Syrian Kurds

Commentators, including myself, forecast a deepening crisis in Turkey and the wider Kurdish region-unless 'peace' talks resume and the sustained assault on the pro-Kurdish HDP's members and supporters cease. Conversely, the Turkish government appears to have little will to backtrack to the sunnier climes of diplomacy and instead emphasises intensified military action. Following the Ankara bombing attack on 17 February, Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, claimed that a member of the PKK's sister organisation, the PYD (Democratic Union Party) had been responsible for the fatal explosion. 1 Salih Muslim, the party's leader rejected the accusation and the 'evidence' of a Syrian ID card found at the scene. Two days later, the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) a PKK splinter group, is said to have claimed responsibility. Reuters reported: " The Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK) said the bombing was in response to the policies of President Tayyip Erdoğan and said it would continue its attacks. It said the bomber was a 26-year old Turkish national born in the eastern city of Van. 2 The attack that left twenty-eight people dead was carried out just two days after the 17 th anniversary of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's capture and can be understood to be part of the message to the Turkish state from the militants responsible. In their own words their website announces in broken English, " The attempts and eternal self-sacrificing efforts to solve the Kurdish problem with democratic and peaceful methods which had been unilaterally carried on for seven years by our leader have had no response… Because we are a people, which have a risk of destruction and we are in a war. TAK's call for youths: You can do all kind of big or small actions of burning and destruction. You must do Turkey worse than France. We are giving initiative to you. You are free. We call brave and heroic Kurdish youths for the more. Struggle together. Our number had been increased three times than last. Our people have hugged us. Since last year, a lot of person had joined our organization from HPG and different segment… 3 Clashes occurred between Turkish security services and ordinary Kurdish demonstrators in numerous locations as happens annually in commemoration of Öcalan's capture and continued imprisonment. 15,000 Kurds demonstrated in Strasbourg calling for him to be freed. Meanwhile, recruitment to the PKK and PYD, in Syria, is enjoying new levels of Kurdish support and by their own account, also to TAK. The youth response can be directly linked to the upsurge in Turkish military action against the PKK since Turkey's bombing campaign of PKK bases in both Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan since August 2015. Ömer Önen, head of the HDP's Diyarbakir branch, asserted " We refuse to let [Erdoğan] drag us into a war for his own politics…There's collective punishment and psychological warfare against Kurds, and the people are scared. " 4 1 http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/510-terror-likely-to-strengthen-turkish-militarism.html 2

This chapter focuses on the Iraqi Kurdish response to the rapid and devastating advance of ISIS. Of course, the Iraqi Kurdish response to the ISIS advance has been a multifaceted, complex, and evolving one that includes military strategy, pragmatic politics, and aspirations of independence. Leaving aside the fact that the ISIS advance has granted the Iraqi Kurds unprecedented access to Iraq’s rich oil reserves and the fact that the initial Kurdish reaction was to ramp up their rhetoric toward complete secession from Iraq, this chapter focuses on two further dimensions of the Iraqi Kurdish response. Firstly, it documents the Iraqi Kurdish seizure of the so-called “disputed territories,” especially
Kirkuk, and their stated intent to hold a referendum on the future of these
regions (effectively to force a resolution to Article 140 of the constitution). Secondly, the chapter documents the Iraqi Kurdish use of the ISIS advance as leverage to enhance Kurdish relations dramatically with the US and Europe via direct military support (including airstrikes and weapons supply) and to become the key launchpad
in the fight against ISIS planned for 2015. The chapter concludes by briefly assessing the efficacy and wisdom of the Kurdish strategy of leveraging the ISIS onslaught to advance their own interests.

تسعى الأطراف الدولية المتدخلة في الأزمة السورية إلى إطالة أمد الصراع التركي-الكردي في سوريا لاستنزاف القدرات العسكرية التركية، وتحجيم النفوذ التركي في سوريا، بهدف استبعاد أنقرة من معادلات تقاسم مناطق النفوذ بعد نهاية الصراع. وفي المقابل، تسعى تركيا لإيجاد موطئ قدم لقواتها في سوريا، وانتزاع الهيمنة على المناطق الحدودية الفاصلة بين تركيا وسوريا من وحدات حماية الشعب الكردية، بالإضافة إلى تأسيس مسارات مستديمة للإمداد العسكري لدعم الفصائل السورية الموالية لها.
وفي هذا الإطار، يتناول هذا التحليل تقييم أبعاد التدخل التركي الذي دخل في أسبوعه الرابع، ويتناول الأهداف التركية من وراء هذه العملية، وأبرز تداعياتها السياسية، والعوامل المؤثرة على مستقبلها.

