Goethean Phenomenology

The concept of 'consciousness soul' (Bewusstseinsseele) is part of the terminological core of Rudolf Steiner's anthroposophy. It has been discussed to a certain extent within the isolated discourse among anthroposophically oriented researchers, but has so far hardly been acknowledged in academic studies on Steiner. The present article undertakes a first systematic mapping of the research area in which this term can be meaningfully located, discussing three frameworks that have appeared so far as promising and hermeneutically appropriate approaches to the difficult subject.

This paper will demonstrate the method of Goethean observation as a means of surveying and appraising landscape which allows a role for a schooled subjectivity.  Similarities between this method and phenomenological studies will be made.  To explore what Goethe’s scientific method is, the first section of this paper discusses the Goethean method as taught by the School of Life Science.  I then move on to the situation of attempting to apply the method as a means to understand the Genius Loci of a specific place.  The final section records what happens when the same place is then revisited.  The method, as negotiated by the group applying it, is examined by describing the experience and examining the intersubjective consistencies and discrepancies that arose within the group.  In conclusion I suggest the way in which this method could be used to approach landscape in an informed way that is also sensitive to the phenomenon of the place itself.

È anzitutto con la voce dei suoi miti – miti di dèi ed eroi – che la civiltà greca antica parla a Friedrich Nietzsche e a Walter F. Otto; ed è per mezzo dell'ampiezza del domandare filosofico che entrambi i filologi intendono guadagnare una consona via d'accesso all'esperienza ellenica, cogliendola al di fuori di strutture teorico-concettuali che non le appartengono. Lungi dall'essere confinato nell'ambito letterario e retorico, il mito viene incontrato – insieme al culto – in tutta la sua forza creativa, secondo un'indagine ove, in vari modi e momenti, filosofia, filologia, scienza della religione, antropologia culturale ed etnologia si intrecciano in un complesso ordito. Un retaggio romantico persiste nel discorso di ambedue gli autori: se da una parte Nietzsche lo porta al collasso facendo emergere il fondamento dionisiaco dell'esistere nei termini di un'affermazione incondizionata del divenire e della volontà, dall'altra Otto ne riabilita la centralità assegnata alla religione quale momento chiave dell'esistenza e della storia, ma marginalizzando la dimensione «mistico-misterica». Egli, così, rielabora in modo incisivo il classicismo tedesco e può riconoscere nelle figure divine dei greci le forme originarie di un essere che si dischiude nella ricca polimorfia della natura e del mondo della vita.

This essay posits that equanimous vision is an approach best suited to seeing objects of inquiry in their fullest reality. In its free-floating attending to what is, equanimity never tries to make sense out of things through fixed concepts/abstractions or single perspectives. Rather, it remains mobile, and describes a way of describing the enactive perception necessary for the insights supporting interpretations of natural, aesthetic, and economic phenomena. The essay will mobilize a few thinkers (e. g., Goethe, Alva Noë, Hilary Putnam) and a few narratives drawn from Zen Buddhism in order to reflect upon the ways in which equanimity may inform the process of knowledge itself—how it is we come to know.  It is precisely this encounter of Eastern and Western thought that allows us to appreciate the full extent to which the analytical intellect alone is inadequate to full, real, useful inquiry.

As I will argue, one of the remarkable things about the equanimous approach to knowing is that, by seeing comprehensively, it engages a higher cognitive function than abstracting what is general. Equanimity, despite its broad and sweeping attention, is not primarily a search for commonality in the form of a common plan or general order for things. Rather, by also looking for the internal “spirit” (Goethe) or essence of the thing, it appreciates how parts and wholes intertwine. In this way, it challenges traditional ways of seeing/knowing by overcoming separation but not at the level of separation. In other words, if the mind looks for unity by removing differences, then it works abstractly by means of seeing generally. The equanimous mind, by not taking abstractions as ends, works by apprehending things comprehensively, understanding differences as a unity. In this way, it is free to travel in the opposite direction to knowing or thinking abstractly. Equanimity is well suited for attending to the ways things are internally related to each other as dynamic elements of an expansive, indivisible totality. To know such a totality demands more than safe, disengaged spectatorship, inviting instead involvement sometimes as shambolic as the world itself.

