Free Will and Determinsim

In this research thesis we will discover that Augustine’s opinion that concupiscence was an evil, hereditary stain of original sin was not in line with the agreed-upon tradition of the earliest of Church fathers but there are strong arguments for believing that this opinion was based on non-Christian or spurious sources, the most probable direct source being the “Ambrosiaster” document. On this shaky foundation of the inheritance of concupiscence, Augustine built the idea of the massa damnata. It was a novel doctrine, since it was incompatible with the earlier Orthodox tradition. Augustine's claim that this denial of limbo and the positive damnation of unbaptized infants was part of the Catholic tradition, was a novelty to the Church universal. It was unsupported by early sources. This leads me to conclude that Augustine’s threefold philosophical structure of concupiscence, massa damnata and the positive damnation of unbaptized infants was not in accordance with “the faith which was once for all delivered to the saints” (Jude 1:3b, NKJV). The lack of orthodox evidence supporting an idea of genetically inheriting sin substantially weakens the basis as proffered by Augustine.

In tracing historically the development of Filipino philosophy as
traditionally conceived, the author discovered that the early Filipino
philosophers were Enlightenment thinkers. This was the direct
consequence of the Filipino colonial experience and the explanation why the trajectory of Filipino philosophy is basically Western in orientation.

In order to find a convincing position in the ‘free will’ debate, two sorts of determinism are distinguished. The merits of encompassing determinism, which is determinism as it is usually understood, and individual determinism, which focuses on the agent, are brought to the fore. The existence of encompassing determinism cannot conclusively be proven, but it may be demonstrated, on the basis of individual determinism, that actions come about in a determined way, leaving no room for ‘free will’. In order to facilitate the discussion, recent scientific developments in such diverse fields as, e.g., quantum mechanics and neuropsychology are incorporated. Balancing the arguments, I aspire to a consistent and nuanced viewpoint, not eschewing divergent conclusions.

This is the fourth article in a four-article series that exam- ines Buddhist responses to the Western philosophical problem of whether free will is compatible with “determinism,” the scientific doctrine of universal lawful causation. The first article focused on “early period” scholar- ship from the 1970’s, which was primarily compatibilist, that is, of the view that the Buddhist conception of causation is compatible with free will. The second and third articles examined “middle period” incompatibilist and semi-compatibilist scholarship in the remainder of the twentieth century and first part of the twenty-first. The present article examines work published in the past few years. It largely agrees that Buddhism tacitly accepts free will (although it also explores an ultimate perspective from which the issue appears moot), but mostly divides along compatibilist and incompatibilist lines, mirroring Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhist perspectives, respectively. Of the writers I emphasize, Gier and Kjellberg articulate both perspectives; Federman and Harvey advocate Theravāda compatibilism; and Wallace argues that although determinism and free will are incompatible, subtle complexities of Mahāyāna Buddhist metaphysics circumvent the free will and determinism dichotomy. Although the pre- sent article focuses on these writers, as the culminating article in the series it also draws on and summarizes the other articles in the series, and directs the reader to other recent period works that, due to space constraints, cannot be reviewed here.

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility brings together nine substantial essays on determinism, freedom, and moral responsibility in antiquity by Susanne Bobzien. The essays present the main ancient theories on these subjects, ranging historically from Aristotle followed by the Epicureans, the early Stoics, several later Stoics, and up to Alexander of Aphrodisias in the third century ce. The author discusses questions about rational and autonomous human agency and their compatibility with a large range of important philosophical issues, including their compatibility with divine predetermination and other theological questions; with atomism and continuum theory and with the physical sciences more generally; with the determination of character and its development from childhood through nature and nurture; with epistemic features such as ignorance of circumstances; with theories of necessity, possibility and contingency; with external or internal preceding causes and impediments; and with folk theories of fatalism. Room is also given to the questions of how human autonomous agency is related to moral development, to virtue and wisdom, and to blame and praise. Historically unified, philosophically profound, and methodologically rigorous, Bobzien's essays show that in Classical and Hellenistic philosophy these topics were all debated without reference to freedom to do otherwise or to a free will, and that the latter two notions were fully developed only later. The volume will be of interest both to philosophers and to historians of philosophy, with more than half of the essays accessible to advanced undergraduates.

