A Paper on the

Independence of the
Judiciary and the
Constitutional
Commissions
by

Julian Rey S. Sabrido

Submitted to

Atty. Paolo Evangelista

Ateneo de Davao University

November 21, 2015

Introduction
The Judiciary is one of the three pillars of our
government. Some would argue that it is the most powerful
branch of the government. But the Court, itself, has
discarded this notion and asserted that it is a co-equal
branch of the executive and the legislative branch.
It is, however, important to underscore that the
judiciary is independent from the other branches. It is its
intendance that lends stability of in our government. Imagine
our Courts being dictated by our politicians or even
influential and wealthy people in our society. Indeed, without
such independence, no justice can truly be served.
Although some would argue that the scenario I just
described actually exists in the status quo. Perhaps there are
some merits in their contentions. There may be some degree
of corruption in our judiciary, After all, its in a country
plagued by fraud and scandals of corruption, who would be
shocked that some judge in some municipality accepted a
bribe?
The cynism towards our judicial system is inevitable at
best and correct at worst. But it would still be important to
believe that our justice system works. Our faith in our justice
system is fundamental to our faith in our government. As
long as we have a judiciary that is free and independent,
there is still reason believe in our government and that our
leaders are held accountable.
The same is true with our Constitutional Commissions.
They were created by our Constitution primarily to hold our
government accountable. They are set up in a way that no
one could dictate in carrying out their mandates.

This paper will discuss the nature of the Judiciary and

the three Constitutional Commissions protected by the 1987
Constitution: the Commission on Elections, Civil Service
Commissions and the Commission on Audit. It also seeks to
determine the nature and importance of independence
among these institutions and how to protect it.

Judicial independence, defined

Judicial independence is one of the most important
principles of democratic governments. Primarily, it is the
concept that the judiciary needs to be kept away from the
other branches of government. That is, courts should not be
subject to improper influence from the other branches of
government, or from private or partisan interests1.
Judicial Independence is vital aspect to the idea of
separation of powers. Separation of powers, as described by
the Supreme Court in the case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission (63 Phil. 139), is the concept of separation of
powers as a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. The court added that each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained
and independent of each other.
The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system
of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government 2.
And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution3.

1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judicial_independence
2 Angara v. Electoral Commissions, 63 Phil. 139
3 Id

In Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the

Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired
Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, where the
Court has yet again reasserted its independence from other
the jurisdiction of Commission on Audit held the concept of
the independence encompasses the idea that individual
judges can freely exercise their mandate to resolve
justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole,
should work in the discharge of its constitutional functions
free of restraints and influence from the other branches,
save only for those imposed by the Constitution itself.
In the same case, the Court further explained the two
concepts of Judicial Independence under its unique
circumstances. Independence, according to the Court,
encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely
exercise their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while
the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the discharge
of its constitutional functions free of restraints and influence
from the other branches, save only for those imposed by the
Constitution itself.
Thus, judicial independence can be broken down into
two distinct concepts: decisional independence and
institutional independence.
Decisional independence refers to a judges ability to
render decisions free from political or popular influence
based solely on the individual facts and applicable law. On
the other hand, institutional independence describes the
separation of the judicial branch from the executive and
legislative branches of government4. Simply put, institutional
independence refers to the collective independence of the
judiciary as a body.
4

Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired
Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC

In the Philippines, the Constitution protects the

independence of the judiciary both in its Jurisdiction and
fiscal autonomy. Section 2, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution states that the Congress shall have the power to
define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
Section 6, on the other hand, grants the Supreme Court the
exclusive jurisdiction to ha administrative supervision over
all courts and personnel thereof.
To protect it from the other branches of government
that control the countrys finances, Section 3, Article VIII
further states that the Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the
legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous
year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly
released. Similarly, Section 10 provides that the salary of the
members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower
courts shall be fixed by law. There shall be no salary
decrease during their continuance.

But the concept of judicial independence is not only

based on the constitutional provision. Judicial independence
is an inherent character of every democratic government. It
is greatly valued and stringently protected every elements
posing threats to it by other jurisdictions in the world. In its
judgment in the case of MacKeigan v. Hickman, the Canadian
Supreme Court held that judicial independence as a
constitutional principle fundamental to the Canadian system
of government possesses both individual and institutional
elements. Actions by other branches of government which
undermine the independence of the judiciary therefore
attack the integrity of our Constitution 5. In Valente v. The
Queen, Justice LeDain of Canada enunciated the three core
characteristics of judicial independence as:
(1) Security of tenure,
(2) Financial security, and
(3) Administrative independence6.
In the United States, which is where our concept of
government is largely based, judicial independence has been
a core political value since its founding. A belief in judicial
independence, however, exists in the United States
alongside an equally strong belief in democratic
accountability7. All of its 53 jurisdictions are all largely free to
structure their judiciaries as they wish. The lesson from the
U.S. experience is that there is no single set of provisions
guaranteed to achieve an independent judiciary. Judicial
independence takes various forms, shaped by different legal
provisions, political traditions, and cultural expectations that

