Stephen Yablo suggested that the relation of mental properties to physical properties is the same... more Stephen Yablo suggested that the relation of mental properties to physical properties is the same as that between red and scarlet: one of determinable property to determinate property. So just as being scarlet is a specific way of being red, on Yablo's proposal being a certain neurological property (c-fibres firing, say) is a specific way of being a certain mental property (pain, in this case). I explain the virtues of this theory, in particular as defended and developed by Jessica Wilson, but raise some problems for it. I then describe a novel theory of the mental/physical relationship, which inverts the Yablo-Wilson proposal. On this theory mental properties, notably phenomenal properties-or, as I will say, qualia-are determinates of determinable physical properties. I explain the virtues of this view, and argue that they at least match, and plausibly exceed, those of the Yablo-Wilson theory. In particular, this new theory is able to account for certain prominent perplexities of the mind/body problem that tend to go unexplained. I distinguish the view from nearby theories, in particular the increasingly popular 'Russellian monism'. I end by likening it to a recent interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy of mind due to David Charles.
Conscious mental qualities, aka phenomenal qualities, are seemingly a leading factor in much of o... more Conscious mental qualities, aka phenomenal qualities, are seemingly a leading factor in much of our behaviour. Pains make us recoil from painful stimuli, itches make us scratch, feelings of anger sometimes make us shout, visually perceiving red leads us to halt at stop lights, and so on. To relinquish this claim about the efficacy of conscious mental qualities would mean surrendering a major component of our everyday, intuitive self-conception; hence, the claim enjoys considerable prima facie plausibility. Unconscious mental qualities, however, have been posited by a mere handful of philosophers historically, and are nowadays almost universally rejected. Via a case study of 'restless legs syndrome', I argue that there is a hitherto unnoticed cost to this prevailing rejection of unconscious mental qualities: the causal efficacy of conscious mental qualities is threatened. In fact, I argue, we face a dilemma: To endorse epiphenomenalism about conscious mental qualities, or to posit unconscious mental qualities. Since it is so plausible that conscious mental qualities are causally efficacious, this reasoning constitutes an argument for unconscious mental qualities. Moving beyond the sensory case, I explain how analogous reasoning might apply to other mental faculties where phenomenal qualities seem causally involved; notably, emotions and mental imagery.
Conscious and Unconscious States and Processes (Routledge, forthcoming, eds. Tomas Marvan and Juraj Hvorecky)
Feeling theories of emotions equate emotions with episodes of conscious qualitative character, of... more Feeling theories of emotions equate emotions with episodes of conscious qualitative character, of a distinctive emotional 'feel'. The feeling theory cannot be true simpliciter, since there are unconscious emotions but no such thing as unconscious feelings. Jesse Prinz and Uriah Kriegel attempt to modify the feeling theory to accommodate unconscious emotions. I argue that their theories founder on a dilemma: they can say either that emotions are feelings, or that there are unconscious emotions, but not both. In their place I propose a simple new feeling theory, which identifies emotions with emotional qualitative characters. When these emotional qualitative characters are conscious, they are feelings. But since emotions can exist unconsciously, it follows, as against Prinz, Kriegel, and others, that qualitative character can exist unconsciously, a thesis I clarify and defend.
Synthese - text available at: https://rdcu.be/cRzZO, 2022
Frank Jackson's case of Mary the colour scientist, and the knowledge argument against physicalism... more Frank Jackson's case of Mary the colour scientist, and the knowledge argument against physicalism built upon it, are well known. This paper starts from Jackson's other, more neglected, thought experiment, about Fred, who sees a unique shade of red. It explores two senses in which properties are said to be 'objective', roughly corresponding to the ideas of a property's being intersubjectively accessible, on the one hand, and its being knowable without the need for special experiences, on the other. These senses of the objective are contrasted, and their links to the doctrine of physicalism explored, and it is argued that, in the sense of objectivity we should embrace, mental qualities come out as objective and physical properties. The paper ends up by proposing a novel theory about how mental qualities fit into the world - as determinates of determinable physical properties, a view that is distinguished from the closely related 'Russellian monism'.
