The Battle Tactics of Alexander the Great Part II: The Main Battles Chapter 3: The Road to Issus When I was reviewing my chapter on the Battle of Issus, I realised that I needed to address the circumstances that saw Alexander’s army having to rush back from the Syrian Gates of Cilicia to confront late in the day an enemy that had somehow managed to get behind him. As I looked into the matter, I realised that the issues could not be addressed in a few paragraphs. Hence, this completely new chapter in which I shift my focus from tactical to strategic issues, and the lingering questions over Alexander’s illness in Tarsus. By Kathleen Toohey (Bronze head of Alexander – Roman, 3rd Cent. AD. Santa Barbara Museum of Art on loan to the Getty Museum, Los Angeles, 2016.) 51 3: The Road to Issus OUTMANOEUVRED – THE BATTLE IN CONTEXT Unlike the Granicus and Gaugamela, the battle of Issus can only be understood in the context of the events that preceded it. The battle at the Granicus had taken place in late May 334 BC. After that, apart from some time lost besieging key cities like Miletus and Halicarnassus, Alexander had been largely unopposed as he marched across Anatolia claiming one territory after another for more than a year.1 During this time, three pivotal events happened. First, in response to Alexander’s invasion, the Persian emperor, Darius III, decided to deal with the problem himself, rather than leaving the matter to some underling. His army was significantly larger than Alexander’s,2 and confident of success he determined to face Alexander at a place of his choosing. To that end he assembled his army “at a place called Sochoi on the N. Syrian plain”.3 Then after marching his army down onto the Cilician plain, Alexander became seriously ill soon after arriving at the city of Tarsus.4 While the cause of the illness remains unclear,5 all sources agree it was both severe and potentially life-threatening.6 This illness was a cause of considerable anxiety and distress to Alexander’s troops; a point affirmed by both Plutarch and Curtius.7 Alexander recovered, but he could no longer be seen as indestructible. And his campaign in Cilicia was significantly delayed by his illness and subsequent recovery, and some minor campaigns undertaken to secure western Cilicia. 1 Precise dating can never be established clearly from our ancient sources. For convenience, I shall generally follow Peter Green’s Table of Dates for a rough chronology of events. Green, Alexander the Great, p. xxviii. Green just dates the battle at the Granicus to May. Brunt suggests it “was fought in May – June”, Arrian I. 13. 1, n. 1, while Harl also dates it to May; Harl, Kenneth, “Alexander’s Cavalry Battle at the Granicus”, Polis and Polemis, (edit. Hamilton, Charles D. And Krentz, Peter) Claremont, Regina Books, 1997, p. 303. For more details on the chronology and route of the campaign, see Engels, Logistics, pp. 30 – 43. While I cannot accept all his conclusions, Engels’ work makes a good starting point. 2 Here is not the place to address all the complexities of the Issus campaign and battle, and the size of the actual armies. From virtually all accounts and interpretations, Darius’ army will have been seen to be larger than Alexander’s. For in depth discussion of the issues, see, for example: Delbruck, H., Warfare in Antiquity: History of the Art of War: Vol. I, (tr. Walter J. Renfroe), London, Greenwood Press, 1975, pp. 191 – 192; Engels, Logistics, pp. 42 – 52, 131 – 134; English, Stephen, The Field Campaigns of Alexander the Great, Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 2011, (Kindle Edition) Chapter 5; Hammond, Nicholas G. L., “Alexander’s Charge at the Battle of Issus in 333 B.C.”, Historia Vol. 41, 1992, pp. 395 – 406. pp. 396 – 399; Murison, “Darius III and the Battle of Issus”, pp. 399 – 423. 3 For convenience, rather than providing multiple references from different sources, I will be following Murison’s account of the campaign which neatly summarises the movements of the two armies prior to the battle. Murison, “Darius III and the Battle of Issus”, pp. 399 – 423. 4 A II.4.1-11. PA XIX-XX. C III. v-vi. D XVII.31.4-6. J 11.8.3-9. 5 For a modern opinion on the illness, see Lascaratos, John and Dalla-Vorgia, P., “The Disease of Alexander the Great in Cilicia (333 B.C.)”, International Journal of Risk & Safety in Medicine,11, 1998, pp. 65 – 68. See also - Borza, Eugene N., “Malaria in Alexander’s Army”, The Ancient History Bulletin, 1.2, 1987, pp. 36 – 38; Engels, Donald W., Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978. p. 42 and n. 90; and Murison, C. L., “Darius III and the Battle of Issus, Historia, Vol. 21, 1972, pp. 402, 405. 6 With the exception of Aristobulus, who apparently attributed the illness to “fatigue”. A.II.4.1. 7 Plutarch reports that the Macedonians “refused to be comforted until they had seen Alexander”, Alexander 19. 5. While Curtius relates how there was “great anxiety, and already almost mourning in the camp”, C III.v.4. 52 Finally, whether misled by Alexander’s delay or for tactical reasons as Murison argues, 8 Darius decided to march down to Cilicia, entering the plain through a pass to the north of the Syrian Gates. (The gate of Amanus according to Polybius.9) Even as he was doing this, Alexander, acting on intelligence that Darius was in Sochoi, set off across the plain to the Syrian Gates. In this way, Darius marched his forces down behind Alexander’s line of march and outflanked Alexander,10 capturing Tarsus and cutting Alexander’s line of supply. These events determined both when and where the battle took place. So understanding what happened during this time is critical to understanding how the battle unfolded. Unfortunately, here the evidence from our sources is either inadequate or conflicted. Because of these problems, in this chapter I will attempt to establish a reasonable outline of the sequence of events leading up to the battle. GORDIUM TO CILICIA SOURCES PROBLEMS Diodorus, Plutarch and Justin Both Diodorus and Justin give grossly simplified accounts of the events leading up to the battle. Neither says anything about the opening manoeuvres that saw the two armies march past each other on opposite sides of the Taurus and Amanus Mountains. Nor is any reference made to how