Xunzi

Li 禮 (translated variously as " ritual " , " etiquette " , or " propriety ") plays a central role in early Confucianism, but its complexity is not always fully understood. At first glance, it may seem as if li behaviors are merely attempts to promote conservative practices from the idealized Chinese past. However , by examining the nature and function of li, as described the Analects (Lunyu 論語) and the Xunzi 荀 子 (two key texts in the early Confucian tradition), it becomes overwhelmingly apparent that li is a much more complicated phenomenon. Li actually plays key roles within the interconnected fields of Confucian ethics, religion, and politics and often adds aesthetic elements to these areas of thought. As such, it is as much a source of Confucian innovation as it is a tool for promoting reverence for the past.

This article introduces and analyses the debate between Mencius and Xunzi on xing 性 (human nature). While Mencius claims that xing is good, Xunzi claims that xing is bad. A common way of interpreting these two different claims is to determine the scope of xing. It is generally agreed that, for Mencius, it is the heart/mind that falls within the scope of xing, for Xunzi, the sensory desires. This article also explores a different way of approaching Mencius's and Xunzi's different claims about xing. It is suggested that Mencius's and Xunzi's different views on xing can be understood in terms of their different views on the heart/mind (xin 心). While Mencius thinks that the heart/mind has a morally good natural tendency, Xunzi thinks that the heart/mind has a morally problematic tendency.

The Xing zi ming chu (性自命出) [XZMC] presents a distinctive account of human dispositions that centers on the spontaneous arising of affects like joy and sadness. This focus on emotion grounds a particular conception of the function of music and ritual that gives music a central role in self-cultivation. Although the account of human dispositions in XZMC was ultimately overshadowed by the opposing views of Mengzi and Xunzi and the question of whether our dispositions are good or bad, its views remained central for Ru philosophy of music. The first three parts of the paper trace the development of the ideas appearing in XZMC through the “Discourse on Music” chapter of the Xunzi and parts of the Yueji. The fourth section highlights the distinctiveness of XZMC’s account through a contrast with the views of Mengzi and Xunzi. The paper concludes by examining the ways in which, in accounting for ritual and music, both the Mengzi and Xunzi employ views like those of the XZMC, even if those are in tension with their core philosophical theories.

This article seeks to advance discussion of Xunzi’s view of ritual by examining the problem ritual treats and the way in which it targets the problem. I argue that the root of the problem is the natural inclination of the heart/mind to be concerned only with self-interest. The reason ritual works is that, on the one hand, it requires one to disregard concern for self-interest and observe ethical standards and, on the other, it allows one to express feelings in an ethically appropriate way. The ideal character shaped by ritual is one of respect in dealing with affairs and people; the ideal effect of ritual on the person is a sense of ease and security. Based on these conclusions, I will flesh out an implicit assumption Xunzi might have adopted about a pattern in human psychological constitution so as to further our understanding of Xunzi’s moral psychology.

Ideas of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ and ‘the responsibility to protect’ have become increasingly accepted by the society of states in recent years. The origins of these ideas are appropriately traced to earlier European concepts of popular resistance and humanitarian intervention. However, Europe is not unique in possessing a heritage of sovereign accountability. Almost two thousand years before sovereignty emerged in early modern Europe, philosophers in Ancient China developed remarkably similar concepts about the responsibilities of legitimate rule. Confucian scholars, in particular Mencius, argued that rulers were established by Heaven for the benefit of the people. The people, in turn, could rightfully hold their rulers to account. They had the right to banish a bad ruler and even to kill a tyrant. Moreover, a benevolent ruler was justified in waging ‘punitive war’ against the tyrannical ruler of another state, in order to punish him and to comfort the people. Recognition of this non-European heritage of sovereign accountability opens up new possibilities for dialogue between those who would promote present-day concepts of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ and those who perceive these concepts as merely Western and alien principles grounded in Western and alien values.

The early Ru or ‘Confucian’ figure Xunzi (‘Master Xun,’ c. 310–c. 220 BCE) gives a sophisticated analysis of war, which he develops on the basis of a larger social and political vision that he works out in considerable detail. This larger vision of human society is thoroughly normative in the sense that Xunzi both argues for the value of his ideal conception of society, and relates these moral arguments for the Confucian Dao or Way to what I take to be fairly hardheaded assessments of the dynamics of international relations in his late Warring States historical context. This combination of moral vision and political realism, combined with his advocacy of strong political authorities that nevertheless rule justly in service to the common good, makes his thought arguably more relevant to the contemporary world of contending nation-states, and a rising, undemocratic China, than any other pre-modern Confucian. Xunzi’s own context, both intellectual and political/military, led him to argue about war in ways that look distinctive to contemporary Western ethicists – and yet his preferred issues are revealing in themselves and are suggestive in relation to current debates in military ethics. In the first part of this paper I analyze Xunzi’s argumentative strategy in debate about war, where he chooses to attack his adversaries on the question of how to cultivate true loyalty and obedience in subordinates. The second part briefly explores Xunzi’s vision of the good society and how it fits into a multi-state world, which undergirds his critique of alternate discourses about war and government. The third examines the Xunzian vision of politics and war as a source for a contemporary Confucian theory of civilian- military relations. The fourth section explores some implications of a Xunzian account for international relations, through a brief comparison with the Kantian notion of ‘perpetual peace’ among liberal states, and whether such ‘zones of peace’ might be conceivable on Confucian grounds. The conclusion reflects on the ambiguous legacy of Xunzi’s moralism in his analysis of war and statecraft, and the possible light this shines on contemporary Chinese political culture.

