Dimensions of Europe - Dimensions of
Europeanization
Conceptual Analysis
Maria Todorova
Professor, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
mtodorov@illinos.edu
Contemporary Southeastern Europe 2019, 6(1), 10-19
DOI: 10.25364/02.6:2019.1.2
Contemporary Southeastern Europe is an online, peer-reviewed, multidisciplinary journal that publishes original,
scholarly, and policy-oriented research on issues relevant to societies in Southeastern Europe. For more
information, please contact us at info@contemporarysee.org or visit our website at www.contemporarysee.org
Dimensions of Europe - Dimensions of
Europeanization
Maria Todorova
Keywords: Europeanization, Periphery, Backwardness, Corruption
Some years ago, the Romanian writer Mircea Cartarescu was approached by a
German publisher at the Frankfurt book fair, who said he was interested in
Eastern European writers. Cartarescu immediately responded that he did not
consider himself an Eastern European writer. “Of course,” the publisher
conceded, “as a Romanian you are from Southeastern Europe.” 1 For Cartarescu
this simple spacing had the following direct message: “Stay where you are,” the
publisher was telling me in a friendly manner. “Stay in your own ghetto.
Describe your tiny chunk of (South) Eastern European history. Write about
your Securitate, about your Ceausescu, about your People’s House. About your
dogs, your homeless children, your Gypsies. Be proud with your dissidence
during the communist days. Leave it to us to write about love, death,
happiness, agony, and ecstasy. Leave it to us to create the avant-garde, to
innovate, to breathe cultural normality. Your only chance here is to describe
your small exotic world for some small publishing house that might accept
you… Just choose: either you confirm our clichés or you disappear.” Cartarescu
was furious. He could not accept the triple division of Europe into Western,
Central, and Eastern, let alone the Southeastern subdivision of the subdivision.
“Western Europe, Central Europe, Eastern Europe. Civilization, neurosis,
chaos. Prosperity, culture, and chaos. Consciousness, subconsciousness, and
chaos.” Cartarescu had read Musil, in whom he saw not Kakanien, but a prince
of the European spirit. He didn’t care which country Andre Breton came from.
He didn’t trace Bulgakov’s Kiev on a map. “I haven’t read Catulus, Rabelais,
Cantemir, and Virginia Woolf from some geographic map,” he wrote, “but from
the library, where books are arranged next to each other.” And he concluded:
“There are many Europes in space and in time, in dreams and in memories, in
reality and in the imagination. I claim only one of them, my Europe, easily
recognizable, because it has the shape of my brain. It has this shape, because
[my brain] has modeled it from the outset after itself.” How do we
“Europeanize” a person such as Cartarescu who is from the “periphery”? The
periphery of what? And what is a periphery?
Maria Todorova is the Gutgsell Professor of History at the Department of History
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The current article is based on talk delivered at the
University of Graz, 26 June 2019 at the launch of the Field of Excellence “Dimensions of
Europeanization”
1 Cartarescu, Mircea. 2004. Europa has the Form of my Brain. Interview in the Bulgarian
newspaper Kultura 23 (2325), May 28. 2004, 12.
10
Dimensions of Europe - Dimensions of Europeanization
The notions of core and periphery were introduced in the 1950s in the
vocabulary of the United Nations, specifically the Economic Commission on
Latin America. They were theorized later by Immanuel Wallerstein in worldsystem theory that stressed the processual character of these concepts: “In
world-system analysis, core-periphery is a relational concept, not a pair of
terms that are reified, that is, have separate essential meanings.” 2 Standing on
but critically complicating dependency theory, world-system theory was mostly
used to describe the international division of labor and its repercussions on the
social system. Within this framework, others developed a comparative theory of
the semi-periphery, which is supposed to occupy “a structural position which
often has developmental (or evolutionary) significance,” 3 and to which Eastern
Europe is often added. While criticized for its excessive economism and neglect
of social class and culture, the influence of world-systems analysis is
undisputed, and the notions core and periphery have entered everyday use, so
much so that a “peripheral” status is accorded to all aspects of life in
economically peripheral territories. But, as Osterhammel has argued,
“[p]olitical geography does not coincide with economic geography, and the
global distribution of cultural cores is different from that of the concentrations
of military power.”4 Others have warned that a number of cultural categories,
among them center-periphery, East-West or public-private, are “indexical signs
that are always relative: dependent for part of their referential meaning on the
interactional context in which they are used.”5 Not only does core-periphery
indicate a relation, it always indicates an asymmetrical relation and “what
matters is the self-understanding of the actor: does (s)he think that her or his
opinion is in the ‘catch up’ part of the yardstick, or does (s)he experience being
part of an ascendant or even dominant culture?”6 Even as I concede that the
category “periphery” continues to have salience “as both critical concept and
media shorthand for (relative) backwardness,” 7 I want to point out that it
shamelessly translates economic wealth to other social and cultural spheres.