Darius and Alexander each had to turn their armies round when they realised what had happened. And both make no mention of the fact that the battle was fought across a river.11 Diodorus actually skips over almost all the details of the campaign, jumping from the siege of Halicarnassus to having Alexander overrun “the littoral as far as Cilicia” while his unnamed commanders “subdued the whole region as far as Greater Phrygia” – a gross truncation of events to this point.12 One factor contributing to this is that here Diodorus appears to be following a source that provided details of the Persian side of the war, with a special focus on the Greek Mercenary, Memnon.13 Tarn identified this as the ‘mercenaries’ source,14 although Hammond subsequently identified the source as the Athenian historian, Diyllus.15 Here again, Diodorus’ attempts to simplify his account and avoid any suggestion that the battle was fought across a river – just as he did in his account of the Granicus. Plutarch’s account is also brief, though his does note that Darius entered Cilicia while Alexander was marching to Syria, adding that the two effectively passed each other “in the night” without knowing, and were then forced to turn back. But Plutarch then presents Darius as 8 Murison, “Darius III and the Battle of Issus”, pp. 420 – 423. Polybius XII. 17. 2. 10 As Delbruck neatly puts it, “The battle of Issus was fought under the strategically noteworthy circumstances that the two enemy armies first marched past each other through different passes of the same mountain chain and then both faced about and fought the battle with a reversed front,” p. 191. 11 Diodorus XVII. 31. 2 – 34. 9. Justin 11. 8 – 9. Diodorus, indeed, appears to have a curious aversion to river crossing battles, as we have already seen in his account of the Granicus. There he went to great lengths to rewrite the course of events so as to place both armies on the same side of the river before the battle started. 12 Diodorus XVII. 24. 1 – 28. 7. 13 See Bradford Welles comments, Diodorus Siculus Vol. VIII, n. 2, p. 185 and n. 4, pp. 194 – 5. 14 Tarn 2, pp. 72 - 74 15 Hammond, Three Historians, pp. 37 – 41. 9 53 trying to retreat back to his camping ground (in Syria).16 This is false, as the most detailed sources clearly show Darius marching in pursuit of Alexander and deploying for battle when it becomes clear Alexander is marching back to meet him. Which leads us to Arrian and Curtius. These authors provide the most detailed accounts of the campaign, though they often disagree on a number of important points. Arrian & Curtius Arrian began his account of Alexander’s passage through central Anatolia to Cilicia after the resolution of his story of Alexander’s encounter with the Gordian Knot. This is significant because Gordium was where Alexander had arranged to bring his army back together. The precise chronology is never clearly spelt out in the sources, but on this point Arrian is clear. Winter was approaching by the time Alexander took Halicarnassus.17 As Engels rightly notes, Alexander’s army was too large to feed itself by foraging on the march during winter. 18 To address this problem, Alexander broke his army up into smaller contingents. Firstly, he sent those Macedonians who had married shortly before the start of the expedition, back to Macedon “to spend the winter with their wives”.19 This was not a simple act of kindness. Alexander needed more men. The married men were sent back under the command of Ptolemy, son of Seleucus, “one of the royal Bodyguards”,20 together with two commanders of the pezhetairoi, Coenus and Meleager.21 These three were together charged with bringing back as many additional infantry and cavalrymen as they could raise. Alexander’s apparent ‘generosity’ in giving the married men leave to see their wives, would have made a useful propaganda tool in the recruitment process. Cleander son of Polemocrates was also sent back to raise more troops from the Peloponnese.22 At the same time, Parmenio was sent off to Sardis en route to Phrygia with the Thessalians and other allies, a company23 of the Companions, “and the waggons”, while Alexander marched on Lycia and Pamphylia. While Arrian goes on to give a detailed account of Alexander’s winter campaign, what matters here is that Parmenio, Ptolemy, Coenus and Meleager, with the men under their command, including the married men and the new recruits, were all under orders to rendezvous with Alexander at Gordium.24 Engels has argued that Gordium was where Alexander spent the winter with one part of his army after first dividing the army to reduce demand on “the agricultural resources of the surrounding territory”.25 And for logistical reasons related to harvest time in central Anatolia, 16 Plutarch Alexander XX. 2 – 3. Arrian I. 23. 5 – 24. 1. Plutarch Alexander XVII. 1. 18 Engels, Logistics, p. 36 and n. 55. 19 Arrian. I. 24. 1. 20 ἕνα τῶν σωματοφυάκων τῶν βασιλικῶν. For a discussion of the term and its application to Ptolemy, see Heckel, Marshals, p. 286. 21 Both also recently married, Arrian. I. 24. 1. 22 Arrian. I. 24. 2. Curtius III. 1. 1. 23 Arrina hear refers to them as a hipparchy, but as Brunt notes, the term here was probably just a non-technical one, referring to a force of Companion cavalry, the exact size of which is unclear. /Brunt 1, p. lxxv, and Arrian I. 24. 3, n. 2. 24 Arrian. I. 29. 3 – 4. Cleander would only join Alexander with his new troops at Sidon in Phoenicia. Heckel, Prosopography, p. 85. 25 As Engels argues, the army had been divided for the 17 54 Engels suggests Alexander probably did not leave Gordium until late July, well into summer. This is contrary to how Arrian presents the tale. In Arrian, when Alexander arrives in Gordium the first thing he does is go straight to the palace of Gordius on the acropolis to see the knot. Arrian then gives a detailed account relating the legend of the knots origin, before offering two different versions, one from Aristobulus, of how Alexander undid the knot. The following day he offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving. And “Next day (he) set out for Ancyra in Galatia”.26 At this point Arrian, and clearly his sources, was more intent on telling an interesting tale to add colour to what would have been an otherwise lacklustre section of his account. Brunt, in his translation, had previously noted that because “Gordium is 500 miles from Pella, they (the married men and reinforcements) could not have arrived before May 333 B.C.”