Mohism

El Mòzǐ en español; La política del Amor Universal. Los textos filosóficos completos del Moísmo. Aunque el Confucianismo es la corriente principal del pensamiento milenario chino y la expresión pública tradicional de su idiosincrasia, permítame el lector que muestre aquí las pruebas y el sentido de la importancia capital del Moísmo, razón por la cual hemos traducido su obra completa por primera vez al español bajo el título La política del Amor Universal. Los textos filosóficos completos del Moísmo, Ed. Universidad de León, 2019. Los registros de la dinastía Han, principalmente de su gran historiador Sima Qian (139 ane-86 ane), ponen a la par a Confucio (551 ane-479 ane) y a Mòzǐ (470 ane-391 ane) como los dos grandes maestros del pensamiento chino. Otra medida o comparación del alcance del Moísmo, que se utiliza a menudo es la cita del libro de Mencio (372 ane-289 ane) afirmando que "las doctrinas de Mozi y Yang Zhu ocupan el Cielo", sin embargo, Mencio no vuelve a mencionar ni a referir más a Yang Zhu, maestro de la escuela 'egoísta', mientras que podemos afirmar que El Mencio está enteramente dedicado a refutar a Mòzǐ y a intentar restaurar el Confucianismo ante la preponderancia del Moísmo en su época. Como es conocido, la propuesta de Mozi es el "amor universal y la cooperación por el beneficio mutuo (común, universal)"-兼相愛交相利. El Confucianismo no negaba el amor universal, sino que proponía una gradación del mismo, cuya fuente política es el poder central, el Reino del Centro (Zhongguo-China) y, más concretamente, el Hijo del Cielo, al que se le instruye en la benevolencia-la forma de amor universal en el confucianismo. Pero otra gran diferencia entre ambos se manifiesta más claramente en el objeto de ese 'amor universal', ya que en el caso del Confucianismo sorprendentemente no es el beneficio (利-Lì).

0 1 D 0 This paper aims at reviewing Mòz doctrine by contextualizing some parts of the Mòbiān, or 0 1 D 0 Mòz´s dialectical chapters, attributed to the later Mohist School or Neo-Mohism. Before going into those texts, we will briefly review some aspects of today´s interpretation of the Mohist doctrine and compare the experience of Mohism in China with its Western counterparts, the Cosmopolitans. Our purpose is to inquiry about the circumstances preventing the success of the Universal Love 0 1 D 0 policy proposed by Mòz and see how those circumstances have been removed by globalization, which has paved the way to allow universality (simultaneity), for inclusive care through an inclusive decision-making system to be implemented and carried out in our time. Therefore, we claim for a renewed attention to the Mohist doctrine.

Durante el período de los Reinos Combatientes la reflexión sobre la guerra es de vital importancia para los pensadores chinos. En este trabajo analizaremos las posiciones de Mozi y Mencio al respecto comenzando, en primer lugar, con las diferencias filosóficas entre las propuestas de ambos, en especial en torno al rol de la utilidad o beneficio (li). Luego, con los argumentos que ambos exponen para oponerse a la guerra, en general en diálogos ante gobernantes de estados. Con esto intentaremos mostrar los vínculos entre teoría y estrategias persuasivas que aplicaban, y las similitudes y diferencias entre las posiciones de dos pensadores usualmente vistos como rivales. Palabras clave: MOZI, MENCIO, FILOSOFÍA CHINA, REINOS COMBATIENTES, GUERRA

Both Socrates and Mozi are said in Plato’s dialogues and in the Mozi respectively to have claimed that they are living a sort of life following superhuman “intention”: Socrates according to the Delphic oracle, and Mozi the intention of heaven. Some modern philosophers show discomfort with their “superstitious” attitudes, taking the claims literally as a kind of groundless devotion, while others conjecture “sensible” purposes to understand the mystic elements as providing moral lessons. This paper, by responding to these modern revisions of their doctrines, aims at highlighting the necessity of their (re-)introductions of superhuman perspectives to their inquiries. Through examining the similarities in Plato’s and Mohists’ demonstrations, the suggestion made will be that despite countless incommensurable features, heaven’s intention for Mohists offers a fundamental philosophical basis which enables them to develop arguments by means of sharp dichotomies, what is right or wrong, in the same way that Socrates in the Apology and in the Hippias Minor does for the development of Plato’s constructive endeavour beyond his Socratic a/euporetic legacy. Not only are their practices dependent on the presupposition of the existence of a perspective beyond humans, but also the reality of that perspective is established though their own investigative practices.

