Metaphysical grounding

Grounding is a hyperintensional notion: necessarily equivalent sentences need not be equivalent from a ground-theoretic perspective. How fine-grained, exactly, is grounding? There is a striking lack of consensus on this question. In this chapter, I try to systematize and review the main options that have been put forward in the literature. For reasons that have to do with both naturalness and convenience, I for the most part take the question to be about what is sometimes called, following terminology introduced by Kit Fine, strict full grounding, and I take for granted a conception of grounding as a relation that is many-to-one and non-factive. I discuss the consequences of making alternative assumptions only in the very last section.

In this paper, I address the grounding problem for contemporary Russellian panpsychism, or the question of how consciousness as an intrinsic nature is connected to dispositions or powers of objects. I claim that Russellian panpsychists cannot offer an adequate solution to the grounding problem and that they should reject the claim that consciousness, as an intrinsic nature, grounds the powers of objects. Instead, I argue that they should favour the identity theory of powers, where categorical and dispositional properties are identified. I maintain that the identity theory serves as a better ontological basis for panpsychism since it avoids the grounding problem. Apart from that, I also argue that identity theory panpsychism is a position more parsimonious than Russellian panpsychism since it introduces fewer entities while successfully avoiding the grounding problem. Based on these considerations, I conclude that identity theory panpsychism is an option worth considering.

“Realization” is a technical term that is used by metaphysicians, philosophers of mind, and philosophers of science to denote some dependence relation that is thought to obtain between higher-level properties and lower-level properties. It is said that mental properties are realized by physical properties; functional and computational properties are realized by first-order properties that occupy certain causal/functional roles; dispositional properties are realized by categorical properties; so on and so forth. Given this wide usage of the term “realization”, it would be right to think that there might be different dependence relations that this term denotes in different cases. Any relation that is aptly picked out by this term can be taken to be a realization relation. The aim of this state-of-the-field article is to introduce the central questions about the concept of realization, and provide formulations of a number of realization relations. In doing so, I identify some theoretical roles realization relations should play, and discuss some theories of realization in relation to these theoretical roles.

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How do we come to know metaphysical truths? How does metaphysical inquiry work? Are metaphysical debates substantial? These are the questions which characterize metametaphysics. This book, the first systematic student introduction dedicated to metametaphysics, discusses the nature of metaphysics - its methodology, epistemology, ontology and our access to metaphysical knowledge. It provides students with a firm grounding in the basics of metametaphysics, covering a broad range of topics in metaontology such as existence, quantification, ontological commitment and ontological realism. Contemporary views are discussed along with those of Quine, Carnap and Meinong. Going beyond the metaontological debate, thorough treatment is given to novel topics in metametaphysics, including grounding, ontological dependence, fundamentality, modal epistemology, intuitions, thought experiments and the relationship between metaphysics and science. The book will be an essential resource for those studying advanced metaphysics, philosophical methodology, metametaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of science.

We consider the connections between panpsychism and Russellian monism, and discuss recent objections to the positions due to Howell and Kind. We suggest possible avenues of response open to the Russellian monist, and develop the ideas of 'compatibilist' and 'necessitarian' Russellian monism.

This article aims to provide an explication of the doctrine of the monarchy of the Father. A precisification of the doctrine is made within the building-fundamentality framework provided by Karen Bennett, which enables a further clarification of the central elements of the doctrine to be made and an important objection against it to be answered.

In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism, the claim that there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the existence of certain entities within the layered structure of reality. More precisely, I assume the cogency of Swinburne’s explanatory framework and seek to resituate it within a new philosophical context-that of the field of contemporary metaphysics-which will enable me to develop a true fundamental explanation for the existence of the non-fundamental entities that fill up the various levels of the layered structure of reality. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation, we will have one more good reason to believe in the existence of God.

David Lewis famously introduces the debate over persistence as follows: Let us say that something persists iff, somehow or other, it exists at various times; this is the neutral word. Something perdures iff it persists by having different temporal parts, or stages, at different times, though no one part of it is wholly present at more than one time; whereas it endures iff it persists by being wholly present at more than one time. (1986: 202) This passage suggests that there are two different theories about how objects persist through time—the perdurantist theory that objects persist through time by having different temporal parts at different times, and the endurantist theory that objects persist through time by being wholly present at different times. This way of framing the debate over persistence involves both an important insight and an important error. Unfortunately , the error is often embraced and the insight is often ignored. This paper aims to correct both of these mistakes, and thus clarify the debate over persistence.

