Popular Culture and Philosophy

نیچه جهان را عاری از ارزش‌های مطلق و فرازمانی-فرامکانی می‌داند. او بر این باور است که فرومایگان و ضعفا از آنجایی که توان مقابله با افراد قدرتمند و والامقام را نداشته‌اند، جهانی ماورای این جهان ساخته‌اند تا با خیال آسوده مطمئن باشند که گرچه در این جهان نمی‌توانند از پس مشکلاتشان بربیایند و زورشان به آن افراد قدرتمند نمی‌رسد، در آن جهان ماورایی حق به حق‌دار خواهد رسید. از نظر نیچه، با این کار ارزش این جهان و این زندگی را به امید رسیدن به خیر در جهانی دیگر نادیده می‌گیریم. حال با پذیرش اینکه ارزشی مطلق و ذاتی در جهان وجود ندارد، به نظر می‌رسد که جهان پُرآشوب و تهی از معنا می‌شود. اما به باورِ نیچه انسان حقیقی و ارزشمند انسانی‌ست که آشوب و بی‌معنایی این جهان را نه تنها بپذیرد، بلکه تلاش کند تا آن را تبدیل به به اثر هنری زیبایی کند که ارزشمند و بامعناست. او چنین انسانی را ابرانسان می‌نامد. هدف مارک. تی. کونارد در این مقاله پاسخ دادن به این پرسش است که آیا می‌توان بارت سیمپسون  در مجموعه‌ی «سیمپسون‌ها» را، باتوجه به شخصیت ستیزه‌جویش که همواره با تمام اولیاءامور به مخالفت برمی‌خیزد، همان ایده‌آل نیچه‌ای، همان ابرمردی که در مخالفت با ارزش‌های پذیرفته شده‌ی جامعه قدعلم می‌کند دانست؟ کونارد پس از بررسی دقیق آراء نیچه به این نتیجه می‌رسد که پاسخ این پرسش منفی‌ست، زیرا بارت سیمپسون شخصیت مستقلی از آن خود ندارد، او صرفاً با همه مخالفت می‌کند، اما در ازاء مخالفتش سازندگی‌ای انجام نمی‌دهد و تلاش نمی‌کند تا از پسِ آشوب زندگی معنا و ارزشی بیافریند؛ بنابراین به هیچ‌عنوان نمی‌توان او را مورد تأییدِ نیچه دانست.

In this article I argue that alternative music can change the world when it migrates from the realm of music to that of ideas. I take the example of My Chemical Romance, and I break down the claim that it changed the world of their fans firstly through a "change of language", by using the structuralist tool of intertextuality, and secondly through a "change of hearts", by building on the cathartic usage of emotions, both for themselves and their fanbase. I also explore the dangers intricate in the process, and I discuss a sample of accusations they were subjected to from the media. Rezumat: În acest articol îmi propun să arăt că muzica alternativă poate schimba lumea, atunci când trece din domeniul muzical în cel al ideilor. Folosesc exemplul formației My Chemical Romance. În ce privește asumpția că aceștia au schimbat lumea propriilor fani, descriu două aspecte: "o schimbare de limbaj", folosind procedeul structuralist al intertextualității; respectiv "o schimbare a inimilor", bazată pe folosirea catarctică a emoțiilor, atât a celor proprii cât și ale fanilor lor. De asemenea,

A history of pop-culture icon, The Batman. Batman, aka Bruce Wayne, was created c.1939 and quickly established itself as a firm favourite among comic book fans. As the century progressed Batman publications and media waxed and waned (pardon the pun) and the Caped Crusader underwent a number of changes in response to societal shifts, emerging as an altogether dark character with potential psychological issues. This is a brief history and overview of one of the most famous literary creations of the twenty and twenty-first centuries and how this historical creation continues to have a firm resonance today.

Originally delivered to An Cumann Staire, NUI Galway, 2013.

In recent years, dozens of books on philosophy and popular culture have been published.
These books have been subjected to a number of criticisms in a number of venues—including other popular philosophy venues. In this paper, I will examine several versions of the criticism that such endeavors are frivolous entertainment. I will argue that, though most of these criticisms do not stand up to scrutiny, they nevertheless express a legitimate worry about the intercourse of philosophy and entertainment. This, I contend, is a criticism the ‘philosophy and popular culture’ genre must live with—and one that cannot easily be dismissed.

Since its inception in 1966, Star Trek has had a big impact on viewers. As its characters travel through space encountering different planets and people, the series provides a forum for many ethical and philosophical questions. The episodes are often morality plays—the situations and dilemmas of the crew serving as allegories for much larger social issues like race, gender, the nature of war, and religion. The result is a Federation message of progress, integrity, and optimism that has sustained audiences throughout the years. Deep Space Nine (DS9) takes these Federation ideals a step further and deliberately places them and its characters in situations which question some of these grand notions, often in ways that are not easily reconciled. DS9’s questioning and further exploration of boundaries occurs specifically via its use of religious tropes, mental illness, and through the concept of difference. DS9 is particularly well suited to such an analysis given the strategic significance of Bajor to the wormhole and the Federation’s insistence that Bajor become a member of the Federation ‘by any means necessary’. In such a situation, the Prime Directive is temporarily set aside or suspended in the quadrant, as the democratic ideals of the Federation move from pharmakon in the curative sense of host to pharmakon in a poisonous sense of parasite.

