Noncooperative Games

In a two-player proactive response game the level of proactive activity and the choice of terrorist target is endogenized. The targeted government first chooses its measures to weaken the terrorists, and the terrorists then choose the type of event—normal or spectacular. Unlike previous analyses, proactive policy has a downside by increasing grievances and, consequently, terrorist recruitment. If the government responds too harshly, its actions can empower the terrorists by providing a larger constituency. Aggressive antiterrorist actions, encouraged by a high perceived loss from terrorism and low marginal proactive costs, may result in spectacular events with dire consequences. If spectaculars are transferred abroad to soft targets, then proactive operations may be excessive from a global viewpoint as external costs are ignored. The analysis explains why some target nations engage in a modest level of offense but a prime target chooses a large level.

We describe the Nash equilibria set as an intersection of graphs of players’ best responses. The problem of Nash equilibria set construction for three-person extended 2× 2× 2 games is studied. Mathematics Subject Classification 2000: 90C05, 90C10, 90C29, 90C31.

Stackelberg differential game models have been used to study sequential decision making in noncooperative games in diverse fields. In this paper, we survey recent applications of Stackelberg differential game models to the supply chain management and marketing channels literatures. A common feature of these applications is the specification of the game structure: a decentralized channel composed of a manufacturer and independent retailers, and a sequential decision procedure with demand and supply dynamics and ...

Modern systems have extended their complexity, administration and design become almost impossible duties. The most frequent performance problems can be identified in database systems and more specific in distributed ones. The problems of data allocation and query optimization in distributed database systems are considered. Because of the possible wide distribution of such a system the replication problem in a distributed

Stackelberg differential game models have been used to study sequential decision making in noncooperative games in diverse fields. In this paper, we survey recent applications of Stackelberg differential game models to the supply chain management and marketing channels literatures. A common feature of these applications is the specification of the game structure: a decentralized channel composed of a manufacturer and independent retailers, and a sequential decision procedure with demand and supply dynamics and ...

We propose a political theory for the slow adoption of technology in sports and other contests. We investigate players'’ preferences for new technology that improves contest accuracy. Modeling accuracy as the elasticity of “production” in a standard Tullock contest, we show that players may dislike accuracy if heterogeneity among them is: (1) sufficiently low; (2) moderate when the initial accuracy is low; or (3) high when the initial accuracy is high. We apply our results to the recent adoption of goal-line technology by major European soccer leagues.

We use the merit function technique to formulate a linearly constrained bilevel convex quadratic problem as a convex program with an additional convex-d.c. constraint. To solve the latter problem we approximate it by convex programs with an additional convex-concave constraint using an adaptive simplicial subdivision. This approximation leads to a branch-and-bound algorithm for finding a global optimal solution to the

We present a game-theoretic treatment of distributed power control in CDMA wireless systems. We make use of the conceptual framework of noncooperative game theory to obtain a distributed and market-based control mechanism. Thus, we address not only the power control problem, but also pricing and allocation of a single resource among several users. A cost function is introduced as the difference between the pricing and utility functions, and the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium is established. In addition, two ...

To demonstrate resolution and psychological strength, players often engage in pre-contest communication by publicly stating their desire to win an upcoming contest. Existing explanations for this phenomenon revolve around incomplete information and signaling. In this paper, I offer a complementary explanation that does not rely on signaling. Within a complete information setup, I show that when communication involves not only an audience cost, e.g., a reputation loss, in case of a false statement (as assumed in the literature) but also an audience reward, e.g., a credibility gain, in case of a true statement, players may have an incentive for pre-contest communication.