5 MacKeigan v. Hickman, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 796, at 825-28

6 The Rule of Law and the Independence of the Judiciary, by Daniel C.
Prfontaine, Q.C. & Joanne Lee
7 Guidance for Promoting Judicial Independence and Impartiality by Mira GurArie Russell Wheeler

have evolved over time and continue to inspire debate and

self- reflection8.
In fact, the international community has acknowledged
the importance of ensuring that the courts of law in every
nation is accorded with independence. In 1985, the Seventh
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders adopted the Basic Principles on the
Independence of the Judiciary. Among others, the following
basic principles, formulated to assist Member States in their
task of securing and promoting the independence of the
judiciary9:
1.

The independence of the judiciary shall be

guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the
Constitution or the law of the country. It is the
duty of all governmental and other institutions to
respect and observe the independence of the
judiciary.
2. The judiciary shall decide matters before them
impartially, on the basis of facts and in
accordance with the law, without any
restrictions, improper influences, inducements,
pressures, threats or interferences, direct or
indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
3.
The judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all
issues of a judicial nature and shall have
exclusive authority to decide whether an issue
submitted for its decision is within its
competence as defined by law.

8 Id
9 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/IndependenceJudiciary.aspx

4.

5.

6.

7.

There shall not be any inappropriate or

unwarranted interference with the judicial
process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts
be subject to revision. This principle is without
prejudice to judicial review or to mitigation or
commutation by competent authorities of
sentences imposed by the judiciary, in
accordance with the law.
Everyone shall have the right to be tried by
ordinary courts or tribunals using established
legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the
duly established procedures of the legal process
shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction
belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial
tribunals.
The principle of the independence of the
judiciary entitles and requires the judiciary to
ensure that judicial proceedings are conducted
fairly and that the rights of the parties are
respected.
It is the duty of each Member State to provide
adequate resources to enable the judiciary to
properly perform its function

These principles should be taken into account and respected

by Governments within the framework of their national
legislation and practice and be brought to the attention of
judges, lawyers, members of the executive and the
legislature and the public in general10.
Importance of Judicial Independence

10

https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-the-government-and-the-constitution/judacc-ind/independence/

Maintaining the independence of judges, justices and

other stakeholders of the judiciary from the pressures and
influence of other branches of government is vital to ensure
that it upholds its mandate of protecting the Constitution
and gain the trust and confidence of the citizenry. Such
influence could come from any number of sources. It could
arise from improper pressure by the executive or the
legislature, by individual litigants, particular pressure groups,
the media, self-interest or other judges, in particular more
senior judges11.
There is increasing acknowledgement that an
independent judiciary is the key to upholding the rule of law
in a free society. This independence may take a variety of
forms across different jurisdictions and systems of law. But
the same principle always applies, namely the protection of
human rights is dependent on the guarantee that judges will
be free and will reasonably be perceived to be free to make
impartial decisions based on the facts and the law in each
case, and to exercise their role as protectors of the
constitution, without any pressure or interference from other
sources, especially government. This basic premise is
crucial to the maintenance of the rule of law (Daniel C.
Prfontaine, 1998).
Constitutional Commission and their independence,
Explained

11 Id

The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines mandates the

establishment of independent Constitutional Commissions,
to wit: the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections, and the Commission on Audit.Like the judiciary,
the independence of the Commissions is likewise assured by
the Constitution.
The express establishment their independence is
unmistakable in Section 5, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution. To ensure this independence is upheld, Section
5 further guaranteed that the Commissions shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
The importance of securing the independence of the
Constitutional Commissions could be undermined. Like the
judiciary, Constitutional Commissions need autonomy to
effectively carry out their mandates. It is the very nature of
their functions that call for independence from other
branches of the government.
The Civil Service Commission (CSC)
The Section 4 of Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution
defined the mandate of the Civil Service Commission as
follow:

The Civil Service Commission, as the central

personnel agency of the Government, shall
establish a career service and adopt
measures to promote morale, efficiency,
integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness,
and courtesy in the civil service. It shall
strengthen the merit and rewards system,
integrate all human resources development
programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate
conducive to public accountability. It shall
submit to the President and the Congress an
annual report on its personnel programs.
Section 2 of the same article, meanwhile, lays the farreaching scope of the Commissions authority and dominion.
It provides that The civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
The COMELEC is the principal government agency
tasked by the Constitution to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations concerning the conduct of regular and
special elections. It is a body that is designed to be
constitutionally independent from the executive, legislative
and judicial branches of government to ensure the conduct
of free, fair and honest elections12.
The Commission has the power to propose to Congress
measures to minimize election spending, including limitation
of places where propaganda materials will be posted, and to
prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidacies13.
12 http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=AboutCOMELEC/OrganizationalInfo

Created in 1940 by an amendment to the 1935

Constitution, the COMELECs membership was enlarged and
its powers expanded by the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The Commission exercises not only administrative, but
judicial and quasi-judicial powers14.
The COMELEC is mandated with the following functions:

13 Id.
14 http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?
r=AboutCOMELEC/SpecialProjects/CitizensCharter/HistoryofCOMELEC

1. Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative

to the conduct of and elections, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall.
2. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of
all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay official
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
3. Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections, including determination of
the number and location of polling places, appointment
of election officials and inspectors, and registration of
voters.
4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purposes of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful credible elections.
5. Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, of coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program
of government; and accredit citizens arms of the
Commission on Elections.
6. File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative,
petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters;
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of elections laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

7. Recommend to the Congress effective measures to

minimize election spending, including limitation of
places where propaganda materials shall be posted,
and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds,
offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates.
8. Recommend to the President the removal of any officer
of employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any
other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or
disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
9. Submit to the President and the Congress a
comprehensive report on the conduct of each election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
The Commission on Elections was created to address
the general dissatisfaction and distrust in the conduct of
elections in the country. Before the creation of the COMELEC,
the supervision over the conduct of elections was vested in
the Executive Bureau, an office under the Department of
Interior and later directly vested in the Department itself
when the Executive Bureau was abolished.
There was, however, general dissatisfaction over the
manner in which elections were conducted under the
supervision of the Secretary of the Interior. There was
growing suspicion that Secretaries of the Interior
administered election laws not for the purpose of securing
honest and free elections, but to serve the political interest
of the party in power to which they belonged. They were
never entirely free from suspicion of acting with partisan
bias.
The close official relationship between the president
and the Secretary of the Interior bred suspicion that
elections served the incumbent Secretarys political interest.
The Secretary of the Interior was directly responsible to the
President and his tenure of office was dependent not only on
the pleasure of the President, but also upon the Presidents

own continuance in office. This set up only induced

increasing distrust in the verdict at the polls.
The situation impelled the National Assembly to
propose the creation by constitutional amendment of a
Commission on Elections to take over the functions of the
Secretary of the Interior relative to elections.
They can be removed from office only by impeachment
and are provided with salaries fixed by law which shall not
be decreased during their term of office. These are the
safeguards to ensure the independence of the Commission 15.
As an added measure, the constitution also grants fiscal
autonomy to enable the COMELEC to operate effectively,
efficiently and free from political interference. The
constitution mandates that "funds certified by the
Commission as necessary to defray the expenses for holding
regular and special elections, plebiscites, initiatives,
referenda, and recalls, will be provided in the regular or
special appropriations and, once approved, will be released
automatically upon certification by the Chairman of the
Commission.16
Furthermore, the Constitution assures the security of
the seven year-tenure of the members of the Commission.
Reappointments are also prohibited. As quoted by Justice
Antonio Carpio in his separate opinion in the case of Funa v.
Villar, Justice JBL Reyes Dissenting Opinion in Visarra further
elucidated how Section 1, Article X of the 1935 Constitution,
on the terms of office of the members of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec), should be interpreted. Justice Reyes
explained:

15 http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?
r=AboutCOMELEC/SpecialProjects/CitizensCharter/HistoryofCOMELEC
16 http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=AboutCOMELEC/OrganizationalInfo

