of

Rwanda and Burundi. During the fifteenth century, the Chwezi were displaced by

a new Nilotic-speaking pastoral group called the Bito. The Chwezi appear to

have moved south of present-day Uganda to establish kingdoms in northwest

Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi.

From this process of cultural contact and state formation, three different

types of states emerged. The Hima type was later to be seen in Rwanda and

Burundi. It preserved a caste system whereby the rulers and their pastoral
relatives attempted to maintain strict separation from the agricultural subjects,

called Hutu. The Hima rulers lost their Nilotic language and became Bantu

speakers, but they preserved an ideology of superiority in political and social life

and attempted to monopolize high status and wealth. In the twentieth century, the

Hutu revolt after independence led to the expulsion from Rwanda of the Hima

elite, who became refugees in Uganda. A counterrevolution in Burundi secured

power for the Hima through periodic massacres of the Hutu majority.

The Bito type of state, in contrast with that of the Hima, was established in

Bunyoro, which for several centuries was the dominant political power in the

region. Bito immigrants displaced the influential Hima and secured power for

themselves as a royal clan, ruling over Hima pastoralists and Hutu agriculturalists

alike. No rigid caste lines divided Bito society. The weakness of the Bito ideology

was that, in theory, it granted every Bito clan member royal status and with it the

eligibility to rule. Although some of these ambitions might be fulfilled by the

Bunyoro king's (omukama) granting his kin offices as governors of districts, there

was always the danger of coup d'état or secession by overambitious relatives.

Thus, in Bunyoro, periods of political stability and expansion were interrupted by

civil wars and secessions.

The third type of state to emerge in Uganda was that of Buganda, on the

northern shores of Lake Victoria. This area of swamp and hillside was not

attractive to the rulers of pastoral states farther north and west. It became a

refuge area, however, for those who wished to escape rule by Bunyoro or for
factions within Bunyoro who were defeated in contests for power. One such

group from Bunyoro, headed by Prince Kimera, arrived in Buganda early in the

fifteenth century. Assimilation of refugee elements had already strained the ruling

abilities of Buganda's various clan chiefs and a supraclan political organization

was already emerging. Kimera seized the initiative in this trend and became the

first effective king (kabaka) of the fledgling Buganda state. Ganda oral traditions

later sought to disguise this intrusion from Bunyoro by claiming earlier, shadowy,

quasisupernatural kabakas.

Unlike the Hima caste system or the Bunyoro royal clan political monopoly,

Buganda's kingship was made a kind of state lottery in which all clans could

participate. Each new king was identified with the clan of his mother, rather than

that of his father. All clans readily provided wives to the ruling kabaka, who had

eligible sons by most of them. When the ruler died, his successor was chosen by

clan elders from among the eligible princes, each of whom belonged to the clan

of his mother. In this way, the throne was never the property of a single clan for

more than one reign.

Consolidating their efforts behind a centralized kingship, the Baganda

(people of Buganda; sing., Muganda) shifted away from defensive strategies and

toward expansion. By the mid-nineteenth century, Buganda had doubled and

redoubled its territory. Newly conquered lands were placed under chiefs

nominated by the king. Buganda's armies and the royal tax collectors traveled

swiftly to all parts of the kingdom along specially constructed roads which
crossed streams and swamps by bridges and viaducts. On Lake Victoria (which

the Baganda called Nnalubale), a royal navy of outrigger canoes, commanded by

an admiral who was chief of the Lungfish clan, could transport Baganda

commandos to raid any shore of the lake. The journalist Henry M. Stanley visited

Buganda in 1875 and provided an estimate of Buganda troop strength. Stanley

counted 125,000 troops marching off on a single campaign to the east, where a

fleet of 230 war canoes waited to act as auxiliary naval support.

At Buganda's capital, Stanley found a well-ordered town of about 40,000

surrounding the king's palace, which was situated atop a commanding hill. A wall

more than four kilometers in circumference surrounded the palace compound,

which was filled with grass-roofed houses, meeting halls, and storage buildings.

At the entrance to the court burned the royal fire (gombolola), which would only

be extinguished when the kabaka died. Thronging the grounds were foreign

ambassadors seeking audiences, chiefs going to the royal advisory council,

messengers running errands, and a corps of young pages, who served the

kabaka while training to become future chiefs. For communication across the

kingdom, the messengers were supplemented by drum signals.

Most communities in Uganda, however, were not organized on such a vast

political scale. To the north, the Nilotic-speaking Acholi people adopted some of

the ideas and regalia of kingship from Bunyoro in the eighteenth century. Chiefs

(rwots) acquired royal drums, collected tribute from followers, and redistributed it

to those who were most loyal. The mobilization of larger numbers of subjects
permitted successful hunts for meat. Extensive areas of bushland were

surrounded by beaters, who forced the game to a central killing point in a hunting

technique that was still practiced in areas of central Africa in 1989. But these

Acholi chieftaincies remained relatively small in size, and within them the power

of the clans remained strong enough to challenge that of the rwot.

Long-Distance Trade and Foreign Contact. Until the middle of the

nineteenth century, Uganda remained relatively isolated from the outside world.

The central African lake region was, after all, a world in miniature, with an internal

trade system, a great power rivalry between Buganda and Bunyoro, and its own

inland seas. When intrusion from the outside world finally came, it was in the

form of long-distance trade for ivory.

Ivory had been a staple trade item from the East Africa coast since before

the time of Christ. But growing world demand in the nineteenth century, together

with the provision of increasingly efficient firearms to hunters, created a moving

"ivory frontier" as elephant herds near the coast were nearly exterminated.

Leading large caravans financed by Indian moneylenders, coastal Arab traders

based on Zanzibar (united with Tanganyika in 1964 to form Tanzania) had

reached Lake Victoria by 1844. One trader, Ahmad bin Ibrahim, introduced

Buganda's kabaka to the advantages of foreign trade: the acquisition of imported

cloth and, more important, guns and gunpowder. Ibrahim also introduced the

religion of Islam, but the kabaka was more interested in guns. By the 1860s,

Buganda was the destination of ever more caravans, and the kabaka and his
chiefs began to dress in cloth called mericani, which was woven in

Massachusetts and carried to Zanzibar by American traders. It was judged finer

in quality than European or Indian cloth, and increasing numbers of ivory tusks

were collected to pay for it. Bunyoro sought to attract foreign trade as well, in an

effort to keep up with Buganda in the burgeoning arms race.

Bunyoro also found itself threatened from the north by Egyptian-

sponsored agents who sought ivory and slaves but who, unlike the Arab traders

from Zanzibar, were also promoting foreign conquest. Khedive Ismael of Egypt

aspired to build an empire on the Upper Nile; by the 1870s, his motley band of

ivory traders and slave raiders had reached the frontiers of Bunyoro. The khedive

sent a British explorer, Samuel Baker, to raise the Egyptian flag over Bunyoro.

The Banyoro (people of Bunyoro) resisted this attempt, and Baker had to fight a

desperate battle to secure his retreat. Baker regarded the resistance as an act of

treachery, and he denounced the Banyoro in a book that was widely read in

Britain. Later British empire builders arrived in Uganda with a predisposition

against Bunyoro, which eventually would cost the kingdom half its territory until

the "lost counties" were restored to Bunyoro after independence.

Farther north the Acholi responded more favorably to the Egyptian

demand for ivory. They were already famous hunters and quickly acquired guns

in return for tusks. The guns permitted the Acholi to retain their independence but

altered the balance of power within Acholi territory, which for the first time

experienced unequal distribution of wealth based on control of firearms.

 Meanwhile, Buganda was receiving not only trade goods and guns, but a

stream of foreign visitors as well. The explorer J.H. Speke passed through

Buganda in 1862 and claimed he had discovered the source of the Nile. Both

Speke and Stanley (based on his 1875 stay in Uganda) wrote books that praised

the Baganda for their organizational skills and willingness to modernize. Stanley

went further and attempted to convert the king to Christianity. Finding Kabaka

Mutesa I apparently receptive, Stanley wrote to the Church Missionary Society

(CMS) in London and persuaded it to send missionaries to Buganda in 1877.

Two years after the CMS established a mission, French Catholic White Fathers

also arrived at the king's court, and the stage was set for a fierce religious and

nationalist rivalry in which Zanzibarbased Muslim traders also participated. By

the mid-1880s, all three parties had been successful in converting substantial

numbers of Baganda, some of whom attained important positions at court. When

a new young kabaka, Mwanga, attempted to halt the dangerous foreign

ideologies that he saw threatening the state, he was deposed by the armed

converts in 1888. A four-year civil war ensued in which the Muslims were initially

successful and proclaimed an Islamic state. They were soon defeated, however,

and were not able to renew their effort.

The victorious Protestant and Catholic converts then divided the Buganda

kingdom, which they ruled through a figurehead kabaka dependent on their guns

and goodwill. Thus, outside religion had disrupted and transformed the traditional

state. Soon afterwards, the arrival of competing European imperialists-- the

German Doctor Karl Peters (an erstwhile philosophy professor) and the British
Captain Frederick Lugard--broke the Christian alliance; the British Protestant

missionaries urged acceptance of the British flag, while the French Catholic

mission either supported the Germans (in the absence of French imperialists) or

called for Buganda to retain its independence. In January 1892, fighting broke

out between the Protestant and Catholic Baganda converts. The Catholics

quickly gained the upper hand, until Lugard intervened with a prototype machine

gun, the Maxim (named after its American inventor, Hiram Maxim). The Maxim

decided the issue in favor of the pro-British Protestants; the French Catholic

mission was burned to the ground, and the French bishop fled. The resultant

scandal was settled in Europe when the British government paid compensation

to the French mission and persuaded the Germans to relinquish their claim to

Uganda.

With Buganda secured by Lugard and the Germans no longer contending

for control, the British began to enlarge their claim to the "headwaters of the

Nile," as they called the land north of Lake Victoria. Allying with the Protestant

Baganda chiefs, the British set about conquering the rest of the country, aided by

Nubian mercenary troops who had formerly served the khedive of Egypt.

Bunyoro had been spared the religious civil wars of Buganda and was firmly

united by its king, Kabarega, who had several regiments of troops armed with

guns. After five years of bloody conflict, the British occupied Bunyoro and

conquered Acholi and the northern region, and the rough outlines of the Uganda

Protectorate came into being. Other African polities, such as the Ankole kingdom

to the southwest, signed treaties with the British, as did the chiefdoms of Busoga,
but the kinship-based peoples of eastern and northeastern Uganda had to be

overcome by military force.

A mutiny by Nubian mercenary troops in 1897 was only barely suppressed

after two years of fighting, during which Baganda Christian allies of the British

once again demonstrated their support for the colonial power. As a reward for this

support, and in recognition of Buganda's formidable military presence, the British

negotiated a separate treaty with Buganda, granting it a large measure of

autonomy and self-government within the larger protectorate under indirect rule.

One-half of Bunyoro's conquered territory was awarded to Buganda as well,

including the historic heartland of the kingdom containing several Nyoro

(Bunyoro) royal tombs. Buganda doubled in size from ten to twenty counties

(sazas), but the "lost counties" of Bunyoro remained a continuing grievance that

would return to haunt Buganda in the 1960s.

THE COLONIAL ERA. Although momentous change occurred during the

colonial era in Uganda, some characteristics of late-nineteenth century African

society survived to reemerge at the time of independence. Colonial rule affected

local economic systems dramatically, in part because the first concern of the

British was financial. Quelling the 1897 mutiny had been costly--units of the

Indian army had been transported to Uganda at considerable expense. The new

commissioner of Uganda in 1900, Sir Harry H. Johnston, had orders to establish

an efficient administration and to levy taxes as quickly as possible. Johnston

approached the chiefs in Buganda with offers of jobs in the colonial

administration in return for their collaboration. The chiefs, whom Johnston

characterized in demeaning terms, were more interested in preserving Buganda

as a self-governing entity, continuing the royal line of kabakas, and securing

private land tenure for themselves and their supporters. Hard bargaining ensued,

but the chiefs ended up with everything they wanted, including one-half of all the

land in Buganda. The half left to the British as "Crown Land" was later found to

be largely swamp and scrub.

Johnston's Buganda Agreement of 1900 imposed a tax on huts and guns,

designated the chiefs as tax collectors, and testified to the continued alliance of

British and Baganda interests. The British signed much less generous treaties

with the other kingdoms (Toro in 1900, Ankole in 1901, and Bunyoro in 1933)

without the provision of large-scale private land tenure. The smaller chiefdoms of

Busoga were ignored.

The Baganda immediately offered their services to the British as

administrators over their recently conquered neighbors, an offer which was

attractive to the economy-minded colonial administration. Baganda agents

fanned out as local tax collectors and labor organizers in areas such as Kigezi,

Mbale, and, significantly, Bunyoro. This subimperialism and Ganda cultural

chauvinism were resented by the people being administered. Wherever they

went, Baganda insisted on the exclusive use of their language, Luganda, and

they planted bananas as the only proper food worth eating. They regarded their

traditional dress-- long cotton gowns called kanzus--as civilized; all else was
barbarian. They also encouraged and engaged in mission work, attempting to

convert locals to their form of Christianity or Islam. In some areas, the resulting

backlash aided the efforts of religious rivals--for example, Catholics won converts

in areas where oppressive rule was identified with a Protestant Muganda chief.

The people of Bunyoro were particularly aggrieved, having fought the

Baganda and the British; having a substantial section of their heartland annexed

to Buganda as the "lost counties;" and finally having "arrogant" Baganda

administrators issuing orders, collecting taxes, and forcing unpaid labor. In 1907

the Banyoro rose in a rebellion called nyangire, or "refusing," and succeeded in

having the Baganda subimperial agents withdrawn.

Meanwhile, in 1901 the completion of the Uganda railroad from the coast

at Mombasa to the Lake Victoria port of Kisumu moved colonial authorities to

encourage the growth of cash crops to help pay the railroad's operating costs.

Another result of the railroad construction was the 1902 decision to transfer the

eastern section of the Uganda Protectorate to the Kenya Colony, then called the

East African Protectorate, to keep the entire railroad line under one local colonial

administration. Because the railroad experienced cost overruns in Kenya, the

British decided to justify its exceptional expense and pay its operating costs by

introducing large-scale European settlement in a vast tract of land that became a

center of cash-crop agriculture known as the "white highlands."

In many areas of Uganda, by contrast, agricultural production was placed

in the hands of Africans, if they responded to the opportunity. Cotton was the
crop of choice, largely because of pressure by the British Cotton Growing

Association, textile manufacturers who urged the colonies to provide raw

materials for British mills. Even the CMS joined the effort by launching the

Uganda Company (managed by a former missionary) to promote cotton planting

and to buy and transport the produce.

Buganda, with its strategic location on the lakeside, reaped the benefits of

cotton growing. The advantages of this crop were quickly recognized by the

Baganda chiefs who had newly acquired freehold estates, which came to be

known as mailo land because they were measured in square miles. In 1905 the

initial baled cotton export was valued at £200; in 1906, £1,000; in 1907; £11,000;

and in 1908, £52,000. By 1915 the value of cotton exports had climbed to

£369,000, and Britain was able to end its subsidy of colonial administration in

Uganda, while in Kenya the white settlers required continuing subsidies by the

home government.

The income generated by cotton sales made the Buganda kingdom

relatively prosperous, compared with the rest of colonial Uganda, although before

World War I cotton was also being grown in the eastern regions of Busoga,

Lango, and Teso. Many Baganda spent their new earnings on imported clothing,

bicycles, metal roofing, and even automobiles. They also invested in their

children's educations. The Christian missions emphasized literacy skills, and

African converts quickly learned to read and write. By 1911 two popular journals,

Ebifa (News) and Munno (Your Friend), were published monthly in Luganda.
Heavily supported by African funds, new schools were soon turning out

graduating classes at Mengo High School, St. Mary's Kisubi, Namilyango,

Gayaza, and King's College Budo--all in Buganda. The chief minister of the

Buganda kingdom, Sir Apolo Kagwa, personally awarded a bicycle to the top

graduate at King's College Budo, together with the promise of a government job.

The schools, in fact, had inherited the educational function formerly performed in

the kabaka's palace, where generations of young pages had been trained to

become chiefs. Now the qualifications sought were literacy and skills, including

typing and English translation.

Two important principles of precolonial political life carried over into the

colonial era: clientage, whereby ambitious younger officeholders attached

themselves to older high-ranking chiefs, and generational conflict, which resulted

when the younger generation sought to expel their elders from office in order to

replace them. After World War I, the younger aspirants to high office in Buganda

became impatient with the seemingly perpetual tenure of Sir Apolo and his

contemporaries, who lacked many of the skills that members of the younger

generation had acquired through schooling. Calling themselves the Young

Baganda Association, members of the new generation attached themselves to

the young kabaka, Daudi Chwa, who was the figurehead ruler of Buganda under

indirect rule. But Kabaka Daudi never gained real political power, and after a

short and frustrating reign, he died at the relatively young age of forty-three.
 Far more promising as a source of political support were the British

colonial officers, who welcomed the typing and translation skills of school

graduates and advanced the careers of their favorites. The contest was decided

after World War I, when an influx of British ex-military officers, now serving as

district commissioners, began to feel that self-government was an obstacle to

good government. Specifically, they accused Sir Apolo and his generation of

inefficiency, abuse of power, and failure to keep adequate financial accounts--

charges that were not hard to document. Sir Apolo resigned in 1926, at about the

same time that a host of elderly Baganda chiefs were replaced by a new

generation of officeholders. The Buganda treasury was also audited that year for

the first time. Although it was not a nationalist organization, the Young Baganda

Association claimed to represent popular African dissatisfaction with the old

order. As soon as the younger Baganda had replaced the older generation in

office, however, their objections to privilege accompanying power ceased. The

pattern persisted in Ugandan politics up to and after independence.

The commoners, who had been laboring on the cotton estates of the

chiefs before World War I, did not remain servile. As time passed, they bought

small parcels of land from their erstwhile landlords. This land fragmentation was

aided by the British, who in 1927 forced the chiefs to limit severely the rents and

obligatory labor they could demand from their tenants. Thus the oligarchy of

landed chiefs who had emerged with the Buganda Agreement of 1900 declined in

importance, and agricultural production shifted to independent smallholders, who

grew cotton, and later coffee, for the export market.

 Unlike Tanganyika, which was devastated during the prolonged fighting

between Britain and Germany in the East African campaign of World War I,

Uganda prospered from wartime agricultural production. After the population

losses during the era of conquest and the losses to disease at the turn of the

century (particularly the devastating sleeping sickness epidemic of 1900- 1906),

Uganda's population was growing again. Even the 1930s depression seemed to

affect smallholder cash farmers in Uganda less severely than it did the white

settler producers in Kenya. Ugandans simply grew their own food until rising

prices made export crops attractive again.

Two issues continued to create grievance through the 1930s and 1940s.

The colonial government strictly regulated the buying and processing of cash

crops, setting prices and reserving the role of intermediary for Asians, who were

thought to be more efficient. The British and Asians firmly repelled African

attempts to break into cotton ginning. In addition, on the Asian- owned sugar

plantations established in the 1920s, labor for sugarcane and other cash crops

was increasingly provided by migrants from peripheral areas of Uganda and even

from outside Uganda.

The Issue of Independence. In 1949 discontented Baganda rioted and

burned down the houses of progovernment chiefs. The rioters had three

demands: the right to bypass government price controls on the export sales of

cotton, the removal of the Asian monopoly over cotton ginning, and the right to

have their own representatives in local government replace chiefs appointed by

the British. They were critical as well of the young kabaka, Frederick Walugembe

Mutesa II (also known as Kabaka Freddie), for his inattention to the needs of his

people. The British governor, Sir John Hall, regarded the riots as the work of

communist-inspired agitators and rejected the suggested reforms.

Far from leading the people into confrontation, Uganda's would-be

agitators were slow to respond to popular discontent. Nevertheless, the Uganda

African Farmers Union, founded by I.K. Musazi in 1947, was blamed for the riots

and was banned by the British. Musazi's Uganda National Congress replaced the

farmers union in 1952, but because the congress remained a casual discussion

group more than an organized political party, it stagnated and came to an end

just two years after its inception.

Meanwhile, the British began to move ahead of the Ugandans in preparing

for independence. The effects of Britain's postwar withdrawal from India, the

march of nationalism in West Africa, and a more liberal philosophy in the Colonial

Office geared toward future self-rule all began to be felt in Uganda. The

embodiment of these issues arrived in 1952 in the person of a new and energetic

reformist governor, Sir Andrew Cohen (formerly undersecretary for African affairs

in the Colonial Office). Cohen set about preparing Uganda for independence. On

the economic side, he removed obstacles to African cotton ginning, rescinded

price discrimination against African-grown coffee, encouraged cooperatives, and

established the Uganda Development Corporation to promote and finance new

projects. On the political side, he reorganized the Legislative Council, which had
consisted of an unrepresentative selection of interest groups heavily favoring the

European community, to include African representatives elected from districts

throughout Uganda. This system became a prototype for the future parliament.

Power Politics in Buganda. The prospect of elections caused a sudden

proliferation of new political parties. This development alarmed the old-guard

leaders within the Uganda kingdoms, because they realized that the center of

power would be at the national level. The spark that ignited wider opposition to

Governor Cohen's reforms was a 1953 speech in London in which the secretary

of state for colonies referred to the possibility of a federation of the three East

African territories (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika), similar to that established in

central Africa. Many Ugandans were aware of the Central African Federation of

Rhodesia and Nyasaland (later Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi) and its

domination by white settler interests. Ugandans deeply feared the prospect of an

East African federation dominated by the racist settlers of Kenya, which was then

in the midst of the bitter Mau Mau uprising. They had vigorously resisted a similar

suggestion by the 1930 Hilton Young Commission. Confidence in Cohen

vanished just as the governor was preparing to urge Buganda to recognize that

its special status would have to be sacrificed in the interests of a new and larger

nation-state.

Kabaka Freddie, who had been regarded by his subjects as uninterested

in their welfare, now refused to cooperate with Cohen's plan for an integrated

Buganda. Instead, he demanded that Buganda be separated from the rest of the
protectorate and transferred to Foreign Office jurisdiction. Cohen's response to

this crisis was to deport the kabaka to a comfortable exile in London. His forced

departure made the kabaka an instant martyr in the eyes of the Baganda, whose

latent separatism and anticolonial sentiments set off a storm of protest. Cohen's

action had backfired, and he could find no one among the Baganda prepared or

able to mobilize support for his schemes. After two frustrating years of

unrelenting Ganda hostility and obstruction, Cohen was forced to reinstate

Kabaka Freddie.

The negotiations leading to the kabaka's return had an outcome similar to

the negotiations of Commissioner Johnston in 1900; although appearing to

satisfy the British, they were a resounding victory for the Baganda. Cohen

secured the kabaka's agreement not to oppose independence within the larger

Uganda framework. Not only was the kabaka reinstated in return, but for the first

time since 1889, the monarch was given the power to appoint and dismiss his

chiefs (Buganda government officials) instead of acting as a mere figurehead

while they conducted the affairs of government. The kabaka's new power was

cloaked in the misleading claim that he would be only a "constitutional monarch,"

while in fact he was a leading player in deciding how Uganda would be governed.

A new grouping of Baganda calling themselves "the King's Friends" rallied to the

kabaka's defense. They were conservative, fiercely loyal to Buganda as a

kingdom, and willing to entertain the prospect of participation in an independent

Uganda only if it were headed by the kabaka. Baganda politicians who did not
share this vision or who were opposed to the "King's Friends" found themselves

branded as the "King's Enemies," which meant political and social ostracism.

The major exception to this rule were the Roman Catholic Baganda who

had formed their own party, the Democratic Party (DP), led by Benedicto

Kiwanuka. Many Catholics had felt excluded from the Protestant-dominated

establishment in Buganda ever since Lugard's Maxim had turned the tide in

1892. The kabaka had to be Protestant, and he was invested in a coronation

ceremony modeled on that of British monarchs (who are invested by the Church

of England's Archbishop of Canterbury) that took place at the main Protestant

church. Religion and politics were equally inseparable in the other kingdoms

throughout Uganda. The DP had Catholic as well as other adherents and was

probably the best organized of all the parties preparing for elections. It had

printing presses and the backing of the popular newspaper, Munno, which was

published at the St. Mary's Kisubi mission.

Elsewhere in Uganda, the emergence of the kabaka as a political force

provoked immediate hostility. Political parties and local interest groups were

riddled with divisions and rivalries, but they shared one concern: they were

determined not to be dominated by Buganda. In 1960 a political organizer from

Lango, Milton Obote, seized the initiative and formed a new party, the Uganda

People's Congress (UPC), as a coalition of all those outside the Roman Catholic-

dominated DP who opposed Buganda hegemony.

 The steps Cohen had initiated to bring about the independence of a

unified Uganda state had led to a polarization between factions from Buganda

and those opposed to its domination. Buganda's population in 1959 was 2

million, out of Uganda's total of 6 million. Even discounting the many non-

Baganda resident in Buganda, there were at least 1 million people who owed

allegiance to the kabaka--too many to be overlooked or shunted aside, but too

few to dominate the country as a whole. At the London Conference of 1960, it

was obvious that Buganda autonomy and a strong unitary government were

incompatible, but no compromise emerged, and the decision on the form of

government was postponed. The British announced that elections would be held

in March 1961 for "responsible government," the next-to-last stage of preparation

before the formal granting of independence. It was assumed that those winning

the election would gain valuable experience in office, preparing them for the

probable responsibility of governing after independence.

In Buganda the "King's Friends" urged a total boycott of the election

because their attempts to secure promises of future autonomy had been

rebuffed. Consequently, when the voters went to the polls throughout Uganda to

elect eighty-two National Assembly members, in Buganda only the Roman

Catholic supporters of the DP braved severe public pressure and voted,

capturing twenty of Buganda's twenty-one allotted seats. This artificial situation

gave the DP a majority of seats, although they had a minority of 416,000 votes

nationwide versus 495,000 for the UPC. Benedicto Kiwanuka became the new

chief minister of Uganda.

 Shocked by the results, the Baganda separatists, who formed a political

party called Kabaka Yekka (KY--The King Only), had second thoughts about the

wisdom of their election boycott. They quickly welcomed the recommendations of

a British commission that proposed a future federal form of government.

According to these recommendations, Buganda would enjoy a measure of

internal autonomy if it participated fully in the national government. For its part,

the UPC was equally anxious to eject its DP rivals from government before they

became entrenched. Obote reached an understanding with Kabaka Freddie and

the KY, accepting Buganda's special federal relationship and even a provision by

which the kabaka could appoint Buganda's representatives to the National

Assembly, in return for a strategic alliance to defeat the DP. The kabaka was also

promised the largely ceremonial position of head of state of Uganda, which was

of great symbolic importance to the Baganda.

This marriage of convenience between the UPC and the KY made

inevitable the defeat of the DP interim administration. In the aftermath of the April

1962 final election leading up to independence, Uganda's national parliament

consisted of fortythree UPC delegates, twenty-four KY delegates, and twenty-

four DP delegates. The new UPC-KY coalition led Uganda into independence in

October 1962, with Obote as prime minister and the kabaka as head of state.

INDEPENDENCE: THE EARLY YEARS. Uganda's approach to

independence was unlike that of most other colonial territories where political

parties had been organized to force self-rule or independence from a reluctant

colonial regime. Whereas these conditions would have required local and

regional differences to be subordinated to the greater goal of winning

independence, in Uganda parties were forced to cooperate with one another, with

the prospect of independence already assured. One of the major parties, KY, was

even opposed to independence unless its particular separatist desires were met.

The UPC-KY partnership represented a fragile alliance of two fragile parties.

In the UPC, leadership was factionalized. Each party functionary

represented a local constituency, and most of the constituencies were ethnically

distinct. For example, Obote's strength lay among his Langi kin in eastern

Uganda; George Magezi represented the local interests of his Banyoro

compatriots; Grace S.K. Ibingira's strength was in the Ankole kingdom; and Felix

Onama was the northern leader of the largely neglected West Nile District in the

northwest corner of Uganda. Each of these regional political bosses and those

from the other Uganda regions expected to receive a ministerial post in the new

Uganda government, to exercise patronage, and to bring the material fruits of

independence to local supporters. Failing these objectives, each was likely either

to withdraw from the UPC coalition or realign within it.

Moreover, the UPC had had no effective urban organization before

independence, although it was able to mobilize the trade unions, most of which

were led by non-Ugandan immigrant workers from Kenya (a situation which

contributed to the independent Uganda government's almost immediate hostility

toward the trade unions). No common ideology united the UPC, the composition
of which ranged from the near reactionary Onama to the radical John Kakonge,

leader of the UPC Youth League. As prime minister, Obote was responsible for

keeping this loose coalition of divergent interest groups intact.

Obote also faced the task of maintaining the UPC's external alliances,

primarily the coalition between the UPC and the kabaka, who led Buganda's KY.

Obote proved adept at meeting the diverse demands of his many partners in

government. He even temporarily acceded to some demands which he found

repugnant, such as Buganda's claim for special treatment. This accession led to

demands by other kingdoms for similar recognition. The Busoga chiefdoms

banded together to claim that they, too, deserved recognition under the rule of

their newly defined monarch, the kyabasinga. Not to be outdone, the Iteso

people, who had never recognized a precolonial king, claimed the title kingoo for

Teso District's political boss, Cuthbert Obwangor. Despite these separatist

pressures, Obote's long-term goal was to build a strong central government at

the expense of entrenched local interests, especially those of Buganda.

The first major challenge to the Obote government came not from the

kingdoms, nor the regional interests, but from the military. In January 1964, units

of the Ugandan Army mutinied, demanding higher pay and more rapid

promotions. Minister of Defense Onama, who courageously went to speak to the

mutineers, was seized and held hostage. Obote was forced to call in British

troops to restore order, a humiliating blow to the new regime. In the aftermath,

Obote's government acceded to all the mutineers' demands, unlike the

governments of Kenya and Tanganyika, which responded to similar demands

with increased discipline and tighter control over their small military forces.

The military then began to assume a more prominent role in Ugandan life.

Obote selected a popular junior officer with minimal education, Idi Amin Dada,

and promoted him rapidly through the ranks as a personal protégé. As the army

expanded, it became a source of political patronage and of potential political

power.

Later in 1964, Obote felt strong enough to address the critical issue of the

"lost counties," which the British had conveniently postponed until after

independence. The combination of patronage offers and the promise of future

rewards within the ruling coalition gradually thinned opposition party ranks, as

members of parliament "crossed the floor" to join the government benches. After

two years of independence, Obote finally acquired enough votes to give the UPC

a majority and free himself of the KY coalition. The turning point came when

several DP members of parliament (MPs) from Bunyoro agreed to join the

government side if Obote would undertake a popular referendum to restore the

"lost counties" to Bunyoro. The kabaka, naturally, opposed the plebiscite. Unable

to prevent it, he sent 300 armed Baganda veterans to the area to intimidate

Banyoro voters. In turn, 2,000 veterans from Bunyoro massed on the frontier.

Civil war was averted, and the referendum was held. The vote demonstrated an

overwhelming desire by residents in the counties annexed to Buganda in 1900 to

be restored to their historic Bunyoro allegiance, which was duly enacted by the

new UPC majority despite KY opposition.

This triumph for Obote and the UPC strengthened the central government

and threw Buganda into disarray. KY unity was weakened by internal

recriminations, after which some KY stalwarts, too, began to "cross the floor" to

join Obote's victorious government. By early 1966, the result was a parliament

composed of seventy- four UPC, nine DP, eight KY, and one independent MP.

Obote's efforts to produce a one-party state with a powerful executive prime

minister appeared to be on the verge of success.

Paradoxically, however, as the perceived threat from Buganda diminished,

many non-Baganda alliances weakened. And as the possibility of an opposition

DP victory faded, the UPC coalition itself began to come apart. The one-party

state did not signal the end of political conflict, however; it merely relocated and

intensified that conflict within the party. The issue that brought the UPC

disharmony to a crisis involved Obote's military protégé, Idi Amin.

In 1966 Amin caused a commotion when he walked into a Kampala bank

with a gold bar (bearing the stamp of the government of the Belgian Congo) and

asked the bank manager to exchange it for cash. Amin's account was ultimately

credited with a deposit of £17,000. Obote rivals questioned the incident, and it

emerged that the prime minister and a handful of close associates had used

Colonel Amin and units of the Uganda Army to intervene in the neighboring

Congo crisis. Former supporters of Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba, led by a

"General Olenga," opposed the American-backed government and were

attempting to lead the Eastern Province into secession. These troops were

reported to be trading looted ivory and gold for arms supplies secretly smuggled

to them by Amin. The arrangement became public when Olenga later claimed

that he failed to receive the promised munitions. This claim appeared to be

supported by the fact that in mid-1965, a seventy-five-ton shipment of Chinese

weapons was intercepted by the Kenyan government as it was being moved from

Tanzania to Uganda.

Obote's rivals for leadership within the UPC, supported by some Baganda

politicians and others who were hostile to Obote, used the evidence revealed by

Amin's casual bank deposit to claim that the prime minister and his closest

associates were corrupt and had conducted secret foreign policy for personal

gain, in the amount of £25,000 each. Obote denied the charge and said the

money had been spent to buy the munitions for Olenga's Congolese troops. On

February 4, 1966, while Obote was away on a trip to the north of the country, an

effective "no confidence" vote against Obote was passed by the UPC Mps. This

attempt to remove Obote appeared to be organized by UPC Secretary General

Grace S.K. Ibingira, closely supported by the UPC leader from Bunyoro, George

Magezi, and a number of other southern UPC notables. Only the radical UPC

member, John Kakonge, voted against the motion.

Because he was faced with a nearly unanimous disavowal by his

governing party and national parliament, many people expected Obote to resign.
Instead, Obote turned to Idi Amin and the army, and, in effect, carried out a coup

d'état against his own government in order to stay in power. Obote suspended

the constitution, arrested the offending UPC ministers, and assumed control of

the state. He forced a new constitution through parliament without a reading and

without the necessary quorum. That constitution abolished the federal powers of

the kingdoms, most notably the internal autonomy enjoyed by Buganda, and

concentrated presidential powers in the prime minister's office. The kabaka

objected, and Buganda prepared to wage a legal battle. Baganda leaders

rhetorically demanded that Obote's "illegal" government remove itself from

Buganda soil.

Buganda, however, once again miscalculated, for Obote was not

interested in negotiating. Instead, he sent Idi Amin and loyal troops to attack the

kabaka's palace on nearby Mengo Hill. The palace was defended by a small

group of bodyguards armed with rifles and shotguns. Amin's troops had heavy

weapons but were reluctant to press the attack until Obote became impatient and

demanded results. By the time the palace was overrun, the kabaka had taken

advantage of a cloudburst to exit over the rear wall. He hailed a passing taxi and

was driven off to exile. After the assault, Obote was reasonably secure from open

opposition. The new republican 1967 constitution abolished the kingdoms

altogether. Buganda was divided into four districts and ruled through martial law,

a forerunner of the military domination over the civilian population that all of

Uganda would experience after 1971.

 Obote's success in the face of adversity reclaimed for him the support of

most members of the UPC, which then became the only legal political party. The

original independence election of 1962, therefore, was the last one held in

Uganda until December 1980. On the homefront, Obote issued the "Common

Man's Charter," echoed the call for African Socialism by Tanzanian President

Julius Nyerere, and proclaimed a "move to the left" to signal new efforts to

consolidate power. His critics noted, however, that he placed most control over

economic nationalization in the hands of an Asian millionaire who was also a

financial backer of the UPC. Obote created a system of secret police, the

General Service Unit (GSU). Headed by a relative, Akena Adoko, the GSU

reported on suspected subversives. The Special Force Units of paramilitary

police, heavily recruited from Obote's own region and ethnic group,

supplemented the security forces within the army and police.

Although Buganda had been defeated and occupied by the military, Obote

was still concerned about security there. His concerns were well founded; in

December 1969 he was wounded in an assassination attempt and narrowly

escaped more serious injury when a grenade thrown near him failed to explode.

He had retained power by relying on Idi Amin and the army, but it was not clear

that he could continue to count on their loyalty.

Obote appeared particularly uncertain of the army after Amin's sole rival

among senior army officers, Brigadier Acap Okoya, was murdered early in 1970.

(Amin later promoted the man rumored to have recruited Okoya's killers.) A
second attempt was made on Obote's life when his motorcade was ambushed

later that year, but the vice-president's car was mistakenly riddled with bullets.

Obote began to recruit more Acholi and Langi troops, and he accelerated their

promotions to counter the large numbers of soldiers from Amin's home, which

was then known as West Nile District. Obote also enlarged the paramilitary

Special Force as a counterweight to the army.

Amin, who at times inspected his troops wearing an outsized sport shirt

with Obote's face across the front and back, protested his loyalty. But in October

1970, Amin was placed under temporary house arrest while investigators looked

into his army expenditures, reportedly several million dollars over budget.

Another charge against Amin was that he had continued to aid southern Sudan's

Anya Nya rebels in opposing the regime of Jafaar Numayri even after Obote had

shifted his support away from the Anyanya to Numayri. This foreign policy shift

provoked an outcry from Israel, which had been supplying the Anyanya rebels.

Amin was close friends with several Israeli military advisers who were in Uganda

to help train the Ugandan Army, and their eventual role in Amin's efforts to oust

Obote remained the subject of continuing controversy.

MILITARY RULE UNDER AMIN. By January 1971, Obote was prepared

to rid himself of the potential threat posed by Idi Amin. Departing for the

Commonwealth Conference of Heads of Government at Singapore, he relayed

orders to loyal Langi officers that Amin and his supporters in the army were to be

arrested. Various versions emerged of the way this news was leaked to Amin; in
any case, Amin decided to strike first. In the early morning hours of January 25,

1971, mechanized units loyal to him attacked strategic targets in Kampala and

the airport at Entebbe, where the first shell fired by a pro-Amin tank commander

killed two Roman Catholic priests in the airport waiting room. Amin's troops easily

overcame the disorganized opposition to the coup, and Amin almost immediately

initiated mass executions of Acholi and Langi troops, whom he believed to be

pro-Obote.

The Amin coup was warmly welcomed by most of the people of the

Buganda kingdom, which Obote had attempted to dismantle. They seemed

willing to forget that their new president, Idi Amin, had been the tool of that

military suppression. Amin made the usual statements about his government's

intent to play a mere "caretaker role" until the country could recover sufficiently

for civilian rule. Amin repudiated Obote's nonaligned foreign policy, and his

government was quickly recognized by Israel, Britain, and the United States. By

contrast, presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia,

Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) initially

refused to accept the legitimacy of the new military government. Nyerere, in

particular, opposed Amin's regime, and he offered hospitality to the exiled Obote,

facilitating his attempts to raise a force and return to power.

Amin's military experience, which was virtually his only experience,

determined the character of his rule. He renamed Government House "the

Command Post," instituted an advisory defense council composed of military

commanders, placed military tribunals above the system of civil law, appointed

soldiers to top government posts and parastatal agencies, and even informed the

newly inducted civilian cabinet ministers that they would be subject to military

discipline. Uganda was, in effect, governed from a collection of military barracks

scattered across the country, where battalion commanders, acting like local

warlords, represented the coercive arm of the government. The GSU was

disbanded and replaced by the State Research Bureau (SRB). SRB

headquarters at Nakasero became the scene of torture and grisly executions

over the next several years.

Despite its outward display of a military chain of command, Amin's

government was arguably more riddled with rivalries, regional divisions, and

ethnic politics than the UPC coalition that it had replaced. The army itself was an

arena of lethal competition, in which losers were usually eliminated. Within the

officer corps, those trained in Britain opposed those trained in Israel, and both

stood against the untrained, who soon eliminated many of the army's most

experienced officers. In 1966, well before the Amin era, northerners in the army

had assaulted and harassed soldiers from the south. In 1971 and 1972, the

Lugbara and Kakwa (Amin's ethnic group) from the West Nile were slaughtering

northern Acholi and Langi, who were identified with Obote. Then the Kakwa

fought the Lugbara. Amin came to rely on Nubians and on former Anya Nya

rebels from southern Sudan.

 The army, which had been progressively expanded under Obote, was

further doubled and redoubled under Amin. Recruitment was largely, but not

entirely, in the north. There were periodic purges, when various battalion

commanders were viewed as potential problems or became real threats. Each

purge provided new opportunities for promotions from the ranks. The commander

of the air force, Smuts Guweddeko, had previously worked as a telephone

operator; the unofficial executioner for the regime, Major Malyamungu, had

formerly been a nightwatch officer. By the mid-1970s, only the most trustworthy

military units were allowed ammunition, although this prohibition did not prevent a

series of mutinies and murders. An attempt by an American journalist, Nicholas

Stroh, and his colleague, Robert Siedle, to investigate one of these barracks

outbreaks in 1972 at the Simba battalion in Mbarara led to their disappearances

and later deaths.

