Rule of Law in International Law

The accountability mechanism for the human rights abuses and environmental damage of transnational corporations is one of the core issues of global governance. The rights and interests of transnational corporations in investment and trade are inconsistent with their obligations and responsibilities under international law. Transnational corporations often take advantage of their complex structure and independent legal personality as well as the weak governance in developing countries to evade legal responsibilities, making it difficult for victims to obtain effective judicial or extrajudicial remedies. This paper analyzes and criticizes the shortcomings of state-centric responsibility model in traditional international law, and incorporates the theory of corporate social responsibility into international rule of law, combined with latest international practice and constructive interpretations, aiming to explore the existence and the establishment of direct responsibilities of transnational corporations.

In Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Despite its potential for harm, Spinoza thinks that religion can perform a positive social function. It can help to breed an obedient spirit, making people pliable to civil law — in this way religion plays a role in bolstering the state. For instance, the ceremonial laws and practices of the Jews helped to foster and preserve cohesion among an ignorant, nomadic populace. The central moral message of religion —namely, to love one's neighbor — may be understood through reason; but Scripture presents this message in a manner that is suited to the understanding of the masses. Religion also seems to play a crucial role in promoting compliance with the law. Michael Rosenthal has suggested that in Spinoza's scheme " transcendental beliefs " play a crucial role in overcoming free rider problems; defections from agreements and non-compliance with the law would likely be widespread among human beings were it not for religion. The salutary function of religion is undermined when sectarianism emerges. When groups like the Pharisees begin to regard themselves as special, disparaging and persecuting other groups, civil order is disrupted. In order to prevent such fissures, Spinoza puts forth a universal or civil religion that captures the moral core of a plurality of faiths, to which all citizens can subscribe irrespective of what other private beliefs they hold. Like Rousseau after him, Spinoza thought that a universal public religion could bolster civic solidarity, channeling religious passions into social benefits.

Від теорії міжнародного права до практики захисту прав людини. Liber Amicorum до 60-річчя проф. В.В. Мицика : моногр. / авт. кол. ; за ред. О.В. Задорожнього та О.Р. Поєдинок. – Київ; Одеса : Фенікс, 2016. – С. 45–70.

Формування дискурсу верховенства права як на національному, так і на міжнародному рівнях зумовлює необхідність пошуків нових підходів до осмислення верховенства права як такого. При цьому суттєві відмінності між національним та міжнародним правом унеможливлюють пряму аналогію між верховенством права в національних правових системах та верховенством права в міжнародно-правовій системі. Це приводить до появи концепту міжнародного верховенства права, осмислення якого поступово стає важливим викликом для міжнародно-правової теорії.
Розгляд верховенства права в його міжнародному вимірі пов’язаний з протиставленням реалізму та формалізму як двох протилежних підходів до розуміння сутності та призначення міжнародного права. Реалізм, скерований на пояснення міжнародного права в інструментальному дусі, тобто як оформлення політики, унеможливлює верховенство права в міжнародно-правовій системі. Натомість, формалізм, в якому міжнародне право розглядається як система, що принаймні частково протиставлена політиці, дає змогу говорити про можливість побудови системи міжнародних відносин на основі ідей та принципів верховенства права. Для цього міжнародне право має визнаватися таким, що має в своїй основі неінструментальні правила співіснування та співробітництва держав, і що ці правила є основними для функціонування міжнародно-правової системи.
Міжнародне верховенство права може осмислюватися, виходячи як із класичних, властивих національній правовій доктрині, підходів, так і з позицій спеціальних концепцій, розроблених з урахуванням особливостей міжнародного права. Так, формальні та матеріальні концепції верховенства права можуть бути застосовані для пояснення міжнародного верховенства права, однак з деякими спрощеннями та застереженнями, пов’язаними, передусім, з неможливістю національної аналогії. Альтернативний класичним формальній та матеріальній концепціям функціональний підхід до міжнародного верховенства права передбачає його розгляд передусім як сфери міжнародної взаємодії. Міжнародне верховенство права тут розуміється як інструмент, який може застосовуватися в різних проблемних сферах міжнародно-правової системи, включаючи перехідну юстицію, захист прав людини, право розвитку тощо. Інтернаціоналізовані концепції міжнародного верховенства права більшою мірою схильні розглядати його не як самостійний міжнародно-правовий феномен, а радше як результат інтернаціоналізації концепту, сформованого в національних правових системах. Через це міжнародне верховенство права розглядається в ракурсі взаємодії національних та міжнародної правових систем.
Формальні, матеріальні та функціональні концепції міжнародного верховенства права мають розглядатися не як альтернативні, а як комплементарні, тобто такі, що розкривають різні аспекти міжнародного верховенства права. У цьому сенсі міжнародне верховенство права є ідеологією, яка поєднує принципи та аксіоми, що пов’язані зі створенням та застосуванням міжнародного права, його інституціоналізацією та розвитком.

