Deradicalisation

Inevitably many terrorists and violent extremists end up in prison where they can pose formidable challenges.  Such prisoners are unusual and distinctive. As a consequence, their management can pose exceptionally difficult problems in prison and probation settings. However, our knowledge of managing and intervening with violent extremists in prison settings is very limited.  On many issues we currently have almost no published research, and much of what does exist is of poor quality. This deficiency unquestionably represents one of the most serious obstacles to developing effective strategies for promoting and facilitating disengagement from terrorism. This chapter provides an introduction to the problems and issues raised by terrorist and extremist offenders in prison settings. Critical issues around management strategies, radicalisation and deradicalisation, reform, risk assessment, as well as post-release experiences, are all explored.

Most terrorists ultimately end up in prison, yet remarkably little is known about what happens behind the prison walls and even less about when those individuals are eventually released back into society. This book provides readers with an up-to-date, informed and accessible account of what is known about terrorists and extremists in prison, what are the genuine risks and dangers, and what are the critical issues and insights in terms of management and reform. In doing so, it strips away many of the myths and media panics which have so often dominated discussions of this vital issue.

What is the risk of reoffending for released terrorist prisoners and what are appropriate processes and systems for managing and risk assessing such individuals? This paper explores these and related issues to help inform wider discussion and debates on appropriate policy in this area. The paper starts by critically analysing what we mean when we talk about ‘recidivism.’ This is followed by a discussion of terrorist recidivism in a range of international contexts, ranging from Northern Ireland to Sri Lanka, the United States to Israel. Taking a broad perspective, helps facilitate both a greater understanding of the factors related to terrorist recidivism rates and to identity key policy recommendations.

Résumé

L’article s’attache à l’engagement radical entendu de façon classique comme un militantisme qui, à partir d’une posture de rupture vis-à-vis de la société d’appartenance, accepte au moins en théorie le recours à des formes non conventionnelles d’action politique éventuellement illégales, voire violentes. Il présente un bilan analytique des recherches qui adoptent de façon croissante une perspective de carrière et travaillent désormais sur le désengagement et la déradicalisation. Tout en refusant une interprétation particulariste et a fortiori pathologique du phénomène, il en restitue les spécificités et dynamiques collectives autant qu’individuelles pour souligner à la fois les continuités et les lignes de fracture le distinguant de l’engagement « ordinaire ».

Abstract

This paper explores radical engagement, understood in the classical sense as a form of activism that, from a position of rupture with the society to which it belongs, agrees at least in theory with resorting to certain unconventional forms of possibly illegal or even violent political action. It offers an analytical assessment of research that is increasingly taking a “career perspective” in focusing on disengagement and deradicalization. While rejecting any particularist and, a fortiori, pathological interpretation of this phenomenon, it reviews the collective as well as individual characteristics and dynamics in order to highlight both the continuities and the fracture lines that distinguish radical from “ordinary” engagement.

Over de Mu'tazila, het Huis der Wijsheid en het hoe en wat om radicalisering tegen te werken bij jongeren. Originele tekst uit 2007 met kleine aanpassingen. Rudi Roth.

Etienne Vermeersch schreef hierover:
Ik vind dit een boeiende tekst en een uitstekend uitgangspunt voor de discussie.
Voor degenen die de (enigszins overdreven) lof zingen van de Islam-invloed op het Westen, is het nuttig de belangrijke rol van de Mutazila daarin te beklemtonen.

Our understanding of the risk assessment of terrorist and extremist prisoners is in its infancy, yet this is clearly a critical issue. How can one tell if a prisoner is still dangerous or not? What are valid measures to assess risk and what type of evidence is worth examining? In considering risk assessment of terrorists and extremists in prison settings there are a range of essential issues to consider.  Crucially, not all terrorist and extremist prisoners are the same and factors which apply clearly to one individual will not apply equally strongly to others. As a result, effective risk assessment processes need to be nuanced. This chapter highlights the range of issues which are likely to be of most use when considering risk assessment in the context of a terrorist prisoner, and also identifies what sources of information can provide the necessary insight to inform this assessment.