Philosophical analysis was the central preoccupation of 20th-century analytic philosophy. In the contemporary methodological debate, however, it faces a number of pressing external and internal challenges. While external challenges, like those from experimental philosophy or semantic externalism, have been extensively discussed, internal challenges to philosophical analysis have received much less attention. One especially vexing internal challenge is that the success conditions of philosophical analysis are deeply unclear. According to the standard textbook view, a philosophical analysis aims at a strict biconditional that captures the necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the relevant category. The textbook view arguably identifies a necessary condition on successful philosophical analyses, but understood as a sufficient condition it is untenable, as I will argue in this paper. To this end, I first uncover eight conditions of adequacy on successful philosophical analyses, some of which have rarely been spelled out in detail. As we shall see, even sophisticated alternatives to the textbook view fail to accommodate some of these conditions. I then propose the concept grounding view as a more promising account of philosophical analysis. According to this view, successful philosophical analyses require necessary biconditionals that are constrained by grounding relations among the concepts involved. Apart from providing a satisfactory account of philosophical analysis in its own right, the concept grounding view is also able to meet the challenge that the success conditions of philosophical analysis are problematically unclear.

This paper offers a critical appraisal of moderate truth pluralism through metaphysics. The appraisal is offered in the context of the ongoing debate between strong and moderate truth pluralists. Both kinds of pluralist endorse conceptual truth monism: there is a single concept of truth, TRUTH. Moderate pluralists endorse a generic truth property to go with truth. Strong pluralists maintain that there is no such property. Both moderate pluralists and strong pluralists endorse a plurality of properties (correspondence, coherence, superassertibility, etc.) that are truth-relevant for specific domains. Moderate pluralists think of truth-relevance as grounding: within a given domain instances of the truth-relevant property of that domain ground instances of generic truth. Generic truth is a property in its own right but, if true, propositions pertaining to a given domain are true because they have the truth-grounding property of the domain. Strong pluralists think of truth-relevance as reduction: truth is not a property in its own right. Within a given domain being true simply reduces to being F, where F is the truth-reducing property of the domain. We investigate how key ideas from contemporary metaphysics bear on moderate pluralism. We support three comparative claims: (i) instances of domain-specific truth-relevant properties enjoy a greater degree of qualitative similarity than instances of generic truth, (ii) domain-specific truth-relevant properties are more natural than generic truth, and (iii) domain-specific truth-relevant properties are more fundamental than generic truth. On the basis of our considerations regarding metaphysics we offer a critical appraisal of moderate pluralism. First, we argue that, in dealing with problems and challenges, moderate pluralist responses must always make ineliminable reference to the plurality of quasi-truth properties—a constraint that moderate pluralists often violate. Second, from a metaphysical point of view the unity of truth is in a certain sense grounded by its plurality—something that moderate pluralists tend to forget. Third, moderate pluralists cannot take the connection between TRUTH, the concept, and the nature of the property of truth to be too intimate. The former betrays the richness of the latter.

This paper develops a novel theory of abstraction-what we call collective abstraction. The theory solves a notorious problem for non-eliminative structuralism. The non-eliminative structuralist holds that in addition to various isomorphic systems there is a pure structure that can be abstracted from each of these systems; but existing accounts of abstraction fail for non-rigid systems like the complex numbers. The problem with the existing accounts is that they attempt to define a unique abstraction operation. The theory of collective abstraction instead simultaneously defines a collection of distinct abstraction operations, each of which maps a system to its corresponding pure structure. The theory is precisely formulated in an essentialist language. This allows us to throw new light on the question to what extent structuralists are committed to symmetric dependence. Finally, we apply the theory of collective abstraction to solve a problem about converse relations.

A fundamental fact is “pure” just in case it has no grounded entities—ex. Tokyo, President Biden, the River Nile, {Socrates}, etc.—among its constituents. Purity is the thesis that every fundamental fact is pure. I argue that Purity is false. My argument begins with a familiar conditional: if Purity is true, then there are no fundamental “grounding facts” or facts about what grounds what. This conditional is accepted by virtually all of Purity’s defenders. However, I argue that it is also the first step toward Purity’s undoing. For, if every grounding fact has a ground, then some grounded entities have “groundmates” or distinct grounded entities that share their full grounds. But, if there are groundmates, then Purity is false. So Purity leads to a contradiction. Therefore, it is false. I close by noting that my argument against Purity also gives us a powerful reason to think that some grounding facts are fundamental.

This working collection of essays problematizes biocentrist conceptions of humanity and looks past the competitive, dominating mechanical evolution of humanity in the Age of Scarcity and Labor to examine the potential for conscious evolution in an Age of Plenty and Leisure.