. And, he suggests, Alexander must have arrived about the same time, and that he set out soon after.27 However, if May was only the earliest date that Ptolemy and the men he brought with him could have reached Gordium, then it is quite possible that both he, Parmenio and Alexander all arrived later than that date. And even if Alexander only spent a couple of days in the city, as Arrian relates, some time must have been spent nearby integrating the new recruits into the reunited army, before Alexander set off for Ancyra. Which makes the later date Engels argues for still possible. In Ancyra, Alexander accepted the submission of the Paphlagonian people, who he placed under the authority of Calas, the strap of Phrygia. He then marched on Cappadocia, claimed at least notional control of part of that territory,28 appointed Sabictas as satrap, and continued on to the Cilician Gates.29 (For the location of this and the other gates and significant places, please see the maps at the end of this chapter.) THE CILICIAN GATES Close to the Gates Alexander made camp at a place Arrian refers to as the “camp of Cyrus”. There, “he saw that the Gates were strongly held”. Alexander is most unlikely to have literally seen that the Gates were held. Much more likely is that he received reports of this from scouts he had sent ahead to reconnoitre. We get more details from Curtius. He tells us that the camp was “fifty stadia from the pass” and that the so called Gates were very narrow, with a formation that looked like man-made fortifications.30 That evening, according to Arrian, Parmenio was left in charge of the camp with the bulk of the army, while Alexander led his hypaspists, together with his archers and the Agrianians on a covert night assault against the Gates. This strike force was detected before they reached the Gates, but the mere approach of Alexander’s forces was sufficient to prompt the forces at the Gates to abandon their post and flee. Curtius’ account is much less heroic. In this version, only “a few (men had been left) to guard the mountain paths”. A few, though still sufficient in the view of Curtius and/or his source, to 26 Arrian II. 3. 1 – 4. 1. Arrian. I. 29. 4, n. 3. 28 “This side (presumably west) of the river Halys”, but on this, see Brunts’ comments, p. 133, n. 1. 28 Arrian II. 4. 1 – 4. 29 Arrian II. 4. 1 – 4. 30 Curtius III. iv. 2. 27 55 hold the pass, given the rough nature of the terrain and the narrowness of the road. As in Arrian, the men fled at the approach of their enemy. Curtius makes no mention of any covert night attack. Instead, he suggests that the men saw themselves as “left behind ... (and) betrayed” by their commander, the Persian satrap, Arsames,31 who was himself already retreating from the province.32 Either way, the Gates were abandoned without a fight, and Alexander entered Cilicia unopposed. But here too Curtius adds further details that paint a much more credible account of how Alexander secured the pass. In this account Alexander was not convinced that the Gates have been abandoned. So he sent a scouting patrol of “light-armed Thracians” ahead to “examine the mountain paths” to make sure there were no enemies present who might attack his men. And to make doubly sure a company of archers were then sent up to the ridge overhanging the pass to keep watch with their bows at the ready,33 presumably until the entire army had safely passed through.34 This, as shall be seen later, was what he did at the Syrian Gates when he learnt Darius was behind him.35 With respect to these accounts, Ramsay reports that the “actual passage of the Gates is about 100 yards long”, and in his estimation about 30 to 40 foot wide at its narrowest. However, this passage was divided between a “wagon-road (which Xenophon speaks about)” on the west side, and a water course “which could readily be traversed by laden animals and by men during great part of the year”. In Roman times the “road was about 11 feet broad”.36 So, even though the passage of the Gates is quite short, the narrowness of that passage will have made movement through the Gates quite slow for an army the size of Alexander’s. Importantly, Ramsay also describes a rocky ridge rising to the north of the Gates that would allow troops to “get over the ridge (overhanging the gates) ... east or west into the gorge south of the Gates.37 The Cilician Gates thus run though this ridge, which is traversable on either side. A description quite consistent with the mountain paths described as used by Arrian in Curtius’ account. CILICIA ARSAMES FLIGHT 31 On Arsames formal position, see Heckel, Prosopography, p. 54 and n. 131, p. 295,where he notes the suggestion of Leuze that the title of satrap may be imprecise. The precise title is of less relevance here than his role as commander and his actions in response to Alexander’s approach. 32 Curtius III. iv. 3 – 5, and 11 – 12 (for a description of the pass itself). 33 Curtius III. iv. 12 – 14. 34 See also Engels estimate that it would have taken Alexander’s army 7½ hours to pass through the Pillars of Jonah Pass, on the march back to meet Darius at Issus. Engels, Logistics, pp. 131 – 132. 35 Considering how Alexander’s army had marched through the gates only a day or so before, this action strongly implies that the sending of advance units to scout and clear the way, was standard practice under Alexander In hazardous terrain such as these Gates. 36 Ramsay, W. M., “Cilicia, Tarsus, and the Great Taurus Pass”, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Oct., 1903), pp. 378 – 379. 37 Ramsay, “Cilicia, Tarsus, and the Great Taurus Pass”, p. 381. Ramsay had earlier described the cliff walls of the pass as about 1,500 feet high, p. 374. 