Xunzi

The article discusses uses of xiu shen, one among a number of terms referring to practices of moral and mental discipline in early China. It sketches out the contexts and discourses in which the term appears and hopes thus to contribute, albeit in a limited way, to eventual broader assessments of the role which different concepts, ideals, and practices of self-discipline played in political and social thought.

惠棟揭櫫「漢學」典範，推明「古義」而催發清儒共撰「新疏」之風，並以《易》學為其核心，力圖發揚漢代象數《易》學的內容與精神，建構一套獨特的詮釋思維。而檢覈惠棟豐富之《易》學著作，我們可以發現惠氏除以《易》結合明堂、禘祭之禮而寄託政治理想，進而將典禮制度展示儒者教化之風外，又由《易》會通《中庸》、《大學》思想以對抗「宋學」體系。更為關鍵的是，在此之中，更呈現出「以《荀》解《易》」的詮釋傾向，著重《荀子》義理思想的闡揚。可惜的是，目前學者未對惠棟思想中所反映出的荀學取向有一整體勾勒，亦缺少以荀學立場看待惠氏《易》學的視角。職是之故，本文以《荀子微言》為中心考察，擬就（一）《荀子》與《易》；（二）氣化流行與氣樂共感；（三）氣與神三方面加以論證，藉以蠡探惠棟思想與荀學二者間饒富意義之連繫及其特色。

Human nature or disposition (xing 性), which is tendency of human mind and behavior, is one of the oldest and the most important philosophical issues in China since 4th century BCE. Among the Hundred Schools, Confucian thinkers developed their thoughts in relation with human nature. As we know the famous disputes between Mengzi and Xunzi, the main issue of their arguments was around a question whether human nature is good or not.
This article aims to rethink those discourses on human nature in Ancient China, with a focus on each thinker's approach to human feelings or sentiments (qing 情). The reason that goodness or badness of human nature has such importance in their argument is closely related with a Confucian ethical purpose - the realization of the proprieties (li 禮). In Confucian thought, the propriety (li), or socially appropriate expression and behavior, is basically ground on natural sentiment. However, natural and spontaneous expression of sentiment itself cannot ensure one’s behavior appropriate to all occasions with the propriety. Then, what is relation between the natural sentiment and the sentiment appropriate for propriety? How Confucian thinkers deal with the continuity and discontinuity between the two, sentiment (qing) and propriety (li)?
Turning attention to above questions, this paper reexamines each discourse on human nature of Mengzi, Xunzi, including an unearthed document “Human Nature Derives from (Heavenly) Order (Xing zi ming chu 性自命出),” and investigates the characteristics and structure of each argument, and their fundamental way of thinking. This survey tries to elucidate a new aspect of disputes over human nature that has been set out to explain the interrelationship between sentiment and propriety, as well as its critical problem lies in dealing with natural sentiment and appropriate sentiment.

This article seeks to advance discussion of Xunzi’s view of ritual by examining the problem ritual treats and the way in which it targets the problem. I argue that the root of the problem is the natural inclination of the heart/mind to be concerned only with self-interest. The reason ritual works is that, on the one hand, it requires one to disregard concern for self-interest and observe ethical standards and, on the other, it allows one to express feelings in an ethically appropriate way. The ideal character shaped by ritual is one of respect in dealing with affairs and people; the ideal effect of ritual on the person is a sense of ease and security. Based on these conclusions, I will flesh out an implicit assumption Xunzi might have adopted about a pattern in human psychological constitution so as to further our understanding of Xunzi’s moral psychology.

It is commonly accepted that Han Fei studied under Xunzi sometime during the late third century BCE. However, there is surprisingly little dedicated to the in-depth study of the relationship between Xunzi’s ideas and one of his best-known followers. In this essay I argue that Han Fei’s notion of xing, commonly translated as human nature, was not only influenced by Xunzi but also that it is an important feature of his political philosophy.

To the extent that contemporary scholars Feng Youlan, Wang Shumin, and Cui Dahua
recognize Xunzi’s engagement with Daoism, they have focused on his debt to the
Zhuangzi. While Xunzi did borrow from the Zhuangzi, the phrases and nature of this
borrowing have not yet been completely understood.

Xunzi did pay a great deal of attention to theories of argument. In the “Fei
xiang” chapter, Xunzi said, “A gentleman would definitely argue.” However, in
the “Bu gou” chapter, he stated, on the contrary, that a gentleman with high virtues
could make himself understood even by saying nothing. This article attempts to
bring out the discussions on Xunzi’s theories of argument which intended to engage
a debate with Zhuangzi. On the other hand, by pointing out the evidence, this article
also proves that Xunzi did borrow some phrases and expressions about theories of
argument from the Zhuangzi.

