Left-Wing Populism

If politics is ultimately about our deepest fears and desires rather than about, say, tax policy or better health care, then what place is there for a Left whose raison d’être will always be tied to improving the economic fortunes of the least fortunate? One answer is to begin to outline an “economics of meaning,” where economic or class critiques are a means to channel anger, create meaning, and build solidarity rather than to implement better policy outcomes (although, of course, policy changes would be good on their own, for moral rather than necessarily electoral reasons). This requires changing standard conceptions of what elections are for and what it means to win.

The electoral growth of several ‘anti-political establishment parties’
in Europe since the end of the Cold War, was accompanied by the
growth of the use of the catch-all category of populism to
describe them. Despite the countless analyses related to
populism, less attention – with some relevant exceptions – has
been given to the impact of populism on party organizations. Still,
populist parties do organize. While it is common to compare the
organization of political parties belonging to the same party
family, the attention on the impact of populism in shaping parties
with different ideological backgrounds is scarce. This paper
focuses on this literature gap, analyzing four parties, which the
literature labels as ‘populist’. The conclusion reached in this paper
is that populism can be an ideological feature incorporated by
different parties; however, its impact on the organization differs
substantially from one party to another.

The crucial question of the Habermas-Streeck debate on the crisis in Europe was, ‘Should the political forces resisting the de-democratization of capitalism strive for renewal of the European Union through its deeper integration, as per Habremas, or for peaceful dissolution of the European Union and a retreat to a national state, as per Streeck?’ In this article, the arguments of each author are examined against the background of the left-wing Syriza party’s challenge to European austerity in Greece. Three conclusions are drawn. First, Syriza’s nationally charged populism in opposition coincided with Streeck’s considerations. Second, Syriza’s governmental strategy reflected Habermas’s views. Third, Syriza’s sudden rise to power and its subsequent failure to reverse the austerity both substantiate Streeck’s thesis that at the present juncture renationalization of economic policy represents a condition of the possibility for egalitarian politics in Europe.

In Eastern Europe the successful populist parties are mostly right-wing nationalist (for instance the Hungarian Fidesz and the Polish Law and Justice) or exceptionally left-wing populist (for instance Slovak Direction – Social Democracy in Slovakia) with a huge nationalist sentiment. It seems to be that in this region populism and nationalism have been closely related or merged. Moreover, following the traditional literature on populism (Ghita Ionescu, Ernest Gellner), we can easily say that our contemporary “populist Zeitgeist” can be seen as some kind of (post)modern nationalism. In this paper, I am dealing with the problem, how can we define and analyse populism in Eastern Europe. It is hard to say that populism and nationalism have nothing to do with each other, but I am convinced that populism cannot be identified with nationalism. That is why, I introduce the term of historical-theoretical complex of nationalism and populism.
According to post-Marxist, critical and discursive literature (Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe) it is obviously that populism is not just a right-wing phenomenon and there is a thing which can be called transnational left-wing populism (Benjamin Moffitt, Panos Panayotu). This version of populism is not an unknow phenomenon in this part of Europe, because the Communist regimes before 1989 a transnational populist agenda has been created (Antal, 2017b), but the Left-wing populism is seriously underrepresented in contemporary Eastern Europe.
I am investigating here the political theoretical (Antal, 2017a) and historical background of nationalist populism of our time in Eastern Europe analysing examples from the following countries of this region: Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania. My main thought is that the politics in this region has always been populist in that sense there is a constant need to contrast “the people” (as a large powerless group) and “the elite” (a small powerful group). This “never ending” political tradition of Eastern European populism turned up in the history once in nationalist and other times in transnational perspectives. However, the contemporary Right-wing nationalist populism means a relatively new phenomenon, but it has deeply historical ground in the interwar Right-wing nationalism.
According to my other hypothesis, the governing Right-wing populist parties (especially the Fidesz in Hungary) use the nationalist discourse to create permanent political enemies inside and outside of the nation (Brubaker argues that this kind of nationalism appears as civilizationsim). These parties belong to the political elite and use populist discourse to cover up their corrupt politics which does not serve the interest of the people. In my view there is a new chapter in historical-theoretical complex of nationalism and populism in Eastern Europe, this is the emergence of populist entrepreneurs using nationalism to maintain their governing power based on populism, which raises several dangers.

