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19. yüzyılda ve 20. Yüzyılın başında Ehli Hak toplulukları inceleyen Rus oryantalistlerin dikkatini çeken Ali İlâhiler’in bir çok dini pratiği Ehl-i Haklar’la aynı olmasına rağmen, temel bazı farklılıkları da göze çarpmaktadır:
          Ehl-i Hak inancının merkezi olan Kerend-Oraman (Orman, Horoman, Hewraman) Lek –Delfan bölgesi,  Hemedan - Kerkük yolu üzerinde, günümüz İran-Irak sınırında, Orta Zağroslar’da, İran-Luristanı’nın (günümüz Kirmanşah vilayetinin) kuzeybatı köşesidir. Yüzyıllar boyunca bölgedeki çoban toplulukların yazın yaylalara çıkış ve kışın kışlaklara (kışlak: kışla, ordugâh, karargâh) sıcak düzlüklere iniş yolunun  tam merkezinde olan Lek-Delfan bölgesi, aynı zamanda Doğu –Batı yönündeki en önemli Hac-Göç ve Ticaret yolu üzerindedir.  (Küçükkalfa, 2015: 69-79, Küçükkalfa 2018) Günümüzde Ali İlâhiler ve Ehl-i Haklar’da bir çok dini pratik ortaktır. Ali İlâhiler’de, kendilerini genellikle Ehl-i Hak (Hünkâri, Hâvendigâri, Hüdavendigâri) olarak tanımlamaktadırlar.  Bölgede farklı inanç ve etnik yapıdan doğan çeşitlilikten bahsedileceği gibi, aynı coğrafyayı paylaşan bu gruplar arasında benzeşmeler ve geçişlerde kaçınılmaz bir gerçekliktir. Röportajımızı yaptığımız İltimas Ahmediyan’da  İran Azerbaycanı’nda doğan ve Tebriz’de yaşayan bir Türk olarak, kendisini  Ali İlâhi  olarak tanımlamaktadır.

          Ali İlâhi inancının merkezinde Hz. Ali’nin ilâhiliği (tanrılığı) bulunmasına karşılık, Ehl-i Hak inancının merkezinde kutsal kitap Serencam’da izlendiği gibi Sultan İshak  (ve donları yani görünümleri)  yer alır. (* İslâmın 4. halifesi Ali’yi referans alan değinmeleri ret etmiyorum.) 

          Ali İlâhiler ve Ehl-i Haklar konusunda diğer bir temel farklılık 3 (üç) günlük oruç tarihi konusundadır. Astronomik hesaplamalarla ve Arap aylarına bağlı olarak her iki topluluğun oruçları arasında 33 (otuz üç) günlük fark vardır.  2016-2017 dönemi için 3 (üç) günlük oruç tarihleri Ali İlâhiler için 12-13-14 Aralık 2016,  Ehl-i Haklar için 14-15-16 Ocak 2017’dir. 

            Bayrak Kuşcuoğlu ile başlayan 24 kutsal şaire  ait nefeslerde, Ali İlâhiler’e ait 3 (üç) günlük oruca dair hiçbir işarete rastlanmaz.

          Ali İlâhiler, Irak kökenli Seyyid Abdullah Musavi el-Iraki’nin manevi liderliğine bağlıdırlar.  Ali İlâhiler’in aksine, Ehl-i Haklar’da halen merkezi liderlik yoktur.

Röportaj yaptığım İltimas Ahmediyan’ın babası, Seyyid İnayed öykülerinin doğrudan tanığı ve anlatıcısıdır. Ahmediyan’ın evinde ve köyünde tekrar edile gelen, inanca ait değerli hatıralardır.
         
            Bu röportajın Ali İlâhiler ve inançları hakkında daha objektif bakış sağlamasını umuyorum. Röportaj 2014 yılında Tebriz’de gerçekleştirilmiştir. 2015 yılında Ehl-i Hak inancının yoğun olduğu Luristan bölgesine bir seyahatim oldu.

ABSTRACT :
            Although many religious practices of Ali Ilâhi Sufi Order, which has drawn attention of Russian orientalists examining Ahl-e Haqq Sufi Orders in the beginning of 19th and 20th centuries, are same with Ahl-e Haqq Sufi Order, several main differences are also noticeable:

              Kerend-Oraman (Orman, Horoman, Hewraman) Leq (Laki) –Delfan region, which is the center of the Ahl-e Haqq Sufi Order, is on the road of Hemedan - Kirkuk, on today’s Iran-Iraq border, at Middle Zagros, in the northwest corner of Iran-Luristan (today’s Kermanshah province). Leq-Delfan region, which is in the center of the road which is used by the shepherd communities in the region throughout centuries for climbing to plateaus on summer and for descending to winter quarters (winter quarters: barracks, camp, headquarters), hot flats, is also on the road of the most important Haj-Migration& Trade Road in direction of East-West. (Küçükkalfa, 2015: 69-79, Küçükkalfa 2018). Today, most of the religious practices are common in Ali Ilâhi Sufi Order and Ahl-e Haqq Sufi Order. Ali Ilâhi Sufi Order usually defines itself as Ahl-e Haqq (Hünkâri, Hâvendigâri, Hüdavendigâri). The variety in the region, generated from different beliefs and ethnicity, may be mentioned while it is an inevitable truth that there are similitudes and transmissions between the groups, which are sharing the same geography.     

        Iltimas Ahmediyan, with whom we have made an interview, defines himself as Ali Ilâhi, as a Turkish, born in Iran’s Azerbaijan and living in Tabriz.

        While Hz. Ali’s divinity is the center of the Ali Ilâhi Sufi Order belief, Sultan Ishak (and his appearances) is the center of the Ahl-e Haqq Sufi Order, as it may be seen from Serencam, the Holy Scripture. (* I do not reject the mentions referring to Hz. Ali, 4th khalifa of the Islam.)

          Another main differance between Ali Ilâhi Sufi Order and Ahl-e Haqq Sufi Order is the date of 3 (three) days of fasting. There is a difference of 33 (thirty three) days between the fasting of the both communities, depending upon the astronomical calculations and Arabian months. As per the 2016-2017 period, dates of the 3 (three) days fasting were 12-13-14 December 2016 for Ali Ilâhi Sufi Order and 14-15-16 January 2017 for Ahl-e Haqq Sufi Order.

          There is no sign on 3 (three) days fasting pertaining to Ali Ilâhi Sufi Order, in the nefes (poems) of the 24 holy poets, beginning with Bayrak Kuşcuoğlu.

          Ali Ilâhi Sufi Order is depending on spiritual leadership of Seyyid Abdullah Musavi el-Iraki, with Iraq origin. Contrary to Ali Ilâhi Sufi Order, there is still no central leadership in Ahl-e Haqq Sufi Order.

          Iltimas Ahmediyan, with whom I made an interview, is son of a direct witness and narrator of Seyyid Inayed stories. These stories about belief, repeated in Ahmediyan's home and village, are precious memories.
     
        I hope that this interview will provide a more objective perspective to Ali Ilâhi Sufi Order and their beliefs. The interview took place in Tabriz, in 2014. I had a journey to Luristan area, in where Ahl-e Haqq Sufi Order belief is intense, in 2015.

ALEVIS AND ALEVISM IN THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF TURKISH POLITICS: THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY'S ALEVI OPENING

The Justice and Development Party (JDP), since coming to power in 2002, has launched several reform programmes which in the previous decades were considered the red lines or bottle necks in Turkish politics. The JDP is the party that has made wide range of reforms necessary for the EU membership. This caused a complexity for students of political science as the party is the leading conservative party in the multiparty politics of Turkish party system accompanied by a wide discussion whether the JDP fell in the category of conservative parties or not. The JDP also started various policy initiatives in the sphere of international relations. The governing party aimed for Turkey’s greater involvement in Middle East, the Caucasian and Balkan affairs, mediation and arbitration role between the conflicting parties of the Middle East, peace making facilities towards Armenia and Azerbaijan and stability and security in Iraq. The Kurdish question has been another arena for the JDP to take important steps for its resolution. Last but not least, the Party, although mainly adheres to the Sunnite segments of the Turkish population, wants to attract votes from the Alevi minority and launch a rapprochement programme. This article tackles with the actors, dynamics and processes involved in the JDP’s Alevi rapprochement. Each subject group – the Alevis (the leftist and the conservative wings), the General Directorate of Religious Affairs, the JDP, the National View Movement, the conservative media writers and the EU officials – is constitutive of a specific discourse and hence holding a deliberate position in the Alevi question. Therefore, each discursive unit composes the sub-sections of the discussion delivered throughout the paper. We aim to make an inquiry of the Alevi rapprochement in light of the positions, arguments and perceptions developed by each agency involved in the question.

From the first half of the nineteenth century the Ottoman State made some reforms to modernize the state and to restore the lost authority. These reforms aimed to prevent the dissolution of the state by providing equality and justice among the subjects. This situation continued during the reign of Sultan Abdülmecid with the declaration of Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayun. The state wanted to break out of the strength of the fortresses and increase the central authority, thereby bringing out all the intermediaries who entered the state. At the same time, he wanted to show that he did not distinguish between military reform and the subject. However, these reforms have caused rebellion against the state in many places, which have traditionally ruled and tribal life. The Ottoman Empire was trying to control the rebellion areas as well as to collect taxes, to buy troops and to come from the top of other issues. One of the places where these problems are experienced is Akçadağ, a district of Malatya. Akçadağ was first referred to the Malatya Sanjag of the Mamuretlaziz Province of Harput Province during the period studied. Serious problems were experienced when entering the reforms to control the region. These problems, which are economically and socially based, have become a sectarian issue over time. As a result, the incident that started in the village of Dümüklü of Akçadağ in January of 1896 due to the tax issue, grew and became a religious feature. One officer, one soldier and one hundred and eight civilian lost their lives in the case of Akçadağ's Dümüklü village. After the events of the Ottoman government were calmed down, the rulers, especially the local administrators, went on. Some of them were dismissed from their posts and sent to court. However, Ahmad Shakir Pasha, the Rehabilitation Inspector of the Anatolian Commonwealth of Provinces, demanded from the central government to stop the proceedings against the Alawis and the judiciary to prevent further growth of the incident. In response to this request, the subject was completely closed in 1898. In this study, the event that originated in 1896 in Akçadağ's Dümüklü Village and originated in taxation and turned into an Alevî uprising over time was examined based on archival sources. In addition, the Ottoman State's view towards Alawis, its attitudes during and after the events were examined in the frame of this event.