The particular focus is on the conceptual relationship between the argument
theories in the Xunzi and that in the Zhuangzi. The author points out that in taking
these stances Xunzi did follow Zhuangzi and this element was incorporated into the
thought of the Xunzi. However there were cases where Xunzi did reject Zhuangzi’s
assumptions.

馮友蘭、王叔岷、崔大華均指出荀子採用《莊子》的道家觀點，此可從二書相合用語
得見。然而，相關研究並不全面，荀子在取用莊周用詞、觀念時，又如何對莊周論
說提出駁詰？

荀子強調言辯，〈非相篇〉嘗言：「君子必辯。」然而，〈不苟篇〉又謂：「君子至
德，嘿然而喻。」兩相牴牾。本文探究《莊子》、《荀子》二書言辯論說關係，考證荀
子部分言辯論說其實與莊周相涉，其中二書措詞用語相合者，其例甚多，以見
《莊》、《荀》言辯論說確有關係。

本文作者通過文本對讀，提出荀子於莊子言辯論說確有採信接納，亦受其哲學
思想影響。然而，荀子對部分莊子言辯論說又痛加詆訿，並提出駁詰。

In response to challenges to ritual practice, Xunzi develops not only a theory of ritual, but also a method of ritual performance that can be illuminated by a comparison to modern Western acting techniques. His method also reveals a “tragic” aesthetic, through which he attempts to reconcile the diversity of beliefs about death within a single practice.

Few words in english since, for italian speakers, all this and more can be found in the Introduction. This work is the result of more than three years of research, conducted literally stealing time to each every moment of the day, when I was not at job - fundamental instrument to earn a living but, at the same time, greedy Moloch demanding more and more energy - or being involved in family life activities. For this reason it represented the greatest possible effort in my whole life, culminated when, more than an year ago, I presented it to the commission for the final examination, and it was awarded with honours. One year passed and life goes on, a carriage is not a pumpkin and a clerk in a transport company remains a clerk. So I decided to “publish” it, to make it public, since to see it covered with dust on my shelf would have been a nonsense and, in last analysis, the umpteenth insult to what I’ve always believed (и всё таки я верю...). It’s in italian but, for interested people, it wouldn’t be a problem for me to translate selected parts into the other languages that I speak. Of course, of all the mistakes that you may (and will) find in it, I am the only responsible.

After decades of attempts, comparisons between classical Chinese and Greco-Roman philosophy have had limited success. While there have been some productive lines of inquiry (for example, comparing early Confucian ethics to virtue ethics as represented by Aristotle), the overall record is disappointing because concepts such as Plato's theory of forms or Aristotle's emphasis on syllogism have proved incommensurable with most classical Chinese ways of thinking. But much of the problem can be attributed to the habit of comparing Chinese thinkers to Plato and Aristotle without asking whether they are the most suitable philosophers for this purpose. For most of the twentieth century, Hellenistic philosophy was scarcely considered. Yet very recently, provocative similarities have been identified between Chinese philosophy and Stoicism, especially Epictetus. In this paper, I argue that these parallels are even more significant than previous scholarship has recognized (I hope to convince the reader that some of them are staggering), and conclude by asking why we find such parallels in the first place. My claim will not be direct or even indirect transmission; this is a case, to borrow a distinction from evolutionary biology, of analogous rather than homologous development.

The present study aims to demonstrate how certain argumentative features of a text that exists only in a fragmentary fashion can be used to gain a fuller picture of its original content and structure. The Daoist treatise Wenzi 文子 is particularly suitable for this study, for it is available in two different but similarly distorted and fragmented versions: the received text as well as some Western Han 西漢 (206 B.C.–A.D. 6) fragments obtained at the archeological site of Dingzhou 定州 (1973). The study first deals with the numerous parallels between the Wenzi and other early Chinese manuscripts. In addition to demonstrating the major influence of Laozi 老子 and Xunzi 荀子 and adducing circumstantial evidence for the time of the text’s creation, the intertextual parallels also point to the importance of specific argumentative features. Among them, “antithetical parallelism” appears to be one of the most salient. The focus of the study is the reconstruction of a text sequence using this rhetorical figure. Furthermore, it argues that despite the widespread usage of “antithetical parallelism” in early Chinese texts, including the Laozi, there is some evidence to identify the source of the Wenzi’s inspiration for this particular argument as the Xunzi. In the latter, “antithesis” was one of the important constituents of the “patterned” discourse (wen) meant to reflect the theme of wen, the cultural legacy of the early Zhou Kings. Given the often neglected importance of the notion wen in the Wenzi, signifying the complete realization of the central Daoist notion, the Way (dao 道), the study concludes with the claim that, just like the Xunzi, the Wenzi also attempted to establish a connection between the content of its philosophical teaching and its formal, textual representation.