This paper argues for a kind of intrinsically unconscious mental-qualitative intentional content ... more This paper argues for a kind of intrinsically unconscious mental-qualitative intentional content as constituting the 'mark of the mental', in an attempt to integrate insights from the phenomenal intentionality programme, Brentano, and Freud about the mind's essential nature. It discusses and rebuts historical objections to the notion of unconscious qualitative character, and ends up by proposing a unified 'qualitative' conception of conscious and unconscious mentality.
Forthcoming in Phenomenology and Mind, special issue on the mark of the mental.
*Penultimate Draft - in press, Philosophical Studies*
Full text at: https://rdcu.be/cnjad
What ... more *Penultimate Draft - in press, Philosophical Studies*
What should you say about unconscious mental states, and their contents, if you believe in phenomenal intentionality/cognitive phenomenology? Here I focus on the case of belief, and a debate between Tim Crane, who holds that beliefs are only ever unconscious, and David Pitt, who holds that beliefs are only ever conscious. I object to both, and argue that we should say instead that beliefs can be conscious or unconscious, and have their contents fixed all the while by qualia. This requires that qualia can exist unconsciously, a notion I explain and defend. So, there is a stream of unconsciousness as well as a stream of consciousness.
Qualitative Consciousness and Higher-Order Thought: Themes from the Philosophy of David Rosenthal (J. Weisberg ed., Cambridge University Press), 2021
Higher-order theories analyse consciousness as higher-order mental representation. Phenomenal int... more Higher-order theories analyse consciousness as higher-order mental representation. Phenomenal intentionality theories understand mental representation in terms of mental qualitative character or qualia. What happens when we try to combine the two, understanding higher-order mental representation, hence consciousness, in terms of phenomenal intentionality? That's the idea this paper explores.
Penultimate draft of paper to appear in J. Weisberg (ed.) *Qualitative Consciousness and Higher-Order Thought: Themes from the Philosophy of David Rosenthal* (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
According to Russellian monism, phenomenal consciousness is constituted by inscrutables: intrinsi... more According to Russellian monism, phenomenal consciousness is constituted by inscrutables: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. On Russellian physicalism, those inscrutables are construed as protophenomenal properties: non-structural properties that both categorically ground dispositional properties and, perhaps when appropriately structured, collectively constitute phenomenal properties. Some (Morris 2016, Brown 2017) argue that protophenomenal properties cannot serve this purpose, given assumptions Russellian monists typically make about the modal profile of such properties. Those assumptions, it is argued, entail that protophenomenal properties are ‘experience specific’, that is, they are individuated by their potential to constitute phenomenal properties, and are thus not genuinely physical. However, we argue, that reasoning assumes that physical inscrutables must be individuated in terms of their (actual or possible) grounding roles. Not only is that assumption questionable: it is antithetical to Russellian monism.
According to Russellian panpsychism, familiar conscious experiences are constituted by phenomenal... more According to Russellian panpsychism, familiar conscious experiences are constituted by phenomenal properties that categorically ground dispositional properties posited by fundamental physics. In this entry, we discuss two challenges to that theory: that it fails to adequately integrate consciousness into physical causation (Howell 2015); and that its alleged advantages over traditional dualist and traditional physicalist theories are illusory (Kind 2015). We argue that neither challenge is insurmountable.
According to Russellian monism, consciousness is constituted at least partly by quiddities: intri... more According to Russellian monism, consciousness is constituted at least partly by quiddities: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. If the theory is true, then consciousness and such dispositional properties are closely connected. But how closely? The contingency thesis says that the connection is contingent. For example, on this thesis the dispositional property associated with negative charge might have been categorically grounded by a quiddity that is distinct from the one that actually grounds it. Some argue that Russellian monism entails the contingency thesis and that this winds up making its consciousness-constituting quiddities epiphenomenal—a disastrous outcome for a theory that is motivated partly by its prospects for integrating consciousness into physical causation. We consider two versions of that argument, a generic version and an intriguing version developed by Robert J. Howell, which he bases on Jaegwon Kim’s well-known “exclusion argument.” We argue that neither succeeds.
