Cryptologic Ouarterly

(U) Dodeinq Armaeeddon: The Third'World V{aV ThatAlmost Was, tg1l

(U) With the comfort and hindsight of a halfcentury, President Harry Truman's decision to commit American power to save South Korea from Communist aggression in late June 1950 stands as perhaps America's finest moment of the Cold War. By rnaking a difficult commitment, by sacrificing 5o,OoO American Iives in the end, Truman upheld Western values and interests where they were directly threatened. It is easy to overlook the unpopularity and unpleasantness of a war which, though necessary, nevertheless remains unknown to most Americans today. Our sacrifices in Korea beginning in the disastrous summer of rgSo merit recognition and honor in their own right, yet they deserve our attention for another reason almost cornpletely neglected in accounts of the period. By dispatching the 24th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions frorn comfortable occupation duty in Japan to death and destruction in Korea in mid-summer 195o, the United States actualll'did nothing less than save the rvorld from a global conflagration.
(U) The issue was found not in Asia but on the

(b) (3)-P.r. 86-36

.--=-:
V. 5ta trn

other side of the planet: in Stalin's private war with Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia. Determined to destroy Tito and his heretic Communist regime at any cost, Stalin was impatiently planning for an all-out invasion of Yugoslavia by the Soviet military and East European satellite forces. As U.S. and NATO records indicate, the thoroughly planned Soviet attack would have resulted in Western military commitment and almost certainly nuclear response. It would have been the Third World War.

ratus opened the "Greek line," supplying Communist insurgents in neighboring Greece r,r,ith weapons and supplies, dn effort which quickly outpaced Soviet support to the guerrillas; IO,OOO Yugoslav "volunteers" fought alongside their Greek allies too. Stalin found Tito's fenror and undue risk-taking troubling; indeed, the Greek issue rvas the last of a long series of Yugoslav actions Moscow disliked. Stalin sent Tito a letter criticizing the "Greek line," observing that the Communist insurgency stood no chance of success due to support for Athens by the United States, "the strongest state in the world." '
(U) When Belgrade astonishingly refused to back down, Moscow exacted retribution. On June 28, L948, Serbia's national day, Stalin expelled Yugoslavia from the Communist Information Bureau the Cominform, the Moscow-led successor to the Comintern - setting off an unprecedented conflict in Communist

(U) Perhaps ironically, Stalin was initially inflamed by Tito's revolutionary ardor.
Beginning in mid -1947, Tito's intelligence appa-

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Declassify On: Xl, X4, X5, X6

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ranks rvhich would nearly provoke the Third World War. The Soviets immediately dispensed vitriolic propaganda, denouncing Tito and his government as a "spy group" in the pay of American and British "imperialism." 2 Purges of alleged "Titoists" began with fervor throughout the Soviet bloc, nor,vhere more thoroughly than in Hungary, the satellite on the frontline of the Yugoslav menace. L6szl6 Rajk, Budapest's interior minister, was executed in mid-1949 for his supposed ideological deviation, while the Hungarian People's Army simultaneously saw a dozen generals and 1,100 high-ranking offrcers purged, and some executed, for alleged proYugoslav sentiments.s

(U) Purges and executions were by no means limited to the Soviet side. The split drove a wedge through Yugoslav Communism. To rid his regime of pro-Soviet elements, Tito commenced a cleansing of his parry, army, and secret police every bit as thorough and brutal as any Stalinist depredations. Against suspected Soviet loyalists, Tito unleashed his formidable secret police, UDBa, setting off an intelligence war of epic proportions.a The hunt for traitors, known as ibeouci (from IB or Informbfro, Serbo-Croatian for the Cominform), was pursued with vigor, led personally by Tito and his feared secret police chief, Aleksandar Rankovic. It was a fight which Tito, the former star NI(fD iilegal, with thirty-three covernames to his credit, was well equipped to pursue.t

(U) Tito rn marshal's uniforrn diately placed under suspicion; in the end, 7,oOO army offrcers and 1,7oO UDBa officials, many of them high-ranking, were purged as ibeouci. Probably IOO,OOO Yugoslav Communists suspected of disloyalty were sent to brutal political prisons, where thousands died.'

