Israel Domestic Politics

From spring 2019 until summer 2021, Israel was politically paralysed because no
stable government could be formed. Four elections were necessary before a new gov-
ernment took over on 13 June 2021. Not only was Benjamin Netanyahu replaced as
prime minister after 12 years. A coalition was formed that covers almost the entire
political spectrum. In the meantime, it has stabilised and its direction is becoming
clearer. Nationally and internationally, the coalition has broken with the populist
rhetoric of the Netanyahu government. At the same time, it is exploring different
policies: Domestically, it is for the first time including an independent Arab party
and has stopped the attacks on principles of liberal democracy. In its foreign policy,
it is promoting rapprochement with the European Union (EU) and the Biden adminis-
tration as well as more integration into the region. It is also trying to contain the
conflict with the Palestinians through social and economic measures. But a political
rapprochement is not in sight. A “point of no return” is looming, making a two-state
solution impossible.

This article examines Israel's decision to launch the 1956 campaign against Egypt. While the current literature tends to argue that, in 1956, the campaign was a response by Israel to security threats, it is suggested here that, if so, these threats certainly did not predetermine any specific response. Israel could, for example, have responded by adopting a defensive posture. In reality, domestic factors were just as influential as external ones. The most important of these was the severe economic crisis caused by mass immigration to Israel during 1948–1951. This crisis in turn led to the creation in 1953–1956 of a war coalition whose three components—David Ben-Gurion (Prime Minister and Minister of Defence), MAPAI's party bosses and the army—had different interests but shared the idea of a war against Israel's Arab neighbours as a way in which each could advance its preferred aims.