The Knowledge Argument, Classic Philosophical Arguments Series (Cambridge University Press), 2019
Draft introduction to a forthcoming collection of essays on Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, f... more Draft introduction to a forthcoming collection of essays on Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, featuring:
Tim Crane, David Rosenthal, Brie Gertler, David Pitt, Frank Jackson, Galen Strawson, Torin Alter, Amy Kind, Tom McClelland, Philip Goff, Hedda Hassel March, Robert Howell, and Michael Tye.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/knowledge-argument/4E82722A55EA31B9B623EEAB3B13767D#fndtn-information
The Philosophy of Suffering, eds. D. Bain, M. Brady and J. Corns, 2019
The popular view on which unpleasant pain consists of two dissociable components, and on which th... more The popular view on which unpleasant pain consists of two dissociable components, and on which there may be pains that wholly lack affect, is the product of a theoretical deference to consciousness. The same is true of the thesis that suffering is exclusively a conscious phenomenon. Pain researchers defer to consciousness, but in my view they do not properly heed its message regarding pain, painfulness, and suffering. I will argue that consciousness actually gives us a double-edged message about these phenomena. Introspection reveals pain and painfulness to be essentially kinds of qualia, or qualitative character, (§1)—a thesis I defend from the ‘heterogeneity problem’ (§2). But introspection also prompts a conception of pain and painfulness on which these are capable in principle of unconscious existence (§3, §5). This implies, in turn, that suffering may well occur unconsciously (§§4-5), something I argue for in part by criticising rival models of suffering (§4). Taking consciousness seriously as an epistemic source for the natures of pain, painfulness, and suffering, thus has the surprising result that consciousness is removed from the metaphysics of pain, painfulness, and suffering.
Draft of an article to appear in U. Kriegel (ed.) Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousn... more Draft of an article to appear in U. Kriegel (ed.) Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness.
We consider the connections between panpsychism and Russellian monism, and discuss recent objecti... more We consider the connections between panpsychism and Russellian monism, and discuss recent objections to the positions due to Howell and Kind. We suggest possible avenues of response open to the Russellian monist, and develop the ideas of 'compatibilist' and 'necessitarian' Russellian monism.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2019
In this paper I develop a theory of personhood which leaves open the possibility of construing th... more In this paper I develop a theory of personhood which leaves open the possibility of construing the universe as a person. If successful, it removes one bar to endorsing pantheism. I do this by examining a rising school of thought on personhood, on which persons, or selves, are understood as identical to episodes of consciousness. Through a critique of this experiential approach to personhood, I develop a theory of self as constituted of qualitative mental contents, but where these contents are also capable of unconscious existence. On this theory, though we can be conscious of our selves, consciousness turns out to be inessential to personhood. This move, I then argue, provides resources for responding to the pantheist’s problem of God’s person.
Over many years and in many publications David Rosenthal has developed, defended and applied his ... more Over many years and in many publications David Rosenthal has developed, defended and applied his justly well-known higher-order thought theory of consciousness. In this paper I explain the theory, then provide a brief history of a major objection to it. I suggest that this objection is ultimately ineffectual, but that behind it lies a reason to look beyond Rosenthal’s theory to another sort of HOT theory. I then offer my own HOT theory as a suitable alternative, before concluding in a final section.