The case of Syrian Kurds has generally been very complicated both for Turkish foreign policy and for the other Kurdish
people beyond the borders. The main purpose of this article is to discuss the policy of Turkey on Rojava and the results
of these policies. Furthermore, by focusing on Syrian Kurds –who constitute one of the key issues on the Turkish foreign
policy in the sense of ethnic and sectarian contradictions both in Syria and in the region right after the Arab Spring–, the
article aims to interpret the reflections of these developments at both national and international levels. Additionally, the
article emphasises ambiguities of Turkey’s policies in its perceptions of the Kurdish political movements within its own
borders, while supporting discourses of freedom, democracy and the will of people which have become ubiquitous in the
region.

يتناول هذا الكتاب بالدراسة أكراد سورية، تاريخهم، مناطق توزعهم، وخطابهم السياسي، موضوع الكتاب عصري جداً، ليس من ناحية ندرة الدراسات والمصادر التي تتناول المسألة الكردية المستجدة في سورية فحسب، بل لمحاولة المؤلف إجراء مقاربة تحليلية ونقدية لهذا الخطاب، والمفاهيم والمصطلحات المتفرعّة منه، الحديثة النشأة، ضمن الجغرافية السياسية السورية.
يحاول المؤلف تقديم صورة واضحة عن المغالطات التي يحملها الخطاب القومي الكردي في سورية، وانعكاسات ذلك على المشروع الوطني الجامع في سورية، وكذلك يسلط الضوء على التحديات والمخاطر التي تواجه أكراد سورية في محاولاتهم لاستنساخ ذات الخطاب والمفاهيم والمصطلحات لأكراد الجوار، في ظل خصوصية ظروفهم التاريخية وواقعم الديموغرافي والسياسية.

Syria's sectarian fragmentation was not created when the war began in 2011; it had its genesis in an inherited Ottoman millet system whose traits were accentuated by the "divide to reign" policies of Hafiz al-Assad. The war has compelled Syrians to cling to their sectarian identities more tightly, whether out of socioeconomic self-interest or simply to survive. Examining these identities is therefore crucial to answering the most fundamental questions about the ongoing upheaval. In many ways, the Syrian conflict has been taken out of the hands of Syrians themselves, becoming a proxy war between regional and international forces that often exploit the country's divided society for their own benefit.

This study analyzes the political reasons that allowed the Islamic State to expand successfully in Syria and Iraq, by enabling to ‘franchise’ worldwide, and the role of the regional governments in this issue. The essay provides a different explanation from the classic approach of the “clash of civilizations” theorized by Samuel P. Huntington, ascribing responsibility for the growth and expansion of the Islamic State to the complex framework of geopolitical alliances within the Muslim civilization and the Arab world. The paper highlights the attempt by Turkey to establish itself as a regional power and guidance of the Islamic world, by resurrecting the Caliphate, and, based on this, explains the contrast with the Islamic State, which goal is the foundation of a globalized Caliphate. The plans of the Turkish President Erdoğan for a Great Turkey, allied with Egypt, have foundered with the coup that ousted the Muslim Brotherhood from power. The study relates the connection of Ankara with the Kurds, regarding the management of the crisis in Syria and Iraq, and the Turkish liaison with regional powers (Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel) and other powers (Russia, Cina and USA).

Η Μεταπτυχιακή Διπλωματική Εργασία που ακολουθεί, μελετά τον ρόλο του Κουρδικού Εθνικού Κινήματος ως παράγοντα ανακατανομής ισχύος. Το σύμπλοκο που αφορά η έρευνα, είναι αυτό της Συρίας, Τουρκίας, Ιράκ και Ιράν. Κύρια ερευνητική μέθοδος, είναι η Συστημική Γεωπολιτική Ανάλυση, ωστόσο στα πλαίσια της διεπιστημονικότητας χρησιμοποιούνται και άλλες μέθοδοι όπως τα Συστήματα Γεωγραφικών Πληροφοριών, η Χαρτογραφία, η Γλωσσολογία Σωμάτων Κειμένων αλλά και η Θεωρία Διεθνών Σχέσεων.