Chris Fraser has written a comprehensive and well-researched work on Mohist philos- ophy. Those who are not already familiar with Mohist thought will find Fraser’s overview of the primary texts and review of previous research very useful. For example, many interpreters assert that the Mohist state of nature argument to justify government authority is like that of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) in assuming that humans are innately self-interested. In contrast, Fraser follows those like FUNG Yu-lan (FENG Youlan 馮友蘭), who argue that, for the Mohists, conflict in the state of nature is driven by disagreement over values, not over conflicts of self-interested desires (86–87; compare Fung, History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952], vol. 1, 101). Fraser also makes a couple of original contribu- tions. He presents a novel account of the assumptions underlying the Mohists’ recom- mendations for transforming human motivations, and he challenges the standard understanding of “impartial caring.” I find the former to be very plausible, while the latter is quite dubious.

This article is a study of the Later Mohists' ‘Lesser Selection (Xiaoqu 小取)’, which, more than any other early Chinese text, seems to engage in the study of logic. I focus on a procedure that the Mohists called mou 侔. Arguments by móu are grounded in linguistic parallelism, implying perhaps that the Mohists were on the way to a formal analysis of argumentation. However, their main aim was to head off arguments by móu that targeted their own doctrines, and if their argument succeeds then it entails that linguistic parallelism can never ground a cogent argument. In a way, this committed them to the view that formal logic cannot work, but the fact that they did not pursue this line of investigation was by no means inevitable. One consequence of this study is that the Later Mohists conducted their logical work by studying the behaviour of terms and verb phrases, and did not identify the sentence as a significant linguistic unit. This tends to confirm Chad Hansen's generalisation that early Chinese philosophers did not posit sentences or other sentence-like entities such as propositions, beliefs, or laws. Focusing on subsentential expressions did not stop the Mohists from addressing genuinely logical issues, but it may help explain the fact that they never developed a conception of logical structure. This study includes the complete Chinese text of the ‘Lesser Selection’ and a translation in English.

In this essay, I hope to explore the idea of the supernatural and its uses in Mozi’s doctrines. Mohism is often characterised as having a belief or rather, utility for the use of the supernatural in its dogma. Supernatural in the context of this essay, would be taken to be in reference to the two main entities that is frequently mentioned in the Mozi, that is ghosts/spirits as well as, Heaven (tian). I would try to explore the philosophical implications of the usage of this supernatural device and also bearing in mind the other prevailing dogmas of the times such as Daoism and Confucianism. I would critique these two particular strands of thought and attempt to argue for the practicality and accessibility of Mozi’s ideas in comparison to both Daoism and Confucianism.

Mozi is an interesting philosopher or thinker in ancient China during Pre-Qin period. In this paper, I will develop my own view on Mozi’s notion of jian’ai by referring primarily to Mozi: Universal Love: Section 16 (trans. Watson 1963). Criticisms on Mozi’s jian’ai will be made based on my analysis on the primary texts, in support of secondary interpretations from contemporary scholars. Potential challenge posed by secondary interpretations to my arguments will be taken into consideration and defensive arguments will be formulated in response to it.

This paper develops an interdisciplinary critical perspective on the concept of ‘Confucian Heritage Cultures’ (CHC), used in intercultural education and English language teaching theory to explain the supposed culturally distinct learning habits and expectations many Asian students bring to academic classrooms in English-speaking countries. Drawing on political scientific, historical and philosophical research, it finds that the CHC thesis has little explanatory value; it does not take into account the effects of rapid social change in Asia, or the cultural diversity within and between contemporary Asian societies, and is often based on highly reductive, essentialist understandings of Confucian traditions themselves. Teachers are well advised to consider other explanations for their students’ learning habits and expectations and for the challenges they face in academic English classrooms.