( in Transformação special issue on theories of consciousness edited by A. Pereira)
Stephen Yablo suggested that the relation of mental properties to physical properties is the same... more Stephen Yablo suggested that the relation of mental properties to physical properties is the same as that between red and scarlet: one of determinable property to determinate property. So just as being scarlet is a specific way of being red, on Yablo's proposal being a certain neurological property (c-fibres firing, say) is a specific way of being a certain mental property (pain, in this case). I explain the virtues of this theory, in particular as defended and developed by Jessica Wilson, but raise some problems for it. I then describe a novel theory of the mental/physical relationship, which inverts the Yablo-Wilson proposal. On this theory mental properties, notably phenomenal properties-or, as I will say, qualia-are determinates of determinable physical properties. I explain the virtues of this view, and argue that they at least match, and plausibly exceed, those of the Yablo-Wilson theory. In particular, this new theory is able to account for certain prominent perplexities of the mind/body problem that tend to go unexplained. I distinguish the view from nearby theories, in particular the increasingly popular 'Russellian monism'. I end by likening it to a recent interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy of mind due to David Charles.
Conscious mental qualities, aka phenomenal qualities, are seemingly a leading factor in much of o... more Conscious mental qualities, aka phenomenal qualities, are seemingly a leading factor in much of our behaviour. Pains make us recoil from painful stimuli, itches make us scratch, feelings of anger sometimes make us shout, visually perceiving red leads us to halt at stop lights, and so on. To relinquish this claim about the efficacy of conscious mental qualities would mean surrendering a major component of our everyday, intuitive self-conception; hence, the claim enjoys considerable prima facie plausibility. Unconscious mental qualities, however, have been posited by a mere handful of philosophers historically, and are nowadays almost universally rejected. Via a case study of 'restless legs syndrome', I argue that there is a hitherto unnoticed cost to this prevailing rejection of unconscious mental qualities: the causal efficacy of conscious mental qualities is threatened. In fact, I argue, we face a dilemma: To endorse epiphenomenalism about conscious mental qualities, or to posit unconscious mental qualities. Since it is so plausible that conscious mental qualities are causally efficacious, this reasoning constitutes an argument for unconscious mental qualities. Moving beyond the sensory case, I explain how analogous reasoning might apply to other mental faculties where phenomenal qualities seem causally involved; notably, emotions and mental imagery.
Conscious and Unconscious States and Processes (Routledge, forthcoming, eds. Tomas Marvan and Juraj Hvorecky)
Feeling theories of emotions equate emotions with episodes of conscious qualitative character, of... more Feeling theories of emotions equate emotions with episodes of conscious qualitative character, of a distinctive emotional 'feel'. The feeling theory cannot be true simpliciter, since there are unconscious emotions but no such thing as unconscious feelings. Jesse Prinz and Uriah Kriegel attempt to modify the feeling theory to accommodate unconscious emotions. I argue that their theories founder on a dilemma: they can say either that emotions are feelings, or that there are unconscious emotions, but not both. In their place I propose a simple new feeling theory, which identifies emotions with emotional qualitative characters. When these emotional qualitative characters are conscious, they are feelings. But since emotions can exist unconsciously, it follows, as against Prinz, Kriegel, and others, that qualitative character can exist unconsciously, a thesis I clarify and defend.
Synthese - text available at: https://rdcu.be/cRzZO, 2022
Frank Jackson's case of Mary the colour scientist, and the knowledge argument against physicalism... more Frank Jackson's case of Mary the colour scientist, and the knowledge argument against physicalism built upon it, are well known. This paper starts from Jackson's other, more neglected, thought experiment, about Fred, who sees a unique shade of red. It explores two senses in which properties are said to be 'objective', roughly corresponding to the ideas of a property's being intersubjectively accessible, on the one hand, and its being knowable without the need for special experiences, on the other. These senses of the objective are contrasted, and their links to the doctrine of physicalism explored, and it is argued that, in the sense of objectivity we should embrace, mental qualities come out as objective and physical properties. The paper ends up by proposing a novel theory about how mental qualities fit into the world - as determinates of determinable physical properties, a view that is distinguished from the closely related 'Russellian monism'.