Populism is the term which dominates every political and public discussion nowadays. However, what does one mean by “populism”? A movement? An ideology? A strategy? A communicative model? A dimension? Is populism something unitary, or is it liable to be divided into the classic political categories of right, centre and left, progressive and reactionary? The questions around this word seem to be endless. Also historical sciences are starting to wonder about this word. Can populism be an historic category, or not? Does a history of populism exist, and, if yes, is it a history of political movements or a history of ideas? This contribution tries to reconstruct the origin and the development of the studies of populism, the several attempts to categorize them made in the course of time by human and social sciences, and their links to the different historical periods in which they were produced, trying to arrange a discussion which is more open than ever.

An approach is proposed towards an understanding of the relationships in Latin America between left wing parties and populist movements and that is applied to the case of Ecuador. The left wing and populist movements in Latin America have related between each other in three possible forms: fusion or “left wing populism”, collaboration without fusion, opposition and conflict. “Left wing populism” is a fusion used by the left towards achieving an expansion of its social and electoral base through the assimilation of discursive and organizational forms similar to successful populist movements and leaders even though the risks of that strategy. In Ecuador the second and third forms of relationship mainly happened, until the failed attempt of the first one with the government of Lucio Gutierrez (2002-2005) and the more successful case of that with the government of Rafael Correa (2007-2017).

Se propone un enfoque para comprender las relaciones en América Latina entre partidos de izquierda y movimientos populistas, y se lo aplica al caso ecuatoriano. La izquierda y los populismos de América Latina se han relacionado históricamente en tres formas posibles: fusión o "populismo de izquierda", colaboración sin fusión, oposición y conflicto. El "populismo de izquierda" es una conjunción utilizada por la izquierda para expandir su base social y electoral por medio de asimilar formas discursivas y organizativas similares a los populismos más exitosos, pese a los riesgos de aquello. En Ecuador principalmente se dio la segunda y tercera forma de relacionamiento, hasta el intento fallido de la primera con el gobierno de Lucio Gutiérrez y otro más exitoso con el gobierno de Rafael Correa.

Populism is a buzzword. This compilation explores the significance of religion for the controversies stirred up by populist politics in European and American contexts in order to understand what lies behind the buzz. Engaging Jewish, Christian, and Islamic political thought and theology, contributions by more than twenty established and emerging scholars explore right-wing and left-wing protests, offering critical interpretations and creative interventions for a polarized public square. Both methodologically and thematically, the compilation moves beyond essentialist definitions of religion, encouraging a comparative approach to political theology today.

This article interrogates dominant definitions of "populism" found in the social sciences, focusing on the term's conceptual utility in understanding recent changes in Western polities. Though populism is typically treated as a deviant form of politics, this article finds that it in fact holds remarkable continuities with conventional politics, and indeed culture more generally. It argues that these more general cultural processes can be illuminated by cultural sociology, just as the more specific but still routine political processes can be illuminated by civil sphere theory (CST). The article goes on to argue that when populism is understood as a formal mode of public signification, rather than a substantive ideology, the substance it signifies becomes crucial to determining its civility. It suggests that while populism can certainly have anti-civil effects, there is nothing inherent in it that precludes it from also acting to promote civil repair.

The global economic crisis, the popular discontent against traditional parties and post-democratic forms of governance, as well as the sharp increase in migrant and refugee arrivals have led to the resurgence of populist parties around the world. Left-wing parties usually express an inclusionary populist discourse with patriotic features, while right-wing parties utilize an exclusionary populism with strong nationalist and xenophobic characteristics. In Greece in recent years, the radical left party of SYRIZA rose to power through a left-wing populist and anti-imperialist discourse. Alexis Tsipras formed a paradox coalition government with the radical right party of ANEL to reach an agreement that would lessen the effects of austerity policies. However, once in office, SYRIZA transformed some features of its political style and began to follow a type of “pragmatic populism”. This paper examines the relationship between populism and anti-imperialism, while analyzing SYRIZA’s discourse in opposition and in power. The questions that it attempts to answer are: does Tsipras express an anti-imperialist discourse both in opposition and in power? What forces are considered imperialist by SYRIZA? Can the notion of “crypto-colonialism” explain the rise of left-wing populism in Greece?