It is clear from the provisions abovequoted that, being, acutely conscious of the
crucial importance of the functions of the
Commission on Elections to candidates for
elective positions, and aware of the consequent
pressures and influences that would be brought
to bear upon the Commissioners, the framers
of this part of the Constitution sought as much
as possible to shield the Commission members
from any force or influence that might affect
them in the discharge of their duties. To this
end, the Constitution not only disqualified the
Commissioners from holding outside interests
that might be affected by their official functions
(section 3); it expressly protected the
Commissioners against danger of possible
retaliation by (a) giving them a fixed term of
nine (9) years, not terminable except by
impeachment, and by (b) prohibiting any
diminution of their salaries during their term of
office. The Constitution went even further:
cognizant that human conduct may be
influenced not only by fear of vindictiveness
but also, and even more subtly and powerfully,
by prospects of advancement, our fundamental
law has likewise provided that members of the
Commission on Elections (c) may not be
reappointed, and that (d) their salaries may not
be increased during their terms. The plain
purpose of all these safeguards is that the
Commissioners,
once
appointed
and
confirmed, should be free to act as their
conscience demands, without fear of
retaliation or hope of reward; that they
should never feel the inducement of
either the stick or the carrot. For only the

man who has nothing to fear, and nothing

to expect, can be considered truly
independent.

Upon these premises, the promotion of Dr.

Gaudencio Garcia from Associate Commissioner
to Chairman of the Commission, with the
attendant higher compensation and prerequisites,
violated
the
Constitutional
prohibition against both reappointment and
salary increase. If, by express mandate of
the fundamental charter, a Commissioner
cannot be validly reappointed, not even to
the same position that he has occupied, I
can see no excuse for holding that he may
validly be appointed again to a higher
position within the Commission. It is
undeniable that a promotion involves a
second
appointment,
i.e.,
a
reappointment that is expressly forbidden
by the Constitution.

And if the legislature may not lawfully

increase the Commissioners salaries during
their terms of office, by express constitutional
inhibition, how in the name of good sense may
the Chief Executive grant such an increase to
an Associate Commissioner via a promotional
appointment to the Chairmanship?
As Justice Carpio pointed out, it is notable that
Justice Reyes dissenting opinion was later on adopted

by the framers of the 1987 Constitution and abandoned

the majority opinion.

The Commission on Audit

The Commission on Audit (COA) is an independent
constitutional commission established by the Constitution. It
is the countrys Supreme State Audit Institution. The
Philippine Constitution declares its independence as a
constitutional office, grants it powers to audit all accounts
pertaining to all government revenues and
expenditures/uses of government resources and to prescribe
accounting and auditing rules.
The scope of power and authority of the Commission is
mandated in Section 2 (1), Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution. The said provision provides that the
Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and
duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to
the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of
funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining
to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters, and on a post- audit
basis:
a. Constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that
have been granted fiscal autonomy under this
Constitution;
b. Autonomous state colleges and universities;
c. Other government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries; and
d. Such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or
equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the
Government, which are required by law or the granting

institution to submit to such audit as a condition of

subsidy or equity.
However, where the internal control system of the
audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt
such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as
are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It
shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for
such period as may be provided by law, preserve the
vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
The Commission shall submit to the President and
Congress, within the time fixed by law, an annual report
covering the financial condition and operation of the
Government, its subdivisions, agencies, and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and non-governmental entities subject to its
audit, and recommend measures necessary to improve their
effectiveness and efficiency. It shall submit such other
reports as may be required by law17.
Like other Constitutional Commissions, the tenure of
the members of COA is also seven years. Reappointments in
any case are likewise prohibited. In his dissent on the case
Funa v. Villar where the petitioner assailed the
reappointment of President Benigno Aquino to the
respondent as the Chairman of the Commission, Justice
Antonio J. Carpio said that the purpose of the constitutional
Prohibition against reappointments is to preserve the
independence of COA.
In his separate opinion, Justice Carpio explained
Since the framers of the 1987 Constitution
adopted
the
dissenting
opinions
in Visarra, Villars promotion from Commissioner
17 Section 4, Article IX-D, 1987 Constitution

to Chairman is clearly a reappointment

expressly prohibited by the 1987 Constitution18.
The prohibition must apply to all kinds of
reappointment if we are to honor the purpose
behind the prohibition. The purpose is to
ensure and preserve the independence of
the COA and its members. The members of
the independent constitutional commissions, in
the wise words of Justice JBL Reyes
xxx should be free to act as their
conscience
demands, without
fear
of
retaliation or hope of reward; that they
should never feel the inducement of either the
stick or the carrot. For only the man who has
nothing to fear, and nothing to expect,
can be considered truly independent. XXX
A COA member, like members of the other
independent constitutional commissions, may
no longer act with independence if he or she
can be rewarded with a promotion or
reappointment, for he or she will likely do the
bidding of the appointing power in the
expectation of being promoted or reappointed.
This Court has a sacred duty to safeguard the
independence
of
the
constitutional
commissions, not make them subservient to
the appointing power by adopting a view that is
grossly and manifestly contrary to the letter
and intent of the Constitution.
The minority likewise points out that after
the
ratification
of
the
1987
Constitution, then President Corazon C. Aquino
promoted
then
Commissioner
Eufemio
18

Funa v. Villar, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012

Domingo to Chairman, after Chairman Teofisto

Guingona resigned to run for a Senate seat.