This paper argues for a kind of intrinsically unconscious mental-qualitative intentional content ... more This paper argues for a kind of intrinsically unconscious mental-qualitative intentional content as constituting the 'mark of the mental', in an attempt to integrate insights from the phenomenal intentionality programme, Brentano, and Freud about the mind's essential nature. It discusses and rebuts historical objections to the notion of unconscious qualitative character, and ends up by proposing a unified 'qualitative' conception of conscious and unconscious mentality.
Forthcoming in Phenomenology and Mind, special issue on the mark of the mental.
*Penultimate Draft - in press, Philosophical Studies*
Full text at: https://rdcu.be/cnjad
What ... more *Penultimate Draft - in press, Philosophical Studies*
What should you say about unconscious mental states, and their contents, if you believe in phenomenal intentionality/cognitive phenomenology? Here I focus on the case of belief, and a debate between Tim Crane, who holds that beliefs are only ever unconscious, and David Pitt, who holds that beliefs are only ever conscious. I object to both, and argue that we should say instead that beliefs can be conscious or unconscious, and have their contents fixed all the while by qualia. This requires that qualia can exist unconsciously, a notion I explain and defend. So, there is a stream of unconsciousness as well as a stream of consciousness.
Qualitative Consciousness and Higher-Order Thought: Themes from the Philosophy of David Rosenthal (J. Weisberg ed., Cambridge University Press), 2021
Higher-order theories analyse consciousness as higher-order mental representation. Phenomenal int... more Higher-order theories analyse consciousness as higher-order mental representation. Phenomenal intentionality theories understand mental representation in terms of mental qualitative character or qualia. What happens when we try to combine the two, understanding higher-order mental representation, hence consciousness, in terms of phenomenal intentionality? That's the idea this paper explores.
Penultimate draft of paper to appear in J. Weisberg (ed.) *Qualitative Consciousness and Higher-Order Thought: Themes from the Philosophy of David Rosenthal* (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
According to Russellian monism, phenomenal consciousness is constituted by inscrutables: intrinsi... more According to Russellian monism, phenomenal consciousness is constituted by inscrutables: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. On Russellian physicalism, those inscrutables are construed as protophenomenal properties: non-structural properties that both categorically ground dispositional properties and, perhaps when appropriately structured, collectively constitute phenomenal properties. Some (Morris 2016, Brown 2017) argue that protophenomenal properties cannot serve this purpose, given assumptions Russellian monists typically make about the modal profile of such properties. Those assumptions, it is argued, entail that protophenomenal properties are ‘experience specific’, that is, they are individuated by their potential to constitute phenomenal properties, and are thus not genuinely physical. However, we argue, that reasoning assumes that physical inscrutables must be individuated in terms of their (actual or possible) grounding roles. Not only is that assumption questionable: it is antithetical to Russellian monism.
According to Russellian panpsychism, familiar conscious experiences are constituted by phenomenal... more According to Russellian panpsychism, familiar conscious experiences are constituted by phenomenal properties that categorically ground dispositional properties posited by fundamental physics. In this entry, we discuss two challenges to that theory: that it fails to adequately integrate consciousness into physical causation (Howell 2015); and that its alleged advantages over traditional dualist and traditional physicalist theories are illusory (Kind 2015). We argue that neither challenge is insurmountable.
According to Russellian monism, consciousness is constituted at least partly by quiddities: intri... more According to Russellian monism, consciousness is constituted at least partly by quiddities: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. If the theory is true, then consciousness and such dispositional properties are closely connected. But how closely? The contingency thesis says that the connection is contingent. For example, on this thesis the dispositional property associated with negative charge might have been categorically grounded by a quiddity that is distinct from the one that actually grounds it. Some argue that Russellian monism entails the contingency thesis and that this winds up making its consciousness-constituting quiddities epiphenomenal—a disastrous outcome for a theory that is motivated partly by its prospects for integrating consciousness into physical causation. We consider two versions of that argument, a generic version and an intriguing version developed by Robert J. Howell, which he bases on Jaegwon Kim’s well-known “exclusion argument.” We argue that neither succeeds.