This is a review article of the following five recent studies on populism: 1) Ruth Wodak’s The Politics of Fear: What Right Wing Populist Discourses Mean(Sage,2015); 2) Benjamin Moffitt’s The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation (Stanford University Press, 2016); 3) Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser’s Populism: A Very Short Introduction (OxfordUniversity Press, 2017); 4) Jan-Werner Müller’sWhat is Populism? (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016); and 5) John B. Judis’ The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics (Columbia GlobalReports,2016).The review argues for a return to early Frankfurt School Critical Theory to address some of the shortcomings of these studies.

How do populists conduct foreign policy? The existing literature on populism focuses mainly on domestic patterns, and until recently the foreign dimension of populism has been largely overlooked. This paper aims to fill theoretical and empirical lacunae by mapping patterns of change and continuity in the formulation of geopolitical and economic international policy among Latin-American populist governments. Striving to conduct a systematic comparative analysis, this paper explores three waves of populist foreign policies in Latin America (classic, neoliberal, and progressive). While it is difficult to highlight a unified phenomenon, the findings reveal that several ‘unifying’ elements indeed exist: they are manifest in the tendency of such governments to jointly (re)construct transnational solidarities for legitimation purposes and to adopt economic foreign policies with a pragmatic bent. Moreover, in opposition to the two first waves of populist governments, the most recent wave has embraced personalist styles, emotional public diplomacy, and clientelist techniques with support networks abroad, thus actively projecting the domestic patterns of populism to the regional and global levels in an attempt to leverage both domestic and international legitimacy. This study offers critical lessons for IR scholarship’s increasing engagement with populism, contributing to the lively debate regarding the rise of populist trends across the globe.

The salience of security concerns has dramatically increased across Europe and a growing body of research converges on their acknowledgement as contributing factors to populist success. As the empirical focus of existing research is on the populist right and on negative emotionality, this paper questions to what extent the populism-(in)security nexus is indeed distinctive to the right and predominantly underpinned by fear-based appeals. By adopting a novel typology of insecurityframing and a qualitative strategy that infers emotions from core relational themes, the paper explores the implicit emotional content of populist insecurity narratives in France, looking at campaign communication from Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon. The article offers three contributions. First, by mapping which emotions underpin their insecurity narratives, it illustrates how these populist actors perform 'emotional governance', addressing the number of ontological insecurities generally linked to populist voting. Second, it shows that not only exclusionary but also inclusionary populists engage with processes of threat framing and do so with overlapping overarching themes. Finally, it proposes a qualitative approach that captures the holistic meaning of emotions via the methodological use of core relational themes, complementing word-based analyses.

This article provides an empirical exploration of the relation between nationalism and populism on the left of the political spectrum. The Spanish party Podemos is a key case study for such an analysis, as it is a left-populist actor that has made extensive use of nationalist rhetoric in its discourse. Through a discourse analysis on a corpus that includes speeches by Podemos leadership and primary data such as interviews and original unpublished material, this article studies the nationalist dimension of Podemos and its relation with the party's much-discussed populism. The analysis shows that the Podemos leadership deliberately embeds nationalism in its populist strategy: Nationalism is a central element of the party's populist project and serves to advance an alternative form of national identification that challenges that of the right wing. Through a resignification of national pride and belonging, Podemos constructs an image of Spain that refers to an inclusive welfare state, to people's mobilization, and to a moral community that is not delimited by lingual or ethnic particularisms.

This is a chapter from the book ''Populism and the digital media: a necessarily symbiotic relationship? in Politics and populism across modes and media'' edited by  Ruth Breeze and Ana María Fernández Vallejo.