本研究旨在探討如何從現存殘篇中的論證特點來推測原始文本的整體內容和結構。道家典籍《文子》十分適合用來做這樣的研究，《文子》現有的兩個版本，即今本《文子》和 1973 年定州出土的西漢簡本《文子》，雖然存在一定差異，但都殘缺不全，且為人篡改過。本文首先分析了《文子》與其他早期中國文獻間的相似之處。研究發現《文子》在很大程度上受到《老子》和《荀子》的影響，這也為研究文本的創作時代提供了間接證據；此外，文本間的互文性也反映出特定論證特點的重要性，其中「反義平行」是最為突出的。本文的重點是要通過文本的修辭方式來重建文本序列。儘管 括《老子》在內的中國早期文獻都廣泛使用「反義平行」，但仍然能找到一些證據表明《荀子》才是《文子》的靈感來源，而「反義平行」恰恰構成了《荀子》中「文」的話語模式，並以此來闡釋周代所崇尚的文化價值 —「文」。《文子》中「文」這一概念極為重要，儘管這一點經常被人忽視，它意味著道家的核心概念「道」得以完全實現。本文認為，正如《荀子》一樣，《文子》也試圖建立一種哲學學說內涵與表現形式上關聯。

This paper gives a reading of the philosophical position found in the Wu xing 五行 (Five Conducts) text excavated at Guodian and Mawangdui. The first part of the essay analyzes the distinction between goodness and de 德. The second part examines how the various forms of correct behavior are linked to the internal, pointing out the similarities and differences from Mengzi's approach. The paper aims to determine more precisely what the Mengzi and Wu xing have in common, while also making sense of the ways in which they diverge.

This article introduces and analyses the debate between Mencius and Xunzi on xing 性 (human nature). While Mencius claims that xing is good, Xunzi claims that xing is bad. A common way of interpreting these two different claims is to determine the scope of xing. It is generally agreed that, for Mencius, it is the heart/mind that falls within the scope of xing, for Xunzi, the sensory desires. This article also explores a different way of approaching Mencius's and Xunzi's different claims about xing. It is suggested that Mencius's and Xunzi's different views on xing can be understood in terms of their different views on the heart/mind (xin 心). While Mencius thinks that the heart/mind has a morally good natural tendency, Xunzi thinks that the heart/mind has a morally problematic tendency.

On the Compositional Structure of the Huainanzi
目前西方學者多以為《淮南》二十篇由「本∕道」和「末∕事」兩部分組成，此說幾成定論。然而，《淮南》後序〈要略〉既然一方面要求讀者順序閱讀《淮南》二十篇，同時明確指出不欲讀者「離本就末」，然則《淮南》二十篇就不可能只由「本∕道」和「末∕事」兩部分組成。
本文通過分析〈要略〉 文義 ，抉發篇中內證 ，指出《淮南》二十篇實由「本/道」、「末/事」以及「大本/大道」三部分組成。 第一部分由開首八篇組成，其論述主題為「天地之理」。第二部分則由第九篇到第十八篇組成，其主題為「人間之事」。第三組的地位最高，由第十九篇〈脩務〉和第二十篇〈泰族〉組成，其主題為「帝王之道」。而〈要略〉指出《淮南》乃「劉氏之書」，「劉氏之書」者皇族之書、帝王之書也。 由此可知 闡述「帝王之道」的兩篇實為 《淮南》 之重心大本。