56 This brings us to the issue of Arsames flight from Cilicia, and the question of whether or not he attempted to engage in any ‘Burnt Earth’ campaign over the course of that flight. On this, we once again encounter problems in the conflicting evidence from Arrian and Curtius. In Curtius, the precise chronology is never made clear, but at some point late in Alexander’s approach to the Gates, Arsames “decided too late to follow a plan” originally advised by the Greek general, Memnon “at the beginning of the war” – to lay waste to his province ahead of Alexander. Such a program would have been deprived the Macedonian army of all useful natural resources. To which end “he devastates Cilicia in order to ... destroy everything that could be of use.”38 This, in Curtius’ view, was clearly a mistake, arguing that Arsames could have stopped, and even possibly destroyed, his enemy if he had properly defended the Gates, instead of leaving just a few troops behind while he “retreated, a devastator of the land”. 39 Despite the rhetoric, it soon becomes clear that Arsames ‘Burnt Earth’ campaign was over before it even began. In this account the Persians appear to have only started setting fire to the city of Tarsus as Alexander approached the city. And both the fires and the incendiaries were swiftly dealt with before any significant damage could be done, when Parmenio was sent ahead with a troop of light-armed men. This action made Alexander the saviour of the city.40 By contrast, Arrian presents Arsames as initially determined to hold onto Tarsus, and Cilicia. There is no suggestion that the satrap ever had any plans of laying waste to the province. The closest we come to this is a brief statement that Alexander had somehow learned that the citizens of Tarsus were afraid that Arsames would plunder their city prior to fleeing the province. And according to Arrian, Arsames decided to flee only after Alexander had safely passed through the Cilician Gates. In response to this, Alexander himself, not Parmenio, led a contingent of cavalry and light troops “at full speed to Tarsus,” prompting Arsames to flee to Darius “without harming the city”.41 Now, despite their apparent differences, there are some important consistencies in the two accounts. These are that:     By the time Alexander reached Tarsus, Arsames had already fled; There is also no suggestion in either account that any attempt was made to pursue or capture the satrap; As at the Gates, Alexander appears to captured Tarsus unopposed; And there is no real evidence of the city being either plundered or actually harmed by the Persians. (In both cases the fires are supposed to have been started while Alexander was still far enough away that he is said to have needed to send a special contingent of mounted men to deal with the problem. Which would have given more than enough time for the alleged fires to take hold and spread, had any real attempt been made to burn the city. 38 Curtius III. iv. 3. Curtius III. iv. 4 – 5. 40 Curtius III. iv. 14 - 15. 41 Arrian II. 4. 5 – 6. 39 57  Tarsus is also 54 kilometres from the Cilician Gates,42 too far away for either Alexander or Parmenio to reach and intervene quickly, especially considering the delays inherent in moving the army through the narrow pass, noted above. So what actually happened? The clue, I suggest, lies in the fact that we have two conflicting accounts in which the alleged attempt to burn the city is prevented by men led by either Parmenio or Alexander himself. Both cannot be true, which suggests that they are both false. An important factor to bear in mind, as I will discuss later, is that we know Arsames was a commander of the Persian forces at the battle of Issus because he is listed amongst the Persian dead there. This means that he must have left Cilicia in time to meet with and join Darius at Sochi, before Darius decided to march on Cilicia. His presence at the battle strongly suggests that Darius did not blame him for abandoning Cilicia. Indeed, the most likely explanation is that he had already been recalled by Darius to assemble at Sochi with as many troops as he could muster,43 well in advance of Alexander’s entry into the plain. And it was the troops he brought with him who Arsames would later command at Issus. Bear in mind as well that there is also no mention of Arsames making any attempt to strip the land bare after leaving Tarsus. This means the most likely explanation for the accounts of the rescue of Tarsus, is that they came from propaganda circulated by Alexander to justify his occupation of the city, and thereby appease the local population. Plans to spread the rumours were probably already in play before Alexander entered the city. The story would then have been further elaborated by Alexanders own men, with the conflicting accounts arising from either factional rivalries within the army, or as a direct consequence of what happened next. ALEXANDER’S ILLNESS Soon after reaching Tarsus Alexander fell severely ill. This is affirmed in all our sources, both directly and indirectly. The illness was a pivotal factor in the course of events leading up to the battle of Issus, which is why some attention must be given to the various accounts and what we can reasonably conclude from them. The Nature of the Illness. From an early date, two stories arose to account for Alexander’s illness. One, from Aristobulus, attributed the condition to simple fatigue.44 The other is the story of how Alexander fell ill swimming in the river Cydnus, and was cured by a physician named Philip.45 This ‘story’ (οἱ δέ ... λέγουσι), as Brunt’s translation of Arrian refers to it, almost certainly comes from Cleitarchus.46 The was plainly too popular to be left out of any 42 Ramsay, “Cilicia, Tarsus, and the Great Taurus Pass”, p. 374. Another reason to see Arsames as having left well in advance of Alexander, given the logistical problems of moving such a company across the Cilician plains and through the Syrian Gates. 44 Arrian II. 4. 7. Also noted by Plutarch Alexander xix. 1. , without any attribution. 45 Arrian II. 4. 7 – 11. Curtius III. 5. 1 – 6. 17. Plutarch Alexander xix. 1 – 5. Diodorus XVII. 31. 4 – 6. Justin 11. 8. 1 – 9. 46 Hammond Three Historians, pp. 97 – 98, 121. “Others say”. Hammond, N.G.L., Sources for Alexander the Great, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp48, 224. Hereafter cited as Hammond Sources. 