220 CHAPTER FIVE Conclusions 5.1 Introduction In this chapter I address the conclusions of this study from both empirical and theoretical perspectives. In the empirical section, first, I point out the most important findings of my research on political mobilization of Mexican immigrants from a comparative perspective. Second, I emphasize the use of the main arguments of my work in Chicago and Houston in a brief analysis of the immigrant mobilization actions across the United States that took place during the first half of 2006. This section mainly shows the analytical potential of my arguments through the consideration of mobilization at an individual-institutional level, and from a perspective that addresses the interactions between local and transnational contexts.i In Chapter Two of this study I explained the process of mobilization of Mexican immigrants in Chicago and Houston, and pointed out the main actors within such process. In Chapter Three, I addressed how political mobilization and participation in Chicago and Houston are different and, in Chapter Four, I proposed an explanation of why there are such differences. Through the whole explanatory process I have shown that in order to understand the political mobilization and participation of Mexican immigrants, it is necessary to focus on the relations of Mexican immigrants with relevant political institutions and processes in their home and host societies. 221 Moreover, in order to understand the how and why of immigrant political mobilization of Mexicans in the U.S., I have shown the importance of considering the local and transnational contexts and their interaction. Higher levels of mobilization in Chicago have to do more with the active role of the Mexican Consulate in the city and with a more immigrant-friendly scheme of local government’s policies and politics. In Houston, the lack of an active role of the Mexican Consulate in the city and a ‘free-enterprise’ local scheme of government policies and politics have led to lower levels of mobilization. Also, considering the direct influence of Mexican politics and policies, I have shown that the home state engagement with political mobilization in the host country has led to more, and not less political mobilization in the host country. In Chapter Four, I also have emphasized, as a major explanatory factor, the role of a nongovernmental actor in the whole process of mobilization of Mexican immigrants: the Catholic Church. This actor plays an important bi-dimensional role in the whole mobilization process: at a local-transnational level, and at an institutional-individual level. In any instance, the interaction between local and transnational contexts, including the home and host states and the Catholic Church, becomes the essence of migrant political transnationalism when addressing political mobilization and participation of immigrants in a host society. In the theoretical section of this chapter, I point out the relationship between the process of ethnic political mobilization and the field of political transnationalism. I frame this basically by arguing that ethnic political mobilization can be analyzed from a macro, meso (intermediate) and micro perspectives. In the section of final remarks, I emphasize the importance of considering such a framework for other fields of study in which also 222 political transnationalism has a promising future in theoretical and practical terms: urban politics and religiously-based mobilization. I conclude this study with some reflections about the importance of the relationship between political mobilization of Mexican immigrants and the notion of political participation through naturalization. 5.2 Discussion on Political Mobilization and Participation Within an empirical framework, this research confirms that a complete understanding of Mexican immigrant political mobilization focuses simultaneously on the relations between Mexican immigrant organizations and relevant political institutions and processes in their home and host societies. One of the main conclusions of this work is that home state politics (via direct Mexican government politics or policies or through the Mexican Consulate) is related to the formation and consolidation of political mobilization of the Mexican population in the U.S. In this sense, home state engagement with political mobilization in the host country has led to more and not less political mobilization of the immigrant population in the host country. This mobilization will vary significantly based on the context of reception, which includes local political institutions. Within a transnational context, the role of the Mexican Consulate is important to explain different levels of political mobilization and organization of Mexican immigrants in Chicago and Houston. In Chicago, the Mexican Consulate has cultivated a relatively strong relationship of trust with the immigrant leadership, and it also has contributed to the formation and consolidation of immigrant political organizations with an important potential to mobilize people (i.e.: state federations). In Houston, the role of the Mexican Consulate tends to be considered marginal by immigrant leaders in their effort to 223 mobilize people. The Mexican Consulate in Houston shows practically no relevant interventions in the process of leadership formation and consolidation in the community. Mexican policies and politics are an important trigger to mobilize the community in both cities. The episode of the Zedillo’s cars and the Zapatista Movement show that there are national-origin issues that can trigger a mobilization process in the host society, which also generates new leadership among immigrants. Not every issue of this type, though, triggers mobilization among immigrants. The right to vote for Mexicans abroad was obtained in 2006; however, institutional restrictions enacted by the Mexican Congress to vote abroad, and levels of mobilization practically close to null, explain the low turnout of Mexicans in the presidential elections of that year: 33,131 voters out of a potential pool of 10 million.ii The Catholic Church is also an important transnational factor of mobilization at an individual and institutional level. At an individual level, the Virgin Mary and the priest become important symbols of mobilization. Mexican Catholics have strong confidence in priests and generally are very attentive and even obedient to any advice that a priest offers. Faith, family and work are the three main explanatory components of the mobilization of the Mexican community. Faith and family are components deeply embedded in a transnational perspective. From an institutional perspective, the Catholic Church is a highly organized institution in which the top hierarchy generally decides why, when, how and who to mobilize. It is within an institutional framework that the relationship between local government and the Church has been important to mobilize minorities, at least in the case of Chicago. For 224 Houston this relationship is practically nonexistent. The top hierarchy of the Catholic Church in Chicago has been always attentive to the most important problems of its immigrant population and, although the Mexican population seems not to be its priority, the attention paid to Mexican immigrant issues, for good or for bad, exceeds by far that of its counterpart in Houston. Church-related organizations in Chicago are part of a consolidated network of work-related and neighborhood organizations, whereas most parishes in Houston deal with the issues of Mexican immigrants mostly from a pastoral perspective, in which prayers are given strong preference over concrete mobilization actions to solve the problems of the community. From a local context perspective, the local government of Houston, through a political framework of “free enterprise politics,” has a long history of non-mobilization of minorities; whereas in Chicago, the long tradition of Machine Politics, and more recently “Global Machine Politics” (Simpson et al. 2004), has created a web of formal and informal contacts between immigrant-focused organizations and City Hall, the City Council and even the state government. One example of the latter is the creation of the “New Americans Immigrant Policy Council” by the State of Illinois in 2005, with the aim to “recommend strategic directions for Illinois immigrant policy in the areas of U.S. citizenship; acquisition of English; education; healthcare; human services; security; entrepreneurialism and workforce development; and home ownership and housing.”iii The Policy Council was created under the assistance and supervision of the Illinois Coalition for Immigrants and Refugee Rights, the Migration Policy Institute and the National Immigration Forum. The state government also created the “Office of New Americans Policy and Advocacy,” in order to assist the Policy Council with its work, and in order to 225 examine, department by department, how state government can “address the rapidly changing population of the State.”iv It was no coincidence that the first head of the new office was José Luis Gutiérrez, a Mexican immigrant and former president of the state federation of Michoacán in Chicago. Also within the local context, the role of immigrant-related organizations becomes essential to understand differences between Houston and Chicago in terms of mobilization of Mexican immigrants. In Chicago, years and years of labor and neighborhood activism, always within a context of Machine Politics, has led to the formation and consolidation of organizations and networks of organizations that are capable to deal directly with authorities on immigration issues at practically every level of government: local, state and national. In Houston, activists point out the lack of unions and neighborhood organizations as one of the main factors that impede the formation and consolidation of immigrant-related organizations. In Chicago the formation and consolidation of coalitions of organizations are two of the main issues for immigrant organizations, whereas in Houston, most organizers are struggling with the institutionalization of their organizations. At an individual level, unions and neighborhood organizations in Chicago tend to deal directly with the ‘work’ factor as one of the most important explanatory factors of mobilization; whereas in Houston, and generally in Texas, the lack of mobilization led by work-related and neighborhood organizations have a strong negative impact on the mobilization capacity of Mexican immigrants. 