La expresión Voluntad del Cielo (天志 Tiān zhì) de Mòzi es parte bien principal para entender su doctrina, sin embargo, en China los estudiantes conocen de Mòzi las expresiones y las triadas del Amor Universal (兼爱 Jiān ài) y Contra la Guerra de Agresión (Fēi gōng 非攻). Estas dos principales doctrinas dejan incompleto el sistema de Mòzi posibilitando su negación, mientras que la voluntad del Cielo se sostiene a si misma, ya que es el modelo o estándar, pero no es 'científica', no puede ser ni probada ni refutada (negada). En cualquier caso, conviene su revisión. Encontramos la expresión Mandato del Cielo, (Tiānmìng 天命) en Confucio que se traspasa o ejecuta el emperador o hijo del Cielo. Sin embargo, la Voluntad del Cielo de Mòzi no implica orden o mandato alguno, tan solo manifiesta una voluntad, un deseo del Cielo expresado en unas reglas de justicia dadas, pero no es ejecutivo y semeja mucho al Logos occidental. Pero, mejor, demos la palabra a Mòzi que se explique: Comienza la primera triada avisando de la imprudencia que es ofender al que aporta el orden, que a la postre el Cielo. Y "lo que el Cielo desea es justicia", lo que implica, se dice, que, como contraparte o consecuencia, "el hará lo que yo deseo", que es proveernos bonanza y librarnos de calamidades. Y ¿qué es la justicia? La no discriminación, así como la injusticia es la violencia. La segunda triada comienza refiriéndose a la justicia como lo que aporta orden al mundo y cómo esta procede del sabio y no del estúpido o el mediocre, de modo que, a la postre, su origen es el Cielo. Así como todos por nuestra simple humanidad entendemos que dañar está mal, Mòzi señala la supremacía del Cielo sobre el hijo del Cielo y de nuevo aconseja la conveniencia de atenernos a la voluntad del Cielo: "en el mundo aquellos que carecen de humanidad son desafortunados", pues no aman universalmente como el Cielo; son desagradecidos, pues "todo está dispuesto para para el bien del ser humano." Concluye como en la anterior triada señalando que el Cielo es el estándar o modelo de la justicia, como lo es el compás para determinar la circularidad o el péndulo para precisar la verticalidad. En la tercera triada comienza repitiendo, como en la primera, lo imprudente que es desobedecer la voluntad del Cielo y nos propone atenernos a ella para vivir con justicia, e igualmente insiste en que el origen de esta está en el Cielo y no en el hijo del Cielo, aunque aquí añade que así lo entienden falsamente los oficiales y caballeros-y también los confucianos. "¿Y cuál es la voluntad del Cielo? Amar a toda la gente del mundo universalmente. Atenerse a la intención del Cielo es ser universal y oponerse a ella es ser parcial, pues en la universalidad está la justicia y en la parcialidad está la fuerza." Finalmente, se pregunta Mòzi por el encomio que hace mucha literatura de lo inhumano, de la guerra, o más bien, claro, de la victoria y recuerda entonces los argumentos que ya esgrimía en Contra la Guerra de Agresión con varios ejemplos de cómo en comunidad (lo contrario de la parcialidad) rechazamos la agresión y el daño

In this paper, I argue for links between two texts that are usually seen as fundamentally distinct and even opposed: the Mozi and the Daodejing.  The first part of the paper lays out initial commonalities between the two texts, offering a justification for discussing them together.  The second part addresses the two main points of opposition between the texts – the contrast between an anthropocentric heaven (tian 天) in the Mozi and the way (dao 道) in the Daodejing, and the conflict between Mohist activism and the Daodejing’s non-action.  I argue that these differences actually emerge from shared assumptions, and that the Daodejing can be seen as working out tensions inherent in the Mozi.  The third part of the paper briefly considers textual sources that suggest hybrid or middle positions between the Mozi and the Daodejing, discussing the last fifteen chapters of the received Daodejing (all of which are missing in the Guodian materials) and parts of the first seven chapters of the Mozi. I conclude by suggesting that these linkages give us a glimpse of some earlier viewpoint that attempted to derive actions from the impartiality and generativity of nature itself, an approach linked closely to opposition to war and to the oppression of the people. The Mozi and the different parts of the Daodejing would represent various developments of some original position, with different orientations and vocabularies. This essay is a companion to “Divergences within the Lǎozǐ: A Study of Chapters 67-81” (T’oung Pao 100 (2014): 1-33), which provides an extensive argument for reading those chapters as expressing a view different from the rest of the Daodejing.

In Mohist philosophy, the gnomon is a metaphor for the standard of valid arguments. This metaphor comes from the method of establishing due east and west by observing gnomon shadows at dusk and dawn. I argue that there is also an overlooked, implicit aspect of the gnomon metaphor that comes from its function of measuring the height of heaven indirectly through proportional calculation. The function of indirect measurement inspires a strategy of argumentation in Mohist ethics, which I call "analogical upscaling." Such an argument draws a parallel between small-scale and large-scale actions for the purpose of determining the Will of Heaven in a particular circumstance, just as the gnomon measures heaven's physical height analogically. In the conclusion, I compare the epistemological status of light and shadow in the Mozi and Plato's Republic.