In Aristotle's Politics, the debate is the question whether political authority is better exercised through a " rule of law " or " a rule of men ". His answer is the Rule of Law. His reasons are: 1. Laws are products of reasons not passions; 2. The sovereignty of a ruler or assembly tends to tyranny i.e. rule in interests of a section, not common good; 3. Equality demands that each mature person have some share in governing; and 4. Rotation of offices and office-holders is desirable and can hardly be managed without legal regulation. So for Aristotle, the central case of practical authority is government of a polis by law and legally regulated rulers. To quote Aristotle in Chapter XVI, (1287a) of Politics: We will next consider the absolute monarch that we have just mentioned, who does everything according to his own will: for a king governing under the direction of laws which he is obliged to follow does not of himself create any particular species of government, as we have already said: for in every state whatsoever, either aristocracy or democracy, it is easy to appoint a general for life; and there are many who entrust the administration of affairs to one person only; such is the government at Dyrrachium, and nearly the same at Opus. As for an absolute monarchy as it is called, that is to say, when the whole state is wholly subject to the will of one person, namely the king, it seems to many that it is unnatural that one man should have the entire rule over his fellow-citizens when the state consists of equals: for nature requires that the same right and the same rank should necessarily take place amongst all those who are equal by nature: for as it would be hurtful to the body for those who are of different constitutions to observe the same regimen, either of diet or clothing, so is it with respect to the honours of the state as hurtful, that those who are equal in merit should be unequal in rank; for which reason it is as much a man's duty to submit to command as to assume it, and this also by rotation; for this is law, for order is law; and it is more proper that law should govern than any one of the citizens: upon the same principle, if it is advantageous to place the supreme power in some particular persons, they should be appointed to be only guardians, and the servants of the laws, for the supreme power must be placed somewhere; but they say, that it is unjust that where all are equal one person should continually enjoy it. But it seems unlikely that man should be able to adjust that which the law cannot determine; it may be replied, that the law having laid down the best rules possible, leaves the adjustment and application of particulars to the discretion of the magistrate; besides, it allows anything to be altered which experience proves may be better established. Moreover, he who would place the supreme power in mind, would place it in God and the laws; but he who entrusts man with it, gives it to a wild beast, for such his appetites sometimes make him; for passion influences those who are in power, even the very best of men: for which reason law is reason without desire. For Aristotle, the Rule of Men is susceptible to tyranny of a one person called the King in a society composed of equals. A King as a supreme ruler can be a legislator, executor and judicator at the same time. He has the final say of everything. No one is allowed to disobey him. It is unnatural that one and only person rules over all others who can be abused, maltreated and oppressed. What more, if the subjects of the King are smarter and wiser than him, they will plot for his ouster that means constant chaos. Since a King's word is the law, he himself is above his own law that is not good in a society where the people can view it as disputable and unfair. No one is capable to challenge or question the King's action whether or not it conform in his own law. A King with an impaired judgment can result to a bad decision-making that injures his people. The King is responsible for anything that may happen to the people, economy, and territory. If the King is abusive, bad, ignorant, or wicked, he and his

The rule of law is nearly generally bolstered at the national and universal level. The exceptional bolster for the rule of law in hypothesis, in any case, is conceivable as it were since of broadly dissimilar sees of what it implies in practice.

