Chapter 16 Wargames at the Hydaspes (Gold-leaf on bronze head of Alexander the Great looking a little the worse for wear. 2 nd Century AD. Photo taken at the Palazzo Massimo Gallery, National Museum of Rome, Athens, 12 May 2018.) 310 Copyright © Kathleen Toohey 2/4/2022 Chapter 16 Wargames at the Hydaspes Unlike Alexander’s earlier major battles, the Battle of the Hydaspes did not just happen when the opposing armies came together in battle order. At the Hydaspes a major obstacle stood between Alexander and Porus, the Hydaspes River. The river was in flood; a real, well defended barrier that Alexander could not just charge his army across as he had at the Granicus and the Pinarus. At a tactical level, Devine compares the Hydaspes to the obstacle Napoleon faced in the river Danube at the battle of Wagram.1 To engage with his opponent, Alexander needed to find a way to safely cross the river. As noted above, Alexander had organised for the boats and floats previously used to bridge the Indus, to be brought across to the Hydaspes. But he could not just bring them out and use them to bridge the river in the face of a determined force of massed archers and javelin men who could easily cut down his engineers even as they struggled against the current to build their floating bridges. So, instead, Alexander began to play games with his enemy, moving his men around while looking for the optimal place to attempt a crossing. Arrian describes these manoeuvres in two parts that suggest he may be conflating two or more different sources. EARLY MANOEUVRES DIVERSIONS The first account is distinctly vague. We are told that Porus had set guards not just at the crossing opposite Alexander’s camp, but also “at the other parts of the river where a crossing was easier”.2 In response, Alexander decided to keep moving his own “army about in different directions, so as to keep Porus” uncertain of his plans. Arrian then elaborates on this. “He (Alexander) therefore broke up his army into several detachments”. Some he “led hither and thither over the country, ravaging enemy territory or reconnoitring for places to cross”. At the same time “he attached other troops to different commanders and kept sending them too in different directions”.3 As I have said, this is all very vague, while at the same time imposing a heavy and apparently extended demand on his own forces in the days leading up to the battle. Bosworth describes it as an “elaborate game of bluff”. But Bosworth takes the passing reference to “ravaging enemy territory” quite literally, albeit admitting he is surprised at the possibility that “there was still hostile territory west of the Hydaspes” that Alexander had to deal with.4 Such elaborate manoeuvres could easily have gone on for weeks. And Arrian reinforces this idea by adding that, apparently at the same time, “Grain was being transported into his camp from all parts of the country this side of the Hydaspes” in an effort to convince Porus that Alexander was planning to stay where he was until “the river fell during the winter”. At this point, Arrian then reports that Alexander had boats “sailing along” in different directions, while rafts of skin were being filled “with chaff”. And, while all this was going on, Alexander had “the whole bank filled with troops, cavalry here and infantry there”,5 a picture Devine, “Hydaspes”, pp. 96 – 97. Arrian V. 9. 1. 3 Arrian V. 9. 2. 4 Bosworth, Commentary 2, p. 269. 5 Arrian V. 9. 3. 1 2 311 Copyright © Kathleen Toohey 2/4/2022 at odds with the earlier description of Alexander and others leading troops of men all over the countryside. A brief description of the state of the river follows, where Arrian wrongly, presumably following the source he was using at this point, puts these events at the time of the Summer solstice.6 After this, he provides a further account of much the same story, in different order. Alexander is again presented as realising that a crossing at the place where he has made camp is impossible while Porus holds the opposite bank with his elephants. He publicly declares he will wait out the summer, while at the same time keeping an eye out for any chance that might let him sneak across.7 Arrian then elaborates on how this might be achieved through a different, more detailed account of the diversionary tactics previously described. In this version, Alexander acts at night, taking “the greater part of his cavalry in this and that direction along the bank”,8 shouting war-cries and making all the other sorts of noises that could lead someone to expect that “an army was preparing to cross”. In response, Porus kept moving his own troops about, particularly his elephants, to where the shouts were coming from. This went on for “some time”, until Porus finally realised that Alexander was just bluffing him with false alarms. After that, he stayed in camp, but kept scouts positioned along the river to warn him of any real threat.9 These noisy sorties are almost certainly a closer version of the