In this paper, a selection of arguments encountered in a pair of canonical classical Greek and Chinese literary and philosophical works are analyzed and compared. The works in which the passages selected for analysis occur are the Histories of Herodotus and the Fei Gong section in the Mozi. The present research focuses on three respective passages in these canonical classical Greek and Chinese works containing early examples of normative argumentation of an internally critical kind ('internal critique'). So-called deontic logic is then applied in order to formally analyze the argumentative content of the selected sections. It is shown that each of the Herodotean and Mohist examples of internal critique may be assigned a formally equivalent Chinese vis-à-vis Greek partner. Based on these similarities, the question of the origins of internal critique in the ancient Greek and Chinese cultural spheres is reconsidered.

Filozofowie chińscy już w Okresie Walczących Królestw (480-221 p.n.e.) pytali o źródła i granice stosowalności języka, jego strukturę oraz funkcje społeczne. Wykład przybliży podstawy filozofii języka starożytnych konfucjanistów, taoistów i motistów oraz przedstawicieli szkoły nazw, z której wywodził się Gongsun Long, autor "Traktatu o białym koniu". Wykład będzie próbą odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy (a jeśli tak, w jakim stopniu) specyfika języka chińskiego ograniczała bądź determinowała wnioski chińskich myślicieli. W końcu to "nie my mówimy językiem, to język nami mówi" (W. Gombrowicz).

‘How should I live my life?’ Inquiry into this question has the longest history in both ancient Greek and Chinese ‘philosophy’. The inquiries began with Socrates in Greece and Kongzi in China, although neither enterprise was documented by its originator. Inspired by Socrates, Plato is the founder of the notion of philosophy (philosophia φιλοσοφία) to exclusively mean his own type of investigation. On the other hand, no equivalent to Greek ‘philosophia’ or English ‘philosophy’ is found in the Lunyu or any other early Chinese text. However, Kongzi, like Socrates, does ask himself and his followers what life they should live and how they can become a better person. The Daodejing also offers sophisticated contemplations on the relation between dao (道) and human morality. And finally, with Mozi and his followers, strategic argumentative methods to discuss moral concerns are developed.
    This thesis looks closely into these very beginnings of the histories of moral inquiry to uncover their methodological differences. My research especially focusses on the problem of the identification of moral values, such as aretē (ἀρετή) on one hand, and ren (仁) and yi (義) on the other, in their respective relations with truth (alētheia ἀλήθεια) and dao (道). Establishment of these notions are crucial to the two traditions, since neither is able to discuss how to acquire or cultivate these moral values without a consensus on what they are.
    The research lays out a few strategies for approaching and comparing these texts composed in completely different intellectual contexts. The distinction between the authored texts and the masters they depict is one thing, but to regard the texts as presenting evolving doctrines is another. In light of the latter, differences in presentation become less pronounced by seeing inconsistency as the outcome of continuous reflections on and modifications of their own doctrines by single or multiple authors. The research essentially aims at understanding what the authors are doing through these texts, rather than to force the proposed ideas into stereotypical argumentative frameworks derived from modern philosophical contexts.
    In the end, I hope to show that these two traditions in ancient Greece and China methodologically come closest in Socratic definition and Platonic Forms (eidos εἶδος or idea ἰδέα) in Plato’s early and transitional dialogues and Mohist fa (法) and shi (實) in the Mozi. These notions contribute to the systematization of moral inquiries based upon complete definitions of each moral value. Nonetheless, their fundamentally distinctive views of the role of language in investigating moral truth and for practicing human dao eventually leads their endeavours in different directions. The Greek side, including Aristotle and the Stoics, develops formal logic as a propaedeutic to philosophical investigations, while the Chinese side appears to abandon Mohist moral realism and leans towards a distinctly pragmatic account of regulating and rectifying names (ming 名).
*The title has been included in Oxford Bibliographies (http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com) under the entry ‘Sino-Hellenic Studies: Comparative Studies of Early China and Greece (2018)’ written by Prof. Lisa Raphals.