Το σκεπτικό πίσω από αυτή τη μελέτη αφορά δύο παράγοντες. Αφορά αφενός την καταγραφή σύγχρονων δεδομένων που άπτονται του ζητήματος αλλά και την επικαιροποίηση ήδη υπαρχόντων στοιχείων. Αφετέρου, η χρήση του κύριου μεθοδολογικού εργαλείου (ΣΓΑ) στο προαναφερθέν σύμπλοκο έχοντας ως Γεωπολιτικό Παράγοντα τον Κουρδικό Εθνικισμό αποτέλεσε μια εξόχως ενδιαφέρουσα επιλογή για έρευνα.

Η ιστορική ανάλυση του Κουρδικού Εθνικού Κινήματος ακολουθείται από την καταγραφή δεδομένων της σύγχρονης εποχής. Έπειτα, ακολουθεί η ορθή χρήση της Συστημικής Γεωπολιτικής Ανάλυσης, μέσω της οποίας εξετάζονται οι Πυλώνες της Άμυνας/Ασφάλειας και της Πολιτικής. Έτσι, εξάγονται συμπεράσματα και απαντώνται ερωτήματα που θέτει η μελέτη, όπως για παράδειγμα το μέγεθος της ισχύος των Κούρδων στο εξεταζόμενο σύμπλοκο και το υπερσύστημα, οι προοπτικές κουρδικής κρατογένεσης αλλά και οι συσχετισμοί δυνάμεων στη Ροτζάβα και το Ιρακινό Κουρδιστάν.

The following paper aims to analyze the historical background of the current happenings such as the Kurdish endeavors towards independence and the strengthening of feminist thought, as well as cultural and political circumstances which put into motion a series of events that ultimately lead to a radical change in the political and social climate of the present day Syria. In the midst of a civil war, the Kurdish people seized the opportunity to fight for their own sovereignty in northern Syria, or as it is known by the Kurds – Rojava. Rooted in the strongly progressive idea of Democratic Confederalism designed by a Kurdish nationalist leader and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) founder Abdullah Öcalan, the Rojava Revolution is often deemed one of the greatest social experiments of our time. Even though the implementation of Democratic Confederalism may be in itself enough to highlight the importance of this revolution in the context of today's Middle East, what is of even greater significance is the blossoming of women's rights in Rojava. Another one of Öcalan's pivotal ideas, known as Jineology (the science of women) puts none other than women at the very center of the revolution. By observing the work of the all-female Women's Protection Units (YPJ) it is clearly evident that the aforementioned ideology manifests itself in practice, not only in the battlefield, but in everyday life as well. In this paper I will try to provide an overview of the historical circumstances that allowed for a spark that started the fire of the Women's Revolution within one of the most patriarchal societies and among one of the most repressed minorities in the world today and further examine the significance of the current situation in Rojava.

Diaries of American missionaries in Hakkari 1830-1870.
The aim of this study  American missionary sources. In XIX. century is how to Hakkari and events around the place given to illustrate and examine the eyes. Therefore, much will be touched little explanation other than information transmitted. If the Nestorian settlement names are known to the avoidance of any misunderstanding is given only in English version or with its current name.Creating a work of missionaries and mission reports as well as their own summer
biographical works are used or prepared. The issue should have been mentioned from time to time in and around Mosul, the real issue is not addressed in detail in our missionary activities in these areas because of the Hakkari region. In order to disrupt the unity issue has been reached in some parts of the state to ignore chronological order

This study seeks to shed light on the preliminary results and potential fruits that the era of so-called Arab Spring bears concerning the Kurds as an increasingly visible actor and an emerging nation in the region. Since the turn of the last decade, several countries in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region have witnessed to large-scale social and political upheavals that have since then been popularly referred to as “the Arab Spring,” “Arab Awakening,” “uprisings” or “revolutions”, “grassroots movements,” and “regime changes.” Usually one considers these changes either as optimistically progressive as springs based on revolutions or pessimistically dangerous for the future of the people in the MENA. It cannot be underestimated that these protest movements have had devastating effects for the shaping of the region and its geopolitical neighborhood (i.e., Europe). Hence, the Arab Spring cannot be seen as an exclusively Arab-related phenomenon due to several reasons. In this context, this study evaluates the case of the so-called Kurdish Spring as part of a chain of seemingly local grassroot struggles which have been presenting themselves across the globe through a nationalist yet modern, pluralist, left-wing discourse for the first time since the homeland of Kurds was divided among four hegemonic regional nation-states (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria) without the will of the Kurdish people themselves.