kinds of diversions Alexander used to mislead Porus prior to the battle than found in Arrian earlier account. There are rough parallels to be found in Plutarch’s account. There Alexander, prior to attempting his crossing, is said to have “day by day caused a great din to be made in his camp”. Through this the Indians became so accustomed to the noise that they ceased to be alarmed by it.10 Plutarch here claims to be following an account from Alexander’s very own letters. While this is highly unlikely, as Bosworth notes the ‘letter’ may well “have been concocted from early sources … including Ptolemy … with some agreement with Arrian on facts, figures, and even wording”.11 The main problem with this account is that Plutarch has the uproar confined to Alexander’s camp. But, as Bosworth notes, this was “possibly an error of contraction on (Plutarch’s) part”.12 Curtius has an interesting variant on the above. In his narrative Ptolemy is ordered to lead his cavalry along the river far away from where Alexander intends to cross. In the course of this action Ptolemy’s men are also ordered “from time to time to alarm the Indi by shouts” while also taking other actions to suggest that they were intending “to swim across the river”. In Curtius, Ptolemy is said to have been required to do “for many days”, until Porus turned his attention away from Alexander’s real goal.13 It is clear from these three accounts that, whatever the details, Alexander’s first gambit in the ‘battle’ of the Hydaspes was to spend several days making raucous feinting attacks at different points along the river course. Their purpose was twofold: first to alarm and disorder his enemy’s forces by forcing them to shift and realign to counter any potential new threat; 6 Arrian V. 9. 4. Arrian V. 10. 1 – 2. 8 My italics. 9 Arrian V. 10. 3 – 4. 10 Plutarch Alexander 60. 1 – 2. 11 Bosworth, Commentary 2, p. 262. 12 Bosworth, Commentary 2, p. 273. 13 Curtius XVIII 13. 18 – 19. 7 312 Copyright © Kathleen Toohey 2/4/2022 and second to gradually lull Porus into complacently believing that Alexander was just bluffing him, but posed no real threat at this time. There is also an important time factor that needs to be borne in mind as we contemplate these manoeuvers. As I have argued above, Alexander was still in Taxila in early June when the rains began, and the battle was fought before the Summer solstice (June 20). Consequently, there was only a couple of weeks at most for Alexander to march his army down to the Hydaspes, make camp, and deploy his opening diversions, before launching his real attack. And all of this will have to have been done while he was also hunting for the best place to cross, bringing boats down unseen for the crossing, and also reorganising and redeploying his forces as described below. SUBTERFUGE With Porus lulled into apparent complacency, Alexander began to prepare his forces for the real attack. And it is only at this point in Arrian’s account that we begin to get some real details of the structure of Alexander’s army at this time. Now, as noted above,14 about a hundred and fifty stades north of Alexander’s camp the Hydaspes made a considerable bend around a wooded headland opposite a sizeable island. This was where Alexander had decided to cross the river. But before attempting to cross, he once again divided his forces. This is where things become complicated, because of the clear gaps in, and conflicting evidence of, our sources. CRATERUS At the main camp, Craterus was “left in charge... with his own hipparchy,15 the cavalry of the Arachotians and Parapamisadae”, and the Macedonian phalanx “battalions of Alcetas and Polyperchon”. The 5,000 troops of the Indian nomachs were also left with him.16 Craterus was under orders “not to attempt a crossing till Porus and his army had left camp to Attack Alexander’s forces, or till he had learnt that Porus was in flight”. And Alexander had clarified that if Porus left part of his army behind with elephants, Craterus should stay where he was. But if Porus took all his elephants with him, Craterus should “cross with all dispatch” because only the elephants serve as a bar to any crossing attempt. Arr V. 11. 4. Fuller estimated Craterus’ forces at 3,000 cavalry and 8,000 infantry. He does not offer any explanation for how these figures were calculated, but it is not hard to work out his justification. At full strength there would be 3,000 men in two taxeis of the pezhetairoi. Add these to the 5,000 Indians,17 and you can claim a total figure of 8,000 infantry. But only if the Indian troops consisted of infantry only, which I consider highly unlikely. The cavalry figure would then be made up of 1,000 Arachotians, 1,000 Parapamisadae, and 1,000 Companions in Craterus’ hipparchy. But, as I have argued, a single hipparchy of Companions was probably at most only 500 strong. And while we have established that the standard size Persian cavalry contingents was 1,000 men, it is possible that companies from neighbouring satrapies could be combined into a single hipparchy of 1,000 men. So, without specific details Craterus’ combined Macedonian and Persian cavalry could have numbered either 1,500 or 2,500 men. 14 See Location and Battlefield above. English, The Army of Alexander, (epub edition), Chapter 3, Macedonian Cavalry - Hipparchies. Brunt 2, pp. 39 - 41 16 Arrian V. 11. 