This thesis offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of scientific knowledge, particularly as this is presented in the Posterior Analytics. The interpretation draws on the theory of knowledge and philosophy of science informing the scientific work of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. It is argued that the interpretation of Aristotle as a rational empiricist in the Goethean sense helps to resolve many central problems in Aristotle’s theory of scientific knowledge. The widely accepted view that Aristotle is torn between incompatible empiricist and rationalist tendencies is described; particularly in relation to the problems associated with the interpretation of epagoge as “induction,” and of nous as an a priori intellectual intuition. Aristotle’s position is shown to be fully coherent when interpreted in terms of a theory of knowledge that transcends the opposition between empiricism and rationalism. Goethe’s rational empiricism is described and is shown to be precisely the theory of knowledge needed to understand Aristotle. A Goethean account of Aristotle’s theory of knowledge is given, focusing on the nature and role of the archai that serve as the first principles of Aristotelian science. It is argued that Aristotle’s archai are best understood as Urphänomene in the Goethean sense. A detailed interpretation is provided of Aristotle’s concept of nous in relation to his theory of knowledge. Aristotle’s account of the cognitive process in Posterior Analytics 2.19 is analysed, the interpretation of epagoge as “induction” is criticised and an alternative account is offered. Finally, an account of Aristotle’s conception of scientific method is presented, and it is argued that, contrary to some interpretations, the Posterior Analytics does contain a general account of the method of scientific discovery.

Este artículo busca proporcionar nuevas perspectivas para una lectura reflexiva de la Teoría de los colores de Goethe, que permitan su puesta en valor más allá de la reconocida polémica con las ideas científicas de Newton, a partir del reconocimiento de la actitud proto-fenomenológica del poeta alemán y su interés en la experiencia directa y subjetiva del fenómeno cromático. Además se abordan otros aportes de la Teoría, fundamentales para comprender la importante influencia de Goethe en la configuración del conocimiento contemporáneo sobre color.

The problems involved in understanding the Aristotelian notion of an arche arise from the widely accepted view that Aristotle’s theory of knowledge is torn between irreconcilable empiricist and rationalist tendencies. I argue that several puzzling features of the Aristotelian arche are clarified when it is understood as akin to the Urphänomen, which plays a central role in the scientific thought of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. More broadly, I argue that the apparent conflict in Aristotle’s theory of knowledge is resolved by seeing that Aristotle is neither an empiricist, nor a rationalist, but a “rational empiricist” akin to Goethe.

This summer/fall 2018 issue of Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology includes the following items:
• A “book note” on the recently published 2nd edition of philosopher Jeff Malpas’ groundbreaking Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography, originally published in 1999. This expanded version includes a new chapter on place and technological modernity, “especially the seeming loss of place in the contemporary world.”
• A “book note” on EAP editor David Seamon’s recently published Life Takes Place: Phenomenology, Lifeworlds and Place Making, which gives particular attention to the generative aspects of place and locates six place processes that Seamon identifies as place interaction, place identity, place release, place realization, place intensification, and place creation.
• An essay by the late philosopher and science educator Henri Bortoft, who focuses on ways of thinking holistically, including the conceptual efforts of proto-phenomenologist Wolfgang Johann von Goethe; physicists Niels Bohr and David Bohm; and philosophers J. G. Bennett, Edmund Husserl, and Ludwig Wittgenstein.
• An essay by retired environmental educator John Cameron, who begins a new series of essays on the lived relationship between interiority and exteriority, particularly as qualities of the natural world and place contribute to that relationship.

My familiarity, as a German, with Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and the renewed
confrontation with his works during the Masters of Holistic Science programme at
Schumacher College have given me the opportunity to explore yet another facet of his
fascinating, multi-talented personality. 

    Although already in high regard for his literary achievements, the full extend of Goethe’s
significance in the history of culture may not yet have been realized. In many ways, his works
seem still to be gaining in influence. In particular with regard to his work as a scientist, he
surprises with astonishing foresight and continues to provide deep inspiration to the
emerging discipline of holistic science.

  To give you a perspective from within the German cultural background: Goethe is most
highly regarded for his work as a poet and his scientific writings are less well known. He is to
German literature and culture, what Shakespeare is to the English, Cervantes is to the
Spanish and Montaigne is to the French, linguistic, cultural identity.

  Rudolf Steiner, the founder of the movement of antroposophy and initiator of the popular
alternative education system, was deeply influenced by Goethe and so was Carl Gustav
Jung. Steiner wrote in his book on Goethean Science: “Goethe’s world-historic significance
lies, indeed, precisely in the fact that his art flows directly from the primal source of all
existence, that there is nothing illusory or subjective about it, that, on the contrary, his art
appears as the herald of that lawfulness that the poet has grasped by listening to the world
spirit within the depth of nature’s working. At this level art becomes the interpreter of the
mysteries of the world just as science is also, in a different sense”(Steiner, 1988).