Failure to move past security and stability-based arguments will greatly diminish the long-term prospects for the survival of the Rojava project. -

See more at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/governing-rojava-layers-legitimacy-syria#sthash.fSq6XhrM.dpuf

In this paper I focus on one of the non-state actors in Syrian conflict, the Kurdish party PYD, because of its significance as the only actor offering a real (political) alternative to the current situation, between the oppressive regime and the bigoted and violent Islamic State, by implementing democratic confederalism in the region of Northern Syria – Rojava - adopting gender equality and ecological principles and respecting the rights of all ethnicities and religious groups (Paasche 2015). In addition, Kurds in Syria are considered as a serious (if not the only one) secularizing agent in the Middle East, a region with deeply ingrained patriarchal structures (Knapp, Flach and Ayboga, 2017: 97).
In particular, I seek to examine if and how during the Syrian conflict there have been arose or (and) created conditions fostering the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish state or a self-determined and self-governed region; the latter has been actually implemented by the Kurdish political party Democratic Union Party  (YPD) under the name “Democratic Federation of Northern Syria”  (DFNS) – however most commonly as “Rojava”- in November 2013 and comprises the three Kurdish enclaves (cantons), currently established as Regions of the DFNS: Afrin, Euphrates Region (Kobani) and Jazira.

During the onslaught of the Islamic caliphate on Kobanî, Syria, media outlets across the globe broadcast pictures of brave and often unveiled Kurdish women fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), a quintessentially male force of destruction. The images of women fighting Islamist male aggressors aroused outrage, admiration, and pity among observers. But had all Kurdish fighters been male or had women fought for ISIS, viewers might have reacted differently. To examine some of the most widely disseminated gendered pictures and videos of the Syrian uprising in the media, this article draws on Mohja Kahf’s three categories, which typify how Muslim women, Arab women, or both are perceived by the Anglophone reading and viewing public: the first is victims; the second, escapees; and the third, pawns of patriarchy and male power. While this typology helps in examining gendered images of the Syrian uprising, it also obscures the socioeconomic realities on the ground.

The Kurdish Federation in Syria Brings Hopes & Concerns, Τhe Social Dimension of Statelessness in a World of Nation-States, The Role of HDP in the Peace Process, The Kurdish Community in the U.S.A., The Evolution of PKK and the Kurdish Left in Turkey (1970s-1980s), Israeli-Kurdish Relations: A not so Secret and Intimate Affair

С начала гражданской войны на территории Сирийской Арабской Республики (САР) Соединенные Штаты Америки и Турецкая Республика выступили активными сторонниками смены правительства и отставки президента Б. Асада. Поиски путей политического урегулирования «сирийской проблемы» открыли широкие возможности для турецко-американского взаимодействия. В статье рассматриваются наиболее важные направления двустороннего взаимодействия и предпринимается попытка объяснить усиление американо-турецких противоречий на фоне событий последних лет в Сирии. Двухчастная структура статьи отражает логику развития взаимоотношений Турецкой Республики и Соединенных Штатов Америки в условиях стремительного изменения расстановки сил в Сирии и регионе, и в этом развитии четко прослеживаются два этапа. Имевшее место на ранних этапах сирийского конфликта в 2011—2013 гг. американо-турецкое сотрудничество, включавшее в том числе и совместную работу по укреплению боевого потенциала сирийской оппозиции, к 2014 г. сменилось соперничеством этих государств за влияние на территории Сирийской Арабской Республики. Основной причиной углубления разногласий между союзниками выступил «курдский вопрос», который во многом стал определять линию поведения Анкары и Вашингтона в отношении участников конфликта в Сирии. Развертывание борьбы с терроризмом в САР выявило глубокие различия в подходах турецкого и американского правительств по отношению к ключевым участникам сирийского конфликта. Автор приходит к выводу, что сегодня США и Турция действуют на сирийском направлении, исходя из безусловной приоритетности собственных национальных интересов, а не связывающих их формальных союзнических обязательств. При этом вопрос отстранения от власти в Сирии Б. Асада и для Вашингтона, и для Анкары отошел на второй план, уступив место борьбе с вызовами национальной безопасности в лице экстремистских и террористических организаций типа «Исламского государства» (организация запрещена в РФ).