In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism, the claim that there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the instantiation of the grounding relation that connects the various entities within the layered structure of reality. More precisely, I seek to utilise the explanatory framework of Richard Swinburne within a specific metaphysical context, a ground-theoretic context, which will enable me to develop a true fundamental explanation for the existence of grounding. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation, we will have a further reason to believe in the existence of God.

There is clearly some intimate relation between Aristotelian form and the structure or organization of a composite thing. In recent years, some neo-Aristotelian philosophers have proposed that this relation is simply identity: forms are structures. I will argue both that Aristotelian forms (especially substantial forms) are essential elements in an adequate ontology and that they form a sui generis category. Substantial forms are not identical to the structure of composite substances: instead, they are metaphysical components of substances that constitute the metaphysical ground of that structure, in a sense of ground that has been rehabilitated in recent years by Kit Fine, Jonathan Schaffer, Gideon Rosen, and others. Forms are that in virtue of which substances are structured internally as they are.

Each of us has a vast network of belief systems that act as a sort of template to help us interpret and organize new information and experiences.  Included in this belief system is what we think is true in regards to the nature of reality.  As we encounter new data we use this network to interpret, analyze, and organize this data.  Our belief systems also act as filters to eliminate data that does not correlated with our constructs.  In this sense, our beliefs can limit our perceptions and keep us trapped in our current ways of thinking.

This paper argues that non-naturalism cannot explain the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, and this counts against the theory. Common sense normative methodology commits us to recognizing that there can be no difference in normative facts without there also being a difference in non-normative facts—this is a supervenience thesis. This thesis indicates that there is some sort of robust metaphysical connection between the normative and the non-normative. But non-naturalism, the view that these two types of facts are fundamentally different, pushes against there being an intimate relation of this sort. The paper explores possible relations on behalf of the non-naturalist by drawing on resources in the burgeoning literature surrounding metaphysical grounding and concludes that the only accounts that would suffice to explain the supervenience thesis require abandoning one’s non-naturalist commitments. The paper also gives a detailed analysis of a recent argument by Gideon Rosen that supervenience is the weakest of three views (strong supervenience, non-naturalism, and metaphysical essentialism) that logically cannot all be true together. The argument of this paper is that these three views are not logically inconsistent, and even if they were, supervenience is too important for normative theorizing to reject.

The question of ontological foundation has undergone a noteworthy revival in recent years: metaphysicians today quarrel about how exactly to understand the asymmetrical and hyperintensional relationship of grounding. One of the reasons for this revival is that the old quantificationalist meta-ontology inherited from Quine has been effectively criticised by leading philosophers favourable to a meta-ontology, the aim of which is to come to know “which facts/items ground (constitute the base of) which other facts/items”, thus to examine the relation of ontological dependence between beings (e.g. chemical properties depend on physical properties, the economic situation on the behaviour of individuals etc.), i.e. to explore the hierarchical structure of reality. I shall not discuss here the relationship of grounding in itself, but make some historical-formal remarks on the properties of the ultimate ontological foundational item itself and its aporetic nature. To do so I explore various more or less exotic philosophical ecosystems in the following order: Heidegger (Seyn), Plato (ἕν), Wáng Bi (道, dào). On the way I shall propose a new interpretation both of certain hypotheses in the Parmenides and of the nature of the opposition between Wáng Bì and Guō Xiàng in regard to the logical grammar of the expression “nothing (無, wú)”

PhD Thesis

This thesis is an investigation into the implications of the introduction of grounding into established debates on the laws of nature, focussing mainly on the implications for David Lewis’s Humean account, and David Armstrong’s universals account.

In chapter 2, I flesh out the notion of grounding that I use throughout the thesis. Grounding is intended to capture the notion of metaphysical dependence. Previously, metaphysical dependence was thought of as being the relation of supervenience. I explain the reasons for the rejection of supervenience in favour of the primitive notion of grounding. Having done so, I then explore grounding’s formal features, how best to regiment grounding talk, what the relata of grounding might be, and the relations connection to explanation. I then move on to discuss how universal generalisations are grounded, whether grounding is ontologically innocent (whether we pay an ontological price for grounded entities, beyond that paid for their grounds) and lastly, argue that ontological dependence should be understood as a species of grounding.

In chapter 3, I then employ the notion of grounding to assess Armstrong’s theory (1978) of universals. I explain how grounding might be employed to solve the problem of unity (the problem of how particulars and universals are held together in states of affairs), and how doing so provides significant theoretical benefits. Having argued that employing grounding is beneficial for Armstrong’s account, I then use grounding to demonstrate an underlying tension in Armstrong’s account that is visible once the account is stated in terms of grounding. Armstrong requires, to solve the problem of unity, that states of affairs ground their constituents. The consequence of this, however, is that his account of laws says that laws are constituents of states of affairs. As such, it appears instances of laws (being states of affairs) ground laws themselves. This is particularly problematic for Armstrong, given that he accords laws a governing role; if laws are grounded by their instances, what mechanism remains for them to govern those same instances?