This volume presents a comprehensive analysis of the Confucian thinker Xunzi and his work, which shares the same name. It features a variety of disciplinary perspectives and offers divergent interpretations. The disagreements reveal that, as with any other classic, the Xunzi provides fertile ground for readers. It is a source from which they have drawn—and will continue to draw—different lessons.

In more than 15 essays, the contributors examine Xunzi’s views on topics such as human nature, ritual, music, ethics, and politics. They also look at his relations with other thinkers in early China and consider his influence in East Asian intellectual history.

A number of important Chinese scholars in the Song dynasty (960–1279 CE) sought to censor the Xunzi. They thought that it offered a heretical and impure version of Confuciansim. As a result, they directed study away from the Xunzi. This has diminished the popularity of the work.

However, the essays presented here help to change this situation. They open the text’s riches to Western students and scholars. The book also highlights the substantial impact the Xunzi has had on thinkers throughout history, even on those who were critical of it. Overall, readers will gain new insights and a deeper understanding of this important, but often neglected, thinker.

What is meant by ritual (li) in the Confucian tradition—mostly Xunzi—might be said to be the root of three different concepts-“stages” or concept-“developments” in European philosophy. The first stage is the concept of habit, from the Aristotelian “hexis” to Bourdieu’s “habitus”. The second is the sign, as developed by the American Pragmatists and, in Europe, by Saussure. There is a third, relatively recent stage, as I would classify it, which is Paul Weiss’ surrogate. Weiss uses the pragmatist theorization of habit to construct his original concept of the surrogates. The above stages might be chronological in the way they appear (habit, sign, surrogate), but one does not erase the other. They have the same root—which I would like to argue is the ritual—and they build on it, while each differentiates ritual in its own way. They are distinctive concepts but, at the same time, are related to one another.

In response to challenges to ritual practice, Xunzi develops not only a theory of ritual, but also a method of ritual performance that can be illuminated by a comparison to modern Western acting techniques. His method also reveals a “tragic” aesthetic, through which he attempts to reconcile the diversity of beliefs about death within a single practice.

This paper gives a reading of the philosophical position found in the Wu xing 五行 (Five Conducts) text excavated at Guodian and Mawangdui. The first part of the essay analyzes the distinction between goodness and de 德. The second part examines how the various forms of correct behavior are linked to the internal, pointing out the similarities and differences from Mengzi's approach. The paper aims to determine more precisely what the Mengzi and Wu xing have in common, while also making sense of the ways in which they diverge.

It is commonly accepted that Han Fei studied under Xunzi sometime during the late third century BCE. However, there is surprisingly little dedicated to the in-depth study of the relationship between Xunzi’s ideas and one of his best-known followers. In this essay I argue that Han Fei’s notion of xing, commonly translated as human nature, was not only influenced by Xunzi but also that it is an important feature of his political philosophy.

Confucian thinkers have traditionally stressed the importance of li 禮, or “ritual” as it is commonly translated, and believed that ancient sages had established an ideal set of rituals for people to follow. Now, most scholars of Confucianism understand li as distinct from law, and hence do not typically discuss Confucian sages as great lawgivers. Nevertheless, I suggest that there is something valuable to be learned from considering the similarities and dissimilarities between great lawgivers and the sages. In particular, this essay reviews some of the challenges for, and virtues of, great legislators, and compares and contrasts these with the challenges for, and virtues of, master inventors of ritual, with the aim of showing how such observations might deepen our understanding of the conception of sages in the Confucian tradition, while perhaps also bringing out certain insights about good lawgivers. I end by using these reflections to point to some challenges for developing rituals to fit our modern context.

RESUMO: Neste artigo comparamos brevemente o conceito de rito (禮) segundo a tradição chinesa confuciana e as tradições bíblicas (em especial a tradição profética do Velho Testamento e a tradição protestante). Demonstramos que, segundo os confucianos, o ritual deve estar ligado a uma atitude sincera e à moral para que mereça o nome de "rito"; por outro lado, a tradição protestante e o movimento profético tendem a ver o rito com desconfiança, como má religião em potencial, se não em essência. Apontamos que, nos textos antigos chineses, o rito está ligado à noção de ordem social, a qual deve refletir a ordem natural do cosmos. Por fim, especulamos como poderia ser formulada uma defesa confuciana do rito e como se daria sua crítica a uma atitude antirritualista. Para tanto, vamos nos valer dos clássicos chineses como O Livro dos Ritos 2 , além de tradutores e comentadores contemporâneos.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Rito; Confucionismo; Reforma Protestante; O Livro dos Ritos.