Citation: Venizelos G. (2020) Populism and the digital media: a necessarily symbiotic relationship? in Politics and populism across modes and media [eds.] Ruth Breeze and Ana María Fernández Vallejo, Bern: Peter Lang

Etienne Balibar (2010) sees in a pan-European populism a chance for the rebirth of Europe's democracy. DiEM25, launched by Yanis Varoufakis, is a transnational European movement that seeks to democratize the European Union and save it from itself. This paper argues that DiEM can be perceived as a positive response to Balibar's call. By utilizing the methodology of the so-called Essex School of Discourse Analysis, I examine the aforementioned hypothesis. What we are witnessing, I claim, is a case of transnational populism, a paradoxical combination for those who identify populism with nationalism. Laclau's formal approach, adopted in this paper, conceives populism as a particular logic detached from certain contents which implies that populism can be anything, and thus there is no contradiction in a transnational populism. What are the possibilities of DiEM's transnational populism for Europe's democratic politics? Is DiEM a chance for European democracy?

"Capitalism. A conversation in Critical Theory", written in the form of a dialogue between Nancy Fraser and Rahel Jaeggi, is an extremely rich book, full of very inspiring thoughts, suggestions and points for reflection. After having summerized the main themes of the book, I would like to put the attention on three aspects of Fraser's refelction wich, in my view, need some further clarification. 1) What is the role that Fraser assigns at the level of social theory to the concept of modern functional differentiation? 2) Is it realistic to exclude the possibility that capitalist societies might be able to overcome their current crisis by finding a new regime of accumulation based on a new social, democratic and ecological compromise? 3) What role do the principles of constitutional democracy - separation of power, fundamental rights, etc. - play in her conception of a post-capitalist and socialist society? ANd how to reconcile her left-wing populistic concept of the people, with the internationalist perspective that in her view must orient a renewal of socialism and emancipatory anti-capitalist struggle?

In recent years, it has been developed a debate about the possible connection between populism and conspirational logic. There are many scholars who believe that populism is linked to conspiracy theories in most cases, while there is a part of them who argue that populism is equated with the populist phenomenon. It is true that populism is often associated with conspirational thinking. But are conspiracy theories an exclusive prerogative of populists? In this presentation, I highlight the discussion that takes place in academia and public sphere on the connection between conspiracy theories and populism, aiming to highlight their distinct character.

in der Reihe "Populismus kritisieren", Universität f. Musik und Darstellende Kunst Wien 19.5.2022, 18.30h – https://www.mdw.ac.at/ikm/populismuskritisieren/vorschau/ – ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Population / Elevation: Towards a Critique of Populism through Film – a Case Study of Jordan Peele´s "Us" (2019) – If this lecture series dealt only with right-wing populism, the task at hand would be to analyze and reject it. We are, however, dealing with populism in general, and with its critique. This complicates things. What is this thing we call populism, what is the thing it does, and what would therefore be the critique that finds itself connected to this form of mobilization? Populism and its claims for truth and legitimacy call for critical perception in the sense of Wahrnehmung, "taking (for) truth". This raises questions of film, of a "theory of film", through film (Heide Schlüpmann).
As a political concept, populism emphasizes twists and misunderstandings, also visibilities – and soundings – of democracy as it un/covers societies and institutions, taking the form of power or of an event. I see populism as marked by a split which confronts us with fascism on the one side and radical democracy on the other. (Note: The hatred of minorities manifested by today´s Querdenker – anti-Covid-measures protesters – is nothing radical.)
Can films enable a critique, a problematizing, of populism, of this sense for Volk in Bewegung, "people in motion" – with all the horror rightly attached to such phrases (not only in post-Nazi countries)? How can film – mainstream film – not only show the demos as precarious, but also, "taking its truth", question the very showing and moving of Volk? I will discuss this along the lines of Jordan Peele´s 2019 film Us (starring Lupita Nyong´o), focusing on its hierarchical splits and "tetherings", its chains of motifs, its elevations that highlight the eleven rather than the 'full dozen', thus going for the unwhole thing.

Ebben a tanulmányban arra vállalkozom, hogy kísérletet tegyek
a hazai politikai ideológiák térképének megalkotására – az
elmúlt három évtized globális szellemi mozgásainak a tükrében.
Ennek során a kritikai társadalomelmélet ideológiakritikai hagyományát
hívom segítségül. Gramsci domináns ideológiára vonatkozó elgondolásai alapján először bemutatom korunk globális uralkodó eszméit, a posztpolitika, a hiperglobalizáció és az individualizmus ideológiáit. Ezután az Orbán Viktor nevével fémjelzett "konzervatív forradalom", majd az idehaza a húszas években fontos szerephez jutó "baloldali populizmus" irányzatait elemzem. Az írás célja annak bemutatása, hogy ezeknek melyek a tényleges sajátosságaik és ambícióik és hogyan értelmezhetők napjainkban a politikai frontvonalak.