Virtue epistemology can be seen as a parallel to virtue ethics in a number of aspects. First, both can be traced (at least) to Aristotle. Aristotle regards rationality as something distinctively human, and rationality for him can be divided into the theoretical and the practical ones. As virtue is merely excellence of rational activities of the soul, there are intellectual virtues and moral virtues. While virtue ethics is concerned with the latter, virtue epistemology is concerned with the former. Second, there is an impressive revival of virtue ethics in contemporary philosophy as a rival to deontology and consequentialism. Similarly, virtue epistemology has also emerged as a viable alternative to naturalized epistemology, with the former being normative and the latter descriptive. Third, contemporary virtue ethics has become pluralized, partially because different virtue ethicists today are appealing to different philosophers, such as Aristotle, Stoics, Hume, Nietzsche, Dewey, among others, for their inspirations. Similarly, contemporary virtue epistemology has also become pluralized, with different virtue epistemologists drawing on different sources such as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, Kierkeggard, Nietzsche, Pierce, among others, in developing their ideas. However, there is a clear disanalogy between virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. As virtue ethics prospers in contemporary Western philosophy, scholars doing Chinese philosophy have quickly produced an impressive number of publications on virtue ethics in Chinese traditions in the form of journal articles, book chapters, and single authored monographs. In contrast, virtue epistemology has not attracted its deserved attention from these scholars, with only a small handful of articles exploring the virtue epistemological potentials in Chinese tradition so far published. In this context, it is significant that, in this volume, 11 experts of Chinese philosophy critically and constructively engage the work of Ernest Sosa, the pioneer of contemporary virtue epistemology, and bring it to fruitful dialogues with classical Chinese philosophers, especially Confucius, Xunzi and Wang Yangming (Confucianism), Zhuangzi (Daoism), and Linji (Chan Buddhism).

如果我们要论证：在荀子的理论中，“化性”如何可能，我们就必须解决“性”的内容是什么，这些内容中哪些是可化的，然后我们才能达到“化性是可化的”这个结论。因此，性的内容便成了整个论证的关键。但是荀子对“性”字的规定是比较形式化的。无论是“天之就”还是“材性”或“本始材朴”，都只是从形式上与人伪相对。我们尚未得到任何实质性的内容。可巧《正名》说：“性者，天之就也；情者，性之质也；欲者，情之应也。” 质是体质、质地、底子、根茎。可见“情”字是关键。我们可以猜测：荀子关于情、欲的论述或许可以为我们提供一些实质性的证据，解开“化性如何可能”的谜团。更巧的是：在荀子对宋钘的“情欲寡”的反驳中，我们可以看清情、欲二字的义涵，由此再反过来与性字比照，则“化性”之义可明。

Este ensaio discute a representação simbólica do cavalo na cultura chinesa da pré-história até a dinastia Han Ocidental 西汉 (206 AEC – 24 EC). Inicia-se com a descrição da presença do cavalo na região antes da pré-história. Na segunda seção, arrolam-se mitos sobre cavalos. Na terceira seção, descreve a introdução e desenvolvimento do cavalo como elemento militar. Na quarta seção, descreve-se o termo cavalo nos primeiros registros escritos e a respectiva simbologia no que concerne aos ritos e à educação. Depois de discutir o status do cavalo sob a égide confuciana ortodoxa e da escola das leis, na quinta seção, analisa-se a alegoria do animal para o daoísmo 道 e a respectiva crítica às escolas filosóficas hegemônicas levadas a cabo em Zhuangzi 庄子. Ao final, a partir da revisão bibliográfica conclui-se a importância do cavalo dentro do sistema cultural chinês sob uma abordagem filosófica até ao período dos Reinos Combatentes (475-221 AEC).

The aim of my paper is to analyze the debate between Mencius and Xunzi from the perspective of their views on the nature of the historical process. The Mencian approach embraces not only elaboration on the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven, resulting in a cyclical vision of history, but also strong idealization of the past. I will show that ren (benevolence), treated as a historical principle, could link two dimensions of his historical thinking: the moral and ontological. Xunzi rejected the possibility of the intervention of Heaven in history, however, his theory of rituals and belief in moral use of history made his philosophy of history much more conservative, embalming the idealization of the past. In short, I will look for the main common points and differences between these two major figures of Confucianism regarding their views on history, attempting to answer which beliefs could constitute a unique Confucian philosophy of history.

In the “Tian lun” 天論 chapter of the Xunzi 荀子 the expression “xingzhui muming” 星隊 木鳴 was used to describe some rare astronomical phenomena. Many attempts have been made to gloss it. Yang Jing 楊倞 of the Tang dynasty, for instance, takes “xingzhui” as meaning “the change of the heaven and earth” and “muming” as “the conversion of the yin and yang.” A research group from the Department of Philosophy at Peking University working on the Xunzi takes “xingzhui muming” as meaning “the sacred trees planted around the altar making strange sounds amid the heavy wind, and the whole country is seized with a panic.” Their commentary, however, has created much doubt. We cannot help but wonder why a fact as simple as trees making sounds in the heavy wind would have caused such a panic, even though the ancients possessed little knowledge in the natural science. Thus it is very likely that the meaning of the expression has not yet been fully explored. With the aid of recent astronomical findings, this article raises a new point: the expression was in fact used by Xunzi to describe only a certain astronomical phenomenon.