And so it is with Europe.
Europe, like the Trinity, has three hypostases: the Name, the Place, and the
Idea, and they all have divine claims. They also all have spaces as one of their
central attributes. The name belonged first to a consort of the chief God, and
she rode on his back (in his incarnation as a bull) from Asia Minor to Crete; it
meant something beautiful, big-eyed, broad-faced and just huge. The place was
first identified by the island Greeks, who named Europe the mainland
stretching north from the Peloponnesus, the area we call today the Balkans. It
was the center of their world and for a certain period of time, the center of the
Hopkins, Terence / Wallerstein, Immanuel and associates. 1982. World-Systems Analysis: Theory
and Methodology. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 17.
3 Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 1988. Comparing World-Systems: Toward a Theory of Semiperipheral
Development. The Comparative Civilizations Review 18, 29-38, 31.
4 Osterhammel, Jürgen. 2014. The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth
Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 78.
5 Gal, Susan. 2002. A Semiotics of the Public/Private Distinction. Differences: A Journal of Feminist
Cultural Studies 13(1), 77-95, 80.
6 Stenius, Henrik. 2017. Concepts in a Nordic Periphery, in Conceptual History in the European
Space, edited by Steinmetz, Willibald / Freeden, Michael and Javier Fernandez-Sebastian. New
York: Berghahn, 263-80, 264.
7 Ballinger, Pamela. 2017. Whatever Happened to Eastern Europe? Revisiting Europe’s Eastern
Peripheries. East European Politics and Societies and Cultures 31(1), 44-67, 61.
2
11
Maria Todorova
ancient world. In the course of several centuries it extended its space
westwards, encompassing the whole western Eurasian peninsula, and then it
started contracting its space, to be finally expropriated by its westernmost
part. It was in this period, especially after the Great Schism of the 11 th century
and then with the coming of the Ottomans, that the name was finally divorced
from its Middle Eastern origins. Christianity is supposed to be the definitive
and intrinsic characteristic of European culture and nowadays is erected as the
central pillar of Fortress Europa. But as the latest magisterial Eerdmans
Encyclopedia of Early Christian Art and Archaeology reminds us, its center of
gravity lay not in Rome nor Constantinople, but in the Middle East, and it was
part of the trilogy of West Asian religions with nothing specifically European
about it.8 In fact, with its trinitarian doctrine it made tritheism official and
launched a rather hypocritical war on the monotheistic religions of Judaism
and Islam, as some detractors have said. Once contracted to Western Europe
(what some authors call Visigothic Europe), this part became known as the
European Union after the Second World War, and some 20 years ago began its
slow eastward expansion. While not quite godlike, it certainly has regal airs,
although its crown nowadays seems a little rusty. Finally, the idea of Europe
or, rather, an ideal of Europe, undoubtedly has its divine pretensions as a value
system; it has succeeded in creating itself by defining what it is not, to
paraphrase the late Edward Said’s characterization of culture (another
category that is questioned in the project), it is constantly practicing a
differentiation of itself from what it believes to be not itself. This ideal type is
widely disseminated, although not entirely uncontested. The understanding of
Europe, notoriously, does not create a consensus and cannot be mandated. A
recent study on the teaching of Europe’s history at the school level shows that
for educators “Europe is mainly understood as a geographical concept [and its
history] as the history of some large western European countries plus Russia.”