Left-wing populists are understudied in populism research and little is known on how enmity and insecurity narratives interplay in their rhetoric. Using a narrative framework to capture insecurity in the 'enemification' of elites, this article examines left-populist Jean-Luc Mélenchon and La France Insoumise. The analysis reveals a multifaceted construction of national, supranational and international elites as sources of insecurity, based on (a) the threats they pose, (b) the uncertainty they generate and (c) their failure to protect citizens. The article makes two contributions to the populism and International Relations literatures. First, it provides empirical evidence to contest the hypothesis that left populism promotes pluralist agonism rather than antagonism. Second, it shows how populists across the spectrum can use insecurity-centred narratives to delegitimise elites from speaking security and promote an agenda centred on popular sovereignty.

In diesem Essay aus dem Jahr 2018 wurde untersucht, ob und inwiefern es sich bei der ehemaligen griechischen Regierungspartei Syriza um eine populistische Partei handelt. Hierfür wurde die Rhetorik der Partei seit ihrer Gründung im Jahr 2004 auf die beiden Hauptmerkmale populistischer Parteien überprüft: die Konstruktion des Feindbildes Elite und den verbalisierten Alleinvertretungsanspruch für den dēmos.

Continuing from their joint work in the 1980s, Ernesto Laclau
and Chantal Mouffe both started developing a new theory of populism in the early 2000s. This paper defines it as a double ontology of politics, which includes both enmity — the dissociative dimension of the political-and deliberation — the associative dimension. In order to distinguish their approach from right-wing populism, Laclau and Mouffe resort to uncompromising antiessentialism which casts history out of the construction of the political subject. Doing so, they assimilate consistent anti-colonial and anti-racist movements to conservatism and reaction. These confusions originate in insufficient problematization of the racial question and anti-racism activism, that the authors often invoke but never analyze properly. These shortcomings require a reformulation of left-wing populism of which the question of pluralism could provide the starting point.

Rad se bavi pitanjem komplementarnosti teorijskog konstrukta agonističke demokratije i levog populizma u radovima Šantal Muf. Strategiju levog populizma praktično primenjuju partije Siriza, Podemos i
Nepokorna Francuska (France Insoumise). Jedna od pretpostavki pojave levog populizma je da je radikalna desnica prva uspela da ponudi
alternativu otuđenom postpolitičkom i postdemokratskom političkom
sistemu tvrdeći da vraća politiku narodu (npr. FPÖ u Austriji, Front
National u Francuskoj). Agonisti zbog toga zagovaraju povratak politici koja uspostavlja jasnu političku granicu (levi u odnosu na desni populizam) kako bi se stvorili uslovi za agonističko osporavanje i omogućavanje demokratskih alternativa ali i podstakli demokratski akteri da se uključe u borbu za moć i osvajanje političkih institucija.

Ključne riječi: agonistička demokratija, levi populizam, narod, Šantal Muf, Ernesto Laklau

Populism has often been described as a great challenge and threat to Western democracies. Not surprisingly, at a time in which we are witnessing a significant rise in populist actors in Europe and the US, scientific analyses and commentary regarding populism have become particularly popular and, indeed, necessary. My aim in this article is to offer a brief yet comprehensive overview of the ongoing debates in a bid to problematise the supposed 'immi-nent threat' of populism in light of recent developments within the political systems and societies of established democracies, especially under conditions of crisis. I understand pop-ulism as a specific type of discourse, and thus as a way—among others—of doing politics and appealing to groups of people. Thus, I highlight the varying orientations that populist movements might take, depending on the ideological traditions with which they are closely articulated and the sociopolitical environment in which they manifest. Last, I relate the 'populist surge' to discussions regarding post-democracy.