O filósofo Xún Kuàng 荀況 (310-211 AEC) viveu durante o final do período chamado  de  Estados  Combatentes  (403-221  AEC),  em  que  a  disputa  bélica  por  poder e a busca por justificativas às escolhas políticas e pessoais era intensa. Xún 荀era seu sobrenome, e zǐ 子 significa “mestre” ou “filósofo” na antiguidade chinesa. Ele recebeu esse reconhecimento por fazer parte da primeira experiência de “ensino superior” na China antiga, a Acadêmia Jixia ( Jìxià Xuégōng 稷下學宮), onde foi aluno e depois professor e diretor.  É considerado o terceiro maior filósofo da “Escola dos Eruditos” (Rújiā 儒家, Confucionismo), depois do próprio Confúcio (Kǒngzǐ 孔子) e de Mêncio (Mèngzǐ 孟子), escola que defendeu de forma argumentativa e sistemática, diferente dos diálogos breves dos seus antecessores (KNOBLOCK, 1988). Sua  obra  recebeu  o  mesmo  nome  do  autor,  Xúnzǐ 荀子,  e  é  constituída  de  32  capítulos  de  tamanhos  médios  ou  grandes,  com  diferentes  linguagens  que  variam entre discursos argumentativos, diálogos dialéticos, poesias e recomendações de  ações.  O  capítulo  17  faz  parte  de  uma  fase  mais  madura,  em  que  ele  já  tinha  estudado,  trabalhado  como  ministro,  e  provavelmente  estava  como  diretor  e  professor da Acadêmia Jixia (KNOBLOCK, 1982-1983, p. 38 e 46). Aqui  apresentamos  uma  tradução  direta  da  língua  chinesa  antiga  para  o  português  brasileiro  desse  capítulo  17,  “Discurso  sobre  o  Céu”  (Tiān  Lùn天論).

In recent years there have been debates surrounding various aspects of the early Confucian philosopher Xunzi’s view on ritual (li 禮) as a specific core element of his ethical thought.  One of the main questions concerns the source of ritual.  Is ritual something that humans (in particular, the sages) discover in the world, or is it instead something they create?  That is—does Xunzi offer a realist or a conventionalist view of ritual?    The answer to this question is of great import for understanding the thought of Xunzi in general, as it will suggest certain readings of his views on language, human nature, and moral self-cultivation.  Part of the problem, however, is that although Xunzi says quite a bit about the function of ritual and why we should be concerned with it (the pragmatic application of ritual), he says relatively little about the metaphysics of ritual.  Arguments either for a realist or conventionalist position have thus far tended to focus mainly on textual interpretation.  The problem is that on the issue of the metaphysics of ritual there is a very limited amount to work with in the text of the Xunzi itself.  Fortunately, however, there are other available methods that have been neglected which can help us to make headway on this issue.  In this paper I outline one such method, which I call the "analogical method", and apply it to the case of Xunzi’s metaphysics of ritual.

The term " sage " 聖 appears a total of 157 times in the Xunzi, whilst other terms such as " junzi " 君子, " da-ru " 大儒 and " kingly person " 王者 that are either directly or indirectly related to Xunzi's concept of the " sagely man " can be found throughout the corpus. The frequent use of the term " sage " strongly implies its influential position in the philosophy of Xunzi. In fact, not only is the Xunzian usage of the term " sage " with regards to the persona of the " sagely man " very rich in content by itself, the concept of " sage " also manifests intricate conceptual relationships with other important Xunzian concepts such as Tian 天, Li 禮 and Dao 道. Therefore, a sophisticated understanding of Xunzi's view of the " sagely man " and its principle characteristics will benefit us largely in clarifying certain important topics in the philosophy of Xunzi. Moreover, it opens up new possibilities for constructive dialogue amongst the pre-Qin thinkers. This paper shall analyze and evaluate Xunzi's concept of " sage " from four different perspectives, namely the " sage " persona as portrayed in the Xunzi, the conceptual relationship between " sage " and Tian, the conceptual relationship between " sage " and Li, and finally, the conceptual relationship between the " sage " and Dao.