Terrorism, radicalization and violent extremism dominate sociological, political and cultural concerns in today's polarized social and political world. However, the role of governments and issues relating to state terrorism and the counter-terror state remain important considerations. This book presents an understanding of the concept of Countering Violent Extremism from a critical terrorism studies perspective using case studies from different countries while examining the issues it raises. Extremism and violence do not emerge in a vacuum – nor do the policies that counter these concerns. There are no simple solutions to violent extremism but the fixation on ideology can do more harm than good.

The paper introduces the field of social diagnostics and three selected instruments and tools that offer potential benefits for P/CVE. The tools presented here are the Inclusion-Chart 4 (IC4), Network Mapping, and the Biographical Timeline. Tools and approaches like these can form the basis for further development of P/CVE-specific social diagnostics in the future – and may act as a steppingstone to the often -discussed resilience assessment.

Cet article a pour but d’aider les professionnels de terrain à mieux repérer des facteurs de désistance adaptés à l’individualisation de l’engagement dans l’extrémisme violent lié à l’islam dit « djihadisme ». Dans un premier temps, nous avons vérifié si les huit motifs d’engagement obtenus par notre approche qualitative Bouzar, Martin, 2016 ; Bouzar 2017, repérés auprès de 830 jeunes pris en charge par le CPDSI entre avril 2014 et août 2016 (tous arrêtés  avant leur départ pour rejoindre l’Irak ou la Syrie),  pouvaient être confirmés par une approche quantitative en croisant nos résultats avec les statistiques élaborées avec la collaboration de l’équipe du Professeur David Cohen du service pédopsychiatrique de l’enfance et de l’adolescence de l’hôpital de la Pitié-Salpêtrière de Paris Campelo, Bouzar, Oppetit, Hefez, Bronsard, Cohen, Bouzar, 2018. Dans un deuxième temps, nous avons croisé les caractéristiques micro et macro des jeunes recensées avec les promesses des recruteurs et la façon dont ils les ont manipulées, pour les catégoriser et proposer des scénarios de « mécanismes de risque » qui tiennent comptent de la combinaison interactive de facteurs micro et macro qui mènent à la radicalisation.  Nous avons pu ainsi considérer chaque jeune dans son propre contexte social et en interaction avec la promesse du discours « djihadiste » qui a attiré son attention. Présentés sous forme de trajectoires, les « mécanismes de risque » sont apparus comme des interactions entre des variables individuelles, des besoins individuels , et des variables situationnelles (qui comprennent notamment la rencontre avec les promesses du discours « djihadiste »). Après avoir mis en évidence huit principaux mécanismes de risque liés aux huit motifs d’engagement, nous avons proposé des facteurs de désistance qui correspondent aux besoins repérés dans chaque mécanisme de risque, afin de proposer aux jeunes engagés dans le « djihadisme » des engagements alternatifs non-violents compatibles avec le contrat social, en prenant en compte ce qui sous-tendait leur engagement initial violent. Nous montrons que pour proposer des « engagements alternatifs », les professionnels doivent identifier ce qui sous-tend l’engagement de chacun des radicalisés.

Most terrorists ultimately end up in prison, yet remarkably little is known about what happens behind the prison walls and even less about when those individuals are eventually released back into society. This book provides readers with an up-to-date, informed and accessible account of what is known about terrorists and extremists in prison, what are the genuine risks and dangers, and what are the critical issues and insights in terms of management and reform. In doing so, it strips away many of the myths and media panics which have so often dominated discussions of this vital issue.