Post the disruption of the Soviet Union, there has been an increasing shift from class-based politics to politics based on mobilizing 'people' within Left-wing political praxis and rhetoric. We argue such tendencies are visible even within the Left rhetoric in Kerala.  This tendency has picked up in the last decade, particularly since 2016. In the particular context of Kerala, this process is enmeshed with sub-nationalist sentiments and concerns around 'vikasanam'(development) of that sub-nationality, since the ‘people’ targeted by Leftwing rhetoric constitute the sub-nationality. It is possible that this tendency can metamorphose into different directions, depending on the tactical priorities of the Left in Kerala.

La izquierda ecuatoriana en la era posterior a la caída del Muro de Berlín pasó principalmente a girar en torno a dos estrategias e iniciativas. Por un lado la construcción de un partido-movimiento alrededor de la CONAIE y los nuevos movimientos sociales con el MUPP. Por otro lado la del “populismo de izquierda” con la promoción de una personalidad carismática para elecciones presidenciales capaz de implementar un gobierno redistributista y desmarcado de la hegemonía estadounidense. El MUPP posibilitó una renovación de la izquierda ecuatoriana pero la estrategia del populismo de izquierda produjo éxitos electorales en elecciones presidenciales. Las experiencias bajo los gobiernos de Lucio Gutiérrez, Rafael Correa y Lenín Moreno muestras las potencialidades y riesgos de la segunda estrategia. Claramente la estrategia del populismo de izquierda no fue una mera adopción voluntaria sino posiblemente la única opción de acceso al gobierno para la izquierda ecuatoriana en esas décadas.

The Ecuadorian left after the fall of the Berlin Wall turned to exist mainly around two strategies and initiatives. On the one hand
a movement party around CONAIE and new social movements with the MUPP. On the other with “left populism” which
consisted on the promotion of a charismatic personality for presidential elections which will be able to implement a redistributist
government non-aligned with US hegemony. MUPP made possible a renewal of the Ecuadorian left but the strategy of leftpopulism
produced electoral successes in presidential elections. The experiences with the presidencies of Lucio Gutiérrez, Rafael
Correa and Lenín Moreno showed the potentialities and risks of the second strategy. Clearly the strategy of left-populism was not
simply a voluntary choice but possibly the only option of access to government for the Ecuadorian left in those decades.

A esquerda equatoriana na época após a queda do Muro de Berlim começou principalmente a girar em torno de duas estratégias e
iniciativas. Por um lado, a construção de um movimento partidário em torno do CONAIE e os novos movimentos sociais com o
MUPP. Por outro lado, o “populismo de esquerda” com a promoção de uma personalidade carismática para as eleições presidenciais
capazes de implementar um governo redistributista e não marcado pela hegemonia americana. O MUPP permitiu a renovação
da esquerda equatoriana, mas a estratégia do populismo de esquerda produziu sucessos eleitorais nas eleições presidenciais. As
experiências dos governos de Lucio Gutiérrez, Rafael Correa e Lenín Moreno mostram o potencial e os riscos da segunda estratégia.
Claramente, a estratégia do populismo de esquerda não era uma mera adoção voluntária, mas possivelmente a única opção de
acesso ao governo para a esquerda equatoriana nessas décadas.

Jan-Werner Müller's short book on populism is direct yet evasive, insightful and provocative while also unsatisfying. The book is officially organized into three parts: what populists say, what they do, and how to deal with them. It also addresses another three-part concern but this time simultaneously rather than sequentially: the identification of populism, diagnoses of conditions favourable to it, and what a better, non-populist politics should be like. Müller is most successful at identifying populism but his diagnosis of contributing conditions and ideas for a preferable politics are anaemic and, if widely shared by others, will contribute to more rather than less of the politics Müller fears.

Resumo: Este ensaio é uma tentativa de compreender as relações entre o populismo e a política da pós-verdade. Assim, num primeiro momento, procuraremos compreender essa categoria semântica difusa que é o populismo. Posteriormente, realizamos um breve percurso histórico sobre populismo, do populismo clássico ao "populismo digital". Por fim, analisamos como o atual modelo da comunicação em rede se converte num campo fértil para a disseminação da retórica populista.