(U) The UDBa crackdown on suspected ibeouci was particularly severe in Montenegro, Yugoslavia's smallest republic, where
Communism had the deepest roots and an entire UDBa division was employed to quell local dissent.6 Tito's fears of Soviet subversion were not misplaced. Not only did Stalin's intelligence service, the MGB, possess numerous agents throughout Yugoslavia, but Tito's military and secret police were among the most deeply penetrated institutions. Thousands of army and state security officers trained in the Soviet Union were imme-

(U) MGB moles existed throughout the Tito

regime. Two cabinet ministers and even the head

of Tito's bodyguard were uncovered as ibeouci. Particularly embarrassing for Belgrade were the defections of many officials to the Soviet bloc. The worst incident came in August 1948, when three senior affny officers plotting a coup d'6tat with Soviet backing attempted to defect. UDBa captured Major C'eneral Branko Petricevic and Colonel Vlado Dapcevic from the main political

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(U) Tito's ruling

triumvirate:

Milovan Dlilas

(left), Edrard
!<ardell (center),

Aleksandar Rankovic, the

secet police chief

(right)

directorate, the latter being head of military agtprop, while the third plotter, Colonel-General Arso Jovanovic, was killed near the Romanian

border. Significantly. all three men were Montenegrins, while Jovanovic had been the
wartime chief of staff of the Yugoslav Army. The Soviet conspiracy could go no higher.s
(U) The ranla of Yugoslavs who sought refuge in the Soviet bloc, what Tito termed the informbirouska emigracija, swelled to 3,5oo in neighboring satellites, where they were put to work in the rising propaganda war. The Soviets soon

(diuerzanry) conducted regular eross-border raids as part of a constant insurgency campaign to destabilize Yugoslavia. UDBa border detachments fought frequent firefights, resulting in hundreds of deaths; according to Belgrade, in the five years after the split, over 7AO 6migr6s attempted to infiltrate Yugoslavia from Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, and t6o of them were captured and forty were killed by Tito's security forces. Over a hundred Yugoslav soldiers and
policemen also died, including some senior UDBa officers.to

formed special combat units, including three "international brigades," in Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, Er ominous development for Belgrade. Their ranks were filled with Yugoslav 6migr6s but others too; the 2nd International
Brigade, garrisoned in western Bulgaria, included 6,000 "volunteers" frorn East Germany as well as
a

battalion of parachutists. Significantly, its commander was Aleksa Micunovic, a former senior staff offrcer in Tito's army.e

(U) Stalin's declaration of war on the Titoist heresy was initially greeted with unconcealed glee by the U.S. government. To our ambassador in Moscow, the split was nothing less than "a Godsend to our propagandists," offering Washington novel options in the budding Cold War. Even the more analyic Policy Planning Staff at the State Department concluded immediately that the break amounted to "an entirely new foreign poliState Department's goal of maintaining balance in the Stalin-Tito struggle would prove almost impossible to achieve.rl

cy for this Government." Yet the

(U) Violent border incid.ents along Yugoslavia's Iong Eastern frontiers quickly
expanded sevenfold. Soviet-sponsored saboteurs

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Hungarian revolution. KirAly, appointed commander of Hungary's planned invasion force, witnessed the Soviet bloc's decision for invasion and the dramatic increase of his country's military in preparalion for war. As Kir6ly recounted, a Soviet colonel who visited his office in July 1951 castii,. gated him for teaching ofificers the geography of any country but Yrrgoslavia: "Your students must be taught one battleground only, the territory of
i"

-GS#StlThe West at once accrued strategic benefits from the Belgrade-Moscow split.
Immediately following Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform, Tito suspended aid to the Greek Communist resistance in Greece, even sealing the frontier, an action which trapped 4,000 Greek

the enemy, Yugoslavia."

(U) Stalin was determined to exterminate the Titoist menace. As Robert Conquest, the preeminent scholar of Soviet totalitarianism, explained, the Yugoslav upstart became "a major villain almost at Trotsky's level in Stalin's personal psychodrama." Stalin planned to employ the same methods which had silenced Trotslqy - propaganda, intimidation, and assassination. Fittingly, he had admonished Tito with the warning: "We think the political career of Trotsky is quite

there will be no more Tito." B The reality was far

instructive." Stalin confidently informed Khrushchev, "I will shake my little finger and

lite states had grown

\$|The

intelligence seryices of frontline satelcommensuratelv. The

different. In addition to the hundreds of raids conducted by Soviet bloc conrmandos inside Yugoslavia, Moscow attempted to assassinate Tito on several occasions. In one case, the MGB planned to gun down the Yugoslav Politburo while its members relaxed over a pool table at Tito's villa. AII the assassination schemes were cut short by UDBa's tenacious counterintelligence work.'a