The Knowledge Argument, Classic Philosophical Arguments Series (Cambridge University Press), 2019
Draft introduction to a forthcoming collection of essays on Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, f... more Draft introduction to a forthcoming collection of essays on Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, featuring:
Tim Crane, David Rosenthal, Brie Gertler, David Pitt, Frank Jackson, Galen Strawson, Torin Alter, Amy Kind, Tom McClelland, Philip Goff, Hedda Hassel March, Robert Howell, and Michael Tye.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/knowledge-argument/4E82722A55EA31B9B623EEAB3B13767D#fndtn-information
The Philosophy of Suffering, eds. D. Bain, M. Brady and J. Corns, 2019
The popular view on which unpleasant pain consists of two dissociable components, and on which th... more The popular view on which unpleasant pain consists of two dissociable components, and on which there may be pains that wholly lack affect, is the product of a theoretical deference to consciousness. The same is true of the thesis that suffering is exclusively a conscious phenomenon. Pain researchers defer to consciousness, but in my view they do not properly heed its message regarding pain, painfulness, and suffering. I will argue that consciousness actually gives us a double-edged message about these phenomena. Introspection reveals pain and painfulness to be essentially kinds of qualia, or qualitative character, (§1)—a thesis I defend from the ‘heterogeneity problem’ (§2). But introspection also prompts a conception of pain and painfulness on which these are capable in principle of unconscious existence (§3, §5). This implies, in turn, that suffering may well occur unconsciously (§§4-5), something I argue for in part by criticising rival models of suffering (§4). Taking consciousness seriously as an epistemic source for the natures of pain, painfulness, and suffering, thus has the surprising result that consciousness is removed from the metaphysics of pain, painfulness, and suffering.
Draft of an article to appear in U. Kriegel (ed.) Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousn... more Draft of an article to appear in U. Kriegel (ed.) Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness.
We consider the connections between panpsychism and Russellian monism, and discuss recent objecti... more We consider the connections between panpsychism and Russellian monism, and discuss recent objections to the positions due to Howell and Kind. We suggest possible avenues of response open to the Russellian monist, and develop the ideas of 'compatibilist' and 'necessitarian' Russellian monism.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2019
In this paper I develop a theory of personhood which leaves open the possibility of construing th... more In this paper I develop a theory of personhood which leaves open the possibility of construing the universe as a person. If successful, it removes one bar to endorsing pantheism. I do this by examining a rising school of thought on personhood, on which persons, or selves, are understood as identical to episodes of consciousness. Through a critique of this experiential approach to personhood, I develop a theory of self as constituted of qualitative mental contents, but where these contents are also capable of unconscious existence. On this theory, though we can be conscious of our selves, consciousness turns out to be inessential to personhood. This move, I then argue, provides resources for responding to the pantheist’s problem of God’s person.
Over many years and in many publications David Rosenthal has developed, defended and applied his ... more Over many years and in many publications David Rosenthal has developed, defended and applied his justly well-known higher-order thought theory of consciousness. In this paper I explain the theory, then provide a brief history of a major objection to it. I suggest that this objection is ultimately ineffectual, but that behind it lies a reason to look beyond Rosenthal’s theory to another sort of HOT theory. I then offer my own HOT theory as a suitable alternative, before concluding in a final section.
( in Transformação special issue on theories of consciousness edited by A. Pereira)
I consider two prominent recent feeling theories of emotions, due to Prinz and Kriegel, argue aga... more I consider two prominent recent feeling theories of emotions, due to Prinz and Kriegel, argue against them, and propose a novel alternative feeling theory. The problem for these theories is that emotions can be unconscious. Feeling theories foreground conscious emotions’ qualitative character as crucial to them. But such theories also deny that unconscious emotions feature qualitative character. This combination of claims leads them into trouble. If emotions exist and function without emotional phenomenology, as the theories imply, just what purpose does it serve? I argue that on these views emotional phenomenology is at best an inert registering of the subject’s true emotional state. Emotions themselves, surprisingly, turn out not to be feelings at all. So these feeling theories of emotions are ultimately self-defeating. I argue instead for this view: Emotional qualitative character is, simply, essential to emotions. Therefore, unconscious emotions possess unconscious qualitative character—in Rosenthal’s terminology, unconscious mental qualities.