43 58 subsequent ancient historical account. And it can be seen to have been subject to a number of elaboration. But that does not mean there was not some truth behind the tale. In different circumstances I would be more inclined to accept the much simpler explanation of Aristobulus. But in this case ascribing the ‘illness’ to simple fatigue which could be treated by a couple of days rest, fails to account for the extended delay to Alexander’s campaign we find referred to later in the tradition. If so, Aristobulus may have deliberately downplayed the illness so as not to detract from the image of the heroic Alexander – an image much favoured by Arrian. This leaves us with Cleitarchus’ account. First, we should leave aside the melodramatic elements of the tale which can never be substantiated.47 There then remain a number of consistencies in the various redactions of the tale from which a reasonable picture of the illness can be extracted. Firstly, Alexander’s symptoms were triggered when he entered the river,48 which is described as cold or bitterly cold. Tarsus lies near the southern end of the Cilician Gates, close to the Taurus Mountains in which the Cydnus rises. (If you search for images of the river on line near Tarsus, you will generally find a river the aqua blue colour typical of an alpine stream.) It is interesting to note, however, that neither Strabo nor Pausanias saw the coldness of the river as dangerous. Pausanias counts the Cydnus amongst the beneficial cold rivers that “have water refreshing to drink” in summer, while still being able “to bathe in, without being painful in winter”.49 And Strabo describes the swift, cold waters of the Cydnus at Tarsus as therapeutic, “helpful both to men and to cattle ... suffering from swollen sinews”.50 Arrian says that after entering the river, Alexander “caught a cramp. And suffered from violent fevers and continuous sleeplessness.”51 Plutarch has nothing to say about Alexander’s initial symptoms. Justin reports that after entering the water Alexander’s muscles suddenly stiffened so badly he could not speak. And it took three days after taking the treatment, for him to recover.52 The most detailed account comes from Curtius. Already covered with sweat, Alexander’s “limbs began to stiffen with a sudden chill” when he entered the river, “and the vital warmth left almost his entire body” so that his attendants had to carry him “almost unconscious to his tent.”53And he adds that there later a partial recovery where his breath began “to pass more freely” so that he was able to open his eyes and recognise his friends.54 Diodorus, with no context offered, simply notes “he became seriously ill, and afflicted by severe pain”.55 47 In particular, Parmenio’s warning that Philip might be a Persian agent intent on poisoning Alexander, and the exchanges between the two men that flow from that. 48 All but Diodorus, who largely skims over the tale. 49 Pausanias VIII. 28. 3. 50 Strabo XIV. 5. 12. 51 Arrian II. 4. 7 – 9 52 Justin 11. 8. 3 – 9. 53 Curtius III. 5. 2 – 4. 54 Curtius III. 5. 9 55 Diodorus XVII. 31. 4. 59 In brief, it appears Alexander suffered from severe cramps or muscle spasms when he entered the water, which may have left him unconscious. And, if Curtius’ comment that he was already covered in sweat is significant, Alexander may have already been suffering from a fever when he entered the water, which could have contributed to the severity of his reaction. Engels has sought to argue that Alexander was suffering from Malaria – a disease arising from infection with an amoeba-like protozoan, in this case plasmodium falciparum,56 transmitted by mosquito bites. And that it took him two months to regain sufficient strength to present himself to his troops.57 While this sounds reasonable, it remains only one theory. However, I find it hard to accept that such a condition could have been isolated to Alexander alone, given the nature of how it is transmitted. Certainly, I accept that Alexander suffered from a very severe, and possibly even life-threatening, illness from which it took him some time to recover. But just what condition that was cannot be established from the textual evidence.58 Duration, treatment and recovery time. Diodorus says Alexander’s symptoms were “promptly relieved” when he drank Philip’s medicine. There is no suggestion that the illness caused any significant delay to Alexander’s campaign, although, according to Diodorus it was during the illness Alexander learnt that Darius “had already left Babylon with his army”.59 Arrian leaves the recovery time slightly open, saying simply that the “purge worked and eased the illness”.60 According to Plutarch Alexander was delayed in Cilicia for a long time because of this illness.61 While Curtius says, Philip’s medication was only given on the third day. And it could be read that it then took a further three days for Alexander to recover enough strength to allow himself to be presented to his troops. Certainly, the description of the course of the illness and subsequent treatments in Curtius, supports that.62 The three day recovery is also asserted by Justin, as noted above.63 The reluctance of Alexander’s other physicians to offer treatment suggests there was also some delay between when Alexander was brought back from the river and when Philip commenced treatment. The physicians probably all feared they would be accused of murder if their treatment failed and Alexander died.64 The story of Parmenio’s warning letter, true or not, affirms this. 56 Of the four varieties of malaria the one least likely to recur if you recover without a fresh infection. MSD Manual: Consumer Version (formerly The Merck Manual), https://www.msdmanuals.com/enau/home/infections/parasitic-infections/malaria#v14458465. 57 Engels, Donald, “A Note on Alexander’s Death”, Classical Philology, Vol. 73, No. 3 (1978) pp. 225 – 226. 58 For a fuller discussion of the condition, see Lascaratos, John and Dalla-Vorgia, P., “The Disease of Alexander the Great in Cilicia (333 B. C.)”, International Journal of Risk & Safety in Medicine, Vol. 11 (1998) pp. 65 – 68. 59 Diodorus XVII. 31. 4 – 6. 60 Arrian II. 4. 11. 61 Plutarch Alexander XIX. 62 After the first draft, Alexander’s breathing is said to have had difficulty breathing, causing Philip to follow up his initial treatment with applications of hot lotions to the kings body, followed by the use of aromatic foods and wine to arouse Alexander from his apparent stupor. And even with that the recovery is described as gradual. Curtius III. 5. 