226 In sum, levels of political mobilization and participation of Mexican immigrants in Chicago are higher than those in Houston. This is explained, from an institutional perspective, because of a more participative role of the Mexican Consulate and the Catholic Church within a transnational context in Chicago; and because of higher levels of openness to immigration issues on the part of the Political Machine regime in Chicago in comparison to the Free Enterprise government in Houston. At an individual level, the different ways to persuade immigrants to participate are highly effective when channeled through work and family channels, as in the case of Chicago, whereas this method is weakly pursued in Houston. The use of faith-related symbols and proactive arguments for mobilization purposes is relatively strong in Chicago and very weak in Houston. The link between the macro context (local and transnational) and the micro context (the individual, the family) in terms of mobilization is clearly determined by the role of immigrant-related organizations, at an intermediate, meso-level of actions. Depending on the relationship of the immigrant-related organizations and the contexts of action, the mobilization of Mexican immigrants can be strong or weak. In Chicago, highly institutionalized organizations or coalitions, such as Centro Legal Sin Fronteras, the Resurrection Project, Enlaces America (Heartland Alliance), Chicago Interfaith Committee on Worker Issues, Pilsen Neighbors Community Council, American Friends Service Committee, Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, West Town Leadership United, more than 15 state federations and even the Institute of Mexicans Abroad in Chicago, consolidate and enforce a solid network of continuous mobilization actions and political activism that deal directly with the government branches or government agencies within a local and a transnational context. In Houston only 227 organizations like the Association for Residency and Citizenship of America, National Organizers Alliance and American Friends Service Committee are capable of mobilizing immigrants and to call the attention of governmental actors within local and transnational contexts. The political mobilization of Mexican immigrants that took place in the United States during the first half of 2006, as a direct response to legislative action regarding immigration issues, offers a unique opportunity to illustrate at a national level the most important empirical premises about immigrant mobilization that have been proposed in this work through the comparative analysis between Chicago and Houston. Through this study, I have addressed the differences of mobilization and political participation of Mexican immigrants in Houston and Chicago, however, an interesting issue arises when researchers address the question of why Mexican immigrants participate in low numbers in proportion to their population living and working in American cities. The standard response is that Mexicans prefer to remain invisible, mostly if they are unauthorized immigrants. The best strategy is to stay out of the radar of U.S. immigration authorities. They perceive that they have more to lose by avoiding political participation, than what they could win by getting involved in non-electoral political participation. However, this does not explain the fact that millions of immigrants (most of them Mexicans) participated in huge political rallies in the first half of 2006. A brief analysis of such mobilization process (Cano 2006), in which the local and transnational role of the Catholic Church is shown at its best, is presented in the following four last subsections of the empirical perspective of this chapter.v 228 5.2.1 Mobilization of Mexican Immigrants and the H.R. 4437 On December 16, 2005, the United States House of Representatives passed the bill H.R. 4437 titled “Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005.” This bill would make illegal presence in the United States a felony. The bill also required the department of Homeland Security to construct a double security fence across several portions of the Mexican border; encouraged local police to enforce immigration law; made it a felony “to assist, encourage, direct, or induce to enter or remain in the country with knowing or reckless disregard” of the fact that immigrants reside in the country illegally; and imposed a maximum fine of forty thousand dollars per undocumented worker that an employer would hire or that an agency would help to find work. At this point in history, between 11 and 12 million unauthorized immigrants were estimated to live in the United States. About fifty six percent of Latino unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. are of Mexican origin.vi This legislative action triggered the mobilization of millions of persons across the U.S. in the first half of 2006. The first major rally against H.R. 4437 took place in the city of Chicago: between 100,000 and 300,000 individuals took to the streets on March 10, 2006. For the period March 11-April 7 the rallies expanded to 76 cities with an estimated mobilization of 500,000 - 900,000 persons. A number between 1.4 and 1.7 million people took to the streets in 108 localities during the weekend of April 8-10. Finally, on May 1, a figure between 1.2 and 2 million people participated in organized rallies associated with an economic boycott in 63 localities across the U.S. 229 In Table 5-A, we can see that high levels of mobilization were observed in 32 cities across the country for this period of time. The following cities held at least one rally with 50,000 participants or more: New York NY, Los Angeles CA, Chicago IL, Houston TX, Phoenix AZ, San Diego CA, Dallas TX, Detroit MI, San Jose CA, Washington D.C., Seattle WA, Denver CO, Atlanta GA and Fort Myers FL. Cities that held at least one rally with 10,000-49,000 participants were: San Antonio TX, Indianapolis IN, San Francisco CA, Austin TX, Memphis TN, Milwaukee WI, Boston MA, Nashville TN, Fresno CA, Oakland CA, Omaha NE, St. Paul MN, Bakersfield CA, Madison WI, Orlando FL, Salt Lake UT, Salinas CA, and Salem OR. From January to July 2006, there were four major rallies in Houston: March 25 (6,000 participants), March 27 (1,000), April 10 (50,000) and May 1 (10,000 – 15,000). In Chicago, for the same period of time, three rallies took place: March 10 (100,000 – 300,000 participants), May 1 (400,000 – 750,000) and July 19 (10,000). Large rally participation in localities can be associated to high proportions of Hispanic populations in large U.S. urban centers. In table 5-B, we can see that the mobilized population tended to be young, predominantly male, highly concentrated in urban centers in terms of the labor force, and showed higher levels of poverty at a family level in comparison to those of the average population. There is no reliable data to determine the migration status of the participants, however, most of them were considered by national and regional media as immigrants or U.S.-born family of immigrants, mostly of Latino origin, from which a large majority were Mexicans and Central Americans. During the first half of 2006, in Chicago, the Catholic Church (at a top hierarchy level and at a parish level), the local governments, the Hispanic media (mostly radio), unions 230 (mostly SIEU) and immigrant-based organizations were the major players in the organization of mobilization actions of the immigrant community. In Houston, the MOIRA office was an important channel in spreading information about the mobilization actions. However, the major players were immigrant-based organizations, the Hispanic media (mostly radio) and some Catholic parishes. In Chicago, the people’s response was extraordinary in March and May. Also, the response in Houston was extraordinary for Houston standards. Although, for these two cities that hold similar numbers of Mexicanborn population, the response was deeply uneven: a range between 500,000 and a million for Chicago in three rallies, and no more than 75,000 for Houston, for four rallies combined. 5.2.1.1 Mobilization and Participation: Institutional Perspective Although socio-demographic indicators can highlight the profile of participants in the most important localities in terms of mobilization, the role of the Catholic Church is a major explanatory factor in the variations of participation in such locations for the whole mobilization process. At an institutional level, the role of the Catholic Church in the mobilization process is mostly explained by a strong opposition of the top hierarchy to the application of the Congressional bill. Appendix 5 of this study shows a detailed chronology of the mobilizations triggered by the U.S. House of Representatives passing of the H.R.4437 during the first semester of 2006. The chronology also shows the intense legislative activity around the passage of the controversial bill and the role of the Catholic Church and other actors in the whole process. 