The emergence of the Islamic State as a regional and ideological player deeply affected the mechanisms of radicalization witnessed worldwide. The article will compare a former instance of jihadism, the Egyptian al-Gamā'a al-Islāmiya (Islamic Group, IG), with the phenomenon of the Islamic State and its wilāyāt system. The Islamic Group, which has been active during the last three decades of the Twentieth century, constitutes an ideal case study because it performed a process of political de-radicalization and disengagement that led its members to abandon violence. The hypothesis underlying the paper is that a similar process could no longer take place in the case of the Islamic State. Indeed, the transnational project of the Caliphate is likely to exclude every chance of undertaking a de-radicalization and/or disengagement process in which a group effectively negotiates with a nation-state, and this difference is likely to represent one of the major counter-terrorism challenges arising from the Syrian-Iraqi scenario. In order to complete its de-radicalization process, the IG issued four books of murāğa'āt, " recantations " , in January 2002, under the general title of The Correcting Conceptions Series. The major one was titled The Initiative for Ceasing Violence: a Realistic View and a Legitimate Perspective. It was authored by two Shura Council members 2 and it generally addressed the practical and the ideological reasons behind the initiative. Unquestionably, this gradual process has been possible not only thanks to the new attitudes towards violence endorsed by al-Gamā'a al-Islāmiya, but also to the perceptive reaction of the State. By contrast, the a-national nature of the Islamic State obstructs this process. Indeed, after the local-oriented attitude of the first gam'iyāt and the emergence of al-Qa'ida as the premium brand of global terror, aims, push factors and geographical horizons of jihadism deeply changed. It is therefore not a question whether jihad is a binding religious prescription: it unquestionably is. The fundamental issue is whether and how one is to conduct it by lawful and prudent means and it is precisely this question that profoundly and irremediably divides the national jihadi movements from the Islamic State. As an internal Islamist critique-one that relies on a common Salafi substratum-the gam'iyāt refutation of global jihad may shed a light over the role of Da'ish in the contemporary jihadi panorama.

This chapter aims to show how radical beliefs and violent action relate to each other. It summarises the current landscape of academic research that has, in different ways, attempted to identify the causes of terrorist action. In showing the current trends, areas of consensus and areas of dispute, the chapter aims to show the complex relationship between drivers based on ideas, ideologies and beliefs and drivers based on other factors. Terrorists, like normal people, are influenced on a number of different levels and in ways that they do not always realise or acknowledge themselves. Whether through social ties, the power of counter-culture, or the desire to seek thrills, status or recognition, the story of why people undertake political violence is more complex and subtle than simply a question of belief.

By bringing together the existing skills and best practices in the field of disengagement and deradicalization, the project activities
used a cross-extremisms approach that allows to use the same key elements of intensive psychosocial mentoring to work with
those involved in various types of violent extremism; not only politically motivated, but united by the group dimension of the crime,
as in the cases of hooligan or youth gangs.
#ReaCT2022 - Report on Terrorism and Radicalization in Europe - N. 3, Year 3
ISSN 2813-1037 (print) ISSN 2813-1045 (online)
Copyright 2022 by START InSight Sagl editore, Lugano (Svizzera)

Governments today tend to grapple with the development and
implementation of deradicalisation programs; and as such, the results
of such programs have led to varying degrees of success. The
programs of three nation states—Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia
have been selected for discussion due to the diversity of programs
used in these Islamic states. This study focuses on the distinction
between disengagement and deradicalisation; and identifying and
understanding the affects that push and pull factors potentially have to
extricate identified terrorists from violent extremism. It also
highlights Jack Roche as an example of someone that in general
deradicalised himself as a result of push and pull factors.
“If the development of terrorism is a product of its own time and
place, it follows that issues of disengagement (and all that that
implies) will also be context-specific and necessarily nuanced . . . in
terms of how the programmes are constructed, implemented, and
promoted . . .” (Horgan, 2008a: 7).

This chapter aims to show how radical beliefs and violent action relate to each other. It summarises the current landscape of academic research that has, in different ways, attempted to identify the causes of terrorist action. In showing the current trends, areas of consensus and areas of dispute, the chapter aims to show the complex relationship between drivers based on ideas, ideologies and beliefs and drivers based on other factors. Terrorists, like normal people, are influenced on a number of different levels and in ways that they do not always realise or acknowledge themselves. Whether through social ties, the power of counter-culture, or the desire to seek thrills, status or recognition, the story of why people undertake political violence is more complex and subtle than simply a question of belief.

Il caso studio   il primo in Italia che riguarda un’attività di cosiddetta de-radicalizzazione nei confronti di un ragazzo coinvolto in attività eversive dell’estrema destra neo-nazista. Il percorso intrapreso nasce nel quadro del progetto europeo “Exit Europe”, che ha coinvolti i partner di 5 paesi nella logica di integrare gli interventi di P/CVE (Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism).
In #ReaCT2022 - 3  Rapporto sul terrorismo e il radicalismo in Europa - N. 3, Anno 3, p. 35-36 ISSN 2813-1037 (print) ISSN 2813-1045 (online)
Copyright 2022 by START InSight Sagl editore, Lugano (Svizzera)

Ahmad Saiful Rijal bin Hassan discusses the mufti-mustafti approach in religious counselling. A mufti is someone qualified to give a legal opinion or fatwa whereas a mustafti is someone seeking a legal opinion (fatwa) from a mufti. The goal of a mufti-mustafti approach is to rehabilitate terrorists and extremists into embracing moderate views and to enable them to denounce their radical beliefs.

