British Army (Second World War)

In 1942 two Free French brigades joined the British 8th Army in Libya. This chapter will focus on the experiences of these French soldiers fighting a coalition war in the desert. In particular, it will try to assess how well integrated the Free French were in this British-led force. It will do so by examining several themes: the difficulties created by an alliance in which there was a gross imbalance of military power, French perceptions of the British and vice versa and the ways in which the Free French units maintained their own distinctive characteristics despite their dependence on the British for equipment and training. The study is mainly based on 8th Army censorship summaries of soldiers’ letters, supplemented by liaison officers’ reports. and Free French diaries and memoires.

Although much has been written about the arguments between Churchill and Auchinleck over when Eighth Army should move over to the offensive in the spring of 1942, the plans for that offensive have been almost entirely overlooked in the literature. Drawing on the records in the archives, and on Auchinleck’s personal correspondence, reveals a planning process characterised by disagreements between the senior officers involved, a lack of urgency, and a flawed operational concept.

While the failure of Operation Market Garden may not be widely debated, the lack of a single obvious cause of the misadventure has provoked a myriad of theories and counter-theories.

The first chapter of this paper assesses how well Allied intelligence processes performed in advance of the operation.  It looks at what intelligence was collected, the performance of intelligence personnel in analysing and disseminating it, and how well they tasked additional collection.  It concludes that while the Allied intelligence machinery prior to Operation Market Garden was not perfect, and that some of the intelligence available to commanders was ambiguous, there was enough evidence available to have precipitated a significant redesign or cancellation of the operation.

The second chapter examines the decision-making that resulted in the operation being neither, altered nor cancelled.  It takes Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney’s Rubicon Theory of War, developed for the study of international relations, and applies it to the way in which decisions are made in the design, development and execution of military operations.  The chapter determines that Operation Market Garden went ahead as a direct result of Montgomery and his senior commanders passing a psychological point of no return and that, following this, a number of cognitive biases made it nearly impossible for them to accept or process new information in a manner which they otherwise might have done.  These biases are directly responsible for the marginalisation of the intelligence case in advance of Operation Market Garden.

The final chapter of this paper examines whether this marginalisation of intelligence was exclusive to Operation Market Garden, or whether it occurs in wider decision-making.  It concludes that the psychological biases responsible for the marginalisation of intelligence in Operation Market Garden have also been directly responsible for the downplaying or dismissal of intelligence and other information in a number of instances.  Furthermore, it determines that militaries are more vulnerable to these forms of cognitive biases, due to both their culture and structure and that, by extension, Operation Market Garden is indeed indicative of military decision-making.

Chapter Eight explores the role of morale in the military strategic process and demonstrates, for the first time, how it is possible to construct a methodologically sound quantitative approach for assessing morale in an historical battle context (the British Army’s progress through Northwest Europe in 1944/5). It proposes a functional conceptualisation of morale, which focuses its meaning and relevance on motivation and the willingness to act in a manner required by an authority or institution. These approaches, at least when applied to the Northwest Europe campaign, point to the need to reevaluate the dominant theories on combat cohesion. It is concluded that strategy, understood as an iterative multilevel process rather than a level of war or activity situated only as a bridge between national policy and tactics, lies at the heart of any understanding of combat cohesion.

The island of Bougainville in the South Pacific was the site of one of the largest and most gruelling campaigns fought by Australian forces during the Second World War. During the offensive against the Japanese from November 1944 to August 1945, more than 500 Australians were killed and two Victoria Crosses awarded. A veteran later described Bougainville as 'one long bloody hard slog'. Despite this, little is known about the campaign, which was dismissed as an unnecessary and costly operation. In the first major study of the Bougainville campaign since 1963, Karl James argues that it was in fact a justifiable use of Australia's military resources. Drawing on original archival research, including wartime reports and soldiers' letters and diaries, James illustrates the experience of Australian soldiers who fought. Generously illustrated with over forty photographs, this important book tells how this often overlooked battle played an important part in Australia's Second World War victory.

In the last decade there has been a plethora of books about Irish soldiers in the First World War, yet the fact that recruitment to the British forces continued into the interwar period and the Second World War has received comparatively little attention. Steven O'Connor's work addresses this gap by providing a much-needed assessment of officer recruitment to the British military after Irish independence. Based on archival research, oral testimony and a database of 1,000 officers it examines the reasons why young Irish people took the king's commission. It explores their subsequent experiences and identity in the forces, and places them within the wider context of Commonwealth recruitment to the British forces. Drawing on evidence from police reports, debates in town councils and local newspapers this volume also offers the first comprehensive account of reactions in independent Ireland to British recruitment and the shared military past.