231 Two weeks after the H.R. 4437 was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives, Cardinal Roger M. Mahony of Los Angeles wrote a letter to President George W. Bush, in which he voiced his opposition to the bill. Cardinal Mahony pointed out that “the bill imposes incredible penalties upon any person assisting others through a Church or social service organization.” He stated that “one could interpret this bill to suggest that any spiritual and pastoral service given to any person requires proof of legal residence.” He added “Are we to stop every person coming to Holy Communion and first ask them to produce proof of legal residence before we can offer them the body and blood of Christ?” He expressed concern regarding the immediate consequences of the bill if becoming law: “In effect, priests, ministers, rabbis and other involved in various church-related activities will be forced to become ‘quasi-immigration enforcement officials.’”vii Cardinal Mahony’s concerns were directly related to the whole infrastructure and mission of the Catholic Church regarding charitable assistance to the low-income population in the United States. The Catholic Charities network, founded in 1910 and currently structured by 1400 local agencies and institutions across the nation, provides emergency services to more than seven million people per year. These services include food, clothing, financial assistance, utilities, medication assistance, community-building, transitional housing, disaster response and temporary shelter services. The Catholic Charities network reported revenue of 2.7 billion dollars in 2000, and 90 percent of that amount was spent on these programs and services.viii Under a strict application of H.R. 4437, it would be virtually impossible for the Catholic Church to verify the migration status of at least 7 million people on a permanent basis, let alone checking the migratory status of every churchgoer that receives Holy Communion every time that he/she attends 232 Mass. If the church or associated institutions failed in verifying the migration status of all these persons, it could risk the incarceration of its personnel, and certainly the progressive destruction of the Catholic Charities network. From March 6 until April 10 the position of the Catholic Church against H.R. 4437 remained steadfast without any alteration; although the church has always been clear about not supporting illegal immigration because “it is contrary to federal law” and because it exposes the immigrant to abuse and exploitation. Instead, the church advocates “changing a broken [immigration] law so that undocumented persons can obtain legal status… and enter the United States legally to work and support their families.”ix During this period of time, the power of mobilization of the Catholic Church was fully displayed through the impressive numbers of the Church’s nationwide structure and faithbased network that includes more than 63 million Catholics in the United States. This membership also includes more than 19,000 parishes across the nation; over 40,000 priests and almost 80,000 religious brothers and sisters; more than 8,000 elementary and high schools with over 2.6 million students enrolled, and 230 Catholic colleges and universities.x This infrastructure, and a major institutional interfaith networking effort, helped to spread the word about the problems that H.R. 4437 represented to the immigrant community and also about the whole set of mobilization actions that would take place throughout at least 108 cities during this period of time. In addition to the infrastructure of the Catholic Church, another important factor became essential for the successful mobilization of millions of people against the H.R. 4437: la confianza (the trust). In order for mobilization to take place, the trust between the 233 “mobilizer” and the mobilized is an essential factor to persuade the latter to participate in the mobilization. This is particularly true between the Catholic priests and their constituency, mostly that of Hispanics. Regardless of their migratory status, Catholic Hispanics in the United States highly appreciate and deeply trust the priests of their parish. Through this period of time the organizational backbone was the Catholic Church, and it showed its strength by initially supporting organizational efforts that took millions of people to the streets in well organized, peaceful rallies. Frequently, priests and other religious leaders rallied along with their constituency. It is also during the period January-April 2006 that the Senate prepared its own version of legislation to address the issue of illegal immigration in the U.S. Indeed, since May 2005 there were clear signs that no progress was made in building consensus between the House and the Senate with the introduction of the “Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act of 2005," a bipartisan, bicameral bill that considered legalization for unauthorized immigrants and the implementation of a guest workers program, in addition to a provision that addressed a national strategy for border security. This bill accentuated the differences on the matter not only between the House and the Senate, but also between Democrats and Republicans, and eventually between Republicans themselves in the House and the Senate. Polarization of positions among legislators first materialized with the House passing H.R. 4437 in December 2005, which placed great emphasis on (Mexican) border-security and criminalized unauthorized immigrants without any chance of legalization or implementation of any type of guest worker program. The introduction of S. 2611 in the Senate by Arlen Specter (R-PA) confirmed such polarization on April 7, 2006. The 234 Senate bill, which was approved on May 25, proposed strengthening border security, establishing a guest worker program, and providing the means for most unauthorized immigrants to become legalized and even achieve citizenship. At this point, President Bush favored the Senate approach within the U.S. immigration debate. For the period April 10-30, 2006, an informal network of hundreds of organizations across the U.S. made the call for a new peaceful rally at a national level and an economic boycott, both scheduled for May 1. Initially, the economic boycott included calls to walkoff jobs, perform school walk-outs, and not to buy or sell anything for 24 hours. At a later stage, calls were made in most cities to skip work only if the worker did not put his/her work at risk, and for students to join in the rallies after class. On April 16, Cardinal Mahony made a call for potential participants to avoid any type of boycott, not to rally, and to pray instead for the legalization process to materialize in the legislative process. The new position of the Catholic Church apparently was originated by the perception that the Senate, though the introduction of S. 2611, would neutralize H.R. 4437, and that sooner or later an agreement would be reached between both chambers on the matter without affecting the interests of the Church. The criminalization of Church activities with immigrants was no longer perceived as a feasible threat at this point.xi The new position of the Catholic Church was practically unanimous among the top hierarchy. Although most high-ranking Church authorities did not pronounce against the economic boycott or the rallies, they did not promote them neither. Most Archbishops and Cardinals offered masses on May 1 on behalf of the immigrant cause (mostly legalization) at a time when most workers had already finished their workday. 235 Mobilizations between April 10-30 slowed to a halt; no rally of more than 3,000 participants was reported anywhere in the U.S. during this period of time. Despite several Cardinals, along with President Bush and Senate leaders, stating that rallies and boycotts were not helpful to the cause, on May 1 a number of protesters similar to the April 10 rallies took to the streets. The economic boycott became more noticeable on the West coast. On May 1 an estimated 1.2-2 million people took to the streets. This time, only 63 localities hosted rallies, a low figure when compared to the 108 participant localities on April 10. A major explanation for this is that the top hierarchy of the Catholic Church, in general terms, withdrew its support for the rallies. However, mostly in large cities, proimmigrant organizations, some of them highly independent of the Catholic Church, had already created in a matter of weeks a relatively solid network or set of networks that would drive a successful mobilization campaign, including advice to workers on how to negotiate with employers on their participation in the marches and what to do in case they get fired because of their job walk-off. Also in large cities, similar to the April 10 experience, these networks of organizations would coordinate with Spanish-speaking radio stations to spread information about the rallies, the boycott and reasons to mobilize, and these broadcasts would contribute to a strong spirit of solidarity and confianza within the immigrant community about participating in the mobilization. In small cities the situation was different. The number of organizations that could advise a worker what to do if his/her job is threatened because of a probable walk-off definitely would be very low in comparison to the numbers of organizations as well as the 236 organizational and networking experience of large cities. In small cities, the formation of organizational networks depends more on the initiative of the local parish or religiousoriented/financed organizations. In these localities, if a priest did not consider it necessary to participate in the rally or the boycott, he would advise against such participation and no organizational meetings would even be held. After the rally of April 10 many workers were notified by employers that another job walk-off could mean that the workers would lose their jobs. In a large city, if workers lose their job, chances were very high that they could get another job in a relatively short period of time. In a small city, job offers would not be as easy to find. In small cities, Spanish-speaking radio stations would broadcast information about the rally and the boycott, however, organizations and leaders would struggle more financially to purchase mobilization ads in comparison to relatively well financed organizational networks in large cities. In large cities, some Spanish-speaking radio stations