The article follows the presumption according to which analogical inferences in Chinese tradition followed a structure that connected all elements within a particular kind. This structure functioned as the basic element of analogies. Another crucial characteristic of classical Chinese analogies is the method of combining meanings. The composition of clas­ sical Chinese sentences tends towards the intrinsic connection among the individual parts of the sentence, and rarely applies morphological signs. This particular feature of the Chi­ nese language also influenced the prevailing methods of thought that manifested themselves in the processes of inferences, based upon proximity, similarity and identity. Focusing upon early Confucian and Mohist philosophy, the author shows how and why these methods could lead to the creation of a specifically Chinese type of analogism.

It can be seen throughout the ancient Chinese texts of the Confucians that there is a deep yearning to return to times bygone. It seems throughout these texts there is a strong nostalgic view which desires that we return to the ancient rituals and ceremonies practiced by the ancient sage-kings. The reasons for this is that for the Confucians, much of human suffering can be attributed to the breakdown of traditions that were found in the Zhao Dynasty. In the following essay I will be illustrating many of the rituals that are encouraged by Confucians in accordance with ren. Once these rituals have been illustrated to the reader I will then state Mozi’s opposition to them. The overarching aim of this essay is to give the read an understanding of Confuciun ritualist behaviour and the reasons as to why Mozi opposes them. Towards the end I will state who I believe to offer a better way of life that is most beneficial to fair conduct of government.

Some contemporary scholars understand the doctrine of 'jian ai' (universal care) of the Mohists to be a less extreme position than it is sometimes made out to be and was often made out to be by opponents of the Mohists in their day.  I argue in this paper that there are a number of reasons in support of the "traditional" interpretation of the Mohist doctrine of jian ai, as a radical position calling for equal concern for all people, independent of particular relationships.

The Mohists develop the concept of yi 義 to denote what is morally right in a normative sense. We argue that this concept has, as one of its necessary conditions, a requirement to not harm others. Additionally, we will show that the motivation of developing this concept is that it can be both universalized and publicly agreed upon, thus serving the Mohists' endeavor to overcome human conflicts that make the world chaotic and unlivable. We argue therefore that the Mohist notion of gongyi 公義 is best captured by the requirement of "not harming." Moreover, we shall show that the Mohists themselves committed to this requirement as the first principle of all their core doctrines. Finally, we argue that due to the justifiability and universalizability of the requirement of "not harming," the Mohists' commitment to it as a prerequisite normatively justifies their other values in a way that was unprecedented at the time.

I defend an interpretation of the Mohist doctrine of inclusive care (jian ai 兼愛). This is often taken to imply that we should treat all people the same and feel the same way about them, regardless of how close they are to us; this sort of interpretation is bolstered by the common mistranslation of "jian ai" as "universal love." I stress the Mohists' insistence on the importance of particularist ties, especially within the family, as well as the reciprocity that they see as essential to inclusive care. I conclude that inclusive care amounts to a commitment, grounded in concern for all people, to doing one's part in the collective project of ensuring the well-being of all, with it understood that this requires us to actively concern ourselves primarily with the well-being of those close to us.

It is well known that the three bundles of bamboo strips found at Guōdiàn containing versions of materials found in the Lǎozǐ included no passages from the last fifteen chapters of the received text. This paper consists of a careful examination of those final fifteen chapters, arguing that they articulate a coherent philosophical position fundamentally different from and even opposed to that of the Guodian materials. The foundation of the last fifteen chapters is an anthropomorphic conception of heaven that supports the good, a view explicitly rejected in the rest of the Lǎozǐ. These last fifteen chapters support the use of punishments, show no awareness of skepticism about language or moralizing categories, and they have no concern with internal practices of self-cultivation. The paper concludes with some reflections on the background of the last fifteen chapters and on the significance of this argument for interpreting the Lǎozǐ, particularly the split between so-called “religious” and “philosophical” readings.

Survey course focusing on the major historical, political and social developments in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe and Australasia, from the Neolithic to the Reformation. This course incorporates multiple formative assessments to foster critical reading and analytical skills to help students prepare for summative projects and assessments.

This paper examines the role of individual judgment in classical Chinese philosophy through the conflict between the Mohists and the Mengzi.  I argue that the Mengzi ultimately argues for limits on individual judgment and calls instead for reliance on tradition.  This is set in contrast to the "birth of philosophy" in ancient Greece.