Amin never forgot the source of his power. He spent much of his time

rewarding, promoting, and manipulating the army. Financing his ever-increasing

military expenditures was a continuing concern. Early in 1972, he reversed

foreign policy-- never a major issue for Amin--to secure financial and military aid

from Muammar Qadhafi of Libya. Amin expelled the remaining Israeli advisers, to

whom he was much indebted, and became vociferously anti-Israel. To induce

foreign aid from Saudi Arabia, he rediscovered his previously neglected Islamic

heritage. He also commissioned the construction of a great mosque on Kampala

Hill in the capital city, but it was never completed because much of the money

intended for it was embezzled.

 In September 1972, Amin expelled almost all of Uganda's 50,000 Asians

and seized their property. Although Amin proclaimed that the "common man" was

the beneficiary of this drastic act-- which proved immensely popular--it was

actually the army that emerged with the houses, cars, and businesses of the

departing Asian minority. This expropriation of property proved disastrous for the

already declining economy. Businesses were run into the ground, cement

factories at Tororo and Fort Portal collapsed from lack of maintenance, and sugar

production literally ground to a halt, as unmaintained machinery jammed

permanently. Uganda's export crops were sold by government parastatals, but

most of the foreign currency they earned went for purchasing imports for the

army. The most famous example was the so-called "whiskey run" to Stansted

Airport in Britain, where planeloads of Scotch whiskey, transistor radios, and

luxury items were purchased for Amin to distribute among his officers and troops.

An African proverb, it was said, summed up Amin's treatment of his army: "A dog

with a bone in its mouth can't bite."

The rural African producers, particularly of coffee, turned to smuggling,

especially to Kenya. The smuggling problem became an obsession with Amin;

toward the end of his rule, he appointed his mercenary adviser, the former British

citizen Bob Astles, to take all necessary steps to eliminate the problem. These

steps included orders to shoot smugglers on sight.

Another near-obsession for Amin was the threat of a counterattack by

former president Obote. Shortly after the expulsion of Asians in 1972, Obote did
launch such an attempt across the Tanzanian border into southwestern Uganda.

His small army contingent in twenty-seven trucks set out to capture the southern

Ugandan military post at Masaka but instead settled down to await a general

uprising against Amin, which did not occur. A planned seizure of the airport at

Entebbe by soldiers in an allegedly hijacked East African Airways passenger

aircraft was aborted when Obote's pilot blew out the aircraft's tires and it

remained in Tanzania. Amin was able to mobilize his more reliable Malire

Mechanical Regiment and expel the invaders.

Although jubilant at his success, Amin realized that Obote, with Nyerere's

aid, might try again. He had the SRB and the newly formed Public Safety Unit

(PSU) redouble their efforts to uncover subversives and other imagined enemies

of the state. General fear and insecurity became a way of life for the populace, as

thousands of people disappeared. In an ominous twist, people sometimes

learned by listening to the radio that they were "about to disappear." State

terrorism was evidenced in a series of spectacular incidents; for example, High

Court Judge Benedicto Kiwanuka, former head of government and leader of the

banned DP, was seized directly from his courtroom. Like many other victims, he

was forced to remove his shoes and then bundled into the trunk of a car, never to

be seen alive again. Whether calculated or not, the symbolism of a pair of shoes

by the roadside to mark the passing of a human life was a bizarre yet piercing

form of state terrorism.

 Amin did attempt to establish ties with an international terrorist group in

July 1976, when he offered the Palestinian hijackers of an Air France flight from

Tel Aviv a protected base at the old airport at Entebbe, from which to press their

demands in exchange for the release of Israeli hostages. The dramatic rescue of

the hostages by Israeli commandos was a severe blow to Amin, unassuaged by

his murder of a hospitalized hostage, Dora Block, and his mass execution of

Entebbe airport personnel.

Amin's government, conducted by often erratic personal proclamation,

continued on. Because he was illiterate--a disability shared with most of his

higher ranking officers--Amin relayed orders and policy decisions orally by

telephone, over the radio, and in long rambling speeches to which civil servants

learned to pay close attention. The bureaucracy became paralyzed as

government administrators feared to make what might prove to be a wrong

decision. The minister of defense demanded and was given the Ministry of

Education office building, but then the decision was reversed. Important

education files were lost during their transfer back and forth by wheelbarrow. In

many respects, Amin's government in the 1970s resembled the governments of

nineteenth-century African monarchs, with the same problems of enforcing

orders at a distance, controlling rival factions at court, and rewarding loyal

followers with plunder. However, Amin's regime was possibly less efficient than

those of the precolonial monarchs.

 Religious conflict was another characteristic of the Amin regime that had

its origins in the nineteenth century. After rediscovering his Islamic allegiance in

the effort to gain foreign aid from Libya and Saudi Arabia, Amin began to pay

more attention to the formerly deprived Muslims in Uganda, a move which turned

out to be a mixed blessing for them. Muslims began to do well in what economic

opportunities yet remained, the more so if they had relatives in the army.

Construction work began on Kibule Hill, the site of Kampala's most prominent

mosque. Many Ugandan Muslims with a sense of history believed that the

Muslim defeat by Christians in 1889 was finally being redressed. Christians, in

turn, perceived that they were under siege as a religious group; it was clear that

Amin viewed the churches as potential centers of opposition. A number of priests

and ministers disappeared in the course of the 1970s, but the matter reached a

climax with the formal protest against army terrorism in 1977 by Church of

Uganda ministers, led by Archbishop Janan Luwum. Although Luwum's body was

subsequently recovered from a clumsily contrived "auto accident," subsequent

investigations revealed that Luwum had been shot to death by Amin himself. This

latest in a long line of atrocities was greeted with international condemnation, but

apart from the continued trade boycott initiated by the United States in July 1978,

verbal condemnation was not accompanied by action.

By 1978 Amin's circle of close associates had shrunk significantly--the

result of defections and executions. It was increasingly risky to be too close to

Amin, as his vice president and formerly trusted associate, General Mustafa

Adrisi, discovered. When Adrisi was injured in a suspicious auto accident, troops
loyal to him became restive. The once reliable Malire Mechanized Regiment

mutinied, as did other units. In October 1978, Amin sent troops still loyal to him

against the mutineers, some of whom fled across the Tanzanian border. Amin

then claimed that Tanzanian President Nyerere, his perennial enemy, had been

at the root of his troubles. Amin accused Nyerere of waging war against Uganda,

and, hoping to divert attention from his internal troubles and rally Uganda against

the foreign adversary, Amin invaded Tanzanian territory and formally annexed a

section across the Kagera River boundary on November 1, 1978.

Nyerere mobilized his citizen army reserves and counterattacked, joined

by Ugandan exiles united as the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). The

Ugandan Army retreated steadily, expending much of its energy by looting along

the way. Libya's Qadhafi sent 3,000 troops to aid fellow Muslim Amin, but the

Libyans soon found themselves on the front line, while behind them Ugandan

Army units were using supply trucks to carry their newly plundered wealth in the

opposite direction. Tanzania and the UNLA took Kampala in April 1979, and Amin

fled by air, first to Libya and later to a seemingly permanent exile at Jiddah, Saudi

Arabia. The war that had cost Tanzania an estimated US$1 million per day was

over. What kind of government would attempt the monumental task of rebuilding

the economically and psychologically devastated country, which had lost an

estimated 300,000 victims to Amin's murderous eight-year regime?

 UGANDA AFTER AMIN - The Interim Period: 1979-80. A month before the

liberation of Kampala, representatives of twenty-two Ugandan civilian and military

groups were hastily called together at Moshi, Tanzania, to try to agree on an

interim civilian government once Amin was removed. Called the Unity

Conference in the hope that unity might prevail, it managed to establish the

Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) as political representative of the UNLA.

Dr. Yusuf Lule, former principal of Makerere University, became head of the

UNLF executive committee. As an academic rather than a politician, Lule was not

regarded as a threat to any of the contending factions. Shortly after Amin's

departure, Lule and the UNLF moved to Kampala, where they established an

interim government. Lule became president, advised by a temporary parliament,

the National Consultative Council (NCC). The NCC, in turn, was composed of

representatives from the Unity Conference.

Conflict surfaced immediately between Lule and some of the more radical

of the council members who saw him as too conservative, too autocratic, and too

willing as a Muganda to listen to advice from other Baganda. After only three

months, with the apparent approval of Nyerere, whose troops still controlled

Kampala, Lule was forcibly removed from office and exiled. He was replaced by

Godfrey Binaisa, a Muganda like Lule, but one who had previously served as a

high-ranking member of Obote's UPC. It was not an auspicious start to the

rebuilding of a new Uganda, which required political and economic stability.

Indeed, the quarrels within the NCC, which Binaisa enlarged to 127 members,

revealed that many rival and would-be politicians who had returned from exile
were resuming their self-interested operating styles. Ugandans who endured the

deprivations of the Amin era became even more disillusioned with their leaders.

Binaisa managed to stay in office longer than Lule, but his inability to gain control

over a burgeoning new military presence proved to be his downfall.

At the beginning of the interim government, the military numbered fewer

than 1,000 troops who had fought alongside the Tanzanian People's Defence

Force (TPDF) to expel Amin. The army was back to the size of the original King's

African Rifles (KAR) at independence in 1962. But in 1979, in an attempt to

consolidate support for the future, such leaders as Yoweri Kaguta Museveni and

Major General (later Chief of Staff) David Oyite Ojok began to enroll thousands of

recruits into what were rapidly becoming their private armies. Museveni's 80

original soldiers grew to 8,000; Ojok's original 600 became 24,000. When Binaisa

sought to curb the use of these militias, which were harassing and detaining

political opponents, he was overthrown in a military coup on May 10, 1980. The

coup was engineered by Ojok, Museveni, and others acting under the general

direction of Paulo Muwanga, Obote's right-hand man and chair of the Military

Commission. The TPDF was still providing necessary security while Uganda's

police force--which had been decimated by Amin--was rebuilt, but Nyerere

refused to help Binaisa retain power. Many Ugandans claimed that although

Nyerere did not impose his own choice on Uganda, he indirectly facilitated the

return to power of his old friend and ally, Milton Obote. In any case, the Military

Commission headed by Muwanga effectively governed Uganda during the six

months leading up to the national elections of December 1980.

 Further evidence of the militarization of Ugandan politics was provided by

the proposed expenditures of the newly empowered Military Commission.

Security and defense were to be allotted more than 30 percent of the national

revenues. For a country desperately seeking funds for economic recovery from

the excesses of the previous military regime, this allocation seemed

unreasonable to civilian leaders.

Shortly after Muwanga's 1980 coup, Obote made a triumphant return from

Tanzania. In the months before the December elections, he began to rally his

former UPC supporters. Ominously, in view of recent Ugandan history, he often

appeared on the platform with General Oyite-Ojok, a fellow Langi. Obote also

began to speak of the need to return to a UPC one-party state.

The national election on December 10, 1980, was a crucial turning point

for Uganda. It was, after all, the first election in eighteen years. Several parties

contested, the most important of which were Obote's UPC and the DP led by

Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere. Most of Uganda's Roman Catholics were DP

members, along with many others whose main concern was to prevent the return

of another Obote regime. Because the Military Commission, as the acting

government, was dominated by Obote supporters (notably chairman Paulo

Muwanga), the DP and other contenders faced formidable obstacles. By election

day, the UPC had achieved some exceptional advantages, summarized by

Minority Rights Group Report Number 66 as follows: Seventeen UPC candidates

were declared "unopposed" by the simple procedure of not allowing DP or other

candidates to run against them. Fourteen district commissioners, who were

expected to supervise local polling, were replaced with UPC nominees. The chief

justice of Uganda, to whom complaints of election irregularities would have to be

made, was replaced with a UPC member. In a number of districts, non-UPC

candidates were arrested, and one was murdered. Even before the election, the

government press and Radio Uganda appeared to treat the UPC as the victor.

Muwanga insisted that each party have a separate ballot box on election day,

thus negating the right of secret ballot. There were a number of other moves to

aid the UPC, including Muwanga's statement that the future parliament would

also contain an unspecified number of unelected representatives of the army and

other interest groups.

Polling appeared to be heavy on election day, and by the end of the

voting, the DP, on the basis of its own estimates, declared victory in 81 of 126

constituencies. The British Broadcasting Corporation and Voice of America

broadcast the news of the DP triumph, and Kampala's streets were filled with DP

celebrants. At this point, Muwanga seized control of the Electoral Commission,

along with the power to count the ballots, and declared that anyone disputing his

count would be subject to a heavy fine and five years in jail. Eighteen hours later,

Muwanga announced a UPC victory, with seventy-two seats. Some DP

candidates claimed the ballot boxes were simply switched to give their own vote

tally to the UPC runner-up. Nevertheless, a small contingent of neutral election

watchers, the Commonwealth Observer Group, declared itself satisfied with the

validity of the election. Some Ugandans criticized the Commonwealth Observer

Group, suggesting that members of the group measured African elections by

different standards than those used elsewhere or that they feared civil war if the

results were questioned. Indeed, popular perception of a stolen election actually

helped bring about the civil war the Commonwealth Observer Group may have

feared.

The Second Obote Regime: 1981-85. In February 1981, shortly after the

new Obote government took office, with Paulo Muwanga as vice president and

minister of defense, a former Military Commission member, Yoweri Museveni,

and his armed supporters declared themselves the National Resistance Army

(NRA). Museveni vowed to overthrow Milton Obote by means of a popular

rebellion, and what became known as "the war in the bush" began. Several other

underground groups also emerged to attempt to sabotage the new regime, but

they were eventually crushed. Museveni, who had guerrilla war experience with

the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de Libertaçâo de

Moçambique--Frelimo), campaigned in rural areas hostile to Obote's government,

especially central and western Buganda and the western regions of Ankole and

Bunyoro.

The Obote government's four-year military effort to destroy its challengers

resulted in vast areas of devastation and greater loss of life than during the eight

years of Amin's rule. UNLA's many Acholi and Langi had been hastily enrolled

with minimal training and little sense of discipline. Although they were survivors of

Amin's genocidal purges of northeast Uganda, in the 1980s they were armed and
in uniform, conducting similar actions against Bantu-speaking Ugandans in the

south, with whom they appeared to feel no empathy or even pity. In early 1983,

to eliminate rural support for Museveni's guerrillas the area of Luwero District,

north of Kampala, was targeted for a massive population removal affecting

almost 750,000 people. These artificially created refugees were packed into

several internment camps subject to military control, which in reality meant

military abuse. Civilians outside the camps, in what came to be known as the

"Luwero Triangle," were presumed to be guerrillas or guerrilla sympathizers and

were treated accordingly. The farms of this highly productive agricultural area

were looted--roofs, doors, and even door frames were stolen by UNLA troops.

Civilian loss of life was extensive, as evidenced some years later by piles of

human skulls in bush clearings and alongside rural roads.

The army also concentrated on the northwestern corner of Uganda, in

what was then West Nile District. Bordering Sudan, West Nile had provided the

ethnic base for much of Idi Amin's earlier support and had enjoyed relative

prosperity under his rule. Having born the brunt of Amin's anti-Acholi massacres

in previous years, Acholi soldiers avenged themselves on inhabitants of Amin's

home region, whom they blamed for their losses. In one famous incident in June

1981, Ugandan Army soldiers attacked a Catholic mission where local refugees

had sought sanctuary. When the International Committee of the Red Cross

(ICRC) reported a subsequent massacre, the government expelled it from

Uganda.
 Despite these activities, Obote's government, unlike Amin's regime, was

sensitive to its international image and realized the importance of securing

foreign aid for the nation's economic recovery. Obote had sought and followed

the advice of the International Monetary Fund ( IMF), even though the austerity

measures ran counter to his own ideology. He devalued the Uganda shilling by

100 percent, attempted to facilitate the export of cash crops, and postponed any

plans he may once have entertained for reestablishing one-party rule. The

continued sufferance of the DP, although much harried and abused by UPC

stalwarts, became an important symbol to international donors. The

government's inability to eliminate Museveni and win the civil war, however,

sapped its economic strength, and the occupation of a large part of the country

by an army hostile to the Ugandans living there furthered discontent with the

regime. Abductions by the police, as well as the detentions and disappearances

so characteristic of the Amin period, recurred. In place of torture at the infamous

State Research Bureau at Nakasero, victims met the same fate at so-called "Nile

Mansions." Amnesty International, a human rights organization, issued a chilling

report of routine torture of civilian detainees at military barracks scattered across

southern Uganda. The overall death toll from 1981 to 1985 was estimated as

high as 500,000. Obote, once seen by the donor community as the one man with

the experience and will to restore Uganda's fortunes, now appeared to be a

liability to recovery.

In this deteriorating military and economic situation, Obote subordinated

other matters to a military victory over Museveni. North Korean military advisers
were invited to take part against the NRA rebels in what was to be a final

campaign that won neither British nor United States approval. But the army was

warweary , and after the death of the highly capable General Oyite Ojok in a

helicopter accident at the end of 1983, it began to split along ethnic lines. Acholi

soldiers complained that they were given too much frontline action and too few

rewards for their services. Obote delayed appointing a successor to Oyite Ojok

for as long as possible. In the end, he appointed a Langi to the post and

attempted to counter the objection of Acholi officers by spying on them, reviving

his old paramilitary counterweight, the mostly Langi Special Force Units, and

thus repeating some of the actions that led to his overthrow by Amin. As if

determined to replay the January 1971 events, Obote once again left the capital

after giving orders for the arrest of a leading Acholi commander, Brigadier (later

Lieutenant General) Basilio Olara Okello, who mobilized troops and entered

Kampala on July 27, 1985. Obote, together with a large entourage, fled the

country for Zambia. This time, unlike the last, Obote allegedly took much of the

national treasury with him.

The Return of Military Rule: 1985. The military government of General

Tito Lutwa Okello ruled from July 1985 to January 1986 with no explicit policy

except the natural goal of self-preservation--the motive for their defensive coup.

To stiffen the flagging efforts of his army against the NRA, Okello invited former

soldiers of Amin's army to reenter Uganda from the Sudanese refugee camps

and participate in the civil war on the government side. As mercenaries fresh to

the scene, these units fought well, but they were equally interested in looting and
did not discriminate between supporters and enemies of the government. The

reintroduction of Amin's infamous cohorts was poor international public relations

for the Okello government and helped create a new tolerance of Museveni.

In 1986 a cease-fire initiative from Kenya was welcomed by Okello, who

could hardly expect to govern the entire country with only war-weary and

disillusioned Acholi troops to back him. Negotiations dragged on, but with Okello

and the remnants of the UNLA army thoroughly discouraged, Museveni had only

to wait for the regime to disintegrate. In January 1986, welcomed enthusiastically

by the local civilian population, Museveni moved against Kampala. Okello and his

soldiers fled northward to their ethnic base in Acholi. Yoweri Museveni formally

claimed the presidency on January 29, 1986. Immense problems of

reconstruction awaited the new regime.

GEOGRAPHY

Uganda is a landlocked

country astride the equator, about

800 kilometers inland from the Indian

Ocean. It lies on the northwestern

shores of Lake Victoria, extending

from 1 south to 4 north latitude and

30 to 35 east longitude.

Uganda is bordered by Tanzania and Rwanda to the south, Zaire to the

west, Sudan to the north, and Kenya to the east. With a land surface of 241,139
square kilometers (roughly twice the size of the state of Pennsylvania), Uganda

occupies most of the Lake Victoria Basin, which was formed by the geological

shifts that created the Rift Valley during the Pleistocene era. The Sese Islands

and other small islands in Lake Victoria also lie within Uganda's borders.

Mountains

Southern Uganda lies at an altitude of 1,134 meters above sea level. The

plateau that stretches northward from Lake Victoria declines gradually to an

altitude of 914 meters on the Sudan border. The gradually sloping terrain is

interrupted by a shallow basin dipping toward the center of the country and small

areas of tropical forest, which mark the western border with Zaire.

Both eastern and western borders are marked by mountains. The

Ruwenzori Mountains (often called the Mountains of the Moon) form about eighty

kilometers of the border between Uganda and Zaire. The highest peaks of Mount

Stanley, in the Ruwenzoris, are snowcapped. Foremost among these are

Margherita (5,113 meters) and Alexandra (5,094 meters). Farther south, the

northernmost of the Mufumbiro volcanoes reach 4,132 meters on Mount

Mahavura; 3,648 meters on Mount Mgahinga; and 3,477 meters on Mount

Sabinio, which marks the border with Rwanda and Zaire.

In eastern Uganda, the border with Kenya is also marked by volcanic hills.

Dominating these, roughly 120 kilometers north of the equator, is Mount Elgon,

which rises from the 1,200-meter plains to reach a height of 4,324 meters. Mount
Elgon is the cone of an extinct volcano, with ridges radiating thirty kilometers

from its crater. Rich soil from its slopes is eroded into the plains below. North of

Mount Elgon are Kadam (also known as Debasien or Tabasiat) Peak, which

reaches a height of 3,054 meters, and Mount Moroto, at 3,085 meters. In the far

northeast, Mount Zulia, Mount Morungole, and the Labwor and Dodoth Hills

reach heights in excess of 2,000 meters. The lower Imatong Mountains and

Mount Langia, at 3,029 meters, mark the border with Sudan.

Land Use

In the southern half of the country, rich soil and rainfall permit extensive

agriculture, and in the drier and less fertile northern areas, pastoral economies

are common. Approximately 21 percent of the land is cultivated and 45 percent is

woodland and grassland, some of which has been cleared for roads, settlements,

and farmland in the south. Approximately 13 percent of the land is set aside as

national parks, forests, and game reserves. Swampland surrounding lakes in the

southern and central regions supports abundant papyrus growth. The central

region's woodlands and savanna give way to acacia and cactus growth in the

north. Valuable seams of copper, cobalt, and other minerals have been revealed

along geological fault lines in the southeast and southwest. Volcanic foothills in

the east contain phosphates and limestone.

 Lakes and Rivers

Uganda is a well-watered country. Nearly one-fifth of the total area, or

44,000 square kilometers, is open water or swampland. Four of East Africa's

Great Lakes--Lake Victoria, Lake Kyoga, Lake Albert, and Lake Edward--lie

within Uganda or on its borders. Lake Victoria dominates the southeastern corner

of the nation, with almost one-half of its 10,200-square-kilometer area lying inside

Ugandan territory. It is the second largest inland freshwater lake in the world

(after Lake Superior), and it feeds the upper waters of the Nile River, which is

referred to in this region as the Victoria Nile.

Lake Kyoga and the surrounding basin dominate central Uganda.

Extensions of Lake Kyoga include Lake Kwania, Lake Bugondo, and Lake Opeta.

These "finger lakes" are surrounded by swampland during rainy seasons. All

lakes in the Lake Kyoga Basin are shallow, usually reaching a depth of only eight

or nine meters, and Lake Opeta forms a separate lake during dry seasons. Along

the border with Zaire, Lake Albert, Lake Edward, and Lake George occupy

troughs in the western Rift Valley.

Leaving Lake Victoria at Owen Falls, the Victoria Nile descends as it

travels toward the northwest. Widening to form Lake Kyoga, the Nile receives the

Kafu River from the west before flowing north to Lake Albert. From Lake Albert,

the Nile is known as the Albert Nile as it travels roughly 200 kilometers to the

Sudan border. In southern and western Uganda, geological activity over several

centuries has shifted drainage patterns. The land west of Lake Victoria is
traversed by valleys that were once rivers carrying the waters of Lake Victoria

into the Congo River system. The Katonga River flows westward from Lake

Victoria to Lake George. Lake George and Lake Edward are connected by the

Kizinga Channel. The Semliki River flows into Lake Edward from the north,

where it drains parts of Zaire and forms a portion of the Uganda-Zaire border.

Spectacular waterfalls occur at Murchison (Kabalega) Falls on the Victoria

Nile River just east of Lake Albert. At the narrowest point on the falls, the waters

of the Nile pass through an opening barely seven meters wide. One of the

tributaries of the Albert Nile, the Zoka River, drains the northwestern corner of

Uganda, a region still popularly known as the West Nile although that name was

not officially recognized in 1989. Other major rivers include the Achwa River

(called the Aswa in Sudan) in the north, the Pager River and the Dopeth-Okok

River in the northeast, and the Mpologoma River, which drains into Lake Kyoga

from the southeast.

POPULATION

In 1990 the Ugandan government estimated the nation's population to be

16.9 million people; international estimates ranged as high as 17.5 million. Most

estimates were based on extrapolations from the 1969 census, which

enumerated approximately 9.5 million people. The results of the 1980 census,

which counted 12.6 million people, were cast in doubt by the loss of census data

in subsequent outbreaks of violence.

 Life expectancy in 1989 averaged fifty-three years, roughly two years

higher for women than men. The population was increasing by over 3.2 percent

per year, a substantial increase over the rate of 2.5 percent in the 1960s and

significantly more than the 2.8 percent growth rate estimated for most of East

Africa. At this rate, Uganda's population was expected to double between 1989

and the year 2012. The crude birth rate, estimated to be 49.9 per 1,000

population, was equivalent to other regional estimates. Fertility ratios, defined as

the number of live births per year per 1,000 women between the ages of sixteen

and forty-five years, ranged from 115 in the south to more than 200 in the

northeast. In general, fertility declined in more developed areas, and birth rates

were lower among educated women.

The population of Uganda in 2003 was estimated by the United Nations at

25,827,000, which placed it as number 40 in population among the 193 nations

of the world. In that year approximately 2% of the population was over 65 years

of age, with another 51% of the population under 15 years of age. There were 99

males for every 100 females in the country in 2003. According to the UN, the

annual population growth rate for 2000–2005 is 3.24%, with the projected

population for the year 2015 at 39,335,000. The population density in 2002

averaged 102 per sq km (265 per sq mi). However, density varied from 260 per

sq km (673 per sq mi) in Kabale to 14 per sq km (36 per sq mi) in the dry

Karamoja plains. The northern, eastern, and western regions are less densely

populated than the region along the north shore of Lake Victoria.
 It was estimated by the Population Reference Bureau that 14% of the

population lived in urban areas in 2001. The capital city, Kampala, had a

population of 1,154,000 in that year. Other major cities were Jinja, 60,979;

Masaka, 49,070; and Mbale, 53,634. According to the United Nations, the urban

population growth rate for 2000–2005 was 5.7%.

The crude death rate was 18 per 1,000 population, equivalent to the

average for East Africa as a whole. Infant mortality in the first year of life

averaged 120 per 1,000 populations, but some infant deaths were not reported to

government officials. Deaths from AIDS were increasing in the late 1980s. Death

rates were generally lower in high altitude areas, in part because of the lower

incidence of malaria.

POLITICS

When the NRM took power in 1986, it added a new element to the

unsolved political issues that had bedeviled Uganda since independence. It

promised new and fundamental changes, but it also brought old fears to the

surface. If this government demonstrated magnanimity toward its opponents and

innovative solutions to Uganda's political difficulties, it also contributed

significantly to the country's political tensions. This paradox appeared in one

political issue after another through the first four years of the interim period. The

most serious political question was the deepening division between the north and

the south, even though these units were neither administrative regions nor

socially or even geographically coherent entities. The relationship of Buganda to

the rest of Uganda, an issue forcibly kept off the public agenda for twenty years,

re-emerged in public debate. Tension between the NRM and the political parties

that had competed for power since independence became a new anxiety. In

addition, the government's resort to political maneuvers and surprise tactics in

two of its most important initiatives in 1989, national elections and the extension

of the interim period of government, illustrated the NRM's difficulties in holding

the nation to its political agenda.

Fears of Regional Domination

For the first time since the protectorate was founded, the NRA victory in

1986 gave a predominantly southern cast to both the new political and the new

military rulers of Uganda. For reasons of climate, population, and colonial

economic policy, parts of the south, particularly Buganda, had developed

economically more rapidly than the north. Until the railroad was extended from

the south, cotton could not become an established cash crop in the north.

Instead, early in the colonial period, northerners established a pattern of earning

a cash income through labor on southern farms or through military service.

Although there had never been a political coalition that consisted exclusively, or

even predominantly, of southerners or northerners, the head of the government

had come from the north for all but one of the preceding twenty-three years of

independence, and each succeeding army's officers and recruits were

predominantly northerners. Northerners feared southern economic domination,

while southerners chafed under what they considered northern political and
military control. Thus, the military victory of the NRA posed a sobering political

question to both northerners and southerners: was the objective of its guerrilla

struggle to end sectarianism, as the Ten-Point Program insisted, or to end

northern political domination?

In the first few days following the NRA takeover of Kampala in January

1986, there were reports of incidents of mob action against individual northerners

in the south, but the new government took decisive steps to prevent their

repetition. By the end of March, NRA troops had taken military control of the

north. A period of uneasy calm followed, during which northerners considered

their options. Incidents of looting and rape of northern civilians by recently

recruited southern NRA soldiers, who had replaced better disciplined but battle-

weary troops, intensified northerners' belief that southerners would take revenge

for earlier atrocities and that the government would not stop them. In this

atmosphere, the NRA order in early August 1986 for all soldiers in the former

army, the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), to report to local police

stations gave rise to panic. These soldiers knew that during the Obote and Amin

governments such an order was likely to have been a prelude to execution.

Instead of reporting, many soldiers joined rebel movements, and a new round of

civil wars began in earnest.

Although the civil wars occurred in parts of the east as well, they

sharpened the sense of political cleavage between north and south and

substantiated the perception that the NRM was intent on consolidating southern
domination. Rebels killed some local RC officials because they were the most

vulnerable representatives of the NRM government. Because war made northern

economic recovery impossible, new development projects were started only in

the south. And because cash crop production in the north was also impossible,

the income gap between the two areas widened. Most government officials sent

north were southerners because the NRA officer corps and the public service

were mostly southern. By mid-1990, the NRA had gained the upper hand in the

wars in the north, but the political damage had been done. The NRM government

had become embroiled in war because it had failed to persuade northerners that

it had a political program that would end regional domination. And its military

success meant that for some time to come its response to all political issues

would carry that extra burden of suspicion.

COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION

Ministry of Planning and Economic Development officials estimated that

nearly 50 percent of the population was under the age of 15 and the median age

was only 15.7 years in 1989. The sex ratio was 101.8 males per 100 females.

The dependency ratio--a measure of the number of young and old in relation to

100 people between the ages of fifteen and sixty--was estimated at 104.

Uganda's population density was found to be relatively high in comparison

with that of most of Africa, estimated to be fifty-three per square kilometer

nationwide. However, this figure masked a range from fewer than thirty per

square kilometer in the north-central region to more than 120 in the far southeast
and southwest, and even these estimates overlooked some regions that were

depopulated by warfare.

In late 1989, nearly 10 percent of the population lived in urban centers of

more than 2,000 people. This figure was increasing in the late 1980s but

remained relatively low in comparison with the rest of Africa and was only slightly

higher than Uganda's 1969 estimate of 7.3 percent. Rural-to-urban migration

declined during the 1970s as a result of deteriorating security and economic

conditions. Kampala, with about 500,000 people, accounted for almost one-half

of the total urban population but recorded a population increase of only 3 percent

during the 1980s. Jinja, the main industrial center and second largest city,

registered a population of about 55,000--an increase of 10,000 from the 1980

population estimate. Six other cities--Kabale, Kabarole, Entebbe, Masaka,

Mbarara, and Mbale-- had populations of more than 20,000 in 1989. Urban

migration was expected to increase markedly during the 1990s.

Uganda was the focus of migration from surrounding African countries

until 1970, with most immigrants coming from Rwanda, Burundi, and Sudan. In

the 1970s, immigrants were estimated to make up 11 percent of the population.

About 23,000 Ugandans were living in Kenya, and a smaller number had fled to

other neighboring countries. Emigration increased dramatically during the 1970s

and was believed to slow during the 1980s.

In 1989 Uganda reported 163,000 refugees to the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Most of these were from Rwanda, but
several other neighboring countries were also represented. At the same time,

Zaire and Sudan registered a total of nearly 250,000 refugees from Uganda.

CLIMATOLOGY AND HYDROGRAPHY

Although Uganda is on the equator, its climate is warm rather than hot,

and temperatures vary little throughout the year. Most of the territory receives an

annual rainfall of at least 100 cm (40 in). At Entebbe, mean annual rainfall is 162

cm (64 in); in the northeast, it is only 69 cm (27 in). Temperature generally varies

by altitude; on Lake Albert, the mean annual maximum is 29°C (84°F) and the

mean annual minimum 22°C (72°F). At Kabale in the southwest, 1,250 m (4,100

ft) higher, the mean annual maximum is 23°C (73°F), and the mean annual

minimum 10°C (50°F). At Kampala, these extremes are 27°C (81°F) and 17°C

(63°F).

Uganda's equatorial climate provides plentiful sunshine, moderated by the

relatively high altitude of most areas of the country. Mean annual temperatures

range from about 16° C in the southwestern highlands to 25° C in the northwest;

but in the northeast, temperatures exceed 30° C about 254 days per year.

Daytime temperatures average about eight to ten degrees warmer than nighttime

temperatures in the Lake Victoria region, and temperatures are generally about

fourteen degrees lower in the southwest.

Except in the northeastern corner of the country, rainfall is well distributed.

The southern region has two rainy seasons, usually beginning in early April and
again in October. Little rain falls in June and December. In the north, occasional

rains occur between April and October, while the period from November to March

is often very dry. Mean annual rainfall near Lake Victoria often exceeds 2,100

millimeters, and the mountainous regions of the southeast and southwest receive

more than 1,500 millimeters of rainfall yearly. The lowest mean annual rainfall in

the northeast measures about 500 millimeters.

ECONOMY

Uganda was one rich in human and natural resources and possessed a

favorable climate for economic development, but in the late 1980s it was still

struggling to end a period of political and economic chaos that had destroyed the

country's reputation as the "pearl" of Africa. Most of the economic infrastructure,

including the power supply system, the transportation system, and industry,

operated only at only a fraction of capacity. Other than limited segments of the

agricultural sector--notably coffee and subsistence production-- cultivation was

almost at a standstill. And in the wake of the much publicized atrocities of the

Idi Amin Dada regime from 1971 to 1979 and the civil war that continued into the

1980s, Uganda's once flourishing tourist industry faced the challenges of

reconstruction and restoring international confidence. Successive governments

had proclaimed their intention to salvage the economy and attract the foreign

assistance necessary for recovery, but none had remained in power long enough

to succeed.
 Agricultural production based primarily on peasant cultivation has been

the mainstay of the economy. In the 1950s, coffee replaced cotton as the primary

cash crop. Some plantations produced tea and sugar, but these exports did not

alter the importance of coffee in the economy. Similarly, some industries

developed before 1970, but most were adjuncts to cotton or sugar production,

and they were not major contributors to gross domestic product ( GDP).

Moreover, Uganda did not possess significant quantities of valuable minerals,

such as oil or gold. In sum, although the economy provided a livelihood for the

population, it was based largely on agricultural commodities with fluctuating

international values. This dependence forced Uganda to import vehicles,

machinery, and other major industrial equipment, and it limited development

choices. The economy seemed to have the potential to stabilize, but throughout

the decade of the 1980s its capacity to generate growth, especially industrial

growth, was small.

After 1986 the National Resistance Movement (NRM) succeeded in

stabilizing most of the nation and began to diversify agricultural exports away

from the near-total dependence on coffee. By 1988 Western donors were

beginning to offer cautious support for the three-year-old regime of Yoweri

Kaguta Museveni. But in 1989, just as the hard work of economic recovery was

beginning to pay off, world coffee prices plummeted, and Uganda's scarce

foreign exchange dwindled further. Despite the country's record of economic

resilience, it still faced serious obstacles to the goal of economic self-sufficiency.

B. THE SUDAN

PROFILE

Sudan (officially the Republic of Sudan) is a country in northeastern Africa.

It is the largest in the African continent and the Arab World, and tenth largest in

the world by area. It is bordered by Egypt to the north, the Red Sea to the

northeast, Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east, Kenya and Uganda to the southeast,

the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic to the

southwest, Chad to the west and Libya to the northwest.

The people of Sudan have a long history extending from antiquity, which is

intertwined with the history of Egypt, with which it was united politically over

several periods. Sudan's history has also been plagued by civil war stemming

from ethnic, religious, and economic conflict between the mostly Muslim and

Arab population to the north, and non-Arab Black Africans to the south. Sudan is

currently ranked as the second most unstable country in the world according to

the Failed States Index, for its military dictatorship and the ongoing humanitarian
crisis in Darfur. However, despite its internal conflicts, Sudan has managed to

achieve economic growth.

BOUNDARIES

Sudan is situated in northern Africa, bordering the Red Sea and

it has a coastline of 853 km along the Red Sea. With an area of 2,505,810

square kilometers (967,499 sq mi), it is the largest country

on the continent and the tenth largest in the world. It borders the

Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the

Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya and Uganda. It is dominated by the

Nile River and its tributaries.

HISTORY

Throughout its history Sudan has been divided between its Arab heritage,

identified with northern Sudan, and its African heritages to the south. The two

groups are divided along linguistic, religious, racial, and economic lines, and the

cleavage has generated ethnic tensions and clashes. Moreover, the geographical

isolation of Sudan's southern African peoples has prevented them from

participating fully in the country's political, economic, and social life. Imperial

Britain acknowledged the north-south division by establishing separate

administrations for the two regions. Independent Sudan further reinforced this

cleavage by treating African southerners as a minority group.

 Another major factor that has affected Sudan's evolution is the country's

relationship with Egypt. As early as the eighth millennium B.C., there was contact

between Sudan and Egypt. Modern relations between the two countries began in

1820, when an Egyptian army under Ottoman command invaded Sudan. In the

years following this invasion, Egypt expanded its area of control in Sudan down

the Red Sea coast and toward East Africa's Great Lakes region. The sixty-four-

year period of Egyptian rule, which ended in 1885, left a deep mark on Sudan's

political and economic systems. The emergence of the Anglo-Egyptian

condominium in 1899 reinforced the links between Cairo and Khartoum. After

Sudan gained independence in 1956, Egypt continued to exert influence over

developments in Sudan.

Similarly, the period of British control (1899-1955) has had a lasting impact

on Sudan. In addition to pacifying and uniting the country, Britain sought to

modernize Sudan by using technology to facilitate economic development and by

establishing democratic institutions to end authoritarian rule. Even in 1991, many

of Sudan's political and economic institutions owed their existence to the British.

Lastly, Sudan's postindependence history has been shaped largely by the

southern civil war. This conflict has retarded the country's social and economic

development, encouraged political instability, and led to an endless cycle of weak

and ineffective military and civilian governments. The conflict appeared likely to

continue to affect Sudan's people and institutions for the rest of the twentieth

century.
EARLY HISTORY – Cush. Northern Sudan's earliest historical record comes from

Egyptian sources, which described the land upstream from the first cataract,

called Cush, as "wretched." For more than 2,000 years after the Old Kingdom

(ca. 2700-2180 B.C.), Egyptian political and economic activities determined the

course of the central Nile region's history. Even during intermediate periods when

Egyptian political power in Cush waned, Egypt exerted a profound cultural and

religious influence on the Cushite people.

Over the centuries, trade developed. Egyptian caravans carried grain to

Cush and returned to Aswan with ivory, incense, hides, and carnelian (a stone

prized both as jewelry and for arrowheads) for shipment downriver. Egyptian

traders particularly valued gold and slaves, who served as domestic servants,

concubines, and soldiers in the pharaoh's army. Egyptian military expeditions

penetrated Cush periodically during the Old Kingdom. Yet there was no attempt

to establish a permanent presence in the area until the Middle Kingdom (ca.

2100-1720 B.C.), when Egypt constructed a network of forts along the Nile as far

south as Samnah, in southern Egypt, to guard the flow of gold from mines in

Wawat.

Around 1720 B.C., Asian nomads called Hyksos invaded Egypt, ended the

Middle Kingdom, severed links with Cush, and destroyed the forts along the Nile

River. To fill the vacuum left by the Egyptian withdrawal, a culturally distinct

indigenous kingdom emerged at Karmah, near present-day Dunqulah. After

Egyptian power revived during the New Kingdom (ca. 1570-1100 B.C.), the
pharaoh Ahmose I incorporated Cush as an Egyptian province governed by a

viceroy. Although Egypt's administrative control of Cush extended only down to

the fourth cataract, Egyptian sources list tributary districts reaching to the Red

Sea and upstream to the confluence of the Blue Nile and White Nile rivers.

Egyptian authorities ensured the loyalty of local chiefs by drafting their children to

serve as pages at the pharaoh's court. Egypt also expected tribute in gold and

slaves from local chiefs.

Once Egypt had established political control over Cush, officials and

priests joined military personnel, merchants, and artisans and settled in the

region. The Coptic language, spoken in Egypt, became widely used in everyday

activities. The Cushite elite adopted Egyptian gods and built temples like that

dedicated to the sun god Amon at Napata, near present-day Kuraymah. The

temples remained centers of official religious worship until the coming of

Christianity to the region in the sixth century. When Egyptian influence declined

or succumbed to foreign domination, the Cushite elite regarded themselves as

champions of genuine Egyptian cultural and religious values.