In ‘Duet’ Major Kira interrogates Aamin Marritza, a Cardassian accused of war crimes against the Bajoran people during the Cardassian occupation of Bajor. It is revealed that at the Gallitepp labour camp thousands of Bajorns died, and that Marritza is somehow—although it is not yet clear to what extent—associated with this camp. Major Kira feels compelled to punish anyone who served at the prison camp and believes that a trial would give Bajor satisfaction. Marritza, in turn, accuses Kira of not wanting the truth: “It’s not the truth you’re interested in”, he tells her, “all you want is vengeance”. To further compound this situation, Commander Sisko and Gul Dukat also enter into dialogue on the prisoner, with the implication that relations between their two governments will suffer depending on the outcome of such a trial. We clearly see that all parties involved are at an impasse, where the possibility of justice—and questions surrounding notions of justice and recompense—become highly problematic. The question remains: are all Cardassians monsters? Are all Bajorans righteous freedom fighters?

This paper is concerned to outline the antagonistic construal of the discourses informing the Bajoran-Cardassian interaction, specifically with regards to the way these discourses have been used to both legitimate certain stakes and identities, while also marginalising and displacing others. For instance, the Bajoran-Cardassian relationship in ‘Duet’ is a particularly clear example of the antagonistic relationship that exists between the two species since the occupation. As I demonstrate, this relationship is particularly entrenched as antagonistic by the constitution of particular identities—the Cardassian overlord or the Bajoran victim—which operate to displace the other as either Cardassian monster or Bajoran freedom fighter.

Overall, the paper is split into three parts. In the first of these I contend that the parties in ‘Duet’ have reached an impasse—unable to move beyond certain grounded assumptions about themselves and others as a result of the occupation. From this point I turn to engage with DS9 in terms of the theory of agonistics as outlined by Jean-François Lyotard, a theory that is suspicious of, and destabilises closed traditions and narratives, whether they be Federation Directives, Cardassian military stratagem or Bajoran faith claims. Further to this, I will draw on Derrida’s notion of differance as a useful tool in recognising the temporality of our claims to truth when applied to the various parties involved in and around the struggle for the rebuilding of Bajor and the Federation’s claim to wormhole access and technology. This discussion is concluded by an exploration of some of the implications of such exclusionary functioning in terms of its impact on Bajor, Cardassia and the Federation.

Finally, although the Bajoran-Cardassian-Federation matrix may often seem to be incommensurable, I would argue that DS9 as a series constantly subverts these (and other) relationships in ways that are best described as transgressive. Furthermore, I would argue that this ongoing transgressive subversion reminds us that agonistic relations and closed boundaries and identities are in fact always open to subversion and a consequent shift beyond impasse. DS9, I suggest, is an exercise in postmodern hope.

Forgiveness is often understood as an individual process and decision. I forgive you so that I can find peace and move on. I forgive you so that you don’t have to feel guilty. I forgive you so that we can get on with life. But in each of these cases, it seems that I forgive you, strictly on the basis of my reasons and choices. In this paper, we question both 1) if forgiveness is an individual’s decision to move on or get over some transgression and 2) if forgiveness is simply an individual’s decision?

In the first section, we provide a brief overview of emotional accounts of forgiveness, which are almost exclusively negative emotional accounts, meaning that forgiveness is typically understood as a process of removing certain emotions such as resentment and anger, Likewise, forgiveness is often conceived negatively as a removal of the harm -- forgive and forget, they say. Furthermore, these emotional accounts are largely rationalistic. On these views, forgiveness is the rational activity of removing emotions or evaluations based on reasons. These might be practical reasons or moral reasons, but even emotional accounts of forgiveness prioritize this rational activity and conceive of forgiveness as a form of individual decision-making.

In the second section, we question this negative, rationalistic account of forgiveness as “getting over” something. Though we concede that this negative account has a place in considerations of forgiveness, we see “getting over” as largely a consequence of forgiveness rather than its substantive content. Our core claim is that forgiveness is better understood relationally, as something dynamic and ongoing, and as a process constituted by a revised worldview (or other-view, as it were). This revised worldview 1) incorporates the harmful act of the wrongdoer into the forgiver’s conception of that person and then 2) accepts this new conception as conducive to the existing relationship or revises the relationship in light of the other-view.

The third section highlights the connections between our conception of forgiveness with feminist care ethics. Care ethics insists on the central importance of interconnectedness and interpersonal relationships, sensitivity to context, and emotional motivation. Our view incorporates these insights and proposes a model of forgiveness that recognizes that though rational activity is indeed a crucial component, the process of forgiveness cannot be reduced to it. Importantly, it is not an isolated individual’s rational activity but a process that takes place in the relationship between the wronged and wrongdoer. As such, our account gives forgiveness positive content and conceives it as not merely the removal of emotion but a robust emotional process in its own right.