Ανάλυση της καταδρομής ενός τμήματος του Ιερού Λόχου στη Νίσυρο, τον Φεβρουάριο του 1945, η οποία είχε ως κατάληξη την εξουδετέρωση της γερμανικής φρουράς της και την απελευθέρωση του νησιού. Επρόκειτο για μια από τις τελευταίες πολεμικές επιχειρήσειςτου Ιερού Λόχου (ενόψει της λήξης του Β' Παγκοσμίου Πολέμυ τον Μάιο του 1945) και μια από τις ελάχιστες κατά τις οποίες είχε ανθρώπινες απώλειες (δημοσιεύτηκε στα TA NEA THΣ ΛEΣXHΣ KATAΔPOMEΩN & IEPOΛOXITΩN, φύλλο 86, Ιανουάριος-Φεβρυάριος-Μάρτιος 2018)

The focus of this article is firstly to examine some aspects of the Kukri (Khukuri) in relation to Col. Kirkpatrick´s mission to Nepal (Nepaul) in 1793. In doing this I´ll attempt to place it in a historical context and briefly discuss the Kukri`s meaning in Nepal.
given is taken from his work published in 1811.

The Kukri & Kora (Kohara) in Col. Kirkpatrick`s work is the very first illustration of a Kukri knife and the Kora sword,  we
have record of and  could for the first time in history
be seen in a book. It thus allowed the British public and of course the World at large to gain knowledge about some of the weapons of the hill mean that have since then been strongly associated to Nepal and thue Gurkha/Gorkha soldier (and regiment/brigade).

The following paper explores the unique history, tradition and culture of the Gurkhas focusing on their knife, the Khukuri, often called Kukri. The relationship between the Gurkhas and Khukuri, its use in Gurkha culture, tradition and history. The Khukuri is a essential part of the Gurkhas identity and soul.

During World War II (WWIl) there were about 35.000 Cypriots engaged in armed combat. This considerable contribution by Cyprus to the Allied war effort needs to be examined against the background that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots' had joined. the British army long before Greece was attacked by Italy, and despite the fact that Turkey only declared war on Germany in 1945, when the war was almost
over.
Based on British archive material (Colonial and War Offices) and interviews conducted with both Greek and Turkish Cypriot former British soldiers in both parts of Cyprus, this paper aims to provide an account of the different motivations which drove Cypriots' of both communities to take up arms in an alien war;
It will be. shown that initially the main reason for this was the terrible economic situation that existed in Cyprus: The British army offered good wages and this attracted many to join. Other inducements embodied the Greek Cypriot hope that Cyprus would be given to Greece after the war was won - a notion inevitably resisted by Turkish Cypriot war veterans. Another reason that stirred the Cypriots was the decision taken by the communist party (AKEL) in 1943, to call upon its members to join the British to fight for the sake of the Soviet Union.
It will be examined how Greek-Turkish Cypriot relations developed within the ranks of the Cyprus Regiment. And, finally two other questions are to be answered: did the different political perspectives on the outcome of the war regarding a postwar Cyprus affect this relationship?i And did the skilled military training bear any consequences for the subsequent build-up of Greek and Turkish Cypriot armed organisations, like the EOKA and the TMT?

"Gallipoli and Kokoda: Enduring resonances"

Some 70 years ago the war correspondent George Johnston predicted that the name “Kokoda” would “live in the minds of Australians for generations, just as another name, Gallipoli, lives on as freshly”.  Johnston’s words proved true. After a more than a century of Australian military history, few names convey as much power or are as symbolic. Tobruk. Changi. Long Tan. These names resonate, too, but it is Gallipoli and Kokoda that have become closely associated with Australian national character.

The attributes displayed by the Australians on Gallipoli and Kokoda – their courage, determination, resourcefulness and, above all else, mateship – have become closely identified with “Australian values”. One hundred and two years ago today the Anzac legend was born on Gallipoli. Seventy-five years ago that legend was upheld along the Kokoda Trail as Australians faced their darkest hour. This address discusses some of the enduring resonances that connect Gallipoli and Kokoda: the rugged terrain and the extreme environment; the conditions endured by Australian soldiers; and the lasting significance of the campaigns.