The Xing zi ming chu (性自命出) [XZMC] presents a distinctive account of human dispositions that centers on the spontaneous arising of affects like joy and sadness. This focus on emotion grounds a particular conception of the function of music and ritual that gives music a central role in self-cultivation. Although the account of human dispositions in XZMC was ultimately overshadowed by the opposing views of Mengzi and Xunzi and the question of whether our dispositions are good or bad, its views remained central for Ru philosophy of music. The first three parts of the paper trace the development of the ideas appearing in XZMC through the “Discourse on Music” chapter of the Xunzi and parts of the Yueji. The fourth section highlights the distinctiveness of XZMC’s account through a contrast with the views of Mengzi and Xunzi. The paper concludes by examining the ways in which, in accounting for ritual and music, both the Mengzi and Xunzi employ views like those of the XZMC, even if those are in tension with their core philosophical theories.

Li 禮 (translated variously as " ritual " , " etiquette " , or " propriety ") plays a central role in early Confucianism, but its complexity is not always fully understood. At first glance, it may seem as if li behaviors are merely attempts to promote conservative practices from the idealized Chinese past. However , by examining the nature and function of li, as described the Analects (Lunyu 論語) and the Xunzi 荀 子 (two key texts in the early Confucian tradition), it becomes overwhelmingly apparent that li is a much more complicated phenomenon. Li actually plays key roles within the interconnected fields of Confucian ethics, religion, and politics and often adds aesthetic elements to these areas of thought. As such, it is as much a source of Confucian innovation as it is a tool for promoting reverence for the past.

Appeals to human nature in normative enquiry have fallen out of favor among contemporary philosophers. In this paper I examine reasons for believing that the notion of human nature has an indispensable role to play in ethics by looking at Alasdair MacIntyre’s views on human nature in light of two diverging conceptions of human nature found in the works of two ancient Chinese philosophers, Mencius and Xunzi. Examining their conflicting accounts, I contend, helps illuminate the development of MacIntyre’s position on human nature, and offers reasons for taking the notion of human nature seriously in moral enquiry.

Xunzi, a famous ancient Chinese thinker, left a valuable work on Confucian philosophy through his writings. His thoughts touched on various issues concerning human nature, domestic and even international politics. In particular, this essay will focus on the latter aspect of his philosophy. Specifically, I will attempt to outline his key ideas on the international
politics and juxtapose them with the ideas of Realism with which Xunzi’s philosophy is often associated. I will argue that Xunzi’s and realists’ views on international politics diverge in most ways, and hence, should not be perceived as similar to each other. In addition, I will try to examine the relevance of Xunzi’s standpoint on particular issues in the contemporary political world.

Ideas of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ and ‘the responsibility to protect’ have become increasingly accepted by the society of states in recent years. The origins of these ideas are appropriately traced to earlier European concepts of popular resistance and humanitarian intervention. However, Europe is not unique in possessing a heritage of sovereign accountability. Almost two thousand years before sovereignty emerged in early modern Europe, philosophers in Ancient China developed remarkably similar concepts about the responsibilities of legitimate rule. Confucian scholars, in particular Mencius, argued that rulers were established by Heaven for the benefit of the people. The people, in turn, could rightfully hold their rulers to account. They had the right to banish a bad ruler and even to kill a tyrant. Moreover, a benevolent ruler was justified in waging ‘punitive war’ against the tyrannical ruler of another state, in order to punish him and to comfort the people. Recognition of this non-European heritage of sovereign accountability opens up new possibilities for dialogue between those who would promote present-day concepts of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ and those who perceive these concepts as merely Western and alien principles grounded in Western and alien values.

Foi meu primeiro artigo completo publicado, então ainda contém alguns erros de português e dificuldades na escrita. Mas ainda sim tem algo a contribuir às ciências humanas através de Xunzi. Consta nos Anais em CD-ROM da XV Semana Filosófica & IV Encontro de Ciências da Religião da Unimontes (novembro/2010)

This volume presents a comprehensive analysis of the Confucian thinker Xunzi and his work, which shares the same name. It features a variety of disciplinary perspectives and offers divergent interpretations. The disagreements reveal that, as with any other classic, the Xunzi provides fertile ground for readers. It is a source from which they have drawn—and will continue to draw—different lessons.

In more than 15 essays, the contributors examine Xunzi’s views on topics such as human nature, ritual, music, ethics, and politics. They also look at his relations with other thinkers in early China and consider his influence in East Asian intellectual history.