9, 6. 3 – 8, 14 – 16. 63 Justin 11. 8. 3 – 9. 64 Lascaratos and Dalla-Vorgia, “Disease of Alexander”, p. 66. 60 It should not be thought, however, that Alexander was fully cured when he first presented himself to his troops. Arrian’s claim that the purge “eased the illness” is quite in keeping with Plutarch’s claim that the illness caused a long delay in Alexander’s campaign. The impact of the illness on Alexander’s army. Only Curtius offers any detailed account of the reaction of the soldiers in Alexander’s army to his illness, citing both grief at the thought the king might die and great anxiety. The men are said to have been very afraid of what might happen to them as they struggled to make their own way back home with no one to lead them.65 Whether any of this came from his source is impossible to say, and much is clearly his own embellishments. But the whole has a ring of truth that undoubtedly reflects what Alexander’s men would have been feeling. They were now far from home in a hostile land, and they had already plundered supplies from the route they would have to take back home. Alexander had cast himself as the champion upon whom they depended for their victories. The thought that he might die must have left them feeling very vulnerable. Is it any wonder then that Alexander had himself presented to the troops as soon as he was fit enough?66 That he showed himself to men who “refused to be comforted until they had seen Alexander”.67 This was a gesture of reassurance. As was what Alexander did soon after. According to Arrian, the first thing Alexander did was to send an expedition off under Parmenio’s leadership to secure the Syrian Gates. This mission will be discussed shortly. “Later on”, and here Arrian is again being vague on the chronology, “he left Tarsus and on the first day reached Anchilaus”, south or south west of Tarsus.68 Of this town, Arrian offers only some background comments regarding its history which is tied directly with the foundation of Tarsus. There is no suggestion that Alexander met with any opposition there, and Anchilaus appears to have opened its gates to Alexander as readily as Tarsus.69 From there, he advanced further west to the city of Soli, which again appears to have surrendered without resistance. Upon this town, Alexander imposed a fine of two hundred talents for their previous support of the Persians, and installed a garrison70 presumably to help maintain his control of the region. According to Arrian, Alexander then launched a campaign against “the Cilicians holding the heights”, i.e. in the mountain ranges that sealed in the plain to the north and west. Against these, he took three taxeis of the pezhetairoi, together with all the archers and the Agrianians. No cavalry units were involved, so it is reasonable to conclude that Alexander himself took no part in any combat. In seven days, he had driven “some of them out, and induced others to enter into agreements”.71 Then he returned to Soli, where he offered up a sacrifice to Asclepius, held athletic games and musical competitions in honour of both Asclepius and possibly Athena (Minerva in Curtius), and paraded his whole army through the city. After which he granted democracy to Soli.72 65 Curtius III. 5. 4 – 8. Curtius III. 6. 16. 67 Plutarch Alexander XIX. 5. 68 See the maps of Cilicia in Murison, “Darius III and the Battle of Issus”, p. 400, and Bosworth, A. B., Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 56. 69 Arrian II. 5. 2 – 4. The visit to Anchilaus is not mentioned in our other sources. 70 Arrian II. 5. 5 – 6. Curtius III. 7. 2 – 3. 71 Arrian II. 5. 6. 72 Arrian II. 5. 8. Curtius III. 7. 3. 66 61 Curtius makes no mention of the campaign against the Cilicians outside of Soli. Nor is it mentioned in any other source. From Arrian’s brief account, this was as much an exercise in intimidation, as a punitive expedition. Alexander could easily have left the work to one of his subordinates. If he led it himself, there can be only one reason. He wanted to be seen doing that. He wanted to show his men he was fit enough to lead them again in circumstances that would not be too demanding on him while he was still recovering from his illness. That was why he waited until after the campaign was concluded to his satisfaction, before he offered his sacrifices of thanks to the God of Healing, and held his games of celebration. Only after that did he return to Tarsus to begin marching his army east towards the Syrian Gates, beyond which he believed Darius and his army were still waiting for him. The impact of the illness on the strategic plans of Darius III. Both Curtius and Diodorus agree that what prompted Darius himself to lead an army against Alexander was the news of the death of Memnon.73 The chronology of these events is unclear.74 But it can be reasonably conjectured that Darius had already begun to assemble an army in Babylon to face Alexander, should the need arise, when he heard of Memnon’s death.75 On hearing the news, he marched into Syria, almost certainly despatching messengers to his satraps in his western provinces to meet with him there. And as Murison elegantly puts it, “at a place called Sochoi on the N. Syrian plain ... on a field of his own choosing, where there was plenty of room for his cavalry to manoeuvre, he settled down to await the arrival of Alexander”. 76 Only Alexander failed to come to battle. With regard to what happened, there is again conflict in the sources, though here it remains possible to reconstruct at least the core sequence of events, if not the precise timeline. According to Arrian, after returning to Tarsus Alexander sent his cavalry under Philotas across the Aleian plain to the river Pyramus. At the same time, “he himself went with the infantry and the royal squadron to Megarsus” where he offered sacrifice, possibly for the second time, to Athena.77 (Alexander’s decision to travel with the infantry, together with the sacrifice to Athena, suggests he was still not fully recovered at this time.) From there he moved on to Mallus. It was while he was in Mallus that he received a report that Darius “was encamped at Sochi”, two days march from the Syrian Gates. After a quick council of war, he set off the next day to attack the Persians, passing through the Gates on the second day, to camp near Myriandrus.78 73 Curtius III. 2 – 3. Diodorus. XVII. 30, 31. 