The growing importance of executive authority at the international level has fuelled scholarly de... more The growing importance of executive authority at the international level has fuelled scholarly debate about the level of autonomy enjoyed by international public administration (IPA), that is, the executive arms of international organisations. Insights from IPAs in the West or Global North, such as the European Union, have largely shaped these debates, whereas data from IPAs in the Global South are largely missing in the discussion. This article seeks to remedy this imbalance and contribute to an organisational‐theory‐inspired conceptualisation of IPA autonomy: We draw insights from survey data from the commissions of the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). We demonstrate that, although both commissions are embedded in inter‐governmental organisations, they demonstrate remarkably strong features of actor‐level autonomy. Thus, this study suggests that even IPAs constrained by an inter‐governmental environment may still wield some degree of autonomy. Finally, the article draws practical implications for reforming IPAs.
Since the end of the Cold War, it has become widely accepted in policy and academic circles alike... more Since the end of the Cold War, it has become widely accepted in policy and academic circles alike that both foreign/security policy and development policy are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing. Similar to international organisations such as the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union has commenced to emphasise the need for forging a closer link between these ‘distinct’ policy arenas. In its 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, for example, the European Council maintained that ‘there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace’ (European Council, 2008, p. 8). As security and development policy face different time horizons and sometimes enshrine different objectives, this affirmation touches upon one of the core questions in development policy: under which conditions can development assistance fulfil its goals? With a view to fragile states, in particular, recent studies have confirmed that rapid and sustained donor engagement is likely to ‘significantly increases the chances of a […] turnaround’ (Chauvet and Collier, 2006, p. 14). Thus far, the EU’s response to emerging political crises in third countries has been criticised as slow, cumbersome and, as a result, ineffective; it was lacking a single and unified instrument at the EU level that could have been initiated on very short notice and implemented rapidly.
ABSTRACT With the creation of the African Peace and Security Architecture in 2004, African states... more ABSTRACT With the creation of the African Peace and Security Architecture in 2004, African states were aiming to assume the primary responsibility for peace and security on the continent and establish a structure to assemble the necessary financial and military means. However, despite the constant evocation of “African ownership,” it is non-African actors that call the tune and can define and drive African security. Based on a detailed juxtaposition of rhetoric and empirical evidence, this paper argues that significant conceptual and practical problems constrain the “Africanization” of African security and that it appears increasingly unlikely that the continent's states will be able to achieve the desired primacy in security affairs in the foreseeable future.
What will be the future of security cooperation in Europe after the Bush Administration? The Chan... more What will be the future of security cooperation in Europe after the Bush Administration? The Changing Politics of European Security explores the key security challenges confronting Europe, from relations with the United States and Russia to the use of military force and the struggle against ...
With the adoption of its first ‘macro-regional’ strategy in 2009 — the EU Strategy for the Baltic... more With the adoption of its first ‘macro-regional’ strategy in 2009 — the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) — the European Union has started to charter new territory in transnational cooperation and cohesion policy. Subsequently, other ‘macro-regions’ have begun to self-identify — such as the Danube (2011), the Adriatic-Ionian basin (2014), the Alpine (2015) and the North Sea regions1 (see European Parliament, 2015) — and are in the process of developing similar strategies of their own, often drawing on ‘the inspiration from the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region and the Danube Region’ (North Sea Commission, 2011, p. 2). These developments suggest that some parts of Europe, if not the entire EU, could come to be covered by some kind of macro-regional strategy. Indeed, in 2013, the Lithuanian Presidency of the EU Council proposed a ‘Europe of macro-regions’ (Lithuanian Presidency of the EU Council, 2013, p. 9) and an ever-increasing area has been described as having succumbed to a kind of ‘macro-regional fever’ (Duhr, 2011, p. 3). Such observations and the concrete developments that underpin them warrant a critical assessment of this ‘“nouvelle vogue” of transnational cooperation’ (Cugusi and Stocchiero, 2012), which has also been depicted as a new ‘tool of European integration’ (Dubois et al., 2009, p. 9; see also Bellini and Hilpert, 2013).2
The growing importance of executive authority at the international level has fuelled scholarly de... more The growing importance of executive authority at the international level has fuelled scholarly debate about the level of autonomy enjoyed by international public administration (IPA), that is, the executive arms of international organisations. Insights from IPAs in the West or Global North, such as the European Union, have largely shaped these debates, whereas data from IPAs in the Global South are largely missing in the discussion. This article seeks to remedy this imbalance and contribute to an organisational‐theory‐inspired conceptualisation of IPA autonomy: We draw insights from survey data from the commissions of the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). We demonstrate that, although both commissions are embedded in inter‐governmental organisations, they demonstrate remarkably strong features of actor‐level autonomy. Thus, this study suggests that even IPAs constrained by an inter‐governmental environment may still wield some degree of autonomy. Finally, the article draws practical implications for reforming IPAs.