Sort of a programmatic piece, arguing that it is wrong to think of the Mohists' core doctrinal writings as targeting an existing philosophical discourse dominated by Confucians. The gentlemen they condemn are not Confucians but men who wielded political and social power and whose actions and attitudes most concerned the Mohists. Interpreting these texts as part of a philosophical debate with Confucians is anachronistic, and has motivated a number of misinterpretations. In fact, it is likely the arguments in these texts that provoked the rise of a philosophical discourse in early China in the first place.

A longstanding orthodoxy holds that the Mohists regard the promotion of li (benefit, 5 2 2 9) as their ultimate normative criterion, meaning that they measure what is yi (just, 7 F A 9) or buyi (unjust, 4 E 0 D 7 F A 9) depending on whether it maximizes li or not. This orthodoxy dates back at least to Joseph Edkins (1859), who saw Mozi as a utilitarian and an ally of Bentham. In this paper, we will argue that this orthodoxy should be reconsidered because it does not square with several passages from the Mozi. That the Mohists place a strong weight on the promotion of 'li for the whole world (tianxia zhi li, 5 9 2 9 4 E 0 B 4 E 4 B 5 2 2 9)' is uncontroversial. We argue, however, that in certain cases the Mohist moral calculus diverges in its rationale or outcome from li-promotionalism. This position rejects the orthodoxy by showing that Mohism and li-promotionalism are not entirely coterminous.
Please only cite to the published version available here:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09552367.2021.1960677
Citation: Yun Wu & Amin Ebrahimi Afrouzi (2021) Is Mohism really li-promotionalism?, Asian Philosophy, DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2021.1960677

Anecdotal narrative as a rhetorical, hermeneutical, literary, or argumentative device, is ubiquitous in early Chinese texts. Throughout these texts, we encounter and re-encounter many anecdotes through re-narration and allusion. Many essays in the present volume contain examples of these recurrent or stock anecdotes.  As these essays demonstrate, stock anecdotes often served as analogies, precedents, or historical allusions that were employed to illustrate ruling principles, elaborate moral norms, amplify arguments, or explicate canonical citations. Being evoked to support a wide range of positions, rather than as subjects of primary interest, the details (of plots, scenes, or wordings) of stock anecdotes could be adapted, abridged, or even omitted for each incarnation.
Some modified details in a version of a stock anecdote could appear quite trivial, yet upon close examination, these details reveal what might be otherwise overlooked about the history and thought of the text in which they occur. The case study examined in the current essay is a version of a stock anecdote — Mozi’s rescue of the state of Song — as it appears in Mozi 墨子 (Master Mo) chapter 50, titled “Gongshu” 公輸 after the surname of one of the main protagonists in the chapter. (Hereafter I will refer to the chapter as Mozi 50). As this “Gongshu” version is included in the book Mozi, scholars generally think, implicitly or not, that it was composed or edited by a Mohist author with the intent of illustrating or reiterating the standpoints of the Mozi. Yet, by paying close attention to the details of its ending, we discover that they contain conceptual and perspectival elements that depart from the rest of the Mozi. More specifically, we will see that the anecdote employs the concepts shen 神 (invisible) and ming 明 (visible) differently from other Mozi chapters and it praises Mozi for his lack of recognition. This praise spells out a view in conflict with the typical Mohist view of the positive correlation between one’s merit and one’s esteem. Such a conceptual pairing of shen and ming and the celebration of an unrecognized Mozi do not cohere with the rest of Mozi, but they do resonate with other discourses in the received Shizi 尸子 (Master Shi), Lüshi chunqiu 呂氏春秋 (Spring and Autumn Annals of Mr. Lü), and Huainanzi 淮南子 (The Master of Huainan). These discourses all refer to Mozi (and Kongzi 孔子 [Confucius] in conjunction), and they advocate ideas that are more generally associated with Daoism than with Mohism.
These particulars carry implications for the research on Mozi as an evolving text  and on the history of Mohist thought.  They suggest that the ending of the “Gongshu” anecdote might have been added to Mozi 50 after the completion and circulation of the main body of the anecdote, or that the ending might have been adapted by subsequent editors whose thought was somehow affiliated with a type of Daoism,  or that Mozi 50 was composed by a Mohist author whose discursive habit or standpoint departed from the majority of Mohist authors. Thus, this case study of Mozi 50 might either show a glimpse of how an early (perhaps pre-Han) Mozi may have differed from the received version as we know it  or reveal the diversity (e.g. the Daoist influence) of early Mohist thought.
This paper first describes the discontinuity between the body and the ending of the “Gongshu” anecdote, and highlights the “un-Mohist” concepts and perspectives in the anecdotal ending. In the second step I trace the “un-Mohist” elements in the Shizi, Lüshi chunqiu, and Huainanzi discourses, in an attempt to explain the rupture between the body and the ending of the “Gongshu” anecdote, interpret the “un-Mohist” message conveyed by the “Gongshu” ending, and indicate the Daoist tinges surrounding these discourses.