Scandinavians, Celts, and East Europeans of all ilk lament that their histories
remain invisible. Students, by contrast, do not treat Europe as mere geography
but are equally distributed among those who see it as the birthplace of
democracy, enlightenment, and progress; or, contrastingly, a club of rich white
countries guilty of economic and ecological exploitation; as a solution to
European contradiction; or a danger to sovereign nations. Perceptions of the
European past include Christian tradition, weak cultural diversity, and
permanent conflict, whereas perceptions of the European present are
tantamount to peace, modernism, citizenship, and cultural diversity. All these
perceptions are, of course, the ones students have picked up and internalized
somewhere—at school, at home, and in the public space. If historians shyly
bring in Europe’s dubious pasts, or more vehemently lambast Eurocentrism,
and post-colonialists attempt to “de-center” it, for practical purposes the idea is
proving very powerful and convenient even for the skeptics (and I confess that
although I belong to the skeptics I still share in the desire to keep up the ideal,
however fraught or imagined).
Like Europe, the concept of Europeanization can also be approached as a triad
but it is less saintly than the trinity; it looks more like the three-headed
Cerberus, the hound guarding the gates of the Underworld or maybe the manyheaded Hydra (any analogy is unintended). Its first, traditional, neutral and
8
Goody, Jack. 2006. The Theft of History. Cambridge / New York: Cambridge University Press, 289.
12
Dimensions of Europe - Dimensions of Europeanization
most innocent sense (or essence, or head) was that of the 18th-19th century, used
to describe the modernizing efforts of different polities: Petrine Russia, the
Ottoman Tanzimat, Meiji Japan, etc.). When I wrote my first book (many
decades ago) on the Tanzimat reforms, I used it without any compunctions. In
the Ottoman Empire the reforms were referred to as Avrupalilaşma =
Europeanization, as a matter of fact without any pejorative connotation; i.e. it
was an emic category. It referred to the borrowing of institutions as tools from
a toolkit, mostly to meet geopolitical needs in the constant great-power
competition. These were not only economic and military tools, but also cultural
ones (in education, in the legal sphere, in fashion, and in the arts). 9 I am
evoking this history because even at the time the accusation both from within
(by conservatives opposed to the reforms) and by outsiders (impatient with
their pace and quality) was that this was simply imitation, imitating
institutions considered “organic” for the West, which were transformed and
deformed when travelling to the East where they were planted on unfavorable
soil. This brings in, of course, the debates on authenticity. Processes such as
industrialization, liberalization, democratization, republicanism etc. were
equally and gradually travelling and taking root in the West itself, but we tend
to forget that this gradual procession was a fairly recent historical process;
instead we often deal only with the final result which we pronounce authentic.
I do not think the modernizing reforms of the 18-20th centuries were imitation,
and I could argue it for the Ottoman Empire and Russia as well. Someone else
would be able to do it best for Japan and so on, but it highlights this important
notion of naked and uncreative imitation, which today is again hurled at the
societies of Eastern Europe, and this is an aspect that ought to be seriously
researched
In a recent article, Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes speak of today’s East
European predicament as “an illiberal mutant… implementing a clever policy
of piecemeal imitation.”10 According to them, 1989 legitimized the politics of
imitation understood as the shortest pathway to freedom and posterity. But,
interestingly, they are unclear about the mechanisms of this imitation. On the
one hand, they write about a voluntary chosen imitation, on the other hand
they insist on an imposed imitation imperative which “comes to feel like a loss
of sovereignty.”11 Unlike the much-touted phrase of Francois Furet that “not a
single new idea has come out of Eastern Europe in 1989” (with which
Habermas apparently seemed to concur),12 there were numerous visions and
strategies. (And as far as the novelty of ideas is concerned, we historians are
very skeptical about the rehashing of old ideas that are passed for new.) The
acceptance (or, as I will address it, the imposition) of one vision and strategy
and the motivation behind that imposition need further analysis. When I say
imposed, I mean not only from the outside, as a condition for accessions, but
also from the inside, by the internal neo-liberal elites that came to power. And
here again, we need to be careful, since these elites continue to call themselves
the guardians of liberal democracy. There is, however, a dramatic distinction
Todorova, Maria. 1983. Angliya, Rossiya i Tanzimat. Moscow: Nauka, Glavnoe izdatel'stvo
vostochnoi literatury.