Since the end of the Cold War, it has become widely accepted in policy and academic circles alike... more Since the end of the Cold War, it has become widely accepted in policy and academic circles alike that both foreign/security policy and development policy are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing. Similar to international organisations such as the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union has commenced to emphasise the need for forging a closer link between these ‘distinct’ policy arenas. In its 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, for example, the European Council maintained that ‘there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace’ (European Council, 2008, p. 8). As security and development policy face different time horizons and sometimes enshrine different objectives, this affirmation touches upon one of the core questions in development policy: under which conditions can development assistance fulfil its goals? With a view to fragile states, in particular, recent studies have confirmed that rapid and sustained donor engagement is likely to ‘significantly increases the chances of a […] turnaround’ (Chauvet and Collier, 2006, p. 14). Thus far, the EU’s response to emerging political crises in third countries has been criticised as slow, cumbersome and, as a result, ineffective; it was lacking a single and unified instrument at the EU level that could have been initiated on very short notice and implemented rapidly.
ABSTRACT With the creation of the African Peace and Security Architecture in 2004, African states... more ABSTRACT With the creation of the African Peace and Security Architecture in 2004, African states were aiming to assume the primary responsibility for peace and security on the continent and establish a structure to assemble the necessary financial and military means. However, despite the constant evocation of “African ownership,” it is non-African actors that call the tune and can define and drive African security. Based on a detailed juxtaposition of rhetoric and empirical evidence, this paper argues that significant conceptual and practical problems constrain the “Africanization” of African security and that it appears increasingly unlikely that the continent's states will be able to achieve the desired primacy in security affairs in the foreseeable future.
What will be the future of security cooperation in Europe after the Bush Administration? The Chan... more What will be the future of security cooperation in Europe after the Bush Administration? The Changing Politics of European Security explores the key security challenges confronting Europe, from relations with the United States and Russia to the use of military force and the struggle against ...
With the adoption of its first ‘macro-regional’ strategy in 2009 — the EU Strategy for the Baltic... more With the adoption of its first ‘macro-regional’ strategy in 2009 — the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) — the European Union has started to charter new territory in transnational cooperation and cohesion policy. Subsequently, other ‘macro-regions’ have begun to self-identify — such as the Danube (2011), the Adriatic-Ionian basin (2014), the Alpine (2015) and the North Sea regions1 (see European Parliament, 2015) — and are in the process of developing similar strategies of their own, often drawing on ‘the inspiration from the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region and the Danube Region’ (North Sea Commission, 2011, p. 2). These developments suggest that some parts of Europe, if not the entire EU, could come to be covered by some kind of macro-regional strategy. Indeed, in 2013, the Lithuanian Presidency of the EU Council proposed a ‘Europe of macro-regions’ (Lithuanian Presidency of the EU Council, 2013, p. 9) and an ever-increasing area has been described as having succumbed to a kind of ‘macro-regional fever’ (Duhr, 2011, p. 3). Such observations and the concrete developments that underpin them warrant a critical assessment of this ‘“nouvelle vogue” of transnational cooperation’ (Cugusi and Stocchiero, 2012), which has also been depicted as a new ‘tool of European integration’ (Dubois et al., 2009, p. 9; see also Bellini and Hilpert, 2013).2
Uploads
Papers