1 – 2. For a discussion, see Murison, “Darius III and the Battle of Issus”, pp. 401 – 402, and Engels, Logistics, pp. 42 – 44. 75 According to Plutarch, Darius had led his army from Susa to confront Alexander. Plutarch Alexander. XVIII. 4. And Justin’s account claimed Darius was on the march while Alexander is still in Gordium. Justin 11. 8. 1. 76 Murison, “Darius III and the Battle of Issus”, p. 402. Arrian II. 6. 1 - 3. 77 Arrian II. 5. 8 - 9. This division is also reported by Strabo. “Above this coast lies the Aleian Plain, through which Philotas led the cavalry for Alexander, when Alexander led his phalanx from Soli along the coast and the territory of Mallus against Issus and the forces of Dareius. It is said that Alexander performed sacrifices to Amphilochus because of his kinship with the Argives.” Strabo 14. 5. 17. Strabo’s reference to the sacrifice to Amphilochus is consistent with the other instances we have seen of Alexander’s endeavours to appease the gods following his illness. 78 Arrian II. 6. 1 – 2. 74 62 Taken literally, this would suggest Mallus was only four days march from Soli. But Arrian’s account makes no allowance for two delays Alexander would have experienced on this march – settling his invalids at Issus,79 and marching the army through the Syrian Gates. As well, the report Alexander received on the location of the Persian army would have been at least two to three days out of date when it reached him. Darius, meanwhile, ignorant of Alexander’s illness,80 had grown progressively more impatient with Alexander’s failure to appear. On Arrian’s account, Darius appears to have remained at Sochi throughout the time Alexander was ill in Tarsus at least up until the time Alexander left Soli.81 How long after that he waivered is unclear. Arrian gives a lengthy account, almost certainly fiction, of the conflicting advice from Darius’ advisers on what the king should do. In the end, he decided to march north and then west on the other side of the Amanus range to Alexander, to descend into Cilicia through the Amanian Gates.82 Plutarch relates much the same course of events, adding that because Darius knew nothing of Alexander’s illness, he attributed the delay to cowardice.83 And while Diodorus, as is his want, otherwise simplifies the chain of events, he does add the interesting detail that when Darius decided to move, he first sought to “make his army mobile” by sending “his baggage train and non-combatants to Damascus”.84 Curtius also reports this, adding that also sent all the wealth he had with him to Damascus.85 In brief, despite their differences, these accounts affirm the following key facts:    That Alexander’s illness was serious enough to delay him for a significant time in Cilicia; That this delay led Darius to abandon his original plans to await Alexander at Sochi; That at the time the two armies were moving both Alexander and Darius were ignorant of just where their enemy’s army was. Murison has suggested that Darius chose to descend through the Amanian Gates in the hope that he would be able to cut “the Macedonian army in two” by inserting his army between Parmenio’s advance guard and the bulk of the army that had remained behind with Alexander.86 Whether the theory is right or not is impossible to say, and I would be reluctant to put too much trust in it. The fact is Darius, not knowing where the Macedonian army was, chose the Amanian Gates to enter Cilicia at a point where the plains opened out, giving him 79 Arrian II. 7. 1. Also Curtius III. 8. 14. Curtius account is quite confused on this point. He claimed Darius knew of Alexander’s illness and that this was the news was what prompted him to cross the Euphrates, presumably from Babylon on a pontoon bridge that took his army five days to cross (III. 7. 1). But his text suggests this happened just before Alexander reached Soli, which is much too late for Darius to reach Cilicia in time to fight Alexander at the Pinarus river as described. (Engels estimates it would have taken at least 48 days for the Persian army just to march from Babylon to Sochi. Engels, Logistics, pp. 42 – 43.) And Curtius then later fall back on a claim that Alexander was only pretending to be ill, out of cowardice, III. 8. 10 – 11. 81 Arrian II. 6. 3 – 4. 82 Arrian II. 6. 3 – 7. 1. Curtius III. 8. 13. 83 Plutarch Alexander. XIX. 1, XX. 2. 84 Diodorus XVII. 32. 3. 85 Curtius III. 8. 12. 86 Murison, “Darius III and the Battle of Issus”, p. 420. 80 63 more room to deploy his army quickly should the need arise.87 This would clearly have been preferable to advancing up from the Syrian Gates across an initially quite narrow strip of land that would later cause difficulties for Alexander on his return march, as shall be discussed later. In the end, both commanders were caught off guard. PARMENIO’S MISSION As we have seen, Parmenio was with Alexander as he passed through the Cilician Gates, marched to Cilicia and entered Tarsus. After that, there is only one reference to Parmenio in our various sources, prior to the end of the tale of Alexander’s illness. This is the reference to the note or letter from Parmenio passed to Alexander warning him not to trust Philip, the treating doctor who, according to the story, will save Alexander’s life.88 The idea that Parmenio’s warning was a written one, could be read to mean that Parmenio was not in Tarsus with Alexander when the king fell ill. But if so, he was still close enough to hear about both what had happened and Philip’s offer of treatment, as well as to send his warning in time. In Justin’s account, Parmenio was still in Cappadocia, when, unaware of Alexander’s illness, he sent his note to Alexander to warn him not to trust Philip. Heckel has suggested that Justin’s reference to Cappadocia may have originally have been Castabalum in Trogus’s text, that was later corrupted into Cappadocia by either a scribe or Justin, himself.89 Even if that were the case, this version was clearly been distorted from the accounts in our other sources. Plutarch says Parmenio was in camp, στρατοπέδου, when he sent the message, so close to where the king was being treated. And this is consistent with subsequent