not only broadcasted information about the rallies and boycott, but the disk jockeys of certain radio programs became public figures that supported and promoted the actions, which proved extremely efficient in advising people what to do and what not to do during the protests. In short, on May 1, workers in small cities had more to lose by participating in rallies, the Catholic Church represented a major demobilization force, organizational networks were relatively weak in terms of mobilization, and the Hispanic media was not as efficient as it proved to be during the April 10 rallies. In large cities, the emergence of large mobilization networks, mostly supported by organizations highly independent of the 237 Catholic Church, and the important role of radio personalities, compensated for the demobilization forces of the church. From an institutional perspective, the process shows that the main motivation to rally against the likely application of anti-immigrant national legislation was not only to take action against the harm that the passage of the bill may have caused to undocumented immigrants, but also to protect the interests of the Catholic Church in its work with immigrants. And the church responded accordingly: right after the interests of the church were at risk no more, mobilizations of immigrants ended. In Chicago, although there is no evidence of any organizational coordination between the Political Machine and the Catholic Church, the strategic alliance between these two actors worked very well and the immigrant-oriented organizations, knowing how to persuade Mexican immigrants to participate from a transnational perspective, became a very efficient complement in the mobilization process. The national impetus for mobilization also dragged in Houston, but the lack of practice and experience of the organizations and, in general terms, the implicit influence of the Free Enterprise Politics government, as well as a generalized lack of support towards the marches by the Catholic Church, had a toll of its own: the response was very light in terms of numbers of participants (Table 5-A and Appendix 5: Houston had four marches with a total estimated participation of 67,000-72,000 people, and Chicago had two marches with a total estimated participation of 500,000-1,050,000), despite that both cities have a similar number of Mexican-origin population. 238 5.2.1.2 Mobilization and Participation: Individual Perspective At an individual level, as stated in Chapter Four, the process of mobilization and participation among Mexican immigrants is explained through the ‘mobilization axis’ of the unauthorized immigrant in the United States: family, work and faith. In the last forty years, Mexican immigration to the United States has been motivated by ample opportunities. Mexicans decide to cross the border to get a job because their level of revenue in Mexico is not enough to cover the basic needs of their family: food, health and education. Once Mexicans cross the border, under normal economic conditions in the U.S., they do find work, otherwise they would migrate somewhere else or would not migrate at all. Mexican migration to the U.S. has been traditionally from rural, poor areas in Mexico to agricultural areas in the United States. However, during the last fifteen to twenty years, Mexican migration has expanded to almost any destination within the U.S., rural or urban. Mexicans migrate by the hundreds of thousands annually to the U.S. because of work and family. The last time that the U.S. granted the opportunity of legalization to unauthorized immigrants was in 1986, through the Immigration and Reform Control Act. During the period 1986-2006, chances are very high that the average unauthorized immigrant now has family of his/her own and/or belongs simultaneously to a family “here” (in the U.S.) and “there” (back in Mexico). The approximate 3.1 million U.S.-born children of unauthorized immigrants are American citizens, according to the U.S. Constitution.xii The first mobilization incentive for unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. is family. Family unification in the U.S. is represented in the rallies by Mexican and Central American 239 flags being waved along with American flags. The protester (U.S. citizen or authorized or unauthorized immigrant) is attending the rally because of the potential damage that legislation criminalizing unauthorized immigration can cause to his/her family. The flag of the foreign country represents the foreign-born part of the family; the American flag represents the U.S.-born part of the family. The defense of the workplace is the second powerful mobilization factor. Unauthorized immigrants and their families see the need to publicly manifest their disagreement with legislation that threatens workers with deportation because they were hired when they asked for a job. Moreover, deportation itself is a powerful disruptive factor not only for family life and its regular revenue flow, but also for the individual that has been living in the U.S. for years, and whose life “back home” becomes extremely difficult once the immigrant is deported. In large cities, mostly within non right-to-work states, the political consciousness of the magnitude of this problem is generally raised by community-based and workers rights’ organizations, regardless of the relationship of these organizations with the Catholic Church. Faith is the third and probably the most powerful mobilization factor of Mexican undocumented immigrants and their families. As explained above, the trust the Hispanic Catholic constituency has in the priest is extremely influential. This may be explained by the transnational institutional origin of the Catholic Church. “Here” (in the U.S.) and “there” (back home) the Church offers the same or similar spiritual comfort and assistance to its constituency. As stated in Chapter Two of this study, when a twenty-fiveyear-old immigrant arrives to the U.S., he may not know where he will work or stay initially, but he already has a spiritual baggage of about 900 religious services in his heart 240 and mind. When new immigrants arrive, and have no family already established in the U.S., chances are very high that they will start to adapt to the new environment through the use of temporary charity services offered by Catholic Church networks across the U.S. The relationship between the local parish and its constituency in the mobilization process is manifested in several ways. Some organizational meetings could take place in the parish or church-owned property; some organizations may be financed partially or totally by the church itself; sometimes the priest or religious-oriented leader is the one who takes the lead in creating the network of organizations in charge of the mobilization, etc. At an individual level, it is the priest, through the Sunday services, that has the capacity to convince his whole constituency to mobilize or not for this or that issue. The average immigrant may perceive that his/her family and work may be threatened by this or that government action, but if he or she does not receive the “green light” of the priest, chances are very high that he/she will not consider mobilization seriously. The decision to participate in a mobilization action involves simultaneous consideration of the three mobilizing factors. An unauthorized immigrant definitely wants to rally to defend her family, however, the act of participating in a rally may affect her family in a direct and negative way (i.e.: getting deported by the ICE). Depending on the political culture of the immigrant,xiii and to the extent that the threat of getting deported is perceived as feasible, the immigrant weights whether or not to participate in a mobilization action. However, if the priest makes the call to participate, chances are very high that Mexican immigrants and their families will participate, trusting that the priest overcomes the immigrant’s probable mistrust of other organizations that make the call to 241 participate, or the fear that participating will affect in a negative way his/her own family. If the three factors act in a simultaneous way, millions of people take to the streets. The trust of the Catholic Church would be reflected in several ways: peaceful, family rallies showing flags and images of religious symbols. But most important of all is the priest, who will march, generally smiling, throughout the whole rally, shoulder to shoulder with his constituency. This occurs when he is allowed to participate by the top hierarchy of the church, of course. From early March to mid-April 2006, millions of unauthorized immigrants and their families impressively took to the streets peacefully in more than 100 cities throughout the U.S. The initiative of the Catholic Church served as a major trigger for the rallies and boycott of May 1, through which the organizational structure of nonreligious organizations was strong enough to replace the original impetus of the church to mobilize people, mostly in major and midsize locations. On May1, priests also participated in rallies, but not in the same numbers than they did on April 10, and they definitely stopped making calls for mobilization after May 1. From May 2 to July 31, only Chicago would organize a major pro-legalization rally (July 19, 10,000 participants) in the U.S. In early September 2006, a new mobilization effort took place at a national level. This effort did not have the explicit support of the Catholic Church; numbers of participants across the country remained in the thousands and not in the hundreds of thousands as it was expected by the different pro-immigrant organizations that led the mobilization attempt. From an individual perspective, the enormous trust of the Mexican immigrant constituency on the Catholic Church played a major motivational factor for immigrant participation in massive, well organized rallies across the United States. Immigrant- 242 related organizations played an important role in implementing the rallies, however, the powerful role of the church in the overall mobilization process of immigrants was obvious when, once the Church was assured that the legislation that affected its interests would not pass the Senate, the mobilization process ended. The power of the Catholic Church in the U.S. manifests itself by both taking and certainly not taking actions. On this occasion, the fact that record-breaking historical numbers of Mexicans in Houston and Chicago participated in non electoral politics show the power of the interaction between local and transnational contexts. Churches and local organizations organized well coordinated manifestations; whereas immigrants participated to protect their work (here) and their family (here and there), motivated mostly by a strong trust of the religious (transnational) authorities. After the protests ended, undocumented Mexican immigrants remained in a vulnerable position: they still could lose their work and their families would pay the consequences “here and there.” The only thing that became evident was that the Catholic Church has the power to change things in the life of Mexicans who live and work in the U.S. However, the use of that power, based on the enormous confianza (trust) of the Mexican immigrant towards religious authorities, seems to be more related to protecting the institutional interests of the church than protecting and advancing the interests of its immigrant Mexican constituency. 