FOR A LEFT POPULISM

Public lecture with Chantal Mouffe

Thursday 31 May 2018
6 – 8 pm


We are currently witnessing in Western Europe a ‘populist moment’ that signals the crisis of neo-liberal hegemony. The outcome of this crisis will depend on which political forces will succeed in hegemonizing the multiple resistances against post-democracy and in restoring popular sovereignty.
The central axis of the political conflict in the next few years will be between right-wing populism and left-wing populism. By establishing a frontier between ‘the people’ and ‘the oligarchy, a left populist strategy could federate the manifold struggles against subordination, oppression and discrimination. Acknowledging the crucial role played by the democratic discourse in the political imaginary of our societies, such a strategy resonates with the aspirations of many people. It is through the construction of a collective will mobilising common affects in defence of equality and social justice, that it will be possible to combat the xenophobic policies promoted by right-wing populism.
In re-creating political frontiers, this 'populist moment' points to a 'return of the political' after years of post-politics. A return that may open the way for authoritarian solutions — through regimes that weaken liberal democratic institutions — but which can also lead to a reaffirmation and extension of the democratic values.


Location: CLO BO1 (Clore Management Centre, Birkbeck, Torrington Square).

Attendance is free, attendants must register in advance. Registration will open shortly.

Conveners: Conveners: Margarita Palacios (Birkbeck), Leticia Sabsay (LSE) and Lasse Thomassen (QM)

AVERTISSEMENT PRELIMINAIRE: ce texte ne vise nullement à «flinguer » Philippe Corcuff au service de telle ou telle organisation, secte ou coterie concurrente. Il a simplement pour but de réaffirmer certaines positions matérialistes qui me semblent toujours utiles aujourd’hui ; à inciter les militants, s’ils le souhaitent, à réfléchir à la nocivité des discours identitaires postmodernes dominants à gauche et à l’extrême gauche et dans les milieux libertaires ou ceux qui se proclament «radicaux» aujourd’hui ; et à rappeler que les écrits d’un universitaire, fût-il partisan de causes qui sont aussi les nôtres (la défense des droits des sans-papiers , la lutte contre l’antisémitisme, le racisme antimusulmans et l’extrême droite, par exemple), doivent être soumis à la critique et confrontés à d’autres recherches, militantes ou pas, sans céder au copinage sans principes, ou pire à l’omerta, si répandus dans les milieux dits «radicaux».

SECONDE PRECISION : ayant publié un Inventaire de la confusion dans la revue Ni patrie ni frontières en 2011, il y a dix ans, je pense désormais que les termes de «confusionnisme» et de «confusionnistes», utilisés pour saisir des réalités mouvantes [A1]  sont très insuffisants. En effet, si l’on en prend en compte l’histoire longue du mouvement ouvrier et de ses courants intellectuels, ou des courants qui l’ont influencé, on ne peut se contenter de s’exclamer «Ah mais, c’est du confusionnisme !», lorsque des militants ou des intellectuels de gauche, d’extrême gauche ou anarchistes, aujourd’hui, tiennent des discours nationalistes, populistes, complotistes et/ou antisémites.
Au sein même des écrits de la gauche (au sens large) depuis les origines du mouvement ouvrier (chez Marx, Proudhon, Bakounine, et leurs disciples, et chez les syndicalistes révolutionnaires) sont présents de grosses scories, voire des éléments de virus mortels, nationalistes, conspirationnistes, antisémites, populistes, etc. Rien ne sert de se scandaliser parce que ces éléments réapparaissent aujourd’hui, sous de nouvelles formes.

How can we make better sense of debates about populism. Can there be a progressive populism? Is populism really a danger for the survival of democracy or a key to democracy's future? Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the oath of office ceremony in Ankara Turkey, 09 July 2018. NurPhoto/Press Association. All rights reserved. RETHINKING POPULISM. At a time when new political actors are mounting electoral and increasingly systemic challenges to contemporary democracies in the name of the people, there is little consensus in what the phenomenon is among academics, political activists and citizens alike. openDemocracy has been featuring articles on populist phenomena for some years (Mudde, Rovira Kaltwasser, Mouffe, Marlière, Pappas, Skodo, Sofos, Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, Gerbaudo, Gandesha, Tamás to name but a few) and has been successful in stimulating a recurring interest. But despite or perhaps because of the extensive and thought-provoking research on populism, the term has come to denote a range of widely diverse phenomena.