3. 17 πεντακισχιλίους – literally 5,000. 15 313 Copyright © Kathleen Toohey 2/4/2022 The issue is further complicated when we consider the troops supplied by the Indian nomachs. Fuller refers to them as Taxiles men, but Arrian says they were the men of the Indian nomachs. This implies they were the same troops who had travelled with their leaders to offer their submission to Alexander at the Cophen River, and who then accompanied Hephaestion and Perdiccas on their march to the Indus. Certainly, the numbers match. If that's correct, then the men will have formed the honour guard of their respective lords. If so, then it is more likely the Indian contingent consisted of both cavalry and infantry, with the weight balanced towards cavalry. Another factor to bear in mind is that Craterus would need to maintain a large enough visible presence to make it seem that Alexander’s main force was still in camp. Indeed, it is possible there were more units left behind in the main camp then Arrian bothers to mention. In which case the units Arrian mentioned were only those Craterus was authorised to take with him across the river should the chance arise. But just which other troops were left at camp is impossible to say. Although Arrian gives us the most complete account of the battle, there are significant gaps in the details he offers on the composition of Alexander’s divided command. As Bosworth notes, “The enumeration of forces (in Arrian) is not complete...only four of Companion hipparchies out of a minimum of eight...are mentioned and only four out of seven phalanx battalions”.18 Brunt expresses similar concerns.19 These issues raise particular problems when considering the composition of Alexander’s own contingent, as examined in detail below. THE MERCENARIES Halfway between Craterus’ camp and the point where Alexander had decided to cross the river, Alexander stationed his mercenary cavalry and infantry under the command of Meleager, Attalus and Gorgias.20 These mercenaries will have included the remaining Greek mercenaries, less those previously left behind on garrison duties, together with the remaining allied troops and Thessalian cavalry who had elected to remain with Alexander following the restructure of the army at Ecbatana.21 Arrian tells us nothing about the size of these forces. Fuller offers an estimate of a total force of 5,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, but this includes 4,500 pezhetairoi; the taxeis of Meleager, Attalus and Gorgias.22 Bosworth is reluctant to accept that the pezhetairoi of those three commanders, though present, were simply overlooked by Arrian in his account, instead choosing to take Arrian’s words at “face value”.23 In this, I think, he is being over cautious. While we do not know how many mercenaries remained with Alexander by this stage, it is hard to see how you can justify the use of the three taxiarchs to command such a limited force. And remember, the placement of these men is also part of Alexander’s overall game of subterfuge. To serve as an effective diversion, the size of this force would need to be at least comparable to those left with Craterus. In that case the massing of the taxeis of Meleager, Attalus and Gorgias with their commanders, and the mercenaries makes much more sense. ALEXANDER’S ASSAULT FORCE Bosworth, Commentary 2, pp. 278 – 279. Brunt 3, Appendix XIX, pp. 485 – 487. 20 Arrian V. 12. 1. 21 See Chapter 11, The Persian Capitals; Ecbatana, above. There, Alexander had dismissed his allied troops and sent them home, save for those who elected to stay with him as mercenaries. 22 Fuller, Generalship of Alexander, p. 187 and n. 5. 23 Bosworth, Commentary 2, pp. 277 – 278. 18 19 314 Copyright © Kathleen Toohey 2/4/2022 As discussed below, Arrian begins with what appears to be a clear and simple statement of the units Alexander took with him. But as we look into what happened later, other units and names start to appear. To obtain a clearer picture, I consider it best to start with what we know about the forces Alexander took with him, both in the way of units and officers. ARMY UNITS In his account of the division of forces before the battle, Arrian states that Alexander took with him “the agema of the Companions, the hipparchies of Hephaestion, Perdiccas and Demetrius, the cavalry from Bactria and Sogdiana and the Scythian horsemen, with the Dahae mounted archers”. The infantry accompanying him included the hypaspists, the taxeis of Clitus and Coenus, and the archers and Agrianians.24 While this passage lists the units Alexander took with him to the river crossing, this does not mean that all those troops crossed