A number of important Chinese scholars in the Song dynasty (960–1279 CE) sought to censor the Xunzi. They thought that it offered a heretical and impure version of Confuciansim. As a result, they directed study away from the Xunzi. This has diminished the popularity of the work.

However, the essays presented here help to change this situation. They open the text’s riches to Western students and scholars. The book also highlights the substantial impact the Xunzi has had on thinkers throughout history, even on those who were critical of it. Overall, readers will gain new insights and a deeper understanding of this important, but often neglected, thinker.

This essay argues that yu 欲 (desire), in Xunzi’s view, cannot by itself motivate action. Such a clarification will also bear on our understanding of the relation between xin 心 (the heart/mind) and yu in the Xunzi. It is divided into three main sections. The first section seeks to explicate the common assumption that yu can be an independent source of motivation. In the second section, I will conduct textual analysis that challenges such an assumption and argue that only xin can by itself motivate action. In the third section, I explain that the issue of whether yu can conflict with xin is not applicable in Xunzi’s thought and extrapolate the implications that xin is always activated and that it has a natural inclination to pursue the objects of yu. For these reasons, the source of moral failure lies in xin being active in certain problematic ways.

《荀子• 非相篇》「君子之度己則以繩，接人則用抴」一語，歷來學者聚訟紛紜，未有達詁。前人對「抴」的詮解可分為四種：牽引說、舟楫說、檠枻說、寬容說。本文從韓愈提出的檠枻說開始，重新檢討，發現從字義上並不能將「枻」直接理解成正弓之器。所謂檠枻，應從糸旁作檠紲。檠是正弓用的木或竹片，紲則是指穿繫檠木並與弓體縛緊的繩索。「接人則用抴」的「抴」就是指縛繫檠木的紲繩，同時借代正弓之檠。從秦始皇帝陵所發掘的弓檠形制可見，先秦時期的檠木呈凸字形，上有三個小孔穿繫繩索，可以配合不同位置繩索的鬆緊，調節弓臂，匡正及保護弓體。先秦檠紲的功用，可以引伸出輔助、引導、牽制、匡正等意義。君子以檠紲接人，便能體現出上述多元含意。以檠紲為喻，恰能與上句的繩墨相對，都是先秦時期慣用的工具譬喻，前後句若合符契；從《荀子》文本多偶句的風格來看，更屬合理。再進一步探討此語的內在意涵，繩墨和檠紲都能代表禮，「度己以繩」與「接人用抴」正能表現禮的兩種功能：克己復禮與導人向善。而且，以禮接人的方法，亦與《荀子》禮論中的養和積互相契合，有透過時日的累積，逐漸感化他人之義。

Scholars have not come to a consensus as to the meaning of the expression “jiren ze yong ye” in the “Fei xiang” chapter of the Xunzi. With regard to the word ye, there are four interpretations, namely pulling, oar, bow frame, and leniency. This article revisits Han Yu’s interpretation of the word ye 枻 as bow frame and argues that we cannot directly interpret it this way. The phrase 檠枻 should read 檠紲. Qing 檠 is a tool made of wood or bamboo splits for adjusting the bow shape, and xie 紲 is the string that ties the bow and the qing. The word ye in the Xunzi line should be understood as such a string, which, in this case, is also a synecdoche for the bow frame. As seen from the bow frame excavated from the tomb of the First Emperor of Qin, a pre-Qin bow frame is in T shape with three small holes on it. By binding the bow and bow frame using three strings through the three holes with different tightness, the bow shape can be adjusted, fixed, and also protected. The functions of the pre- Qin bow frame can be layered with philosophical connotations such as assistance, guidance, restraint, and rectification. A gentleman using a bow frame and its string to contact others can reflect those complex philosophical connotations. Bow frame, as a metaphor, also corresponds to the phrase “plumb line” in the sentence before. This pair of metaphors of tools are typical in the Xunzi text, which contains plenty of pairing sentences in its chapters. Furthermore, both plumb line and bow frame can represent rituals in Xunzi. Together they show the two divergent functions of Chinese rituals, which are self-restraint and guiding others to good. Moreover, gentlemen contacting others by rituals also match the theory of cultivation and accumulation in Xunzi, which means gradually influencing others to become good over time.

L'elaborato analizza il significato del binomio "Radici e rami" (benmo 本末) nel dibattito della Cina classica. Particolare enfasi viene posta sull'origine logografica dei due caratteri che compongono l'espressione e sulla valenza antinomica da loro espressa nel Zhuangzi e nel Xunzi.