در نتیجه تغییر و تحولات سیاسی و اجتماعی گسترده در خاورمیانه در یک دهه اخیر، به ویژه بعد از شعله‌ور شدن قیام‌های موسوم به بهار عربی، زمینه‌های لازم برای ایفای نقش اقلیت‌های قومی و مذهبی در بسیاری از کشورهای که تحت تاثیر این تحولات بودند فراهم شد. ضعف جوامع مدنی در کشورهای خاورمیانه، عدم همگرایی آراء و مطالبات کنشگران مختلف در این کشورها و ماشین سرکوب قدرتمند دولت‌های اقتدارگرا سبب شد بسیاری از این قیام‌ها و حرکت‌های گسترده اعتراضی راه بجای نبرد. امروز بعد از گذشت بیش از هشت سال از شروع قیام مردم در سوریه، نه تنها مطالبه آزادی و دموکراسی ره به جای نبرده، بلکه حاکمیت اقتدارگرایی رژیم بعث در آستانه اعلام پیروزی بر مخالفان خود است. کُردهای سوریه به همراه همپیمانان خود که بخش بزرگی از شمال و شمال شرق سوریه را تحت عنوان خودمدریتی مناطق شمال و شرق سوریه در اختیار دارند، در تلاش هستند تا یک سیستم حاکمیتی غیرمتمرکز مورد توافق تمام طرفین ایجاد کنند؛ تلاشی که تا کنون بی‌نتیجه بوده است. در این مقاله با روش تحلیل – توصیفی و با استناد به داده‌ها و از طریق جستجو در ادبیات و مباحث نظری به بررسی وضعیت کُردها در سوریه، سیر تکاملی جُنبش کُردی در این کشور و تحولات آن در قالب خودمدیریتی دموکراتیک پرداخته شده است.

Abstract: While the Kurds of Syria, Turkey, and Iraq have received significant attention from analysts following a perceived “Kurdish Awakening” as well as their key combat roles in Iraq and Syria, there has been less focus on Iran’s Kurds. Long a source of concern to the Iranian regime, Iranian Kurdish militants officially announced the renewal of their insurgent campaign against Tehran in 2016. Inspired by the increasing assertiveness of Kurds in neighboring countries and bristling under continued repression, these groups have shown some signs of increased cohesion and unity, making them potentially significant players on the regional chessboard.

The Southeastern Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, GAP) is the largest regional development project in Turkey, involving the construction of twenty-two dams and nineteen hydroelectric power plants along the Tigris and Euphrates river basins. Particularly notable is the Ilisu Dam, the last major dam built under GAP. Although the Turkish state has presented the dam as a potent source of renewable energy and job growth, it has also faced criticism for its devastating impact on the local Kurdish population. Using the Ilisu Dam as a case study, this paper examines the relationship between Turkey's water development projects and the long-standing Turkish-Kurdish conflict. I used three main research methods: (1) conducting a qualitative literature review of the Southeastern Anatolia Project, (2) analyzing promotional government campaigns of the Ilisu Dam, and (3) examining data and information presented by international nongovernmental organizations. This paper concludes that while the Ilisu Dam has reduced Turkey's reliance on energy imports and stimulated economic growth, it also reflects the states' historical attempts to assimilate ethnic Kurds by inundating historical sites and forcing resettlement into cities. Additionally, this paper suggests that these assimilationist and repressive practices have not diminished Kurdish political aspirations. Instead, Kurdish communities have perceived the project as a cultural cleansing of their history, which has fuelled international opposition and cast critical light on Turkey's developmental projects.

Artykuł opisuje przygotowania, działania i konsekwencje rosyjskiej interwencji w Syrii od początku interwencji do blisko końca marca. Autor przedstawia najważniejsze sukcesy zarówno militarne i dyplomatyczne. W podanym linku tylko pierwsza strona tekstu. Artykuł powstał przy współpracy z Michałem Likowskim, redaktorem naczelnym miesięcznika RAPORT-wto. http://www.altair.com.pl/magazines/eissue-sample?issue_id=803&ref=issue

Suriyeli Kürtler, hem Türk dış politikası hem de sınır ötesindeki diğer Kürtler için çoğu zaman karmaşık bir mesele
olagelmiştir. Bu makalenin ana amacı, Türkiye’nin Rojava’ya yönelik politikalarını, bu politikaların sonuçlarını
tartışmak ve Arap Devrimleri sonrası gerek Suriye’de gerek bölgede etnik ve mezhepsel mücadeleler bağlamında Türk
dış politikasına son yıllarda damgasını vuran en önemli meselelerden biri olan Suriye Kürtlerini mercek altına alarak
ulusal ve uluslararası ilişkilerdeki yansımalarını yorumlamaktır. Bunun yanı sıra, Türkiye’nin bölgede yaygınlaşan
özgürlük, demokrasi ve halk iradesi gibi söylemlere destek verirken kendi sınırları içerisinde ve ötesinde Kürt siyasi
hareketine yaklaşımını da ele almaktadır.