Resorting to the " rule of law " within the traditional environment of international law generates diffi culties, especially when circumstances require us to square the circle by accommodating normative claims with state legal orders, fundamental rights, and democracy. Unsurprisingly, in recent cases brought before supranational courts, such as the European Court of Justice (Kadì and Al Baarakat, for example), or domestic courts, such as the United States Supreme Court (Hamdan, for example), the import and notion of the rule of law have been interpreted in ways that reveal the uncertainty surrounding the concept and the rather idiosyncratic or instrumental uses to which it is put. Through the analysis of such instances, this article proposes a restatement of the rule of law that better explains its use beyond state borders. Then, it shows how the relation between different orders, as a factual matter, does not obey some monist hierarchy and does not even refl ect the logic of the " dualism " of self-contained systems. Given that the autonomy of legal orders is a vital contemporary reality, confrontation between them and with international law appears to be replacing the formal primacy of sources as well as blind or dogmatic closure by content-dependent constitutional assessments. In this connection, a road taken in the European environment shows that communicative pluralism can embark on a practice of giving reasons inherently capable of producing common standards, the rule of law, and thin lines of principle. All of these factors are ingredients that might fi nally evolve further into a rule of recognition for the international legal order.

The paper makes three central arguments: First, sudden influxes of official development aid into countries with unprepared governance institutions hinder their long-term economic and structural development. I analogize to the "resource curse" of countries rich in natural sources that cannot effectively absorb newly realized resource rents stemming therefrom, highlighting recent international experience in this regard; Second, "raining" significant development aid on an economy before helping it develop basic capacity (i.e., competence) to govern is not only counter-productive, but is corrupting. In such cases, the aid is, in effect, a supply-side appeal to (and institutionalization of) monopolistic rent- taking tendencies. Thus, the aid does long-term damage to the country by perverting its governance system and converting localized petty corruption into institutionalized grand corruption – corruption that is difficult (or impossible) to reverse through traditional anti-corruption campaigns. Third, in situations where official development aid has induced the institutionalization of grand corruption, traditional cleanup efforts – focused on ex ante public awareness, anti-corruption committees, and punitive sanctions – have proven to be virtually worthless. Therefore, in cases of grand corruption institutionalism, rather than focus on ineffective punitive sanctions, I propose ex ante anti-corruption cleanup efforts concentrate on regularizing the rent taker’s future behavior. Such inducements to regularization could include amnesty programs designed to bring the underground economy into the open.

In its landmark judgment in the case of Achmea (judgment of 6 March 2018, case C-284/16 [GC]), the Court of Justice adjudicated that Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) adversely affects the autonomy of EU law. Accordingly, ISDS clauses in international investment agreements that contravene Arts 267 and 344 TFEU and the principles of mutual trust and sincere cooperation enshrined in Arts 19, para 1, and 4, para 3 TEU are inapplicable under EU law. However, the reasoning of the Court of Justice in Achmea did not convince international investment tribunals that they lack jurisdiction in intra-EU investment disputes. This opposition calls for clarification of different principles underpinning the EU legal order and international investment law. This Article presents a debate between these two legal orders, which unfolds around three separate albeit related issues: the status and applicability of the EU and the Member States' international agreements within the EU legal order; the manner in which the Achmea judgment must be interpreted and its application in the international investment law context; and the meaning and relevance of the concept of the autonomy of EU law as the key issue in defining the relationship between EU law and international investment law. KEYWORDS: autonomy of the EU legal order-international investment law-Arts 267 and 344 TFEU-mutual trust-compatibility of ISDS with EU law-rule of law.

This chapter invites a reading of the international rule of law as a marketing tool. Its rhetorical purchase is shown to provide fertile ground for branding, employed as a means to attract resources in a highly competitive industry – what I call the 'global justice sector'. The practices of the International Criminal Court, one of the institutions competing in this sector, exemplify the employment of the international rule of law in its marketized form as a means to strengthen its global justice brand. This reading of the international rule of law is placed within the context of a neoliberalism which constitutes and reconstitutes the juncture between the market and justice.