5.3 Discussion on Transnationalism In this, the last section of the study, I point out the relationship between the process of ethnic mobilization and the field of political transnationalism. I frame this basically by arguing that (1) ethnic political mobilization can be analyzed from a macro, meso 243 (intermediate) and micro perspectives; (2) the meso perspective is the starting point of analysis in a transnational, political context; (3) the essence of political transnationalism within a framework of political mobilization of an immigrant group in a host society is based on the interactions between local and transnational contexts; and (4) that the consideration of such an analytical framework is promising in theoretical terms, especially in the fields of urban politics and religiously-based mobilization. 5.3.1 Mobilization and Political Transnationalism: The Micro Perspective The most important contribution of this study to the development of ethnic political mobilization is the consideration of transnational factors in the process of individual mobilization of an immigrant group. As stated throughout this study, within the process of immigrant mobilization, the importance of faith, work and family becomes evident when analyzed within a framework of political transnationalism. This is reflected through the fact that Mexican immigrants are influenced by a context that is developed here (in the U.S.) and there (in Mexico) whenever weighting to politically participate in any mobilization action. From a family perspective, the decision to migrate to the U.S. for the Mexican immigrant for most of the 20th Century is generally based on family survival considerations. Once in the U.S., whenever the immigrant has the option to participate in a mobilization action, it is the family in Mexico (and more increasingly in both places, the U.S. and Mexico) which is one of the main components of his decision to participate. He definitely will participate on behalf of his family if there is a perceived threat against the family or one of its members, like feasible threats of deportation. From a labor perspective, the threat of 244 losing a job through deportation of the individual is a strong motivation for the immigrant to participate in a mobilization action. However, Mexicans tend to mistrust labor organizations and leadership, mostly because of their political experience with unions back home; therefore, an extra effort must be performed in order to mobilize them from this perspective alone. Within this context, religiously-based mobilization seems to be the most powerful factor in comparison to family and work. Although the union of the family and the job itself can be totally lost by suffering deportation, the Mexican immigrant will be more willing to be part of a mobilization action if the priest advises him/her to participate. This solid trust between the priest and its constituency is the product of a profound religiosity that the immigrant has cultivated through generations back home. The image of the Virgin Mary is as powerful as the Mexican flag for immigrants to identify themselves as members of a specific ethnic group. The results of this research enforce the postulate of Verba et al. (1995) that people are likely to participate in politics if they are asked to do so. In Chicago, the Catholic Church, implicitly or explicitly tends to ask Mexican immigrants to participate, whereas in Houston’s parishes this rarely happens. Another important aspect at a micro level within transnational politics has to do with leadership formation amongst Mexican immigrants. The short-term explanation to the process of leadership formation of this group has macro-origins, which is the point in which ‘East meets West.’ One of the long-term goals of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, January 1, 1994) was to generate enough jobs in Mexico through local and foreign investment in order to deter migration flows of Mexican laborers into the United States. 245 On the American side, additionally, the ‘Southwest Border Strategy’ was launched by the Clinton administration in the mid-nineties. The strategy “treats the entire border as a single, seamless entity,” and “specifically calls for ‘prevention through deterrence,’ (with the aim of) elevating the risk of apprehension to a level so high that prospective illegal entrants would consider it futile to attempt entering into the U.S. illegally.”xiv The strategy is formed by Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego (established in 1994), Operation Hold the Line in El Paso (1993), Operation Rio Grande in McAllen (1997), and Operation Safeguard in Tucson (1995). After 15 years of starting measures, almost nothing has changed; and what has changed, has changed for the worse for the average Mexican. Mexicans keep on emigrating for economic reasons. Levels and flows of foreign investment in Mexico have not reached its theoretical optimum, and an average of one undocumented immigrant dies per day in his/her attempt to cross the border through the desert, nonetheless, the flow of successful attempts of trespassing the border by undocumented aliens have gone up from 750 persons per day, to approximately 1,000 persons per day.xv However, organizations that deal with immigrant issues in the U.S. are by no means on the scene just by chance. They are a direct product of a set of macroeconomic and political conditions. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) produced a new generation of Mexican immigrants in the United States. The immigrants who benefited from the amnesty started to trust, and to get incorporated into, the economic and financial system to the extent that they began buying properties, and started to invest their capital in U.S.-established businesses, from taco shops to jewelry stores, and from furniture stores to construction businesses. They also invested in their children’s 246 education. Since then, no other major legalization action of that type has taken place. Through that period of time, more than twenty years now, those immigrants have become a political and financial elite within the Mexican community who lives and works in the U.S. This elite started to consolidate hometown associations, to form state federations (with the assistance of Mexican Consulates), and Mexican-businesses’ chambers of commerce. In the U.S., the Mexican immigrant elite networks regularly with local and state politicians, while in Mexico they do the same with Mexican state governors, local politicians, and members of the Mexican Congress. At the end of the day, this elite has a strong voice about what is best for the Mexican community as a whole, regardless of what the Mexican community has to say. Globalization has not worked as expected, and this has generated a whole new generation of transnational politicians and leaders. In theory (that is, neoliberal economics theory), globalization rationale points out that the higher the levels of invested capital in Mexico, the higher the levels of employment in Mexico, and the lower the levels of low-skilled Mexican immigration to the U.S. The model would be reinforced in the short and midterms through a bold strategy to ‘persuade’ undocumented aliens to abstain from trespassing the southern border of the U.S. A reality check says the following: in the aggregate, no higher levels of productive investments have been produced by NAFTA in Mexico, at least for employment purposes in real terms. Nevertheless, the reality check also points out that the accumulation of Mexican capital that gets established on U.S. soil is real and has two visible effects. First, 247 this capital accumulation is a direct response to a growing ‘Latino’ market in the U.S., and expectations are that the accumulation will keep on growing. Second, this capital accumulation has not created only an homogeneous elite, but several elites, among Mexican immigrants, mostly as a product of the 1986 amnesty. These elites differ from each other, depending on several factors, like the place of origin in their homeland, the American city in which they have established themselves, their level of education, and the type of business that they develop. The common factor among them is their transnational behavior: these elites have a growing interest in getting involved (and they are already getting involved) in U.S. local and state politics (national levels might be coming soon), and they are definitely involved in Mexican politics at different levels. Most important of all: they act within the