Waiver

O Supremo Tribunal Federal teria aparentemente alterado seu anterior entendimento de que qualquer constatação de um crime em estado de flagrância dentro do domicílio era capaz de validar uma busca domiciliar realizada sem mandado judicial. Desde final de 2015 as buscas domiciliares são inválidas se não era possível divisar a ocorrência de um crime em estado de flagrância a partir do exterior do domicílio. No entanto, se o estado de flagrância for percebi-do apenas de dentro do domicílio e a entrada tenha se dado por consentimento do morador, é válida a prisão em flagrante dela decorrente? O direito fundamental da inviolabilidade domi-ciliar pode ser renunciado? Como deve ocorrer a renúncia à inviolabilidade do domicílio para que se entenda o consentimento como válido? Palavras-chave: BUSCA DOMICILIAR SEM MANDADO. LEGALIDADE. CONSENTI-MENTO. RENÚNCIA A DIREITOS FUNDAMENTAIS. RENÚNCIA À INVIOLABILI-DADE DOMICILIAR. REQUISITOS. ABSTRACT The Brazilian Federal Supreme Court seems to have altered its previous holding that any crime in flagrante state found within a house was able to validate a search and seizure conducted in a house without a court order. Since the end of 2015 warrantless house search and seizure are invalid if the flagrante state of a crime was not perceivable from the outside of the house. However, if the flagrante state is perceived only within the house and the entrance occurred by resident's consent, is it valid the arrest made that arises from the consented en-trance? Can the fundamental right of house inviolability be waived? How should a waiver of the house inviolability occur in order to be valid? Keywords: WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE. LEGALITY. CONSENT. WAIVER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. WAIVER OF THE HOUSE INVIOLABILITY. REQUIREMENTS. Introdução Este estudo de caso tenta responder se e como o consentimento pode ser utilizado para autorizar a realização de busca e apreensão em domicílio sem mandado judicial e, por conseguinte, validando a prisão em flagrante dela decorrente e se há razão na nova ratio decidendi aparentemente adotado pelo STF.

A waiver would not be a global answer to the pandemic but would be a step in the right direction. It would remove the legal barriers that prevent cross-border cooperation in generic manufacturing of Covid-19 medical products as well as cross-border manufacturing capacity building – both long-term considerations. In the short and medium term a waiver would facilitate generic export to members in need (with limited and no manufacturing capacity, eg African countries) and simplify and potentially speed up generic production (for those with manufacturing capacity such as India).

"For more than 20 years now, the attitude in some jurisdictions has been "if you're old enough to do the crime, you're old enough to do the time." After two decades of applying this increasingly punitive mindset to juvenile offenders, it is possible to see the actual consequences of transferring more and younger offenders to adult courts.


In Do the Crime, Do the Time: Juvenile Criminals and Adult Justice in the American Court System, the authors apply their decades of experience, both in the practical world and from unique research perspectives, to shed light on the influence of public opinion and the political forces that shape juvenile justice policy in the United States. The book provides a fresh look at the way the United States is choosing to deal with some of the serious or persistent juvenile offenders, utilizing real-life examples and cases to draw connections between transfer policies and individual outcomes."

"    Using Arkansas insurance law with an outlined suggested by Spencer Kimball's classic insurance law text, this article provides a basic primer in insurance contract law. It summarizes high points in several law review articles published on a range of basic insurance law topics. The annotation includes state-specific updates to the articles, with a national application but with a focus on Arkansas state law. The article is marked by running commentary and organization by the editor that places primary insurance law principles in context. The article is a compilation effort by a teacher of insurance law and her students, with a table of contents and focused guidance for additional reading."

Este trabalho objetiva questionar sobre o alcance e utilização de ferramentas antidiscriminatórias, mediante categorias e institutos jurídicos próprios, em uma perspectiva decolonial, para o eficaz combate à pandemia por Covid-19 de forma igualitária no contexto global. Isso induz ao questionamento se para um eficaz e amplo combate à pandemia é suficiente uma interpretação jurídica imbricada às regras comerciais ou se é necessário adotar uma visão de mundo decolonial e antidiscriminatória. Nessa toada, se uma perspectiva decolonial sobre à antidiscriminação se permitiria uma visão ampla sobre a construção de mundo patrocinada por uma lógica colonial e desumanizante. Isso porque a administração do combate à pandemia decorrente do vírus Sars-Cov-2 denota o avanço das linhas abissais entre o norte-global e o sul-global quando se aborda a distribuição desigual de vacinas para a população mundial. Será utilizada a técnica de pesquisa de revisão bibliográfica. A metodologia aqui utilizada é pautada em campo metodológico jurídico-científico, o qual permite a problematização das fontes do direito estudadas.

