Hydro-Hegemony

This paper proposes a partial reconceptualization and a redesign of the Framework of Hydro-Hegemony, an analytical tool devised to study how power, hegemony, and power asymmetries can influence transboundary water politics. This is done by presenting the original Circle of Hydro-Hegemony (CHH), an analytical framework that places the neo-Gramscian notion of hegemony at the centre of its structure, to illustrate how various forms of power are connective in the function of hegemony. Following a theoretical discussion on how the concepts of power and hegemony can interact, the case of the Aral Sea basin in Central Asia will provide a practical application of the CHH to transboundary water politics.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the hydro political situation on the Nile River Bain. The Nile is shared by eleven riparian states, but the allocation of water shares is highly asymmetric. Historically, Egypt receives the lion’s share of the benefits but attributes no water to the Nile, while Ethiopia as the main contributor of water utilizes a meager 1 percent of its available water from the Nile. However, in recent years Ethiopia has challenged Egyptian hydro-hegemony on multiple arenas and through a multitude of tactics. This study analyzes Ethiopia’s strategy to move towards increased cooperation on the Nile River Basin by examining events and diplomatic tendencies in the past 15 years.

Through the analytical framework of hydro-hegemony as developed by Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner, this study emphasizes the role of power asymmetry in establishing and maintaining a favorable position in regional hydro political questions. Hydro-hegemony is a reflection of one state’s ability to dictate the agenda on a transboundary river basin through tactics such as; coercion-pressure; treaties; knowledge construction, etc. Due to historical factors, Egypt has been able to successfully maintain its hydro-hegemonic status through employing an array of the tactics mentioned above.

The study analyzes the establishment of the Nile Basin Initiative, the drafting of the Cooperative Framework Agreement and the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam to show how Ethiopia during the past 15 years, has spearheaded an upstream effort to challenge Egypt’s hydro-hegemony on the Nile River Bain. By employing tactics similar to those of Egypt, Ethiopia has managed to successfully reduce the power asymmetry between the upstream and downstream riparian states, and thus access some of the development potential provided by the Nile River.

Hydro-hegemons can provide both positive and negative forms of leadership, the former leading to cooperative outcomes and the latter to conflict in transboundary river basins. What constrains hydro-hegemons and under what conditions do they cooperate? This paper examines China's and India's hydro-hegemonic behavior, using case studies of the Mekong and the Ganges, respectively. As a positive hydro-hegemon, China cooperates multilaterally with other Mekong riparians, while India takes a limited sovereignty view by sharing water with Bangladesh and Nepal in the Ganges. China and India behave as dominant hydro-hegemons when they engage in resource capture strategies, such as water diversion projects and unilateral dam-building activities. The regional context and domestic politics of hydro-hegemons constrain their behavior, and determine the forms of positive and negative leadership they provide. When strong multilateral mechanisms already exist in the regional context, hydro-hege-mons are more likely to cooperate multilaterally. This explains why China cooperates multilaterally in the Mekong while India rejects multilateralism in the Ganges. Domestic considerations also explain why China cooperates multilaterally in the Mekong but avoids water-sharing discussions. In India's case, electoral politics account for the eventual signing of the Ganges and Mahakali treaties after decades of negotiations.

The person who can solve the water problems    of  the world should receive two Nobel prizes,        one  for  PEACE  and the other for SCIENCE.                                           

June 10, 1963                                           
J.F. Kennedy –USA President

More than five decades after his death, the world is realising (?)
  the complexity and urgency of the water-related problems facing humanity, and the relevance of his remark.

This paper blends the analytical framework of hydro-hegemony with a waterscape reading to explore the use and methods of control of the Upper Jordan River flows. Seen as a sub-component of the broader Lebanon-Israel-Syria political conflict, the struggles over water are interpreted through evidence from the colonial archives, key informant interviews, media pieces, and policy and academic literature. Extreme asymmetry in the use and control of the basin is found to be influenced by a number of issues that also shape the concept of 'international waterscapes': political borders, domestic pressures and competition, perceptions of water security, and other non-material factors active at multiple spatial scales. Israeli hydro-hegemony is found to be independent of its riparian position, and due in part to its greater capacity to exploit the flows. More significant are the repeated Israeli expressions of hard power which have supported a degree of (soft) 'reputational' power, and enable control over the flows without direct physical control of the territory they run through – which is referred to here as 'remote' control. The 2002 Lebanese challenge of the hegemony established shows that full consent has never been achieved, however, and suggests the maintenance of hydro-hegemony in this international waterscape relies on the reconstitution of reputational power.