10 Krastev, Ivan and Stephen Holmes. 2018. Explaining Eastern Europe: Imitation and Its
Discontents. Journal of Democracy 29(3), 117-28.
11 Krastev and Holmes. Explaining Eastern Europe, 118.
12 Krastev and Holmes. Explaining Eastern Europe, 120.
9
13
Maria Todorova
between liberalism and neoliberalism. Classical liberalism (as a few recent
books remind us)13 had little to do with the individualistic ideology and laissezfaire capitalism linked to John Locke and which became predominant in the
Anglo-American world. Instead, classic liberalism had its roots on the
continent, particularly the French Revolution. It was infused with a strong
social component, a moral message for the common good, and strove to
maximize democratic participation. Neo-liberalism has been entirely focused on
the economy and the unrestricted free market. There were no referenda in
Eastern Europe on the ways forward; the first free elections simply toppled the
old elites. The Jeffrey Sachs and Balcerowicz types of reforms that came to be
the imitation in practice for the whole region were in fact not an imitation of
any existing western practices or institution. Shock-therapy (and I am passing
no judgment) was a new remedy experienced by and experimented on Eastern
Europe. In any case, the notion of “imitation” as a way to Europeanization
needs to be seriously interrogated.
There was an additional dimension to this type of Europeanization and it had
to do with achieving a stable society. It meant trying to emulate the nationbuilding of the western societies who were seen as stable because of their
ethnic homogeneity and homogenizing politics (especially the French). Let us
not forget that Bismarck dismissed the Grossdeutsche version of his empire
because of the excessive ethnic diversity of the Habsburgs. The irony is that
after World War II Eastern Europe reached a relative ethnic homogeneity;
whereas Western Europe, with the consequences of decolonization browned
considerably, and despite the usual use of “xenophobic Eastern Europeans” as
scapegoats, it is Western Europe which is most alarmist about Islam and
emigration. The largest Muslim presence in Europe (outside the
overwhelmingly Muslim Bosnia and Albania) is in Bulgaria, Montenegro, and
Cyprus (between 10 and 20%). Yet, the real anti-Muslim hysteria does not
come from them but from France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands,
Belgium, and the UK where they are less than 10%. Interestingly enough it is
true that the biggest xenophobes are countries where Muslims are less than 1%
(Czechia, Hungary, Poland, the Baltics) but then, these are not the Balkans but
the civilized Central Europeans who deserved first to “return” to Europe.
After the Second World War, with the processes of de-colonialization and
Europeanization acquired a negative - and I would say harmful - connotation.
This was also accompanied by the demise of developmentalism (mostly in
Africa) and modernization theory by the 1960s, when the proper term was
“westernization” adding the influence of the premier great power, the USA.
Emulating Europe was seen as ethnocentric and thus, the second head of the
beast becomes Eurocentrism. Quite apart from the real record of Europe, there
is the harm of applying a universalist terminology to the world which is based
entirely on Europe. I am not to repeat here what many critics have said, but I
will mention Jack Goody’s magisterial “The Theft of History” in which he
E.g. Edelstein, Dan. 2018. On the Spirit of Rights. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press;
Miller, James. 2018. Can Democracy Work? A Short History of a Radical Idea, from Ancient Athens
to Our World. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux; Rosenblatt, Helena. 2018. The Lost History of
Liberalism: From Ancient Rome to the Twenty-First Century. Princeton: Princeton University
Press; see: Bell, David A. 2019. The Many Lives of Liberalism. The New York Review of Books
66(1), 17. January (accessed: 16. October 2019).