the river with him. In Arrian’s account of Alexander’s first deployment of his forces after the crossing,25 not all these units are mentioned. There the units named include the cavalry agema, “the best men of the other hipparchies”, the mounted archers, “the royal hypaspists under Seleucus”, the agema, the rest of the hypaspists, the archers, Agrianians, and a company of previously unmentioned javelin-men.26 The mounted archers must include both the Dahae and the Scythians,27 but there is no reference to the phalanx battalions, or the Bactrians and Sogdiani. Bosworth suggests there may be a lacuna in the text, here.28 But whatever the cause, there are clear omissions in Arrian’s list of units at this time. The confusion about the strength of the forces Alexander had with him for the coming battle is further compounded by the next part of Arrian’s account, where he reports that Alexander’s army at this point included some 6,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry.29 The cavalry numbers are roughly consistent with my own estimate of the size of Alexander’s forces in Table 1, below. But if we accept that the heavy infantry units are at full strength,30 then the infantry numbers here make no allowance for the light infantry units; archers, Agrianians and javelin-men. Either that or all the units were distinctly under strength. Table 1 Companions Persian Cavalry Macedonian Infantry Unit Size Unit Size Unit Size Agema 300 Bactrians 1,000 Hypaspists 3,000 Light infantry31 Unit Size Archers 1,000 24 Arrian V. 12. 2. Arrian V. 13. 4. 26 The javelin-men were most likely those previously led by Balacrus, though whether he had been replaced or simply left unnamed by Arrian is impossible to say. He had certainly been active in the earlier part of the Indian campaign, up to the capture of the Rock of Aornos. Heckel, Prosopography, p. 69, Balacrus [3]. 27 Arrian later describes how Alexander sent about 1,000 mounted archers against the Indian’s left wing; Arrian V. 16. 4. This strongly correlates with the described attack of the Dahae and Scythians together in Curtius VIII. 14. 5. Consequently, the Dahae and Scythians must have been each about 500 strong. This means that the Bactrian and Sogdian cavalry units must have been each 1,000 men strong on the basis of Arrian’s later total cavalry numbers. 28 Bosworth, Commentary 2, p. 283, an re royal hypaspists pp. 283 – 285. 29 Arrian V. 14. 1. 30 3,000 hypaspists and 1,500 men each in the two taxeis of pezhetairoi. 31 The figures below are a tempered variant of the estimates of Fuller and Devine. Fuller, Generalship of Alexander, p. 187, Devine, “Hydaspes”, p. 98. Both use 2,000 men for the archers and 500 for the javelin men. I suspect that here the archers were probably of a comparable size to the Agrianians. 25 315 Copyright © Kathleen Toohey 2/4/2022 Hephaestion 500 Sogdiani 1,000 Clitus 1,500 Agrianians 1,00032 Perdiccas 500 Scythians 500 Coenus 1,500 Javelin men Demetrius 500 Dahae 500 Totals 1800 3,000 6,000 500 2,500 However, it is also possible that not all the pezhetairoi were involved in the battle. Alexander was facing an army of light infantry, light cavalry, chariots and elephants. He may have decided that he did not need a large, formed phalanx of heavy infantry for the battle to come. There is certainly little evidence of their playing any significant role in the fighting. So it is possible the pezhetairoi were left behind either before the army crossed the river or afterwards. To resolve this issue, we need to look at what we know of the unit commanders engaged in the battle.33 THE COMMANDERS DESIGNATED COMMANDERS Companion Cavalry Hipparchs As noted above, when Alexander marched to cross the Hydaspes he had four hipparchies of Companions with him. The commander of the agema is left unnamed. The other hipparchies were led by Hephaestion, Perdiccas and Demetrius. Perdiccas is discussed below under The Successors. Hephaestion is mentioned only once by Arrian and once by Curtius. In both instances, he is clearly, if not so named by Curtius, the commander of a hipparchy of Companion cavalry.34 The absence of any other reference to him over the course of the battle is not surprising, given that the sources generally refer to the actions of the Companions as a whole, rather than to individual hipparchies. Demetrius was one of the Companion cavalry ilarchs at Gaugamela. As Heckel notes, he was also the only one of those officers to feature in a prominent position after that battle. He was already a hipparch by the time of the Swat Valley campaign, and he is last mentioned in the Mallian campaign, after the battle of the Hydaspes.35 The Taxiarchs Clitus commanded one of the three taxeis of pezhetairoi that were included in the of Alexander’s army that Hephaestion and Perdiccas on the march into India.36 For reasons which will be discussed later, the pezhetairoi appear to have been left behind after the river crossing, and appear to have played little role in the battle. Consequently, the one reference by Arrian is the only reference to Clitus in any of the ancient accounts of the battle. 