The rule of law requires that States set up a fair and expeditious legal system and prosecute persons accused of crimes. In international law, and particularly in post-conflict situations, the rule of law is materialised through the establishment of international criminal tribunals, hybrid courts, truth commissions and by the exercise of universal jurisdiction by the community of nations. This has only been achieved in recent years and the success of any of these judicial institutions must be measured not only by reference to the number of persons it has prosecuted but also on the basis of whether it has influenced or enhanced the development of the local legal system. From a methodological point of view hybrid tribunals are more appropriate to bring about this dual result because they are part of the local legal system and local judges participate therein. However, as is the case with all international tribunals all the relevant actors wish to exercise some degree of control over their operations and so each institution must ultimately be judged on its deliverable results. ÖZET Hukukun üstünlüğü; devletlerin adil ve düzenli bir hukuk sistemi kurmasını ve suç isnat edilmiş kişileri yargılamasını gerektirir. Uluslararası hukukta ve özellikle ihtilaf sonrası durumlarda; uluslararası ceza mahkemeleri, karma mahkemeler, gerçek komisyonları kurarak ve milletler topluluğu tarafından evrensel yargının uygulanmasıyla hukukun üstünlüğü materyalize olur. Bu sadece son yıllarda başarılmıştır ve bu yargı kurumlarından herhangi birinin başarısı, sadece cezai takibat açtığı kişilerin sayısını referans göstererek ölçülmemeli aynı zamanda yerel hukuk sisteminin gelişmesini etkiyip etkilemediğine ve değerini artırıp artırmadığına dayanarak ölçülmelidir. Metodolojik bakış açısına göre; karma mahkemeler bu ikili sonucu meydana getirmek için daha uygundur çünkü onlar yerel hukuk sisteminin bir parçasıdır ve yerel hakimler orada katılım göstermektedir. Ancak, tüm uluslararası mahkemelerle olduğu gibi, tüm ilgili aktörler çalışmalarında kontrol derecesini uygulamak istemektedirler ve böylece her kurum nihai olarak teslim edilebilir sonuçlarıyla ilgili yargılanmalıdır.

Con la pandemia SARS-CoV-2 (Covid-19), el mundo digital ha desplazado de una sacudida al mundo físico. El teletrabajo y los interminables confinamientos domiciliarios han comportado un aumento inimaginable del uso de la Internet, redes sociales y plataformas digitales. Con ello, las instancias públicas, las empresas, los profesionales y los ciudadanos son y somos también más vulnerables en el entorno digital. Las amenazas individuales han ido en aumento y, en paralelo, se han incrementado los ciberataques a organismos estatales, autonómicos, y también a ayuntamientos, mucho más frágiles y expuestos a fallos de seguridad en la transición hacia una administración electrónica plena.

Al hilo de esta realidad, la presente monografía se divide en dos partes claramente diferenciadas aunque interconectadas. La primera, más teórica, aborda las incidencias del ciberespacio y de la ciberseguridad en el derecho constitucional, administrativo y procesal, además del derecho penal y de la criminología.

La segunda parte, más práctica, se centra en los riesgos que la cibercriminalidad comporta para las administraciones municipales, así como las garantías y sistemas de seguridad que resultan necesarios en su actuación a través medios informáticos, telemáticos y digitales. El objetivo de esta monografía no es otro que el de contribuir a la formación del personal al servicio de los Gobiernos locales en los conceptos y elementos básicos de seguridad digital, así como en los ataques informáticos habituales y en los instrumentos de seguridad apropiados.

La voluntad de l@s coautor@s es también divulgar la «cultura de la ciberseguridad». Sin duda, la consecución de la seguridad en el ciberespacio, cada vez más extenso, más complejo tecnológicamente y bajo un orden establecido extramuros del Estado, es una responsabilidad que nos incumbe a todos.

The rule of law has become a key notion of national law. Even though - or possibly because - there are differences between the concepts of rule of law in different states and the concept remains frustratingly elusive even within a single state, the rule of law has become universally accepted as an attribute of a just, successful, modern state and as an essential requirement for legitimizing the exercise of public power. With more and more power wielded by international organizations, it is hardly surprising that the notion has also entered the realm of international law. What is the status and content of the rule of law under international law, both as a principle binding states and as a principle binding the United Nations and other international organizations? The paper alleges that in the realm of universal international law the principle of the rule of law suffers from three weaknesses: its source under public international law is dubious, its content poorly defined and there is no court of general jurisdiction that could fill the abstract notion with content. As a remedy, I propose a distinction between two notions of the rule of law on the international level: a binding principle of the rule of law, defined through a rights-based approach and containing rule of law-related obligations already binding under international law, and an aspirational notion of the rule of law, aspiring towards a fairer, more just and law-abiding society. The proposed solution is applied to the field of UN peacekeeping.