According to Jackson's Knowledge Argument, since one can know everything physical about someone, ... more According to Jackson's Knowledge Argument, since one can know everything physical about someone, without being able to know the quality of their experience, this experience is more than physical. Jackson, now a physicalist, no longer accepts the Argument. Through chronological treatment of his evolving position, I defend it against objections, including his own. The Argument, properly understood and reinforced, should still prompt Jackson - and us - away from physicalism.
The trajectory of Jackson's thought moves from presenting the Argument to refute physicalism, through developing semantic apparatus to strengthen it and supply arguments against non-reductive physicalism, to adopting reductive physicalism and embracing the Ability Hypothesis. At each stage I propose changes to his view.
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Forthcoming in Phenomenology and Mind, special issue on the mark of the mental.
Full text at: https://rdcu.be/cnjad
What should you say about unconscious mental states, and their contents, if you believe in phenomenal intentionality/cognitive phenomenology? Here I focus on the case of belief, and a debate between Tim Crane, who holds that beliefs are only ever unconscious, and David Pitt, who holds that beliefs are only ever conscious. I object to both, and argue that we should say instead that beliefs can be conscious or unconscious, and have their contents fixed all the while by qualia. This requires that qualia can exist unconsciously, a notion I explain and defend. So, there is a stream of unconsciousness as well as a stream of consciousness.
Penultimate draft of paper to appear in J. Weisberg (ed.) *Qualitative Consciousness and Higher-Order Thought: Themes from the Philosophy of David Rosenthal* (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
Tim Crane, David Rosenthal, Brie Gertler, David Pitt, Frank Jackson, Galen Strawson, Torin Alter, Amy Kind, Tom McClelland, Philip Goff, Hedda Hassel March, Robert Howell, and Michael Tye.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/knowledge-argument/4E82722A55EA31B9B623EEAB3B13767D#fndtn-information
( in Transformação special issue on theories of consciousness edited by A. Pereira)
Forthcoming in Phenomenology and Mind, special issue on the mark of the mental.
Full text at: https://rdcu.be/cnjad
What should you say about unconscious mental states, and their contents, if you believe in phenomenal intentionality/cognitive phenomenology? Here I focus on the case of belief, and a debate between Tim Crane, who holds that beliefs are only ever unconscious, and David Pitt, who holds that beliefs are only ever conscious. I object to both, and argue that we should say instead that beliefs can be conscious or unconscious, and have their contents fixed all the while by qualia. This requires that qualia can exist unconsciously, a notion I explain and defend. So, there is a stream of unconsciousness as well as a stream of consciousness.
Penultimate draft of paper to appear in J. Weisberg (ed.) *Qualitative Consciousness and Higher-Order Thought: Themes from the Philosophy of David Rosenthal* (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
Tim Crane, David Rosenthal, Brie Gertler, David Pitt, Frank Jackson, Galen Strawson, Torin Alter, Amy Kind, Tom McClelland, Philip Goff, Hedda Hassel March, Robert Howell, and Michael Tye.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/knowledge-argument/4E82722A55EA31B9B623EEAB3B13767D#fndtn-information
( in Transformação special issue on theories of consciousness edited by A. Pereira)
The trajectory of Jackson's thought moves from presenting the Argument to refute physicalism, through developing semantic apparatus to strengthen it and supply arguments against non-reductive physicalism, to adopting reductive physicalism and embracing the Ability Hypothesis. At each stage I propose changes to his view.