32 Roughly, see Chapter 14, p. 294. The archers were probably of a comparable size. Arrian and Curtius give the most details regarding unit commanders, though there is some conflict in their evidence. Diodorus names no commanders. Plutarch mentions only Coenus, and the Metz Epitome, Craterus. 34 Arrian, before the battle as noted above; Curtius during the battle, Curtius 8. 14. 15. 35 Heckel, Prosopography, p. 108. 36 See Chapter 13, above, The Road to India. 33 316 Copyright © Kathleen Toohey 2/4/2022 Coenus, by contrast, did play a significant part in the battle, but as a cavalry, not infantry commander.37 On the face of it this appears to be a quite remarkable turn of events. But before reviewing the debate over what this change of command meant, we need to put the appointment into the broader context of Coenus’ career up to this point. Heckel’s summary serves as a convenient starting point. Coenus had served as a taxeis commander from at least the time of the Illyrian revolt, early in Alexander’s reign, if not earlier under Philip. He had fought at the Granicus, Issus and Gaugamela, and played an important role in the siege of Tyre. After the Granicus, Coenus was entrusted with the task of going back to Macedonia to raise more troops, returning with 3,000 infantry and 650 cavalry.38 In Bactria, when Amyntas son of Nicolaus was appointed satrap, Alexander left Coenus with him in overall command of a sizeable command. There he had two taxeis; his own and Meleager; 400 Companion cavalry, the mounted javelin men and the Bactrians and Sogdianians (my italics). In other words, like Ptolemy, here Coenus was beginning to be entrusted with higher levels of command responsibility. As well, in the preceding chapters on Alexander’s advance to the Indus we have seen Coenus repeatedly playing a prominent role, including holding an independent command at Bazira.39 In modern parlance, Coenus had moved from a unit to section commander well before the Hydaspes battle. Here we find him taking a similar part when it comes to the main battle. As Alexander draws his army up to fight the army of Porus, he put Coenus in charge of the cavalry on his left flank, specifically “the hipparchy of Demetrius and his own”.40 But what does Arrian mean in this reference to Coenus’ own hipparchy. The question has been much debated. The issues, together with counter arguments, are neatly summarised by Bosworth in his Commentary.41 On the right, Alexander had most of the Companions, including the agema and the hipparchies of Hephaestion, Perdiccas,42 along with the mounted archers.43 Taking account of the units Alexander took with him to the crossing, the unit described as Coenus’ hipparchy can only be the otherwise unaccounted for Bactrians and Sogdianians. So Bosworth concluded, and I agree, given Coenus had previously commanded the same units of cavalry in Bactria/Sogdiana. This raises the question of who then commanded Coenus taxeis during the battle. The most likely answer is Coenus’ immediate unnamed subordinate. Others This brings us to another curious point in the battle narrative. In the same passage where Coenus is sent off to command Alexander’s left, Arrian tells us his ‘infantry phalanx’ was put in charge of three men, Seleucus, Antigenes and Tauron.44 Now it is clear when we look at these men that here Arrian was using ‘phalanx’ in its broadest sense to refer to a range of infantry commands.45 At the officers, at least up to this time, appear surprisingly obscure given the responsibilities placed upon them. 37 Arrian V. 16. 3. Heckel, Prosopography, p. 92. 39 Chapters 13 and 14. 40 Arrian V. 16. 3. See also Curtius, VIII. 14. 15. 41 Bosworth, Commentary 2, pp. 294 – 295. 42 The presence of Hephaestion, Perdiccas is affirmed by Curtius, VIII. 14. 15. 43 Arrian V. 16. 4. Arrian says the mounted archers were “about a thousand strong”, so must include both the Dahae and the Scythian horsemen since there is no suggestion any mounted archers were attached to Coenus command. 44 Arrian V. 16. 3. 45 See Heckel, Prosopography, pp. 30, and 290 n. 30. Also, Bosworth, Commentary 2, pp. 294 – 298. 38 317 Copyright © Kathleen Toohey 2/4/2022 Seleucus is linked with the hypaspists, as discussed below under the heading The Successors. Tauron had previously commanded a force of mercenaries and Agrianians against the Uxians.46 After recounting the crossing of the Hydaspes Arrian tells us Tauron commanded the archers.47 From this it is reasonable to conclude that for the main battle Tauron was given overall command of all the light infantry; the archers, Agrianians and javelin men. Antigenes is more of a mystery. Like Seleucus, he only really becomes prominent after this battle, and in particular after Alexander’s death. As Alexander was preparing to set off on his expedition to the mouth of the Indus, he decided it was time to send home to Macedonia those