  I decided to attempt my own translation of Goethe’s collected ‘aphorisms on the theory of
nature and science”, after comparing some of the translations offered by Naydler with the
German original and realizing that he not only translated them rather freely, but that there
were also a lot of aphorisms that to my knowledge have so far not been translated into
English.

  In my translation, I have attempted to stay as close to the literal meaning of Goethe’s
sentences as possible and this may occasionally result in the need to re-read an aphorism
once or twice, when unusual word order or word use obscure easy access to its meaning. I
deliberately made this decision in order to preserve Goethe’s intent and to avoid interpretive
translation on my part.

  In general it can be said of aphorisms, that they loose in clarity what they gain in brevity.
Nevertheless, they can be powerful instruments in conveying deeper insights on a level,
which transcends the purely rational and stimulates intuitive understanding.

  After every translated aphorism, I briefly comment on the association it invoked in me. I am
fully aware that these associations are coloured by my own background and are subjective
interpretations, as I realize the impossibility of ‘objective analysis’. The translations and my
comments on them make up the main part of this essay. 

    I will discuss Goethe’s influence on the newly emerging discipline of holistic science and
investigate to what extent Goethe’s way of seeing the world is central to the emerging new
paradigm, which will hopefully constitute the basis for a more holistic worldview.
I will briefly review some of the evidence which links Goethe to the ancient traditions of
Alchemy and Hermetic Science and discuss to what extend Goethe may be regarded as a
conduit for this ancient knowledge from before the scientific revolution to the present day and
whether these ancient disciplines may still be of significance in the attempt to formulate a
new holistic worldview. In their participatory nature they may point the way towards
incorporating the achievements of 300 years of Reductionist science into the wider
framework of a holistic science that re-unites the arts and the sciences, re-introduces a focus
on qualities over quantities, moves from control to participation and provides a basis for a
new ethical way of engaging with nature.

A reading of Benjamin’s review of Karl Blossfeldt's Urformen der Kunst . I suggest how Benjamin positions Blossfeldt’s plant photography in relation to Goethean science as well as to his understanding of the manifestations of fantasy.
Forthcoming in October 2017 issue of Critical Horizons, edited by Alison Ross

In the last several decades, there has arisen a growing interest in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s way of science as it contributes to a phenomenology of the natural world. Though must better known for his works in poetry, drama, and imaginative literature, Goethe (1749-1832) was profoundly interested in studying the natural world (Goethe 1988). His writings on plants, morphology, geology, weather, and color continue to draw supportive attention today, from scientists, artists, and philosophers (Bortoft 2012; Richards 2002; Schad 2019).

One of the most significant aspects of Goethe’s scientific efforts was his developing a method of study whereby the researcher might empathize with the thing studied and see it in a comprehensive, accurate way truthful to what the thing actually is, mostly via a method of engaged, qualitative encounter and description. Since the 1990s, this method of study has been associated broadly with a particular manner of phenomenology—more specifically, with a phenomenology of the natural world (Hennigfeld 2015; Seamon and Zajonc 1998; Simms 2005). A recent effort to draw on Goethe’s way of understanding the natural world is ecologist Craig Holdrege’s Seeing the Animal Whole and Why It Matters. In this book, Holdrege uses a Goethean approach to understand nine animals as they might be described “holistically,” by which the author means showing “how an animal’s many features are interconnected and are a revelation of the animal as a whole” (p. 12). The nine animals that Holdrege studies are the sloth, elephant, mole, bison, zebra, lion, giraffe, tadpole/frog, and dairy cow.

Since Bill McKibben’s 1989 book, The End of Nature, it has become commonplace to pronounce the ‘end’ of that which, for many decades, we called nature. Although in many instances the reiterations of the end of nature do not agree with McKibben’s reasoning — instead, offering reasons quite contrary to his — they concur on the premise that nature is not a plausible or desirable concept for environmental thought or activism. Alongside this growing trend in environmental philosophy, a number of studies have recently appeared which reconsider the environmental significance of romanticism. While an environmental interest in romanticism is not surprising, it is very surprising given the increasingly pervasive critique of the idea of nature. After all, for the romantics, nature (not the environment, or ecology, or biodiversity) was the most significant and central concern. In this chapter, I offer an environmental reappraisal of romanticism, which takes account of the recent critiques of the idea of nature. My goals are historical and systematic. First, I seek to assess the validity of the environmentalist critique of the romantic conception of nature by distinguishing different traditions or strands within romantic thought. I argue that within romanticism, we find a tradition that emphasizes empirical experience, careful observation and methodological inquiry, and offers a conception of nature that cannot be criticized as an idealized or abstracted transcendental entity. Second, I consider the systematic significance of this “romantic empiricism,” and argue that while an abstract or idealized notion of nature is indeed problematic, a concrete conception that is achieved through the mutually supportive work of observation and reflection is essential for environmental thought. In particular, I contend that it is only on the basis of the kind of careful empirical observation and rigorous ontological account of nature that we find in the work of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe that an environmental ethic is possible. In Goethe’s approach, we find a notion of epistemological responsibility or obligation that offers the first step toward developing a sustainable environmental ethic.