What roles do various (security) authorities and civil society organisations play in deradicalisation and exit work? What findings can be drawn from the scientific monitoring of the counselling centres? The second anthology published by the BAMF Research Centre, "SCHNITT:STELLEN 2.0", deals with these and other questions. The anthology was produced in cooperation with the association of academic staff FoPraTEx (Research-Practice-Transfer in the Phenomenon Area of Islamist Extremism).
The anthology is divided into four parts, each of which follows a thematic focus.
- In the first part, various research results are presented that are of a more fundamental nature and contribute to the understanding of radicalisation and deradicalisation work.
- The second part presents contributions from direct accompanying research on current topics and target groups of counselling work.
- The third part is dedicated to the practical research perspective and highlights current questions on radicalisation and deradicalisation processes with so-called trend analyses based on insights from practitioners of counselling work.
- In the concluding fourth part, the scientific accompanying research is reflected on using the example of the projects FoPraTEx and InFoEx (International Forum for Expert Exchange on Countering Islamist Extremism).

Over the past decade, government policy has repeatedly identified prisons as particularly important environments in terms of both the risks of radicalisation and of opportunities for de-radicalisation. This paper provides an overview of some of the most important research findings that have emerged on prison and violent extremism in recent years. Drawing on this research, the article synthesises and assesses the dominating themes and views in the literature. The paper also identifies a number of significant knowledge gaps that deserve further scholarly attention.

Increasingly, governments are facing the challenge of resettling those convicted of terrorism offences at the end of their prison term. This raises questions about the effectiveness of rehabilitative efforts and the best way of reducing the risk that these individuals will commit a further terrorist offence. Drawing on research with those tasked with this work in the United Kingdom, this paper examines two competing approaches to engaging with ex-offenders: the "strengths based" approach and the "risk" model. The first encourages the individual to conceive of ways to work towards a positive future, whilst the second tries to plug perceived deficits, such as poor educational attainment, and manage risk through control and monitoring. Based on extensive interviews and observation of statutory and third sector actors as they carried out this work, this paper argues that practitioners see promise in a strengths based approach, but given the risk these ex-prisoners are deemed to pose, and the limited knowledge we have of what might promote desistance from further offending, a risk focused model prevails. As well as setting out the research that underpins this conclusion, this paper explores the theoretical and practical implications for academics and practitioners working in the field, including the inadequacy of the term "deradicalisation," and the need to invest further in understanding successful resettlement of politically motivated ex-prisoners.

Structured professional judgement tools were specifically created to measure risk related to violent extremism. But there is no instrument that measures disengagement and deradicalization program. The result of an action research realized in parallel of the follow-up of 450 French jihadists enabled the creation of a trial of a specialized protocol, named NOORAPPLI 3D 1. It is intended for professionals who take charge of jihadists. Its main aim is to measure how disengagement/deradicalization programs manage to change attitudes associated to violent extremism. It fills practitioners' need of deepening in order to measure the exit of radicalization and to fight recidivism. This practical guide helps professionals to consider the meaning of the radicalized individ-ual's engagement (engagement motives with promises of a better world and/or self), to detect his needs which were compensated by the radical discourse (psychological, socio-political…), to evaluate his level of "paranoid perspective" (rigid and persecuting emotional dimension), his level of "socialization in terrorism" (relational dimension) and his level of adhesion to the utopia of a perfect world with divine law (ideological dimension) as well as the evolution of the cognitive change provoked by these three dimensions (dichotomic thought causing an inversion of the perpetrator/victim status and the dehumanisation of victims). This article aims at submitting to critics this trial of exit of jihadist radicalization protocol. It presents a method which led to the creation of items allowing a follow-up individual to be replaced in his own trajectory of radicalization. NOORAPPLI 3D relies on results of a scientific research on contemporary jihadism but incorporates them transversely, to help professionals to measure concretely follow-up individuals, on the basis of objective facts and not according to subjective representations nor principled positions. NOORAPPLI 3D items are organized into three chapters corresponding to the three dimensions of the radicalization process (emotional, relational, ideological). For each of these items, four levels of answers are proposed. The professional will check the closest answer to the concerned subject's situation. The items are formulated so that the professional will gather precise information on each matter: either after a discussion or by the observation of the radicalized individual's behaviour, with a risk of dissimulation. The following items must be adapted and experimented. It will also be necessary to adapt them to help professionals of other countries because they are built upon the exit of radicalization of French jihadists who were largely recruited by French extremist leaders in the French language and tested by teams of French professionals within and outside prisons. FOREWORD: The question of assessing and taking charge a potential perpetrator of a terrorist attack forms a major societal issue. According to me, the present work represents an important action research given an examination of the international literature and the meeting of numerous concerned participants. This attempt of operationalisation of criteria which is compulsory in terms of evaluation and motivation, constitutes an important advance. The pursuit of such a work should foresee the deepening of relations between the defined criteria, their internal consistency, the recoveries of profiles in a same individual, as well as gender comparisons, often neglected internationally speaking. These joint analyses with relapse factors described in the international literature , will clear the specified fields of surveillance and the targets for an individualized support".