troops who he considered were no longer fit for service.48 Was put in charge of the expedition, and sent off with the taxeis of Attalus, Meleager and Antigenes.49 We know Attalus and Meleager led divisions of the pezhetairoi, which implies that Antigenes then held a similar command. But Alexander had taken only two taxeis of pezhetairoi across the Hydaspes, those of Clitus and Coenus. The simplest explanation is that Antigenes took Coenus’ place in command of his taxeis;50 he may have been Coenus’ deputy; and was then chosen by Alexander to have overall command of the pezhetairoi with Alexander.51 The issue of just how big a role the pezhetairoi played in the subsequent fighting, will be addressed in the discussion of the actual battle. Leonnatus appears only in Curtius’ account in place of Seleucus in a list of infantry commanders otherwise parallel to that in Arrian.52 Heckel, following Berve, dismisses this as a mistake on the part of Curtius, who has for some reason substituted Leonnatus for Seleucus.53 But Leonnatus, one of the somatophylakes, had played a significant role in Alexander’s campaign against the Aspasians where he led a combined force of a taxeis of 46 Curtius V. 3. 6. For more details, see Heckel, Prosopography, p. 260. Arrian V. 14. 1. 48 Presumably due to age or injury. 49 Arrian VI. 17. 3. 50 Bosworth disputes this possibility on the grounds that Coenus’ taxeis “belonged to the asthetairoi ... who were retained en bloc ... after Craterus’ departure”. Bosworth Commentary 2 pp. 297 – 8. However, by this time I believe Alexander was disinclined to limit his command appointments according to regional affiliations. 51 In so saying I acknowledge that I am aware of the differing views on this matter between Bosworth and Heckel. In brief, Heckel considers Antigenes to have already held a command position with the hypaspists well before the Hydaspes. Consequently, he could not have led the pezhetairoi at this battle. His case appears to be largely based on the identification of this Antigenes with the Antigenes mentioned by Curtius who won second place for bravery in some sort of competition held by Alexander in Sittacene in 331 BC. The prize being command of a 1,000 strong troop of men. (Curtius V. 2. 1 – 5.) On Heckel’s position, see Heckel, Prosopography, p. 30, Heckel, Marshals, pp. 281 – 2. Personally, I am unconvinced by this argument. The competition is unique to Curtius account, and Curtius does not name the unit as belonging to the hypaspists, or silver shields as he anachronistically labels them at Gaugamela. Curtius IV. 13. 27. Bosworth, however, puts more weight on the point that this is the first appearance of Antigenes, at least in Arrian, and that the next time he is mentioned he is, as noted above, commanding one of the phalanx taxeis under Craterus. Such a placement is incompatible with an already appointed hypaspist commander. (Bosworth does acknowledge that this Antigenes could also be the Antigenes mentioned by Curtius as being promoted in Sittacene. But he stresses that “there is no indication that he held a hypaspist command at the Hydaspes”. Bosworth Commentary 2 pp. 297 – 8. As regards the present discussion I am more inclined to agree with Bosworth. Either way, Antigenes placement is in any case immaterial, since he played no significant role in the course of the battle. 52 Curtius VIII. 14. 15. 53 Heckel, Marshals, p. 87. 47 318 Copyright © Kathleen Toohey 2/4/2022 pezhetairoi and Balacrus’ javelin-men,54 In brief, he was better qualified to share joint command of the infantry than Seleucus, as discussed below. THE SUCCESSORS According to Arrian, Alexander crossed the river to the island by boat with “Ptolemy, Perdiccas, Lysimachus, bodyguards (somatophylakes), Seleucus...who afterwards became king, and half the hypaspists.”55 This account is doubly problematic. Firstly, as Bosworth bluntly puts it, the idea that half the hypaspists could have been fitted into this single boat “is an absurdity”.56 Secondly, the men named consist of a remarkable “list of future dynasts”, as Bosworth pointedly observes.57 Some previously unknown. Something else lies behind this passage than a simple account of the men travelling in a boat together. After Alexander’s death, and following many wars, Alexander’s empire would eventually be subdivided between the Successors; the strongest and cleverest of his generals. The process took more than twenty years to resolve into relative stability, and by that time many of the early contenders were dead.58 There are two striking features about ‘the crossing passage’. The first is that the four men named as travelling on the boat with Alexander would all feature prominently in the wars of succession. And the second is that not all the men named had played a prominent role in the narrative of Alexander’s conquests prior to this point. Perdiccas That Perdiccas was included should come as no surprise. As we have seen, together with Hephaestion he had led half Alexander’s army