By the eleventh century B.C., the authority of the New Kingdom dynasties

had diminished, allowing divided rule in Egypt, and ending Egyptian control of

Cush. There is no information about the region's activities over the next 300

years. In the eighth century B.C., however, Cush reemerged as an independent

kingdom ruled from Napata by an aggressive line of monarchs who gradually

extended their influence into Egypt. About 750 B.C., a Cushite king called Kashta
conquered Upper Egypt and became ruler of Thebes until approximately 740

B.C. His successor, Painkhy, subdued the delta, reunited Egypt under the

Twenty-fifth Dynasty, and founded a line of kings who ruled Cush and Thebes for

about a hundred years. The dynasty's intervention in the area of modern Syria

caused a confrontation between Egypt and Assyria. When the Assyrians in

retaliation invaded Egypt, Taharqa (688-663 B.C.), the last Cushite pharaoh,

withdrew and returned the dynasty to Napata, where it continued to rule Cush

and extended its dominions to the south and east.

Meroe. Egypt's succeeding dynasty failed to reassert control over Cush. In

590 B.C., however, an Egyptian army sacked Napata, compelling the Cushite

court to move to a more secure location at Meroe near the sixth cataract. For

several centuries thereafter, the Meroitic kingdom developed independently of

Egypt, which passed successively under Persian, Greek, and, finally, Roman

domination. During the height of its power in the second and third centuries B.C.,

Meroe extended over a region from the third cataract in the north to Sawba, near

present-day Khartoum, in the south.

The pharaonic tradition persisted among a line of rulers at Meroe, who

raised stelae to record the achievements of their reigns and erected pyramids to

contain their tombs. These objects and the ruins of palaces, temples, and baths

at Meroe attest to a centralized political system that employed artisans' skills and

commanded the labor of a large work force. A well-managed irrigation system

allowed the area to support a higher population density than was possible during
later periods. By the first century B.C., the use of hieroglyphs gave way to a

Meroitic script that adapted the Egyptian writing system to an indigenous,

Nubian-related language spoken later by the region's people. Meroe's

succession system was not necessarily hereditary; the matriarchal royal family

member deemed most worthy often became king. The queen mother's role in the

selection process was crucial to a smooth succession. The crown appears to

have passed from brother to brother (or sister) and only when no siblings

remained from father to son.

Although Napata remained Meroe's religious center, northern Cush

eventually fell into disorder as it came under pressure from the Blemmyes,

predatory nomads from east of the Nile. However, the Nile continued to give the

region access to the Mediterranean world. Additionally, Meroe maintained contact

with Arab and Indian traders along the Red Sea coast and incorporated

Hellenistic and Hindu cultural influences into its daily life. Inconclusive evidence

suggests that metallurgical technology may have been transmitted westward

across the savanna belt to West Africa from Meroe's iron smelteries.

Relations between Meroe and Egypt were not always peaceful. In 23 B.C.,

in response to Meroe's incursions into Upper Egypt, a Roman army moved south

and razed Napata. The Roman commander quickly abandoned the area,

however, as too poor to warrant colonization.

In the second century A.D., the Nobatae occupied the Nile's west bank in

northern Cush. They are believed to have been one of several well-armed bands
of horse- and camel-borne warriors who sold protection to the Meroitic

population; eventually they intermarried and established themselves among the

Meroitic people as a military aristocracy. Until nearly the fifth century, Rome

subsidized the Nobatae and used Meroe as a buffer between Egypt and the

Blemmyes. Meanwhile, the old Meroitic kingdom contracted because of the

expansion of Axum, a powerful Abyssinian state in modern Ethiopia to the east.

About A.D. 350, an Axumite army captured and destroyed Meroe city, ending the

kingdom's independent existence.

Christian Nubia. By the sixth century, three states had emerged as the

political and cultural heirs of the Meroitic kingdom. Nobatia in the north, also

known as Ballanah, had its capital at Faras, in what is now Egypt; the central

kingdom, Muqurra, was centered at Dunqulah, the old city on the Nile about 150

kilometers south of modern Dunqulah; and Alwa, in the heartland of old Meroe in

the south, had its capital at Sawba. In all three kingdoms, warrior aristocracies

ruled Meroitic populations from royal courts where functionaries bore Greek titles

in emulation of the Byzantine court.

The earliest references to Nubia's successor kingdoms are contained in

accounts by Greek and Coptic authors of the conversion of Nubian kings to

Christianity in the sixth century. According to tradition, a missionary sent by

Byzantine empress Theodora arrived in Nobatia and started preaching the

gospel about 540. It is possible that the conversion process began earlier,

however, under the aegis of Coptic missionaries from Egypt, who in the previous
century had brought Christianity to the Abyssinians. The Nubian kings accepted

the Monophysite Christianity practiced in Egypt and acknowledged the spiritual

authority of the Coptic patriarch of Alexandria over the Nubian church. A

hierarchy of bishops named by the Coptic patriarch and consecrated in Egypt

directed the church's activities and wielded considerable secular power. The

church sanctioned a sacerdotal kingship, confirming the royal line's legitimacy. In

turn the monarch protected the church's interests. The queen mother's role in the

succession process paralleled that of Meroe's matriarchal tradition. Because

women transmitted the right to succession, a renowned warrior not of royal birth

might be nominated to become king through marriage to a woman in line of

succession.

The emergence of Christianity reopened channels to Mediterranean

civilization and renewed Nubia's cultural and ideological ties to Egypt. The church

encouraged literacy in Nubia through its Egyptian-trained clergy and in its

monastic and cathedral schools. The use of Greek in liturgy eventually gave way

to the Nubian language, which was written using an indigenous alphabet that

combined elements of the old Meroitic and Coptic scripts. Coptic, however, often

appeared in ecclesiastical and secular circles. Additionally, early inscriptions

have indicated a continuing knowledge of colloquial Greek in Nubia as late as the

twelfth century. After the seventh century, Arabic gained importance in the Nubian

kingdoms, especially as a medium for commerce.

 The Christian Nubian kingdoms, which survived for many centuries,

achieved their peak of prosperity and military power in the ninth and tenth

centuries. However, Muslim Arab invaders, who in 640 had conquered Egypt,

posed a threat to the Christian Nubian kingdoms. Most historians believe that

Arab pressure forced Nobatia and Muqurra to merge into the kingdom of

Dunqulah sometime before 700. Although the Arabs soon abandoned attempts to

reduce Nubia by force, Muslim domination of Egypt often made it difficult to

communicate with the Coptic patriarch or to obtain Egyptian-trained clergy. As a

result, the Nubian church became isolated from the rest of the Christian world.

THE COMING OF ISLAM. The coming of Islam eventually changed the

nature of Sudanese society and facilitated the division of the country into north

and south. Islam also fostered political unity, economic growth, and educational

development among its adherents; however, these benefits were restricted

largely to urban and commercial centers.

The spread of Islam began shortly after the Prophet Muhammad's death in

632. By that time, he and his followers had converted most of Arabia's tribes and

towns to Islam (literally, submission), which Muslims maintained united the

individual believer, the state, and society under God's will. Islamic rulers,

therefore, exercised temporal and religious authority. Islamic law ( sharia), which

was derived primarily from the Quran, encompassed all aspects of the lives of

believers, who were called Muslims ("those who submit" to God's will).
 Within a generation of Muhammad's death, Arab armies had carried Islam

north and east from Arabia into North Africa. Muslims imposed political control

over conquered territories in the name of the caliph (the Prophet's successor as

supreme earthly leader of Islam). The Islamic armies won their first North African

victory in 643 in Tripoli (in modern Libya). However, the Muslim subjugation of all

of North Africa took about seventy-five years. The Arabs invaded Nubia in 642

and again in 652, when they laid siege to the city of Dunqulah and destroyed its

cathedral. The Nubians put up a stout defense, however, causing the Arabs to

accept an armistice and withdraw their forces.

The Arabs

Contacts between Nubians and Arabs long predated the coming of Islam,

but the arabization of the Nile Valley was a gradual process that occurred over a

period of nearly 1,000 years. Arab nomads continually wandered into the region

in search of fresh pasturage, and Arab seafarers and merchants traded in Red

Sea ports for spices and slaves. Intermarriage and assimilation also facilitated

arabization. After the initial attempts at military conquest failed, the Arab

commander in Egypt, Abd Allah ibn Saad, concluded the first in a series of

regularly renewed treaties with the Nubians that, with only brief interruptions,

governed relations between the two peoples for more than 600 years. So long as

Arabs ruled Egypt, there was peace on the Nubian frontier; however, when non-

Arabs acquired control of the Nile Delta, tension arose in Upper Egypt.
 The Arabs realized the commercial advantages of peaceful relations with

Nubia and used the treaty to ensure that travel and trade proceeded unhindered

across the frontier. The treaty also contained security arrangements whereby

both parties agreed that neither would come to the defense of the other in the

event of an attack by a third party. The treaty obliged both to exchange annual

tribute as a goodwill symbol, the Nubians in slaves and the Arabs in grain. This

formality was only a token of the trade that developed between the two, not only

in these commodities but also in horses and manufactured goods brought to

Nubia by the Arabs and in ivory, gold, gems, gum arabic, and cattle carried back

by them to Egypt or shipped to Arabia.

Acceptance of the treaty did not indicate Nubian submission to the Arabs,

but the treaty did impose conditions for Arab friendship that eventually permitted

Arabs to achieve a privileged position in Nubia. For example, provisions of the

treaty allowed Arabs to buy land from Nubians south of the frontier at Aswan.

Arab merchants established markets in Nubian towns to facilitate the exchange

of grain and slaves. Arab engineers supervised the operation of mines east of the

Nile in which they used slave labor to extract gold and emeralds. Muslim pilgrims

en route to Mecca traveled across the Red Sea on ferries from Aydhab and

Sawakin, ports that also received cargoes bound from India to Egypt.

Traditional genealogies trace the ancestry of most of the Nile Valley's

mixed population to Arab tribes that migrated into the region during this period.

Even many non-Arabic-speaking groups claim descent from Arab forebears. The
two most important Arabic-speaking groups to emerge in Nubia were the Jaali

and the Juhayna. Both showed physical continuity with the indigenous pre-

Islamic population. The former claimed descent from the Quraysh, the Prophet

Muhammad's tribe. Historically, the Jaali have been sedentary farmers and

herders or townspeople settled along the Nile and in Al Jazirah. The nomadic

Juhayna comprised a family of tribes that included the Kababish, Baqqara, and

Shukriya. They were descended from Arabs who migrated after the thirteenth

century into an area that extended from the savanna and semidesert west of the

Nile to the Abyssinian foothills east of the Blue Nile. Both groups formed a series

of tribal shaykhdoms that succeeded the crumbling Christian Nubian kingdoms

and that were in frequent conflict with one another and with neighboring non-

Arabs. In some instances, as among the Beja, the indigenous people absorbed

Arab migrants who settled among them. Beja ruling families later derived their

legitimacy from their claims of Arab ancestry.

Although not all Muslims in the region were Arabic-speaking, acceptance

of Islam facilitated the arabizing process. There was no policy of proselytism,

however, and forced conversion was rare. Islam penetrated the area over a long

period of time through intermarriage and contacts with Arab merchants and

settlers. Exemption from taxation in regions under Muslim rule also proved a

powerful incentive to conversion.

The Decline of Christian Nubia. Until the thirteenth century, the Nubian

kingdoms proved their resilience in maintaining political independence and their

commitment to Christianity. In the early eighth century and again in the tenth

century, Nubian kings led armies into Egypt to force the release of the imprisoned

Coptic patriarch and to relieve fellow Christians suffering persecution under

Muslim rulers. In 1276, however, the Mamluks (Arabic for "owned"), who were an

elite but frequently disorderly caste of soldier-administrators composed largely of

Turkish, Kurdish, and Circassian slaves, intervened in a dynastic dispute, ousted

Dunqulah's reigning monarch and delivered the crown and silver cross that

symbolized Nubian kingship to a rival claimant. Thereafter, Dunqulah became a

satellite of Egypt.

Because of the frequent intermarriage between Nubian nobles and the

kinswomen of Arab shaykhs, the lineages of the two elites merged and the

Muslim heirs took their places in the royal line of succession. In 1315 a Muslim

prince of Nubian royal blood ascended the throne of Dunqulah as king. The

expansion of Islam coincided with the decline of the Nubian Christian church. A

"dark age" enveloped Nubia in the fifteenth century during which political

authority fragmented and slave raiding intensified. Communities in the river valley

and savanna, fearful for their safety, formed tribal organizations and adopted

Arab protectors. Muslims probably did not constitute a majority in the old Nubian

areas until the fifteenth or sixteenth century.

The Rule of the Kashif. For several centuries Arab caliphs had governed

Egypt through the Mamluks. In the thirteenth century, the Mamluks seized control

of the state and created a sultanate that ruled Egypt until the early sixteenth
century. Although they repeatedly launched military expeditions that weakened

Dunqulah, the Mamluks did not directly rule Nubia. In 1517 the Turks conquered

Egypt and incorporated the country into the Ottoman Empire as

a pashalik (province).

Ottoman forces pursued fleeing Mamluks into Nubia, which had been

claimed as a dependency of the Egyptian pashalik. Although they established

administrative structures in ports on the Red Sea coast, the Ottomans exerted

little authority over the interior. Instead, the Ottomans relied on

military kashif (leaders), who controlled their virtually autonomous fiefs as agents

of the pasha in Cairo, to rule the interior. The rule of the kashif, many of whom

were Mamluks who had made their peace with the Ottomans, lasted 300 years.

Concerned with little more than tax collecting and slave trading, the military

leaders terrorized the population and constantly fought among themselves for

title to territory.

The Funj. At the same time that the Ottomans brought northern Nubia into

their orbit, a new power, the Funj, had risen in southern Nubia and had

supplanted the remnants of the old Christian kingdom of Alwa. In 1504 a Funj

leader, Amara Dunqas, founded the Black Sultanate (As Saltana az Zarqa) at

Sannar. The Black Sultanate eventually became the keystone of the Funj Empire.

By the mid-sixteenth century, Sannar controlled Al Jazirah and commanded the

allegiance of vassal states and tribal districts north to the third cataract and south

to the rainforests.
 The Funj state included a loose confederation of sultanates and

dependent tribal chieftaincies drawn together under the suzerainty of

Sannar's mek (sultan). As overlord, the mek received tribute, levied taxes, and

called on his vassals to supply troops in time of war. Vassal states in turn relied

on the mek to settle local disorders and to resolve internal disputes. The Funj

stabilized the region and interposed a military bloc between the Arabs in the

north, the Abyssinians in the east, and the non-Muslim blacks in the south.

The sultanate's economy depended on the role played by the Funj in the

slave trade. Farming and herding also thrived in Al Jazirah and in the southern

rainforests. Sannar apportioned tributary areas into tribal homelands (each one

termed a dar; pl., dur), where the mek granted the local population the right to

use arable land. The diverse groups that inhabitated each dar eventually

regarded themselves as units of tribes. Movement from one dar to another

entailed a change in tribal identification. (Tribal distinctions in these areas in

modern Sudan can be traced to this period.) The mek appointed a chieftain

(nazir; pl., nawazir) to govern each dar. Nawaziradministered dur according to

customary law, paid tribute to the mek, and collected taxes. Themek also derived

income from crown lands set aside for his use in each dar.

At the peak of its power in the mid-seventeenth century, Sannar repulsed

the northward advance of the Nilotic Shilluk people up the White Nile and

compelled many of them to submit to Funj authority. After this victory,

the mek Badi II Abu Duqn (1642-81) sought to centralize the government of the
confederacy at Sannar. To implement this policy, Badi introduced a standing army

of slave soldiers that would free Sannar from dependence on vassal sultans for

military assistance and would provide the mek with the means to enforce his will.

The move alienated the dynasty from the Funj warrior aristocracy, which in 1718

deposed the reigning mek and placed one of their own ranks on the throne of

Sannar. The mid-eighteenth century witnessed another brief period of expansion

when the Funj turned back an Abyssinian invasion, defeated the Fur, and took

control of much of Kurdufan. But civil war and the demands of defending the

sultanate had overextended the warrior society's resources and sapped its

strength.

Another reason for Sannar's decline may have been the growing influence

of its hereditary viziers (chancellors), chiefs of a non-Funj tributary tribe who

managed court affairs. In 1761 the vizier Muhammad Abu al Kaylak, who had led

the Funj army in wars, carried out a palace coup, relegating the sultan to a

figurehead role. Sannar's hold over its vassals diminished, and by the early

nineteenth century more remote areas ceased to recognize even the nominal

authority of themek.

The Fur. Darfur was the Fur homeland. Renowned as cavalrymen, Fur

clans frequently allied with or opposed their kin, the Kanuri of Borno, in modern

Nigeria. After a period of disorder in the sixteenth century, during which the

region was briefly subject to Bornu, the leader of the Keira clan, Sulayman

Solong (1596-1637), supplanted a rival clan and became Darfur's first sultan.
Sulayman Solong decreed Islam to be the sultanate's official religion. However,

large-scale religious conversions did not occur until the reign of Ahmad Bakr

(1682-1722), who imported teachers, built mosques, and compelled his subjects

to become Muslims. In the eighteenth century, several sultans consolidated the

dynasty's hold on Darfur, established a capital at Al Fashir, and contested the

Funj for control of Kurdufan.

The sultans operated the slave trade as a monopoly. They levied taxes on

traders and export duties on slaves sent to Egypt, and took a share of the slaves

brought into Darfur. Some household slaves advanced to prominent positions in

the courts of sultans, and the power exercised by these slaves provoked a violent

reaction among the traditional class of Fur officeholders in the late eighteenth

century. The rivalry between the slave and traditional elites caused recurrent

unrest throughout the next century.

THE TURKIYAH, 1821-85. As a pashalik of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt

had been divided into several provinces, each of which was placed under a

Mamluk bey (governor) reponsible to the pasha, who in turn answered to the

Porte, the term used for the Ottoman government referring to the Sublime Porte,

or high gate, of the grand vizier's building. In approximately 280 years of Ottoman

rule, no fewer than 100 pashas succeeded each other. In the eighteenth century,

their authority became tenuous as rival Mamluk beys became the real power in

the land. The struggles among the beys continued until 1798 when the French

invasion of Egypt altered the situation. Combined British and Turkish military
operations forced the withdrawal of French forces in 1801, introducing a period of

chaos in Egypt. In 1805 the Ottomans sought to restore order by appointing

Muhammad Ali as Egypt's pasha.

With the help of 10,000 Albanian troops provided by the Ottomans,

Muhammad Ali purged Egypt of the Mamluks. In 1811 he launched a seven-year

campaign in Arabia, supporting his suzerain, the Ottoman sultan, in the

suppression of a revolt by the Wahhabi, an ultraconservative Muslim sect. To

replace the Albanian soldiers, Muhammad Ali planned to build an Egyptian army

with Sudanese slave recruits.

Although a part of present-day northern Sudan was nominally an Egyptian

dependency, the previous pashas had demanded little more from the kashif who

ruled there than the regular remittance of tribute; that changed under Muhammad

Ali. After he had defeated the Mamluks in Egypt, a party of them had escaped

and had fled south. In 1811 these Mamluks established a state at Dunqulah as a

base for their slave trading. In 1820 the sultan of Sannar informed Muhammad Ali

that he was unable to comply with the demand to expel the Mamluks. In

response the pasha sent 4,000 troops to invade Sudan, clear it of Mamluks, and

reclaim it for Egypt. The pasha's forces received the submission of the kashif,

dispersed the Dunqulah Mamluks, conquered Kurdufan, and accepted Sannar's

surrender from the last Funj sultan, Badi IV. The Jaali Arab tribes offered stiff

resistance, however.
 Initially, the Egyptian occupation of Sudan was disastrous. Under the new

government established in 1821, which was known as the Turkiyah or Turkish

regime, soldiers lived off the land and exacted exorbitant taxes from the

population. They also destroyed many ancient Meroitic pyramids searching for

hidden gold. Furthermore, slave trading increased, causing many of the

inhabitants of the fertile Al Jazirah, heartland of Funj, to flee to escape the slave

traders. Within a year of the pasha's victory, 30,000 Sudanese slaves went to

Egypt for training and induction into the army. However, so many perished from

disease and the unfamiliar climate that the remaining slaves could be used only

in garrisons in Sudan.

As the military occupation became more secure, the government became

less harsh. Egypt saddled Sudan with a parasitic bureaucracy, however, and

expected the country to be self- supporting. Nevertheless, farmers and herders

gradually returned to Al Jazirah. The Turkiyah also won the allegiance of some

tribal and religious leaders by granting them a tax exemption. Egyptian soldiers

and Sudanese jahidiyah (slave soldiers; literally, fighters), supplemented by

mercenaries recruited in various Ottoman domains, manned garrisons in

Khartoum, Kassala, and Al Ubayyid and at several smaller outposts. The

Shaiqiyah, Arabic speakers who had resisted Egyptian occupation, were

defeated and allowed to serve the Egyptian rulers as tax collectors and irregular

cavalry under their own shaykhs. The Egyptians divided Sudan into provinces,

which they then subdivided into smaller administrative units that usually

corresponded to tribal territories. In 1835 Khartoum became the seat of

the hakimadar (governor general); many garrison towns also developed into

administrative centers in their respective regions. At the local level, shaykhs and

traditional tribal chieftains assumed administrative responsibilities.

In the 1850s, the pashalik revised the legal systems in Egypt and Sudan,

introducing a commercial code and a criminal code administered in secular

courts. The change reduced the prestige of the qadis (Islamic judges) whose

sharia courts were confined to dealing with matters of personal status. Even in

this area, the courts lacked credibility in the eyes of Sudanese Muslims because

they conducted hearings according to the Ottoman Empire's Hanafi school of law

rather than the stricter Maliki school traditional in the area.

The Turkiyah also encouraged a religious orthodoxy favored in the

Ottoman Empire. The government undertook a mosque-building program and

staffed religious schools and courts with teachers and judges trained at Cairo's Al

Azhar University. The government favored the Khatmiyyah, a traditional religious

order, because its leaders preached cooperation with the regime. But Sudanese

Muslims condemned the official orthodoxy as decadent because it had rejected

many popular beliefs and practices.

Until its gradual suppression in the 1860s, the slave trade was the most

profitable undertaking in Sudan and was the focus of Egyptian interests in the

country. The government encouraged economic development through state

monopolies that had exported slaves, ivory, and gum arabic. In some areas, tribal
land, which had been held in common, became the private property of the

shaykhs and was sometimes sold to buyers outside the tribe.

Muhammad Ali's immediate successors, Abbas I (1849-54) and Said

(1854-63), lacked leadership qualities and paid little attention to Sudan, but the

reign of Ismail (1863-79) revitalized Egyptian interest in the country. In 1865 the

Ottoman Empire ceded the Red Sea coast and its ports to Egypt. Two years

later, the Ottoman sultan granted Ismail the title of khedive (sovereign prince).

Egypt organized and garrisoned the new provinces of Upper Nile, Bahr al

Ghazal, and Equatoria and, in 1874, conquered and annexed Darfur. Ismail

named Europeans to provincial governorships and appointed Sudanese to more

responsible government positions. Under prodding from Britain, Ismail took steps

to complete the elimination of the slave trade in the north of present-day Sudan.

The khedive also tried to build a new army on the European model that no longer

would depend on slaves to provide manpower. However, this modernization

process caused unrest. Army units mutinied, and many Sudanese resented the

quartering of troops among the civilian population and the use of Sudanese

forced labor on public projects. Efforts to suppress the slave trade angered the

urban merchant class and the Baqqara Arabs, who had grown prosperous by

selling slaves.

There is little documentation for the history of the southern Sudanese

provinces until the introduction of the Turkiyah in the north in the early 1820s and

the subsequent extension of slave raiding into the south. Information about their
peoples before that time is based largely on oral history. According to these

traditions, the Nilotic peoples--the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, and others--first entered

southern Sudan sometime before the tenth century. During the period from the

fifteenth century to the nineteenth century, tribal migrations, largely from the area

of Bahr al Ghazal, brought these peoples to their modern locations. Some, like

the Shilluk, developed a centralized monarchical tradition that enabled them to

preserve their tribal integrity in the face of external pressures in the nineteenth

and twentieth centuries. The non-Nilotic Azande people, who entered southern

Sudan in the sixteenth century, established the region's largest state. In the

eighteenth century, the militaristic Avungara people entered and quickly imposed

their authority over the poorly organized and weaker Azande. Avungara power

remained largely unchallenged until the arrival of the British at the end of the

nineteenth century. Geographic barriers protected the southerners from Islam's

advance, enabling them to retain their social and cultural heritage and their

political and religious institutions. During the nineteenth century, the slave trade

brought southerners into closer contact with Sudanese Arabs and resulted in a

deep hatred for the northerners.

Slavery had been an institution of Sudanese life throughout history, but

southern Sudan, where slavery flourished particularly, was originally considered

an area beyond Cairo's control. Because Sudan had access to Middle East slave

markets, the slave trade in the south intensified in the nineteenth century and

continued after the British had suppressed slavery in much of sub-Saharan

Africa. Annual raids resulted in the capture of countless thousands of southern

Sudanese, and the destruction of the region's stability and economy. The horrors

associated with the slave trade generated European interest in Sudan.

Until 1843 Muhammad Ali maintained a state monopoly on slave trading in

Egypt and thepashalik. Thereafter, authorities sold licenses to private traders

who competed with government- conducted slave raids. In 1854 Cairo ended

state participation in the slave trade, and in 1860, in response to European

pressure, Egypt prohibited the slave trade. However, the Egyptian army failed to

enforce the prohibition against the private armies of the slave traders. The

introduction of steamboats and firearms enabled slave traders to overwhelm local

resistance and prompted the creation of southern "bush empires" by Baqqara

Arabs.

Ismail implemented a military modernization program and proposed to

extend Egyptian rule to the southern region. In 1869 British explorer Sir Samuel

Baker received a commission as governor of Equatoria Province, with orders to

annex all territory in the White Nile's basin and to suppress the slave trade. In

1874 Charles George Gordon, a British officer, succeeded Baker. Gordon

disarmed many slave traders and hanged those who defied him. By the time he

became Sudan's governor general in 1877, Gordon had weakened the slave

trade in much of the south.

Unfortunately, Ismail's southern policy lacked consistency. In 1871 he had

named a notorious Arab slave trader, Rahman Mansur az Zubayr, as governor of

the newly created province of Bahr al Ghazal. Zubayr used his army to pacify the
province and to eliminate his competition in the slave trade. In 1874 he invaded

Darfur after the sultan had refused to guard caravan routes through his territory.

Zubayr then offered the region as a province to the khedive. Later that year,

Zubayr defied Cairo when it attempted to relieve him of his post, and defeated an

Egyptian force that sought to oust him. After he became Sudan's governor

general, Gordon ended Zubayr's slave trading, disbanded his army, and sent him

back to Cairo.

THE MAHDIYAH, 1884-98. Developments in Sudan during this period

cannot be understood without reference to the British position in Egypt. In 1869

the Suez Canal opened and quickly became Britain's economic lifeline to India

and the Far East. To defend this waterway, Britain sought a greater role in

Egyptian affairs. In 1873 the British government therefore supported a program

whereby an Anglo-French debt commission assumed responsibility for managing

Egypt's fiscal affairs. This commission eventually forced Khedive Ismail to

abdicate in favor of his more politically acceptable son, Tawfiq (1877-92).

After the removal, in 1877, of Ismail, who had appointed him to the post,

Gordon resigned as governor general of Sudan in 1880. His successors lacked

direction from Cairo and feared the political turmoil that had engulfed Egypt. As a

result, they failed to continue the policies Gordon had put in place. The illegal

slave trade revived, although not enough to satisfy the merchants whom Gordon

had put out of business. The Sudanese army suffered from a lack of resources,
and unemployed soldiers from disbanded units troubled garrison towns. Tax

collectors arbitrarily increased taxation.

In this troubled atmosphere, Muhammad Ahmad ibn as Sayyid Abd Allah,

a faqir or holy man who combined personal magnetism with religious zealotry,

emerged, determined to expel the Turks and restore Islam to its primitive purity.

The son of a Dunqulah boatbuilder, Muhammad Ahmad had become the disciple

of Muhammad ash Sharif, the head of the Sammaniyah order. Later, as a shaykh

of the order, Muhammad Ahmad spent several years in seclusion and gained a

reputation as a mystic and teacher. In 1880 he became a Sammaniyah leader.

Muhammad Ahmad's sermons attracted an increasing number of

followers. Among those who joined him was Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, a

Baqqara from southern Darfur. His planning capabilities proved invaluable to

Muhammad Ahmad, who revealed himself as Al Mahdi al Muntazar ("the awaited

guide in the right path," usually seen as the Mahdi), sent from God to redeem the

faithful and prepare the way for the second coming of the Prophet Isa (Jesus).

The Mahdist movement demanded a return to the simplicity of early Islam,

abstention from alcohol and tobacco, and the strict seclusion of women.

Even after the Mahdi proclaimed a jihad, or holy war, against the Turkiyah,

Khartoum dismissed him as a religious fanatic. The government paid more

attention when his religious zeal turned to denunciation of tax collectors. To avoid

arrest, the Mahdi and a party of his followers, the Ansar, made a long march to

Kurdufan, where he gained a large number of recruits, especially from the

Baqqara. From a refuge in the area, he wrote appeals to the shaykhs of the

religious orders and won active support or assurances of neutrality from all

except the pro-Egyptian Khatmiyyah. Merchants and Arab tribes that had

depended on the slave trade responded as well, along with the Hadendowa Beja,

who were rallied to the Mahdi by an Ansar captain, Usman Digna.

Early in 1882, the Ansar, armed with spears and swords, overwhelmed a

7,000-man Egyptian force not far from Al Ubayyid and seized their rifles and

ammunition. The Mahdi followed up this victory by laying siege to Al Ubayyid and

starving it into submission after four months. The Ansar, 30,000 men strong, then

defeated an 8,000-man Egyptian relief force at Sheikan. Next the Mahdi captured

Darfur and imprisoned Rudolf Slatin, an Austrian in the khedive's service, who

later became the first Egyptianappointed governor of Darfur Province.

The advance of the Ansar and the Beja rising in the east imperiled

communications with Egypt and threatened to cut off garrisons at Khartoum,

Kassala, Sannar, and Sawakin and in the south. To avoid being drawn into a

costly military intervention, the British government ordered an Egyptian

withdrawal from Sudan. Gordon, who had received a reappointment as governor

general, arranged to supervise the evacuation of Egyptian troops and officials

and all foreigners from Sudan.

After reaching Khartoum in February 1884, Gordon realized that he could

not extricate the garrisons. As a result, he called for reinforcements from Egypt to

relieve Khartoum. Gordon also recommended that Zubayr, an old enemy whom
he recognized as an excellent military commander, be named to succeed him to

give disaffected Sudanese a leader other than the Mahdi to rally behind. London

rejected this plan. As the situation deteriorated, Gordon argued that Sudan was

essential to Egypt's security and that to allow the Ansar a victory there would

invite the movement to spread elsewhere.

Increasing British popular support for Gordon eventually forced Prime

Minister William Gladstone to mobilize a relief force under the command of Lord

Garnet Joseph Wolseley. A "flying column" sent overland from Wadi Halfa across

the Bayyudah Desert bogged down at Abu Tulayh (commonly called Abu Klea),

where the Hadendowa Beja--the so-called Fuzzy Wuzzies--broke the British line.

An advance unit that had gone ahead by river when the column reached Al

Matammah arrived at Khartoum on January 28, 1885, to find the town had fallen

two days earlier. The Ansar had waited for the Nile flood to recede before

attacking the poorly defended river approach to Khartoum in boats, slaughtering

the garrison, killing Gordon, and delivering his head to the Mahdi's tent. Kassala

and Sannar fell soon after, and by the end of 1885 the Ansar had begun to move

into the southern region. In all Sudan, only Sawakin, reinforced by Indian army

troops, and Wadi Halfa on the northern frontier remained in Anglo-Egyptian

hands.

The Mahdiyah (Mahdist regime) imposed traditional Islamic laws. Sudan's

new ruler also authorized the burning of lists of pedigrees and books of law and
theology because of their association with the old order and because he believed

that the former accentuated tribalism at the expense of religious unity.

The Mahdiyah has become known as the first genuine Sudanese

nationalist government. The Mahdi maintained that his movement was not a

religious order that could be accepted or rejected at will, but that it was a

universal regime, which challenged man to join or to be destroyed. The Mahdi

modified Islam's five pillars to support the dogma that loyalty to him was essential

to true belief. The Mahdi also added the declaration "and Muhammad Ahmad is

the Mahdi of God and the representative of His Prophet" to the recitation of the

creed, the shahada. Moreover, service in the jihad replaced the hajj, or

pilgrimage to Mecca, as a duty incumbent on the faithful. Zakat(almsgiving)

became the tax paid to the state. The Mahdi justified these and other innovations

and reforms as responses to instructions conveyed to him by God in visions.

The Khalifa. Six months after the capture of Khartoum, the Mahdi died of

typhus. The task of establishing and maintaining a government fell to his

deputies--three caliphs chosen by the Mahdi in emulation of the Prophet

Muhammad. Rivalry among the three, each supported by people of his native

region, continued until 1891, when Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, with the help

primarily of the Baqqara Arabs, overcame the opposition of the others and

emerged as unchallenged leader of the Mahdiyah. Abdallahi--called the Khalifa

(successor)--purged the Mahdiyah of members of the Mahdi's family and many of

his early religious disciples.

 Originally the Mahdiyah was a jihad state, run like a military camp. Sharia

courts enforced Islamic law and the Mahdi's precepts, which had the force of law.

After consolidating his power, the Khalifa instituted an administration and

appointed Ansar (who were usually Baqqara) as amirs over each of the several

provinces. The Khalifa also ruled over rich Al Jazirah. Although he failed to

restore this region's commercial wellbeing , the Khalifa organized workshops to

manufacture ammunition and to maintain river steamboats.

Regional relations remained tense throughout much of the Mahdiyah

period, largely because of the Khalifa's commitment to using the jihad to extend

his version of Islam throughout the world. For example, the Khalifa rejected an

offer of an alliance against the Europeans by Ethiopia's negus (king), Yohannes

IV. In 1887 a 60,000-man Ansar army invaded Ethiopia, penetrated as far as

Gonder, and captured prisoners and booty. The Khalifa then refused to conclude

peace with Ethiopia. In March 1889, an Ethiopian force, commanded by the king,

marched on Qallabat; however, after Yohannes IV fell in battle, the Ethiopians

withdrew. Abd ar Rahman an Nujumi, the Khalifa's best general, invaded Egypt in

1889, but British-led Egyptian troops defeated the Ansar at Tushkah. The failure

of the Egyptian invasion ended the Ansar' invincibility. The Belgians prevented

the Mahdi's men from conquering Equatoria, and in 1893 the Italians repulsed an

Ansar attack at Akordat (in Eritrea) and forced the Ansar to withdraw from

Ethiopia.
 Reconquest of Sudan. In 1892 Herbert Kitchener (later Lord Kitchener)

became sirdar, or commander, of the Egyptian army and started preparations for

the reconquest of Sudan. The British decision to occupy Sudan resulted in part

from international developments that required the country be brought under

British supervision. By the early 1890s, British, French, and Belgian claims had

converged at the Nile headwaters. Britain feared that the other colonial powers

would take advantage of Sudan's instability to acquire territory previously

annexed to Egypt. Apart from these political considerations, Britain wanted to

establish control over the Nile to safeguard a planned irrigation dam at Aswan.

In 1895 the British government authorized Kitchener to launch a campaign

to reconquer Sudan. Britain provided men and matériel while Egypt financed the

expedition. The Anglo-Egyptian Nile Expeditionary Force included 25,800 men,

8,600 of whom were British. The remainder were troops belonging to Egyptian

units that included six battalions recruited in southern Sudan. An armed river

flotilla escorted the force, which also had artillery support. In preparation for the

attack, the British established army headquarters at Wadi Halfa and extended

and reinforced the perimeter defenses around Sawakin. In March 1896, the

campaign started; in September, Kitchener captured Dunqulah. The British then

constructed a rail line from Wadi Halfa to Abu Hamad and an extension parallel to

the Nile to transport troops and supplies to Barbar. Anglo-Egyptian units fought a

sharp action at Abu Hamad, but there was little other significant resistance until

Kitchener reached Atbarah and defeated the Ansar. After this engagement,
Kitchener's soldiers marched and sailed toward Omdurman, where the Khalifa

made his last stand.

On September 2, 1898, the Khalifa committed his 52,000-man army to a

frontal assault against the Anglo-Egyptian force, which was massed on the plain

outside Omdurman. The outcome never was in doubt, largely because of

superior British firepower. During the five-hour battle, about 11,000 Mahdists died

whereas AngloEgyptian losses amounted to 48 dead and fewer than 400

wounded.

Mopping-up operations required several years, but organized resistance

ended when the Khalifa, who had escaped to Kurdufan, died in fighting at Umm

Diwaykarat in November 1899. Many areas welcomed the downfall of his regime.

Sudan's economy had been all but destroyed during his reign and the population

had declined by approximately one-half because of famine, disease, persecution,

and warfare. Moreover, none of the country's traditional institutions or loyalties

remained intact. Tribes had been divided in their attitudes toward Mahdism,

religious brotherhoods had been weakened, and orthodox religious leaders had

vanished.

THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONDOMINIUM, 1899-1955. In January 1899,

an Anglo-Egyptian agreement restored Egyptian rule in Sudan but as part of a

condominium, or joint authority, exercised by Britain and Egypt. The agreement

designated territory south of the twenty-second parallel as the Anglo-Egyptian

Sudan. Although it emphasized Egypt's indebtedness to Britain for its

participation in the reconquest, the agreement failed to clarify the juridical

relationship between the two condominium powers in Sudan or to provide a legal

basis for continued British presence in the south. Britain assumed responsibility

for governing the territory on behalf of the khedive.

Article II of the agreement specified that "the supreme military and civil

command in Sudan shall be vested in one officer, termed the Governor-General

of Sudan. He shall be appointed by Khedival Decree on the recommendation of

Her Britannic Majesty's Government and shall be removed only by Khedival

Decree with the consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government." The British

governor general, who was a military officer, reported to the Foreign Office

through its resident agent in Cairo. In practice, however, he exercised

extraordinary powers and directed the condominium government from Khartoum

as if it were a colonial administration. Sir Reginald Wingate succeeded Kitchener

as governor general in 1899. In each province, two inspectors and several district

commissioners aided the British governor (mudir). Initially, nearly all

administrative personnel were British army officers attached to the Egyptian

army. In 1901, however, civilian administrators started arriving in Sudan from

Britain and formed the nucleus of the Sudan Political Service. Egyptians filled

middle-level posts while Sudanese gradually acquired lower-level positions.

In the condominium's early years, the governor general and provincial

governors exercised great latitude in governing Sudan. After 1910, however, an

executive council, whose approval was required for all legislation and for
budgetary matters, assisted the governor general. The governor general

presided over this council, which included the inspector general; the civil, legal,

and financial secretaries; and two to four other British officials appointed by the

governor general. The executive council retained legislative authority until 1948.

After restoring order and the government's authority, the British dedicated

themselves to creating a modern government in the condominium. Jurists

adopted penal and criminal procedural codes similar to those in force in British

India. Commissions established land tenure rules and adjusted claims in dispute

because of grants made by successive governments. Taxes on land remained

the basic form of taxation, the amount assessed depending on the type of

irrigation, the number of date palms, and the size of herds; however, the rate of

taxation was fixed for the first time in Sudan's history. The 1902 Code of Civil

Procedure continued the Ottoman separation of civil law and sharia, but it also

created guidelines for the operation of sharia courts as an autonomous judicial

division under a chief qadi appointed by the governor general. Religious judges

and other sharia court officials were invariably Egyptian.

There was little resistance to the condominium. Breaches of the peace

usually took the form of intertribal warfare, banditry, or revolts of short duration.

For example, Mahdist uprisings occurred in February 1900, in 1902-3, in 1904,

and in 1908. In 1916 Abd Allah as Suhayni, who claimed to be the Prophet Isa,

launched an unsuccessful jihad.

 The problem of the condominium's undefined borders was a greater

concern. A 1902 treaty with Ethiopia fixed the southeastern boundary with Sudan.

Seven years later, an AngloBelgian treaty determined the status of the Lado

Enclave in the south establishing a border with the Belgian Congo (present-day

Zaire). The western boundary proved more difficult to resolve. Darfur was the

only province formerly under Egyptian control that was not soon recovered under

the condominium. When the Mahdiyah disintegrated, Sultan Ali Dinar reclaimed

Darfur's throne, which had been lost to the Egyptians in 1874 and held the throne

under Ottoman suzerainty, with British approval on condition that he pay annual

tribute to the khedive. When World War I broke out, Ali Dinar proclaimed his

loyalty to the Ottoman Empire and responded to the Porte's call for a jihad

against the Allies. Britain, which had declared a protectorate over Egypt in 1914,

sent a small force against Ali Dinar, who died in subsequent fighting. In 1916 the

British annexed Darfur to Sudan and terminated the Fur sultanate.