... Free Will: a historical and philosophical introduction jej autor, Ilham Dilman, przenikają karty najstarszych dzieł literatury greckiej [Dilman, 1999]. ... świadomej woli: „plany działania nie wydają się wymuszać zachowa-nia w tym sensie, iż jeśli pojawi się dany plan, dochodzi do ...

Ted Honderich, a British philosophy professor, is the leading proponent in our time of the doctrine known as determinism (more accurately called “predeterminism”). His most elaborate treatment of this issue was in his 1988 tome, "A Theory of Determinism: The Mind, Neuroscience, and Life" (Oxford University Press). But, as he explains in the second edition (2002) of his book "How Free Are You?: The Determinism Problem," “I’ve had some second thoughts,” and this second edition “goes further than its large predecessor and also than the first edition of itself.” Accordingly, the present review focuses on this second edition of "How Free Are You?" See also the section on Honderich in Chapter 1 of my book "Free Will and Human Life" (Pittsburgh: Philosophia, 2021), 20-24 (https://www.amazon.com/Free-Will-Human-Life-Johnson/dp/0970105533/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=).

Three points of view on the problem of the answerability of philosophical questions are developed:
a) the traditional view that the questions are perfectly genuine but just very difficult;
b) what I call the 'nonsensicalist' view, characteristic of logical positivists and Wittgensteinians, that they are largely meaningless pseudo-problems;
c) the 'mysterian' or transcendental naturalist view that they are genuine problems but ones that our intellects are unequipped, or at least very ill-equipped, to handle.

Overview and Disclaimer There are few passages, if any, in canonical or authoritative Buddhist texts that explicitly address anything remotely resembling the philosophical problem of free will. This series of four articles is intended as an in-depth guide to the secondary literature on Buddhism and free will, a fairly small and relatively recent body of writings that began roughly within the past half century. Although these four articles appear in this journal, the intended audience is not only scholars and students of Buddhist ethics, but also Western philosophers who for the most part have only recently begun to take Buddhism seriously and to try to mine it for ideas, arguments, theories, and alternative ways of knowing. This dual audience complicates matters. On the one hand, many Buddhist scholars are not only unfamiliar with the Western philosophical problem of free will and its many iterations in the hands of soft versus hard determinists, libertarians, compatibilists, incomp...

Determinism from the 1 st and 3 rd person perspective as well as the universal point of reference aee dealt with. This is to show the absence of free will in the last perspective and the illusion of it when seen from the first two perspectives. 'Free' choice is dealt with as well as the absence of free will and the consequences of determinism for law and court judgements are explored. So, what if any, is the place and the role of God in all this? Did s/he create determinism and the potential for or any semblance of choice and free will? Or is the existence of God, the fulfilling of prayer intentions and miracles impossible and redundant in a universe of determinism (laws of nature etc) or universal determinism?

Daniel C. Dennett is a self-acknowledged "compatibilist"—one who takes a middle road between the "hard determinists" and the advocates of free will.  How Dennett can take such a position without violating the principle of (non)contradiction is the central mystery of this book. See also the discussion of Dennett in my book "Free Will and Human Life" (Pittsburgh: Philosophia, 2021) (https://www.amazon.com/Free-Will-Human-Life-Johnson/dp/0970105533/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=).

This project examines whether we can consistently make two claims: i) God cannot prevent sin without destroying free will; and ii) in heaven, God prevents sin without destroying free will. It explores the conditions under which agents may be said to be acting freely, guided by consideration of the free will defence to the problem of evil. This involved considering prominent themes in the philosophy of action, and in the metaphysics of free will. It develops, and defends, a non-causal incompatibilist account of free agency. This is then applied to the theological problem of how God ensures the sinlessness of the saints in heaven, and why this could not be achieved prior to heaven.