down the Cophen/Kabul River to establish a bridge across the Indus River. He had served as a military commander in various positions from virtually the start of Alexander’s reign, and was raised to the somatophylakes (i.e. the Seven) in late 331 BC.59 Perdiccas was initially in overall charge of how the administration of the empire was divided between commanders after Alexander’s death. But he was killed in Egypt just a couple of years later, in 321.60 Arrian mentions Perdiccas only twice, once as one of the hipparchs in Alexander’s attack force, and in the crossing passage. He is not referred to in any part of Arrian’s account of the subsequent fighting. Perdiccas does feature twice in Curtius’ account of the battle; first in the opening clash with Porus’ kinsman,61 and then in Alexander’s cavalry charge in the main battle.62 Ptolemy Like Perdiccas, the inclusion of Ptolemy here comes as no surprise, given the prominent command roles he has undertaken in Alexander’s later campaigns in Bactria, Sogdiana and the Swat Valley. What is remarkable is that following the crossing Ptolemy seems to have had no part to play in the subsequent fighting, at least in Arrian’s account. Instead, when after the crossing Arrian mentions him it is only to name him as one of the sources for See Chapter 13 above – The Aspasians. Arrian V. 13. 1. Hereafter referred to as ‘the crossing passage’. 56 Bosworth, Commentary 2, p. 281. See also Brunt 3, p. 39, n. 2. 57 Bosworth, Commentary 2, p. 280. 58 Shipley G The Greek World After Alexander 323 – 30BC, Oxon, Routledge, 2005, pp. 40 – 41. Afterwards cited as Shipley, After Alexander. 59 Heckel, Prosopography, pp. 164 (for Menes, who Perdiccas replaced), 197 – 202. 60 Shipley, After Alexander, p. 41. 61 Curtius 8.14.5. 62 Curtius 8.14.15. 54 55 319 Copyright © Kathleen Toohey 2/4/2022 Arrian’s own account.63 There is also no mention of Ptolemy in the list of commanders and units that Alexander took with him up to the crossing point.64 Ptolemy is named by Curtius as leading a diversionary force down river that held Porus’ attention while Alexander led his contingent across the river.65 If Curtius is right, Ptolemy could only have joined Alexander for the river crossing if he had handed over his command to a subordinate. That seems unlikely. There is also the fact that, as Heckel and Bosworth both note, Ptolemy liked to focus on his own achievements in his own History.66 Since Arrian was using Ptolemy as one of his sources, if Ptolemy had played any significant role in the battle one would expect to find some mention of that in Arrian’s tale of events.67 Ptolemy is named once by Curtius in his account of the actual battle.68 But on this occasion he is in a list of cavalry commanders, along with Perdiccas and Hephaestion, named when Alexander is giving Coenus his orders. The reference is unreliable. Ptolemy’s placement here is inconsistent with Curtius’ earlier reports on his role in the battle. And at this point Curtius appears to be simply substituting his more familiar name among the Companion hipparch commanders for that Demetrius, who is never mentioned in Curtius’ account.69 Lysimachus The crossing passage is the first time Arrian mentions Lysimachus. He is included among the wounded after the battle.70 He is also counted among the somatophylakes, but appears to have held no military commands up to this time. Consequently, he must have been wounded at the Hydaspes while riding with the Companions close to Alexander as a personal bodyguard. Heckel has suggested Lysimachus was a few years older than Alexander and had been appointed to the somatophylakes under Philip II.71 If that is correct, then Lysimachus had a remarkably undistinguished career under Alexander, compared to other somatophylakes like Hephaestion, Ptolemy and Perdiccas. Heckel has further argued that somatophylakes like Lysimachus, Aristonous and Pithon had been appointed by Philip II, and were effectively sidelined by Alexander.72 If so, that only makes his inclusion here even more curious. In 323, after Alexander’s death, Lysimachus was made satrap of Thrace, allied himself by marriage to Ptolemy’s daughter, and eventually took the title of king from 306/5 until his death.73 Arrian V. 14. 6, 15.1. See also Heckel, Prosopography, p. 237, where no mention is made of Ptolemy’s role, or lack thereof, in the battle of the Hydaspes. Instead, Heckel skips straight from Aornos to later in the Indian campaign. 64 Arrian V. 12. 2. 65 Curtius 8.13.19, 23, 27. 66 Heckel, Prosopography, p. 237. See also, though in a different context, Bosworth, Commentary 2, p. 187. “Ptolemy annexed the credit for himself … the only acts of heroism … recorded … were his own”. 67 Bosworth, it should be noted, assumes Ptolemy was there, leading his own unspecified column of troops. Commentary 2, p. 283 On Ptolemy’s role in the diversionary tactics see also pp. 273, 275 – 276. 68 Curtius 8. 14. 15. 