The water crisis has been regarded as a governance crisis. Transboundary watercourses and basins are vital for South America’s development and regional integration, but the governance of shared waters has faced many challenges. The field of study of hydropolitics seeks to understand how the interactions between riparian states influences the control and management of shared waters over time. In this study, we seek to demystify geopolitical conflicts over water in the light of critical hydropolitics and the concept of hydro-hegemony rooted in the neogramscian approach of global political economy. The political economy of water governance is related both with the creation of international institutions and organizations and cooperation on international basins to regulate water use and conservation in many political levels and spatial scales. In this perspective we highlight the evolution of water issues on international development agenda and the issue of sovereignty on natural resources on international water law. Finally, we discuss the challenges on Uruguay River governance as an illustrative case in the context of the La Plata basin on the interaction between riparian states since the hegemonic rivalry between Argentina and Brazil until the early experiences of regional integration in scope of Mercosul. Thus, we highlight the role of transnational forces in two cases: the dispute between Argentina and Uruguay because of pulp mills at the east bank of the international river and the social struggle against the Garabi-Panambi Binational Hydroeletric project at the border of Brasil and Argentina.

The modern international legal regime governing nation-states is intrinsically tied to power. Power analyses thus play a major role in understanding international law and its impacts on water access and distribution. Building on theories of hydro-hegemony (power relationships in transboundary water interactions), this chapter examines the relationship between hydro-hegemons, freshwater, and law. Examples from river basins and aquifers around the world help analyse the (counter-)hegemonic potential of both the content and structure of international law governing freshwater. Particular attention is given to the debate over whether international law might help 'level the playing field' in transboundary water interactions.

This paper blends the analytical framework of hydro-hegemony with a waterscape reading to explore the use and methods of control of the Upper Jordan River flows. Seen as a sub-component of the broader Lebanon-Israel-Syria political conflict, the struggles over water are interpreted through evidence from the colonial archives, key informant interviews, media pieces, and policy and academic literature. Extreme asymmetry in the use and control of the basin is found to be influenced by a number of issues that also shape the concept of 'international waterscapes': political borders, domestic pressures and competition, perceptions of water security, and other non-material factors active at multiple spatial scales. Israeli hydro-hegemony is found to be independent of its riparian position, and due in part to its greater capacity to exploit the flows. More significant are the repeated Israeli expressions of hard power which have supported a degree of (soft) 'reputational' po...

This article places the theorization and analysis of hydro-hegemony in the context of the scholarship on transboundary water conflict and cooperation. We discuss critiques, developments, and debates in this domain over the past 10 years, focusing particularly on the contributions of the London Water Research Group, showing how thinking on the theorization and analysis of hydro-hegemony—and hydropolitics—has moved beyond the state-centricity, the tendency to see hegemony as solely negative, and the conceptually hegemonic potential of hydro-hegemony itself. Various strands of international relations theory (realism, neo-institutionalism, critical theory) have left their mark on the London School. Intense interaction between analysts and pragmatic practitioners is found to invite (or incite) eclecticism as well as promote vibrancy.

Hydro-hegemonic praxis defines much of Israel’s occupation that has continued since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. Two empirical case studies of hydro-hegemony and counter-hegemony at local level are compared in this paper: the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and the Israeli-occupied West Bank. Both case studies show that control over water resources and supply provides political power over others at local level. Yet non-violent resistance can be observed in these border areas. In border areas between Israel, Syria and Palestine, control over access and water supply plays an important role in the ability of Israel to exercise hegemonic power in daily hydro-politics, which in the long term is detrimental for the people and the environment and disrupts the hydrological balance in the entire Jordan River basin.