(tI) In response, Stalin sought a direct military solution to his Yugoslav problem.
Subversion and sabotage having failed, crushing the Titoist heresy with the might of the Red Army became the preferred option. The details of Soviet military planning to annihilate fitoism, suspected by NATO intelligence, were confirmed by the defection of General B6Ia Kir6ly after the 1956

(U) Soviet invasion plans forecast a massive push by an infantry-heavy first echelon, composed of Hungarian and Romanian troops; the brunt would be borne by the 3OO,OOO-strong

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Hung4rian People's Army, whigb would pierce of Vojvodina, opening the door to Belgrade, which i would be taken by mechanized Soviet forces , forming the invasion's second, decisive echelon. , While fito's forees were expected to offer stiff iresistance, a rapid, if hard-fought victory was anticipated. Crushing Yugoslavia had become the entire raison dtre of'the satellite armies. The purpose of Hungary's unprecedented military buildup wffi, Colonel-General Mih6ly Farkas, the ar,my chief, explained, to counter "aggression by Titoist bandits against the sacred territory of our soeialist fatherland."'e
Yugoslav defenses in the flat northern prgvince

(U) Washington lacked vital intelligence

regarding Soviet intentions; the SIGINT system in particular offered few insights into high-level Soviet military and political planning, thanks to

the treachery of AFSA employee William

early 1951, Yugoslav feats_p[_a Soviet invasion had reached a fever pi

fV/Str}In

Weisband, which compromised numerous highlevel cryptologic successes against Moscow.t2 Nevertheless, in August lgSO CIA assessments concluded that while Yugoslavia's quarter-million-strong army might stand a chance against the satellite armies of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, the presence of six Soviet divisions in those satellites tipped the balance; against a combined Soviet bloc invasion, Tito's forces would be soon overwhelmed. Hence the CIA concluded that Yugoslav resistance was dependent "on the degree and promptness of Western assistance." 2s
grave. George Kennan, the early Cold Warrior, initially greeted the Moscow-Belgrade split as an unparal-

(U) Washington's concerns grew

leled opportunity; Kennan reasoned that the "gain" of Yugoslavia in the Western camp offset
the recent "loss" of China. Yet by late May 195O, a

month before Korea exploded, Kennan had grown concerned about a pro)ry war in the
Balkans, speculating that a Soviet attack was likely. On June 29, 1950, four days after the invasion of South Korea, Yugoslavia topped the National Security Council's list of "chief danger spots."

Moscow propaganda denounced Tito as a "Syngman Rhee" in Belgrade, heightening Western worries. Kennan soon concluded that a likely Soviet attack on Yugoslavia would merely be a prelude to the Third World War.ta (U) To ready the Yugoslav military for war, the United States embarked on an adventurous

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military assistance scheme. In the year following

the Korean invasion, Washington provided

Belgrade with $ZZ.S million in military aid; by the

mid-r9sos, military aid would total a half-billion dollars. In June 1951, General Koca Popovic, the Yugoslav chief of staff, even visited Washington for joint planning discussions. Prodigious American military assistance to Yugoslavia tvas as ironic as it was unanticipated. Before the split with Moscow, the radical regime in Belgrade had justly been denounced as "soviet Satellite Number One" in Western media, and the U.S.Yugoslav relationship had been tense; in the contested Trieste area, occupied by U.S. and British troops, Tito's forces in 1946 had forced down one U.S. C-47 cargo aircraft and shot down a second, killing the crew.2s

(U) Four years before it had all looked very different. By late September 1951, the U.S. intelligence community already regarded Yugoslavia as a valuable de facto ally and anti-soviet bulwark. e CIA special estimate projecting developments over the next twenty-four months counted Yugoslavia alongside future NATO members Greece, Turkey, and Spain in Western military totals, indeed as "a major increment to NATO strength" - in the event of war with the Soviet bloc. The estimate concluded that Soviet "local aggression" against Yugoslavia was likely: "the USSR may be compelled to act soon." T
'r sr'vd