69 In this case I am referring to Heckel’s Demetrius [1], as opposed to Demetrius [2], who fell from grace following the alleged Philotas conspiracy. Heckel, Prosopography, p. 108. 70 Arrian V. 24. 5. 71 Heckel, Prosopography, pp. 153 – 155. Bosworth dates the appointment back to at least the murder of Cleitus, while acknowledging Heckel’s different position. Bosworth, Commentary 2, p. 280. 72 Heckel, Marshals, p. 252. 73 For more details see Shipley, After Alexander, pp. 47 – 51. 63 320 Copyright © Kathleen Toohey 2/4/2022 Seleucus The inclusion of Seleucus in the list of those named crossing the river with Alexander is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, unlike Ptolemy, Perdiccas and Lysimachus, he was not one of Alexander’s seven personal bodyguards.74 He could be counted as a somatophylake, or bodyguard, only in the broader sense of those charged with defending the personal safety of the king, including the Royal Pages and the agema of the hypaspists.75 Seleucus, at this time, held only a very minor, but important, position compared to his travelling companions. Shortly after this, in Arrian’s description of Alexander’s initial deployment following the crossing, Seleucus is described as commanding “the royal hypaspists”, which is presented as a separate unit to both “the royal agema” and “the rest of the hypaspists”.76 This distinction between “the royal hypaspists” and “the royal agema” is problematic. Heckel argues that Arrian has failed to understand that the royal hypaspists and the royal agema “are one and the same” unit.77 Bosworth, by contrast, leans to the view that the royal hypaspists referred to a very small elite division of the agema “charged with … protection of the king”.78 Either way, Seleucus clearly held a distinctly subordinate position to the likes of Ptolemy, Perdiccas and even Lysimachus. Yet, in the crossing passage it is Seleucus who is listed to later become king, even though Ptolemy and Lysimachus would also become kings of their own realms. So why was Seleucus singled out here. The simplest solution is that Arrian, as Bosworth has noted, “had a high opinion of Seleucus”79 and would later describe Seleucus “as the greatest king of those who succeeded Alexander” and comparable to Alexander himself.80 Indeed, Seleucus would go on to found the Seleucid Empire, which would become “the largest of the Successor Kingdoms”.81 This leaves us with two possibilities as far as this crossing passage is concerned. Either Arrian’s source, or more likely Arrian himself, felt he needed to place all these men, especially Seleucus, in what would come to be regarded as Alexander’s last major battle. Possibly, at this point, Arrian was already looking ahead to his now largely lost History of Affairs after Alexander.82 This fabrication could also account for how Seleucus – sub-commander of the hypaspists – later came to be substituted for Leonnatus as one of the three infantry commanders at the Hydaspes. If that is so, and Curtius was correct, then Tauron commanded the light infantry, with Leonnatus the pezhetairoi and Antigenes the hypaspists or vice versa. The former seems more likely, given that appears to have no other known association with the hypaspists, unlike Antigenes who would go on to command the Silver Shields.83 Arrian may also have chosen to substitute Seleucus for Leonnatus because Leonnatus played a much more prominent role in events following Alexander’s death than Antigenes. By swapping Seleucus for Leonnatus, Arrian effectively removed Leonnatus from any role in Alexander’s last battle. 74 Arrian VI. 28. 4. Heckel, Marshals, p. 217. 76 Arrian V. 13. 4. 77 Heckel, Marshals, pp. 226 – 227 and n. 31. 78 Bosworth, Commentary 2, pp. 283 – 285. 79 Bosworth, Commentary 2, p. 281. 80 Arrian VII. 22. 5. 81 Shipley G The Greek World After Alexander 323 – 30BC, Oxon, Routledge, 2005, p. 271. See also pp. 40 – 43. 82 Brunt 1, p. xii. 83 Heckel, Prosopography, pp. 30 – 31 (Antigenes), 147 – 151 (Leonnatus). 75 321 Copyright © Kathleen Toohey 2/4/2022 SOME CONCLUSIONS In brief, then, Arrian’s account of the Battle of the Hydaspes must be treated with caution, since the author has coloured his narrative to bring to prominence men who would feature strongly in the wars of the successors to come. From this analysis we can conclude that Alexander took with him the agema and three other hipparchies of the Companions under Hephaestion, Perdiccas and Demetrius. There was also additional cavalry from Bactria and Sogdiana, the Scythian horsemen, and the Dahae mounted archers. The infantry component included the hypaspists, the taxeis of Clitus and Coenus, the archers, Agrianians and javelin-men. There are no grounds to add any other units to this list. But the command structure as originally listed is misleading. Clitus had probably already been raised to hipparch to lead the Bactrians and Sogdianians before they crossed the river. Leonnidas took his place as taxiarch, while Antigenes for the first time commanded the hypaspists as a whole. 322 Copyright © Kathleen Toohey 2/4/2022