interaction of both political arenas. These elites also plan to invest in Mexico; however, it seems that major levels of capital accumulation are needed to carry on significant enterprises. In the meantime, business, activist, and intellectual elites dedicate most of their time to criticizing the Mexican government from every possible angle and in influencing the rules of the game of local and state Mexican elections. Interestingly enough, only a small minority of these elites actually do any community work to enhance the lives for the approximately 4-5 million unauthorized Mexican immigrants who live and work in the U.S. In Chicago, right after the 1986 Amnesty, the Mexican immigrant elite started to consolidate its financial, social and political positions, to the extent that they are currently recognized by local and Mexican authorities as an example of a successful case of economic integration of an immigrant group. In Houston, this successful elite is mostly formed by Mexican Americans and Mexican businessmen. Mexican immigrant 248 xvi leadership in Houston tends not to get involved in business. One of the main reasons is the transient nature of their residence in the city. Most Mexican immigrants use Houston as a port of entry and transit, whereas immigrants in Chicago arrive to the city generally as the last stop in their search for a better life. However, most of the leadership that leads Mexican community-oriented or communitybased organizations in Houston, and that tend to mobilize immigrants, are not Mexicanborn. Continuous or discontinuous flows of relatively highly educated Mexican immigrants are likely to determine the rise or decline of the Mexican-born leadership. 5.3.2 Mobilization and Political Transnationalism: The Macro Perspective At a macro level, an important conclusion of this work is that the interaction between local and transnational politics explains different levels of empowerment of the home community in the host society. Mexican immigrants who live in cities in which the Mexican Consulate constantly addresses their needs and concerns are better off than Mexican immigrants who live in cities in which the Mexican Consulate does not address their non-administrative needs and that does not get involved with the community. At a local level, a relatively immigrant-friendly government will work better for immigrant organizations whenever an issue arises for the immigrant community; whereas things will hardly work for organizations in an environment in which there are no clear channels to deal with immigrants’ issues from a local government perspective, and in which no development of unions and neighborhood organizations for minorities is favored. The role of the Catholic Church at a local level is also important in the process: the support of 249 the church for political participation can be decisive whenever immigrant organizations are seeking to mobilize immigrants. Chicago’s and Houston’s local authorities have started a process of political incorporation of Mexican immigrants into their political systems. This process takes place within a framework of political mobilization in nonelectoral politics. However, the effect of this process is quite different in each city. In general terms, in Chicago, Mexicans are highly conscious of their potential force as an ethnic group within city politics. The issue generally is not about being “Latinos” or “Hispanics,” but about finding the most efficient way to exert their “Mexicanness.” In Houston, and all over Texas, assimilation processes into mainstream, pan-ethnic political incorporation, are definitely the name of the game. In both cities, transnational politics are highly influenced by local politics. Mobilization efforts of Mexican immigrants in Chicago have been linked more to the Mexican government’s organizing efforts in the U.S., and to ethnic Machine Politics in the city. Mobilization efforts of Mexican immigrants in Houston have been less linked to the Mexican government’s efforts and, to a certain extent, more linked to mainstream, ‘Anglo’ assimilatory processes of political incorporation. Mexican immigrants in Chicago are experiencing a process of segmented assimilation, and expectations are that full political incorporation of Mexican immigrants can be reached through a major legalization of undocumented immigrants. In any case, most actors consider that political mobilization of Mexican immigrants is already a way of incorporating this population into the political system of the city. 250 In Chicago, Machine Politics is an essential factor in understanding the political incorporation of minorities by the local political system. Although Mexicans generally have been considered the last of the “major-league players” in the process, the political structure of the city in the last fifty years has affected their slow integration into local politics. Moreover, Chicago is one of the most segregated cities in the country, and this is pointed out as a potential source of strength for political mobilization of an immigrant group. The majority of Chicagoans have lived in neighborhoods with strictly delineated de facto borders, giving the inhabitants and each neighborhood an impression of being permanently isolated from the rest of the city. Such isolation enhances nationalist feelings and group consciousness among ethnic groups whenever the community has to solve a problem. This leaves the door open in developing a process of segmented political assimilation, as ethnic community leaders deal with their community-neighborhood problems by consulting their options first with their respective aldermen. In theory, this works if the alderman shares the ethnic identity of their constituency, although this is not always the case, and even if it were the case, the fact that the alderman has a Mexicanorigin ethnic background “does not mean that the results will always favor the interest of the Mexican community,” according to PILNE’s Teresa Fraga. In terms of formation of transnational communities (Castles 2003), Chicago would be an interesting case, in which high levels of segregation, as a practice of exclusion, and relatively high levels of political tolerance for multiculturalism, interact to reinforce the formation process of a transnational community within a transnational political context.xvii 251 In Houston, assimilatory tendencies work in a straightforward manner, with practically no middle-of-the-road points in the process. Although legalization is also seen as an essential component in the process of political incorporation, it seems that Mexicans get involved in a winner-takes-all dynamic, in which the winner goes from being a Mexican immigrant to becoming a U.S. (Latino or Hispanic) citizen who lives in Texas, and then the individual is incorporated into political life. This generally happens with second generation immigrants. There is no hard evidence about systematic or institutionalized processes of political mobilization of Mexican immigrants in Houston. Low levels of political mobilization among Mexican immigrants have led to low levels of political incorporation and participation. In Texas, citizenship does matter. Also in terms of Castles (2003), Houston would be a model to emphasize how practices of exclusion (with virtually no incorporation into the political landscape without citizenship) and the lack of political tolerance to multiculturalism (with pro-assimilatory policies in Texas, and the lack of open channels in local government to deal with immigrants’ issues) interact against the formation of a transnational community in a transnational political context. However, things are changing in Houston. On the one hand, some local politicians, like Council Member Gordon Quan, consider that regardless of their citizenship status, Mexican immigrants are already “citizens of the city.” They represent more than ten percent of the total population, and they are a component of the city’s economy that cannot and should not be ignored. They represent tax revenues for the city and the state, and they require the most elemental services from the city as well. From this perspective, mainstream local politicians can no longer afford to ignore the presence of Mexican 252 immigrants, mostly when it comes to the allocation of city resources in order to address their constituency’s needs. On the other hand, recent organizational and mobilization efforts among immigrants in Houston have proved to be extremely successful at a local level. ARCA’s ingenious dealings with the former INS regarding late amnesty cases, and the Coalition for Higher Education for Immigrant Students’ efforts to grant higher education to the immigrant population, are cases that reinforce the idea that through the process of non-electoral mobilization, political incorporation is definitely a reachable goal for noncitizens in Texas. Through the whole process of mobilizing and organizing immigrants in order to reach their objectives, the leadership of these organizations has built strong links with local, state, and national level politicians. They single out these links as essential in accomplishing their aims, although they also point out that hardly anything can be done without a good mobilization plan and well developed organizational skills. Finally, in both cities, the interaction between local and transnational actors at an organizational level determines not only the agenda, but also different levels of empowerment of the community. In Chicago, the relationship of the immigrant leadership with local politicians, Mexican state governments, and the Mexican Consulate gives them credibility with other players, and allows them to become active players in terms of defending the community’s interests in every possible arena. Leadership in Houston has learned to relate to Mexican politicians and Consular functionaries in order to attract the attention of local politicians and the mass media, and try to commit both of them in activities that might empower the community as a whole. The lack of 253 institutionalization of these efforts in Houston is one of the main components that differentiates the city with other urban centers, like Chicago and Los Angeles. 