The paper looks at the utility of shame treatment espoused by the Confucian system in the process of corrective behavioural rehabilitation. The primary focus of this paper is the Buddhist critique of an attachment to shame and shame treatment. The research covers three main thinkers –Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi and how their methodologies promote self-heightening processes that are seen as problematic from a Buddhist world view. These self-heightening processes are observed to be problematic in corrective behaviour rehabilitation as they hinder Buddhist true liberation, serving as a mechanism for the perpetuation of suffering and an erroneous perspective of self. The emphasis on shame creates particularisations of a unique, unchanging self through reinforced psychological distinctions. This framework also sees an entrapment of the transgressor through this false concept of a self which is subject to a cycle of constant self-criticism and shame, perpetuating emotional suffering. Shame in Buddhism is be explored to show differences between it and Confucian shame, mainly the action-centric nature in the former and self-centric nature in the latter. A solution in the form of Buddhist mindfulness techniques would be offered as a feasible alternative to the issue of corrective behaviour rehabilitation that the Confucians were concerned with.

Keywords: Buddhism, Confucianism, Shame, Mindfulness, Self, Rehabilitation

The seventeen essays in Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Xunzi introduce readers to Xunzi and the Xunzi text, overview the debates in existing scholarship, and provide original analysis of various aspects of Xunzi's thought as well as its interaction with other philosophical traditions. This is, in my view, a long-awaited volume that contains comprehensive, in-depth, and up-to-date discussions of Xunzi. What is unique about this volume is that it is the first English-language anthology that examines a wide range of philosophical themes and issues in Xunzi's thought. It also situates Xunzi's thought in his own pre-Qin China context and traces the influence and development of his thought in the later periods from Han to Song China, Edo Japan, and Chosŏn Korea. The contributing authors' knowledge of the Xunzi in their respective disciplines is exceptional. The essays generally follow the text closely and exhibit high sensitivity to textual nuances. Each of the individual essays not only introduces readers to the topic and reviews the state of debate, it also proposes an original argument. It is exciting to see that new questions are being raised and more attention is drawn to some of the relatively understudied issues. A number of arguments put forth in this volume are groundbreaking and could stimulate much future discussion. The editor, Eric L. Hutton, has done an impressive job of organizing these different essays that touch on a number of different themes. The volume begins with Martin Kern's chapter, which introduces readers to the textual composition and construction of the Xunzi. The next ten chapters then move on to examine various philosophical topics: self-cultivation ethics, political philosophy, metaethics, human nature, moral psychology, ritual, aesthetics, language, and religion. The next four chapters helpfully examine Xunzi's engagement with and influence on later Chinese philosophical traditions. The last two chapters discuss the development of Xunzi scholarship in Edo Japan and Chosŏn Korea. The Index of Xunzi Passages in the end is very helpful, making this companion a more user-friendly " running commentary " of the Xunzi as Hutton has intended (xxiii). It would have been better if there were one chapter devoted specifically to tracing Xunzi's engagement with Confucius and Mencius, helping readers to make sense of why later thinkers are so preoccupied with whether or not Xunzi is a " pure " Confucian. Since Hutton's " Introduction " has already provided a succinct summary of each chapter, I shall not try to summarize too much here. In the following, I will make some specific comments about each chapter. In Chapter 1, Martin Kern brings to light the different stylistic elements in the Xunzi. In English-language studies, there are very few studies on stylistic differences in the Xunzi. Kern's erudite chapter calls into question the common assumption that Xunzi is written in a homogenous style, owing to the oft-cited remark that Xunzi is the first systematic thinker who writes in treatise form. The textual issues discussed in Kern's chapter have significant bearing on our understanding of the authorship of the text. It is important to keep these issues in mind when we try to decide how much weight is to be assigned to the textual evidence we employ. In Chapter 2, Aaron Stalnaker outlines key ideas and passages in the Xunzi that are related to self-cultivation and raises intriguing issues that prepare the ground for discussion in the chapters that follow, for example, why music can make our hearts good, why sagehood is possible, why human nature can be transformed. This is a significant contribution to existing literature because few have in such detailed manner looked into the particular content of the programme of self-cultivation that Xunzi envisions. It gives us a sense of what, in Xunzi's view, one is supposed to learn such that one can move from a student to a shi scholar and then to a junzi (and probably, finally, to a sage). I agree with Stalnaker that ritual develops and enriches qing 情 into orderly forms but I am not sure about his claim that " we do a certain amount of violence to our spontaneous promoting and desires, and slowly reshape our disposition over time as we adjust to these respectful,