Presented to the 12th International Conference on Military Geosciences
“The scope, reach, and impact of Military Geosciences”
Stellenbosch, South Africa
June 2017

The desert, like the jungle, is essentially neutral. Harsh, bleak and unforgiving, it presents military prospects to the astute and resolute tactician. Desert warfare is the ultimate expression of manoeuvre warfare. It is an endeavour to concentrate one’s forces in space and time, while splitting the enemy forces spatially and then destroying them piecemeal at different times. Desert warfare has been described as a tactician's paradise and a quartermaster's nightmare. Manoeuvre warfare assumed its most advanced form in the North African deserts of the Second World War. There, devoid of civilian population, rivers, dense forests, built up cities and dominant terrain features, mechanised armies swept unhindered across wide open featureless expanses. The vast expanse ensured that opposing armies always had an open flank to defend or attack.  Rommel, the finest practitioner and proponent of desert-style, mobile warfare, described the obstruction-free desert environment as offering undreamed-of possibilities. However, in the desert the manoeuvreist’s dream is at risk of descending into a nightmare at all levels of warfare. The desert presents unprecedented logistical challenges with every drop of water, of fuel, and every morsel of food having to be transported to the front. The inhospitable climate tests the mettle and endurance of men and machines beyond the harshest norms of warfare. Barren featureless wastes offer few natural defensive positions and even less opportunities for concealment. Armies have resorted to planting vast minefields for protection and night movement for concealment. In an environment where the tank is king, vehicle recovery teams play a critical role equal to, if not exceeding, that of the combat teams in gaining advantageous force ratios. Conserving precious resources, while inflicting maximum damage, is more important than territorial conquest. The Italians, the British, more recently the Israelis and Iraqis, have all tried to impose static warfare by building fortifications, but to no avail. Here battles are won by the side who conducts operations at a higher tempo than the adversary. Commanders resorting to static warfare are dearly punished by those who adopt a free-flowing war of movement. This paper uses the North African Campaign of 1941-1943 as a lens to examine the art of manoeuvre warfare under desert conditions.

A Over view of Kukri knives (Khukuri) as issued/used/provenanced to the 4th Gurkha Rifles over the 20th and 19th Century, during the British Raj.

Artefacts plays a important role in understanding history and this is a attempt to identify and document some of the Kukri knives as given and sued by the 4 GR in colonial India, specially over WW1 and WW2.

In July 1940, shortly after the fall of France, Winston Churchill insisted that the British high command organise immediately, in coordination with General Charles de Gaulle, strong forces of French exiles who wanted to continue the war against Germany. The British army’s liaison mission to these Free French forces, named the ‘Spears Mission’ after its commander General Edward Spears, struggled to achieve this goal. In the Franco-British campaign to take Syria in 1941, the Free French fought not against Germans but fellow Frenchmen of the Vichy garrison. Worse still, the British were unable to provide sufficient transport or artillery to their ally. However, in 1942 the 1st Free French Brigade joined the British Eighth Army in Libya. By now the Free French were one of the best equipped forces in the desert and performed outstandingly at the defence of Bir Hakeim.

How does an army integrate foreign soldiers, overcoming the differences of language, culture, training, equipment?  Taking the Free French forces in the Libyan campaign as a case study, this article will examine the problems resulting from Allied units serving under British command and how they were resolved. In particular, it will examine the work of the Spears Mission which played an important role in Free French success in 1942. The liaison officers of the Spears Mission represented Free French needs and problems to the British high command, while also having responsibility for ensuring that the Free French followed British procedures and orders. Managing Franco-British military relations was a difficult task and sometimes the Mission was the victim of both sides’ frustration. Yet, this article will show that despite setbacks, or perhaps because of them, interallied military cooperation gradually improved during the 1942 Libyan campaign, which saw the first sustained large-scale deployment of Free French forces under British command.

In spite of Ireland’s neutrality tens of thousands of Irish people fought in the British forces during the Second World War. Previous studies of  these transnational volunteers have focused largely on government policies towards the recruits and on ascertaining an accurate figure for
the number of Irish people in the wartime British forces. However, there remain important questions about these Irish recruits. This article examines their social backgrounds and their motives for enlisting. It concludes by assessing the significance of Irish recruitment within the
wider context of the contribution to Britain’s war effort from members of the British Commonwealth.

In 1940 the British Army formed commando units to raid, conduct sabotage, and gather information in German-occupied Europe. A small British military mission was sent to Australia, and the first of eight Australian independent companies was raised in 1941. In 1943 the companies were redesignated cavalry (commando) squadrons, later just commando squadrons. Four additional commando squadrons were later established. The employment of these units evolved throughout the war. From conducting a guerrilla war on Timor against the occupying Japanese, over time their role became akin to the traditional role of cavalry; thinly deployed on the flanks of the main force, carrying out reconnaissance, conducting raids, and harassing the Japanese. Yet even as late as 1945 commando squadrons could be misused or underemployed, assigned to tasks better suited to the infantry.
This paper will provide an overview of the Australian independent companies and commando squadrons – their training, employment, and wartime experiences – offering historical lessons on their employment. This study will also provide insights into the interactions between Australians and the local peoples of the region, whose support and assistance were vital to both the survival and success of Australian forces and the Allied war effort.

In 2013, Kohima was chosen as the 'Greatest British Battle Ever' in a deserved tribute to all those that for our tomorrow, gave their today. While many books and papers describe the battle and the wider Burma campaign – the longest in the Second World War – the Kohima Museum in York is not as widely known as it should be. Providing yet another reason to visit this beautiful city replete with history, the museum is not only home to myriad interesting objects, but serves as the focal point for educational and outreach activities – in addition to being involved in Anglo-Japanese reconciliation efforts. The museum also offers a mobile display, which is available to other institutions and events. This year, Bob Cook – a retired warrant officer Royal Signals – is taking part in a trip to Kohima, which is another reason to interview him.

Much has been written about WWII in the South Pacific and the battle for Rabaul, but very little about the people Imperial Japan imprisoned there.  The six U.S. airmen and one Australian coast watcher who survived out of the 200 plus Allied airmen and coast watchers imprisoned at Rabaul were not alone.  Thousands of other Allied POWs,  hundreds of missionaries and  thousands of Korean laborers and "comfort women" shared a similar fate.  My father was one of the airmen who survived "paradise." Their saga is explored to better understand their captors' motives for treating their prisoners so inhumanely.

Imperial Military Transportation in British Asia sheds light on attempts by royal engineers to introduce innovations devised in the UK to wartime India, Iraq, and Burma, as well as the initial resistance of local groups of colonial railwaymen to such metropolitan innovations.

Michael W. Charney looks at the role of the railways in the First Burma Campaign to show how some kinds of military technology – as an example of imperial knowledge – faced resistance due to 1930s-era colonial insularity. The delay this caused significantly compromised the early defense of the colony when the Japanese invaded in 1942. Charney examines the efforts made by one engineer in particular to revive the railways and shows how this effort was responsible for the development of a truly imperial technology that was suitable for extra-European contexts and finally won acceptance in India.

Incorporating newly accessible primary source material from the files of the military Director of Transportation during the Campaign, this book highlights a hitherto unfilled gap in the archival record and explores an ignored but crucial aspect of the 1942 Japanese invasion of Burma.

Table of contents
List of Abbreviations
Introduction
1. Metropolitan Transportation Technique from Britain to India and Iraq
2. Local, Colonial Railway Experience
3. A Colonial Railway in Wartime
4. Militarisation
5. Kings of the Road
6. The Technical Limits of Military Supply
7. Dark Territory and the Collapse of the Burma Defense
8. After the Campaign: India Learns from Burma
Notes
Bibliography
Index

11 Indian Brigade attack by 2/5 Mahrattas and 2 Cameron Highlanders against Young Fascists Battalion is a miserable failure after some initial success, because of under estimating Italians --Its British battalion loses its gallant commanding officer
• May 2021
• DOI:10.13140/RG.2.2.10016.92160
• Project:
• CRUSADER
• Agha H Amin

Highlighting the forgotten role of Australian commando squadrons and other special purpose units in the Pacific War - units that embraced a style of fighting that undertook missions then completely new to Australian forces.
During the Second World War, special operations were carried out by small groups of soldiers who could be inserted undetected by land, sea, or air into any environment to conduct sensitive operations in a secret,
unorthodox, or unconventional manner. These operations were high-risk, and often achieved significant military or political objectives.

ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ: Az 1917-től 1948-ig fennállt palesztinai brit mandátum története csupán héber és angol nyelven rendelkezik gazdag szakirodalommal, magyarul egyedül Arthur Koestler Ígéret és beteljesedés című, publicisztika jellegű munkája érhető el. A szerző jelen tanulmá-nyában a brit adminisztráció és rendfenntartás technikai problémáiról, a rendre felmerülő etnikai konfliktusok és összecsapások kezeléséről, illetve a brit csapatokkal és irányítással legélesebben szemben álló jobboldali cionista milíciákról ír a holokauszt és az izraeli államiság közötti időszakban, 1944 és 1948 között. Eredményeit az érintett felek iratait gyűjtő londoni National Archives, a Wiener Library és a jeruzsálemi Jabotinsky Institute anyagára alapozza.

In 1940 the British army formed commando units to raid, conduct sabotage and gather information in German-occupied Europe. A small British military mission was sent to Australia to establish similar units in the Australian Imperial Force (AIF), and the first of eight Australian independent companies was raised in 1941. Wearing their unique double-diamond-shaped unit colour patches on their hatbands and shoulders, each independent company contained some 290 officers and men. In 1943 the companies were redesignated cavalry (commando) squadrons, later just commando squadrons. Four additional commando squadrons were established during 1944.
Made famous in part by Damien Parer’s wartime newsreel The Men of Timor (1942), the almost year-long guerrilla war fought by Sparrow Force’s No. 2 Independent Company in Timor has been widely praised. The film’s opening titles note that, as the war swept past them, the Australians “went on fighting”, harrying the Japanese with guerrilla warfare in ‘one of the imperishable stories of this gigantic world catastrophe’. The story of the bearded men of Timor, who were later joined by the 2/4th Independent Company, is arguably the most well-known episode in the history of Australian independent companies
These exploits have often been told and celebrated, but the guerrilla war on Timor was not typical. From the tragic loss suffered to No. 1 Independent Company as prisoners of the Japanese on the Montevideo Maru to the celebrated defiance on Timor in 1942, each independent company later commando squadron was involved in myriad wartime experiences. It was in the vastness of New Guinea’s jungles that the independent companies came into their own, thinly deployed on the flanks of the main force, carrying out reconnaissance, conducting raids and harassing the Japanese. By the war’s end in 1945 the AIF had commando squadrons in action in New Guinea, Bougainville and Borneo.

Half a million Australians encountered a new world when they entered Asia and the Pacific during World War II: different peoples, cultures, languages and religions chafing under the grip of colonial rule. Moving beyond the battlefield, this book tells the story of how mid-century experiences of troops in Asia-Pacific shaped how we feel about our nation’s place in the region and the world. Spanning the vast region from New Guinea to Southeast Asia and India, Lachlan Grant uncovers affecting tales of friendship, grief, spiritual awakening, rebellion, incarceration, sex and souvenir hunting.

Focusing on the day-to-day interactions between soldiers on the ground and the people and cultures they encountered, this book paints a picture not only of individual lives transformed, but of dramatically shifting national perceptions, as the gaze of Australia turned from Britain to Asia.

Contents
Introduction
1. Australia, the war, and the world
2. The new world: arriving in British Asia
3. Making friends: first encounters with Asia
4. 'Nothing like Dorothy Lamour': perceptions of Asian women
5. Myth and memory: Australia's war in New Guinea
6. Reversal of fortunes: POW contacts in captivity
7. At war's end: facing the new Asia
8. 'Good neighbours' or 'police dogs of imperialism'?: attitudes to empire
Conclusion

This study became a chapter of my book (Piercing the Fog of War), rather than having an early version of the text published as a standalone article. Readers are therefore referred to that publication.

The counterattack launched by forces of Frankforce against Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division in the vicinity of Arras on 21 May 1940 was the first armoured attack by a British armoured brigade since August 1918. It was also the last chance for the Allies to block the German thrust from the Ardennes through to the English Channel, which sliced the French and British forces in two. Although the counterattack failed to reach its objectives, and as such was a failure, it did lead to Hitler’s famous halt order, which paused the headlong rush of the panzers and made the withdrawal from Dunkirk possible. Despite the importance of the battle, in some ways representing the pivotal moment of the campaign, it has been the subject of limited academic study, perhaps through being overshadowed by the drama of the subsequent evacuation.
This article seeks to explore three issues emerging from the battle that offer the potential to cast a wider light:
• How and why the British command system experienced such a level of friction that an attack, recognised as vital to the future survival of the British Expeditionary Force, was reduced from a vigorous assault by two entire infantry divisions and Britain’s only armoured division to a cautious reconnaissance by just four battalions;
• What these events reveal about the effectiveness and focus on pre-war thinking and training in the British Army, in terms of both armoured doctrine and command approaches; and
• How such a small-scale operation, which largely failed to achieve its objectives, still had such an impact on the perception of the battle held by the German higher command as to cause them to issue the ‘halt order’, thereby highlighting further aspects of the nature of friction.