The Extremism Research Forum is a UK government funded research project, examining drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism in the Western Balkans – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.

The research commenced in 2017, exploring a range of themes and topics with key stakeholders within communities, civil society and government, in order to build a coherent picture of the specific situation in each country. 

This research seeks to inform and assist in the development of CVE policies and programming, offering key findings that could be relevant to practitioners and policymakers working in the field of countering violent extremism.

Each country study: 1) maps out the forms of extremism; 2) examines drivers and contributing factors of radicalisation (global, regional, national and local drivers, political and socio-economic); 3) develops a profile of at risk communities.

Taking into account the multifaceted nature of extremism, the research also; 4) identifies any potential links with organised crime, money laundering, links to terrorism; and; 5) analyses transnational co-operation of violent extremist groups.

This study forms one of the six contextual research pieces, presenting findings from in-depth primary research conducted with communities and wider stakeholders with knowledge of the violent extremist threats specific to the country. The findings are based on primary, and where credible, secondary data sources in order to create an informed and nuanced picture of the violent extremist activity or potential threat within the country. Importantly, it is intended that this research usefully informs policy development, providing practical recommendations, while also feeding into an overarching regional report, where broader linkages and key transnational issues that have been identified from the research will be examined.

It is expected that this project will result in an increased understanding of the size of extremist threats emanating from the WB region, and ultimately increased ability of the UK and Western Balkan partners to address radicalisation based on increased understanding of the issues and the problem.

Up to the present time, many countries have proved to be successful in operational counter-terrorism, but not strategic counter-terrorism. To achieve complete success, the operational hunt for terrorists must be accompanied with the correction of their misled ideologies. Investing in religious rehabilitation is one of the vital strategies in pursuing a holistic approach in deradicalisation programmes. This is because many terrorists of today commit act of violence under the guise of religion. In Singapore, the Religious Rehabilitation Group undertook the onerous task of helping detained terrorists by countering their ideological misunderstanding of religion through religious counselling sessions. Beyond counselling sessions, the group also took the responsibility to spread awareness to the public on the dangers of radicalism and extremism. The group also plays a great role to educate the public on the peaceful messages and moderate message of Islam, universal Islamic and moral values that are deemed important in the current context.

Two recent attacks in London, in November 2019 and February 2020, by two convicted terrorists released from prison resulted in a surge of concern about terrorist recid- ivism. However, statistics and the academic literature sug- gest that, on the contrary, terrorists are unlikely to relapse into violent extremism. A review of the judiciary files of 557 jihadi terrorist convicts in Belgium, spanning the three decades from 1990, confirms that less than five percent re- engaged in terrorist activities. These findings bear signif- icant implications for counterterrorism policies broadly and for sentencing and post-penitentiary measures more specifically.