During the condominium period, economic development occurred only in

the Nile Valley's settled areas. In the first two decades of condominium rule, the

British extended telegraph and rail lines to link key points in northern Sudan but

services did not reach more remote areas. Port Sudan opened in 1906, replacing

Sawakin as the country's principal outlet to the sea. In 1911 the Sudanese

government and the private Sudan Plantations Syndicate launched the Gezira

Scheme (Gezira is also seen as Jazirah) to provide a source of high-quality

cotton for Britain's textile industry. An irrigation dam near Sannar, completed in

1925, brought a much larger area in Al Jazirah under cultivation. Planters sent
cotton by rail from Sannar to Port Sudan for shipment abroad. The Gezira

Scheme made cotton the mainstay of the country's economy and turned the

region into Sudan's most densely populated area.

In 1922 Britain renounced the protectorate and approved Egypt's

declaration of independence. However, the 1923 Egyptian constitution made no

claim to Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan. Subsequent negotiations in London

between the British and the new Egyptian government foundered on the Sudan

question. Nationalists who were inflamed by the failure of the talks rioted in Egypt

and Sudan, where a minority supported union with Egypt. In November 1924, Sir

Lee Stack, governor general of Sudan and sirdar, was assassinated in Cairo.

Britain ordered all Egyptian troops, civil servants, and public employees

withdrawn from Sudan. In 1925 Khartoum formed the 4,500-man Sudan Defence

Force (SDF) under Sudanese officers to replace Egyptian units.

Sudan was relatively quiet in the late 1920s and 1930s. During this period,

the colonial government favored indirect rule, which allowed the British to govern

through indigenous leaders. In Sudan, the traditional leaders were the shaykhs--

of villages, tribes, and districts--in the north and tribal chiefs in the south. The

number of Sudanese recognizing them and the degree of authority they held

varied considerably. The British first delegated judicial powers to shaykhs to

enable them to settle local disputes and then gradually allowed the shaykhs to

administer local governments under the supervision of British district

commissioners.
 The mainstream of political development, however, occurred among local

leaders and among Khartoum's educated elite. In their view, indirect rule

prevented the country's unification, exacerbated tribalism in the north, and served

in the south to buttress a less-advanced society against Arab influence. Indirect

rule also implied government decentralization, which alarmed the educated elite

who had careers in the central administration and envisioned an eventual

transfer of power from British colonial authorities to their class. Although

nationalists and the Khatmiyyah opposed indirect rule, the Ansar, many of whom

enjoyed positions of local authority, supported the concept.

Britain's Southern Policy. From the beginning of the Anglo-Egyptian

condominium, the British sought to modernize Sudan by applying European

technology to its underdeveloped economy and by replacing its authoritarian

institutions with ones that adhered to liberal English traditions. However, southern

Sudan's remote and undeveloped provinces--Equatoria, Bahr al Ghazal, and

Upper Nile--received little official attention until after World War I, except for

efforts to suppress tribal warfare and the slave trade. The British justified this

policy by claiming that the south was not ready for exposure to the modern world.

To allow the south to develop along indigenous lines, the British, therefore,

closed the region to outsiders. As a result, the south remained isolated and

backward. A few Arab merchants controlled the region's limited commercial

activities while Arab bureaucrats administered whatever laws existed. Christian

missionaries, who operated schools and medical clinics, provided limited social

services in southern Sudan.

 The earliest Christian missionaries were the Verona Fathers, a Roman

Catholic religious order that had established southern missions before the

Mahdiyah. Other missionary groups active in the south included Presbyterians

from the United States and the Anglican Church Missionary Society. There was

no competition among these missions, largely because they maintained separate

areas of influence. The government eventually subsidized the mission schools

that educated southerners. Because mission graduates usually succeeded in

gaining posts in the provincial civil service, many northerners regarded them as

tools of British imperialism. The few southerners who received higher training

attended schools in British East Africa (present-day Kenya, Uganda, and

Tanzania) rather than in Khartoum, thereby exacerbating the north-south division.

British authorities treated the three southern provinces as a separate

region. The colonial administration, as it consolidated its southern position in the

1920s, detached the south from the rest of Sudan for all practical purposes. The

period's "closed door" ordinances, which barred northern Sudanese from

entering or working in the south, reinforced this separate development policy.

Moreover, the British gradually replaced Arab administrators and expelled Arab

merchants, thereby severing the south's last economic contacts with the north.

The colonial administration also discouraged the spread of Islam, the practice of

Arab customs, and the wearing of Arab dress. At the same time, the British made

efforts to revitalize African customs and tribal life that the slave trade had

disrupted. Finally, a 1930 directive stated that blacks in the southern provinces
were to be considered a people distinct from northern Muslims and that the

region should be prepared for eventual integration with British East Africa.

Although potentially a rich agricultural zone, the south's economic

development suffered because of the region's isolation. Moreover, a continual

struggle went on between British officials in the north and south, as those in the

former resisted recommendations that northern resources be diverted to spur

southern economic development. Personality clashes between officials in the two

branches in the Sudan Political Service also impeded the south's growth. Those

individuals who served in the southern provinces tended to be military officers

with previous Africa experience on secondment to the colonial service. They

usually were distrustful of Arab influence and were committed to keeping the

south under British control. By contrast, officials in the northern provinces tended

to be Arabists often drawn from the diplomatic and consular service. Whereas

northern provincial governors conferred regularly as a group with the governor

general in Khartoum, their three southern colleagues met to coordinate activities

with the governors of the British East African colonies.

Rise of Sudanese Nationalism. Sudanese nationalism, as it developed

after World War I, was an Arab and Muslim phenomenon with its support base in

the northern provinces. Nationalists opposed indirect rule and advocated a

centralized national government in Khartoum responsible for both regions.

Nationalists also perceived Britain's southern policy as artificially dividing Sudan

and preventing its unification under an arabized and Islamic ruling class.
 Ironically, however, a non-Arab led Sudan's first modern nationalist

movement. In 1921 Ali Abd al Latif, a Muslim Dinka and former army officer,

founded the United Tribes Society that called for an independent Sudan in which

power would be shared by tribal and religious leaders. Three years later, Ali Abd

al Latif's movement, reconstituted as the White Flag League, organized

demonstrations in Khartoum that took advantage of the unrest that followed

Stack's assassination. Ali Abd al Latif's arrest and subsequent exile in Egypt

sparked a mutiny by a Sudanese army battalion, the suppression of which

succeeded in temporarily crippling the nationalist movement.

In the 1930s, nationalism reemerged in Sudan. Educated Sudanese

wanted to restrict the governor general's power and to obtain Sudanese

participation in the council's deliberations. However, any change in government

required a change in the condominium agreement. Neither Britain nor Egypt

would agree to a modification. Moreover, the British regarded their role as the

protection of the Sudanese from Egyptian domination. The nationalists feared

that the eventual result of friction between the condominium powers might be the

attachment of northern Sudan to Egypt and southern Sudan to Uganda and

Kenya. Although they settled most of their differences in the 1936 Treaty of

Alliance, which set a timetable for the end of British military occupation, Britain

and Egypt failed to agree on Sudan's future status.

Nationalists and religious leaders were divided on the issue of whether

Sudan should apply for independence or for union with Egypt. The Mahdi's son,
Abd ar Rahman al Mahdi, emerged as a spokesman for independence in

opposition to Ali al Mirghani, the Khatmiyyah leader, who favored union with

Egypt. Coalitions supported by each of these leaders formed rival wings of the

nationalist movement. Later, radical nationalists and the Khatmiyyah created the

Ashigga, later renamed the National Unionist Party (NUP), to advance the cause

of Sudanese-Egyptian unification. The moderates favored Sudanese

independence in cooperation with Britain and together with the Ansar established

the Umma Party.

The Road to Independence. As World War II approached, the SDF

assumed the mission of guarding Sudan's frontier with Italian East Africa

(present-day Ethiopia). During the summer of 1940, Italian forces invaded Sudan

at several points and captured Kassala. However, the SDF prevented a further

advance on Port Sudan. In January 1941, the SDF, expanded to 20,000 troops,

retook Kassala and participated in the British offensive that routed the Italians in

Eritrea and liberated Ethiopia. Some Sudanese units later contributed to the

British Eighth Army's North Africa victory.

In the immediate postwar years, the condominium government made a

number of significant changes. In 1942 the Graduates' General Conference, a

quasi-nationalist movement formed by educated Sudanese, presented the

government with a memorandum that demanded a pledge of self-determination

after the war to be preceded by abolition of the "closed door" ordinances, an end

to the separate curriculum in southern schools, and an increase in the number of

Sudanese in the civil service. The governor general refused to accept the

memorandum but agreed to a governmentsupervised transformation of indirect

rule into a modernized system of local government. Sir Douglas Newbold,

governor of Kurdufan Province in the 1930s and later the executive council's civil

secretary, advised the establishment of parliamentary government and the

administrative unification of north and south. In 1948, over Egyptian objections,

Britain authorized the partially elected consultative Legislative Assembly

representing both regions to supersede the advisory executive council.

The pro-Egyptian NUP boycotted the 1948 Legislative Assembly elections.

As a result, pro-independence groups dominated the Legislative Assembly. In

1952 leaders of the Umma-dominated legislature negotiated the Self-

Determination Agreement with Britain. The legislators then enacted a constitution

that provided for a prime minister and council of ministers responsible to a

bicameral parliament. The new Sudanese government would have responsibility

in all areas except military and foreign affairs, which remained in the British

governor general's hands. Cairo, which demanded recognition of Egyptian

sovereignty over Sudan, repudiated the condominium agreement in protest and

declared its reigning monarch, Faruk, king of Sudan.

After seizing power in Egypt and overthrowing the Faruk monarchy in late

1952, Colonel Muhammad Naguib broke the deadlock on the problem of

Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan. Cairo previously had linked discussions on

Sudan's status to an agreement on the evacuation of British troops from the Suez
Canal. Naguib separated the two issues and accepted the right of Sudanese self-

determination. In February 1953, London and Cairo signed an Anglo-Egyptian

accord, which allowed for a three-year transition period from condominium rule to

self-government. During the transition phase, British and Egyptian troops would

withdraw from Sudan. At the end of this period, the Sudanese would decide their

future status in a plebiscite conducted under international supervision. Naguib's

concession seemed justified when parliamentary elections held at the end of

1952 gave a majority to the pro-Egyptian NUP, which had called for an eventual

union with Egypt. In January 1954, a new government emerged under NUP

leader Ismail al Azhari.

The South and the Unity of Sudan. During World War II, some British

colonial officers questioned the economic and political viability of the southern

provinces as separate from northern Sudan. Britain also had become more

sensitive to Arab criticism of the southern policy. In 1946 the Sudan

Administrative Conference determined that Sudan should be administered as

one country. Moreover, the conference delegates agreed to readmit northern

administrators to southern posts, abolish the trade restrictions imposed under the

"closed door" ordinances, and allow southerners to seek employment in the

north. Khartoum also nullified the prohibition against Muslim proselytizing in the

south and introduced Arabic in the south as the official administration language.

Some southern British colonial officials responded to the Sudan

Administrative Conference by charging that northern agitation had influenced the

conferees and that no voice had been heard at the conference in support of

retaining the separate development policy. These British officers argued that

northern domination of the south would result in a southern rebellion against the

government. Khartoum therefore convened a conference at Juba to allay the

fears of southern leaders and British officials in the south and to assure them that

a postindependence government would safeguard southern political and cultural

rights.

Despite these promises, an increasing number of southerners expressed

concern that northerners would overwhelm them. In particular, they resented the

imposition of Arabic as the official language of administration, which deprived

most of the few educated English-speaking southerners of the opportunity to

enter public service. They also felt threatened by the replacement of trusted

British district commissioners with unsympathetic northerners. After the

government replaced several hundred colonial officials with Sudanese, only four

of whom were southerners, the southern elite abandoned hope of a peaceful,

unified, independent Sudan.

The hostility of southerners toward the northern Arab majority surfaced

violently when southern army units mutinied in August 1955 to protest their

transfer to garrisons under northern officers. The rebellious troops killed several

hundred northerners, including government officials, army officers, and

merchants. The government quickly suppressed the revolt and eventually

executed seventy southerners for sedition. But this harsh reaction failed to pacify
the south, as some of the mutineers escaped to remote areas and organized

resistance to the Arab-dominated government of Sudan.

INDEPENDENT SUDAN. The Azhari government temporarily halted

progress toward self-determination for Sudan, hoping to promote unity with

Egypt. Although his pro-Egyptian NUP had won a majority in the 1953

parliamentary elections, Azhari realized that popular opinion had shifted against

union with Egypt. As a result, Azhari, who had been the major spokesman for the

"unity of the Nile Valley," reversed the NUP's stand and supported Sudanese

independence. On December 19, 1955, the Sudanese parliament, under Azhari's

leadership, unanimously adopted a declaration of independence; on January 1,

1956, Sudan became an independent republic. Azhari called for the withdrawal of

foreign troops and requested the condominium powers to sponsor a plebiscite in

advance of the scheduled date.

The Politics of Independence

Sudan achieved independence without the rival political parties having

agreed on the form and content of a permanent constitution. Instead, the

Constituent Assembly adopted a document known as the Transitional

Constitution, which replaced the governor general as head of state with a five-

member Supreme Commission that was elected by a parliament composed of an

indirectly elected Senate and a popularly elected House of Representatives. The

Transitional Constitution also allocated executive power to the prime minister,

who was nominated by the House of Representatives and confirmed in office by

the Supreme Commission.

Although it achieved independence without conflict, Sudan inherited many

problems from the condominium. Chief among these was the status of the civil

service. The government placed Sudanese in the administration and provided

compensation and pensions for British officers of the Sudan Political Service who

left the country; it retained those who could not be replaced, mostly technicians

and teachers. Khartoum achieved this transformation quickly and with a minimum

of turbulence, although southerners resented the replacement of British

administrators in the south with northern Sudanese. To advance their interests,

many southern leaders concentrated their efforts in Khartoum, where they hoped

to win constitutional concessions. Although determined to resist what they

perceived to be Arab imperialism, they were opposed to violence. Most southern

representatives supported provincial autonomy and warned that failure to win

legal concessions would drive the south to rebellion.

The parliamentary regime introduced plans to expand the country's

education, economic, and transportation sectors. To achieve these goals,

Khartoum needed foreign economic and technical assistance, to which the

United States made an early commitment. Conversations between the two

governments had begun in mid-1957, and the parliament ratified a United States

aid agreement in July 1958. Washington hoped this agreement would reduce

Sudan's excessive reliance on a one-crop (cotton) economy and would facilitate

the development of the country's transportation and communications

infrastructure.

The prime minister formed a coalition government in February 1956, but

he alienated the Khatmiyyah by supporting increasingly secular government

policies. In June some Khatmiyyah members who had defected from the NUP

established the People's Democratic Party (PDP) under Mirghani's leadership.

The Umma and the PDP combined in parliament to bring down the Azhari

government. With support from the two parties and backing from the Ansar and

the Khatmiyyah, Abd Allah Khalil put together a coalition government.

Major issues confronting Khalil's coalition government included winning

agreement on a permanent constitution, stabilizing the south, encouraging

economic development, and improving relations with Egypt. Strains within the

Umma-PDP coalition hampered the government's ability to make progress on

these matters. The Umma, for example, wanted the proposed constitution to

institute a presidential form of government on the assumption that Abd ar

Rahman al Mahdi would be elected the first president. Consensus was lacking

about the country's economic future. A poor cotton harvest followed the 1957

bumper cotton crop, which Sudan had been unable to sell at a good price in a

glutted market. This downturn depleted Sudan's reserves and caused unrest over

government-imposed economic restrictions. To overcome these problems and

finance future development projects, the Umma called for greater reliance on

foreign aid. The PDP, however, objected to this strategy because it promoted
unacceptable foreign influence in Sudan. The PDP's philosophy reflected the

Arab nationalism espoused by Gamal Abdul Nasser, who had replaced Egyptian

leader Naguib in 1954. Despite these policy differences, the Umma-PDP coalition

lasted for the remaining year of the parliament's tenure. Moreover, after the

parliament adjourned, the two parties promised to maintain a common front for

the 1958 elections.

The electorate gave a plurality in both houses to the Umma and an overall

majority to the Umma-PDP coalition. The NUP, however, won nearly one-quarter

of the seats, largely from urban centers and from Gezira Scheme agricultural

workers. In the south, the vote represented a rejection of the men who had

cooperated with the government--voters defeated all three southerners in the

preelection cabinet--and a victory for advocates of autonomy within a federal

system. Resentment against the government's taking over mission schools and

against the measures used in suppressing the 1955 mutiny contributed to the

election of several candidates who had been implicated in the rebellion.

After the new parliament convened, Khalil again formed an Umma-PDP

coalition government. Unfortunately, factionalism, corruption, and vote fraud

dominated parliamentary deliberations at a time when the country needed

decisive action with regard to the proposed constitution and the future of the

south. As a result, the Umma-PDP coalition failed to exercise effective

leadership.
 Another issue that divided the parliament concerned SudaneseUnited

States relations. In March 1958, Khalil signed a technical assistance agreement

with the United States. When he presented the pact to parliament for ratification,

he discovered that the NUP wanted to use the issue to defeat the Umma-PDP

coalition and that many PDP delegates opposed the agreement. Nevertheless,

the Umma, with the support of some PDP and southern delegates, managed to

obtain approval of the agreement.

Factionalism and bribery in parliament, coupled with the government's

inability to resolve Sudan's many social, political, and economic problems,

increased popular disillusion with democratic government. Specific complaints

included Khartoum's decision to sell cotton at a price above world market prices.

This policy resulted in low sales of cotton, the commodity from which Sudan

derived most of its income. Restrictions on imports imposed to take pressure off

depleted foreign exchange reserves caused consternation among town dwellers

who had become accustomed to buying foreign goods. Moreover, rural

northerners also suffered from an embargo that Egypt placed on imports of

cattle, camels, and dates from Sudan. Growing popular discontent caused many

antigovernment demonstrations in Khartoum. Egypt also criticized Khalil and

suggested that it might support a coup against his government. Meanwhile,

reports circulated in Khartoum that the Umma and the NUP were near agreement

on a new coalition that would exclude the PDP and Khalil.

 On November 17, 1958, the day parliament was to convene, a military

coup occurred. Khalil, himself a retired army general, planned the preemptive

coup in conjunction with leading Umma members and the army's two senior

generals, Ibrahim Abbud and Ahmad Abd al Wahab, who became leaders of the

military regime. Abbud immediately pledged to resolve all disputes with Egypt,

including the long-standing problem of the status of the Nile River. Abbud

abandoned the previous government's unrealistic policies regarding the sale of

cotton. He also appointed a constitutional commission, headed by the chief

justice, to draft a permanent constitution. Abbud maintained, however, that

political parties only served as vehicles for personal ambitions and that they

would not be reestablished when civilian rule was restored.

The Abbud Military Government, 1958-64. The coup removed political

decision making from the control of the civilian politicians. Abbud created the

Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to rule Sudan. This body contained

officers affiliated with the Ansar and the Khatmiyyah. Abbud belonged to the

Khatmiyyah, whereas Abd al Wahab was a member of the Ansar. Until Abd al

Wahab's removal in March 1959, the Ansar were the stronger of the two groups

in the government.

The regime benefited during its first year in office from successful

marketing of the cotton crop. Abbud also profited from the settlement of the Nile

waters dispute with Egypt and the improvement of relations between the two

countries. Under the military regime, the influence of the Ansar and the
Khatmiyyah lessened. The strongest religious leader, Abd ar Rahman al Mahdi,

died in early 1959. His son and successor, the elder Sadiq al Mahdi, failed to

enjoy the respect accorded his father. When Sadiq died two years later, Ansar

religious and political leadership divided between his brother, Imam Al Hadi al

Mahdi, and his son, the younger Sadiq al Mahdi.

Despite the Abbud regime's early successes, opposition elements

remained powerful. In 1959 dissident military officers made three attempts to

displace the Abbud government and to establish a "popular government."

Although the courts sentenced the leaders of these attempted coups to life

imprisonment, discontent in the military continued to hamper the government's

performance. In particular, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), which

supported the attempted coups, gained a reputation as an effective

antigovernment organization. To compound its problems, the Abbud regime

lacked dynamism and the ability to stabilize the country. Its failure to place

capable civilian advisers in positions of authority, to launch a credible economic

and social development program, and to gain the army's support created an

atmosphere that encouraged political turbulence.

Abbud's southern policy proved to be his undoing. The government

suppressed expressions of religious and cultural differences and bolstered

attempts to arabize society. In February 1964, for example, Abbud ordered the

mass explusion of foreign missionaries from the south. He then closed

parliament to cut off outlets for southern complaints. Southern leaders had
renewed in 1963 the armed struggle against the Sudanese government that had

continued sporadically since 1955. The rebellion was spearheaded from 1963 by

guerrilla forces known as the Anya Nya (the name of a poisonous concoction).

Return to Civilian Rule, 1964-69. Recognizing its inability to quell

growing southern discontent, the Abbud regime asked the civilian sector to

submit proposals for a solution to the southern problem. However, criticism of

government policy quickly went beyond the southern issue and included Abbud's

handling of other problems, such as the economy and education. Government

attempts to silence these protests, which were centered in the University of

Khartoum, brought a reaction not only from teachers and students but also from

Khartoum's civil servants and trade unionists. The so-called October Revolution

of 1964 centered around a general strike that spread throughout the country.

Strike leaders identified themselves as the National Front for Professionals.

Along with some former politicians, they formed the leftist United National Front

(UNF), which made contact with dissident army officers.

After several days of rioting that resulted in many deaths, Abbud dissolved

the government and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. UNF leaders and

army commanders who planned the transition from military to civilian rule

selected a nonpolitical senior civil servant, Sirr al Khatim al Khalifa, as prime

minister to head a transitional government.

The new civilian regime, which operated under the 1956 Transitional

Constitution, tried to end political factionalism by establishing a coalition

government. There was continued popular hostility to the reappearance of

political parties, however, because of their divisiveness during the Abbud regime.

Although the new government allowed all parties, including the SCP, to operate,

only five of fifteen posts in Khatim's cabinet went to party politicians. The prime

minister gave two positions to nonparty southerners and the remaining eight to

members of the National Front for Professionals, which included several

communists.

Eventually two political parties emerged to represent the south. The

Sudan African National Union (SANU), founded in 1963 and led by William Deng

and Saturino Lahure, a Roman Catholic priest, operated among refugee groups

and guerrilla forces. The Southern Front, a mass organization led by Stanislaus

Payasama that had worked underground during the Abbud regime, functioned

openly within the southern provinces. After the collapse of government-

sponsored peace conferences in 1965, Deng's wing of SANU--known locally as

SANU-William--and the Southern Front coalesced to take part in the

parliamentary elections. SANU remained active in parliament for the next four

years as a voice for southern regional autonomy within a unified state. Exiled

SANU leaders balked at Deng's moderate approach and formed the Azania

Liberation Front based in Kampala, Uganda.

Anya Nya leaders remained aloof from political movements. The guerrillas

were fragmented by ethnic and religious differences. Additionally, conflicts

surfaced within Anya Nya between older leaders who had been in the bush since
1955, and younger, better educated men like Joseph Lagu, a former Sudanese

army captain, who eventually became a strong guerrilla leader, largely because

of his ability to get arms from Israel.

The government scheduled national elections for March 1965 and

announced that the new parliament's task would be to prepare a new

constitution. The deteriorating southern security situation prevented elections

from being conducted in that region, however, and the political parties split on the

question of whether elections should be held in the north as scheduled or

postponed until the whole country could vote. The PDP and SCP, both fearful of

losing votes, wanted to postpone the elections, as did southern elements loyal to

Khartoum. Their opposition forced the government to resign. The president of the

reinstated Supreme Commission, who had replaced Abbud as chief of state,

directed that the elections be held wherever possible. The PDP rejected this

decision and boycotted the elections.

The 1965 election results were inconclusive. Apart from a low voter

turnout, there was a confusing overabundance of candidates on the ballots. As a

result, few of those elected won a majority of the votes cast. The Umma captured

75 out of 158 parliamentary seats while its NUP ally took 52 of the remainder.

The two parties formed a coalition cabinet in June headed by Umma leader

Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub, whereas Azhari, the NUP leader, became the

Supreme Commission's permanent president and chief of state.

 The Mahjub government had two goals: progress toward solving the

southern problem and the removal of communists from positions of power. The

army launched a major offensive to crush the rebellion and in the process

augmented its reputation for brutality among the southerners. Many southerners

reported government atrocities against civilians, especially at Juba and Waw.

Sudanese army troops also burned churches and huts, closed schools, and

destroyed crops and cattle. To achieve his second objective, Mahjub succeeded

in having parliament approve a decree that abolished the SCP and deprived the

eleven communists of their seats.

In October 1965, the Umma-NUP coalition collapsed because of a

disagreement over whether Mahjub, as prime minister, or Azhari, as president,

should conduct Sudan's foreign relations. Mahjub continued in office for another

eight months but resigned in July 1966 after a parliamentary vote of censure,

which resulted in a split in the Umma. The traditional wing led by Mahjub, under

the Imam Al Hadi al Mahjub's spiritual leadership, opposed the party's majority.

The latter group professed loyalty to the imam's nephew, the younger Sadiq al

Mahdi, who was the Umma's official leader and who rejected religious

sectarianism. Sadiq became prime minister with backing from his own Umma

wing and from NUP allies.

The Sadiq al Mahdi government, supported by a sizable parliamentary

majority, sought to reduce regional disparities by organizing economic

development. Sadiq al Mahdi also planned to use his personal rapport with
southern leaders to engineer a peace agreement with the insurgents. He

proposed to replace the Supreme Commission with a president and a southern

vice president and called for the approval of autonomy for the southern

provinces.

The educated elite and segments of the army opposed Sadiq al Mahdi

because of his gradualist approach to Sudan's political, economic, and social

problems. Leftist student organizations and the trade unions demanded the

creation of a socialist state. Although these elements lacked widespread popular

support, they represented an influential portion of educated public opinion. Their

resentment of Sadiq increased when he refused to honor a Supreme Court ruling

that overturned legislation banning the SCP and ousting communists elected to

parliamentary seats. In December 1966, a coup attempt by communists and a

small army unit against the government failed. The government subsequently

arrested many communists and army personnel.

In March 1967, the government held elections in thirty-six constituencies

in pacified southern areas. The Sadiq al Mahdi wing of the Umma won fifteen

seats, the federalist SANU ten, and the NUP five. Despite this apparent boost in

his support, however, Sadiq's position in parliament had become tenuous

because of concessions he promised to the south in order to bring an end to the

civil war. The Umma traditionalist wing opposed Sadiq al Mahdi because of his

support for constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and his refusal to

declare Sudan an Islamic state. When the traditionalists and the NUP withdrew
their support, his government fell. In May 1967, Mahjub became prime minister

and head of a coalition government whose cabinet included members of his wing

of the Umma, of the NUP, and of the PDP. In December 1967, the PDP and the

NUP formed the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) under Azhari's leadership.

By early 1968, widening divisions in the Umma threatened the survival of

the Mahjub government. Sadiq al Mahdi's wing held a majority in parliament and

could thwart any government action. Mahjub therefore dissolved parliament.

However, Sadiq refused to recognize the legitimacy of the prime minister's action.

As a result, two governments functioned in Khartoum--one meeting in the

parliament building and the other on its lawn--both of which claimed to represent

the legislature's will. The army commander requested clarification from the

Supreme Court regarding which of them had authority to issue orders. The court

backed Mahjub's dissolution; the government scheduled new elections for April.

Although the DUP won 101 of 218 seats, no single party controlled a

parliamentary majority. Thirty-six seats went to the Umma traditionalists, thirty to

the Sadiq wing, and twenty-five to the two southern parties--SANU and the

Southern Front. The SCP secretary general, Abd al Khaliq Mahjub, also won a

seat. In a major setback, Sadiq lost his own seat to a traditionalist rival.

Because it lacked a majority, the DUP concluded an alliance with Umma

traditionalists, who received the prime ministership for their leader, Muhammad

Ahmad Mahjub, and four other cabinet posts. The coalition's program included

plans for government reorganization, closer ties with the Arab world, and
renewed economic development efforts, particularly in the southern provinces.

The Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub government also accepted military, technical,

and economic aid from the Soviet Union. Sadiq al Mahdi's wing of the Umma

formed the small parliamentary opposition. When it refused to participate in

efforts to complete the draft constitution, already ten years overdue, the

government retaliated by closing the opposition's newspaper and clamping down

on pro-Sadiq demonstrations in Khartoum.

By late 1968, the two Umma wings agreed to support the Ansar chief

Imam Al Hadi al Mahdi in the 1969 presidential election. At the same time, the

DUP announced that Azhari also would seek the presidency. The communists

and other leftists aligned themselves behind the presidential candidacy of former

Chief Justice Babikr Awadallah, whom they viewed as an ally because he had

ruled against the government when it attempted to outlaw the SCP.

THE NIMEIRI ERA, 1969-85. On May 25, 1969, several young officers,

calling themselves the Free Officers' Movement, seized power. At the

conspiracy's core were nine officers led by Colonel Jaafar an Nimeiri, who had

been implicated in plots against the Abbud regime. Nimeiri's coup preempted

plots by other groups, most of which involved army factions supported by the

SCP, Arab nationalists, or conservative religious groups. He justified the coup on

the grounds that civilian politicians had paralyzed the decision-making process,

had failed to deal with the country's economic and regional problems, and had

left Sudan without a permanent constitution.

 Revolutionary Command Council

The coup leaders, joined by Awadallah, the former chief justice who had

been privy to the coup, constituted themselves as the ten-member Revolutionary

Command Council (RCC), which posssessed collective executive authority under

Nimeiri's chairmanship. On assuming control, the RCC proclaimed the

establishment of a "democratic republic" dedicated to advancing independent

"Sudanese socialism." The RCC's first acts included the suspension of the

Transitional Constitution, the abolition of all government institutions, and the

banning of political parties. The RCC also nationalized many industries,

businesses, and banks. Furthermore, Nimeiri ordered the arrest of sixty-three

civilian politicians and forcibly retired senior army officers.

Awadallah, appointed prime minister to form a new government to

implement RCC policy directives, wanted to dispel the notion that the coup had

installed a military dictatorship. He presided over a twenty-one-member cabinet

that included only three officers from the RCC, among them its chairman, Nimeiri,

who was also defense minister. The cabinet's other military members held the

portfolios for internal security and communications. Nine members of the

Awadallah regime were allegedly communists, including one of the two

southerners in the cabinet, John Garang, minister of supply and later minister for

southern affairs. Others identified themselves as Marxists. Since the RCC lacked

political and administrative experience, the communists played a significant role

in shaping government policies and programs. Despite the influence of individual

SCP members, the RCC claimed that its cooperation with the party was a matter

of convenience.

In November 1969, after he claimed the regime could not survive without

communist assistance, Awadallah lost the prime ministership. Nimeiri, who

became head of a largely civilian government in addition to being chief of state,

succeeded him. Awadallah retained his position as RCC deputy chairman and

remained in the government as foreign minister and as an important link with

leftist elements.

Conservative forces, led by the Ansar, posed the greatest threat to the

RCC. Imam Al Hadi al Mahdi had withdrawn to his Aba Island stronghold (in the

Nile, near Khartoum) in the belief that the government had decided to strike at

the Ansar movement. The imam had demanded a return to democratic

government, the exclusion of communists from power, and an end to RCC rule.

In March 1970, hostile Ansar crowds prevented Nimeiri from visiting the island for

talks with the imam. Fighting subsequently erupted between government forces

and as many as 30,000 Ansar. When the Ansar ignored an ultimatum to

surrender, army units with air support assaulted Aba Island. About 3,000 people

died during the battle. The imam escaped only to be killed while attempting to

cross the border into Ethiopia. The government exiled Sadiq al Mahdi to Egypt,

where Nasser promised to keep him under guard to prevent him from succeeding

his uncle as head of the Ansar movement.

 After neutralizing this conservative opposition, the RCC concentrated on

consolidating its political organization to phase out communist participation in the

government. This strategy prompted an internal debate within the SCP. The

orthodox wing, led by party secretary general Abd al Khaliq Mahjub, demanded a

popular front government with communists participating as equal partners. The

National Communist wing, on the other hand, supported cooperation with the

government.

Soon after the army had crushed the Ansar at Aba Island, Nimeiri moved

against the SCP. He ordered the deportation of Abd al Khaliq Mahjub. Then,

when the SCP secretary general returned to Sudan illegally after several months

abroad, Nimeiri placed him under house arrest. In March 1971, Nimeiri indicated

that trade unions, a traditional communist stronghold, would be placed under

government control. The RCC also banned communistaffiliated student,

women's, and professional organizations. Additionally, Nimeiri announced the

planned formation of a national political movement called the Sudan Socialist

Union (SSU), which would assume control of all political parties, including the

SCP. After this speech, the government arrested the SCP's central committee

and other leading communists.

The SCP, however, retained a covert organization that was not damaged

in the sweep. Before further action could be taken against the party, the SCP

launched a coup against Nimeiri. The coup occurred on July 19, 1971, when one

of the plotters, Major Hisham al Atta, surprised Nimeiri and the RCC meeting in
the presidential palace and seized them along with a number of proNimeiri

officers. Atta named a seven-member revolutionary council, in which communists

ranked prominently, to serve as the national government. Three days after the

coup, however, loyal army units stormed the palace, rescued Nimeiri, and

arrested Atta and his confederates. Nimeiri, who blamed the SCP for the coup,

ordered the arrest of hundreds of communists and dissident military officers. The

government subsequently executed some of these individuals and imprisoned

many others.

Having survived the SCP-inspired coup, Nimeiri reaffirmed his

commitment to establishing a socialist state. A provisional constitution, published

in August 1971, described Sudan as a "socialist democracy" and provided for a

presidential form of government to replace the RCC. A plebiscite the following

month elected Nimeiri to a six-year term as president.

The Southern Problem. The origins of the civil war in the south date back

to the 1950s. On August 18, 1955, the Equatoria Corps, a military unit composed

of southerners, mutinied at Torit. Rather than surrender to Sudanese government

authorities, many mutineers disappeared into hiding with their weapons, marking

the beginning of the first war in southern Sudan. By the late 1960s, the war had

resulted in the deaths of about 500,000 people. Several hundred thousand more

southerners hid in the forests or escaped to refugee camps in neighboring

countries.
 By 1969 the rebels had developed foreign contacts to obtain weapons and

supplies. Israel, for example, trained Anya Nya recruits and shipped weapons via

Ethiopia and Uganda to the rebels. Anya Nya also purchased arms from

Congolese rebels and international arms dealers with monies collected in the

south and from among southern Sudanese exile communities in the Middle East,

Western Europe, and North America. The rebels also captured arms, equipment,

and supplies from government troops.

Militarily, Anya Nya controlled much of the southern countryside while

government forces occupied the region's major towns. The guerrillas operated at

will from remote camps. However, rebel units were too small and scattered to be

highly effective in any single area. Estimates of Anya Nya personnel strength

ranged from 5,000 to 10,000.

Government operations against the rebels declined after the 1969 coup.

However, when negotiations failed to result in a settlement, Khartoum increased

troop strength in the south to about 12,000 in 1969, and intensified military

activity throughout the region. Although the Soviet Union had concluded a

US$100 million to US$150 million arms agreement with Sudan in August 1968,

which included T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and aircraft, the nation

failed to deliver any equipment to Khartoum by May 1969. During this period,

Sudan obtained some Soviet-manufactured weapons from Egypt, most of which

went to the Sudanese air force. By the end of 1969, however, the Soviet Union

had shipped unknown quantities of 85mm antiaircraft guns, sixteen MiG-21s, and
five Antonov-24 transport aircraft. Over the next two years, the Soviet Union

delivered an impressive array of equipment to Sudan, including T-54, T-55, T56 ,

and T-59 tanks; and BTR-40 and BTR-152 light armored vehicles.

In 1971 Joseph Lagu, who had become the leader of southern forces

opposed to Khartoum, proclaimed the creation of the Southern Sudan Liberation

Movement (SSLM). Anya Nya leaders united behind him, and nearly all exiled

southern politicians supported the SSLM. Although the SSLM created a

governing infrastructure throughout many areas of southern Sudan, real power

remained with Anya Nya, with Lagu at its head.

Despite his political problems, Nimeiri remained committed to ending the

southern insurgency. He believed he could stop the fighting and stabilize the

region by granting regional selfgovernment and undertaking economic

development in the south. By October 1971, Khartoum had established contact

with the SSLM. After considerable consultation, a conference between SSLM and

Sudanese government delegations convened at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in

February 1972. Initially, the two sides were far apart, the southerners demanding

a federal state with a separate southern government and an army that would

come under the federal president's command only in response to an external

threat to Sudan. Eventually, however, the two sides, with the help of Ethiopia's

Emperor Haile Selassie, reached an agreement.

The Addis Ababa accords guaranteed autonomy for a southern region--

composed of the three provinces of Equatoria (present-day Al Istiwai), Bahr al

Ghazal, and Upper Nile (present-day Aali an Nil)--under a regional president

appointed by the national president on the recommendation of an elected

Southern Regional Assembly. The High Executive Council or cabinet named by

the regional president would be responsible for all aspects of government in the

region except such areas as defense, foreign affairs, currency and finance,

economic and social planning, and interregional concerns, authority over which

would be retained by the national government in which southerners would be

represented. Southerners, including qualified Anya Nya veterans, would be

incorporated into a 12,000-man southern command of the Sudanese army under

equal numbers of northern and southern officers. The accords also recognized

Arabic as Sudan's official language, and English as the south's principal

language, which would be used in administration and would be taught in the

schools.

Although many SSLM leaders opposed the settlement, Lagu approved its

terms and both sides agreed to a cease-fire. The national government issued a

decree legalizing the agreement and creating an international armistice

commission to ensure the well-being of returning southern refugees. Khartoum

also announced an amnesty, retroactive to 1955. The two sides signed the Addis

Ababa accords on March 27, 1972, which was thereafter celebrated as National

Unity Day.

Political Developments. After the settlement in the south, Nimeiri

attempted to mend fences with northern Muslim religious groups. The

government undertook administrative decentralization, popular with the Ansar,

that favored rural over urban areas, where leftist activism was most evident.

Khartoum also reaffirmed Islam's special position in the country, recognized the

sharia as the source of all legislation, and released some members of religious

orders who had been incarcerated. However, a reconciliation with conservative

groups, which had organized outside Sudan under Sadiq al Mahdi's leadership

and were later known as the National Front, eluded Nimeiri.

In August 1972, Nimeiri sought to consolidate his position by creating a

Constituent Assembly to draft a permanent constitution. He then asked for the

government's resignation to allow him to appoint a cabinet whose members were

drawn from the Constituent Assembly. Nimeiri excluded individuals who had

opposed the southern settlement or who had been identified with the SSU's pro-

Egyptian faction.

In May 1973, the Constitutent Assembly promulgated a draft constitution.

This document provided for a continuation of presidential government,

recognized the SSU as the only authorized political organization, and supported

regional autonomy for the south. The constitution also stipulated that voters were

to choose members for the 250-seat People's Assembly from an SSU-approved

slate. Although it cited Islam as Sudan's official religion, the constitution admitted

Christianity as the faith of a large number of Sudanese citizens. In May 1974,

voters selected 125 members for the assembly; SSU-affiliated occupational and

professional groups named 100; and the president appointed the remaining 25.
 Discontent with Nimeiri's policies and the increased military role in

government escalated as a result of food shortages and the southern settlement,

which many Muslim conservatives regarded as surrender. In 1973 and 1974

there were unsuccessful coup attempts against Nimeiri. Muslims and leftist

students also staged strikes against the government. In September 1974, Nimeiri

responded to this unrest by declaring a state of emergency, purging the SSU,

and arresting large numbers of dissidents. Nimeiri also replaced some cabinet

members with military personnel loyal to him.

Conservative opposition to Nimeiri coalesced in the National Front, formed

in 1974. The National Front included people from Sadiq's wing of Umma; the

NUP; and the Islamic Charter Front, then the political arm of the Muslim

Brotherhood, an Islamic activist movement. Their activity crystallized in a July

1976 Ansar-inspired coup attempt. Government soldiers quickly restored order by

killing more than 700 rebels in Khartoum and arresting scores of dissidents,

including many prominent religious leaders. Despite this unrest, in 1977

Sudanese voters reelected Nimeiri for a second six-year term as president.