5.3.3 Mobilization and Political Transnationalism: The Meso Perspective From an organizational perspective, Houston tends to mobilize on an issue-by-issue basis, while Chicago exercises a more institutionalized approach in dealing with issues. This also explains the dormant character of local coalitions in Houston; coalitions that are created for a specific issue tend to lower their activity through time, to the extent that it may even seem that they do not exist anymore. In Chicago the problem is how to sustain coalitions, while in Houston it is how to institutionalize community-based organizations. In Chicago, the unit of mobilization is the family and the neighborhood whereas in Houston it is mostly the individual. In Chicago, the traditional Mexican leadership is rapidly becoming familiar with the political advantages of knowing how the local system works. In Houston, a new generation of leaders, along with the traditional leadership, both are combined through a similar process. However, it is not enough for organizations to have an immigrant constituency; indeed, it is the agenda which can be considered the essence of transnational politics from an organizational, meso-perspective. In Chicago, legalization, Mexican electoral politics, and immigrant workers’ rights are the main issues; whereas in Houston the issues are the same with the exception of Mexican electoral politics. Mexican state federations are important actors recognized by both, local and Mexican authorities. Their agenda tends to consider issues from both sides of the border and, most important of all, a double, transnational agenda is considered a survival strategy for the 254 majority of these organizations. They do care about political and economic actions of their homeland authorities, mostly at a state level; they do care about their –political, social, and economic- relationship with local authorities; and some of them really do care about what can be done to solve the community’s problems that they assert they represent. In organizational terms, some of these organizations are extremely well developed, and have survived complex democratic change-of-command schemes. Regarding mobilization, their capacity is always expressed in potential terms. The big question mark regarding state federations is to what extent all these relations with local and Mexican authorities offer tangible benefits to the immigrant community as a whole. The issue itself also becomes an important component of the transnational context. For example, in Chicago, the struggle for Mexicans to vote abroad is an important issue, whereas in Houston it is hardly considered an issue. According to Joel Magallán, from Asociación Tepeyac in New York, one of the main obstacles to overcome for the Chicago immigrant leadership in order to accomplish tangible positive actions towards its local immigrant constituency, is precisely the separation in human, economic and intellectual resources that has caused the decision of some leaders to push for the vote of Mexicans abroad, instead of launching a national campaign for the legalization of the undocumented. In Houston, depending on the issue, coalitions of immigrant organizations are created and/or destroyed. Immigrant organization and mobilization in the area are strongly issuebased, according to María Jiménez (AFSC). Indeed, service providers, governmentsponsored institutions, and the Catholic Church tend to establish the immigrant agenda through the flow of grants and resources that are assigned for specific projects/issues. 255 This is one of the main reasons organizations and coalitions are relatively easy to form, but extremely hard to consolidate. At this point, the capacity of financial independence for most organizations and/or coalitions to lead the agenda is low. However, the capacity of setting a transnational agenda ‘step by step’ in Houston is actually occurring through the involvement of Mexican authorities (and not only the Mexican Consulate) in processes and activities that local authorities are interested in. Activities like official visits of Mexican politicians to discuss the problems of the immigrant community have led to important lobbying actions between local and immigration authorities, and the local immigrant leadership, which have been translated into specific tangible benefits to the members of grassroots organizations like ARCA. Finally, there is the interaction generated by all the organizations that deal with immigrant issues in their everyday struggle. In Houston, the AFSC, right until its last day of duty, and the Catholic Campaign of Human Development, were both very efficient promoters of immigrant organization and mobilization. Their influence was present in the formation of several coalitions (though not in their consolidation), and immigrant organizations. They certainly emphasized the need for new organizations to be financially independent in order to become successful in long-term projects. In Chicago, the universe of interactions is much more rich and complex. Organizations like Centro Legal Sin Fronteras, Heartland Alliance, Erie Neighborhood House, Casa Aztlán, Unión Latina, West Town Leadership United, COMMO, ICIRR, the Pilsen Neighbors Community Council, the Resurrection Project, the Chicago Interfaith Committee, the CDPME, and the CIME, to mention the most important, form a complex 256 web of transnational actions that determine a transnational agenda as a whole. Indeed, this agenda is constantly modified, mostly in terms of the interactive relationship of these organizations with local or state authorities, and with the Mexican Consulate and/or Mexican authorities and politicians. Chicago and Houston both have transnational agendas at the organization-basis and aggregate levels. At the core of these agendas is the interaction between their transnational and local components, and this interaction becomes the essence of transnational politics in these two cities. The aim to deal with the problems that Mexicans immigrants face during their stay as an important component of the local labor force is the fuel that feeds this huge transnational political engine. 5.4 Final Remarks The study of political transnationalism, through mobilization and political participation of ethnic groups, shows a rich theoretical interconnection with specific fields of research, specifically urban politics and religiously based mobilization. Additionally, this study also highlights future trends in the research of the relationship between political mobilization and participation of noncitizen Mexican immigrants and naturalized Mexican Americans. The inclusion of transnational perspectives will be essential to explain different levels of empowerment among different immigrant communities in a city or group of cities. The study of “transnational urbanism” (M.P. Smith 1999) deserves more attention on the part of political scientists. Moreover, the study of the interaction between local and transnational politics around an immigrant constituency has a promising future within the 257 fields of the structure of city politics, regime politics, urban planning and development, urban administration and budgeting, the political dynamics of urban and metropolitan areas, studies of municipal productivity, community values, the relationship between City Councils and City Hall, and the role of the foreign born labor factor in the economic and political development of global cities. Studies on religious traditions -and/or symbols- and their relationship with immigrant groups have been developed mainly within a transnational context. They include implicit or explicit references to transnational religious networks (Williams 1998, Ebaugh and Chafetz 2002, Sandoval 2002); transnational religious ties (Levitt 1997, 1998, 2001); the relationship between transnational religious groups or communities, the church and the nation-state (Garrard-Burnett 1998, Haynes 2001); the importance of church relations with future immigrant generations as a key factor for a transnational religious field to survive (Cook 2002); and the consideration of the Virgin of Guadalupe as a powerful religious, national, and political symbol for Mexican-origin people in the United States (Goizueta 2002; Matovina 2002; Levitt 2002, 2003). Also, as stated in Chapter Four, the Virgin becomes a source of empowerment for the community, and a symbol of Mexican consciousness (Rodríguez 1999), and the Virgin expresses not only a collective Mexican identity and cultural pride, but also enhances the struggle for justice and even resistance to assimilatory pressures (Matovina and Riebe-Estrella 2002). The results of this study complete these research efforts by reassessing the political role of religious symbols and traditions in the immigrant community from a comparative, intra-group perspective. Moreover, the fact that the actions of the Catholic Church became such an important explanatory factor in the mobilization process of Mexican 258 immigrants in these two cities during the initial period of study, and later on during the political mobilizations of the first semester of 2006, offers a challenge for future research of transnational scholars on the matter. The Catholic Church in any country represents the interests of a powerful, third transnational state -the Vatican- and the study of its political influence on immigrant or religious groups within a context of political transnationalism, in addition to the study of the role of host and home states, is very promising for the theoretical development of the term. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, pp. 5-6) state that “political leaders, in their struggles for political advantage, mobilize ordinary citizens into American politics. The strategic choices they make, the strategic decisions they reach, shape the contours -the whos, whens and whys- of political participation in America.” This study enforces such a statement through the analysis of ethnic mobilization in America from a transnational perspective. We can then state that leadership of immigrant organizations, in their struggles for political advantage, mobilizes ordinary noncitizens into home and state politics. The strategic choices they make shape the contours of immigrant political participation in America. Mobilization of an ethnic group is also shaped by the context in which it takes place. For the case of Mexican immigrants in a transnational context, the Mexican Consulate, the Catholic Church and policies and politics in Mexico definitely shape the organizations and their leadership in their effort to mobilize people. From a local perspective, local government policies and politics can make a big difference for mobilization efforts to take place within an ethnic community. 259 Different aspects of the mobilization process, like agenda setting, the elite formation process, the mechanisms of individual mobilization and the influence of local and foreign politics in organizational and mobilization actions of the immigrant community offer a solid idea about the complexity of the whole process, and what mobilization is about in global cities. The research presented in this study suggests that transnational politics in American cities is the core subject of the study of political transnationalism at an organizational (meso) level in American politics. The essence of political transnationalism is about the interaction between local and transnational contexts at an organizational, governmental and individual level. However, it is at an organizational level in which the mechanisms of immigrant, individual mobilization are constantly explored through a complex web of transnational symbols, practices and appeals by the leadership of immigrant organizations. At a macro level, the influence of local and transnational contexts, and even third transnational states, in the agenda setting process and the formation process of immigrant-origin leadership are just the starting points in order to explain the causes and effects of urban transnational political activities and empowerment of a growing immigrant community in a host state. Finally, there seems to be consensus among Latino scholars about the mobilization and political participation of the naturalized population of Mexican-origin in the following aspects: naturalization does not necessarily translates into political participation (DeSipio 1996) and, more specifically, that “we cannot say with certainty that immigrants who are naturalized citizens are more likely to participate than those who are noncitizens” (Barreto and Muñoz 2003:443); naturalized Latino citizens who have a longer length of time in the U.S. are more likely to politically participate (Bass and Casper 2001, 260 Ramakrishnan and Epenshade 2001); context of naturalization matters: in a hostile, antiimmigrant climate (i.e.: California during and after the Proposition 187), mobilization and participation through naturalization becomes a reality among the Mexican origin population (Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura 2001; Barreto 2005); and that Mexican immigrants do participate in electoral political activities despite their non-citizenship status via union mobilization (Varsanyi 2005). In general terms, this study establishes sound parallels between mainstream Latino research and the research of political participation and mobilization of Mexican immigrants from an organizational perspective: for the formation of Mexican immigrant leadership, context and length of stay in the U.S. matters. The consolidation of Mexican immigrant leadership (not Mexican American leadership) starts to develop in Chicago and Houston right after the amnesty of 1986, as most of these leaders legalized their status through the Immigration Reform and Control Act, and keeps on developing and maturing through events that take place “here and there,” like the Zedillo’s cars episode and the mass mobilizations of 2006 in American cities. Future research on the topic should address the question of to what extent political mobilization of Mexican immigrants influence the political mobilization of future Mexican-origin naturalized citizens. Important anti-immigrant actions, like that of California’s proposition 187 or the Congress’ HR 4437, definitely have left their mark on the political mobilization process when analyzing the links between the political participation of Mexican immigrants and political participation through naturalization: in accordance with Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura (2001, 2008) such events (here) have led, 261 along with changes in Mexican nationality laws (there), to a real increase in the number of petitions to naturalize. This topic certainly is research material of incredible proportions for the analysis of U.S. legislative actions in terms of migration policies for the presidency of Barack Obama and subsequent generations. Within this context, the expectations about the participation and mobilization of the Mexican-origin population (foreign-born or not, naturalized or not) in the process seem to be completely linked to whatever the Catholic Church has to say (or not) about the way the U.S. political system deals with the legalization process (or not) of millions of undocumented Mexican immigrants. 262 Endnotes Chapter 5 i The reflection about the different faces of the power of the Catholic Church from both a local and transnational contexts, and from individual and institutional perspectives, is the product of the field research of this work and was deeply enriched through personal communications between the author and Joel Magallán Reyes, Executive Director of Asociación Tepeyac de New York. ii MX Magazine, several articles, July 2006. iii Illinois New Americans Immigrants Policy, State of Illinois Executive Order, September 2005. http://www.icirr.org/exec/projectoverview.pdf#search=%22new%20americans%20state %20illinois%22 iv Idem. v The four subsections are based on Cano’s “Political Mobilization of Mexican Immigrants in American Cities and the U.S. Immigration Debate” (2006) www.mexnor.org vi “Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S. Estimates Based on the March 2005 Current Population Survey” by Jeffrey S. Passel, Pew Hispanic Center, March 2006. http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf vii “Cardinal Mahony Launches Immigration Justice Campaign in Los Angeles,” United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Migration and Refugee Services, document without date, June 18, 2006, http://www.usccb.org/mrs/cardinalmahony.shtml. viii United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (2003) “Catholic Information Project”, December, Washington D.C. ix “Comprehensive Immigration Reform,” United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Migration and Refugee Services, document without date, June 18, 2006. http://www.usccb.org/mrs/mrp.shtml. x xi Catholic Information Project, December 2003. After the Senate passed S. 2611 in late May 2006, expectations were high that the House and Senate would reach a feasible commitment on a comprehensive immigration reform through a conference committee that would work out the differences in the two bills (H.R. 4437 and S. 2611). However, in an unusual action, the House decided on June 20 to hold a series of public hearings on the matter across the nation. The Senate also 263 decided to have its own hearings. Since July 2006, after President Bush signaled public opinion that he is open to prioritize an enforcement-first approach, there seems to be consensus in Washington, mostly among Republican members of Congress and the Executive branch, that border security programs should be given priority over guest worker programs and over any legalization options for unauthorized immigrants. Indeed, the only legislation that was enacted by Congress after this historical episode of immigrant mobilization in U.S. soil was the Secure Fence Act of 2006, which became law in October and authorized the construction of new infrastructure along the border with Mexico. xii Approximate figure disclosed by the Pew Hispanic Center in “Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S.” (2006) xiii For Mexican immigrants, for example, unions (sindicatos) could mean corruption and cooptation, for Central Americans they could mean government opposition, and for the Poles, they could mean government control. Even among Mexicans, community organization could mean several things: if previous experience is related to community organizations led by Jesuit priests, the organization could mean high standards of service and commitment to poor communities along with high levels of political consciousness. If the experience is related to community organizations organized by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional during the 70 years of PRI-government, it could mean high levels of corruption and personal gratification for the leadership. Levels of confidence of organizations that pursue political mobilization of unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. vary in accordance to the political culture of the immigrant. xiv Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. The National Border Patrol Strategy. http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/shared/lawenfor/bpatrol/strategy.htm xv For the period 1990-2003, in accordance to data from the Mexican Population Council, and the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs. xvi Although there is a well established Mexican elite who lives and does business on both sides of the border. xvii Castles defines transnational communities “as groups based in two or more countries that engage in recurrent, enduring, and significant cross-border activities, which may be economic, political, social, or cultural” (2003, p. 433)