to

In addition to overt U.S. militarv aid Tito,

(U) From NATO's viewpoint, Yugoslavia os a "shield" for vulnerable Italy and Greece; Slovenia's Ljubljana Gap in particular
was a critical component of Western defenses, and in mid-tgSz Belgrade announced it would defend the vital gap with four corps, a dozen divisions in all, more than a third ofjfito's army. In Seplember 1951, the Suprerne AlJied Commander Europe (SACEUR) ordered that Italy would be defended at the Isonzo River line - half of which was actually inside Yugoslav territory.'* (U) Despite the West's crash military aid program to Y-ugoslavia, fears ofrinvasion and a wider conflict continued to mount in NATO capitals. In

early February 1951, the British Chiefs of Staff announced, that a direct Soviet attack on Yugoslavia I "would le-ad to world war." Washington agreed that Stalinist aggression on Yugoslavia "might well be the prelude to a global war." NATO concerns,about what was termed a "second Korea", in Europe were increased by a broad acceptance that, unlike in Korea, a Communist offiensirre against Tito could not be localizedi or, 3s', the British Chiefs of Staff (b ) (1) (b) (3)-rB usc 798 (b) (3)-s0 usc 403 (b) (3)-p.r,. 86-36
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expressed

it, "it is always likely that an attack on

2e

Yugoslavia would spread to a global war."

(U) Given NATO's overwhelming weakness in conventional forces, it was inevitable that the nuclear issue came to the fore. Within weeks of the invasion of South Korea, Washington had accepted in principle that due to the dearth of conventional forces, atomic weapons would probably have to be used to defend Yugoslavia against

(U) Fortunately for all concerned, the longawaited Soviet attack never came. The war fever increased substantially with the June 25, 19SO, invasion of South Korea; in the satellites, propaganda and planning grew more frenzied. To General Kir6ly, the activities appeared coordinated with the putative attack on Tito: "That coordination indicated that there was a direct relationship between the timing of the Korean aggression and the completion of preparations for war against Yugoslavi a." 3t Washington's unexpeetedly strong response to North Korean aggression was dismaylng to the Soviets: If America would commit two divisions at once, and eventually more than a half-dozen, to save South Korea, what might it do to rescue the strategically vital Tito?

Soviet attack. America's "freedom of action to employ atomic weapons in such a localized conflict if the situation dictates" was a jealously guarded prerogative, as well as the strategic logic underpinning NATO policy towards Yugoslavia. Given that the conventional balance in the Balkans continued to deteriorate - by early 1951, not counting Soviet garrisons, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria possessed standing forces more than twice the size of Tito's army - any NATO defense of Yugoslavia would require nuclear backing to be viable.so

(U) Nevertheless, Soviet military planning

continued, undaunted by events in the Far East. Major maneuvers in Hungary in January 1951, involving 8O,OO0 satellite troops, simulated an invasion of Yugoslavia; it was a dry run. Ominously, the war games placed American

(V)

Planned Soviet invasion o( Vugoslavia, 1950

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troops in the Yugoslav second defensive echelon: war with NATO was now assumed. The Soviet Union, now a nuclear power too, was unintimidated by Western military power. Yet the January 1951 maneuvers would be the higlr-water mark of the war that almost was. Thereafter, the threat slowly receded; Stalin's willingness to risk world war - even atomic war - waned, and plans for allout invasion were quietly shelved. As Kir6ly, who witnessed the high-level proceedings, recalled, a strong American defense of South Korea "nipped Stalin's pet projeet in the bud." 32

ty and as an unofficial NATO associate member

for decades to come.sa (U) Until Tito's death in 198O, Soviet military threats remained a concern for Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, with its potential Yugoslav parallels, seriously alarmed Tito. Decades after the

though only the Soviet invasion of

intelligence war which Stalin lost, Belgrade feared Soviet subvercion and espionage. UDBa sensed

(U) Stalin resigned himself to resolving his Tito problem short of all-out war. Assassination efforts continued, spurred on by the USSR's humiliating upset loss to Yugoslavia at the 1952 soccer Olympics, an event which resulted in the dismissal of senior Soviet officials denounced as having "dishonored themselves and the entire nation and all people working for peace." The last assassination plan involved the noted Soviet illegal Iosif Grigulevich, known as MAX, who had been involved in the first, unsuccessful attempt to kill Trotsky. Grigulevich volunteered for an outIandish plot to kill Tito with a lethal dose of either plague or poison gas; it was all "childish and naive," according to Pavel Sudoplatov, the top MGB expert in "wet affairs." And it never happened. late on March 1, 19SS, the MGB sent Stalin a report explaining that MA)( had not yet been dispatched to Belgrade. It may have been the last report the Soviet dietator ever read, for
Stalin suffered a fatal stroke in the predawn hours of March 2. His obsession with Tito lasted to the very end.s