Mob Rule is known as Ochlocracy, the rule of government by mob or a mass of people, or the intimidation of legitimate authorities by the mob. It is democracy (the rule of the people) minus the rule of law. It is rule by a fickle crowd, which has to do with demagoguery, passion over reason, absolute freedom of expression, groundless and false accusations, complete disregard for constitutional authorities, and the tyranny of the few (Mob rule must be nipped in the bud before it engulfs us by Pornpimol Kanchanalak published on May 13, 2010). Thomas Jefferson said that " Democracy is nothing more than mob rule, where 51% of the people may take away the rights of the other 49%. " It was Polybius in Histories who coined the term to name the "pathological" version of popular rule in opposition to the good version, which he refers to as democracy. According to him, the political cycle of government rotates through the three basic forms of government, democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy. These three degenerate into the governments of ochlocracy, oligarchy, and tyranny. Original society is in anarchy but the strongest figure emerges and sets up a monarchy. The monarch's descendants, become despots and the monarchy degenerates into a tyranny. Because of the abuses and excesses of the tyrant ruler, the tyranny is overthrown by the leading intellectual rebels of the state who set up an aristocracy. They too quickly forget about good virtues in government and the state becomes an oligarchy. These oligarchs are overthrown by the common people who set up a democracy. Democracy soon becomes corrupt and degenerates into Ochlocracy, beginning the cycle anew. Thus, in ancient Greek political thought Ochlocracy was considered as one of the three "bad" forms of government (Tyranny, Oligarchy and Ochlocracy) as opposed to the three "good" forms of government (Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy). The distinction between "good" and "bad" was made according to whether the government form would act in the interest of the whole community is "good" or the exclusive interests of a group or individual at the expense of justice is "bad". Mob rule is as old as human history. In ancient Greece, it was considered one of the three bad forms of ruling authority. Socrates died by drinking a poison when he was sentenced to death by jury, others considered it was a cry of the mob that influenced the judgment. History showed that Rome was built, maintained and destroyed by mob rule. At certain times, some government officials whose assignments were to disperse a seditious multitude would actually be headed by the mob. The government would lose its control, which led to loss of power. Once the mob tasted victory, it realized that it had every chance of success. In the United States, the Salem witch trials, lynchings of blacks in the South, and the McCarthyism are just three examples of mob rule. The Salem witch trials were the prosecutions of people accused of witchcraft and their trials in colonial Massachusetts between 1692 to 1693. These resulted in the executions of twenty people, most of them women. Lynching is an extrajudicial punishment by an informal group characterized by informal public executions by a mob, often by hanging, in order to punish an alleged transgressor, or to intimidate a minority group. McCarthyism is the practice of making

The concept of Rule of Law forms the basis of a democratic legal system. It is through the supremacy of courts that the powers of the executives are kept under control. It has evolved through the common law system and through A.V. Dicey and even though it faced a lot of criticism, it forms the basis of most of the legal systems around the world.
This paper aims to analyse the concept of rule of law which is the backbone of every legal system. It emphasizes that a government or any authoritative body of a country should be bound under the ambit of regular law of the country instead of it being controlled by laws devised for itself. This paper traces the origins of this rule and also talks about how it is applied in India.

This article considers the relationship between international law and the UN Security Council. The practical power of the Council is constituted at the intersection of its legal framing, its political legitimacy, and the interests of powerful states. This sometimes means the Council has less power than is assigned to it by the UN Charter, but it often means that it has more. It is clear that the Council sits within the international legal system, the legal limits on its action are interpreted in light of prior Council practice, and thus the meaning of ‘compliance’ and ‘violation’ of the Charter changes over time. Some transgressions of the Charter are understood as informal amendments to it; others are seen as threats to international peace and se- curity that impel enforcement action. This ambiguity in the law and practice of the United Nations is inherent in the idea of the ‘international rule of law’. The Council straddles the unstable boundary between international law and politics, both undermining and reinforcing the distinction between them.