13
14
Dimensions of Europe - Dimensions of Europeanization
demonstrated the take-over of history by the west: “the past is conceptualized
and presented according to what happened on the provincial scale of Europe,
often western Europe, and then imposed upon the rest of the world.” 14 There is
much to be said for this and yet, one can retain an ambivalent attitude,
especially in the US where Eurocentrism is one of the central targets of
political correctness. There is also the natural reaction (not necessarily
conservative or racist as in John Headley’s “The Europeanization of the World”
against negating the historically premier powerful position of Europe for the
last half millennium (which, in the end, is a fairly short stretch of time).15
Here is the place to revisit our conceptual apparatus which came under attack
with the critique of modernization and diffusion theory. Heretofore ideas and
institutions were usually described in a specific language: they “penetrate,”
they “exert influence,” they are being “diffused,” “transmitted,” “transformed,”
and “deformed.” The countries that were the object of this diffusion were,
accordingly, imitative and derivative. With the advent of transfer studies, this
vocabulary became somewhat more subtle: knowledge was “circulated,”
“appropriated,” ideas were “translated,” “transplanted;” adapted in a
communicative action, stressing the processual character of the transfer,
cultural mixing, and hybridization. Transfer studies, sometimes too strongly
contrasted to comparative studies, were supposed to overcome the assumption
inbuilt in comparison about static units of analysis and, instead, study
processes in transformation. An additional advantage was that while
comparison tended to focus on synchrony, inquiry into transfer favored a
diachronic perspective. Even though “transfer” introduced a greater flexibility
and dynamism in the analysis, transfer studies came with their inbuilt
problems, the most important being the fixed frames of reference that included
the points of departure and arrival. Today the proper framework is that of
entangled history, histoire croisée, with its insistence on “a multidimensional
approach that acknowledges plurality and the complex configurations that
result from it.”16 This does not evade the asymmetry of the relationship, not
only in the sense of an unequal starting point, but also in the sense of not being
affected in the same manner by the interaction. The important point, however,
is that the two sides of the intercrossing remain active. Thus we should be very
careful how we apply it to Southeastern Europe, where the power relation is
hugely lopsided.
Here we should also evoke another dimension or sub-characteristic:
Europeanization as part of European imperialism and colonialism. It is
symptomatic that the Balkans have the only two colonial (or quasi-colonial)
territories of Europe alongside Ireland where the mission civilisatrice was
played out: Albania as an Italian colony and Bosnia as an Austrian one (the
Goody. The Theft of History, 1.
Headley, John. 2007. The Europeanization of the World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
16 To mention just a few titles on these historiographical developments, see Espagne, Michel. 1999.
Les transfers culturels franco-allemand. Paris: PUF; Espagne, Michel and Michael Werner. (eds.).
1988. Transfers: Les relations interculturelles dans l’espace franco-allemand (XVIIIe et XIXe siècle).
Paris: Editions recherches sur les civilisations; Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard und Jürgen Kocka. (eds.).
1996. Geschichte und Vergleich. Ansätze und Ergebnisse international vergleichender
Geschichtsschreibung. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag; Middel, Matthias. 2000. Kulturtransfer
und Vergleich. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitäts Verlag.
14
15
15
Maria Todorova
work of Bojan Aleksov and Clemens Ruthner). It is a sublime irony that
Eastern Europe (including the Balkans) is sharing and carrying the “white
man’s burden” of the western part of Europe vis-à-vis the world, even as their
western counterparts do not recognize them as authentic. But it has to be
admitted that they are not only victims in this; they themselves also display an
astounding amount of racial prejudice vis-à-vis their browner fellow-humans.
Colonialism and post-colonialism is a category which needs to be explored in
depth here since it has begun to be indiscriminately applied to Eastern Europe
and especially to the Balkans. I have been on record as opposing this
historically and will not go in length arguing my case, but essentially it comes
down to my conviction that neither the Ottoman, nor the Habsburg, nor
Romanov empires as they were placed in Eastern Europe can be treated as late
colonial empires (there are exceptions in their last decades but vis-à-vis other
territories in Africa or Central Asia). Neither do I think can the Soviet Union
be treated as such in its relationship with Eastern Europe. But it has become
cool and more academic to substitute the “Turkish yoke” or “Soviet yoke” with
Ottoman and Soviet colonialism and pronounce the Balkans as the author of
the first global model of decolonization.17 Why specifically “decolonization” is
used over a quantity of other analogues has mostly to do with its metaphorical
and emancipatory power, evoking the saintly specters of Mahatma Ghandi and
Frantz Fannon. The emancipatory mantle of “decolonization” all too often
serves as a cover for the perpetual lament of self-victimization. One hears the
congruent overtones between old-fashioned nationalism and ultra-fashionable
post-colonialism when it comes to lament the colonial status of the Balkans visà-vis the Ottomans or of Eastern Europe vis-à-vis the Soviets. Ironically, the
Habsburgs served as a useful tool promoting the myth of Central Europe, so
their civilizing mission was inversely promoted by the Central European
marginals in their quest of accession to the European Union. And yet, what is
interesting is that the argument about coloniality is revived today rhetorically
in some quarters of Eastern Europe not only about the USSR but also vis-à-vis
the European Union. At a recent symposium in New York marking 30 years
after 1989, I first heard the slogan “Brussels is the new Moscow” (ascribed to
the Czechs). In highlighting the new common East European experience of
marginality, some East European intellectuals (beginning in literary theory)
call for opening up of categories that were hitherto used almost exclusively to
conceptualize the non-European experience. In this vision, the application of
post-colonial studies serves largely emancipatory goals; it empowers East
European intellectuals by propelling them into a paradigm which by now
pretends to be speaking a universal language.