Soviet machinations behind manifestations of antiregime sentiments, partieularly Croatian nationalism, by no means entirely incorrectly. Certainly KGB interest in Yugoslav 6migr6s remained high through the 197os.3s As a result, the Yugoslav secret police monitored the activities of the informbirouska emigracLl'o, especially what it termed the "enemy emigration." Against Cominformists in exile, Tito's spres showed no
mercy and never forgot an enemy. As late as 1975,

Yugoslav agents in Bucharest kidnapped Mado Dapcevic, the army colonel arrested in 1948 attempting to defect, and brought him back to Belgrade to stand trial for his continuing proSoviet agitation.s6 (U) In the end, robust American intenrention to resist Communist aggression in East Asia during the blood-stained summer of 1950 ultimately preserved much more than the freedom of South Korea. That accomplishment, though considerable and defended to this day in a war that never formally ended, nevertheless pales by comparison with the little-known achievement of preventing a world war, even an atomic holocaust. By their sacrifices, the doomed men of Task Force Smith, the heroes of Inchon, the scarred veterans of Chosin, prevented armageddon. They fully earned their rightful place alongside their older brothers in what we have lately termed "The Greatest Generation." It is fashionable today to hail the veterans of the Second World War as "the kids who saved the world," and rightly so. Yet the fine young men of t95o did no less, though few knew it then - or now.

(U) With Stalin gone, relations between

Belgrade and Moscow began to slowly improve. By May 1955, when Khrushchev visited Belgrade, Soviet-Yugoslav relations had healed, though Tito would remain outside Soviet bloc military, political, and economic structures in perpeturty; the rift, though no longer ominous, was permanent.

For Western planning purposes, Yugoslavia

would continue to function as a strategic necessi-

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(U) Notes 1. (U) Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformfst Splfts in Yugoslau Communism (Ithaca, I{Y, 1988), 35; Robert Conquest, Stch'n; Breaker of Nations (NewYork, t99t), 286. 2. (U) See Petar Po ak, Reznlucija Informbiroa @ije i poslije) (7agreb,1988), Zt-8o, r$-20. 3. ru) G.M. Adibekov, Kominform i posleuoennaya Europa 1947-1956 gg. (Moscow, 1994), 150-169.

11.

(U) Foreign Relorions of the United

Srares

GRUS) 1948: VoI.IV (Washington, DC, 1974), ro79lo81, 1082-1083.

(Upraua Dr aune Bezbednostr), said by Yugoslavs to stand for LIDBa - tr:oja sudbo ('UDBa - your fate'); on its origins (from its foundation in 1944 until t946, it was known as the Department for the Protection of the 4.

(U) State Security Directorate

13. (U) Conquest,

Stalin,297.
,,

14.

(U) Marko Lopu5ina, Ubij bli njeg

.,'

Jugoslouenska tajna polictja

1996),

st)og: Ig4S-tggS (Belgsade,

,'

101-117. a

People,

OZNa) see Milovan D elebd ic, Abaueitajna slu ba u narodnooslobodilockom ratu

1941- 1945

or

15. (U) B6la Kir6ly, "The Aborted Soviet Military Plans Against Tito's Yugoslavia" in .At the Brink,: of War

and Peace: The Tito-Staltn Sptft in

Historic
,

(Belgrade, 1987), l3-4o, 41-48, 266-269. 5. U) On the UDBa chief, see Jovan Kesar and Pero Simic, LEI{A: Alelcsandar Rankourc (Belgrade,

Perspectiue (W. Vucinich, ed.) (New York, tg8?),273-

276.

1990); Tito's own espionage career is elaborated in Pero Simic,Tito agent Kominterne (Be1grade, l99O). 6. (U) Branislav Kovacevic, "O Informbirou u

16. (U) S6ndor Mucs, A magyar ndphadsereg megszerrezdse ds fejloddse 1945-1948 (Budapest,
1963), 184; Zoltan D. Barany, Soldiers qnid'Politr'cs in Eastern Europe, 1945-90: The Cose of Hur,tgar? (New

Crnoj Gori"

in

1948

Jugoslauija

Kominform:

Petdeset Godina kasnije 1998), 127-L48.

(R Petkovic,

ed.) (Belgrade,

z. (U) Banac, Withstalin, ts7-t62,246-249.