This book presents a phenomenology of EVERYDAY ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERIENCE--The sum total of peoples’ firsthand involvements with their everyday places, spaces, and environments. Through a phenomenological explication of some 1,500 personal observations provided by “environmental experience groups,” the author identifies three overarching themes—movement, rest, and encounter—that appear to mark the essential lived core of everyday environmental experience.

The section on MOVEMENT examines the habitual nature of everyday environmental behaviors and argues, after French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962), that the lived foundation of these behaviors is the body as preconscious but intelligent subject (“body-subject”). The section on REST explores people’s attachment to place and gives particular attention to at-homeness and positive affective relationships with places and environments.

The book’s third section on ENCOUNTER considers the multifaceted ways in which people make or do not make attentive contact with their surroundings and explores such modes of awareness as obliviousness, noticing, watching, and more intense encounters.

In the book’s concluding section, the author examines the lived relationships and interconnections among movement, rest, and encounter and argues that their threefold structure offers one simple but integrated way to envision human environmental experience conceptually and to think about design and policy implications practically.

This essay explores the building of a new aesthetic consciousness, working out of insights from alchemy, into a new aesthetic method of observing brought forth by Goethe, and ending with a brief mention of the way this stream was taken further with the works of Rudolf Steiner.  I present an evocative picture of the development of this new consciousness, which Goethe felt dissolved the subject/object boundary, and give a series of images and related videos as a part of a brief practical example of how this consciousness can be developed.  I invite you, the reader, to participate actively in your reading of this work, as if you were viewing an artistic piece, to get into a mood suitable for engagement with the content herein.

Concepts slides from a lecture for designers on Goethean Science. It asked the question 'can Goethe's approach to understanding the wholeness of natural organisms be applied to design process in order to design more appropriately and responsibly?'.

Abstract in italiano: Contributo alla riflessione sull’intertestualità e sul romanzo moderno, il volume studia minuziosamente il Werther e La nouvelle Héloïse come ipotesti delle Ultime lettere di Jacopo Ortis nelle sue tre prime stesure (la “parte del Sassoli”, la prima parte dell’Ortis 98 e l’Ortis 1802 e in tal modo delinea tre diverse concezioni dell’Io moderno e del nodo natura, famiglia, passione, amore coniugale, adulterio, a cui si intreccia, nel caso di Foscolo, che lancia il Risorgimento, anche l’amore di patria. A Rousseau che edifica nella sua fantasia un “paese delle chimere”, Goethe risponde rappresentando, con crudo realismo ma anche con la serenità del poeta che contempla dall’alto l’enigma dell’universo, gli intricati sentieri degli uomini su questa terra. Tornando in parte a Rousseau, forte inoltre della lezione tragica e eroica di Alfieri, Foscolo misura l’uomo con il metro della guerra e delle sue pulsioni ferine, ci insegna un mondo senza Provvidenza e senza progresso, ma in cui l’amore può nascere, come espiazione e consolazione, dal male subito e dal male fatto. Proprio in questo è vicino a noi, lettori dell’inizio di XXI secolo, che non abbiamo ancora dimenticato i massacri del precedente.

Abstract in English: As a contribution on hypertextuality and on modern novel, the book explores Goethe’s «Werther» (1774) and Rousseau’s «La nouvelle Héloïse» (1761) as hypotexts of Foscolo’s «Ultime lettere di Jacopo Ortis» (1802). It so outlines three différentes views of modern subjectivity and of the relationship between nature, family, passion, married love and adultery.

In this article, I argue that Goethe’s way of science, understood as a phenomenology of nature, might be one valuable means for fostering a deeper sense of responsibility and care for the natural world. By providing a conceptual and lived means to allow the natural world to present itself in a way by which it might speak if it were able, Goethe’s method offers one conceptual and applied means to bypass the reductive accounts of nature typically produced by standard scientific and humanist perspectives. I illustrate this possibility largely through examples from Goethe’s Theory of Color (1810).

A reflection on the evolution of western psychology that reviews the work of Freud, Jung, Medard Boss and Ian Dallas. This analysis finds parallels in their thinking that may be classified and Jewish (Freud), Christian (Jung), post Christian/pre-Islamic (Boss) and Islamic (Dallas)