The convoluted relationship between the state and citizens in conflict-ridden Syria often has been reduced to a binary of dissent and consent. Challenging these simplistic categorizations, this article analyzes how state mechanisms resonate in the everyday lives of Syrians since the beginning of the crisis. Drawing on ethnographic insights from Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Syrian Kurds in northeastern Syria, this article shows how state, society and political opposition function as relational processes. Then, it identifies the limitations of contemporary strategies of everyday political contestation through the theory of Syrian intellectual ‘Omar ‘Aziz’s ‘time of the revolution.’

Piştî şerê naxweyî yê Suriyeyê dest pê kir, Rojavayê Kurdistanê, nêzî 65 sal şûnde ji bandora rêveberiya hikumeta Suriyeyê xwe rizgar kir. Ev şer her çi qas zirar û wêrankirineke mezin bi xwe re anîbe jî, bi saya rêxistinbûna gelê Kurd a ku bi salan e dewam dike, Kurdan karîn xwe biparêzin û li wir rêverberiyeke xweser ava bikin. Di Berfanbara 2014’ê de li herêmên Efrîn, Kobanî û Cizîreyê Kurdan, Ereban û Suryanan sê kantonên xweser îlan kirin. Hevpeymana Civakî ya Rojavayê Kurdistanê di 6’ê Berfanbara 2014’ê de li bajarê Amûdê hat îlankirin û li gorî vê hevpeymanê, kurdî, suryanî1 û erebî bûn zimanên fermî yên Rojavayê Kurdistanê. Beriya vê hevpeymanê, demeke dirêj bû Kurdan jixwe dest bi hînkirina zimanê kurdî kiribûn lê piştî vê peymanê êdî bi awayekî fermî her sê ziman hem di perwerdehiyê hem jî di rêveberiyê de wê bihata bikaranîn. Ev rapor, encamên hevdîtinên bi rayedar û endamên saziyên fermî, sazî û akademiyên zimanê kurdî derketiye. Hevdîtinên di raporê de di navbera 20-30’ê Tebaxa 2014’ê hatin lidarxistin. Rapor bi taybetî li ser rewşa xebat û perwerdehiya bi kurdî û rêveberiya sêzimanî disekine.