Very little is known about how violent extremist practices are learned, and the role of educational channels through which they are spread. This empirical study extrapolates insights specific to the Bosnian and Herzegovinian context to demonstrate how one ultraconservative ideology, Salafism, can radically alter the dominant thinking and behavior of ordinary individuals once they feel displaced from the mainstream institutions and particularly from the formal education. At the core of the displacement and replacement model of radicalization is an informal and tactful teacher, influencer, or a mentor that individuals connect with either online or in person. Using the primary data collected in Bosnia and Herzegovina through 20 in-depth and semi-structured interviews with radicalized persons, the study sequences a ten-step radicalization model through which the interviewees have transformed from ordinary citizens into radicalized actors with a potential to engage in violent extremism. 2. Background: emergence of different forms of radicalization in Bosnia and Herzegovina Helped by Bosnian Serbs, Serbia invaded Bosnia and Herzegovina in ☆ This research has been funded by The Smith Richardson Foundation (USA), Grant #20150816.

Structural problems in the Indonesian prison system continue to defeat efforts to manage extremist prisoners, though 2016 has seen some small steps forward. This report by the IPAC team looks at case studies of recidivism, recruitment of criminal offenders by pro-ISIS inmates and attempts to launch jihad operations from behind bars.

Despite an increasing need to understand the aims of work with ex-prisoners convicted of terrorism offences, the knowledge base remains underdeveloped. Notwithstanding this limited theoretical and empirical foundation, practitioners in probation are increasingly faced with trying to successfully resettle these ex-prisoners. In the south of England, the organisation tasked with this work is London Probation Trust’s Central Extremism Unit (CEU). Based on interviews and observational research with practitioners, this article sets out a framework for interpreting this work’s aims from a practitioner perspective. Alongside describing the 13 primary aims of successful resettlement, the research sets out what success would ‘look like’, as well as considering some of the challenges in interpreting and promoting positive outcomes. The CEU’s model reflects a multimodal approach, speaking to both criminogenic needs, and the primary themes of desistance. Within this, practitioners try to encourage the probationers to take control of their own life and develop an agentic approach to their present and future. It is in this way that successful resettlement is conceptualised by practitioners working in this field. The implications of these findings for current debates over the appropriate focus of work on countering violent extremism and returnees from overseas conflict are also discussed.

Die KN:IX Impulse erfassen aktuelle Entwicklungen und Handlungsbedarfe im Phänomenbereich “Islamistischer Extremismus” und bieten praktische Ansätze und Empfehlungen an der Schnittstelle zwischen Wissenschaft und Praxis. Der erste Impuls liefert Hinweise zur praktischen Bedeutung des Nahostkonflikts für Fachkräfte im Bereich der selektiven und indizierten Präventionsarbeit.

Compared to the topic of radicalization, deradicalization was long treated as secondary in research, at least until recently. This article outlines the most important findings from theory and practice in three steps by: (1) discussing and reviewing existing classifications and typologies, (2) suggesting a conceptualization of the term “deradicalization” while considering discourses about the roles of ideology, identity and risk, and, based on this, (3) providing an overview of the empirical case of practical work in Germany. It turns out that central actors from practice, academia, (security) authorities and politics not only use different definitions, but there is also little agreement on what deradicalization practically) means. The German case shows that the landscape of deradicalization, differentiated into four fields of action, is highly diverse. However, the existing hybrid model of state and civic competences as well as the variety of approaches and actors should – with proper accentuation – be seen as an opportunity.

Klient*innenzentrierte Intervention im Zuge ganzheitlicher Fallarbeit versucht, auf der Grundlage einer langfristigen Beziehungsarbeit Veränderungsprozesse zu initiieren. Dabei werden Klienten im Kontext ihrer Lebensgeschichte und ihres Lebensumfeldes betrachtet. Maßnahmen vor allem der aufsuchenden Sozialarbeit, der systemischen Beratung, der Antigewaltarbeit, der politischen Bildungsarbeit und der sozialen Integration werden ganzheitlich verbunden. Hierdurch sollen nicht nur Distanzierungsprozesse vom Extremismus angeregt und begleitet, sondern auch die langfristigen Gefahren einer Re-Radikalisierung minimiert werden.

Konflikty zbrojne nierozerwalnie związane były z historią Europy. Kiedy jedne kończyły się, inne wybuchały zwykle ze zdwojoną siłą. To właśnie one stawały się przyczyną często wymuszanych i niekontrolowanych migracji ludzi z regionów do regionów, z państw do państw a często również na inny kontynent. Do czasu wojen bałkańskich, na obszarze Bałkanów, ruch migracyjny był głównie ruchem muzułmanów z Bałkanów do Turcji. Zaś wojny, które dotknęły ten region wywołały olbrzymi problem uchodźcy, który oszacowany został przez niezależnych obserwatorów na liczbę około trzech milionów osób.