Membership in the European Union comes with identity side effects. As a
prominent Bulgarian intellectual and member of the neo-liberal elite (the
economist Rumen Avramov) remarked: “Backwardness becomes more
transparent to the extent that it is not the same to be a relatively poor country
outside and the poorest one inside an affluent community.” 18 Identity issues
aside, there is no doubt that there is a double standard and two-tiered
See Snyder, Timothy. 2015. Integration and Disintegration: Europe, Ukraine, and the World.
Slavic Review 74(4), 695-707. For a response, see Todorova, Maria. 2015. On Public Intellectuals
and Their Conceptual Frameworks. Slavic Review 74(4), 708-14.
18 Avramov, Roumen. 2016. Bulgaria in Europe – Societal Legacies, Models and Targets: A
Personal Outlook. Euxeinos 21, 33-39, 36.
17
16
Dimensions of Europe - Dimensions of Europeanization
membership in the EU, and this is broadly recognized. After the 2008 crisis
and recession, European rules are applied differently. Again a quote from
Avramov (and again, I should add that this is an impeccable liberal
Europeanizer, not a socialist critic): “Policies rightly considered as vicious in
the periphery (massive bail-outs of irresponsible debtors or imprudent
creditors) are applied in the core countries.” 19 This brings me to an important
question raised by Krastev and Holmes, who maintain that:
“In order to reconcile the idea of ‘normal’ (meaning what is widespread at
home) with what is normatively obligatory in the countries they aim to imitate,
East Europeans consciously or unconsciously have begun to ‘normalize’ the
model countries, arguing that what is widespread in the East is also prevalent
in the West, even though Westerners hypocritically pretend that their societies
are different. East Europeans often relieve their normative dissonance—say,
between paying bribes to survive in the East and fighting corruption to be
accepted in the West—by concluding that the West is really just as corrupt as
the East, but Westerners are simply in denial and hiding the truth.”20
This to me seems to be a gesture of ultimate aggressive defensiveness, as the
verity of the statement is never addressed. What if indeed westerners are in
denial? What if small corruption that is allegedly intrinsic to the New Europe
is visible and ugly whereas the large corruption of the Old Europe is civilized
and legalized? And it is not true that this pose of “normalizing” the west is
ubiquitous. What is ubiquitous is self-criticism and self-degradation.21
Europeanization through rationality and Enlightenment is a worthy ideal, but
the enlightened agents themselves have not reached it. (To take an example
from the Enlightenment itself, which the Balkans have missed together with
the Renaissance and Reformation, Voltaire held that Jews were not Europeans
but Asiatics: “all of them born with raging fanaticism in their heart, just as the
Bretons and Germans are born with blond hair.” And the “Blacks are not men,
except in their stature.”22 This was certainly not the case in the unenlightened
Southeastern Europe . Edi Rama, the prime-minister of Albania, said in a
recent interview in the Guardian: “It’s very Balkanic what’s happening in
Britain. Deal, no deal. Soft border, hard border, no agreements. It’s the
Balkans! It is like the Bosnian parliament! While we are trying to Europeanize,
it looks like they are Balkanizing!”23 This brings us to the last and perhaps only
unambiguously noble and positive hypostasis to Europeanization, its essence as
an ideal. And this is perfectly fine. Except that this particular dimension of
Europeanization should correspond to the whole dimension of Europe and be a
perhaps distant ideal for the whole continent, not only for its SEE corner.