Η επανεκλογή του Ταγίπ Ερντογάν στην Τουρκική Προεδρία τον τον Ιούνιο του 2018 τον κατέστησε τον απόλυτο κυρίαρχο στο τουρκικό πολιτικό σύστημα, όπως άλλωστε ήταν και η πολιτική στοχευση του.
Κατακτώντας πλέον τις ενισχυμένες εξουσίες που υιοθετήθηκαν από το λαϊκό δημοψήφισμα του Απριλίου 2017, είναι έτοιμος – όπως  πολλάκις ανέφερε  – να συνεχίσει όχι μόνο με την εσωτερική μεταμόρφωση της Τουρκίας αλλά και με τον εξωτερικό προσανατολισμό του τουρκικού κράτους. Όπως έχουν επισημάνει πολλοί αναλυτές[1] το νέο προεδρικό σύστημα θέτει σε προεξέχουσα ηγεμονική θέση και ρόλο το πόστο του προέδρου της Τουρκικής  Δημοκρατίας.
Στην ουσία, το νέο πολιτικό σύστημα παραβιάζει μια παλιά αρχή της πολιτικής, τον διαχωρισμό των εξουσιών[2] που κωδικοποίησε ο Γάλλος φιλόσοφος Montesquieu κατά τη διάρκεια του Διαφωτισμού,[3] η οποία θεωρείται ως ο κύριος πυλώνας των σύγχρονων φιλελεύθερων δημοκρατικών πολιτικών συστημάτων. Δεν είναι μυστικό ότι ο Ερντογάν τάσσεται ενάντια στον διαχωρισμό των εξουσιών.  Ο ίδιος περιέγραψε τον διαχωρισμό των εξουσιών ως ” το κύριο εμπόδιο στη διακυβέρνηση του κράτους που εμποδίζει την εισαγωγή νέων υπηρεσιών προς όφελος του λαού.”[4]
Πιο συγκεκριμένα, ο Τούρκος πρόεδρος είναι πλέον σε θέση να να παρεμβαίνει σε όλο το φάσμα των κρατικών εξουσιών, από  τα δικαστήρια μέχρι τη νομοθετική λειτουργία, ενώ είναι σε θέση να εκδίδει διατάγματα και να παρακάμψει το κοινοβούλιο, ειδικά σε  θέματα εξωτερικής πολιτικής. Με άλλα λόγια, από το νέο πολιτικό σύστημα  απουσιάζουν τα απαιτούμενα “checks and balances”οδηγώντας σε υπερβολική συγκέντρωση εξουσιών για τη θέση του Προέδρου.
Σε αυτό το άρθρο θα ασχοληθούμε κυρίως με την  εξωτερική πολιτική της Τουρκίας, καθώς όπως θα δούμε πιο κάτω δυνητικά θα επηρεάσει πολλά κράτη της Εγγύς Ανατολής αλλά και την Ελλάδα και την Κύπρο στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο. Ενα και πλέον χρόνο μετά την εκλογή του Ταγίπ Ερντογάν έχουν δοθεί τα πρώτα «δείγματα γραφής» τα οποία μας βοηθούν να αποκρυσταλλώσουμε καλύτερη εικόνα για την τουρκική εξωτερική πολιτική.
Η ανάλυση εμπίπτει στην ρεαλιστική σχολή σκέψης συνδυάζοντας δύο σημαντικά ρεύματα των Διεθνών Σχέσεων  του νεορεαλισμού[5] και του νεοκλασικού ρεαλισμού.[6]
Όπως κατέδειξε η προϊούσα σύγκρουση Τουρκίας- ΗΠΑ με αφορμή το θέμα της κράτησης και ζητούμενης από τις ΗΠΑ απελευθέρωσης του Αμερικανού πάστορα Άντριου Μπράνσον[7] οι τουρκικές κυβερνητικές δράσεις συναντούν προσκόμματα  από τις δράσεις-αντιδράσεις τις υπερδύναμης, τα οποία  θα πρέπει να προσπελάσει η Τουρκία. Η Άγκυρα αναγκάστηκε να ενδώσει στην οικονομική πίεση των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών και να απελευθερώσει τον πάστορα Μπράνσον τον Οκτώβριο του 2018. Η κρίση στις σχέσεις μεταξύ των δύο συμμάχων έχει ενταθεί λόγω της απόφασης της Άγκυρας να προχωρήσει με την αγορά των αντιπυραυλικών συστημάτων S-400 από την Ρωσία. Ωστόσο, παρά τις τριβές στις σχέσεις ΗΠΑ-Τουρκίας οι δυο Νατοϊκοί σύμμαχοι δεν έχουν διαρρήξει τις σχέσεις τους.

Almost a year after the outbreak of the Syrian uprising in March, the Syrian opposition is still very much fragmented and lacking an inclusive vision which will satisfy various minority groups. One major part of this equation has been the Kurds which make up the largest ethnic minority in Syria, constituting somewhere between 10% and 15% of the population, or about 2 million people.
The Kurds have been divided in their response to the uprising and their approach to the opposition with representation on both the Syrian National Council (SNC), and the National Coordination Body (NCB), as well as a third body, the Syrian Kurdish National Council (KNC). The factor of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) offshoots in Syria, which once were supported by the Assad regime, complicates the Kurdish issue further, as does Turkey’s role.
In this report drawing on original interviews with Syrian Kurds, Omar Hossino and Ilhan Tanir provide details of what this significant group has contributed to the uprising so far and examine how they might influence the future of the fight against Bashar al-Assad.

Alle westerse bemoeienis ten spijt: na 9 jaar van gruwelijke oorlog en meer dan 500.000 doden, is Bashar-al Assad nog steeds de machtigste man van Syrië. De totale overwinning van zijn leger is volgens Assad nu binnen handbereik. Voormalig Syrië-gezant Koos van Dam voorspelde jaren geleden al dat dit de uitkomst zou worden. Volgens Van Dam heeft de bemoeizucht van het Westen de situatie bovendien nog véél erger gemaakt. Bernard Hammelburg bespreekt het met hem. https://www.bnr.nl/podcast/de-wereld/10403134/syrie-een-ramp-die-waste -voorzien