As many violent domestic or international conflicts ebb, there is often an opportunity to regain what has been lost or, optimally, to achieve new capacities for effective governance and economic development. Since the end of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, the international community has increasingly responded to such post-conflict situations by providing a plethora of capacity development aid programs.  These programs have routinely focused on providing everything from sustenance assurance to infrastructure development and new or “adjusted” governance institutions.  However, such “outside-in” approaches have often failed to successfully create sustainable change.  This has been due to the fact that the programs in question have routinely ignored the social and political capital inherent in each society. In order to ensure sustainable development and progressive governance, the international community must work with local partners to create programs that support the capacity development of sustainable institutions - as well as work with local partners to enhance the resilience of these institutions to meet the ever changing needs of the populace. Admittedly, such a process is difficult and fraught with complex challenges. In his address, General Tucker will discuss a number of the challenges – and successes - the World Engagement Institute has encountered in its international capacity building projects.

The Chilcot Inquiry found that Tony Blair was privately committed to the military option even though he lied to the Cabinet, Parliament and the British public that war would only be a last resort, and so was himself an active and knowing participant in the conspiracy to invade another sovereign nation on a false premise.

In doing this, he was breaching the “Nuremberg Principles” which clearly outlined the crime of waging aggressive war; the principle under which military and political leaders of the Nazi regime such as General Alfred Jodl, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel and Joachim von Ribbentrop were convicted and later hanged.

Considering the implications of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) for the architecture of global (economic) governance, including the international rule of law at large, the paper addresses some of the most pertinent systemic consequences TTIP is likely to produce, based on the shape the agreement is currently taking. The paper’s main arguments are that despite representing innovation and added value in some areas, TTIP may produce negative consequences in at least three respects. Firstly, it will cater to an imbalance in terms of access to justice in the area of investment protection; secondly, by providing a way out for the WTO’s two most active litigants, it can contribute to the de judicialization of international trade law; and thirdly, it creates potential for a fierce backlash from the rest of the world as regards the global promotion of an overtly transatlantic regulatory and normative agenda.

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione. – 2.1. I precedenti capitoli della vicenda: la coppia di sentenze del Tribunale del 2005. – 2.2. La “storica” sentenza della Corte del 2008. – 2.3. Il “seguito” della sentenza del 2008 e i problemi irrisolti. – 2.4. La sentenza del Tribunale del 2010. – 3.1. La sentenza della Corte del 2013. – 3.2. A proposito del “grado di intensità” del controllo giurisdizionale: il significativo ruolo della Carta dei diritti fondamentali. – 3.3. La (mancata) comunicazione di informazioni o prove e il compito del giudice dell’Unione. – 3.4. Ancora sulla ambigua “natura” delle misure adottate dai comitati per le sanzioni. –4. Conclusioni.

It has been argued, due to the fact the rule of law is a universal legal phenomenon, its domestic (that is Ukrainian) version has remained isolated from the qualitatively new international legal and scientific approaches.  In this scientific thesis discussion will point to the "great rule of law debate", currently unfolding in the contemporary academic community. Specifically, the essence of the multidimensional approach, under which rule of law is understood not only as general-theoretical notion, but primarily as a complex philosophical construction. On these grounds, we can argue that there are two different but interrelated "co-approaches" in the rule of law investigation - 1) structurally systematic and 2) functional equivalent. In its turn, they  encapsulated into multidimensional approach to the rule of law idea.

The issue of rule of law is a critical contributor to achieving peace and stability. The role of the  Australian Civil-Military Centre is to support agencies across government develop national civil-military capabilities to prevent, prepare for, and respond more effectively to conflicts and disasters overseas. We at the ACMC are not directly responsible for rule of law policy in government — the Attorney General's Department, Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Australian Federal Police and capabilities across the Department of Defence are engaged on these issues in peace operations every day. We do however have the advantage of a perspective that takes in what all these agencies, plus international organizations and civil-society partners are doing in the area of rule of law. The rule of law falls squarely into the civil-military-police context and the most recent Presidential statement from the UN Security Council last year on the rule of law captured this fact. It expressed 'its commitment to an international order based on the rule of law, which is essential for cooperation among States'.