National Reconciliation. Following the 1976 coup attempt, Nimeiri and

his opponents adopted more conciliatory policies. In early 1977, government

officials met with the National Front in London, and arranged for a conference

between Nimeiri and Sadiq al Mahdi in Port Sudan. In what became known as

the "national reconciliation," the two leaders signed an eight-point agreement that

readmitted the opposition to national life in return for the dissolution of the
National Front. The agreement also restored civil liberties, freed political

prisoners, reaffirmed Sudan's nonaligned foreign policy, and promised to reform

local government. As a result of the reconciliation, the government released

about 1,000 detainees and granted an amnesty to Sadiq al Mahdi. The SSU also

admitted former supporters of the National Front to its ranks. Sadiq renounced

multiparty politics and urged his followers to work within the regime's one-party

system.

The first test of national reconciliation occurred during the February 1978

People's Assembly elections. Nimeiri authorized returning exiles who had been

associated with the old Umma Party, the DUP, and the Muslim Brotherhood to

stand for election as independent candidates. These independents won 140 of

304 seats, leading many observers to applaud Nimeiri's efforts to democratize

Sudan's political system. However, the People's Assembly elections marked the

beginning of further political decline. The SSU's failure to sponsor official

candidates weakened party discipline and prompted many assembly deputies

who also were SSU members to claim that the party had betrayed them. As a

result, an increasing number of assembly deputies used their offices to advance

personal rather than national interests.

The end of the SSU's political monopoly, coupled with rampant corruption

at all levels of government, cast increasing doubt on Nimeiri's ability to govern

Sudan. To preserve his regime, Nimeiri adopted a more dictatorial leadership

style. He ordered the State Security Organisation to imprison without trial

thousands of opponents and dissidents. Nimeiri also dismissed or transferred

any minister or senior military officer who appeared to be developing his own

power base. Nimeiri selected replacements based on their loyalty to him rather

than on their abilities. This strategy caused the president to lose touch with

popular feeling and the country's deteriorated political situation.

On June 5, 1983, Nimeiri sought to counter the south's growing political

power by redividing the Southern Region into the three old provinces of Bahr al

Ghazal, Al Istiwai, and Aali an Nil; he had suspended the Southern Regional

Assembly almost two years earlier. The southern-based Sudanese People's

Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the Sudanese People's

Liberation Army (SPLA), which emerged in mid-1983, unsuccessfully opposed

this redivision and called for the creation of a new united Sudan.

Within a few months, in September 1983 Nimeiri proclaimed the sharia as

the basis of the Sudanese legal system. Nimeiri's decrees, which became known

as the September Laws, were bitterly resented both by secularized Muslims and

by the predominantly non-Muslim southerners. The SPLM denounced the sharia

and the executions and amputations ordered by religious courts. Meanwhile, the

security situation in the south had deteriorated so much that by the end of 1983 it

amounted to a resumption of the civil war.

In early 1985, antigovernment discontent resulted in a general strike in

Khartoum. Demonstrators opposed rising food, gasoline, and transport costs.

The general strike paralyzed the country. Nimeiri, who was on a visit to the
United States, was unable to suppress the rapidly growing demonstrations

against his regime.

THE TRANSITIONAL MILITARY COUNCIL. The combination of the

south's redivision, the introduction throughout the country of the sharia, the

renewed civil war, and growing economic problems eventually contributed to

Nimeiri's downfall. On April 6, 1985, a group of military officers, led by Lieutenant

General Abd ar Rahman Siwar adh Dhahab, overthrew Nimeiri, who took refuge

in Egypt. Three days later, Dhahab authorized the creation of a fifteen-man

Transitional Military Council (TMC) to rule Sudan. During its first few weeks in

power, the TMC suspended the constitution; dissolved the SSU, the secret

police, and the parliament and regional assemblies; dismissed regional

governors and their ministers; and released hundreds of political detainees from

Kober Prison. Dhahab also promised to negotiate an end to the southern civil war

and to relinquish power to a civilian government in twelve months. The general

populace welcomed and supported the new regime. Despite the TMC's energetic

beginning, it soon became evident that Dhahab lacked the skills to resolve

Sudan's economic problems, restore peace to the south, and establish national

unity.

By the time Dhahab seized power, Sudan's economy was in shambles.

The country's international debt was approximately US$9 billion. Agricultural and

industrial projects funded by the International Monetary Fund ( IMF) and the

World Bank remained in the planning stages. Most factories operated at less
than 50 percent of capacity, while agricultural output had dropped by 50 percent

since 1960. Moreover, famine threatened vast areas of southern and western

Sudan.

The TMC lacked a realistic strategy to resolve these problems. The

Dhahab government refused to accept IMF economic austerity measures. As a

result, the IMF, which influenced nearly all bilateral and multilateral donors, in

February 1986, declared Sudan bankrupt. Efforts to attract a US$6 billion twenty-

five- year investment from the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development

failed when Sudan mismanaged an initial US$2.3 billion investment. A rapid

expansion of the money supply and the TMC's inability to control prices caused a

soaring inflation rate. Although he appealed to forty donor and relief agencies for

emergency food shipments, Dhahab was unable to prevent famine from claiming

an estimated 400,000 to 500,000 lives. He also failed to end hostilities in the

south, which constituted the major drain on Sudan's limited resources.

Shortly after taking power, Dhahab adopted a conciliatory approach

toward the south. Among other things, he declared a unilateral cease-fire, called

for direct talks with the SPLM, and offered an amnesty to rebel fighters. The TMC

recognized the need for special development efforts in the south and proposed a

national conference to review the southern problem. However, Dhahab's refusal

to repeal the sharia negated these overtures and convinced SPLM leader

Garang that the Sudanese government still wanted to subjugate the south.
 Despite this gulf, both sides continued to work for a peaceful resolution of

the southern problem. In March 1986, the Sudanese government and the SPLM

produced the Koka Dam Declaration, which called for a Sudan "free from racism,

tribalism, sectarianism and all causes of discrimination and disparity." The

declaration also demanded the repeal of the sharia and the opening of a

constitutional conference. All major political parties and organizations, with the

exception of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the National Islamic Front

(NIF), supported the Koka Dam Declaration. To avoid a confrontation with the

DUP and the NIF, Dhahab decided to leave the sharia question to the new

civilian government. Meanwhile, the SPLA kept up the military pressure on the

Sudanese government, especially in Aali an Nil, Bahr al Ghazal, and Al Istiwai

provinces.

The TMC's greatest failure concerned its inability to form a national

political consensus. In late April 1985, negotiations between the TMC and the

Alliance of Professional and Trade Unions resulted in the establishment of a

civilian cabinet under the direction of Dr. Gazuli Dafalla. The cabinet, which was

subordinate to the TMC, devoted itself to conducting the government's daily

business and to preparing for the election. Although it contained three

southerners who belonged to the newly formed Southern Sudanese Political

Association, the cabinet failed to win the loyalty of most southerners, who

believed the TMC only reflected the policies of the deposed Nimeiri. As a result,

Sudan remained a divided nation.

 The other factor that prevented the emergence of a national political

consensus concerned party factionalism. After sixteen years of one-party rule,

most Sudanese favored the revival of the multiparty system. In the aftermath of

Nimeiri's overthrow, approximately forty political parties registered with the TMC

and announced their intention to participate in national politics. The political

parties ranged from those committed to revolutionary socialism to those that

supported Islamism. Of these latter, the NIF had succeeded the Islamic Charter

Front as the main vehicle for the Muslim Brotherhood's political aspirations.

However, policy disagreements over the sharia, the southern civil war, and the

country's future direction contributed to the confusion that characterized Sudan's

national politics.

In this troubled atmosphere, Dhahab sanctioned the promised April 1986

general election, which the authorities spread over a twelve-day period and

postponed in thirty-seven southern constituencies because of the civil war. The

Umma Party, headed by Sadiq al Mahdi, won ninety-nine seats. The DUP, which

was led after the April 1985 uprising by Khatmiyyah leader Muhammad Uthman

al Mirghani, gained sixty-four seats. Dr. Hassan Abd Allah at Turabi's NIF

obtained fifty-one seats. Regional political parties from the south, the Nuba

Mountains, and the Red Sea Hills won lesser numbers of seats. The Sudanese

Communist Party (SCP) and other radical parties failed to score any significant

victories.
 SADIQ AL MAHDI. In June 1986, Sadiq al Mahdi formed a coalition

government with the Umma, the DUP, the NIF, and four southern parties.

Unfortunately, however, Sadiq proved to be a weak leader and incapable of

governing Sudan. Party factionalism, corruption, personal rivalries, scandals, and

political instability characterized the Sadiq regime. After less than a year in office,

Sadiq al Mahdi dismissed the government because it had failed to draft a new

penal code to replace the sharia, reach an agreement with the IMF, end the civil

war in the south, or devise a scheme to attract remittances from Sudanese

expatriates. To retain the support of the DUP and the southern political parties,

Sadiq formed another ineffective coalition government.

Instead of removing the ministers who had been associated with the

failures of the first coalition government, Sadiq al Mahdi retained thirteen of them,

of whom eleven kept their previous portfolios. As a result, many Sudanese

rejected the second coalition government as being a replica of the first. To make

matters worse, Sadiq and DUP leader Mirghani signed an inadequate

memorandum of understanding that fixed the new government's priorities as

affirming the application of the sharia to Muslims, consolidating the Islamic

banking system, and changing the national flag and national emblem.

Furthermore, the memorandum directed the government to remove Nimeiri's

name from all institutions and dismiss all officials appointed by Nimeiri to serve in

international and regional organizations. As expected, antigovernment elements

criticized the memorandum for not mentioning the civil war, famine, or the

country's disintegrating social and economic conditions.

 In August 1987, the DUP brought down the government because Sadiq al

Mahdi opposed the appointment of a DUP member, Ahmad as Sayid, to the

Supreme Commission. For the next nine months, Sadiq and Mirghani failed to

agree on the composition of another coalition government. During this period,

Sadiq moved closer to the NIF. However, the NIF refused to join a coalition

government that included leftist elements. Moreover, Turabi indicated that the

formation of a coalition government would depend on numerous factors, the most

important of which were the resignation or dismissal of those serving in senior

positions in the central and regional governments, the lifting of the state of

emergency reimposed in July 1987, and the continuation of the Constituent

Assembly.

Because of the endless debate over these issues, it was not until May 15,

1988, that a new coalition government emerged headed by Sadiq al Mahdi.

Members of this coalition included the Umma, the DUP, the NIF, and some

southern parties. As in the past, however, the coalition quickly disintegrated

because of political bickering among its members. Major disagreements included

the NIF's demand that it be given the post of commissioner of Khartoum, the

inability to establish criteria for the selection of regional governors, and the NIF's

opposition to the replacement of senior military officers and the chief of staff of

the executive branch.

In November 1988, another more explosive political issue emerged when

Mirghani and the SPLM signed an agreement in Addis Ababa that included
provisions for a cease-fire, the freezing of the sharia, the lifting of the state of

emergency, and the abolition of all foreign political and military pacts. The two

sides also proposed to convene a constitutional conference to decide Sudan's

political future. The NIF opposed this agreement because of its stand on the

sharia. When the government refused to support the agreement, the DUP

withdrew from the coalition. Shortly thereafter armed forces commander in chief

Lieutenant General Fathi Ahmad Ali presented an ultimatum, signed by 150

senior military officers, to Sadiq al Mahdi demanding that he make the coalition

government more representative and that he announce terms for ending the civil

war.

On March 11, 1989, Sadiq al Mahdi responded to this pressure by

dissolving the government. The new coalition had included the Umma, the DUP,

and representatives of southern parties and the trade unions. The NIF refused to

join the coalition because it was not committed to enforcing the sharia. Sadiq

claimed his new government was committed to ending the southern civil war by

implementing the November 1988 DUP-SPLM agreement. He also promised to

mobilize government resources to bring food relief to famine areas, reduce the

government's international debt, and build a national political consensus. Sadiq's

inability to live up to these promises eventually caused his downfall. On June 30,

1989, Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir

overthrew Sadiq and established the Revolutionary Command Council for

National Salvation to rule Sudan. Bashir's commitment to imposing the sharia on

the non-Muslim south and to seeking a military victory over the SPLA, however,
seemed likely to keep the country divided for the foreseeable future and hamper

resolution of the same problems faced by Sadiq al Mahdi. Moreover, the

emergence of the NIF as a political force made compromise with the south more

unlikely.

GEOGRAPHY

Sudan is Africa's

largest country, embracing

2,505,813 square kilometers

of northeast and central

Africa. It consists of a huge

plain bordered on three sides

by mountains: to the east the

Red Sea Hills, to the west

Jabal Marrah, and on the

southern frontier the Didinga

Hills and the Dongotona and

Imatong mountains. Jutting up abruptly in the south-central region of this vast

plain are the isolated Nuba Mountains and Ingessana Hills, and far to the

southeast, the lone Boma Plateau near the Ethiopian border. Spanning eighteen

degrees of latitude, the plain of the Sudan includes from north to south significant

regions with distinctive characters--northern Sudan, western Sudan, the central

clay plains, eastern Sudan, the southern clay plains, and the Jabal Hadid, or

Ironstone Plateau, and southern hill masses.

Northern Sudan, lying between the Egyptian border and Khartoum, has

two distinct parts, the desert and the Nile Valley. To the east of the Nile lies the

Nubian Desert; to the west, the Libyan Desert. They are similar--stony, with

sandy dunes drifting over the landscape. There is virtually no rainfall in these

deserts, and in the Nubian Desert there are no oases. In the west there are a few

small watering holes, such as Bir an Natrun, where the water table reaches the

surface to form wells that provide water for nomads, caravans, and administrative

patrols, although insufficient to support an oasis and inadequate to provide for a

settled population. Flowing through the desert is the Nile Valley, whose alluvial

strip of habitable land is no more than two kilometers wide and whose

productivity depends on the annual flood.

Western Sudan is a generic term describing the regions known as Darfur

and Kurdufan that comprise 850,000 square kilometers. Traditionally, this has

been regarded as a single regional unit despite the physical differences. The

dominant feature throughout this immense area is the absence of perennial

streams; thus, people and animals must remain within reach of permanent wells.

Consequently, the population is sparse and unevenly distributed. Western Darfur

is an undulating plain dominated by the volcanic massif of Jabal Marrah towering

900 meters above the Sudanic plain; the drainage from Jabal Marrah onto the

plain can support a settled population. Western Darfur stands in stark contrast to
northern and eastern Darfur, which are semidesert with little water either from the

intermittent streams known as wadis or from wells that normally go dry during the

winter months. Northwest of Darfur and continuing into Chad lies the unusual

region called the jizzu, where sporadic winter rains generated from the

Mediterranean frequently provide excellent grazing into January or even

February. The southern region of western Sudan is known as the qoz, a land of

sand dunes that in the rainy season is characterized by a rolling mantle of grass

and has more reliable sources of water with its bore holes and hafri (sing., hafr)

than does the north. A unique feature of western Sudan is the Nuba Mountain

range of southeast Kurdufan in the center of the country, a conglomerate of

isolated dome-shaped, sugarloaf hills that ascend steeply and abruptly from the

great Sudanic plain. Many hills are isolated and extend only a few square

kilometers, but there are several large hill masses with internal valleys that cut

through the mountains high above the plain.

Sudan's third distinct region is the central clay plains that stretch eastward

from the Nuba Mountains to the Ethiopian frontier, broken only by the Ingessana

Hills, and from Khartoum in the north to the far reaches of southern Sudan.

Between the Dindar and the Rahad rivers, a low ridge slopes down from the

Ethiopian highlands to break the endless skyline of the plains, and the occasional

hill stands out in stark relief. The central clay plains provide the backbone of

Sudan's economy because they are productive where settlements cluster around

available water. Furthermore, in the heartland of the central clay plains lies

the jazirah, the land between the Blue Nile and the White Nile (literally in Arabic
"peninsula") where the great Gezira Scheme (also seen as Jazirah Scheme) was

developed. This project grows cotton for export and has traditionally produced

more than half of Sudan's revenue and export earnings.

Northeast of the central clay plains lies eastern Sudan, which is divided

between desert and semidesert and includes Al Butanah, the Qash Delta, the

Red Sea Hills, and the coastal plain. Al Butanah is an undulating land between

Khartoum and Kassala that provides good grazing for cattle, sheep, and goats.

East of Al Butanah is a peculiar geological formation known as the Qash Delta.

Originally a depression, it has been filled with sand and silt brought down by the

flash floods of the Qash River, creating a delta above the surrounding plain.

Extending 100 kilometers north of Kassala, the whole area watered by the Qash

is a rich grassland with bountiful cultivation long after the river has spent its

waters on the surface of its delta. Trees and bushes provide grazing for the

camels from the north, and the rich moist soil provides an abundance of food

crops and cotton.

Northward beyond the Qash lie the more formidable Red Sea Hills. Dry,

bleak, and cooler than the surrounding land, particularly in the heat of the Sudan

summer, they stretch northward into Egypt, a jumbled mass of hills where life is

hard and unpredictable for the hardy Beja inhabitants. Below the hills sprawls the

coastal plain of the Red Sea, varying in width from about fifty-six kilometers in the

south near Tawkar to about twenty-four kilometers near the Egyptian frontier. The
coastal plain is dry and barren. It consists of rocks, and the seaward side is thick

with coral reefs.

The southern clay plains, which can be regarded as an extension of the

northern clay plains, extend all the way from northern Sudan to the mountains on

the Sudan - Uganda frontier, and in the west from the borders of Central African

Republic eastward to the Ethiopian highlands. This great Nilotic plain is broken

by several distinctive features. First, the White Nile bisects the plain and provides

large permanent water surfaces such as lakes Fajarial, No, and Shambe.

Second, As Sudd, the world's largest swamp, provides a formidable expanse of

lakes, lagoons, and aquatic plants, whose area in high flood waters exceeds

30,000 square kilometers, or approximately the size of Belgium. So intractable

was this sudd as an obstacle to navigation that a passage was not discovered

until the midnineteenth century. Then as now, As Sudd with its extreme rate of

evaporation consumes on average more than half the waters that come down the

White Nile from the equatorial lakes. These waters also create a flood plain

known as the toicthat provides grazing when the flood waters retreat to the

permanent swamp and sluggish river, the Bahr al Jabal, as the White Nile is

called here.

The land rising to the south and west of the southern clay plain is referred

to as the Ironstone Plateau (Jabal Hadid), a name derived from its laterite soils

and increasing elevation. The plateau rises from the west bank of the Nile,

sloping gradually upward to the Congo-Nile watershed. The land is well watered,
providing rich cultivation, but the streams and rivers that come down from the

watershed divide and erode the land before flowing on to the Nilotic plain flow

into in As Sudd. Along the streams of the watershed are the gallery forests, the

beginnings of the tropical rain forests that extend far into Zaire. To the east of the

Jabal Hadid and the Bahr al Jabal rise the foothills of the mountain ranges along

the Sudan-Uganda border - the Imatong, Didinga, and Dongotona - which rise to

more than 3,000 meters. These mountains form a stark contrast to the great

plains to the north that dominate Sudan's geography.

POPULATION

Population information for Sudan has been limited, but in 1990 it was clear

that the country was experiencing a high birth rate and a high, but declining,

death rate. Infant mortality was high, but Sudan was expected to continue its

rapid population growth, with a large percentage of its people under fifteen years

of age, for some time to come. The trends indicated an overall low population

density. However, with famine affecting much of the country, internal migration by

hundreds of thousands of people was on the increase. The United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees reported that in early 1991, approximately 1,800,000

people were displaced in the northern states, of whom it was estimated that

750,000 were in Al Khartum State, 30,000 each in Kurdufan and Al Awsat states,

300,000 each in Darfur and Ash Sharqi states, and 150,000 in Ash Shamali

State. Efforts were underway to provide permanent sites for about 800,000 of
these displaced people. The civil war and famine in the south was estimated to

have displaced up to 3.5 million southern Sudanese by early 1990.

In addition to uncertainties concerning the number of refugees, population

estimates were complicated by census difficulties. Since independence there

have been three national censuses, in 1955-56, 1973, and 1983. The first was

inadequately prepared and executed. The second was not officially recognized

by the government, and thus its complete findings have never been released.

The third census was of better quality, but some of the data has never been

analyzed because of inadequate resources.

The 1983 census put the total population at 21.6 million with a growth rate

between 1956 and 1983 of 2.8 percent per year. In 1990, the National Population

Committee and the Department of Statistics put Sudan's birthrate at 50 births per

1,000 and the death rate at 19 per 1,000, for a rate of increase of 31 per 1,000 or

3.1 percent per year. This is a staggering increase; compared with the world

average of 1.8 percent per year and the average for developing countries of 2.1

percent per annum, this percentage made Sudan one of the world's fastest

growing countries. The 1983 population estimate was thought to be too low, but

even accepting it and the pre-1983 growth rate of 2.8 percent, Sudan's

population in 1990 would have been well over 25 million. At the estimated 1990

growth rate of 3.1 percent, the population would double in twenty-two years.

Even if the lower estimated rate were sustained, the population would reach 38.6

million in 2003 and 50.9 million by 2013.

 Both within Sudan and among the international community, it was

commonly thought that with an average population density of nine persons per

square kilometer, population density was not a major problem. This assumption,

however, failed to take into account that much of Sudan was uninhabitable and

its people were unevenly distributed, with about 33 percent of the nation's

population occupying 7 percent of the land and concentrated around Khartoum

and in Al Awsat. In fact, 66 percent of the population lived within 300 kilometers

of Khartoum. In 1990 the population of the Three Towns (Khartoum, Omdurman,

and Khartoum North) was unknown because of the constant influx of refugees,

but estimates of 3 million, well over half the urban dwellers in Sudan, may not

have been unrealistic. Nevertheless, only 20 percent of Sudanese lived in towns

and cities; 80 percent still lived in rural areas.

The birthrate between the 1973 census and the 1987 National Population

Conference appeared to have remained constant at from 48 to 50 births per

1,000 populations. The fertility rate (the average number of children per woman)

was estimated at 6.9 in 1983. Knowledge of family planning remained minimal.

During the period, the annual death rate fell from 23 to 19 per 1,000, and the

estimated life expectancy rose from 43.5 years to 47 years.

For more than a decade the gross domestic product (GDP) of Sudan had

not kept pace with the increasing population, a trend indicating that Sudan would

have difficulty in providing adequate services for its people. Moreover, half the

populations were under eighteen years of age and therefore were primarily
consumers not producers. Internal migration caused by civil war and famine

created major shifts in population distribution, producing overpopulation in areas

that could provide neither services nor employment. Furthermore, Sudan has

suffered a continuous "brain drain" as its finest professionals and most skilled

laborers emigrated, while simultaneously there has been an influx of more than 1

million refugees, who not only lacked skills but required massive relief. Droughts

in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s have undermined Sudan's food production, and

the country would have to double its production to feed its expected population

within the next generation. In the absence of a national population policy to deal

with these problems, they were expected to worsen.

Moreover, throughout Sudan continuous environmental degradation

accompanied the dearth of rainfall. Experts estimated that desertification caused

by deforestation and drought had allowed the Sahara to advance southward at

the rate of ten kilometers per year. About 7.8 million Sudanese were estimated to

be at risk from famine in early 1991, according to the United Nations World Food

Program and other agencies. The Save the Children Fund estimated that the

famine in Darfur would cost the lives of "tens of thousands" of people in the early

1990s. Analysts believed that the lack of rainfall combined with the ravages of

war would result in massive numbers of deaths from starvation in the 1990s.

CLIMATOLOGY

Although Sudan lies within the tropics, the climate ranges from arid in the

north to tropical wet-and-dry in the far southwest. Temperatures do not vary

greatly with the season at any location; the most significant climatic variables are

rainfall and the length of the dry season. Variations in the length of the dry

season depend on which of two air flows predominates, dry northeasterly winds

from the Arabian Peninsula or moist southwesterly winds from the Congo River

basin.

From January to March, the country is under the influence of the dry

northeasterlies. There is practically no rainfall countrywide except for a small

area in northwestern Sudan in where the winds have passed over the

Mediterranean bringing occasional light rains. By early April, the moist

southwesterlies have reached southern Sudan, bringing heavy rains and

thunderstorms. By July the moist air has reached Khartoum, and in August it

extends to its usual northern limits around Abu Hamad, although in some years

the humid air may even reach the Egyptian border. The flow becomes weaker as

it spreads north. In September the dry northeasterlies begin to strengthen and to

push south and by the end of December they cover the entire country. Yambio,

close to the border with Zaire, has a nine-month rainy season (April-December)

and receives an average of 1,142 millimeters of rain each year; Khartoum has a

three-month rainy season (JulySeptember ) with an annual average rainfall of

161 millimeters; Atbarah receives showers in August that produce an annual

average of only 74 millimeters.

In some years, the arrival of the southwesterlies and their rain in central

Sudan can be delayed, or they may not come at all. If that happens, drought and
famine follow. The decades of the 1970s and 1980s saw the southwesterlies

frequently fail, with disastrous results for the Sudanese people and economy.

Temperatures are highest at the end of the dry season when cloudless

skies and dry air allow them to soar. The far south, however, with only a short dry

season, has uniformly high temperatures throughout the year. In Khartoum, the

warmest months are May and June, when average highs are 41° C and

temperatures can reach 48° C. Northern Sudan, with its short rainy season, has

hot daytime temperatures year round, except for winter months in the northwest

where there is precipitation from the Mediterranean in January and February.

Conditions in highland areas are generally cooler, and the hot daytime

temperatures during the dry season throughout central and northern Sudan fall

rapidly after sunset. Lows in Khartoum average 15° C in January and have

dropped as low as 6° C after the passing of a cool front in winter.

The haboob, a violent dust storm, can occur in central Sudan when the

moist southwesterly flow first arrives (May through July). The moist, unstable air

forms thunderstorms in the heat of the afternoon. The initial downflow of air from

an approaching storm produces a huge yellow wall of sand and clay that can

temporarily reduce visibility to zero.

HYDROGRAPHY

Except for a small area in northeastern Sudan where wadis discharge the

sporadic runoff into the Red Sea or rivers from Ethiopia flow into shallow,
evaporating ponds west of the Red Sea Hills, the entire country is drained by the

Nile and its two main tributaries, the Blue Nile (Al Bahr al Azraq) and the White

Nile (Al Bahr al Abyad). The longest river in the world, the Nile flows for 6,737

kilometers from its farthest headwaters in central Africa to the Mediterranean.

The importance of the Nile has been recognized since biblical times; for centuries

the river has been a lifeline for Sudan.

The Blue Nile flows out of the Ethiopian highlands to meet the White Nile

at Khartoum. The Blue Nile is the smaller of the two; its flow usually accounts for

only one-sixth of the total. In August, however, the rains in the Ethiopian

highlands swell the Blue Nile until it accounts for 90 percent of the Nile's total

flow. Several dams have been constructed to regulate the river's flow--the

Roseires Dam (Ar Rusayris), about 100 kilometers from the Ethiopian border; the

Meina al Mak Dam at Sinjah; and the largest, the forty-meter-high Sennar Dam

constructed in 1925 at Sannar. The Blue Nile's two main tributaries, the Dindar

and the Rahad, have headwaters in the Ethiopian highlands and discharge water

into the Blue Nile only during the summer high-water season. For the remainder

of the year, their flow is reduced to pools in their sandy riverbeds.

The White Nile flows north from central Africa, draining Lake Victoria and

the highland regions of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. At Bor, the great swamp

of the Nile, As Sudd begins. The river has no well-defined channel here; the

water flows slowly through a labyrinth of small spillways and lakes choked with

papyrus and reeds. Much water is lost to evaporation. To provide for water
transportation through this region and to speed the river's flow so that less water

evaporates, Sudan, with French help, began building the Jonglei Canal (also

seen as Junqali Canal) from Bor to a point just upstream from Malakal. However,

construction was suspended in 1984 because of security problems caused by the

civil war in the south.

South of Khartoum, the British built the Jabal al Auliya Dam in 1937 to

store the water of the White Nile and then release it in the fall when the flow from

the Blue Nile slackens. Much water from the reservoir has been diverted for

irrigation projects in central Sudan, however, or it merely evaporates, so the

overall flow released downstream is not great.

The White Nile has several substantial tributaries that drain southern

Sudan. In the southwest, the Bahr al Ghazal drains a basin larger in area than

France. Although the drainage area is extensive, evaporation takes most of the

water from the slowmoving streams in this region, and the discharge of the Bahr

al Ghazal into the White Nile is minimal. In southeast Sudan, the Sobat River

drains an area of western Ethiopia and the hills near the Sudan-Uganda border.

The Sobat's discharge is considerable; at its confluence with the White Nile just

south of Malakal, the Sobat accounts for half the White Nile's water.

Above Khartoum, the Nile flows through desert in a large Sshaped pattern

to empty into Lake Nasser behind the Aswan High Dam in Egypt. The river flows

slowly above Khartoum, dropping little in elevation although five cataracts hinder

river transport at times of low water. The Atbarah River, flowing out of Ethiopia, is
the only tributary north of Khartoum, and its waters reach the Nile for only the six

months between July and December. During the rest of the year, the Atbarah's

bed is dry, except for a few pools and ponds.

ECONOMY

The economy of Sudan continued to be in disarray in mid-1991. The

principal causes of the disorder have been the violent, costly civil war, an inept

government, an influx of refugees from neighboring countries, as well as internal

migration, and a decade of below normal annual rainfall with the concomitant

failure of staple food and cash crops.

The economic and political upheavals that characterized Sudan in the

1980s have made statistical material either difficult to obtain or unreliable. Prices

and wages in the marketplace fluctuated constantly, as did the government's

revenue. Consequently, information concerning Sudan's economy tends to be

more historical than current.

In the 1970s, economic growth had been stimulated by a large influx of

capital from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, invested with the expectation that Sudan

would become "the breadbasket" of the Arab world, and by large increments of

foreign aid from the United States and the European Community (EC).

Predictions of continuing economic growth were sustained by loans from the

World Bank and generous contributions from such disparate countries as

Norway, Yugoslavia, and China. Sudan's greatest economic resource was its
agriculture, to be developed in the vast arable land that either received sufficient

rainfall or could be irrigated from the Nile. By 1991 Sudan had not yet claimed its

full water share (18.5 billion cubic meters) under the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement

between Egypt and Sudan.

Sudan's economic future in the 1970s was also energized by the Chevron

Overseas Petroleum Corporation's discovery of oil on the borderlands between

the provinces of Kurdufan and Bahr al Ghazal. Concurrently, the most thoroughly

researched hydrological project in the Third World, the Jonglei Canal (also seen

as Junqali Canal), was proceeding ahead of schedule, planned not only to

provide water for northern Sudan and Egypt, but also to improve the life of the

Nilotic people of the canal zone. New, large agricultural projects had been

undertaken in sugar at Kinanah and cotton at Rahad. Particularly in southern

Sudan, where the Addis Ababa accords of March 27, 1972, had seemingly ended

the insurgency, a sense of optimism and prosperity prevailed, dashed, however,

when the civil war resumed in 1983. The Khartoum government controlled these

development projects, but entrepreneurs could make fortunes through the

intricate network of kinship and political relations that has traditionally driven

Sudan's social and economic machinery.

In the early 1970s, public enterprises dominated the modern sector,

including much of agriculture and most of large-scale industry, transport, electric

power, banking, and insurance. This situation resulted from the private sector's

inability to finance major development and from an initial government policy after
the 1969 military coup to nationalize the financial sector and part of existing

industry. Private economic activities were relegated to modern small- and

medium-scale industry. The private sector dominated road transport and

domestic commerce and virtually controlled traditional agriculture and

handicrafts.

In the 1980s, however, Sudan underwent severe political and economic

upheavals that have shaken its traditional institutions and its economy. The civil

war in the south resumed in 1983, at a cost of more than £Sd11 million per day.

The main participant in the war against government was the Sudanese People's

Liberation Army (SPLA, the armed wing of the Sudanese People's Liberation

Movement (SPLM)), under John Garang's leadership. The SPLA made steady

gains against the Sudanese army until by 1991 it controlled nearly one-third of

the country.

The dearth of rainfall in the usually productive regions of Sahel and

southern Sudan added to the country's economic problems. Refugees, both

Sudanese and foreigners from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Chad, further

strained the Sudanese budget. International humanitarian agencies have rallied

to Sudan's aid, but the government rejected their help.

When Jaafar an Nimeiri was overthrown in April 1985, his political party

disappeared, as did his elaborate security apparatus. The military transitional

government and the democratically elected coalition government of Sadiq al

Mahdi that succeeded the exiled Nimeiri failed to address the country's economic
problems. Production continued to decline as a result of mismanagement and

natural disasters. The national debt grew at an alarming rate because Sudan's

resources were insufficient to service it. Not only did the SPLA shut down

Chevron's prospecting and oil production, but it also stopped work on the Jonglei

Canal.

On June 30, 1989, a military coup d'état led by Colonel (later Lieutenant

General) Umar al Bashir overthrew the government of Sadiq al Mahdi.

Ideologically tied to the Muslim Brotherhood and dependent for political support

on the Brotherhood's party, the National Islamic Front, the Bashir regime has

methodically purged those agencies that dealt primarily with the economy--the

civil service, the trade unions, the boards of publicly owned enterprises, the

Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, and the central bank. Under Bashir's

government, Sudan's economy has been further strained by the most severe

famine of this century, the continuation of the war in the south, and a foreign

policy that has left Sudan economically, if not politically, isolated from the world

community.
C. SOMALIA

PROFILE

Somalia is situated on the horn of East Africa and is bordered by the Gulf

of Aden and Djibouti to the north, the Indian Ocean to the east and south, to

the north and northwest by Ethiopia and Kenya to the southwest.

The northern region is mountainous with plateaus ranging 3,000 and

7,000 ft. To the northeast there is an extremely dry dissected plateau that

reaches a maximum height of 8,250 ft. South and west of this region, extending

to the Shebeli River, lies a plateau whose maximum elevation is 2,250 ft. The

region between the Juba and Shebeli rivers is low agricultural land, and the area

that extends southwest of the Juba River to the Kenyan border is low pasture

land.

The Juba and Shebeli rivers originate in Ethiopia and flow toward the

Indian Ocean. They provide water for irrigation but are not navigable by

commercial vessels. The Shebeli dries up before reaching the ocean. Despite its
lengthy shore line, Somalia has no natural harbours because of inshore coral

reefs.

BOUNDARIES

Somalia is in the Horn of Africa. It is bordered by Djibouti to the

northwest, Kenya to the southwest, the Gulf of Aden with Yemen to the north,

the Indian Ocean to the east, and Ethiopia to the west.

HISTORY

By the eighteenth century, the Somalis essentially had developed their

present way of life, which is based on pastoral nomadism and the Islamic faith.

During the colonial period (approximately 1891 to 1960), the Somalis were

separated into five mini-Somalilands: British Somaliland (north central); French

Somaliland (east and southeast); Italian Somaliland (south); Ethiopian

Somaliland (the Ogaden); and, what came to be called the Northern Frontier

District (NFD) of Kenya. In 1960 Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland were

merged into a single independent state, the Somali Republic. In its first nine

years the Somali state, although plagued by territorial disputes with Ethiopia and

Kenya, and by difficulties in integrating the dual legacy of Italian and British

administrations, remained a model of democratic governance in Africa;

governments were regularly voted into and out of office. Taking advantage of the

widespread public bitterness and cynicism attendant upon the rigged elections of

early 1969, Major General Mahammad Siad Barre seized power on October 21,
1969, in a bloodless coup. Over the next twenty-one years Siad Barre

established a military dictatorship that divided and oppressed the Somalis. Siad

Barre maintained control of the social system by playing off clan against clan until

the country became riven with interclan strife and bloodshed. Siad Barre's regime

came to a disastrous end in early 1991 with the collapse of the Somali state. In

the regime's place emerged armed clan militias fighting one another for political

power. Siad Barre fled the capital on January 27, 1991, into the safety of his

Mareehaan clan's territory in southern Somalia.

Mogadishu and Its Banaadir Hinterlands. In the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries, the southern city of Mogadishu became Somalia's most

important city. Mogadishu, Merca, and Baraawe, had been major Somali coastal

towns in medieval times. Their origins are unknown, but by the fourteenth century

travelers were mentioning the three towns more and more as important centers

of urban ease and learning. Mogadishu, the largest and most prosperous, dates

back at least to the ninth century, when Persian and Arabian immigrants

intermingled with Somali elements to produce a distinctive hybrid culture. The

meaning of Mogadishu's name is uncertain. Some render it as a Somali version

of the Arabic "maqad shah," or "imperial seat of the shah," thus hinting at a

Persian role in the city's founding. Others consider it a Somali mispronunciation

of the Swahili "mwyu wa" (last northern city), raising the possibility of its being the

northernmost of the chain of Swahili city-states on the East African coast.

Whatever its origin, Mogadishu was at the zenith of its prosperity when the well-

known Arab traveler Ibn Batuta appeared on the Somali coast in 1331. Ibn Batuta
describes "Maqdashu" as "an exceedingly large city" with merchants who

exported to Egypt and elsewhere the excellent cloth made in the city.

Through commerce, proselytization, and political influence, Mogadishu

and other coastal commercial towns influenced the Banaadir hinterlands (the

rural areas outlying Mogadishu) in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Evidence

of that influence was the increasing Islamization of the interior by sufis (Muslim

mystics) who emigrated upcountry, where they settled among the nomads,

married local women, and brought Islam to temper the random violence of the

inhabitants.

By the end of the sixteenth century, the locus of intercommunication

shifted upland to the well-watered region between the Shabeelle and Jubba

rivers. Evidence of the shift of initiative from the coast to the interior may be

found in the rise between 1550 and 1650 of the Ujuuraan (also seen as

Ajuuraan) state, which prospered on the lower reaches of the interriverine region

under the clan of the Gareen. The considerable power of the Ujuuraan state was

not diminished until the Portuguese penetration of the East African coast in the

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Among Somali towns and cities, only

Mogadishu successfully resisted the repeated depredations of the Portuguese.

The Majeerteen Sultanates. Farther east on the Majeerteen (Bari) coast,

by the middle of the nineteenth century two tiny kingdoms emerged that would

play a significant political role on the Somali Peninsula prior to colonization.

These were the Majeerteen Sultanate of Boqor Ismaan Mahamuud, and that of
his kinsman Sultan Yuusuf Ali Keenadiid of Hobyo (Obbia). The Majeerteen

Sultanate originated in the mideighteenth century, but only came into its own in

the nineteenth century with the reign of the resourceful Boqor Ismaan

Mahamuud. Ismaan Mahamuud's kingdom benefited from British subsidies (for

protecting the British naval crews that were shipwrecked periodically on the

Somali coast) and from a liberal trade policy that facilitated a flourishing

commerce in livestock, ostrich feathers, and gum arabic. While acknowledging a

vague vassalage to the British, the sultan kept his desert kingdom free until well

after 1800.

Boqor Ismaan Mahamuud's sultanate was nearly destroyed in the middle

of the nineteenth century by a power struggle between him and his young,

ambitious cousin, Keenadiid. Nearly five years of destructive civil war passed

before Boqor Ismaan Mahamuud managed to stave off the challenge of the

young upstart, who was finally driven into exile in Arabia. A decade later, in the

1870s, Keenadiid returned from Arabia with a score of Hadhrami musketeers and

a band of devoted lieutenants. With their help, he carved out the small kingdom

of Hobyo after conquering the local Hawiye clans. Both kingdoms, however, were

gradually absorbed by the extension into southern Somalia of Italian colonial rule

in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

IMPERIAL PARTITION. The last quarter of the nineteenth century saw

political developments that transformed the Somali Peninsula. During this period,

the Somalis became the subjects of state systems under the flags of Britain,
France, Italy, Egypt, and Ethiopia. The new rulers had various motives for

colonization. Britain sought to gain control of the northern Somali coast as a

source of mutton and other livestock products for its naval port of Aden in

present-day Yemen. As a result of the growing importance of the Red Sea to

British operations in the East, Aden was regarded as indispensable to the

defense of British India. British occupation of the northern Somali coast began in

earnest in February 1884, when Major A. Hunter arrived at Berbera to negotiate

treaties of friendship and protection with numerous Somali clans. Hunter

arranged to have British vice consuls installed in Berbera, Bullaxaar, and Saylac.

The French, having been evicted from Egypt by the British, wished to

establish a coaling station on the Red Sea coast to strengthen naval links with

their Indochina colonies. The French were also eager to bisect Britain's vaunted

Cairo to Cape Town zone of influence with an east to west expansion across

Africa. France extended its foothold on the Afar coast partly to counter the high

duties that the British authorities imposed on French goods in Obock. A French

protectorate was proclaimed under the governorship of Léonce Lagarde, who

played a prominent role in extending French influence into the Horn of Africa.