Konflikty zbrojne nierozerwalnie związane były z historią Europy. Kiedy jedne kończyły się, inne wybuchały zwykle ze zdwojoną siłą. To właśnie one stawały się przyczyną często wymuszanych i niekontrolowanych migracji ludzi z regionów do regionów, z państw do państw a często również na inny kontynent. Do czasu wojen bałkańskich, na obszarze Bałkanów, ruch migracyjny był głównie ruchem muzułmanów z Bałkanów do Turcji. Zaś wojny, które dotknęły ten region wywołały olbrzymi problem uchodźcy, który oszacowany został przez niezależnych obserwatorów na liczbę około trzech milionów osób.

The concepts of deradicalisation and disengagement and are often applied in parallel, with the former generally interpreted in terms of attitudinal change (i.e. reducing sympathy for such violence), and the latter relating instead to behavioural change (i.e. no longer directly contributing to violence). The number of programmes aiming to achieve these objectives has increased substantially over recent years, including in locations such as Indonesia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, and Yemen. While the effects of Preventing / Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) programmes is notoriously difficult to measure, there is a strong case that such initiatives have the potential to deliver greater 'bang per buck' than other intervention types, for the reasons discussed in this paper. Of course, optimising efforts to counter this violence should clearly be of importance to the EU both on moral grounds (in relation to addressing violence in the countries in which interventions occur), and as a matter of 'enlightened self-interest' (as there is a continued threat of this violence being imported to Europe). Of course, the risks associated to such programmes are also prominent, precisely because they provide an existential threat to violent extremist organisations. This paper covers a range of themes relating to disengagement and deradicalisation programmes, including their activities, staffing considerations, facility upgrades, segregation policies, how to determine their success (or failure), and criteria through which to assess suitable locations for such initiatives.

Résumé

L’article traite de l’évolution du féminisme chilien depuis le retour à la démocratie en 1990 à la suite de la dictature militaire du général Pinochet. Le mouvement de femmes et féministe qui était mobilisé dans les années 1980 autour de la revendication de « la démocratie dans le pays et à la maison » entre alors dans une phase de démobilisation et de divisions, liées à la double militance et à la tension entre autonomie et intégration, en particulier vis-à-vis de l’institutionnalisation des politiques d’égalité des sexes. Dans ce contexte singulier, l’autonomie constitue le marqueur de la radicalité féministe.

Abstract

This paper explores the development of Chilean feminism since the return to democracy in 1990, following the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet. The women’s and feminist movement that mobilized in the 1980s around demands for “democracy in the country and the home” subsequently entered a phase of demobilization and division, stemming from the dual militancy and the tension between autonomy and integration, particularly with respect to the institutionalization of gender-equality policies. In this unique context, autonomy is the distinctive trait of feminist radicalism.

Rehabilitation, especially when addressing radicalised and terrorist offenders, is not optional. Our criminal justice and prison services are currently facing increasing numbers of offenders convicted of terrorism-related domestic crimes or assessed as radicalised, as well as returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) from conflict areas (see RAN Manual – Responses to returnees: Foreign terrorist fighters and their families). Most of these (prospective) prisoners will be released from prison at some point. How can they find a positive path back into society – how can they be rehabilitated? In response to this pressing question, this manual offers guidance for practitioners working to rehabilitate radicalised and terrorist offenders, both within and outside prison. It provides a comprehensive overview of the chronological phases of rehabilitation. The various actors contributing to rehabilitation processes are offered a structured assessment of important points of attention.

What is the threat from terrorist recidivism? And how do we interpret whether those who have been involved in terrorism are likely to return to violence? The fact that a number of recent attacks have been carried out by those with a history of militancy, lends added urgency to these questions. From the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, to the Sydney siege, and the murder of Lee Rigby on the streets of London, we appear to be witnessing repeated cases of terrorist recidivism.
This short commentary offers an overview of some of the main issues related to terrorism reoffending and efforts at 'deradicalisation', arguing for a more theoretically informed, holistic approach focused on reintegration rather than the heavy concentration on ideological issues that dominates much of the literature.