Lend Lease

Using a range of Soviet archival sources and memoirs this article
examines the contribution made by US-supplied tanks and other
armoured and unarmoured vehicles to the Soviet war effort, focusing
on examples in Soviet archival photographs reproduced alongside
the text

В годы Второй мировой войны вопросы формирования послевоенного международного экономического порядка затрагивались в разных документах - в Атлантической хартии, Соглашении о ленд-лизе, в рабочих и программных документах, принятых на встречах лидеров государств антигитлеровской коалиции. В 1941-начале 1943 гг. выявились основные направления, по которым в дальнейшем велась работа правительствами союзных стран: учреждение международного валютно-финансового института (будущего Международного валютного фонда - МВФ); создание международного банка для предоставления кредитов странам, пострадавшим от военных дей-ствий и оккупации (Международного банка реконструкции и развития - МБРР); организации института регулирования международной торговли (Международной торговой организации - МТО). В 1943-1946 гг. эти три направления имели и для США, и для СССР важное и равное значение.

The article is devoted to the problem of the formation of the structure of the federal management of the US military industry during the Second World War. It has been established that the administration and coordination of measures to mobilize the military industry was carried out by institutions founded by executive orders of President Roosevelt. Considered, using the example of Vice President Wallace, the mechanism of work, the problems that arose during the activities of some of these departments. Analyzed by the example of institutions headed by Wallace, the reasons for interdepartmental disputes in the war cabinet of Roosevelt.

While the development of tanks had largely led to the replacement of cavalry in most armies by
1939, the Soviets retained a strong mounted arm. In the terrain and conditions of the Eastern Front
they were able to play an important role denied them elsewhere. John Harrel shows how the Soviets
developed a doctrine of deep penetration, using cavalry formations to strike into the Axis rear,
disrupting logistics and lines of communication, encircling and isolating units. Interestingly he
shows that this doctrine did not stem from the native cavalry tradition of the steppe but from the
example of the American Civil War. The American approach was copied by the Russians in WWI
and the Russian Civil War, refined by the Soviets in the early stages of World War Two and
perfected during the last two years of the war. The Soviet experience demonstrated that deep
operations (cavalry raids) against enemy rear echelons set the conditions for victory. Although the
last horse-mounted units disappeared in the 1950s, their influence led directly to the formation of the
Operational Manoeuvre Groups that, ironically, faced US forces in the Cold War.

Afirmarea pe toate căile a excepţionalismului rusesc, în paralel cu susţinerea unei politici imperialiste de către autorităţile de la Moscova nu constituie o noutate în relaţiile internaţionale actuale. Această situaţie este mai veche şi un exemplu în acest sens îl constituie poziţia dură susţinută de Nikolai Nikiforov la o conferinţă ştiinţifică desfăşurată la Washington, la 15 iunie 2011 şi intitulată „Relaţiile sovieto-americane în timpul celei de-a doua conflagraţii mondiale: Istorie şi lecţii pentru astăzi”. Adjunctul directorului Institutului de Istorie Militară din Moscova nu a fost de acord cu ideile pe care istoricii occidentali le-au prezentat în mod argumentat cu diferite prilejuri şi a afirmat, în spiritul excepţionalismului rusesc, faptul că în Vest nu sunt recunoscute suficient meritele pe care le are Uniunea Sovietică în victoria obţinută de Naţiunile Unite împotriva Germaniei în anul 1945.

The article focuses on the early history of post-war Lend-Lease settlement between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., which was little studied in the Russian historiography. It considers the political aspects of the establishment of the Mutual Aid program for the Soviet Union, the attitude of U.S. President F.D. Roosevelt and his administration, representatives of the U.S. Congress and – on the example of the results of relevant public opinion polls – the American people.
The author uncovers the reasons and circumstances of the signing by U.S. President Нarry Truman a note on the termination of Lend-Lease deliveries dated May 12, 1945. Based on several documentary sources, the author emphasizes that this note did not reflect Truman's personal attitude to the U.S.S.R. and was not directed solely against the Soviet Union. In addition, reaffirming her argument with the relevant sources, the author insists that the Soviet side was informed and repeatedly warned of the termination of deliveries after the end of hostilities in Europe well in advance. Thus, while acknowledging the imprudence and undiplomatic actions of the American side, one should not nevertheless accuse them of neglecting their duties, which they fulfilled in full.
The article also uncovers the negotiations on lend-lease in 1946, which have hardly been ever described in Soviet and Russian historiography. The intention to bind Lend-Lease settlement with other important economic problems in Soviet-American relations and, indirectly, to the participation of the U.S.S.R. in a number of important international trade and economic institutions – the IMF, the IBRD, the ITO – expressed by Washington in early 1946 has become an insurmountable obstacle to reaching a consensus between the parties and, as a result, has become one of the origins of the Cold war. However, one can not but acknowledge that an essential part of the blame for the failure of the 1945–1947 talks lies also on the Soviet leadership.