E-Mail: b-vlegaloutfit@gmx.co.uk

It has generally appeared in the international development legal regime that Law has been approached as 'a tool for development itself'. In this sense, experts sometimes assume that Law is both distinctively placed and uniquely suited as a mechanism for development programmes and projects because a key function of Law is to engineer, attain or enhance the social and economic changes necessary to achieve the goals of development. From this perspective, it is expected that Law will provide the infrastructural mechanism required for development, and that Law has the capacity to bring about the social, economic, and political changes needed, as well as necessary cultural attitudinal tenets conducive to development. The paper examines the approaches to the Role of Law and the importance of Rule of Law in economic development process. It critics the current approach which sees Law as a 'tool or mechanism for development itself'. It argues that Law and the Rule of Law should have better roles to play in the international development process in order to improve the development stance of the third world countries within the global plane. In order to make the international development law agenda 'functional', the strategy would be to approach Law as a 'facilitator of development reform' in developing countries, rather than as 'a tool for development itself.' It suggests that this approach of seeing Law as a facilitator will equally help take into consideration indigenous needs and distinctiveness, thereby remove disagreements over reform priorities and improve efficiency and accountability. This is a new direction which highlights the importance or necessity of focusing the international system's approach to Law, as a 'means to facilitate' local empowerment, social cohesion and justice that is, as an approach to development consistent with the life choices and development goals of indigenous populations, rather than as it has generally appeared as an 'end in itself'. The paper uses the well-being and structural-functional legal theoretical approaches, interdisciplinary and critical-analytical perspective within the framework of (international) law and development. It employs qualitative empirical evidence from developed and developing countries.

Article deals with an issue of domestic analogy as a methodological instrument for conceptualising the international rule of law. It starts with an overview of the most spread approaches to the international rule of law as based upon such an analogy. Then, it provides an analysis of the meaning of domestic analogy. Finally, it covers the issues of the international rule of law lato sensu and stricto sensu.

The UN Security Council cannot be the instrument of its own transformation. It is a political institution with an important realist agenda ‘to maintain or restore international peace and security’. The pace of events usually means that to achieve that end in ways that are consistent with an objective and neutral reading of customary and normative international law is extremely challenging.
This paper suggests that the members of the UN and its key agencies must first create the preconditions for success. This approach requires states and international organisations to build capacity in the domain of peacebuilding and peace enforcement and explicitly build coherent levels of understanding, language and culture. The Council will only have the assurance to act decisively and effectively if it has confidence that the agencies and forces called upon to promote the rule of law possess common understanding of what that means and have the ability to coordinate their efforts in a practical manner.

This paper argues that one of the main reasons recent nation-building “Stability and Reconstruction Operations” have largely been unsuccessful is because most of these efforts have taken a top-down approach, while largely ignoring (or inappropriately resourcing) the most appropriate means and methods of facilitating day-to-day local/regional governance and rule of law capacity-building mechanisms.

The Article constitutes an initial attempt to combine all existing in modern scientific literature approaches devoted to the interconnection of two Rule of Law versions  - international and national. Accordingly, the article illustrates the contextual interplay between two levels of legal orders. Viewing interfaces between international rule of law principle and its domestic analogue through the prism of their correlation, the author marks out three important aspects in such synergy. On the basis of comparative research, it is concluded that among most substantive correlation aspect is the dialectical nexus between rule of law principles that are operated both at the international and national levels.

In the Rule of Law, there exists an agreement between the Indonesian State as a principal and the Indonesian President as an agent who will act on behalf of the former by enforcing the Constitution and statutes that promote the general welfare of the Indonesian people as introduced in Indonesia's Pancasila, an official philosophical foundation that comprises five principles held to be inseparable and interrelated:

The Rule of Law is opposite to the Rule of Man. The Rule of Law is based on the Constitution of the ruled while the Rule of Man is based on political power of a ruler. Every country in this world that has a Constitution as the supreme law upholds the principle of the Rule of Law. Ideally, what limits the arbitrary and despotic exercise of government powers by a ruler and his representatives resulting to abuses and oppression is no other than the Rule of Law, the heart of each democratic institution. On the other hand, a good point to ponder is what are the limits of the Rule of Law? The following are the perceived limitations of the Rule of Law that are not exclusive: