www.wider.unu.edu
NUmbER 3, 2008
Overview
Many of the world’s poorest countries
can be described as “fragile states”
wherein governments cannot or
will not provide an environment for
households to reduce, mitigate or
cope with poverty and other risks
to well-being. Many of these states
are in conflict or just emerging from
conflict. The UNU-WIDER project
“Fragility and Development” explored
state fragility and its relationship to
household vulnerability, noting that
there is a lack of research on the
economic dimensions of conflict, aid
and development in fragile states. This
research brief provides a summary
of the various contributions made by
this project, including case studies on
Iraq, Kosovo, Palestine and Somalia. It
also addresses a number of pertinent
questions. When are states fragile?
What are the costs that fragile states
impose on their people and the
international community? Should
the sovereignty of fragile states be
reconsidered? And how can aid
flows to fragile states be made more
effective?
Written by WIm NAUDÉ, AmELIA U.
SANTOS-PAULINO and MARK
MCGILLIVRAY
© United Nations University, 2008
ISBN 978-92-808-3511-3
ISSN 1816-5796
Licensed under the Creative Commons
Deed “Attribution-NonCommercialNoDerivs 2.5”
Fragile States
T
HE UNU-WIDER PROJECT ON “FRAGILITY AND
development’’ began with the premise that dealing simultaneously with
household vulnerability and state fragility is probably one of the most urgent
development challenges of our time. Consequently, the project explored the
dimensions of household vulnerability and state fragility in development. This
research brief is about the roughly 50 or more fragile states that are home to around
a billion people. An accompanying UNU research brief considers vulnerability in
developing countries (see UNU Research Brief No. 2, 2008).
State fragility has serious repercussions for national and international security
and prosperity. Many fragile states are ravaged by conflict and have become “failed”
states. Some have only recently emerged from devastating civil wars and remain
fragile. Others have histories of military coups or have been through serious political
crises. Others still are small states with limited resource endowments and high
debts, and are subject to natural hazards that render them extremely unstable.
The UNU-WIDER project on “Fragility and Development” brought an
economic perspective to the concept and classification of fragile states, the costs
they impose on global development and security, and the challenges they and the
international community face in the quest for development, particularly for those in
or emerging from conflict. A number of pertinent questions were addressed. When
are states fragile? What are the costs that fragile states impose on their people and
the international community? Should the sovereignty of fragile states in conflict
be reconsidered? How can peace agreements be enforced through appropriate
economic incentives? How does conflict impact disproportionately on women? How
can aid flows to fragile states be made more effective?
The studies addressing these questions are summarized in the box “Selected
WIDER Papers Dealing with Fragile States”, which also refers to their UNUWIDER research paper numbers to facilitate downloading from the website
(www.wider.unu.edu).
Which States are Fragile?
The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd edition, 1989) defines the word “fragile” as
meaning “liable to break or be broken; easily snapped or shattered; in a looser sense,
weak, perishable, easily destroyed”. In the context of independent political states
or countries, the term “fragile” seems to imply the existence of states or territories
whose very being is under threat. In the extreme case, where states do cease to exist
Fragile States
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About the Authors
Wim Naudé is a Senior
Research Fellow at UNUWIDER. Previously he has
been a Research Director at
North-West University, South
Africa, and a Research Officer
at the Centre for the Study of
African Economies, University
of Oxford, UK. He specializes in
regional and urban development,
entrepreneurship and African
development.
Amelia U. Santos-Paulino is
a Research Fellow at UNUWIDER. Previously she was
a Research Fellow at the
Institute of Development
Studies, University of Sussex,
UK. She specializes in
trade, macroeconomics and
development issues.
Mark McGillivray is Chief
Economist of the Australian
Agency for International
Development. He was
previously Deputy Director
of UNU-WIDER. He is also
an honorary Professor of
Development Economics at the
University of Glasgow, UK, an
External Fellow of the Centre
for Economic Development
and International Trade at the
University of Nottingham, UK,
and an Inaugural Fellow of the
Human Development and
Capability Association.
2051 Research Brief 03-08(web).i2 2
or function to any normal degree, they
can even be labelled as “failed states”.
A number of definitions and
measurements of fragile states have
been proposed. Most of these have been
developed by international financial
institutions and development agencies,
reflecting their concern that countries
may be too fragile to use aid effectively.
One of the best-known definitions
is that of the UK’s Department for
International Development (DFID),
which defines a fragile state as one
where “the government cannot or
will not deliver core functions to the
majority of its people, including the
poor”. Core functions here include
the provision of basic services such
as education, health, safety and
security, often the focus of donor aid
programmes.
The World Bank and the OECD
classify states as fragile based on
their score in the Country Policy and
Institutional Assessment (CPIA)
ratings: a low-income country with
a CPIA score of 3.0 or less is seen as
fragile. These countries are also termed
“low-income countries under stress”
(LICUS), and have been described
as “difficult partnership countries” to
denote the fact that the underlying
concern of the World Bank and the
OECD is that countries may be too
fragile to use aid effectively.
Mina Baliamoune-Lutz and Mark
McGillivray (RP2008-44) take issue
with the choice of a rigid CPIA score
of 3.0 as the cut-off point for deciding
whether or not a country is too “fragile”
to use aid effectively. In their words, “all
countries are fragile to the extent that
their ability to use aid differs. Some are
simply more fragile than others.” To
take into account that fragility differs
along a continuum, they propose a
framework that uses fuzzy-set theory,
which allows for a more gradual
distinction to be made between fragile
and non-fragile states. They apply
this to the 2005 CPIA scores from 76
countries, and conclude that using the
traditional methods to classify countries
may lead to some countries being
incorrectly classified.
Another operational definition of
fragile states stems from the Canadian
International Development Agency’s
“Country Indicators for Foreign
Policy (CIFP)” project. For the UNUWIDER project David Carment,
Yiagadeesen Samy and Stewart Prest
(RP2008-46) provided a critical review
of the CIFP Fragility Index. In this
index the fundamental causes of state
fragility are broader than just violent
conflict. In particular, in the CIFP
Fragility Index, state fragility is due to
threats to the authority (A), legitimacy
(L) and capacity (C) of the state. These
so-called ALC components are used to
gauge state performance across various
dimensions, including economic,
governance, security and crime,
human development, demographic
and environmental dimensions.
They use this approach to compile a
fragility index for countries over the
period 1999–2005. Here it is only the
degree of fragility that differs between
countries. In the CIFP Fragility Index
70 per cent of the 40 most fragile states
are in sub-Saharan Africa.
When Do Fragile States Fail?
The Political Instability Task Force
(PITF), previously the State Failure
Task Force, describes four types of
conflict events that can push a fragile
state into failure: revolutionary wars,
ethnic wars, adverse regime changes,
and genocides and politicides (see
http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/).
From these types of conflict the PITF
has compiled a consolidated list of state
failures over the period 1955 to 2006.
Over this period they record no fewer
than 139 “state failure events’’ across
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107 countries. Although they note that
the number of wars and civil conflicts in
the world had declined since the end of
the Cold War, there were still at least 18
countries that, by the end of 2006, were
in a state of serious conflict or state
failure. A disproportionate number of
failing states in conflict are in Africa
(about 40 per cent) and the Middle and
Near East (50 per cent).
state fragility and failure and conflict
is multi-directional. In practice, given
the complex nature of many conflicts,
it is most often difficult to disentangle
the various influences, especially when
conflicts have persisted for many
years.
The relationship between state
fragility and state failure has been taken
up in this project.
All countries are fragile to the extent that their ability to use aid
differs. Some are simply more fragile than others
Many of the states that were in
conflict previously, and which are now
in post-conflict reconstructive phases,
remain in a precarious, very fragile
condition. One major reason for continued
fragility is that the possibility of a
relapse into conflict is high. Another
reason is the economic impact of violent
conflict on a country’s development
and development prospects. A growing
literature has examined the costs of conflict, especially civil war. Most estimates
suggest that the impacts of civil war
are substantial and long-lasting and
include direct costs such as destruction
of infrastructure, diverted (military)
expenditure and indirect costs such as
the disruption of markets and increase
in risk and uncertainty. Civil conflict
also has spillover effects reducing
growth in neighbouring countries.
Conflict, which undermines the
authority and legitimacy of the state
and limits prospects for development,
is clearly a major cause of fragility,
and of identifying countries as fragile.
However, weak or fragile states,
due to low development status, in
themselves can lead to conflict and an
ensuing vicious cycle from fragility to
conflict, and from conflict to further
fragility. Thus the causality between
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Ghassan Dibeh (RP2008-35)
studies the causes and consequences
when fragile states become failed
states. He does so using the cases of
Iraq and Somalia, and shows that while
states such as oil-rich Iraq may fail due
to conflict over bountiful resources,
those poor in resources, like Somalia,
may also fail because no group has an
interest in forming a central authority.
To understand the relationship between
resources, state structures and economic
growth, Dibeh provides an overview of
the theoretical literature and a model
of the relationship between resources
and the formation of government.
This is then applied to the situations
in Iraq and Somalia. He provides a
useful reminder that it is often difficult
to predict in advance state failure,
and that the importance of good
leadership in the context of strong
governance institutions should not be
underestimated. These lessons emerge
from a historical overview of Iraq’s
economic development since the 1960s.
Three periods are contrasted: the era
before the first Gulf War (1991), the
era of international isolation between
1991 and 2003, and the subsequent
post-Saddam Hussein period following
the 2003 US-led invasion. In essence
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Selected WIDER Papers Dealing with Fragile States
Mina Baliamoune-Lutz and Mark
State Fragility: Concept and
McGillivray
Measurement
David Carment,Yiagadeesen Samy and
Determinants of State Fragility: The
Stewart Prest
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
Project
Ghassan Dibeh
Resources and the Political Economy of
State Fragility in Conflict States: Iraq and
Somalia
Lisa Chauvet, Paul Collier and Anke
The Cost of Failing States and the Limits
Hoeffler
to Sovereignty
Sebnem Akkaya, Norbert Fiess,
Economics of “Policy-Induced”
Bartlomiej Kaminski and Gael
Fragmentation: The Costs of the Closures
Raballand
Regime to the West Bank and Gaza
Sumon Kumar Bhaumik, Ira N. Gang
Gender and Ethnicity in Postand Myeong-Su Yun
Conflict Kosovo
Tilman Brück and Kati Schindler
The Impact of Conflict and Fragility on
Households
S. Mansoob Murshed and Phillip
Enforcing Peace Agreements through
Verwimp
Commitment Technologies
Mark McGillivray
Aid Allocation and Fragile States
Sanjeev Gupta
Enhancing Effective Utilization of Aid in
Fragile States
the story of the rise and fall of Iraq is
of a country failing due to avoidable
external conflicts (war with Iran and
the occupation of Kuwait) and internal
conflicts (failing to establish trust and
co-operation between Sunni, Shiite, and
Kurdish groups). The policy implication
is that efforts to end conflict in failed
states will differ significantly depending
on the availability and distribution of
resources, and the resulting incentive
structures facing conflicting parties:
one-size-fits-all externally imposed
solutions are not likely to bring lasting
peace and development.
What are the Costs and
Consequences of Fragile States?
Major contributions were made by
the UNU-WIDER “Fragility and
Development” project in quantifying
the macro-level costs, and illustrating
the micro-level impacts, of failed and
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RP008-
RP008-6
RP008-5
RP007-0
Not published as a
WIDER research paper
RP008-
RP008-8
RP008-5
DP006-0
RP008-07
fragile states. Much of the existing
literature on the costs of fragile states
is limited to an assessment of the costs
of violent conflict (war, civil war). In
contrast, Lisa Chauvet, Paul Collier
and Anke Hoeffler (RP2007-30)
estimate the full costs of a failing state.
They argue that states can fail in three
ways: by causing negative spillovers for
citizens of neighbouring countries, by
failing to provide basic security for their
own citizens and by failing to create
and maintain an environment for the
progressive and sustainable reduction of
poverty. The core argument here is that
in these three ways failing (or fragile)
states impose costs which, if large
enough, may justify overriding their
national sovereignty by international
intervention. They calculate that the
combined total cost of failing states
(using the World Bank’s classification
of LICUS) is around US$276 billion
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per annum – more than twice what
international aid flows would be if the
OECD countries actually reach the UN
target of giving 0.7 per cent of their
GDP in aid. This suggests that there
are significant benefits in solving the
problems of fragile states.
Other papers in this project
provide country and householdlevel assessments of the costs of state
failure. Sebnem Akkaya, Norbert
Fiess, Bartlomeij Kaminski and Gael
Raballand (in a paper presented at the
UNU-WIDER Conference on Fragile
States in June 2007) assess the costs
and consequences of Israeli border
society: women are often seen to be
particularly affected. Sumon Kumar
Bhaumik, Ira Gang and MyeongSu Yun (RP2008-43) investigate
whether female-headed households,
particularly in relation to their ethnic
group, suffer more after a conflict.
They do this using household data on
Serbian and Albanian households in
the Balkan region of Kosovo, a region
characterized by decades of political
strife and outright armed conflict
during most of the 1990s. They find
that female-headed households did
not on average suffer more than maleheaded households, but when ethnic
The combined total cost of failing states is around US$276 billion
per annum
closures for the West Bank and Gaza
(WB&G) economy. This research notes
that Israeli security arrangements (such
as checkpoints and road closures) have
placed restrictions on the movement
of goods and people to and from the
WB&G, imposing significant economic
costs. The authors estimate that one
day of closure costs the WB&G
about US$7 million in lost income. In
addition to these macro-economic costs
they consider the impact of closures
on remittances, employment, transport
costs, external trade and future
economic activity. The loss in income of
Palestinian workers in Israel between
2001 and 2003 is estimated to total
more than US$3 billion, and the loss of
export earnings as US$693 million. As
the case of Palestine illustrates, conflict
leads to isolation and fragmentation,
which ultimately imposes huge
economic costs, further weakening the
state’s capacity to address development
progressively.
The costs of state fragility do not
impact equally on all members of a
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2051 Research Brief 03-08(web).i5 5
affiliation is taken into consideration,
the picture changes. They also find
that living standards of minority Serb
households are lower than those of
Albanian households, with femaleheaded Serbian households having the
lowest standard of living in Kosovo. The
authors conclude that “we need to study
welfare in fragile states, where conflicts
among ethnicities or tribes or political
ideologies are at the forefront, not
only from the ethnicity/tribe/ideology
perspective, but also from gender
perspectives”. This is an important
message for finding ways and means of
mitigating the impact of violent conflict
in fragile states and aiding post-conflict
reconstruction.
Tilman Brück and Kati Schindler
(RP2008-83) further explore the
plight of women when states fail to
provide security. The paper shows that,
based on published statistics, the wars
in Afghanistan and Vietnam and the
1994 genocide in Rwanda brought
700,000, 1,000,000 and 500,000
women into widowhood, respectively.
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This study fills an important gap in
the literature on “widows and conflict”
by analysing the main channels
through which mass violent conflict
affects households, namely household
boundaries, household activities and
intra-household relations and gender
roles. Their findings indicate that, first,
household boundaries, activities and
intra-household relations and gender
roles are likely to be affected strongly
by mass violent conflict and fragility.
Second, households are likely to be
Carment and co-authors (RP200846), this range of interventions should
include aiming to improve the authority
and legitimacy of states and their
capacity to provide basic services.
One controversial form these
interventions can take is the suggestion
by Chauvet and co-authors (RP200730) that national sovereignty should be
overridden in certain cases in order to
limit the negative spillover effects that
fragile states impose on neighbouring
countries.
It is in the global interest to help fragile states
constrained in their choice of coping
strategies because conflict potentially
destroys various production inputs.
As a result, a household’s incomegenerating activities may entail higher
risk and a reduced profit margin.
Arguably, the efficiency of aid to
countries in or emerging from conflict
may be improved from this better
understanding of the situation facing
the many women-headed households
that characterize post-conflict
communities.
What Can Be Done About Fragile
States?
The final group of research papers asks
how the international community can
assist fragile states, given what we
know of their causes, costs and
consequences.
A two-pronged approach can
be supported from the findings of
this project, consisting of adopting a
holistic approach towards fragile states
and improving the effectiveness of
assistance to these states.
A broad and holistic approach
is needed, requiring a wide range of
interventions from the international
community. As explained by David
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On a related note, Mansoob
Murshed and Philip Verwimp
(RP2008-45) argue strongly for the
vital role of international intervention
and mediation in securing sustainable
peace agreements. The paper implies
that it is difficult to sustain peace
agreements following civil wars, citing as
examples the Addis Ababa Agreement
(1972), the Arusha Agreement (1993)
and the Angolan Peace Agreements
(1991 and 1994). They recognize
that “most peace agreements between
warring factions in contemporary
developing country civil wars are not
self-enforcing” and that “most civil
wars cannot be ended without outside
intervention, including the use of aid,
trade restrictions, and peacekeeping
efforts”. The paper’s arguments are
illustrated by a discussion of the
fragile state of Rwanda, where the
1993 peace agreement failed, setting
in motion events that led to the
massacre of at least 500,000 Tutsis.
The authors also construct an analytical
“signalling” model of peace agreements
that shows why self-enforcing peace
agreements are so difficult to achieve.
The model in particular shows that
external intervention can work if it is
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credible – providing important food
for thought for those concerned about
the effectiveness of such intervention in
many of today’s most enduring violent
conflicts.
The second prong of the approach
to dealing with fragile states is
to improve the effectiveness of
international assistance, in particular
aid and humanitarian assistance. Aid
effectiveness has spawned a large
literature, which is partly surveyed
by Mark McGillivray, but has tended
to neglect the case of fragile states.
In McGillivray’s survey and that by
Sanjeev Gupta, the question of how to
improve aid effectiveness in fragile states
is investigated.
Mark McGillivray (DP2006-01)
reviews the extensive literature on how
aid should be allocated to developing
economies and how it is in practice
allocated to these countries. He shows
that, despite the apparent view that
fragile states use aid less effectively,
there is little in the literature to
substantiate this view. In particular, aid
does not affect only growth (the focus
of much of the economics literature)
but is important in preventing
instability and conflict, improving
human rights and preventing or
limiting negative spillovers to
neighbouring countries. Therefore,
McGillivray argues for aid to fragile
states, arguing that to the extent that
there might be absorptive capacity
constraints, these might be avoided by
allocating aid via non-governmental
channels.
Sanjeev Gupta (RP2008-07)
points out that the literature on aid
spending absorption in fragile states
is still in its infancy. He adds to this
literature by discussing the macro-
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economic implications of aid flows for
fragile states, and in particular for postconflict countries. The paper shows
that these depend on the configuration
between aid absorption and spending;
that is, whether or not aid is absorbed
and spent, or absorbed but not spent,
or neither absorbed nor spent, or
spent but not absorbed. Aspects that
influence this decision are a country’s
macro-economic position, its capacity
to absorb aid and the quality of its
institutions. Two options for fragile
states are explored: front-loading
of expenditure, and expenditure
smoothing. Under the first, a country
increases spending sharply as aid flows
in, and reduces it again afterwards.
Gupta suggests that this might be a
relevant approach for post-conflict
countries where returns to physical
infrastructure investment are likely to
be substantial. Under the second option,
a country aims to keep its spending
stable over time. According to Gupta,
this might be an appropriate strategy for
fragile states that face high uncertainty
and only temporary access to aid. A
challenge that remains if fragile states
are to adopt these strategies successfully
is the implementation of a supportive
medium-term expenditure framework
in fiscal planning. Currently such a
level of planning is beyond the
capabilities of many fragile states,
and remains an area wherein the
international community can provide
valuable assistance.
In conclusion, this UNU-WIDER
project has brought together a number
of crucial contributions that have
shown it is possible to identify fragile
states and their causes, and to address
these causes – and moreover that it is in
the global interest to do so.
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INSIDE:
Research
Brief
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER)
was established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first
research and training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in
985. The Institute undertakes applied research and policy analysis on
structural changes affecting the developing and transitional economies,
provides a forum for the advocacy of policies leading to robust,
equitable, and environmentally sustainable growth, and promotes
capacity strengthening and training in the field of economic and social
policy making. Work is carried out by staff researchers and visiting
scholars in Helsinki and through networks of collaborating scholars
and institutions around the world.
Fragile States
This policy brief deals
with the identification of
fragile states and the causes
and consequences of state
fragility. Addressing the
problem of fragile states is
in the global interest.
World Institute for Development
Economics Research
of the United Nations University
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B
FIN-00160 Helsinki
Finland
Tel. +358-9-6159911
wider@wider.unu.edu
www.wider.unu.edu
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