The Constitution likewise guarantees the

autonomy of the Commission in its conduct of its
functions. Section 2 (2), Article IX-D of the
Constitution provides that the Commission shall have
exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article,
to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish
the techniques and methods required therefor, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
including those for the prevention and disallowance of
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds
and properties.
The Constitution, likewise, protects the
jurisdiction of COA. Section 3 prohibits any law
exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in
any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from
the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.

Protecting the independence of the judiciary and

Constitutional Commissions
1. Securing Tenure and Compensation
Security of tenure and compensation are often
described as the hallmarks of an independent judiciary.
Common sense dictates that in order for judges to be
impartial and independent, they will need to have the
security of their jobs and that their families are wellprovided. Take these two away and all that we will have
are judges giving in and even seeking the approval of
our politicians.

Safeguards are in places in no less than the

Constitution itself to secure the tenure and
compensation of the members of the judiciary and
constitutional commissions. The security of tenure of
judges and members of the Constitutional Commissions
is well-estabished in the Constitution. As provided by
Section 11 of Article VIII, justices and justices shall hold
office until they retire at age seventy or become
incapacitated to discharge duties of their office. The
power to discipline judges and order their dismissal was
also conferred upon the Supreme Court.
As with their compensation, Section 10, Article VIII
prohibits any decrease in the compensation of the
members of the judiciary during their continuance in
the office. But the question still remains on whether
their compensation is enough to prevent them from
being dissuade them from resorting into corruption or
bribery. Accoding to Supreme Court Justice Ma. Lourdes
Serreno, judges have to live a middle class life. They
should be able to send their children to college.
In a report by the Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism which studied the
descrepensies between the decalred income of
Supreme Court Justices in their Statement of Assets,
Liabilities, and Net Worth and the income reported by
the Commission on Audit, it was revealed that the
Justices were amongst the highest paid public officials
in the country. While that may be true for the Justices,
such is not the case for judges in the lower courts. In
fact, it has been reported that some courts now are in
need of judges. Being a judge seems is increasingly

becoming an unattracted job for the competent lawyers

because of its very low pay19.
Jose Midas Marquez, the high courts spokesperson
and administrator, said the unattractive financial
packages for judges in the first and second level courts
had discouraged brilliant lawyers from joining the
judiciary. At present, he said judges handling at least
300 cases in metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial
courts and municipal circuit trial courts receive a
monthly salary of only P60,000 plus P20,000 in
allowances20. The Supreme Court (SC) has pushed for
its order for the increase in the compensation and
allowances of justices and judges nationwide 21
If this is the case, it would not be difficult to think
that some of the judges, auditors, or commissioners
would be persuaded to accept inducements or bribes
from the other interested people.
2. Disallowing Local Government Units Subsidy to Judges
The independence of the judiciary is not only
threatened by regulation of its finances. It is likewise
weakened by the influence of politicians even in the
local level. Many local government units now provide
special allowances to judges. Cebu City government
appropriated a total of P 11,664,000.00 for subsidy to
the employees for all courts in the city, including Court
of Appeals Judges in Cebu with a monthly subsidy of
19 http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/63635/lower-courts-lack-judges-due-to-lowunattractive-pay
20 Id.
21 http://www.interaksyon.com/article/21545/sc-reiterates-call-for-raise-inpay-of-justices-and-judges

P25,000, and P20,000 for the Regional Trial Court

Judges for the year 201422. Meanwhile, the Makati City
government increased its allowances to judges to
P12,000 in 200723.
While the intentions of these allowances may be to
support the meager income of our judges, as pointed out by
Dean Cesar Villanueva of the Ateneo Law School, the LGUs
contributions may threatens judicial independence.
Conclusion
The independence of our courts and the Constitutional
Commissions is beyond question. They are fundamental to
our existence for their independence to be jeopardized. As
with all other aspects of governance, there may be
challenges confronting the independence of these
institutions. But perhaps as brought about by our history,
there has been many safeguards in our Constitution and
jurisprudence protecting them. What we will need to do is to
fully enforce them and remain vigilant of the forces that
threaten the independence of these valued institutions.

22 http://www.cebucity.gov.ph
23 http://www.makati.gov.ph/portal/roms/docs/ORD.%202007/2007-006.pdf