This essay is part of my series exploring the validity of the existence of “Classical Daoism” or Daojia 道家, “Dao Specialists.” Prior to examining the various texts on matters pertaining to ethics or morality (forthcoming in Part 5.3), it’s prudent to briefly discuss some relevant Chinese “ethical terms.” This is a work in progress: comments and questions are most welcome, as are notification of any typos or mistakes.

A proposta é oferecer um panorama das principais filosofias e religiões que emergiram na China a partir dos textos filosóficos, literários e históricos desenvolvidos no período mais ou menos do segundo milênio a.C. até cerca do século XIII d.C. Os encontros serão ao vivo pelo Google Meet, gravados, e disponibilizados na plataforma da Eagle - Gestão de Conhecimento. Abordaremos questões acerca da língua e do relativo isolamento dos chineses arcaicos. Disso, veremos seus mitos fundacionais, os primeiros textos relacionados à filosofia moral e política que se conectam com uma metafísica da contingência. Do humanismo das primeiras dinastias à decadência das guerras e tensões sociais surgem Confúcio, os taoístas, os legalistas, Mozi – e tantos outros tentando restaurar as glórias passadas. Das transições dinásticas da primeira unificação da China, passando pelo classicismo Han e novos períodos de fragmentação, veremos os desenvolvimentos das escolas principais, a introdução do budismo na China, até a chamada “Grande Síntese” neoconfuciana de Zhuxi.

Texto publicado na Coluna ANPOF em 16 de maio de 2021 em que articulei, de um lado, o debate ético sobre pena de morte entre duas escolas filosóficas da China antiga, e, de outro lado, o debate político atual brasileiro que diz que "bandido bom é bandido morto" e que somente o "cidadão de bem" deve ter direitos plenos. Mostrei a falácia contida nesse último discurso, sendo um tipo de falácia já denunciada pelo filósofo Xun na China antiga.

Mohism and Confucianism are usually characterized as utilitarian and anti-utilitarian, respectively. This article argues that although Confucians do not espouse the kind of utilitarianism found in the Mozi, both Confucianism and Mohism qualify as forms of consequentialism in emphasizing that the outcome of a given behavior or action constitutes the basis for determining whether the latter qualifies as morally good. Through an analysis of the classical texts of the Analects and the Mengzi, I demonstrate that the similarities between the Confucian and Mohist perspectives on yi 義 and li 利 are much greater than their supposed differences, which have generally been taken for granted. Like Mohism, Confucianism upholds what we might call a “deliberated utilitarianism.”

Those who are not already familiar with Mohist thought will find Fraser’s overview of the primary texts and review of previous research very useful. For example, many interpreters assert that the Mohist state of nature argument to justify government authority is like that of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) in assuming that humans are innately self-interested. In contrast, Fraser follows those like FUNG Yu-lan (FENG Youlan 馮友蘭), who argue that, for the Mohists, conflict in the state of nature is driven by disagreement over values, not over conflicts of self-interested desires (86–87; compare Fung, History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952], vol. 1, 101). Fraser also makes a couple of original contributions. He presents a novel account of the assumptions underlying the Mohists’ recommendations for transforming human motivations, and he challenges the standard understanding of “impartial caring.” I find the former to be very plausible, while the
latter is quite dubious.

The thought of KANG Youwei 康有為, who is revered as one of the most important Confucian politicians of modern China, has received considerable attention in recent decades. While many studies are devoted to Kang's theory of Confucianism and his political visions underlying the theory, what is generally overlooked is that, to a large extent, his arguments are built upon his understanding of Mohism. This article argues that KANG Youwei employs the Mozi 墨子 and early narratives about Mozi and Mohism to support his claims that Kongzi 孔子 authored the New-Text versions of the Five Classics, that he was a reformer of political institutions, and that he was a religious leader. By shedding light on KANG Youwei's discussions of Mohism, this article offers a reconstruction of his argument and an alternative perspective for investigating his New-Text interpretation of Confucianism.