8. (U) Ibid., t29-13o; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The
MitrokhinArchiue and the Secret History of the KGB (NewYork, 1999), 356-357. (S) Not all defections were

one-way:

in July 1949 Toma Elekes, an

ethnic

Hungarian officer in Romanian intelligence, commandeered a light plane and flew to Novi Sad, Yugoslavia; for his trouble, Elekes spent over a half-year in UDBa captivity alongside numerous Cominformists - see 17th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment (Trieste U.S. Troops), lnterrogation Report, M-9OS-15,29 Jan
1951.

19. (U) Kir6ly, "Abortedoviet Military Plaps"

284-5; Calloc'h, tJn dpisode oublid, rc;S'.
25 Apr 195r. 21.

9. (U) Ivo Banac, "Yugoslav Cominformist Organizations and Insurgent Activity: 1948-1954" in At the Bink of Wor and Peace: The Tito-Stalin Sph? in a Historic Perspectiue (W. Vucinich, ed.) (New York, 1982),240-249. 10. (U) Ibid., 243-245; Beatrice Heuser, Western 'Containment' Policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslau Case, 1948-53 (London, 1989), 149.

22. (U) See

[,...Benson,

The Korean War: fheii:SIGIITIT 'Background (CCH

23. (U) Lorraine tgs,,Keepintg Tito Afloat: The

United Stafes, Yugb$Iayia, and the CoId War

(University Park, PA,!WZ), 86-88.
turrr r (bx3)-18 USC 7e8

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Western

798
403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

24.
'

(V) Ibid., 81-82; Heuser,

Containmen t', r5o- lS3. 25. (U) Lees, Keeping Tito AJloat, 13-14, Heuser, Western' Containment', 162-17 O.

tlo-trl;

Interview, Dr. GGza Jeszensky, 16 Nov 2OOO; Jeszensky.; Hungary's current ambassador in Washington, is an esteemed historian and served. as the first post-Communist Hungarian foreign minister (rsgo-s+).
33. (U) Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov, Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an llnuanted. Witness - A Souiet Spymaster (Boston, 1994), 335-339;

27. (U) "CIA Special Estimate 13: Probable Developments in the World Situation Through Mid1953" in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA Under Harry Trumon (M. Warner, ed.) (Washington, DC,
1994), 419, 423-424.

fuidrew and Mitrokhin, Surord 357-358. 34. ru) For details see Pierre Maurer, Lardconciliation soui4to-yougoslaue 1954-1958: Illusions et d4sillusions de fito (Fribourg, 1991). \dhen Marshal Zhukov traveled to Belgrade in 1957, he confirmed
Stalin's war plans by askingTito, "Did you know, comrade, what we wanted to do to you in 1951?" to which

Tito replied, "You know, comrade, so did Hitler."

Heuser, Western Containment', 129.

28. (U) Heuser, Western'Containment', L55-156;

Beatrice Heuser, "Yugoslavia in Western Military Planning, 1948-53" in Yugoslauia's Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defence and Foreign Poliq (M. Milivojevic, J. Allcock, P. Maurcr, eds.) (Odord, 1988), B9-r4o.
29. (U) Heuser, "Yugoslavia," L42-L43.

35. (U) Marko Iopu5ina, Ubij bli njeg suog 2:

Akcije Dr aune Bezbednosti protiu ipijuna 1946-1997 (Belgrade, 1997), 20.3-34; Eduard Van Der Rhoer, The Shadous Netusork: Espionage as Souiet Policy (New York, 1983), 12.

an Instntment of

30. (U) FRUS 195o: Vol.

I,

(Washington, DC,

36. (U) Dragan Ganovic, Teroristi iz "fieste kolone": Dokumentarna hronika o teroristickoj
aktiunosti protiu Jugoslauye (Belgrade, 1979). 143154; Slavko Curuvija, Ibeouac: Ja, Vlado Dapceuic

t97 4), 37 6-389 ; Heuser, "Yugoslavi a," l3Z, 146-L49 .

31. (tD Kir6ly, "Aborted Soviet Military Plans,"

286.

Ibid., 286-287. Kir6ly's account and perceptions are widely accepted in Hungary today 32.

(I,

(Belgrade, 1990), 246-258; Milenko Doder,

Jug oslauenska neprijateljska emigracij
1979), 133-198.

a (7agreb,

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(bxl )
(b)(3)-18 USC 7e8

(bx3)-50 usc 403 (bx3)-P.1. 86-36