The present study aims to demonstrate how certain argumentative features of a text that exists only in a fragmentary fashion can be used to gain a fuller picture of its original content and structure. The Daoist treatise Wenzi 文子 is particularly suitable for this study, for it is available in two different but similarly distorted and fragmented versions: the received text as well as some Western Han 西漢 (206 B.C.–A.D. 6) fragments obtained at the archeological site of Dingzhou 定州 (1973). The study first deals with the numerous parallels between the Wenzi and other early Chinese manuscripts. In addition to demonstrating the major influence of Laozi 老子 and Xunzi 荀子 and adducing circumstantial evidence for the time of the text’s creation, the intertextual parallels also point to the importance of specific argumentative features. Among them, “antithetical parallelism” appears to be one of the most salient. The focus of the study is the reconstruction of a text sequence using this rhetorical figure. Furthermore, it argues that despite the widespread usage of “antithetical parallelism” in early Chinese texts, including the Laozi, there is some evidence to identify the source of the Wenzi’s inspiration for this particular argument as the Xunzi. In the latter, “antithesis” was one of the important constituents of the “patterned” discourse (wen) meant to reflect the theme of wen, the cultural legacy of the early Zhou Kings. Given the often neglected importance of the notion wen in the Wenzi, signifying the complete realization of the central Daoist notion, the Way (dao 道), the study concludes with the claim that, just like the Xunzi, the Wenzi also attempted to establish a connection between the content of its philosophical teaching and its formal, textual representation.

本研究旨在探討如何從現存殘篇中的論證特點來推測原始文本的整體內容和結構。道家典籍《文子》十分適合用來做這樣的研究，《文子》現有的兩個版本，即今本《文子》和 1973 年定州出土的西漢簡本《文子》，雖然存在一定差異，但都殘缺不全，且為人篡改過。本文首先分析了《文子》與其他早期中國文獻間的相似之處。研究發現《文子》在很大程度上受到《老子》和《荀子》的影響，這也為研究文本的創作時代提供了間接證據；此外，文本間的互文性也反映出特定論證特點的重要性，其中「反義平行」是最為突出的。本文的重點是要通過文本的修辭方式來重建文本序列。儘管 括《老子》在內的中國早期文獻都廣泛使用「反義平行」，但仍然能找到一些證據表明《荀子》才是《文子》的靈感來源，而「反義平行」恰恰構成了《荀子》中「文」的話語模式，並以此來闡釋周代所崇尚的文化價值 —「文」。《文子》中「文」這一概念極為重要，儘管這一點經常被人忽視，它意味著道家的核心概念「道」得以完全實現。本文認為，正如《荀子》一樣，《文子》也試圖建立一種哲學學說內涵與表現形式上關聯。

The aim of my paper is to analyze the debate between Mencius and Xunzi from the perspective of their views on the nature of the historical process. The Mencian approach embraces not only elaboration on the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven, resulting in a cyclical vision of history, but also strong idealization of the past. I will show that ren (benevolence), treated as a historical principle, could link two dimensions of his historical thinking: the moral and ontological. Xunzi rejected the possibility of the intervention of Heaven in history, however, his theory of rituals and belief in moral use of history made his philosophy of history much more conservative, embalming the idealization of the past. In short, I will look for the main common points and differences between these two major figures of Confucianism regarding their views on history, attempting to answer which beliefs could constitute a unique Confucian philosophy of history.

In recent years there have been debates surrounding various aspects of the early Confucian philosopher Xunzi’s view on ritual (li 禮) as a specific core element of his ethical thought.  One of the main questions concerns the source of ritual.  Is ritual something that humans (in particular, the sages) discover in the world, or is it instead something they create?  That is—does Xunzi offer a realist or a conventionalist view of ritual?    The answer to this question is of great import for understanding the thought of Xunzi in general, as it will suggest certain readings of his views on language, human nature, and moral self-cultivation.  Part of the problem, however, is that although Xunzi says quite a bit about the function of ritual and why we should be concerned with it (the pragmatic application of ritual), he says relatively little about the metaphysics of ritual.  Arguments either for a realist or conventionalist position have thus far tended to focus mainly on textual interpretation.  The problem is that on the issue of the metaphysics of ritual there is a very limited amount to work with in the text of the Xunzi itself.  Fortunately, however, there are other available methods that have been neglected which can help us to make headway on this issue.  In this paper I outline one such method, which I call the "analogical method", and apply it to the case of Xunzi’s metaphysics of ritual.