In chapter 4, I explore the implications for Lewis’s (1973) Humean account of the laws of nature. I explain the motivations for the contemporary Humean’s famous denial of necessary connections, concluding that contemporary Humeans would be reluctant to commit to an irreducibly modal notion like grounding as a result of the denial. I then argue, however, that without a notion like grounding, Humeanism collapses into an interminably expensive position, ontologically. Furthermore, shorn of any notion of dependence other than supervenience, I demonstrate the counterintuitiveness of the resulting position, in so far as it requires that we sacrifice any notion of fundamentality, and offers no account of how laws explain their instances. I finally highlight a separate problem for Humeanism, in that, despite the frequency with which one hears the claim, Humean laws don’t actually appear to supervene on their instances.

On a natural picture (one that is natural in general, but is especially attractive for Robust Realists), particular moral facts are partly grounded in the morally relevant natural facts, and partly in moral principles. However, Selim Berker has recently challenged that picture by arguing that a plausible understanding of the content of moral principles precludes them from doing any grounding work.
This paper is a response to Berker. Utilizing a comparison with legal facts and how they are grounded in legal norms or principles, I argue that accepting grounding pluralism (as we should) there is no problem in moral principles (and legal ones, and many many others) grounding particular moral (and legal, and ...) facts.

This article builds on C. S. Peirce’s suggestive blueprint for an inclusive outlook that grants reality to his three categories. Moving away from the usual focus on (contentious) cosmological forces, I use a modal principle to partition various ontological layers: regular sign-action (like coded language) subsumes actual sign-action (like here-and-now events) which in turn subsumes possible sign-action (like qualities related to whatever would be similar to them). Once we realize that the triadic sign’s components are each answerable to this asymmetric subsumption, we obtain the means to track at which level of complexity semiosis finds itself, in a given case. Since the bulk of such a “trinitarian” metaphysics would be devoted to countenancing un-interpreted phenomena, I argue that current misgivings about sign-based ontologies are largely misplaced.

Is it possible to provide an account of metaphysical grounding in terms of essence? E. J. Lowe addresses a similar question about truth-making and essence, and makes a suggestion which points towards a positive answer. Kit Fine addresses the original question and answers negatively. I argue that the prospects for an account of metaphysical grounding in terms of essence are not as bad as one might have thought.

In this paper I suggest a new interpretation of the relations of inherence, causation and conception in Spinoza. I discuss the views of Don Garrett on this issue and argue against Della Rocca's recent suggestion that a strict endorsement of the PSR leads necessarily to the identification of the relations of inherence, causation and conception. I argue that (1) Spinoza never endorsed this identity, and (2) that Della Rocca's suggestion could not be considered as a legitimate reconstruction or friendly amendment to Spinoza's system because it creates several severe and irresolvable problems in the system.

In the first part of the paper, I present the considerations and arguments that motivated Don Garrett's and Della Rocca's interpretations. In the second part, I present and examine several problems that result from Della Rocca's reading. In the third and final part, I (1) present my own view on the relation among inherence, causation, and conception; (2) offer a new interpretation of the conceived through relation in Spinoza; and finally, (3) defend and justify the presence of (non-arbitrary) bifurcations at the very center of Spinoza's system.

Priority monism-the position that one object, the Cosmos, is fundamental-has recently been brought to the fore by Jonathan Schaffer, who has put forward a variety of arguments in its favour. In this paper, however, I defend a new version of priority monism on which the Cosmos is also identical to its proper parts collectively. This involves accepting composition is identity, and I call this version of monism 'weak priority monism' (WPM). The aim of this paper is to argue that not only is (WPM) a coherent metaphysical view, but is preferable to Schaffer's version of monism on two grounds: it gives a better account of the world's heterogeneity, and solves the problem of 'weak junk'. I then defend (WPM) from two potential objections: it is committed to mereological essentialism, and is incompatible with emergent properties. Contra Schaffer, then, I hold the priority monist should embrace composition is identity as a mereological thesis.

In what follows, a plausible version of the panpsychist thesis is worked out
before two arguments for panpsychism are examined for their soundness. In a next step, two arguments against the developed panpsychist thesis are discussed, which, prima facie, pose theoretically insurmountable aporia for it. In a final step, it is argued that panpsychism as located in analytic philosophy can overcome these problems when it is included in the wider theoretical framework of panentheism, as it is paradigmatically set out in the classical German philosophy of the panentheist Karl Christian Friedrich Krause and his pupil Arthur Schopenhauer.

