Improving public resilience to CBRN incidents

ISSN 2192-6921 Independent Review on European Security & Defence − Winner of the European Award 2011 for Citizenship, Security and Defence Volume No 19 MAIN TOPIC: Energies To enhance energy security Europe needs better connected infrastructure and to use the new technologies, including in the security and defence area The future of European Defence Anna Elżbieta Fotyga MEP, Chair SEDE Committee, European Parliament The next generation of Airborne Surveillance Solutions Philippe Roy, President Aero Surveillance Inc. www.magazine-the-european.com ProPress Publishing Group Edition 2/2014 Protection How risk communication can improve public responses to CBRN incidents Improving public resilience to CBRN incidents by Dr Kristian Krieger and Dr Brooke Rogers, Kings College, London In the aftermath of the Sarin attacks in Tokyo in 1995, the anthrax attacks in the USA in 2001, and the Litvinenko incident in London in 2006, incidents involving CBRN substances have become a growing concern for policy-makers and professionals in the area of civil protection in Europe. Resources were poured into preventing and responding to such incidents, often focussing on improving technical and organisational capabilities. In spite of the significant progress made in the technical and procedural responses to CBRN events, “for many high-impact risks we do not understand what the public actually expects in a situation or how tolerant they may be of ‘abnormal’ risks during a crisis”1. This is changing partly as a result of EU-funded research that has delved into understanding the role of the public in preparing for and responding to CBRN incidents. The PRACTICE project is unique within the world of CBRN research. Specifically, PRACTICE took us a step closer to improving the effectiveness of communicating with the public during a CBRN event by enabling researchers to test the risk communication and behaviourbased findings of past EU-funded studies during a live emergency planning field exercise involving members of the public. What shapes the public response to CBRN incidents? Members of the public can become casualties or the first responders to CBRN events. CBRN impacts on the public can vary from physical trauma and fatalities, to psychological and Dr Kristian Krieger is a Research Associate at King’s College London. He is currently joint lead of the social science work package of the EU-FP7 funded project “Preparedness and Resilience against CBRN attacks” (PRACTICE). Photos: private Dr. Brooke Rogers is a Reader in Risk and Terror in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. She is a social psychologist interested in risk and crisis communication, perceptions of risk, and health outcomes in response to extreme events. behavioural impacts. The public response can make a positive difference to the impact of CBRN events. For example, members of the public can prevent widespread contamination by following health advice during an incident. But public behaviour also has the potential to overwhelm the capacity of our health systems if worried but unexposed individuals seek medical attention during a CBRN incident. A combination of factors shapes public responses to CBRN: Emergency responders engaging with members of the public during CBRN live exercise ARDEN photo: foi.se 53 THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION Public threat perceptions; trust in responders; perceptions of response measures; and communication with the public. Key among these factors is communicating with the public before, during and after an incident. Effective risk communication can reduce uncertainty, and improve confidence and trust in responders and their actions. Risk communication can only be effective if communicators understand the public information needs and communication preferences in relation to CBRN events. To what extent are the public needs met? If directly involved in an incident, the public wants information about the measures that emergency responders are taking, how this helps, and how effective the measures are. Preferences for risk communicators can vary. However, it is clear that directly affected members of the public want to receive information from individuals with formal authority capable of demonstrating leadership skills balanced by compassion and respect for the concerns of the public. While there is increasing recognition among emergency responders that they need to communicate with the public, there is a limited understanding of how, what and even what role this communication can fulfil. This leads to a Catch-22 in which longstanding practitioner assumptions about public behaviour (such as irrational panic and sheepish compliance) have hindered the development of risk communications that can facilitate an effective response. Instead, information about CBRN incidents is often delayed if provided, leading to an information vacuum resulting in public anxiety, confusion, information seeking and potentially non-compliant behaviours. PRACTICE and other studies show that risk communication about CBRN events must reach beyond basic instructions on what to do in order to include justifications of ‘why’ advised activities are effective, need to be continuous, and that the worries and input of the public have to be taken seriously. How can these shortcomings be addressed? The potential for the public response to influence the effectiveness and outcomes of CBRN events has attracted increasing attention among decision-makers. In order to effectively improve the role of the public in CBRN incident, it is important to increase the knowledge of emergency responders about how the public responds to CBRN incidents and how to engage with the public. There is little CBRN-specific guidance across Europe that can help responders learn about engaging with the public. One attempt to address this gap is the production of communication manuals for responders in the context of the PRACTICE project. In order to ensure that emergency response plans include public communication aspects, the EU needs to develop a legislative framework that encourages member states to address this gap. High-tech protection for crisis management Water-Food-Camps Interview with Thomas Popp and Volker Welzenbach, Managing Dir The European: Mr Welzenbach and Mr Popp, you have both been Managing Directors with equal rights of Futuretech, a member of the Kärcher group, for about three years. I see that since then your company has undergone a profound reorganisation, giving a new “comprehensive orientation” to its product range. V. Welzenbach: Within the past decade there have been major changes within our target group; these are due to the continuously changing reality of operations and theatres. The European: Am I right in saying that the most significant and obvious changes are a modernised and updated product range, as well as modularisation? Th. Popp: Indeed, cost cutting, cost efficiency and energy saving requirements as well as reduced manpower following reorganisations are key developments affecting our customer base, as are pooling and sharing initiatives and the growing cooperation between civil and military forces. Last but not least, there is an increased demand on export markets. The European: Why is it that your products have become the preferred choice of users worldwide? V. Welzenbach: In line with our strategy and the objective of being “the leading customer-centric partner for mobile and modular solutions for military and civil defence missions” we have implemented the move from single sourced stand-alone products towards solution-oriented systems. The European: If I may delve a little deeper: what does “solutionoriented” mean? Th. Popp: This means the complete picture: integration, modularity, increased training and service concepts for the forces on the ground, not to forget life cycle management. We take a very Thomas Popp has been Managing Director of Kärcher Futuretech GmbH since 2012. Born in 1963, he studied Mechanical Engineering at the University of Stuttgart from 1984 to 1991. Mr Popp started his professional career at Kärcher in production planning. From 1994 to 1996 he worked at the Kärcher plant in Los Angeles and as Head of Sourcing until 1999. Thomas Popp was Head of Sourcing, Central Technical Departments and Logistics until 2007. Prior to his current position, he was Managing Director at the Kärcher Group in charge of Sourcing, IT, Logistics, Central Technical Departments, Research & Predevelopment and Facilities. 1 GOS (2011): Blackett Review of High Impact Low Probability Risks. London: UK Government Office for Science, page 24. 54