Tu Weiming

“体知”是杜维明提出的一个重要概念，用来说明儒家传统所强调的 一种特殊的知识类型。这种知识类型在宋明儒学中被称作“德性之知”，而与“闻 见之知”相区别。这种知识有两个主要特征:一方面，要获得这样的知识，不能只 靠理智的认知活动，还需要有内心的体验活动;另一方面，这样的知识不只让其拥 有者知道孰是孰非，而且还会让他好是恶非、行是除非。这种知识类型既与西方传 统认识论强调的命题性知识(knowing-that)不同，也与 20 世纪中叶为赖尔所强调 的能力之知(knowing-how)不同。就其能够驱使其拥有者做出与这种知识相应的 行动而言，它是一种动力之知(knowing-to);就这种知识不只是信念(belief)而且 也是欲望(desire)而言，它是一种信欲(besire)。在这个意义上，作为动力之知的“体知”概念的提出是对当代认识论特别是道德认识论的一个重要贡献。

Tu Weiming’s concept of humanism illuminates the essential difference between the context and philosophy of traditional Confucianism and the importance of New Confucianism improvement.
Tu Weiming’s concept of humanism was arguably derived from flawed Enlightenment Humanism in its anthropocentric lack of social solidarity. Humanistic values as understood and integrated in Western philosophy exist in a multicultural society. They describe humanistic ideals of Confucian philosophy as core principles.
Tu Weiming’s concept of humanism was a significant improvement on New Confucianism. Its different context improved such matters as a legacy of feudalistic views and Chinese familial adherence. It is open to influence by Western philosophy in such aspects as individualism, scientific rationality, and Christian transcendence.  The Confucian Humanism ideal is improved, to become consistent with multicultural society. As a result, Confucianism becomes a use of intellectual knowledge to expand human views of the self, society, and the surrounding world.

This paper begins by rehearsing a debate, which took place in the 1980s in the journal Philosophy East and West on whether Mencius was a true successor to Confucius, which has recently prompted a new debate on the topic of tradition and true succession in social epistemology. Rejecting the understanding of tradition in this latter debate as often aloof from the world and as of limited use for the investigation of concrete cases, I turn to the Confucian tradition and to Tu Weiming as one of its current representatives. My interest lies in the ways Tu represents and reconstructs the Confucian tradition and I intend to offer analyses based on two sets of selected English writings asking questions such as: Which textual references does Tu explicitly or only implicitly foreground as crucial to his understanding of the tradition that he is taken to represent? What vocabulary does he use to articulate the contents of the tradition? The paper ends with some thoughts on the question of true succession in Confucianism, stressing the importance of domains of representation and the addressed audiences, in an attempt to enrich the mentioned debates in current social epistemology.

Virtue theories can plausibly be argued to have important advantages over normative ethical theories which prescribe a strict impartialism in moral judgment, or which neglect people’s special roles and relationships. However, there are clear examples of both virtuous and vicious partiality in people’s moral judgments, and virtue theorists may struggle to adequately distinguish them, much as proponents of other normative ethical theories do. This paper first adapts the “expanding moral circle” concept and some literary examples to illustrate the difficulty of adequately distinguishing virtuous from vicious partiality.  Later sections aim to show how an adequate philosophical ethics will be able to both a) attribute virtue (and hence praiseworthiness) to agents whose actions may directly serve only their special interests, roles, or special relationships; and b) attribute vice (and hence censure) where an agent’s attitudes and/or actions mirror known personal biases (for instance, an egoistic attitude) or social biases (for instance, and ethnocentric attitude). This dual ability leaves space for much virtuous partiality, while also reflecting a “risk-aware” approach, recognizing the deleterious consequences of our human penchant for constructing and imbuing moral significance to oftentimes factitious us/them dichotomies.

Autores ocidentais chamam atenção para uma grande diversidade de formas de ativismo, expressões religiosas, práticas pedagógicas alternativas e, mesmo a ação do Estado em defesa de concepções tradicionais associadas ao confucianismo, principalmente após a morte de Mao Zedong em 1976. Este trabalho tenta articular o atual fenômeno conhecido como ‘confuncian revival’, com alguns marcos e processos históricos anteriores, demonstrando as variações de defesa e crítica do confucianismo bem como da aceitação ou não da imposição de ideias e estruturas sociais estrangeiras pelos chineses.

Western scholars call attention to a wide variety of activisms, religious expressions, alternative pedagogical practices, and even state actions in defense of traditional conceptions associated with confucianism, especially after Mao Zedong's death in 1976. This paper attempts to articulate the current phenomenon known as 'confucian revival', with some milestones and previous historical processes, demonstrating the variations of defense and criticism of confucianism, as well the acceptance or non-acceptance of the imposition of foreign social ideas and structures by the Chinese.

[Abstract] Tu develops his idea of tizhi primarily or at least initially to characterize the Neo-Confucian idea of knowledge of/as virtue in contrast to knowledge from hearing and seeing. Instead of depending upon our sense organs' perceptions of external things and events, it relies upon the comprehension of our xin; instead of purely intellectual understanding of the mind aspect of xin, it is more due to the affective experiences of the heart aspect of xin; and instead of merely a piece of knowledge added to its possessor, it is existentially transformative of its possessor. Knowledge of such a nature cannot be accounted for by our traditional conception of knowledge as justified true belief, nor by Ryle's knowing-how. It is a third type of knowledge, knowing-to. In this sense, it is a significant contribution that Tu's Confucian idea can make to contemporary epistemology.

“Hewei jingjie? Shilun xiandai zhongguo sixiangjie Zhong dui rujia jingshenxing de dingyi” 何謂境界？試論現代中國思想界中對儒家精神性的定義 (What is Jingjie? Defining Confucian Spirituality in the Modern Chinese Intellectual Context). Trans. Chen Zhipin. Ruxue disan qi de renwen jingshen: Tu Weiming xiansheng bashi shouqing wenji 儒學第三期的人文精神：杜維明先生八十壽慶文集. Ed. Chen Lai 陳來. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2019. 103-125. Originally published in Monumenta Serica 50 (2002): 441-462.

This article examines the views of ninety-eight study participants on community development and peacebuilding supported by the European Union (EU) Peace II Fund and the International Fund for Ireland (IFI). We elaborate the perceptions of community group leaders, funding agency civil servants and development officers regarding the role of both funds in Northern Ireland. Their experiences of the EU Peace II Fund and the IFI are discussed in the wider context of peacebuilding and reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties. Furthermore, this article explores the importance of community development and cross-community contact through joint economic and social development projects.

NEW YORK/TOKYO – Eric Draitser sits down with Dr. Thorsten Pattberg to discuss academia, language and imperialism. Dr. Pattberg examines the ways in which academic imperialism is used to shape dominant discourse. Also, Dr. Pattberg explains the concepts of language imperialism and linguistic imperialism and the distinction between the two. Additionally, the conversation touches on the differences between Western and Chinese perspectives on a wide range of issues.

Dr. Thorsten Pattberg is a renowned author and lecturer at Peking University. His books include The East-West Dichotomy, Shengren, and Inside Peking University. He has written extensively on linguistics and the relationship between language and imperialism. Visit his website at www.east-west-dichotomy.com

FEW people realize the great appeal of Chinese thought in today's Europe. Germany, for example, is de facto undergoing a transformation away from sheer philosophical idealism and violent Christian doctrine towards a lofty Confucian pragmatism.