Avramov. Bulgaria in Europe, 37.
Krastev and Holmes, Explaining Eastern Europe, 122.
21 A recent book announcement of a book to come from the region is titled Balkanizing
Europeanization: Fight against Corruption and Regional Relations in the Western Balkans edited
by Vladimir Vuckovic and Vladimir Djordjevic.
22 Appiah, Kwame A. 2019. Dialectics of Enlightenment. The New York Review of Books 66(8), 9.
May 2019, 40 (accessed: 16. October 2019).
23 Walker, Shaun. 2019. Edi Rama, Albania’s unconventional PM who wants to escape the ‘curse of
history’. The Guardian, 10. June 2019 (accessed: 25. October 2019).
19
20
17
Maria Todorova
Bibliography
Appiah, Kwame A. 2019. Dialectics of Enlightenment. The New York Review of
Books 66(8), 9. May 2019, 40 (accessed: 16. October 2019).
Avramov, Roumen. 2016. Bulgaria in Europe – Societal Legacies, Models and
Targets: A Personal Outlook. Euxeinos 21, 33-39.
Ballinger, Pamela. 2017. Whatever Happened to Eastern Europe? Revisiting
Europe’s Eastern Peripheries. East European Politics and Societies and
Cultures 31(1), 44-67.
Bell, David A. 2019. The Many Lives of Liberalism. The New York Review of
Books 66(1), 17. January (accessed: 16. October 2019).
Cartarescu, Mircea. 2004. Europa has the Form of my Brain. Kultura 23
(2325).
Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 1988. Comparing World-Systems: Toward a Theory
of Semiperipheral Development. The Comparative Civilizations Review 18,
29-38.
Edelstein, Dan. 2018. On the Spirit of Rights. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press.
Espagne, Michel. 1999. Les transfers culturels franco-allemand. Paris: PUF.
and Michael Werner. (eds.). 1988. Transfers. Les relations interculturelles
dans l’espace franco-allemand (XVIIIe et XIXe siècle). Paris: Editions
recherches sur les civilisations.
Gal, Susan. 2002. A Semiotics of the Public/Private Distinction. Differences: A
Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 13(1), 77-95.
Goody, Jack. 2006. The Theft of History. Cambridge / New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard und Jürgen Kocka. (eds.). 1996. Geschichte und
Vergleich.
Ansätze
und
Ergebnisse
international
vergleichender
Geschichtsschreibung. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag.
Hopkins, Terence / Wallerstein, Immanuel and associates. 1982. World-Systems
Analysis: Theory and Methodology. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
Headley, John. 2007. The Europeanization of the World. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Krastev, Ivan and Stephen Holmes. 2018. Explaining Eastern Europe:
Imitation and Its Discontents. Journal of Democracy 29(3), 117-28.
Middell, Matthias. 2000. Kulturtransfer und Vergleich. Leipzig: Leipziger
Universitäts Verlag.
Miller, James. 2018. Can Democracy Work? A Short History of a Radical Idea,
from Ancient Athens to Our World. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Osterhammel, Jürgen. 2014. The Transformation of the World: A Global
History of the Nineteenth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rosenblatt, Helena. 2018. The Lost History of Liberalism: From Ancient Rome
to the Twenty-First Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Snyder, Timothy. 2015. Integration and Disintegration: Europe, Ukraine, and
the World. Slavic Review 74(4), 695-7.
Stenius, Henrik. 2017. Concepts in a Nordic Periphery, in Conceptual History
in the European Space, edited by Steinmetz, Willibald / Freeden, Michael
and Javier Fernandez-Sebastian. New York: Berghahn, 263-80.
Todorova, Maria. 2015. On public Intellectuals and Their Conceptual
Frameworks. Slavic Review 74(4), 708-14.
.1986. Angliya, Rossiya i Tanzimat. Moscow: Nauka, Glavnoe izdatel'stvo
vostochnoi literatury.
18
Dimensions of Europe - Dimensions of Europeanization
Walker, Shaun. 2019. Edi Rama, Albania’s unconventional PM who wants to
escape the ‘curse of history’. The Guardian, 10. June 2019 (accessed: 25.
October 2019).
19