I will use paradox as a guide to metaphysical grounding, a kind of non-causal explanation that has recently shown itself to play a pivotal role in philosophical inquiry. Specifically, I will analyze the grounding structure of the Predestination paradox, the regresses of Carroll and Bradley, Russell's paradox and the Liar, Yablo's paradox, Zeno's paradoxes, and a novel omega plus one variant of Yablo's paradox, and thus find reason for the following: We should continue to characterize grounding as asymmetrical and irreflexive. We should change our understanding of the transitivity of grounding in a certain sense. We should require foundationality in a new, generalized sense, that has well-foundedness as its limit case. Meta-grounding is important. The polarity of grounding can be crucial. Thus we will learn a lot about structural properties of grounding from considering the various paradoxes. On the way, grounding will also turn out to be relevant to the diagnosis (if not the solution) of paradox. All the paradoxes under consideration will turn out to be breaches of some standard requirement on grounding, which makes uniform solutions of large groups of these paradoxes more desirable. In sum, bringing together paradox and grounding will be shown to be of considerable value to philosophy.

Realists about universals face a question about grounding. Are things how they are because they instantiate the universals they do? Or do they instantiate those universals because they are how they are? Take Ebenezer Scrooge. You can say that (i) Scrooge is greedy because he instantiates greediness, or you can say that (ii) Scrooge instantiates greediness because he is greedy. I argue that there is reason to prefer the latter to the former. I develop two arguments for the view. I also respond to some concerns one might have about the view defended. I close by showing that analogous views regarding the truth of propositions (that if the proposition that p is true, then it is true because p) and the existence of facts (that if the fact that p exists, then it exists because p) are supported by analogs of one of these arguments.

Priority and posteriority are about ordering: the prior comes before the posterior. In the 14th century, Latin scholastics discussed different types of ordering. They asked: what types of priority are there, and how should they be defined? I examine William Ockham's analysis of two kinds: (1) priority in time and place, and (2) natural priority. For Ockham, objects $x$ and $y$ are ordered by time or place when they correspond to sequential times or places $u$ and $v$. Crucially, in order for $x$ to be prior to $y$, $x$ must correspond to $u$ by itself, without $y$. Regarding natural priority, Ockham defines it like this: $x$ is naturally prior to $y$ iff $x$ can exist without $y$ but not vice versa. Ockham sharply distinguishes this from causal priority, and that has a number of consequences. (1) Things can be naturally ordered, even if there is no causal connection between them. (2) Necessary things cannot be naturally ordered. They must be naturally simultaneous. (3) Mutually separable items cannot be naturally ordered either. (4) Natural priority is not a type of dependence.

Priority Monism – the position that what is fundamental is one object, the Cosmos – has recently been brought to the fore by Jonathan Schaffer, who has put forward a variety of arguments in its favour. However, Priority Monism has been criticised on the grounds that worldless junk – where for something to be junky is for every part of it to be a proper part – is metaphysically possible. The aim of this paper is to investigate how the monist can deal with this problem. I argue they can successfully argue against junk’s possibility, but their response leaves a new problem for monism. To get round this problem, they need to develop a new version of Priority Monism, on which the Cosmos is identical to all its parts taken collectively. Contra Schaffer, I think a Priority Monist can and should hold to the thesis that Composition is Identity.

Explanandum: no normative difference without non-normative difference.
-->what explains this supervenience?
Answer defended:
(i) The normative supervenes on the non-normative as a matter of metaphysical necessity, i.e. in virtue of the essence of some entities.
(ii) The essences incurring responsibility for supervenience depend on the cases. Sometimes:
1. the essence of non-normative entities;
2. the essence of normative principles. (legal norms);
3. the essence of the supervenient normative features.
(iii) Negative theses defend along the way:
1. No normative necessitation.
2. Normative principles as grounds for supervenience works only for a limited number of cases.

The book provides the first analysis of Karl Christian Friedrich Krause’s system of philosophy and his panentheism in English. Karl Christian Friedrich Krause has bequeathed to us a system of philosophy which is little recognised in contemporary philosophy. This is both surprising and unfortunate, because Krause’s philosophical system has much to offer: Through transcendental reflection on the nature of the human, Krause understands God as the one infinite and unconditioned reality, and the ultimate necessary condition of knowledge. God makes humanity, nature, and reason ultimately comprehensible as the essential categories of the divine Essence. God is thus the single, primary, object of science that is already logically presupposed even before His discovery. Science presupposes theology, and theology is best read as panentheism.