Recently unified, Italy was inexperienced at imperial power plays. It was

therefore content to stake out a territory whenever it could do so without

confronting another colonial power. In southern Somalia, better known as the

Banaadir coast, Italy was the main colonizer, but the extension of Italian influence

was painstakingly slow owing to parliamentary lack of enthusiasm for overseas

territory. Italy acquired its first possession in southern Somalia in 1888 when the

Sultan of Hobyo, Keenadiid, agreed to Italian "protection." In the same year,

Vincenzo Filonardi, Italy's architect of imperialism in southern Somalia,

demanded a similar arrangement from the Majeerteen Sultanate of Ismaan

Mahamuud. In 1889 both sultans, suspicious of each other, consented to place

their lands under Italian protection. Italy then notified the signatory powers of the

Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884-85 of its southeastern Somali

protectorate. Later, Italy seized the Banaadir coast proper, which had long been

under the tenuous authority of the Zanzibaris, to form the colony of Italian

Somaliland. Chisimayu Region, which passed to the British as a result of their

protectorate over the Zanzibaris, was ceded to Italy in 1925 to complete Italian

tenure over southern Somalia.

The catalyst for imperial tenure over Somali territory was Egypt under its

ambitious ruler, Khedive Ismail. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, this

Ottoman vassal sought to carve out for Egypt a swath of territory in the Horn of

Africa. However, the Sudanese anti-Egyptian Mahdist revolt that broke out in

1884 shattered the khedive's plan for imperial aggrandizement. The Egyptians

needed British help to evacuate their troops marooned in Sudan and on the

Somali coast.

What the European colonialists failed to foresee was that the biggest

threat to their imperial ambitions in the Horn of Africa would come from an

emerging regional power, the Ethiopia of Emperor Menelik II. Emperor Menelik II
not only managed to defend Ethiopia against European encroachment, but also

succeeded in competing with the Europeans for the Somali-inhabited territories

that he claimed as part of Ethiopia. Between 1887 and 1897, Menelik II

successfully extended Ethiopian rule over the long independent Muslim Emirate

of Harer and over western Somalia (better known as the Ogaden). Thus, by the

turn of the century, the Somali Peninsula, one of the most culturally

homogeneous regions of Africa, was divided into British Somaliland, French

Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, Ethiopian Somaliland (the Ogaden), and what

came to be called the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya.

Although the officials of the three European powers often lacked funds,

they nevertheless managed to establish the rudimentary organs of colonial

administration. Moreover, because they controlled the port outlets, they could

levy taxes on livestock to obtain the necessary funds to administer their

respective Somali territories. In contrast, Ethiopia was largely a feudal state with

a subsistence economy that required its army of occupation to live off the land.

Thus, Ethiopian armies repeatedly despoiled the Ogaden in the last two decades

of the nineteenth century.

Dervish Resistance to Colonial Occupation. Given the frequency and

virulence of the Ethiopian raids, it was natural that the first pan-Somali or Greater

Somalia effort against colonial occupation, and for unification of all areas

populated by Somalis into one country, should have been directed at Ethiopians

rather than at the Europeans; the effort was spearheaded by the Somali dervish
resistance movement. The dervishes followed Mahammad Abdille Hasan of the

puritanical Salihiyah tariqa (religious order or brotherhood). His ability as an

orator and a poet (much-valued skills in Somali society) won him many disciples,

especially among his own Dulbahante and Ogaden clans (both of the Daarood

clan-family). The British dismissed Hasan as a religious fanatic, calling him the

"Mad Mullah." They underestimated his following, however, because from 1899

to 1920, the dervishes conducted a war of resistance against the Ethiopians and

British, a struggle that devastated the Somali Peninsula and resulted in the death

of an estimated one-third of northern Somalia's population and the near

destruction of its economy. One of the longest and bloodiest conflicts in the

annals of sub-Saharan resistance to alien encroachment, the dervish uprising

was not quelled until 1920 with the death of Hasan, who became a hero of

Somali nationalism. Deploying a Royal Air Force squadron recently returned from

action in combat in World War I, the British delivered the decisive blow with a

devastating aerial bombardment of the dervish capital at Taleex in northern

Somalia.

Consolidation of Colonial Rule. The two decades between 1900 and

1920 were a period of colonial consolidation. However, of the colonial powers

that had divided the Somalis, only Italy developed a comprehensive

administrative plan for its colony. The Italians intended to plant a colony of

settlers and commercial entrepreneurs in the region between the Shabeelle and

Jubba rivers in southern Somalia. The motivation was threefold: to "relieve

population pressure at home," to offer the "civilizing Roman mission" to the

Somalis, and to increase Italian prestige through overseas colonization. Initiated

by Governor Carletti (1906-10), Italy's colonial program received further impetus

by the introduction of fascist ideology and economic planning in the 1920s,

particularly during the administration of Governor Cesare Maria de Vecchi de Val

Cismon. Large-scale development projects were launched, including a system of

plantations on which citrus fruits, primarily bananas, and sugarcane, were grown.

Sugarcane fields in Giohar and numerous banana plantations around the town of

Jannaale on the Shabeelle River, and at the southern mouth of the Jubba River

near Chisimayu, helped transform southern Somalia's economy.

In contrast to the Italian colony, British Somaliland stayed a neglected

backwater. Daunted by the diversion of substantial development funds to the

suppression of the dervish insurrection and by the "wild" character of the

anarchic Somali pastoralists, Britain used its colony as little more than a supplier

of meat products to Aden. This policy had a tragic effect on the future unity and

stability of independent Somalia. When the two former colonies merged to form

the Somali Republic in 1960, the north lagged far behind the south in economic

infrastructure and skilled labor. As a result, southerners gradually came to

dominate the new state's economic and political life--a hegemony that bred a

sense of betrayal and bitterness among northerners.

Somalia During World War II. Italy's 1935 attack on Ethiopia led to a

temporary Somali reunification. After Italian premier Benito Mussolini's armies

marched into Ethiopia and toppled Emperor Haile Selassie, the Italians seized
British Somaliland. During their occupation (1940-41), the Italians

reamalgamated the Ogaden with southern and northern Somalilands, uniting for

the first time in forty years all the Somali clans that had been arbitrarily separated

by the Anglo-Italo-Ethiopian boundaries. The elimination of these artificial

boundaries and the unification of the Somali Peninsula enabled the Italians to set

prices and impose taxes and to issue a common currency for the entire area.

These actions helped move the Somali economy from traditional exchange in

kind to a monetarized system.

Thousands of Italians, either veterans of the Ethiopian conquest or new

emigrants, poured into Somalia, especially into the interriverine region. Although

colonization was designed to entrench the white conquerors, many Somalis did

not fare badly under Italian rule during this period. Some, such as the Haaji

Diiriye and Yuusuf Igaal families, accumulated considerable fortunes. One

indicator of the Somali sense of relative wellbeing may have been the absence of

any major anti-Italian revolt during Italy's occupation.

At the onset of World War II, Italian holdings in East Africa included

southern Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Italy subsequently invaded northern

Somalia and ejected the British from the Horn of Africa. The Italian victory turned

out to be short-lived, however. In March 1941, the British counterattacked and

reoccupied northern Somalia, from which they launched their lightning campaign

to retake the whole region from Italy and restore Emperor Haile Selassie to his
throne. The British then placed southern Somalia and the Ogaden under a

military administration.

British Military Administration. Following Italy's defeat, the British

established military administrations in what had been British Somaliland, Italian

Somaliland, and Ethiopian Somaliland. Thus, all Somali-inhabited territories--with

the exception of French Somaliland and Kenya's Northern Frontier District

(NFD)--were for the second time brought under a single tenure. No integrated

administrative structure for the Somali areas was established, however, and

under intense pressure from Haile Selassie, Britain agreed to return the Ogaden

to Ethiopian jurisdiction. A military governor, aided by a handful of military

officers, took over the work of the colonial civil service. In what had been Italian

Somaliland, a similar military administration, headed by a military commander,

was established.

The principal concern of the British administration during World War II and

subsequently was to reestablish order. Accordingly, the Somaliland Camel Corps

(local levies raised during the dervish disturbances) was reorganized and later

disbanded. This effort resulted in the creation of five battalions known as the

Somaliland Scouts, (Ilalos), which absorbed former irregular units. The British

disbanded the Italian security units in the south and raised a new army, the

Somalia Gendarmerie, commanded by British officers, to police the occupied

territory.
 Originally, many of the rank and file of the gendarmerie were askaris from

Kenya and Uganda who had served under British officers. The gendarmerie was

gradually transformed into an indigenous force through the infusion of local

recruits who were trained in a new police academy created by the British military

administration. Somalia was full of Italian military stragglers, so the security

services of the northern and southern protectorates collaborated in rounding

them up. The greater security challenge for the British during World War II and

immediately after was to disarm the Somalis who had taken advantage of the

windfall in arms brought about by the war. Also, Ethiopia had organized Somali

bandits to infest the British side so as to discourage continued British occupation

of the Ogaden. Ethiopia also armed clan militias and encouraged them to cross

into the British zone and cause bloodshed.

Despite its distracting security problems, the British military forces that

administered the two Somali protectorates from 1941 to 1949 effected greater

social and political changes than had their predecessors. Britain's wartime

requirement that the protectorate be self-supporting was modified after 1945, and

the appropriation of new funds for the north created a burst of development. To

signal the start of a new policy of increased attention to control of the interior, the

capital was transferred from Berbera, a hot coastal town, to Hargeysa, whose

location on the inland plateau offered the incidental benefit of a more hospitable

climate. Although the civil service remained inadequate to staff the expanding

administration, efforts were made to establish health and veterinary services, to

improve agriculture in the Gabiley-Boorama agricultural corridor northwest of

Hargeysa, to increase the water supply to pastoralists by digging more bore

wells, and to introduce secular elementary schools where previously only

Quranic schools had existed. The judiciary was reorganized as a dual court

system combining elements from the Somali heer (traditional jurisprudence),

Islamic sharia or religious law, and British common law.

In Italian Somaliland, the British improved working conditions for Somali

agricultural laborers, doubled the size of the elementary school system, and

allowed Somalis to staff the lower stratum of the civil service and gendarmerie.

Additionally, military administrators opened the political process for Somalis,

replacing Italian-appointed chiefs with clan-elected bodies, as well as district and

regional councils whose purpose was to advise the military administration.

Military officials could not govern without the Italian civilians who

constituted the experienced civil service. The British military also recognized that

Italian technocrats would be needed to keep the economy going. Only Italians

deemed to be security risks were interned or excluded from the new system. In

early 1943, Italians were permitted to organize political associations. A host of

Italian organizations of varying ideologies sprang up to challenge British rule, to

compete politically with Somalis and Arabs (the latter being politically significant

only in the urban areas, particularly the towns of Mogadishu, Merca, and

Baraawe), and to agitate, sometimes violently, for the return of the colony to

Italian rule. Faced with growing Italian political pressure, inimical to continued

British tenure and to Somali aspirations for independence, the Somalis and the
British came to see each other as allies. The situation prompted British colonial

officials to encourage the Somalis to organize politically; the result was the first

modern Somali political party, the Somali Youth Club (SYC), established in

Mogadishu in 1943.

To empower the new party, the British allowed the better educated police

and civil servants to join it, thus relaxing Britain's traditional policy of separating

the civil service from leadership, if not membership, in political parties. The SYC

expanded rapidly and boasted 25,000 card-carrying members by 1946. In 1947 it

renamed itself the Somali Youth League (SYL) and began to open offices not

only in the two British-run Somalilands but also in Ethiopia's Ogaden and in the

NFD of Kenya. The SYL's stated objectives were to unify all Somali territories,

including the NFD and the Ogaden; to create opportunities for universal modern

education; to develop the Somali language by a standard national orthography;

to safeguard Somali interests; and to oppose the restoration of Italian rule. SYL

policy banned clannishness so that the thirteen founding members, although

representing four of Somalia's six major clans, refused to disclose their ethnic

identities. A second political body sprang up, originally calling itself the Patriotic

Benefit Union but later renaming itself the Hisbia Digil Mirifle (HDM), representing

the two interriverine clans of Digil and Mirifle. The HDM allegedly cooperated with

the Italians and accepted significant Italian financial backing in its struggle

against the SYL. Although the SYL enjoyed considerable popular support from

northerners, the principal parties in British Somaliland were the Somali National

League (SNL), mainly associated with the Isaaq clan-family, and the United
Somali Party (USP), which had the support of the Dir (Gadabursi and Issa) and

Daarood (Dulbahante and Warsangali) clan-families.

Although southern Somalia legally was an Italian colony, in 1945 the

Potsdam Conference decided not to return to Italy the African territory it had

seized during the war. The disposition of Somalia therefore fell to the Allied

Council of Foreign Ministers, which assigned a four-power commission consisting

of Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States to decide Somalia's

future. The British suggested that all the Somalis should be placed under a single

administration, preferably British, but the other powers accused Britain of imperial

machinations.

In January 1948, commission representatives arrived in Mogadishu to

learn the aspirations of the Somalis. The SYL requested and obtained permission

from the military administration to organize a massive demonstration to show the

commission delegates the strength of popular demand for independence. When

the SYL held its rally, a counter demonstration led by Italian elements came out

to voice pro- Italian sentiment and to attempt to discredit the SYL before the

commission. A riot erupted in which fifty-one Italians and twenty-four Somalis

were killed. Despite the confusion, the commission proceeded with its hearings

and seemed favorably impressed by the proposal the SYL presented: to reunite

all Somalis and to place Somalia under a ten-year trusteeship overseen by an

international body that would lead the country to independence. The commission

heard two other plans. One was offered by the HDM, which departed from its
pro-Italian stance to present an agenda similar to that of the SYL, but which

included a request that the trusteeship period last thirty years. The other was put

forward by a combination of Italian and Somali groups petitioning for the return of

Italian rule.

The commission recommended a plan similar to that of the SYL, but the

Allied Council of Foreign Ministers, under the influence of conflicting diplomatic

interests, failed to reach consensus on the way to guide the country to

independence. France favored the colony's return to Italy; Britain favored a

formula much like that of the SYL, but the British plan was thwarted by the United

States and the Soviet Union, which accused Britain of seeking imperial gains at

the expense of Ethiopian and Italian interests. Britain was unwilling to quarrel

with its erstwhile allies over Somali well-being and the SYL plan was withdrawn.

Meanwhile, Ethiopia strongly pressured Britain through the United States, which

was anxious to accommodate Emperor Haile Selassie in return for his promise to

offer the United States a military base in Ethiopia. For its part, the Soviet Union

preferred to reinstate Italian tenure, mainly because of the growing communist

influence on Italian domestic politics.

Under United States and Soviet prodding, Britain returned the Ogaden to

Ethiopia in 1948 over massive Somali protests. The action shattered Somali

nationalist aspirations for Greater Somalia, but the shock was softened by the

payment of considerable war reparations--or "bribes," as the Somalis

characterized them--to Ogaden clan chiefs. In 1949 many grazing areas in the
hinterlands also were returned to Ethiopia, but Britain gained Ethiopian

permission to station British liaison officers in the Reserved Areas, areas

frequented by British- protected Somali clans. The liaison officers moved about

with the British-protected clans that frequented the Haud pasturelands for six

months of the year. The liaison officers protected the pastoralists from Ethiopian

"tax collectors"--armed bands that Ethiopia frequently sent to the Ogaden, both to

demonstrate its sovereignty and to defray administrative costs by seizing Somali

livestock.

Meanwhile, because of disagreements among commission members over

the disposition of Somalia, the Allied Council of Foreign Ministers referred the

matter to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. In November 1949, the

General Assembly voted to make southern Somalia a trust territory to be placed

under Italian control for ten years, following which it would become independent.

The General Assembly stipulated that under no circumstance should Italian rule

over the colony extend beyond 1960. The General Assembly seems to have

been persuaded by the argument that Italy, because of its experience and

economic interests, was best suited to administer southern Somalia. Thus, the

SYL's vehement opposition to the reimposition of Italian rule fell on deaf ears at

the UN.

Trusteeship and Protectorate: The Road to Independence. The

conditional return of Italian administration to southern Somalia gave the new trust

territory several unique advantages compared with other African colonies. To the
extent that Italy held the territory by UN mandate, the trusteeship provisions gave

the Somalis the opportunity to gain experience in political education and self-

government. These were advantages that British Somaliland, which was to be

incorporated into the new Somali state, did not have. Although in the 1950s

British colonial officials attempted, through various development efforts, to make

up for past neglect, the protectorate stagnated. The disparity between the two

territories in economic development and political experience would cause serious

difficulties when it came time to integrate the two parts.

The UN agreement established the Italian Trusteeship Administration

(Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia--AFIS) to prepare southern

Somalia for independence over a ten-year period. Under the agreement, a UN

Advisory Council based in Mogadishu observed the AFIS and reported its

progress to the UN Trusteeship Council. The agreement required the new

administration to develop the colony's political institutions, to expand the

educational system, to improve the economic infrastructure, and to give the

indigenous people freedom of the press and the right to dissent. These political

and civil guarantees did not make for smooth Italo-Somali relations. Seen by the

Italians as the source of nationalist sentiment and activity, the SYL distrusted the

new administration, suspecting it of having a hidden colonial agenda. SYL fears

were exacerbated when the AFIS, soon after taking control, proceeded to jail

some SYL members and to fire others from their civil service posts. The SYL

responded with protests, civil disobedience, and representations to the UN

Advisory Council. The council intervened to arbitrate the disputes and to

encourage the two sides to collaborate. The conflict simmered for three years

(1950-53) until new economic and political initiatives provided a channel for the

energies of Somali nationalists.

The centerpiece of the initiatives was a series of seven-year development

programs introduced in 1954. Drawing on development blueprints provided by

the United States Agency for International Cooperation (AIC; later the United

States Agency for International Development--AID) and the UN Development

Programme, the Italian administration initiated plans to stimulate local agriculture,

to improve the infrastructure, and to expand educational facilities. Exports,

responding to these stimuli, trebled from 1954 to 1960. Despite these

improvements, an acute balance of payments deficit persisted, and the

administration had to rely on foreign grants and Italian subsidies to balance the

budget.

Development efforts in education were more successful. Between 1952

and 1957, student enrollment at the elementary and secondary levels doubled. In

1957 there were 2,000 students receiving secondary, technical, and university

education in Italian Somaliland and through scholarship programs in China,

Egypt, and Italy. Another program offered night-school adult literacy instruction

and provided further training to civil servants. However, these programs were

severely handicapped by the absence of a standard script and a written national

language. Arabic, Italian, and English served as media of instruction in the

various schools; this linguistic plurality created a Tower of Babel.

 Progress was made throughout the 1950s in fostering political institutions.

In accordance with a UN resolution, in 1950 the Italians had established in Italian

Somaliland an advisory body known as the Territorial Council, which took an

active part in discussions of proposed AFIS legislation. Composed of thirty-five

members, the council came to be dominated by representatives of political

parties such as the SYL and HDM. Acting as a nascent parliament, the Territorial

Council gained experience not only in procedural matters but also in legislative

debates on the political, economic, and social problems that would face future

Somali governments. For its part the AFIS, by working closely with the council,

won legitimacy in Somali eyes.

There were other forums, besides the Territorial Council, in which Somalis

gained executive and legislative experience. These included the forty-eight-

member Municipal Council introduced in 1950, whose members dealt with urban

planning, public services, and, after 1956, fiscal and budgetary matters. Rural

councils handled tribal and local problems such as conflicts over grazing grounds

and access to water and pasturelands. However, the effectiveness of the rural

councils was undermined by the wanderings of the nomads as they searched for

water wells and pastures, a circumstance that made stable political organizations

difficult to sustain. Thus, the UN Advisory Council's plans to use the rural councils

as bridges to development turned out to be untenable, a situation that enabled

AFIS-appointed district commissioners to become the focus of power and

political action.
 Territory-wide elections were first held in southern Somalia in 1956.

Although ten parties fielded candidates to select representatives to a new

seventy-seat Legislative Assembly that replaced the Territorial Council, only the

SYL (which won forty- three seats) and HDM (which won thirteen seats) gained

significant percentages of the sixty seats that the Somalis contested. The

remaining ten seats were reserved for Indians, Arabs, and other non-Somalia.

Abdullaahi Iise, leader of the SYL in the assembly, became the first prime

minister of a government composed of five ministerial posts, all held by Somalis.

The new assembly assumed responsibility for domestic affairs, although the

governor as representative of the Italian government and as the most senior

official of the AFIS retained the "power of absolute veto" as well as the authority

to rule by emergency decree should the need arise. Moreover, until 1958 the

AFIS continued to control important areas such as foreign relations, external

finance, defense, and public order.

The term of office of the Iise government was four years (1956-60)--a trial

period that enabled the nascent southern Somali administration to shape the

terms under which it was to gain its independence. This period was the most

stable in modern Somali politics. The government's outlook was modernist and,

once the Somalis become convinced that Italy would not attempt to postpone

independence, pro-Italian. The franchise was extended to women in 1958, and

nationalization at all levels of administration from district commissioner to

provincial governor proceeded apace. Attempts were made to suppress

clannishness and to raise the status of women and of groups holding lowly
occupations. The future promised hope: the moral support of global anticolonial

forces, the active backing of the UN, and the goodwill of the Western powers,

including Italy.

The southern Somali government's principal tasks were to increase

economic self-sufficiency and to find external sources of financial assistance that

would replace the support Italy would withdraw after independence. Another

major concern was to frame the constitution that would take effect once Somalia

became independent. The writers of this document faced two sensitive issues:

the form of government--federalist or unitary--the new nation would adopt, and

nationalist aspirations concerning Greater Somalia. The first issue was of great

interest to the HDM, whose supporters mainly were cultivators from the well-

watered region between the Shabeelle and Jubba rivers and who represented

about 30 percent of the population. The HDM wanted a federal form of

government. This preference derived from concerns about dominance by the

SYL, which was supported by pastoral clans that accounted for 60 percent of the

population (Daarood and Hawiye). Not surprisingly, the SYL advocated a unitary

form of government, arguing that federalism would encourage clannishness and

social strife. In the end, political and numerical strength enabled the SYL to

prevail.

The delicate issue of Greater Somalia, whose recreation would entail the

detachment from Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya of Somali-inhabited areas,

presented Somali leaders with a dilemma: they wanted peace with their
neighbors, but making claims on their territory was certain to provoke hostility.

Led by Haaji Mahammad Husseen, the SYL radical wing wanted to include in the

constitution an article calling for the unification of the Somali nation "by all means

necessary." In the end, the moderate majority prevailed in modifying the wording

to demand "reunification of the dismembered nation by peaceful means."

During the four-year transition to independence, conflicts over unresolved

economic and political issues took the form of intraparty squabbling within the

dominant SYL rather than interparty competition, as Daarood and Hawiye party

stalwarts banded into factions. The Daarood accused Iise's government of being

under Italian influence and the Hawiye countered with a charge of clannishness

in the Daarood ranks. Husseen's radical faction continued to charge Iise's

government with being too close to the West, and to Italy in particular, and of

doing little to realize the national goal of reconstituting Greater Somalia. Despite

his rift with prime minister Iise, Husseen, who had headed the party in the early

years, was again elected SYL president in July 1957. But his agenda of looser

ties with the West and closer relations with the Arab world clashed with the

policies of Iise and of Aadan Abdullah Usmaan, the parliamentary leader who

would become the first president of independent Somalia. Husseen inveighed

against "reactionaries in government," a thinly veiled reference to Iise and

Usmaan. The latter two responded by expelling Husseen and his supporters from

the SYL. Having lost the power struggle, Husseen created a militant new party,

the Greater Somali League (GSL). Although Husseen's firebrand politics

continued to worry the SYL leadership, he never managed to cut deeply into the

party's constituency.

The SYL won the 1958 municipal elections in the Italian trust territory, in

part because it had begun to succeed in attracting important Rahanwayn clan

elements like Abdulqaadir Soppe, who formerly had supported the HDM. Its

growing appeal put the SYL in a commanding position going into the pre-

independence election campaigns for the National Assembly of the Republic, a

new body that replaced the two legislative assemblies of British and Italian

Somaliland. The National Assembly had been enlarged to contain ninety seats

for southern representatives and thirty- three for northern representatives. The

HDM and the GSL accused the SYL of tampering with the election process and

decided to boycott the elections. Consequently, the SYL garnered sixty-one

uncontested seats by default, in addition to the twenty seats contested and won

by the party. The new government formed in 1959 was headed by incumbent

prime minister Iise. The expanded SYL gave representation to virtually all the

major clans in the south. Although efforts were made to distribute the fifteen

cabinet posts among the contending clan-families, a political tug-of-war within the

party continued between conservatives from the religious communities and

modernists such as Abdirashiid Ali Shermaarke.

Meanwhile, in British Somaliland the civilian colonial administration

attempted to expand educational opportunities in the protectorate. The number of

Somalis qualifying for administrative posts remained negligible, however. The

protectorate had experienced little economic or infrastructural development apart

from the digging of more bore wells and the establishment of agricultural and

veterinary services to benefit animal and plant husbandry. Comprehensive

geological surveys failed to uncover exploitable mineral resources.

Politically, although the SYL opened branches in the north and the SNL

continued to expand its membership, neither party could mobilize grass-roots

support. This changed in 1954, when the last British liaison officers withdrew

from the Reserved Areas--parts of the Ogaden and the Haud in which the British

were given temporary administrative rights, in accordance with a 1942 military

convention between Britain and Ethiopian emperor in exile Haile Selassie. This

move conformed with Britain's agreement with Ethiopia confirming the latter's title

deeds to the Haud under the 1897 treaty that granted Ethiopia full jurisdiction

over the region. The British colonial administrators of the area were, however,

embarrassed by what they saw as Britain's betrayal of the trust put in it by Somali

clans who were to be protected against Ethiopian raids.

The Somalis responded with dismay to the ceding of the Haud to Ethiopia.

A new party named the National United Front (NUF), supported by the SNL and

the SYL, arose under the leadership of a Somali civil servant, Michael Mariano, a

prominent veteran of the SYL's formative years. Remarkably, for the militantly

Muslim country, the man selected to lead the nationalist struggle for the return of

the Haud, was a Christian. NUF representatives visited London and the UN

seeking to have the Haud issue brought before the world community, in particular
the International Court of Justice. Britain attempted unsuccessfully to purchase

the Haud from Ethiopia. Ethiopia responded with a counterprotest laying claim to

all Somali territories, including the British and Italian Somalilands, as part of

historical Ethiopia--territories, Haile Selassie claimed, seized by the European

powers during a period of Ethiopian weakness. The Europeans were reluctant to

press new territorial demands on Haile Selassie and did little to help the Somalis

recover the Haud.

Political protests forced Britain in 1956 to introduce representative

government in its protectorate and to accept the eventual unification of British

Somaliland with southern Somalia. Accordingly, in 1957 a Legislative Council

was established, composed of six members appointed by the governor to

represent the principal clan-families. The council was expanded the following

year to consist of twelve elected members, two appointees, and fifteen senior

elders and notables chosen as ex officio members. The electoral procedure in

the north followed that in the south, with elections in urban areas conducted by

secret ballot and in the countryside by acclamation in clan assemblies. In 1960

the first elections contested along party lines resulted in a victory for the SNL and

its affiliate the USP, the two winning between them all but one of the thirty-three

seats in the new Legislative Assembly. The remaining seat was won by Mariano,

the NUF's defeat clearly attributable to his Christian affiliation, which his political

opponents had made a prominent campaign issue. Following the election,

Mahammad Ibrahim Igaal was chosen as prime minister to lead a four-man

government.
 Popular demand compelled the leaders of the two territories to proceed

with plans for immediate unification. The British government acquiesced to the

force of Somali nationalist public opinion and agreed to terminate its rule of

Somaliland in 1960 in time for the protectorate to merge with the trust territory on

the independence date already fixed by the UN commission. In April 1960,

leaders of the two territories met in Mogadishu and agreed to form a unitary

state. An elected president was to be head of state. Full executive powers would

be held by a prime minister answerable to an elected National Assembly of 123

members representing the two territories. Accordingly, British Somaliland

received its independence on June 26, 1960, and united with the trust territory to

establish the Somali Republic on July 1, 1960. The legislature appointed Usmaan

president; he in turn appointed Shermaarke the first prime minister. Shermaarke

formed a coalition government dominated by the SYL but supported by the two

clan-based northern parties, the SNL and the USC. Usmaan's appointment as

president was ratified a year later in a national referendum.

FROM INDEPENDENCE TO REVOLUTION. During the nine-year period

of parliamentary democracy that followed Somali independence, freedom of

expression was widely regarded as being derived from the traditional right of

every man to be heard. The national ideal professed by Somalis was one of

political and legal equality in which historical Somali values and acquired

Western practices appeared to coincide. Politics was viewed as a realm not

limited to one profession, clan, or class, but open to all male members of society.

The role of women, however, was more limited. Women had voted in Italian
Somaliland since the municipal elections in 1958. In May 1963, by an assembly

margin of 52 to 42, suffrage was extended to women in former British Somaliland

as well. Politics was at once the Somalis' most practiced art and favorite sport.

The most desired possession of most nomads was a radio, which was used to

keep informed on political news. The level of political participation often

surpassed that in many Western democracies.

Problems of National Integration

Although unified as a single nation at independence, the south and the

north were, from an institutional perspective, two separate countries. Italy and

Britain had left the two with separate administrative, legal, and education

systems in which affairs were conducted according to different procedures and in

different languages. Police, taxes, and the exchange rates of their respective

currencies also differed. Their educated elites had divergent interests, and

economic contacts between the two regions were virtually nonexistent. In 1960

the UN created the Consultative Commission for Integration, an international

board headed by UN official Paolo Contini, to guide the gradual merger of the

new country's legal systems and institutions and to reconcile the differences

between them. (In 1964 the Consultative Commission for Legislation succeeded

this body. Composed of Somalis, it took up its predecessor's work under the

chairmanship of Mariano.) But many southerners believed that, because of

experience gained under the Italian trusteeship, theirs was the better prepared of

the two regions for self-government. Northern political, administrative, and

commercial elites were reluctant to recognize that they now had to deal with

Mogadishu.

At independence, the northern region had two functioning political parties:

the SNL, representing the Isaaq clan-family that constituted a numerical majority

there; and the USP, supported largely by the Dir and the Daarood. In a unified

Somalia, however, the Isaaq were a small minority, whereas the northern

Daarood joined members of their clan-family from the south in the SYL. The Dir,

having few kinsmen in the south, were pulled on the one hand by traditional ties

to the Hawiye and on the other hand by common regional sympathies to the

Isaaq. The southern opposition party, the GSL, pro-Arab and militantly panSomali

, attracted the support of the SNL and the USP against the SYL, which had

adopted a moderate stand before independence.

Northern misgivings about being too tightly harnessed to the south were

demonstrated by the voting pattern in the June 1961 referendum on the

constitution, which was in effect Somalia's first national election. Although the

draft was overwhelmingly approved in the south, it was supported by less than 50

percent of the northern electorate.

Dissatisfaction at the distribution of power among the clanfamilies and

between the two regions boiled over in December 1961, when a group of British-

trained junior army officers in the north rebelled in reaction to the posting of

higher ranking southern officers (who had been trained by the Italians for police

duties) to command their units. The ringleaders urged a separation of north and
south. Northern noncommissioned officers arrested the rebels, but discontent in

the north persisted.

In early 1962, GSL leader Husseen, seeking in part to exploit northern

dissatisfaction, attempted to form an amalgamated party, known as the Somali

Democratic Union (SDU). It enrolled northern elements, some of which were

displeased with the northern SNL representatives in the coalition government.

Husseen's attempt failed. In May 1962, however, Igaal and another northern SNL

minister resigned from the cabinet and took many SNL followers with them into a

new party, the Somali National Congress (SNC), which won widespread northern

support. The new party also gained support in the south when it was joined by an

SYL faction composed predominantly of Hawiye. This move gave the country

three truly national political parties and further served to blur north-south

differences.

Pan-Somalism. Despite the difficulties encountered in integrating north

and south, the most important political issue in postindependence Somali politics

was the unification of all areas populated by Somalis into one country--a concept

identified as pan-Somalism, or Greater Somalia. Politicians assumed that this

issue dominated popular opinion and that any government would fall if it did not

demonstrate a militant attitude toward neighboring countries occupying Somali

territory.

Preoccupation with Greater Somalia shaped the character of the country's

newly formed institutions and led to the build-up of the Somali military and
ultimately to the war with Ethiopia and fighting in the NFD in Kenya. By law the

exact size of the National Assembly was not established in order to facilitate the

inclusion of representatives of the contested areas after unification. The national

flag featured a five-pointed star whose points represented those areas claimed

as part of the Somali nation--the former Italian and British territories, the Ogaden,

Djibouti, and the NFD. Moreover, the preamble to the constitution approved in

1961 included the statement, "The Somali Republic promotes by legal and

peaceful means, the union of the territories." The constitution also provided that

all ethnic Somalis, no matter where they resided, were citizens of the republic.

The Somalis did not claim sovereignty over adjacent territories, but rather

demanded that Somalis living in them be granted the right to self-determination.

Somali leaders asserted that they would be satisfied only when their fellow

Somalis outside the republic had the opportunity to decide for themselves what

their status would be.

At the 1961 London talks on the future of Kenya, Somali representatives

from the NFD demanded that Britain arrange for the NFD's separation before

Kenya was granted independence. The British government appointed a

commission to ascertain popular opinion in the NFD on the question. Its

investigation indicated that separation from Kenya was almost unanimously

supported by the Somalis and their fellow nomadic pastoralists, the Oromo.

These two peoples, it was noted, represented a majority of the NFD's population.
 Despite Somali diplomatic activity, the colonial government in Kenya did

not act on the commission's findings. British officials believed that the federal

format then proposed in the Kenyan constitution would provide a solution through

the degree of autonomy it allowed the predominantly Somali region within the

federal system. This solution did not diminish Somali demands for unification,

however, and the modicum of federalism disappeared after Kenya's government

opted for a centralized constitution in 1964.

The denial of Somali claims led to growing hostility between the Kenyan

government and Somalis in the NFD. Adapting easily to life as shiftas, or bandits,

the Somalis conducted a guerrilla campaign against the police and army for more

than four years between 1960 and 1964. The Somali government officially denied

Kenya's charges that the guerrillas were trained in Somalia, equipped there with

Soviet arms, and directed from Mogadishu. But it could not deny that the Voice of

Somalia radio influenced the level of guerrilla activity by means of its broadcasts

beamed into Kenya.

Somalia refused to acknowledge in particular the validity of the Anglo-

Ethiopian Treaty of 1954 recognizing Ethiopia's claim to the Haud or, in general,

the relevance of treaties defining Somali-Ethiopian borders. Somalia's position

was based on three points: first, that the treaties disregarded agreements made

with the clans that had put them under British protection; second, that the

Somalis were not consulted on the terms of the treaties and in fact had not been
informed of their existence; and third, that such treaties violated the self-

determination principle.

Incidents began to occur in the Haud within six months after Somali

independence. At first the incidents were confined to minor clashes between

Ethiopian police and armed parties of Somali nomads, usually resulting from

traditional provocations such as smuggling, livestock rustling, and tax collecting,

rather than irredentist agitation. Their actual causes aside, these incidents

tended to be viewed in Somalia as expressions of Somali nationalism. Hostilities

grew steadily, eventually involving small-scale actions between Somali and

Ethiopian armed forces along the border. In February 1964, armed conflict

erupted along the Somali-Ethiopian frontier, and Ethiopian aircraft raided targets

in Somalia. Hostilities ended in April through the mediation of Sudan, acting

under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Under the terms

of the cease-fire, a joint commission was established to examine the causes of

frontier incidents, and a demilitarized zone ten to fifteen kilometers wide was

established on either side of the border. At least temporarily, further military

confrontations were prevented.

Ethiopia and Kenya concluded a mutual defense pact in 1964 in response

to what both countries perceived as a continuing threat from Somalia. This pact

was renewed in 1980 and again on August 28, 1987, calling for the coordination

of the armed forces of both states in the event of an attack by Somalia. Most

OAU members were alienated by Somali irredentism and feared that if Somalia
were successful in detaching the Somali-populated portions of Kenya and

Ethiopia, the example might inspire their own restive minorities divided by

frontiers imposed during the colonial period. In addition, in making its irredentist

claims, the Somalis had challenged two of Africa's leading elder statesmen,

President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia.

Foreign Relations, 1960-69. Somalia's government was in the hands of

leaders who were favorably disposed toward the Western democracies,

particularly Italy and Britain, in whose political traditions many of them had been

educated. Nevertheless, as a reflection of its desire to demonstrate self-reliance

and nonalignment, the Somali government established ties with the Soviet Union

and China soon after independence.

The growth of Soviet influence in Somalia dated from 1962, when Moscow

agreed to provide loans to finance the training and equipping of the armed

forces. By the late 1960s, about 300 Soviet military personnel were serving as

advisers to the Somali forces, whose inventories had been stocked almost

entirely with equipment of East European manufacture. During the same period,

about 500 Somalis received military training in the Soviet Union. As a result of

their contact with Soviet personnel, some Somali military officers developed a

Marxist perspective on important issues that contrasted with the democratic

outlook of most of the country's civilian leaders.

The Soviet Union also provided nonmilitary assistance, including technical

training scholarships, printing presses, broadcasting equipment for the

government, and agricultural and industrial development aid. By 1969

considerable nonmilitary assistance had also been provided by China. Such

projects included the construction of hospitals and factories and in the 1970s of

the major north-south road.

Somalia's relations with Italy after independence remained good, and

Italian influence continued in the modernized sectors of social and cultural affairs.

Although their number had dropped to about 3,000 by 1965, the Italians residing

in Somalia still dominated many of the country's economic activities. Italian

economic assistance during the 1960s totaled more than a quarter of all the

nonmilitary foreign aid received, and Italy was an important market for Somali

goods, particularly food crops produced on the large, Italian-owned commercial

farms in the river valleys. Italy's sponsorship enabled Somalia to become an

associate of the European Economic Community (EEC), which formed another

source of economic and technical aid and assured preferential status for Somali

exports in West European markets.

In contrast to the cordial relations maintained with Italy, Somalia severed

diplomatic ties to Britain in 1962 to protest British support of Kenya's position on

the NFD. Somalia's relations with France were likewise strained because of

opposition to the French presence in the Territory of the Afars and Issas (formerly

French Somaliland, later independent Djibouti). Meanwhile, the Federal Republic

of Germany (West Germany) provided Somalia with a moderate amount of aid,

most notably sharing with Italy and the United States the task of training the
police force. The Somali government purposely sought a variety of foreign

sponsors to instruct its security forces, and Western-trained police were seen as

counterbalancing the Soviet-trained military. Likewise, the division of training

missions was believed to reduce dependence on either the West or the

communist countries to meet Somali security needs.

Throughout the 1960s, the United States supplied nonmilitary aid to

Somalia, a large proportion of it in the form of grants. But the image of the United

States in the eyes of most Somalis was influenced more by its support for

Ethiopia than by any assistance to Somalia. The large scale of United States

military aid to Ethiopia was particularly resented. Although aid to that country had

begun long before the Somali-Ethiopian conflict and was based on other

considerations, the Somalis' attitude remained unchanged as long as the United

States continued to train and equip a hostile neighbor.

The Husseen Government. Countrywide municipal elections, in which

the SYL won 74 percent of the seats, occurred in November 1963. These were

followed in March 1964 by the country's first postindependence national

elections. Again the SYL triumphed, winning 69 out of l23 parliamentary seats.

The party's true margin of victory was even greater, as the fifty-four seats won by

the opposition were divided among a number of small parties.

After the 1964 National Assembly election in March, a crisis occurred that

left Somalia without a government until the beginning of September. President

Usmaan, who was empowered to propose the candidate for prime minister after
an election or the fall of a government, chose Abdirizaaq Haaji Husseen as his

nominee instead of the incumbent, Shermaarke, who had the endorsement of the

SYL party leadership. Shermaarke had been prime minister for the four previous

years, and Usmaan decided that new leadership might be able to introduce fresh

ideas for solving national problems.

In drawing up a Council of Ministers for presentation to the National

Assembly, the nominee for prime minister chose candidates on the basis of

ability and without regard to place of origin. But Husseen's choices strained

intraparty relations and broke the unwritten rules that there be clan and regional

balance. For instance, only two members of Shermaarke's cabinet were to be

retained, and the number of posts in northern hands was to be increased from

two to five.

The SYL's governing Central Committee and its parliamentary groups

became split. Husseen had been a party member since 1944 and had

participated in the two previous Shermaarke cabinets. His primary appeal was to

younger and more educated party members. Several political leaders who had

been left out of the cabinet joined the supporters of Shermaarke to form an

opposition group within the party. As a result, the Husseen faction sought support

among non-SYL members of the National Assembly.

Although the disagreements primarily involved personal or group political

ambitions, the debate leading to the initial vote of confidence centered on the

issue of Greater Somalia. Both Usmaan and prime minister-designate Husseen

wanted to give priority to the country's internal economic and social problems.

Although Husseen had supported militant pan-Somalism, he was portrayed as

willing to accept the continued sovereignty of Ethiopia and Kenya over Somali

areas.

The proposed cabinet failed to be affirmed by a margin of two votes.

Seven National Assembly members, including Shermaarke, abstained, while

forty-eight members of the SYL voted for Husseen and thirty-three opposed him.

Despite the apparent split in the SYL, it continued to attract recruits from other

parties. In the first three months after the election, seventeen members of the

parliamentary opposition resigned from their parties to join the SYL.

Usmaan ignored the results of the vote and again nominated Husseen as

prime minister. After intraparty negotiation, which included the reinstatement of

four party officials expelled for voting against him, Husseen presented a second

cabinet list to the National Assembly that included all but one of his earlier

nominees. However, the proposed new cabinet contained three additional

ministerial positions filled by men chosen to mollify opposition factions. The new

cabinet was approved with the support of all but a handful of SYL National

Assembly members. Husseen remained in office until the presidential elections of

June 1967.

The 1967 presidential elections, conducted by a secret poll of National

Assembly members, pitted former prime minister Shermaarke against Usmaan.

Again the central issue was moderation versus militancy on the pan-Somali
question. Usmaan, through Husseen, had stressed priority for internal

development. Shermaarke, who had served as prime minister when pan-

Somalism was at its height, was elected president of the republic.

The Igaal Government. The new president nominated as prime minister

Mahammad Ibrahim Igaal, who raised cabinet membership from thirteen to

fifteen members and included representatives of every major clanfamily , as well

as some members of the rival SNC. In August 1967, the National Assembly

confirmed his appointment without serious opposition. Although the new prime

minister had supported Shermaarke in the presidential election, he was a

northerner and had led a 1962 defection of the northern SNL assembly members

from the government. He had also been closely involved in the founding of the

SNC but, with many other northern members of that group, had rejoined the SYL

after the 1964 elections.

A more important difference between Shermaarke and Igaal, other than

their past affiliations, was the new prime minister's moderate position on pan-

Somali issues and his desire for improved relations with other African countries.

In these areas, he was allied with the "modernists" in the government,

parliament, and administration who favored redirecting the nation's energies from

confrontation with its neighbors to combating social and economic ills. Although

many of his domestic policies seemed more in line with those of the previous

administration, Igaal continued to hold the confidence of both Shermaarke and

the National Assembly during the eighteen months preceding the March 1969

national elections.

Igaal's policy of regional détente resulted in improved relations with

Ethiopia and Kenya. The prime minister did not relinquish Somalia's territorial

claims, but he hoped to create an atmosphere in which the issue could be

peacefully negotiated. In September 1968, Somalia and Ethiopia agreed to

establish commercial air and telecommunication links. The termination of the

state of emergency in the border regions, which had been declared by Ethiopia in

February 1964, permitted the resumption of free access by Somali pastoralists to

their traditional grazing lands and the reopening of the road across Ethiopian

territory between Mogadishu and Hargeysa. With foreign affairs a less

consuming issue, the government's energy and the country's meager resources

could now be applied more effectively to the challenges of internal development.

However, the relaxation of tensions had an unanticipated effect. The conflict with

its neighbors had promoted Somalia's internal political cohesion and solidified

public opinion at all levels on at least one issue. As tension from that source

subsided, old cleavages based on clan rivalries became more prominent.

The March 1969 elections were the first to combine voting for municipal

and National Assembly posts. Sixty-four parties contested the elections. Only the

SYL, however, presented candidates in every election district, in many cases

without opposition. Eight other parties presented lists of candidates for national

offices in most districts. Of the remaining fifty-five parties, only twenty-four gained
representation in the assembly, but all of these were disbanded almost

immediately when their fifty members joined the SYL.

Both the plethora of parties and the defection to the majority party were

typical of Somali parliamentary elections. To register for elective office, a

candidate merely needed either the support of 500 voters or the sponsorship of

his clan, expressed through a vote of its traditional assembly. After registering,

the office seeker then attempted to become the official candidate of a political

party. Failing this, he would remain on the ballot as an individual contestant.

Voting was by party list, which could make a candidate a one-person party. (This

practice explained not only the proliferation of small parties but also the transient

nature of party support.) Many candidates affiliated with a major party only long

enough to use its symbol in the election campaign and, if elected, abandoned it

for the winning side as soon as the National Assembly met. Thus, by the end of

May 1969 the SYL parliamentary cohort had swelled from 73 to 109.

In addition, the eleven SNC members had formed a coalition with the SYL,

which held 120 of the 123 seats in the National Assembly. A few of these 120 left

the SYL after the composition of Igaal's cabinet became clear and after the

announcement of his program, both of which were bound to displease some who

had joined only to be on the winning side. Offered a huge list of candidates, the

almost 900,000 voters in 1969 took delight in defeating incumbents. Of the

incumbent deputies, 77 out of 123 were not returned (including 8 out of 18

members of the previous cabinet), but these figures did not unequivocally
demonstrate dissatisfaction with the government. Statistically, they were nearly

identical with the results of the 1964 election, and, given the profusion of parties

and the system of proportional representation, a clear sense of public opinion

could not be obtained solely on the basis of the election results. The fact that a

single party--the SYL--dominated the field implied neither stability nor solidarity.

Anthropologist I.M. Lewis has noted that the SYL government was a very

heterogeneous group with diverging personal and lineage interests.

Candidates who had lost seats in the assembly and those who had

supported them were frustrated and angry. A number of charges were made of

government election fraud, at least some firmly founded. Discontent was

exacerbated when the Supreme Court, under its newly appointed president,

declined to accept jurisdiction over election petitions, although it had accepted

such jurisdiction on an earlier occasion.

Neither the president nor the prime minister seemed particularly

concerned about official corruption and nepotism. Although these practices were

conceivably normal in a society based on kinship, some were bitter over their

prevalence in the National Assembly, where it seemed that deputies ignored their

constituents in trading votes for personal gain.

Among those most dissatisfied with the government were intellectuals and

members of the armed forces and police. (General Mahammad Abshir, the chief

of police, had resigned just before the elections after refusing to permit police

vehicles to transport SYL voters to the polls.) Of these dissatisfied groups, the
most significant element was the military, which since 1961 had remained outside

politics. It had done so partly because the government had not called upon it for

support and partly because, unlike most other African armed forces, the Somali

National Army had a genuine external mission in which it was supported by all

Somalis--that of protecting the borders with Ethiopia and Kenya.

Coup d'Etat. The stage was set for a coup d'état, but the event that

precipitated the coup was unplanned. On October 15, 1969, a bodyguard killed

president Shermaarke while prime minister Igaal was out of the country. (The

assassin, a member of a lineage said to have been badly treated by the

president, was subsequently tried and executed by the revolutionary

government.) Igaal returned to Mogadishu to arrange for the selection of a new

president by the National Assembly. His choice was, like Shermaarke, a member

of the Daarood clan-family (Igaal was an Isaaq). Government critics, particularly

a group of army officers, saw no hope for improving the country's situation by this

means. On October 21, 1969, when it became apparent that the assembly would

support Igaal's choice, army units took over strategic points in Mogadishu and

rounded up government officials and other prominent political figures. The police

cooperated with the army.

Although not regarded as the author of the military takeover, army

commander Major General Mahammad Siad Barre assumed leadership of the

officers who deposed the civilian government. The new governing body, the

Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), installed Siad Barre as its president. The
SRC arrested and detained at the presidential palace leading members of the

democratic regime, including Igaal. The SRC banned political parties, abolished

the National Assembly, and suspended the constitution. The new regime's goals

included an end to "tribalism, nepotism, corruption, and misrule." Existing treaties

were to be honored, but national liberation movements and Somali unification

were to be supported. The country was renamed the Somali Democratic

Republic.

THE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME. The military coup that ended the

democratic regime retroactively defined its action as a Marxist revolution not only

instituting a new political order but also proposing the radical transformation of

Somali society through the application of "scientific socialism." Despite the

presence of Soviet advisers with the armed forces, no evidence indicated that the

coup was Soviet-inspired. SRC members included officers ranging in rank from

major general (Siad Barre and Jaama Ali Qoorsheel) to captain, but the young

Soviet-trained junior officers--versed in Marx and Lenin--who had encouraged the

coup were excluded from important positions in the revolutionary regime.

The SRC, which was synonymous with the new government, reorganized

the country's political and legal institutions, formulated a guiding ideology based

on the Quran as well as on Marx, and purged civilian officials who were not

susceptible to "reeducation." The influence of lineage groups at all levels and

elitism in public life based on clan affiliation were targeted for eradication.

Eventually, Siad Barre emerged as Somalia's strongman, spokesman for its

revolution, and leader of its government. In 1971 he announced the regime's

intention to phase out military rule after the establishment of a political party

whose central committee ultimately would supersede the SRC as a policy- and

decision-making body.

Supreme Revolutionary Council. The SRC also gave priority to rapid

economic and social development through "crash programs," efficient and

responsive government, and creation of a standard written form of Somali as the

country's single official language. The regime pledged continuance of regional

détente in its foreign relations without relinquishing Somali claims to disputed

territories.

The SRC's domestic program, known as the First Charter of the

Revolution, appeared in 1969. Along with Law Number 1, an enabling instrument

promulgated on the day of the military takeover, the First Charter provided the

institutional and ideological framework of the new regime. Law Number 1

assigned to the SRC all functions previously performed by the president, the

National Assembly, and the Council of Ministers, as well as many duties of the

courts. The role of the twenty-five-member military junta was that of an executive

committee that made decisions and had responsibility to formulate and execute

policy. Actions were based on majority vote, but deliberations rarely were

published. SRC members met in specialized committees to oversee government

operations in given areas. A subordinate fourteen-man secretariat--the Council of

the Secretaries of State (CSS)-- functioned as a cabinet and was responsible for
day-to-day government operation, although it lacked political power. The CSS

consisted largely of civilians, but until 1974 several key ministries were headed

by military officers who were concurrently members of the SRC. Existing

legislation from the previous democratic government remained in force unless

specifically abrogated by the SRC, usually on the grounds that it was

"incompatible...with the spirit of the Revolution." In February 1970, the

democratic constitution of 1960, suspended at the time of the coup, was repealed

by the SRC under powers conferred by Law Number 1.

Although the SRC monopolized executive and legislative authority, Siad

Barre filled a number of executive posts: titular head of state, chairman of the

CSS (and thereby head of government), commander in chief of the armed forces,

and president of the SRC. His titles were of less importance, however, than was

his personal authority, to which most SRC members deferred, and his ability to

manipulate the clans.

Military and police officers, including some SRC members, headed

government agencies and public institutions to supervise economic development,

financial management, trade, communications, and public utilities. Military

officers replaced civilian district and regional officials. Meanwhile, civil servants

attended reorientation courses that combined professional training with political

indoctrination, and those found to be incompetent or politically unreliable were

fired. A mass dismissal of civil servants in 1974, however, was dictated in part by

economic pressures.
 The legal system functioned after the coup, subject to modification. In

1970 special tribunals, the National Security Courts (NSC), were set up as the

judicial arm of the SRC. Using a military attorney as prosecutor, the courts

operated outside the ordinary legal system as watchdogs against activities

considered to be counterrevolutionary. The first cases that the courts dealt with

involved Shermaarke's assassination and charges of corruption leveled by the

SRC against members of the democratic regime. The NSC subsequently heard

cases with and without political content. A uniform civil code introduced in 1973

replaced predecessor laws inherited from the Italians and British and also

imposed restrictions on the activities of sharia courts. The new regime

subsequently extended the death penalty and prison sentences to individual

offenders, formally eliminating collective responsibility through the payment of

diya or blood money.

The SRC also overhauled local government, breaking up the old regions

into smaller units as part of a long-range decentralization program intended to

destroy the influence of the traditional clan assemblies and, in the government's

words, to bring government "closer to the people." Local councils, composed of

military administrators and representatives appointed by the SRC, were

established under the Ministry of Interior at the regional, district, and village

levels to advise the government on local conditions and to expedite its directives.

Other institutional innovations included the organization (under Soviet direction)

of the National Security Service (NSS), directed initially at halting the flow of

professionals and dissidents out of the country and at counteracting attempts to

settle disputes among the clans by traditional means. The newly formed Ministry

of Information and National Guidance set up local political education bureaus to

carry the government's message to the people and used Somalia's print and

broadcast media for the "success of the socialist, revolutionary road." A

censorship board, appointed by the ministry, tailored information to SRC

guidelines.

The SRC took its toughest political stance in the campaign to break down

the solidarity of the lineage groups. Tribalism was condemned as the most

serious impediment to national unity. Siad Barre denounced tribalism in a wider

context as a "disease" obstructing development not only in Somalia, but also

throughout the Third World. The government meted out prison terms and fines for

a broad category of proscribed activities classified as tribalism. Traditional

headmen, whom the democratic government had paid a stipend, were replaced

by reliable local dignitaries known as "peacekeepers" (nabod doan), appointed

by Mogadishu to represent government interests. Community identification rather

than lineage affiliation was forcefully advocated at orientation centers set up in

every district as the foci of local political and social activity. For example, the SRC

decreed that all marriage ceremonies should occur at an orientation center. Siad

Barre presided over these ceremonies from time to time and contrasted the

benefits of socialism to the evils he associated with tribalism.

To increase production and control over the nomads, the government

resettled 140,000 nomadic pastoralists in farming communities and in coastal

towns, where the erstwhile herders were encouraged to engage in agriculture

and fishing. By dispersing the nomads and severing their ties with the land to

which specific clans made collective claim, the government may also have

undercut clan solidarity. In many instances, real improvement in the living

conditions of resettled nomads was evident, but despite government efforts to

eliminate it, clan consciousness as well as a desire to return to the nomadic life

persisted. Concurrent SRC attempts to improve the status of Somali women

were unpopular in a traditional Muslim society, despite Siad Barre's argument

that such reforms were consonant with Islamic principles.

Challenges to the Regime. The SRC announced on two occasions that it

had discovered plotters in the act of initiating coup attempts. Both instances

involved SRC members. In April 1970, Qoorsheel, the first vice president, was

arrested and charged with treason. Qoorsheel represented the more

conservative police and army elements and thus opposed the socialist orientation

of the majority of SRC members. He was convicted of treason in a trial before the

National Security Court and sentenced to a prison term.

In May 1971, the second vice president, Major General Mahammad

Ainanche, and a fellow SRC member, Soviet-trained Lieutenant Colonel Salah

Gaveire Kedie, who had served as head of the Ministry of Defense and later as

secretary of state for communications, were arrested along with several other

army officers for plotting Siad Barre's assassination. The conspirators, who had

sought the support of clans that had lost influence in the 1969 overthrow of the
democratic regime, appeared to have been motivated by personal rivalries rather

than by ideology. Accused of conspiring to assassinate the president, the two key

figures in the plot and another army officer were executed after a lengthy trial.

By 1974 the SRC felt sufficiently secure to release Qoorsheel and most of

the leaders of the democratic regime who had been detained since the 1969

coup. Igaal and four other former ministers were excepted from the amnesty,

however, and were sentenced to long prison terms. Igaal received thirty years for

embezzlement and conspiracy against the state.

Siad Barre and Scientific Socialism. Somalia's adherence to socialism

became official on the first anniversary of the military coup when Siad Barre

proclaimed that Somalia was a socialist state, despite the fact that the country

had no history of class conflict in the Marxist sense. For purposes of Marxist

analysis, therefore, tribalism was equated with class in a society struggling to

liberate itself from distinctions imposed by lineage group affiliation. At the time,

Siad Barre explained that the official ideology consisted of three elements: his

own conception of community development based on the principle of self-

reliance, a form of socialism based on Marxist principles, and Islam. These were

subsumed under "scientific socialism," although such a definition was at variance

with the Soviet and Chinese models to which reference was frequently made.

The theoretical underpinning of the state ideology combined aspects of

the Quran with the influences of Marx, Lenin, Mao, and Mussolini, but Siad Barre

was pragmatic in its application. "Socialism is not a religion," he explained; "It is a

political principle" to organize government and manage production. Somalia's

alignment with communist states, coupled with its proclaimed adherence to

scientific socialism, led to frequent accusations that the country had become a

Soviet satellite. For all the rhetoric extolling scientific socialism, however, genuine

Marxist sympathies were not deep-rooted in Somalia. But the ideology was

acknowledged--partly in view of the country's economic and military dependence

on the Soviet Union--as the most convenient peg on which to hang a revolution

introduced through a military coup that had supplanted a Western-oriented

parliamentary democracy.

More important than Marxist ideology to the popular acceptance of the

revolutionary regime in the early 1970s were the personal power of Siad Barre

and the image he projected. Styled the "Victorious Leader" (Guulwaadde), Siad

Barre fostered the growth of a personality cult. Portraits of him in the company of

Marx and Lenin festooned the streets on public occasions. The epigrams,

exhortations, and advice of the paternalistic leader who had synthesized Marx

with Islam and had found a uniquely Somali path to socialist revolution were

widely distributed in Siad Barre's little blue-and-white book. Despite the

revolutionary regime's intention to stamp out the clan politics, the government

was commonly referred to by the code name MOD. This acronym stood for

Mareehaan (Siad Barre's clan), Ogaden (the clan of Siad Barre's mother), and

Dulbahante (the clan of Siad Barre son-in-law Colonel Ahmad Sulaymaan

Abdullah, who headed the NSS). These were the three clans whose members

formed the government's inner circle. In 1975, for example, ten of the twenty
members of the SRC were from the Daarood clan-family, of which these three

clans were a part; the Digil and Rahanwayn, the sedentary interriverine clan-

families, were totally unrepresented.

The Language and Literacy Issue. One of the principal objectives of the

revolutionary regime was the adoption of a standard orthography of the Somali

language. Such a system would enable the government to make Somali the

country's official language. Since independence Italian and English had served

as the languages of administration and instruction in Somalia's schools. A11

government documents had been published in the two European languages.

Indeed, it had been considered necessary that certain civil service posts of

national importance be held by two officials, one proficient in English and the

other in Italian. During the Husseen and Igaal governments, when a number of

English-speaking northerners were put in prominent positions, English had

dominated Italian in official circles and had even begun to replace it as a medium

of instruction in southern schools. Arabic--or a heavily arabized Somali--also had

been widely used in cultural and commercial areas and in Islamic schools and

courts. Religious traditionalists and supporters of Somalia's integration into the

Arab world had advocated that Arabic be adopted as the official language, with

Somali as a vernacular.

A few months after independence, the Somali Language Committee was

appointed to investigate the best means of writing Somali. The committee

considered nine scripts, including Arabic, Latin, and various indigenous scripts.
Its report, issued in 1962, favored the Latin script, which the committee regarded

as the best suited to represent the phonemic structure of Somali and flexible

enough to be adjusted for the dialects. Facility with a Latin system, moreover,

offered obvious advantages to those who sought higher education outside the

country. Modern printing equipment would also be more easily and reasonably

available for Latin type. Existing Somali grammars prepared by foreign scholars,

although outdated for modern teaching methods, would give some initial

advantage in the preparation of teaching materials. Disagreement had been so

intense among opposing factions, however, that no action was taken to adopt a

standard script, although successive governments continued to reiterate their

intention to resolve the issue.

On coming to power, the SRC made clear that it viewed the official use of

foreign languages, of which only a relatively small fraction of the population had

an adequate working knowledge, as a threat to national unity, contributing to the

stratification of society on the basis of language. In 1971 the SRC revived the

Somali Language Committee and instructed it to prepare textbooks for schools

and adult education programs, a national grammar, and a new Somali dictionary.

However, no decision was made at the time concerning the use of a particular

script, and each member of the committee worked in the one with which he was

familiar. The understanding was that, upon adoption of a standard script, all

materials would be immediately transcribed.

 On the third anniversary of the 1969 coup, the SRC announced that a

Latin script had been adopted as the standard script to be used throughout

Somalia beginning January 1, 1973. As a prerequisite for continued government

service, all officials were given three months (later extended to six months) to

learn the new script and to become proficient in it. During 1973 educational

material written in the standard orthography was introduced in elementary

schools and by 1975 was also being used in secondary and higher education.

Somalia's literacy rate was estimated at only 5 percent in 1972. After

adopting the new script, the SRC launched a "cultural revolution" aimed at

making the entire population literate in two years. The first part of the massive

literacy campaign was carried out in a series of three-month sessions in urban

and rural sedentary areas and reportedly resulted in several hundred thousand

people learning to read and write. As many as 8,000 teachers were recruited,

mostly among government employees and members of the armed forces, to

conduct the program.

The campaign in settled areas was followed by preparations for a major

effort among the nomads that got underway in August 1974. The program in the

countryside was carried out by more than 20,000 teachers, half of whom were

secondary school students whose classes were suspended for the duration of

the school year. The rural program also compelled a privileged class of urban

youth to share the hardships of the nomadic pastoralists. Although affected by

the onset of a severe drought, the program appeared to have achieved

substantial results in the field in a short period of time. Nevertheless, the UN

estimate of Somalia's literacy rate in 1990 was only 24 percent.

Creation of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party. One of the SRC's

first acts was to prohibit the existence of any political association. Under Soviet

pressure to create a communist party structure to replace Somalia's military

regime, Siad Barre had announced as early as 1971 the SRC's intention to

establish a one-party state. The SRC already had begun organizing what was

described as a "vanguard of the revolution" composed of members of a socialist

elite drawn from the military and the civilian sectors. The National Public

Relations Office (retitled the National Political Office in 1973) was formed to

propagate scientific socialism with the support of the Ministry of Information and

National Guidance through orientation centers that had been built around the

country, generally as local selfhelp projects.

The SRC convened a congress of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist

Party (SRSP) in June 1976 and voted to establish the Supreme Council as the

new party's central committee. The council included the nineteen officers who

composed the SRC, in addition to civilian advisers, heads of ministries, and other

public figures. Civilians accounted for a majority of the Supreme Council's

seventy-three members. On July 1, 1976, the SRC dissolved itself, formally

vesting power over the government in the SRSP under the direction of the

Supreme Council.
 In theory the SRSP's creation marked the end of military rule, but in

practice real power over the party and the government remained with the small

group of military officers who had been most influential in the SRC. Decision-

making power resided with the new party's politburo, a select committee of the

Supreme Council that was composed of five former SRC members, including

Siad Barre and his son-in-law, NSS chief Abdullah. Siad Barre was also secretary

general of the SRSP, as well as chairman of the Council of Ministers, which had

replaced the CSS in 1981. Military influence in the new government increased

with the assignment of former SRC members to additional ministerial posts. The

MOD circle also had wide representation on the Supreme Council and in other

party organs. Upon the establishment of the SRSP, the National Political Office

was abolished; local party leadership assumed its functions.

SOMALIA'S DIFFICULT DECADE, 1980-90 - Entrenching Siad Barre's

Personal Rule. The Ogaden War of 1977-78 between Somalia and Ethiopia and

the consequent refugee influx forced Somalia to depend for its economic survival

on humanitarian handouts. Domestically, the lost war produced a national mood

of depression. Organized opposition groups began to emerge, and in dealing

with them Siad Barre intensified his political repression, using jailings, torture,

and summary executions of dissidents and collective punishment of clans

thought to have engaged in organized resistance.

Siad Barre's new Western friends, especially the United States, which had

replaced the Soviet Union as the main user of the naval facilities at Berbera,
turned out to be reluctant allies. Although prepared to help the Siad Barre regime

economically through direct grants, World Bank - sponsored loans, and relaxed

International Monetary Fund ( IMF) regulations, the United States hesitated to

offer Somalia more military aid than was essential to maintain internal security.

The amount of United States military and economic aid to the regime was US$34

million in 1984; by 1987 this amount had dwindled to about US$8.7 million, a

fraction of the regime's requested allocation of US$47 million. Western countries

were also pressuring the regime to liberalize economic and political life and to

renounce historical Somali claims on territory in Kenya and Ethiopia. In response,

Siad Barre held parliamentary elections in December 1979. A "people's

parliament" was elected, all of whose members belonged to the government

party, the SRSP. Following the elections, Siad Barre again reshuffled the cabinet,

abolishing the positions of his three vice presidents. This action was followed by

another reshuffling in October 1980 in which the old Supreme Revolutionary

Council was revived. The move resulted in three parallel and overlapping

bureaucratic structures within one administration: the party's politburo, which

exercised executive powers through its Central Committee, the Council of

Minsters, and the SRC. The resulting confusion of functions within the

administration left decision making solely in Siad Barre's hands.

In February 1982, Siad Barre visited the United States. He had responded

to growing domestic criticism by releasing from detention two leading political

prisoners of conscience, former premier Igaal and former police commander

Abshir, both of whom had languished in prison since 1969. On June 7, 1982,
apparently wishing to prove that he alone ruled Somalia, ordered the arrest of

seventeen prominent politicians. This development shook the "old establishment"

because the arrests included Mahammad Aadan Shaykh, a prominent

Mareehaan politician, detained for the second time; Umar Haaji Masala, chief of

staff of the military, also a Mareehaan; and a former vice president and a former

foreign minister. At the time of detention, one official was a member of the

politburo; the others were members of the Central Committee of the SRSP. The

jailing of these prominent figures created an atmosphere of fear, and alienated

the Isaaq, Majeerteen, and Hawiye clans, whose disaffection and consequent

armed resistance were to lead to the toppling of the Siad Barre regime.

The regime's insecurity was considerably increased by repeated forays

across the Somali border in the Mudug (central) and Boorama (northwest) areas

by a combination of Somali dissidents and Ethiopian army units. In mid-July

1982, Somali dissidents with Ethiopian air support invaded Somalia in the center,

threatening to split the country in two. The invaders managed to capture the

Somali border towns of Balumbale and Galdogob, northwest of the Mudug

regional capital of Galcaio. Siad Barre's regime declared a state of emergency in

the war zone and appealed for Western aid to help repel the invasion. The United

States government responded by speeding deliveries of light arms already

promised. In addition, the initially pledged US$45 million in economic and military

aid was increased to US$80 million. The new arms were not used to repel the

Ethiopians, however, but to repress Siad Barre's domestic opponents.

 Although the Siad Barre regime received some verbal support at the

League of Arab States (Arab League) summit conference in September 1982,

and Somali units participated in war games with the United States Rapid

Deployment Force in Berbera, the revolutionary government's position continued

to erode. In December 1984, Siad Barre sought to broaden his political base by

amending the constitution. One amendment extended the president's term from

six to seven years. Another amendment stipulated that the president was to be

elected by universal suffrage (Siad Barre always received 99 percent of the vote

in such elections) rather than by the National Assembly. The assembly rubber-

stamped these amendments, thereby presiding over its own disenfranchisement.

On the diplomatic front, the regime undertook some fence mending. An

accord was signed with Kenya in December 1984 in which Somalia

"permanently" renounced its historical territorial claims, and relations between

the two countries thereafter began to improve. This diplomatic gain was offset,

however, by the "scandal" of South African foreign minister Roelof "Pik" Botha's

secret visit to Mogadishu the same month, in which South Africa promised arms

to Somalia in return for landing rights for South African Airways.

Complicating matters for the regime, at the end of 1984 the Western

Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) (a guerrilla organizaton based in Ethiopia

seeking to free the Ogaden and unite it with Somalia) announced a temporary

halt in military operations against Ethiopia. This decision was impelled by the

drought then ravaging the Ogaden and by a serious split within the WSLF, a
number of whose leaders claimed that their struggle for selfdetermination had

been used by Mogadishu to advance its expansionist policies. These elements

said they now favored autonomy based on a federal union with Ethiopia. This

development removed Siad Barre's option to foment anti-Ethiopian activity in the

Ogaden in retaliation for Ethiopian aid to domestic opponents of his regime.

To overcome its diplomatic isolation, Somalia resumed relations with Libya

in April 1985. Recognition had been withdrawn in 1977 in response to Libyan

support of Ethiopia during the Ogaden War. Also in early 1985 Somalia

participated in a meeting of EEC and UN officials with the foreign ministers of

several northeast African states to discuss regional cooperation under a planned

new authority, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development

(IGADD). Formed in January 1986 and headquartered in Djibouti, IGADD

brought together Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda in addition to

Somalia. In January 1986, under the auspices of IGADD, Siad Barre met

Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile-Mariam in Djibouti to discuss the "provisional"

administrative line (the undemarcated boundary) between Ethiopia and Somalia.

They agreed to hold further meetings, which took place on and off throughout

1986-87. Although Siad Barre and Mengistu agreed to exchange prisoners taken

in the Ogaden War and to cease aiding each other's domestic opponents, these

plans were never implemented. In August 1986, Somalia held joint military

exercises with the United States.

 Diplomatic setbacks also occurred in 1986, however. In September,

Somali foreign minister Abdirahmaan Jaama Barre, the president's brother,

accused the Somali Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation of anti-

Somali propaganda. The charge precipitated a diplomatic rift with Britain. The

regime also entered into a dispute with Amnesty International, which charged the

Somali regime with blatant violations of human rights. Wholesale human rights

violations documented by Amnesty International, and subsequently by Africa

Watch, prompted the United States Congress by 1987 to make deep cuts in aid

to Somalia.

Economically, the regime was repeatedly pressured between 1983 and

1987 by the IMF, the United Nations Development Programme, and the World

Bank to liberalize its economy. Specifically, Somalia was urged to create a free

market system and to devalue the Somali shilling so that its official rate would

reflect its true value.

Siad Barre's Repressive Measures. Faced with shrinking popularity and

an armed and organized domestic resistance, Siad Barre unleashed a reign of

terror against the Majeerteen, the Hawiye, and the Isaaq, carried out by the Red

Berets (Duub Cas), a dreaded elite unit recruited from among the president's

Mareehaan clansmen. Thus, by the beginning of 1986 Siad Barre's grip on power

seemed secure, despite the host of problems facing the regime. The president

received a severe blow from an unexpected quarter, however. On the evening of

May 23, he was severely injured in an automobile accident. Astonishingly,

although at the time he was in his early seventies and suffered from chronic

diabetes, Siad Barre recovered sufficiently to resume the reins of government

following a month's recuperation. But the accident unleashed a power struggle

among senior army commandants, elements of the president's Mareehaan clan,

and related factions, whose infighting practically brought the country to a

standstill. Broadly, two groups contended for power: a constitutional faction and a

clan faction. The constitutional faction was led by the senior vice president,

Brigadier General Mahammad Ali Samantar; the second vice president, Major

General Husseen Kulmiye; and generals Ahmad Sulaymaan Abdullah and

Ahmad Mahamuud Faarah. The four, together with president Siad Barre,

constituted the politburo of the SRSP.

Opposed to the constitutional group were elements from the president's

Mareehaan clan, especially members of his immediate family, including his

brother, Abdirahmaan Jaama Barre; the president's son, Colonel Masleh Siad,

and the formidable Mama Khadiija, Siad Barre's senior wife. By some accounts,

Mama Khadiija ran her own intelligence network, had well-placed political

contacts, and oversaw a large group who had prospered under her patronage.

In November 1986, the dreaded Red Berets unleashed a campaign of

terror and intimidation on a frightened citizenry. Meanwhile, the ministries

atrophied and the army's officer corps was purged of competent career officers

on suspicion of insufficient loyalty to the president. In addition, ministers and

bureaucrats plundered what was left of the national treasury after it had been

repeatedly skimmed by the top family.

The same month, the SRSP held its third congress. The Central

Committee was reshuffled and the president was nominated as the only

candidate for another seven-year term. Thus, with a weak opposition divided

along clan lines, which he skillfully exploited, Siad Barre seemed invulnerable

well into 1988. The regime might have lingered indefinitely but for the wholesale

disaffection engendered by the genocidal policies carried out against important

lineages of Somali kinship groupings. These actions were waged first against the

Majeerteen clan (of the Daarood clan-family), then against the Isaaq clans of the

north, and finally against the Hawiye, who occupied the strategic central area of

the country, which included the capital. The disaffection of the Hawiye and their

subsequent organized armed resistance eventually caused the regime's downfall.

Persecution of the Majeerteen. In the aftermath of the Ogaden debacle,

a group of disgruntled army officers attempted a coup d'état against the regime in

April 1978. Their leader was Colonel Mahammad Shaykh Usmaan, a member of

the Majeerteen clan. The coup failed and seventeen alleged ringleaders,

including Usmaan, were summarily executed. All but one of the executed were of

the Majeerteen clan. One of the plotters, Lieutenant Colonel Abdillaahi Yuusuf

Ahmad, a Majeerteen, escaped to Ethiopia and founded an anti-Siad Barre

organization initially called the Somali Salvation Front (SSDF; later the Somali

Salvation Democratic Front, SSDF). During their preeminence in the civilian

regimes, the Majeerteen had alienated other clans. Thus, when Siad Barre sent

the Red Berets against the Majeerteen in Mudug Region, other clans declined to

support them.

The Red Berets systematically smashed the small reservoirs in the area

around Galcaio so as to deny water to the Umar Mahamuud Majeerteen

sublineages and their herds. In May and June 1979, more than 2,000 Umar

Mahamuud, the Majeerteen sublineage of Colonel Ahmad, died of thirst in the

waterless area northeast of Galcaio, Garoowe, and Jerriiban. In Galcaio,

members of the Victory Pioneers, the urban militia notorious for harassing

civilians, raped large numbers of Majeerteen women. In addition, the clan lost an

estimated 50,000 camels, 10,000 cattle, and 100,000 sheep and goats.

Oppression of the Isaaq. The Isaaq as a clan-family occupy the northern

portion of the country. Three major cities are predominantly, if not exclusively,

Isaaq: Hargeysa, the second largest city in Somalia until it was razed during

disturbances in 1988; Burao in the interior, also destroyed by the military; and the

port of Berbera.

Formed in London on April 6, 1981, by 400 to 500 Isaaq emigrés, the

Somali National Movement (SNM) remained an Isaaq clan-family organization

dedicated to ridding the country of Siad Barre. The Isaaq felt deprived both as a

clan and as a region, and Isaaq outbursts against the central government had

occurred sporadically since independence. The SNM launched a military

campaign in 1988, capturing Burao on May 27 and part of Hargeysa on May 31.
Government forces bombarded the towns heavily in June, forcing the SNM to

withdraw and causing more than 300,000 Isaaq to flee to Ethiopia.

The military regime conducted savage reprisals against the Isaaq. The

same methods were used as against the Majeerteen-- destruction of water wells

and grazing grounds and raping of women. An estimated 5,000 Isaaq were killed

between May 27 and the end of December 1988. About 4,000 died in the fighting,

but 1,000, including women and children, were alleged to have been bayoneted

to death.

Harrying of the Hawiye. The Hawiye occupy the south central portions of

Somalia. The capital of Mogadishu is located in the country of the Abgaal, a

Hawiye subclan. In numbers the Hawiye in Somalia are roughly comparable to

the Isaaq, occupying a distant second place to the Daarood clans. Southern

Somalia's first prime minister during the UN trusteeship period, Abdullaahi Iise,

was a Hawiye; so was the trust territory's first president, Aadan Abdullah

Usmaan. The first commander of the Somali army, General Daauud, was also a

Hawiye. Although the Hawiye had not held any major office since independence,

they had occupied important administrative positions in the bureaucracy and in

the top army command.

In the late 1980s, disaffection with the regime set in among the Hawiye

who felt increasingly marginalized in the Siad Barre regime. From the town of

Beledweyne in the central valley of the Shabeelle River to Buulobarde, to Giohar,

and in Mogadishu, the clan was subjected to ruthless assault. Government

atrocities inflicted on the Hawiye were considered comparable in scale to those

against the Majeerteen and Isaaq. By undertaking this assault on the Hawiye,

Siad Barre committed a fatal error. By the end of 1990, he still controlled the

capital and adjacent regions but by alienating the Hawiye, Siad Barre turned his

last stronghold into enemy territory.

Faced with saboteurs by day and sniper fire by night, Siad Barre ordered

remaining units of the badly demoralized Red Berets to massacre civilians. By

1989 torture and murder became the order of the day in Mogadishu. On July 9,

1989, Somalia's Italian-born Roman Catholic bishop, Salvatore Colombo, was

gunned down in his church in Mogadishu by an unknown assassin. The order to

murder the bishop, an outspoken critic of the regime, was widely believed to

have had come from the presidential palace.

On the heels of the bishop's murder came the infamous July 14 massacre,

when the Red Berets slaughtered 450 Muslims demonstrating against the arrest

of their spiritual leaders. More than 2,000 were seriously injured. On July 15,

forty-seven people, mainly from the Isaaq clan, were taken to Jasiira Beach west

of the city and summarily executed. The July massacres prompted a shift in

United States policy as the United States began to distance itself from Siad

Barre.

With the loss of United States support, the regime grew more desperate.

An anti-Siad Barre demonstration on July 6, 1990, at a soccer match in the main

stadium deteriorated into a riot, causing Siad Barre's bodyguard to panic and
open fire on the demonstrators. At least sixty-five people were killed. A week

later, while the city reeled from the impact of what came to be called the Stadia

Corna Affair, Siad Barre sentenced to death 46 prominent members of the

Manifesto Group, a body of 114 notables who had signed a petition in May calling

for elections and improved human rights. During the contrived trial that resulted

in the death sentences, demonstrators surrounded the court and activity in the

city came to a virtual halt. On July 13, a shaken Siad Barre dropped the charges

against the accused. As the city celebrated victory, Siad Barre, conceding defeat

for the first time in twenty years, retreated into his bunker at the military barracks

near the airport to save himself from the people's wrath.

GEOGRAPHY

Africa's easternmost

country, Somalia has a land area of

637,540 square kilometers, slightly

less than that of the state of Texas.

Somalia occupies the tip of a

region commonly referred to as the

Horn of Africa--because of its

resemblance on the map to a

rhinoceros's horn--that also

includes Ethiopia and Djibouti.

 Somalia's terrain consists mainly of plateaus, plains, and highlands. In the

far north, however, the rugged east-west ranges of the Karkaar Mountains lie at

varying distances from the Gulf of Aden coast. The weather is hot throughout the

year, except at the higher elevations in the north. Rainfall is sparse, and most of

Somalia has a semiarid-to- arid environment suitable only for the nomadic

pastoralism practiced by well over half the population. Only in limited areas of

moderate rainfall in the northwest, and particularly in the southwest, where the

country's two perennial rivers are found, is agriculture practiced to any extent.

The local geology suggests the presence of valuable mineral deposits. As

of 1992, however, only a few significant sites had been located, and mineral

extraction played a very minor role in the economy.

Somalia's long coastline (3,025 kilometers) has been of importance chiefly

in permitting trade with the Middle East and the rest of East Africa. The

exploitation of the shore and the continental shelf for fishing and other purposes

had barely begun by the early 1990s. Sovereignty was claimed over territorial

waters up to 200 nautical miles.

POPULATION

Somalia's first national census was taken in February 1975, and as of mid-

1992 no further census had been conducted. In the absence of independent

verification, the reliability of the 1975 count has been questioned because those

conducting it may have overstated the size of their own clans and lineage groups
to augment their allocations of political and economic resources. The census

nonetheless included a complete enumeration in all urban and settled rural areas

and a sample enumeration of the nomadic population. In the latter case, the

sampling units were chiefly watering points. Preliminary results of that census

were made public as part of the Three-Year Plan, 1979-81, issued by the Ministry

of National Planning in existence at the time. (Because the Somali state had

disintegrated and the government's physical infrastructure had been destroyed,

no ministry of planning, or indeed any other government ministry, existed in mid-

1992.) Somali officials suggested that the 1975 census undercounted the

nomadic population substantially, in part because the count took place during

one of the worst droughts in Somalia's recorded history, a time when many

people were moving in search of food and water.

The total population according to the 1975 census was 3.3 million. The

United Nations (UN) estimated Somalia's population in mid-1991 at nearly 7.7

million. Not included were numerous refugees who had fled from the Ogaden

(Ogaadeen) in Ethiopia to Somalia beginning in the mid-1970s.

The Ministry of National Planning's preliminary census data distinguished

three main categories of residents: nomads, settled farmers, and persons in

nonagricultural occupations. Settled farmers lived in permanent settlements

outside the national, regional, and district capitals, although some of these were

in fact pastoralists, and others might have been craftsmen and small traders.

Those living in urban centers were defined as nonagricultural regardless of their

occupations. In 1975 nomads constituted nearly 59 percent of the population,

settled persons nearly 22 percent, and nonagricultural persons more than 19

percent. Of the population categorized as nomads, about 30 percent were

considered seminomadic because of their relatively permanent settlements and

shorter range of seasonal migration.

Various segments of the population apparently increased at different rates.

The nomadic population grew at less than 2 percent a year, and the

seminomadic, fully settled rural and urban populations (in that order) at higher

rates--well over 2.5 percent in the case of the urban population. These varied

rates of growth coupled with increasing urbanization and the efforts, even if of

limited success, to settle nomads as cultivators or fishermen were likely to

diminish the proportion of nomads in the population.

The 1975 census did not indicate the composition of the population by age

and sex. Estimates suggested, however, that more than 45 percent of the total

was under fifteen years of age, only about 2 percent was over sixty-five years,

and that there were more males than females among the nomadic population

and proportionately fewer males in urban areas.

Population densities varied widely. The areas of greatest rural density

were the settled zones adjacent to the Jubba and Shabeelle rivers, a few places

between them, and several small areas in the northern highlands. The most

lightly populated zones (fewer than six persons per square kilometer) were in
northeastern and central Somalia, but there were some sparsely populated areas

in the far southwest along the Kenyan border.

The nomadic and seminomadic segments of the population traditionally

engage in cyclical migrations related to the seasons, particularly in northern and

northeastern Somalia. During the dry season, the nomads of the Ogo highlands

and plateau areas in the north and the Nugaal Valley in the northeast generally

congregate in villages or large encampments at permanent wells or other reliable

sources of water. When the rains come, the nomads scatter with their herds

throughout the vast expanse of the Haud, where they live in dispersed small

encampments during the wet season, or as long as animal forage and water last.

When these resources are depleted, the area empties as the nomads return to

their home areas. In most cases, adult men and women and their children remain

with the sheep, goats, burden camels, and, occasionally, cattle. Grazing camels

are herded at some distance by boys and young unmarried men.

A nomadic population also inhabits the southwest between the Jubba

River and the Kenyan border. Little is known about the migratory patterns or

dispersal of these peoples.

Somalia's best arable lands lie along the Jubba and Shabeelle rivers and

in the interriverine area. Most of the sedentary rural population resides in the

area in permanent agricultural villages and settlements. Nomads are also found

in this area, but many pastoralists engage part-time in farming, and the range of

seasonal migrations is more restricted. After the spring rains begin, herders move
from the river edge into the interior. They return to the rivers in the dry season

(hagaa), but move again to the interior in October and November if the second

rainy season (day) permits. They then retreat to the rivers until the next spring

rains. The sedentary population was augmented in the mid-1970s by the arrival

of more than 100,000 nomads who came from the drought-stricken north and

northeast to take up agricultural occupations in the southwest. However, the

1980s saw some Somalis return to nomadism; data on the extent of this reverse

movement remain unavailable.

The locations of many towns appear to have been determined by trade

factors. The present-day major ports, which range from Chisimayu and

Mogadishu in the southwest to Berbera and Saylac in the far northwest, were

founded from the eighth to the tenth centuries A.D. by Arab and Persian

immigrants. They became centers of commerce with the interior, a function they

continued to perform in the 1990s, although some towns, such as Saylac, had

declined because of the diminution of the dhow trade and repeated Ethiopian

raids. Unlike in other areas of coastal Africa, important fishing ports failed to

develop despite the substantial piscine resources of the Indian Ocean and the

Gulf of Aden. This failure appears to reflect the centuries-old Somali aversion to

eating fish and the absence of any sizable inland market. Some of the towns

south of Mogadishu have long been sites of non-Somali fishing communities,

however. The fisheries' potential and the need to expand food production,

coupled with the problem of finding occupations for nomads ruined by the 1974-

75 drought, resulted in government incentives to nomad families to settle

permanently in fishing cooperatives; about 15,000 nomads were reported

established in such cooperatives in late 1975.

Present-day inland trading centers in otherwise sparsely populated areas

began their existence as caravan crossing points or as regular stopping places

along caravan routes. In some cases, the ready availability of water throughout

the year led to the growth of substantial settlements providing market and service

facilities to nomadic populations. One such settlement is Galcaio, an oasis in the

Mudug Plain that has permanent wells.

The distribution of town and villages in the agricultural areas of the Jubba

and Shabeelle rivers is related in part to the development of market centers by

the sedentary population. But the origin of a considerable number of such

settlements derives from the founding of agricultural religious communities

(jamaat) by various Islamic brotherhoods during the nineteenth century. An

example is the large town of Baardheere, on the Jubba River in the Gedo

Region, which evolved from ajamaa founded in 1819. Hargeysa, the largest town

in northern Somalia, also started as a religious community in the second half of

the nineteenth century. However, growth into the country's second biggest city

was stimulated mainly by its selection in 1942 as the administrative center for

British Somaliland. In 1988 Hargeysa was virtually destroyed by troops loyal to

Siad Barre in the course of putting down the Isaaq insurrection.

After the establishment of a number of new regions (for a total of sixteen

as of early 1992, including Mogadishu) and districts (second order administrative

areas--sixty-nine as of 1989 plus fifteen in the capital region), the government

defined towns to include all regional and district headquarters regardless of size.

(When the civil war broke out in 1991, the regional administrative system was

nullified and replaced by one based on regional clan groups.) Also defined as

towns were all other communities having populations of 2,000 or more. Some

administrative headquarters were much smaller than that. Data on the number of

communities specified as urban in the 1975 census were not available except for

the region of Mogadishu. At that time, the capital had 380,000 residents, slightly

more than 52 percent of all persons in the category of "nonagricultural" (taken to

be largely urban). Only three other regions--Woqooyi Galbeed, Shabeellaha

Hoose, and the Bay--had urban populations constituting 7 to 9 percent of the

total urban population in 1975. The sole town of importance in Woqooyi Galbeed

Region at that time was Hargeysa. Berbera was much smaller, but as a port on

the Gulf of Aden it had the potential to grow considerably. The chief town in

Shabeellaha Hoose Region was Merca, which was of some importance as a port.

There were several other port towns, such as Baraawe, and some inland

communities that served as sites for light manufacturing or food processing. In

the Bay Region the major towns, Baidoa and Buurhakaba, were located in

relatively densely settled agricultural areas. There were a few important towns in

other regions: the port of Chisimayu in Jubbada Hoose and Dujuuma in the

agricultural area of Jubbada Dhexe.

CLIMATOLOGY

Climate is the primary factor in much of Somali life. For the large nomadic

population, the timing and amount of rainfall are crucial determinants of the

adequacy of grazing and the prospects of relative prosperity. During droughts

such as occurred during 1974-75 and 1984-85, starvation can occur. There are

some indications that the climate has become drier in the last century and that

the increase in the number of people and animals has put a growing burden on

water and vegetation.

Somalis recognize four seasons, two rainy (gu and day) and two dry

(jiilaal and hagaa). The gurains begin in April and last until June, producing a

fresh supply of pasture and for a brief period turning the desert into a flowering

garden. Lush vegetation covers most of the land, especially the central grazing

plateau where grass grows tall. Milk and meat abound, water is plentiful, and

animals do not require much care. The clans, reprieved from four months'

drought, assemble to engage alternately in banter and poetic exchange or in a

new cycle of hereditary feuds. They also offer sacrifices to Allah and to the

founding clan ancestors, whose blessings they seek. Numerous social functions

occur: marriages are contracted, outstanding disputes are settled or

exacerbated, and a person's age is calculated in terms of the number of gus he

or she has lived. The gu season is followed by the hagaa drought (July-

September) and the hagaa by the day rains (October-November). Next

is jiilaal (December-March), the harshest season for pastoralists and their herds.
 Most of the country receives less than 500 millimeters of rain annually,

and a large area encompassing the northeast and much of northern Somalia

receives as little as 50 to 150 millimeters. Certain higher areas in the north,

however, record more than 500 millimeters a year, as do some coastal sites. The

southwest receives 330 to 500 millimeters. Generally, rainfall takes the form of

showers or localized torrential rains and is extremely variable.

Mean daily maximum temperatures throughout the country range from 30°

C to 40° C, except at higher elevations and along the Indian Ocean coast. Mean

daily minimum temperatures vary from 20° C to more than 30° C. Northern

Somalia experiences the greatest temperature extremes, with readings ranging

from below freezing in the highlands in December to more than 45° C in July in

the coastal plain skirting the Gulf of Aden. The north's relative humidity ranges

from about 40 percent in midafternoon to 85 percent at night, varying somewhat

with the season. During the colder months, December to February, visibility at

higher elevations is often restricted by fog.

Temperatures in the south are less extreme, ranging from about 20° C to

40° C. The hottest months are February through April. Coastal readings are

usually five to ten degrees cooler than those inland. The coastal zone's relative

humidity usually remains about 70 percent even during the dry seasons.
ECONOMY

Already seriously weakened by a devastating civil war, the Somali

economy was further undermined by the fall of President Mahammad Siad

Barre's government in late January 1991 and the subsequent absence of political

consensus. Economic statistics from the early post-Siad Barre period were not

available in early 1992; however, one can gain some understanding of Somalia's

economic situation during that period by looking at the country's prior economic

history.

Generally, interventions in the Somali economy, whether by Italian

fascists, Somali Marxists, or International Monetary Fund ( IMF) economists,

have had minimal impact on economic development. Yet the shrewd Somalis

have been able to survive and even prosper in their harsh desert homeland.

Pastoralism and Commerce in Historical Perspective

The Somalis raise cattle, sheep, and goats, but the camel plays the

central role as an indicator of wealth and success. Camels can survive in an

environment where water and grazing areas are scarce and widely scattered.

They provide meat, milk, and transportation for Somali pastoralists, and serve as

their principal medium of exchange. Camels are provided as compensation for

homicides and are a standard component of the dowry package.

For centuries, nomads have relied on their livestock for subsistence and

luxuries. They have sold cows, goats, and older camels to international traders
and butchers in the coastal cities, and in the urban markets have bought tea,

coffee beans, and salt. In the nineteenth century, northern Somalis were quick to

take advantage of the market for goats with middlemen representing the British,

who needed meat for their enclave in Aden, a coaling station for ships traveling

through the Suez Canal. By the turn of the century, about 1,000 cattle and 80,000

sheep and goats were being exported annually from Berbera to Aden.

Starting in the fifteenth century, the ports of Saylac and Berbera were well

integrated into the international Arab economy, with weapons, slaves, hides,

skins, gums, ghee (a type of butter), ostrich feathers, and ivory being traded. On

the Banaadir coast, especially in Mogadishu but also in Merca and Baraawe, a

lively trade with China, India, and Arabia existed as early as the fourteenth

century. Finally, starting with the Somalis who for centuries have joined the crews

of oceangoing ships, the exportation of labor has long been a crucial element in

Somalia's ability to sustain itself.

POLITICS

The most significant political consequence of Siad Barre's twenty-one-year

rule was an intensified identification with parochial clans. By 1992 the multiplicity

of political rivalries among the country's numerous clans seriously jeopardized

Somalia's continued existence as a unified state. There was considerable irony in

this situation because Siad Barre, following the 1969 military coup that had

brought him to power, had proclaimed his opposition to clan politics and had

justified the banning of political parties on the grounds that they were merely
partisan organizations that impeded national integration. Nevertheless, from the

beginning of his rule Siad Barre favored the lineages and clans of his own clan-

family, the Daarood. In particular, he distributed political offices and the powers

and rewards concomitant with these positions disproportionately to three clans of

the Daarood: his own clan, the Mareehaan; the clan of his son-in-law, the

Dulbahante; and the clan of his mother, the Ogaden. The exclusion of other clans

from important government posts was a gradual process, but by the late 1970s

there was a growing perception, at least among the political elite, that Siad Barre

was unduly partial toward the three Daarood clans to which he had family ties.

The forced dissolution of political parties in 1969 and the continuing

prohibition of political activity tended to enhance the importance of clans because

family gatherings remained virtually the only regular venue where politics could

be discussed freely. The creation in 1976 of the governmentsponsored Somali

Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) failed to fill the political vacuum created by

the absence of legitimate parties. Siad Barre and his closest military advisers had

formed the SRSP as the country's sole political organization, anticipating that it

would transcend clan loyalties and mobilize popular support for government

policies. The SRSP's five-member politburo, which Siad Barre chaired, decided

the party's position on issues. The members of the SRSP, who never numbered

more than 20,000, implemented directives from the politburo (via the central

committee) or the government; they did not debate policy. Because most of the

top SRSP leaders by 1980 were of the Mareehaan, Dulbahante, or Ogaden

clans, the party became another example to disaffected clans of their exclusion

from any meaningful political role.

D. DJIBOUTI

BACKGROUND

Djibouti, the smallest country in the Horn of Africa, is strategically located

at the mouth of the Red Sea with a large natural harbour providing essential port

services to neighbouring landlocked countries. Djibouti is still recovering from the

1990-1994 civil war that led to massive population displacement, destruction of

infrastructure and a downturn in the economy.

Despite recent increased investments in economic infrastructure,

particularly Djibouti’s modern port, which serves Ethiopia, the country remains

underdeveloped.

A sizeable proportion of the population lives on less than US$2 a day

while one-third lack adequate access to healthcare, education and clean water.

Djibouti is affected by events in neighbouring countries and has provided refuge

to thousands of people, mainly from Somalia, fleeing droughts and war.

 The country is also prone to natural disasters such as drought and floods,

with a limited capacity for disaster prevention and management.

BOUNDARIES

Djibouti is bounded by Eritrea to the north, Ethiopia to the west and

southwest, and Somalia to the south. The Gulf of Tadjoura, which opens into the

Gulf of Aden, bifurcates the eastern half of the country and supplies much of its

230 miles (370 km) of coastline.

HISTORY

The history of Djibouti, recorded in poetry and songs of its nomadic

peoples, goes back thousands of years to a time when Djiboutians traded hides

and skins for the perfumes and spices of ancient Egypt, India, and China.

Through close contacts with the Arabian Peninsula for more than one-thousand

years, the Somali and Afar tribes in this region became among the first on the

African continent to adopt Islam.

French Interest. It was Rochet d'Hericourt's exploration into Shoa (1839-

42) that marked the beginning of French interest in the African shores of the Red

Sea. Further exploration by Henri Lambert, French Consular Agent at Aden, and

Captain Fleuriot de Langle led to a treaty of friendship and assistance between

France and the sultans of Raheita, Tadjoura, and Gobaad, from whom the

French purchased the anchorage of Obock in 1862.

 French Somaliland. Growing French interest in the area took place

against a backdrop of British activity in Egypt and the opening of the Suez Canal

in 1869. In 1884-85, France expanded its protectorate to include parts of

Somaliland. Léonce Lagarde was installed as governor of this protectorate.

Boundaries of the protectorate, marked out in 1897 by France and Emperor

Menelik II of Ethiopia, were reaffirmed by agreements with Emperor Haile

Selassie I of Ethiopia in 1945 and 1954.

The administrative capital was moved from Obock in 1896. The city of

Djibouti, which had a harbor with good access that attracted trade caravans

crossing East Africa as well as Somali settlers from the south, became the new

administrative capital. The Franco-Ethiopian railway, linking Djibouti to the heart

of Ethiopia, began in 1897 and reached Addis Ababa in June 1917, increasing

the volume of trade passing through the port.

World War II. After the Italian invasion and occupation of Ethiopia in the

mid-1930s, constant border skirmishes occurred between French forces in

French Somaliland and Italian forces in Italian East Africa. In June 1940, during

the early stages of World War II, France fell and the colony was then ruled by the

pro-Axis Vichy (French) government.

British and Commonwealth forces fought the neighboring Italians during

the East African Campaign. In 1941, the Italians were defeated and the Vichy

forces in French Somaliland were isolated. The Vichy French administration

continued to hold out in the colony for over one year after the Italian collapse. In
December 1942, after a 101-day long British blockade, Governor Pierre

Nouailhetas surrendered French Somaliland. Free French and Allied forces then

occupied the French colony. Before the war ended, the colony fell under the

Provisional Government of the French Republic.

A local battalion from French Somaliland participated in the Liberation of

Paris in 1944. Manyo rocks out lound one of the greatest to ever walk on this

earth. Even though he has many temptations sometime he falls but he gets back

up and fights to see another day.

Reform. On July 22, 1957, the colony was reorganized by the French

Fourth Republic to give the people of French Somaliland considerable self-

government. On the same day, a decree applying the Overseas Reform Act (Loi

Cadre) of June 23, 1956, established a territorial assembly that elected eight of

its members to an executive council. Members of the executive council were

responsible for one or more of the territorial services and carried the title of

minister. The council advised the French-appointed governor general.

In a September 1958 constitutional referendum, French Somaliland opted

to join the French community as an overseas territory. This act entitled the region

to representation by one deputy and one senator in the French Parliament, and

one counselor in the French Union Assembly.

On October 5, 1958, the French Fifth Republic was formed. The first

elections to the territorial assembly were held on November 23, 1958, under a
system of proportional representation. In the next assembly elections (1963), a

new electoral law was enacted. Representation was abolished in exchange for a

system of straight plurality vote based on lists submitted by political parties in

seven designated districts. Ali Aref Bourhan, allegedly of Turkish origin, was

selected to be the president of the executive council. French President Charles

de Gaulle's August 1966 visit to Djibouti was marked by 2 days of public

demonstrations by Somalis demanding independence. On September 21, 1966,

Louis Saget, appointed governor general of the territory after the demonstrations,

announced the French Government's decision to hold a referendum to determine

whether the people would remain within the French Republic or become

independent. In March 1967, 60% chose to continue the territory's association

with France.

French Territory of the Afars and Issas. In July of that year, a directive

from Paris formally changed the name of the region to the French Territory of the

Afars and Issas. The directive also reorganized the governmental structure of the

territory, making the senior French representative, formerly the governor general,

a high commissioner. In addition, the executive council was redesignated as the

council of government, with nine members.

Independence. In 1975, the French Government began to accommodate

increasingly insistent demands for independence. In June 1976, the territory's

citizenship law, which favored the Afar minority, was revised to reflect more

closely the weight of the Issa Somali. The electorate voted for independence in a
May 1977 referendum, and the Republic of Djibouti was established June that

same year. Hassan Gouled Aptidon became the country's first president.

In 1981, Aptidon turned the country into a one party state by declaring that

his party, the Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès (RPP) (People's Rally

for Progress), was the sole legal one. A civil war broke out in 1991, between the

government and a predominantly Afar rebel group, the Front for the Restoration

of Unity and Democracy (FRUD). The FRUD signed a peace accord with the

government in December 1994, ending the conflict. Two FRUD members were

made cabinet members, and in the presidential elections of 1999 the FRUD

campaigned in support of the RPP.

Aptidon resigned as president 1999, at the age of 83, after being elected

to a fifth term in 1997. His successor was his nephew, Ismail Omar Guelleh.

On May 12, 2001, President Ismail Omar Guelleh presided over the

signing of what is termed the final peace accord officially ending the decade-long

civil war between the government and the armed faction of the FRUD, led by

Ahmed Dini Ahmed, an Afar nationalist and former Gouled political ally. The

peace accord successfully completed the peace process begun on February 7,

2000 in Paris. Ahmed Dini Ahmed represented the FRUD.

In the presidential election held April 8, 2005 Ismail Omar Guelleh was re-

elected to a second 6-year term at the head of a multi-party coalition that

included the FRUD and other major parties. A loose coalition of opposition parties
again boycotted the election. Currently, political power is shared by a Somali

president and an Afar prime minister, with an Afar career diplomat as Foreign

Minister and other cabinet posts roughly divided. However, Issas are

predominate in the government, civil service, and the ruling party. That, together

with a shortage of non-government employment, has bred resentment and

continued political competition between the Issa Somalis and the Afars. In March

2006, Djibouti held its first regional elections and began implementing a

decentralization plan. The broad pro-government coalition, including FRUD

candidates, again ran unopposed when the government refused to meet

opposition preconditions for participation. A nationwide voter registration

campaign is now underway in advance of the scheduled 2008 parliamentary

elections.

GEOGRAPHY

The landscape of Djibouti is

varied and extreme, ranging from

rugged mountains in the north to a

series of low desert plains separated

by parallel plateaus in the west and

south. Its highest peak is Mount

Moussa at 6,654 feet (2,028

metres); the lowest point, which is

also the lowest in Africa, is the saline Lake Assal, 509 feet (155 metres) below

sea level.

The country is internationally renowned as a geologic treasure trove.

Located at a triple juncture of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and East African rift

systems, the country hosts significant seismic and geothermal activity. Slight

tremors are frequent, and much of the terrain is littered with basalt from past

volcanic activity. In November 1978 the eruption of the Ardoukoba volcano,

complete with spectacular lava flows, attracted the attention of volcanologists

worldwide. Of particular interest was the tremendous seismic activity that

accompanied the eruption and led to the widening by more than a metre of the

plates between Africa and the Arabian peninsula.

Drainage. Besides Lake Assal, the other major inland body of water is

Lake Abbe, located on Djibouti’s southwestern border with Ethiopia. The country

is completely devoid of any permanent above-ground rivers, although some

subterranean rivers exist.

CLIMATOLOGY

The often torrid climate varies between two major seasons. The cool

season lasts from October to April and typifies a Mediterranean-style climate in

which temperatures range from the low 70s to the mid-80s F (low 20s to low 30s

C) with low humidity. The hot season lasts from May to September. Temperatures

increase as the hot khamsin wind blows off the inland desert, and they range
from an average low in the mid-80s F (low 30s C) to a stifling high in the low 110s

F (mid-40s C). This time of year is also noted for days in which humidity is at its

highest. Among the coolest areas in the country is the Day Forest, which is

located at a high elevation; temperatures in the low to mid-50s F (low to mid-10s

C) have been recorded.

The average annual precipitation is limited and is usually spread over 26

days. Different regions of the country receive varying amounts of precipitation:

the coastal regions receive 5 inches (130 mm) of rainfall per annum, while the

northern and mountainous portions of the country receive about 15 inches (380

mm). The rainy season lasts between January and March, with the majority of

precipitation falling in quick, short bursts. One outcome of this erratic rainfall

pattern is periodic flash floods that devastate those areas located at sea level.

POLITICS

Djibouti is a semi-presidential republic, with executive power in the central

government, and legislative power in both the government and parliament. The

parliamentary party system is dominated by the People's Rally for Progress and

the President who currently is Ismail Omar Guelleh. The country's current

constitution was approved in September 1992. Djibouti is a one party dominant

state with the People's Rally for Progress in power. Other parties are allowed, but

the main opposition, Union for a Presidential Majority, boycotted the 2005 and

2008 elections leaving all of the legislative seats to the PRP.

 The government is seen as being controlled by the Somali Issa clan. The

country has recently come out of a decade long civil war, with the government

and the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) signing a

peace treaty in 2000. Two FRUD members are part of the current cabinet.

Djibouti's second president, Guelleh was first elected to office in 1999,

taking over from Hassan Gouled Aptidon, who had ruled the country since its

independence from France in 1977. Despite elections of the 1990s being

described as "generally fair", Guelleh was sworn in for his second and final six-

year term as president after a one-man election on 8 April 2005. He took 100% of

the votes in a 78.9% turnout.

The prime minister, who follows the council of ministers “cabinet”, is

appointed by the President. The parliament - the Chambre des Députés -

consists of 52 members who are selected every five to nine years.

In 2001, the Djiboutian government leased the former French Foreign

Legion base Camp Lemonier to the United States. Camp Lemonier is being used

for fighting terrorism in the region, mainly performing airstrikes on suspected

terrorist targets in the Somalian territory by the United States Central Command

as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.

France's 13th Foreign Legion Demi-Brigade shares Camp Lemonier with

the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) of the United States

Central Command, which arrived in 2002. It is from Djibouti that Abu Ali al-Harithi,
suspected mastermind of the 2000 USS Cole bombing, and the American citizen

Ahmed Hijazi, along with four others persons, lost their lives in 2002 while riding

a car in Yemen, by a Hellfire missile launched by an RQ-1 Predator drone

provided by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It is also from there

that the American Army launched a few attacks in 2007 against enemy forces in

Somalia.

The country of Djibouti is a member of the Arab League, as well as the

African Union, and also the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

ECONOMY

The Economy of Djbouti is derived in large part from its strategic location

on the Red Sea. Djibouti is mostly barren, with little development in the

agricultural and industrial sectors. The country has a harsh climate, a largely

unskilled labour force, and limited natural resources. The country’s most

important economic asset is its strategic location connecting the Red Sea and

the Gulf of Aden. As such, Djibouti’s economy is dominated by the services

sector, providing services as both a transit port for the region and as an

international transshipment and refuelling centre.

Between 1991 to 1994, Djibouti experienced a civil war which had a

devastating effect on the economy. Since then, the country has benefited from

political stability. In recent years, Djibouti has seen significant improvement in

macroeconomic stability, with its annual GDP improving at an average of over 3

percent since 2003. This comes after a decade of negative or low growth. This is

attributed to fiscal adjustment measures aimed at improving public financing, as

well as reforms in port management.

Despite the recent modest and stable growth, Djibouti is faced with many

economic challenges, particularly job creation and poverty reduction. With an

average annual population growth rate of 2.5 percent, the economy cannot

significantly benefit national income per capita growth. Unemployment is

extremely high at over 50 percent and is a major contributor to widespread

poverty. Efforts are needed in creating conditions that will enhance private sector

development and accumulate human capital. These conditions can be achieved

through improvements in macroeconomic and fiscal framework, public

administration, and labour market flexibility.

E. KENYA

BACKGROUND

A country in East Africa famed for its scenic landscapes and vast wildlife

preserves. Its Indian Ocean coast provided historically important ports by which

goods from Arabian and Asian traders have entered the continent for many

centuries. Along that coast, which holds some of the finest beaches in Africa, are

predominantly Muslim Swahili cities such as Mombasa, a historic centre that has

contributed much to the musical and culinary heritage of the country. Inland are

populous highlands famed for both their tea plantations, an economic staple

during the British colonial era, and their variety of animal species, including lions,

elephants, cheetahs, rhinoceroses, and hippopotamuses. Kenya’s western

provinces, marked by lakes and rivers, are forested, while a small portion of the

north is desert and semidesert. The country’s diverse wildlife and panoramic

geography draw large numbers of European and North American visitors, and

tourism is an important contributor to Kenya’s economy.

 The capital of Kenya is Nairobi, a sprawling city that, like many other

African metropolises, is a study in contrasts, with modern skyscrapers looking out

over vast shantytowns in the distance, many harbouring refugees fleeing civil

wars in neighbouring countries. Older neighbourhoods, some of them

prosperous, tend to be ethnically mixed and well served by utilities and other

amenities, while the tents and hastily assembled shacks that ring the city tend to

be organized tribally and even locally, inasmuch as in some instances whole rural

villages have removed themselves to the more promising city.

With a long history of musical and artistic expression, Kenya enjoys a rich

tradition of oral and written literature, including many fables that speak to the

virtues of determination and perseverance, important and widely shared values,

given the country’s experience during the struggle for independence. Kikuyu

writer Ngugi wa Thiong’o, one of the country’s best-known authors internationally,

addresses these concerns in his remarks on one folkloric figure:

Hare being small, weak, but full of innovative wit, was our hero. We

identified with him as he struggled against the brutes of prey like lion, leopard,

and hyena. His victories were our victories and we learnt that the apparently

weak can outwit the strong.

Kenya’s many peoples are well known to outsiders, largely because of the

British colonial administration’s openness to study. Anthropologists and other

social scientists have documented for generations the lives of the Maasai, Luhya,

Luo, Kalenjin, and Kikuyu peoples, to name only some of the groups. Adding to
the country’s ethnic diversity are European and Asian immigrants from many

nations. Kenyans proudly embrace their individual cultures and traditions, yet

they are also cognizant of the importance of national solidarity; a motto of

“Harambee” (Swahili: “Pulling together”) has been stressed by Kenya’s

government since independence.

BOUNDARIES

Kenya is Bisected horizontally by the Equator and vertically by longitude

38° E, Kenya is bordered to the north by The Sudan and Ethiopia, to the east by

Somalia and the Indian Ocean, to the south by Tanzania, and to the west by Lake

Victoria and Uganda.

HISTORY

Kenya has been called the ‘cradle of mankind’: the place where the first

humans appeared. Fossils found in the Great Rift Valley, around Lake Turkana

(in the north of Kenya) suggest that hominids (the family of man apes and

humans) walked around there several millions of years ago. But there are little

remains and a new find could change the theories quickly. A key figure in

researching Kenya’s prehistoric past was the British-Kenyan anthropologist Louis

Leakey. Many remains are displayed in the famous Kenya National Museum in

Nairobi, where they have met with fierce opposition from Kenyan Christians, who

find them to be insulting to their religion.

 Tribes Moving In. The current tribes in Kenya – like elsewhere in East

Africa – can be divided into three (language) groups: the Bantus, Nilotes and

Cushites. The Cushitic-speaking peoples moved into what is now Kenya from

north African territory around 2000 BC. They were hunterer-gatherers, but also

livestock herders and farmers. A new phase in Kenya history was born. Today

they form only a small part of the population: for example the Somali, Boni,

Rendille and Wata tribes are Cushitic.

More important for Kenya were the Bantu and Nilotic peoples, who moved

into the area from about 400 AD on - an important phase in Kenya history. The

Bantu peoples came from the Nigeria and Cameroon region (in West-Africa).

From them, the Kikuyu, Mijikenda, Dawida, Taveta and Akamba tribes emerged.

The Masai, Luo, Kalenjin and Turkana tribes are Nilotic. Together they form the

bulk of the Kenyan people nowadays. Especially the Bantus brought new

technologies, such as iron working. They were mainly farmers but they

supplemented this with herding, fishing, hunting, gathering and trading their iron

products with the other tribes who mainly limited themselves to hunting and

gathering. By 1000 AD the techniques from the Stone Age had been replaced by

those from the Iron Age throughout Kenya, and more sophisticated farming

methods were developed.

Arab domination. From about the 7th century on, Kenya history

underwent a big change when Arab traders started coming to Kenya by dhows

(boats) over the Indian Ocean. During the 8th century, Arabs and Persians
founded colonies along the coast and came to dominate a large part of what is

now Kenya for many centuries to come. This is how Swahili (together with

English the official language of Kenya) appeared: a Bantu language with many

Arabic loan words. Swahili became the ‘lingua franca’ (general language)

between the many tribes.

The Arab and Persian traders also brought religion with them – today the

majority of the people in the coast region are Muslim – and from the beginning

they traded slaves, transporting them to the Arab Peninsula, the Persian Gulf and

other Asian regions.

The Portuguese Period. In 1498 Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama’s

ship landed in what is now Malindi, a city on the Kenyan coast, on his route to

India. The European colonial period of Kenya history began. In 1515, Francisco

de Almeida’s armada staged a full-scale invasion of several coastal cities. In

1525 the Portuguese returned again to sack Mombasa, now the second city of

Kenya. In Mombasa they built Fort Jesus as a stronghold, which still is a main

tourist attraction.

However, the Portuguese only gained a partial control over the region.

The Arabs kept several strongholds and attempts to convert the population to

Catholicism generally failed. In 1698 Mombasa fell to the Arabs from Oman after

a 33-month siege and in 1729 the Portuguese left East Africa for good. The

Omani Arabs, who heavily increased the slave trade, were regarded by the

Africans with the same hostility as the Portuguese.

 British Colonization. Oman came under British influence, and became a

British protectorate. The British would be the next external force dominating the

region. At the 1885 Berlin conference, at the height of European colonialism, the

European powers arbitrarily divided Africa among themselves. Germany was to

get Tanganyika (Tanzania), Britain was awarded Kenya and Uganda. The British

were more interested in controlling Uganda (because of the Nile River) than

Kenya, but needed Kenya in order to do that. The Imperial British East Africa

Company (IBEAC) was authorized to set up commercial operations in Uganda

and Kenya, but when it failed it’s mission, Kenya and Uganda were made a direct

British protectorate in 1895. The British began building a railroad through Kenya,

which would become a decisive factor in Kenya history.

Several factors led to African resistance against colonization. After

decades the British had taken the bulk of the land suitable for farming –

especially the highlands which were declared solely for whites - pushing aside

the original inhabitants or turning them into squatters without rights. The British

introduced taxes, but as there existed no money, Africans were supposed to pay

them through labor. This way, the squatters were more or less forced to labor on

the lands from which was taken from them by the British. Cash cropping was

discouraged or banned for Africans on their own plots. Coffee licenses, for

example, were strictly reserved for whites.

Moreover, World War I proved that Europeans were not so civilized as

they appeared to be. The British lost a lot of prestige in the eyes of Africans.
Several movements began to agitate against colonization. They became more

aware of their own Kenya history. Interestingly enough they were generally

started by Kenyans which had attended missionary schools, where they had

learned about justice, freedom and love. One of them was Harry Thuku, who was

sent to prison for 11 years for organizing mass protests in 1921 with the Young

Kikuyu Association that he co-founded. This organization went over into the

Kenya African Union (later renamed Kenya African National Union or KANU), led

by Jomo Kenyatta. The famous Mau Mau rebellion from 1952-1960 was the

culmination of these protests. This was led by the Kikuyu, who suffered heavily

from British land politics as they had lived in the highlands before colonization.

Kenyan Independence under Kenyatta. On December 12th, 1963, the

British granted full independence to Kenya. KANU leader Jomo Kenyatta (a

Kikuyu) became it’s first president. This was the first period of freedom in Kenya

history for a long time - at least formally, because the Cold War ensured plenty of

Western grip in the next phase of Kenya history. Although the British had

sentenced Kenyatta to 7 years of hard labor for his role in the Mau Mau

rebellions, Kenyatta followed a course of reconciliation. He asked white settlers

not to leave Kenya, let many colonial civil servants keep their jobs, and made

Kenya a member of the British Commonwealth. In the Cold War he followed a

pro-Western, anti-communist course (more on our separate page about Kenya

and the Cold War). Foreign investments flew in because of Kenya’s relative

stability and Kenyatta had political influence throughout Africa. A relative

prosperous phase in Kenya history began.

 However, Kenyatta was criticized because of authoritarian politics and

favouritism: during his land reforms the best pieces of land went to his relatives

and friends (the “Kiambu Mafia”), and Kenyatta himself became the nation’s

largest landowner.

Daniel Arap Moi’s one Party State. After Kenyatta’s death in 1978,

Daniel Arap Moi – vice president under Kenyatta – became the second president

in modern Kenya history. The authoritarian traits of Kenyatta’s government

increased. After a coup attempt against his government in 1982, he tightened his

grip on the country. He had the main conspirators executed, changed the

constitution to outlaw all political parties other than KANU, and put his friends on

important government positions. However, he was rather popular among the

population, regularly visiting many parts of the country.

Arap Moi received support of the West, who saw in him a bulwark against

communist influences from Tanzania, Ethiopia and Uganda. After the end of the

Cold War, this support fell away. Foreign donors, including the USA, now

withheld financial aid if Moi would not allow political reforms. So in 1992 elections

were held again, and Moi won these as well as the 1997 elections by skillfully

exploiting fear of the smaller tribes that they would be dominated by the big

tribes.

The Kibaki Presidency. The Constitution forbade Arap Moi to run again

for president in the 2002 elections. Mwai Kibaki won the elections on the promise

to fight corruption, and became the third president. Kibaki had been a minister
under Arap Moi, but fell out of favor with Moi in the 1980s. Kibaki was praised for

abolishing school fees for primary education. This program saw nearly 1.7 million

more pupils enroll in school by the end of 2004. On the other hand, critics say he

has done little to fight corruption and done much to take good care of himself.

From 2003 to 2006, Kibaki’s cabinet spent 14 million dollars on new Mercedes

and BMW cars for themselves. Kibaki lost the 2005 referendum on a new

Constitution, after he changed the constitutional proposals to increase the power

of the president.

GEOGRAPHY

Kenya is the world's forty-seventh largest country (after Madagascar).

From the coast on the Indian Ocean the Low plains rise to central highlands. The

highlands are bisected

by the Great Rift Valley;

a fertile plateau in the

east. The Kenyan

Highlands comprise one

of the most successful

agricultural production

regions in Africa. The

highlands are the site of

the highest point in Kenya (and the second highest in Africa): Mount Kenya,

which reaches 5,199 metres (17,057 ft) and is also the site of glaciers. Climate
varies from tropical along the coast to arid in the interior. Mount Kilimanjaro

(5,895m - 19,341 ft) can be seen from Kenya to the South of the Tanzanian

border.

Kenya has considerable land area of wildlife habitat, including the Masai

Mara, where Blue Wildebeest and other bovids participate in a large scale annual

migration. Up to 250,000 blue wildebeest perish each year in the long and

arduous movement to find forage in the dry season. The "Big Five" animals of

Africa can also be found in Kenya: the lion, leopard, buffalo, rhinoceros and

elephant. A significant population of other wild animals, reptiles and birds can be

found in the national parks and game reserves in the country. The environment of

Kenya is threatened by high population growth and its side effects.

CLIMATOLOGY

The weather in Kenya is observed from the starts of summer from

December to March and winter starts from July to August. Temperatures over

much of Kenya are subtropical or temperate, because of the reduction of

temperature with altitude, and are similar to those in California, summer in

France or southern Britain rather than those elsewhere in Africa.

Only the coastal lowlands experience the constant high temperatures and

humidity associated with equatorial latitudes. Even they are less oppressive than

one might expect, because of the regular daytime sea breezes and longer hours

of sunshine. It is not surprising that with such a favourable weather pattern -

sunny, only moderately wet, and not too hot - and a great variety of scenery, wild

life, game parks, and good communications. The variety of relief and the range of

altitude in Kenya produce a considerable number of distinctive local climates and

local weather too numerous to be detailed here. The country can be divided

broadly into four climatic regions, each with certain features of equatorial weather

climates. There is a double rainy season between March and May and between

November and December, with two intervening dry seasons.

Kenya’s different topographical regions experience distinct climates.

Generally, the hottest time is in February and March and the coldest in July and

August. The coastal region is largely humid and wet. The city of Malindi, for

instance, receives an average rainfall of 1,050 mm (41 in) per year, with average

temperatures ranging from 21° to 32°C (70° to 90°F) in January and 20° to 29°C

(68° to 84°F) in July. The low plateau area is the driest part of the country. There,

the town of Wajir receives an average annual rainfall of 320 mm (13 in) and

experiences average temperatures ranging from 19° to 37°C (66° to 99°F) in

January and 19° to 34°C (66° to 93°F) in July. Nairobi, in the temperate Kenya

highlands, receives an average annual rainfall of 790 mm (31 in) and

experiences average temperatures ranging from 9° to 29°C (48° to 84°F) in

January and 7° to 26°C (45° to 79°F) in July.

Higher elevation areas within the highlands receive much larger amounts

of rainfall. The Lake Victoria basin in western Kenya is generally the wettest

region in the country, particularly the highland regions to the north and south of
Kisumu, where average annual rainfall ranges from 1,740 mm (70 in) to 1,940

mm (80 in). Average temperatures in this region range from 14° to 34°C (57° to

93°F) in January and 14° to 30°C (57° to 86°F) in July.

The average annual temperatures in the main areas are: Mombasa

(coastal): Max 30ºC, Min 22ºC, Nairobi: Max 25ºC, Min 13ºC, North Plainlands:

Max 34ºC, Min 23ºC. Rainfall occurs seasonally throughout most of Kenya. The

coast, eastern plateaus, and Lake Basin experience two rainy seasons: the “long

rains” extends roughly from March to June, and the “short rains” lasts from

approximately October to December. The highlands of western Kenya have a

single rainy season, lasting from March to September. All parts of the country are

subject to periodic droughts, or delays in the start of the rainy seasons. Kenya’s

climate has had a profound effect on settlement patterns, as for centuries

population has been concentrated in the wettest areas of the country.

POLITICS

Kenya is a presidential representative democratic republic, whereby the

President is both the head of state and head of government, and of a multi-party

system. Executive power is exercised by the government. Legislative power is

vested in both the government and the National Assembly. The Judiciary is

independent of the executive and the legislature. However, there was growing

concern especially during former president Daniel arap Moi's tenure that the

executive was increasingly meddling with the affairs of the judiciary.

 Until the unrest occasioned by the disputed election results of December

2007, Kenya had hitherto maintained remarkable stability despite changes in its

political system and crises in neighbouring countries. A cross-party parliamentary

reform initiative in the fall of 1997 revised some oppressive laws inherited from

the colonial era that had been used to limit freedom of speech and assembly.

This improved public freedoms and contributed to generally credible national

elections in December 1997.

In December 2002, Kenyans held democratic and open elections, most of

which were judged free and fair by international observers. The 2002 elections

marked an important turning point in Kenya's democratic evolution in that power

was transferred peacefully from the Kenya African Union (KANU), which had

ruled the country since independence to the National Rainbow Coalition (Narc), a

coalition of political parties.

Under the presidency of Mwai Kibaki, the new ruling coalition promised to

focus its efforts on generating economic growth, combating corruption, improving

education, and rewriting its constitution. A few of these promises have been met.

There is free primary education. In 2007 the government issued a statement

declaring that from 2008, secondary education would be heavily subsidised, with

the government footing all tuition fees.

ECONOMY

The Kenyan economy remains dependant on agriculture and periodic

drought often threatens GDP growth. Farming and livestock are important

activities, accounting (with forestry and fishing) for 23.9% of GDP and about half

of total exports in 2007. Horticultural produce and tea are Kenya’s two single

most valuable exports, accounting for 18.8% and 15.5% respectively of total

sales in 2007.

The post-election violence in the first quarter of 2008 hit the Kenyan

economy hard. The Kenya Private Sector Alliance (representing most major

businesses) estimated that 400,000 jobs were lost and economic growth was

expected to slow to 4%. The tourism industry, which is a major source of foreign

exchange, was severely damaged. The agriculture sector was also been heavily

affected, which will have long term effects on Kenya's economy.