Irony is defined as, “the use of words to express something other than and especially the opposite of the literal meaning.” Though many other definitions of the word exist, in light of the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in AT&T v. Concepcion, this definition comes to mind. Read broadly, the decision strikes a blow to the ability of consumers to bring suits against companies, both inside and outside of arbitration. But that was not the intent behind the federal act which the Court relied upon to justify its decision.

In 1925, when Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), its intended purpose was to promote enforcement of arbitration clauses. Congress did not sweep away all state-created defenses to contract; however; quite the contrary, Congress inserted a savings clause that arbitration provisions could be stricken just as any other contract could, “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity.” It was upon this basis that the Ninth Circuit upheld a decision to strike down a clause in an agreement between AT&T and the Concepcions which required not only that the Concepcions submit all disputes to arbitration, but also forbade them from forming a class within that arbitration. On appeal to the Supreme Court, AT&T argued that the FAA preempted the unconscionably finding, despite the savings clause, as California law discriminated against arbitration clauses in violation of the FAA. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, agreed that the unconscionably finding under California law was preempted by the FAA. In overruling the Ninth Circuit, he repeated the theme of the need to promote arbitration. Throughout the majority opinion, he introduced, as a corollary, the desire to promote expedited resolution of disputes.

The majority opinion is itself open to multiple interpretations, however. Read narrowly, the opinion may do nothing more than restate the already established principle that states cannot strike down arbitration clauses simply by virtue of their existence. But the decision can also be read much more broadly. A broad reading of the opinion suggests that any attempt by a court or state legislature to limit the method and means of arbitration in a way inconsistent with what Congress envisioned is preempted by the FAA. Thus, according to the majority opinion, Congress’ desire to promote bilateral arbitrations preempted the California courts’ rulings that clauses limiting the ability to form class actions are unconscionable.

And therein lies the irony. 

If the opinion is read broadly, in striking down the defense of unconscionably to class actions waivers as inconsistent with the purposes of the FAA, the majority opinion, in effect, has denied a large swath of individuals the realistic opportunity to ever bring their claims, in arbitration or otherwise. In the aftermath of this decision, every corporation will be inserting class action waivers into their arbitration clauses, if they haven’t already, and may be emboldened to go much further. Thus, while the majority opinion cites, as the reason for its decision, to a broad policy of encouraging arbitration and the expeditious resolution of disputes, the effect will be quite the opposite. 

This essay explores the possible dual readings of AT&T v. Concepcion in light of the FAA and its interpretation, including Supreme Court precedents. This essay concludes that, though there is support for interpreting the Concepcion decision narrowly, it is more likely that a broader interpretation was intended, but the metes and bounds of this opinion have yet to be explored. Nonetheless, under this broad interpretation, the effect on consumers will be to discourage individuals from seeking redress for their claims. The decision may actually encourage businesses to breach contractual obligations with impunity when the individual sums owed are too small to justify, in the mind of a reasonable consumer, the time and effort to seek a remedy.

The word "right" is the most basic and practical concepts in the domain of law. The word Right is known as an easy and impossible concept. Although the apparent of this word seems simply; but has a countless complicated nature. The word has multiple dimensions and wide aspects, the "foreclosure" is one of its dimensions and the subject of this article.
There are several types of deprivation of rights. It may be done by one person or another or by the ruling political power. It may be thought of as absolute or relative, and it may also be regarded as a right, or as an effect of a right, or as a punishment.
This article is an attempt to define the concepts surrounding foreclosures and analyze similarities and differences in the legal literature of Iran, religious teachings and Western legal texts.

With a naturalization rate above 80%, Canada is a world leader in granting citizenship to immigrants and refugees. However, policy changes over the past decade — which we identify as falling within the “civic integration paradigm” — have led to a steady decline in both citizenship applications and attributions. This paper takes a closer look at the reasons for this decline. In particular, we examine who fails in meeting the mandatory citizenship knowledge and language requirements such as members of the family class and refugees. We also show that Canada’s naturalization rules have become highly econocentric.

With a naturalization rate above 80%, Canada is a world leader in granting citizenship to immigrants and refugees. However, policy changes over the past decade — which we identify as falling within the “civic integration paradigm” — have led to a steady decline in both citizenship applications and attributions. This paper takes a closer look at the reasons for this decline. In particular, we examine who fails in meeting the mandatory citizenship knowledge and language requirements such as members of the family class and refugees. We also show that Canada’s naturalization rules have become highly econocentric.