events. (It is also possible that the story of Parmenio’s warning, at least, is a total invention – one, as Heckel notes, of several tales where Parmenio offers advice only to have it rejected by Alexander.90) After addressing Alexander’s illness with a colourful narrative about the doctor who healed him, Arrian tells us “Next he (Alexander) sent Parmenio to the other Gates which divide the Cilician and Assyrian lands”. Parmenio is commanded both to seize the Gates before the enemy and to guard them. And for this task “the allied infantry, the Greek mercenaries, the Thracians ... and the Thessalian horse” are all assigned to him.91 Parmenio must have been nearby to accept this commission. And the army must also have remained together at Tarsus during the worst of Alexander’s illness. As second in command, Parmenio would have assumed full command as soon as it was clear that Alexander was unfit to do so. But he would have also felt duty bound to remain with Alexander while any question remained that Alexander might not survive his illness. It was not his place to take any initiative, or go on the offensive while Alexander’s health was in doubt. So the army remained camped at 87 See the map of the plain in Olson, Brandon R., From Issus to Rhosus: an Assessment of Settlement Dynamics in the Hellenistic Countryside, Boston University Theses & Dissertations 2016, p. 53. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/14547 88 Arrian II. 4. 9 – 10. Curtius III. 6. 3. Plutarch Alexander. XIX. 3. Justin 11. 8. 5 – 6. POxy1798 Fr, 44. Diodorus XVII. 31. 4 – 6. Only Diodorus and the unknown author of POxy1798 make no mention Parmenio’s letter in their accounts of this story. 89 Heckel, Commentary I, pp. 129 – 130. 90 Heckel, Prosopography, pp. 190 – 191. 91 Arrian. II. 5. 1. 64 Tarsus, and Parmenio stayed in camp to manage daily affairs, just where Plutarch had placed him. Arrian’s text changes abruptly with the end of the story of Alexander’s illness. “The purge worked and eased92 the illness”. Arrian does not say he was cured or that the king had fully recovered. Alexander thanks Philip, then next thing he is sending Parmenio off on his mission. In Brunt’s translation this seems to happen after Alexander has recovered. But as I have argued above, full recovery probably took some time. The Greek text Brunt translated as ‘Next’, Έκ δὲ τούτου,93 could be read as consequential rather than simply sequential as ‘next’ implies. This, I believe, is the more likely interpretation. Once he was strong enough, and it was clear he would recover, the very first thing Alexander would want do was to present himself to his troops to reassure the army that he was alright. Both Curtius and Plutarch refer to this,94 but Arrian, seeking to play down the illness, appears to intentionally omitted any reference to it. The next thing he would want done is to have the Gates from Syria into Cilicia secured, to ensure his army could not be taken by surprise during his recovery. So Parmenio was sent off with both the cavalry troops usually assigned to him, the Thracians and Thessalians, reliable light cavalry suitable for both scouting and harassing the enemy. With him, too, went the most expendable, of the infantry, the allied infantry and the Greek mercenaries who Alexander never trusted for front line duties in battle. What Parmenio did after that is much less clear. Arrian makes no further mention of him until he is outlining Alexander’s deployment for the battle of Issus, when as at the Granicus, Parmenio is given charge of the left wing.95 We do get a few details from both Diodorus and Curtius. Diodorus’ account, as previously noted, is heavily truncated and quite garbled. In it, though, there is a statement that Parmenio was sent to secure the Gates, adding that when he “reached the place, he forced out the Persians who were holding the pass and remained master of it”.96 In the Loeb edition there is a lacuna in both the Greek text and Welles translation where the name of the Gates should have been. In his translation, Welles identifies them as the Syrian Gates.97 But in his note to the text, he notes that in the manuscript text of C. Th. Fischer that he was following, the gates are named as the Cilician Gates.98 While this may be an error, it is also possible that Diodorus or his source was being careless here, and simply referring to the Gates leading into Cilicia. Curtius provides much more details. In his account, Parmenio “had been sent ahead to reconnoitre (explorandum) the road through the mountain-pass” to Issus. Having secured the pass, he left a moderate guard to secure the pass, he then “captured Issus”, which, like Tarsus, “had been abandoned by the barbarians”. And he used Issus as a base to dislodge, secure and garrison any positions the Persians held in the inland mountains, including, presumably, the 92 My italics. Arrian. II. 5. 1. 94 Curtius III. 6. 16. Plutarch Alexander XIX. 5. 95 Arrian. II. 8. 9. 96 Diodorus XVII. 32. 2. 97 Diodorus Vol. VIII, p. 207, n. 3. 98 Κιλικίας Diodorus Vol. VIII, pp. 18, and 206, n.2. Polybius also refers to them as the Cilician Gates, Polybius XII. 17. 2. 93 65 Syrian Gates. Once that was done, he then headed back to rendezvous with Alexander in the town of Castabalum,99 a day after the king left Mallus.100 (If Parmenio’s orders included sending men to secure the Amanian Gates is not possible to say. Castabalum is directly west of the Gates, so he may have thought that holding the town sufficient to secure those Gates. If he did send men to secure the Amanian Gates, they were will have been mercenaries who probably broke and fled when they saw the Persian army approaching. However, they may have also been the ones who sent word to Alexander that the Persians were behind him.) Curtius’ account is completely consistent with the limited information provided by Arrian, with Diodorus, and with the tactics used earlier by Alexander in approaching and entering the Cilician plains, as discussed above. Mallus was where Alexander had received a report that Darius was at Sochi, close to the Syrian Gates. This report must have come either from or through Parmenio, and gives another reason why Parmenio left Issus to meet Alexander at Castabalum. And from there Alexander and Parmenio headed south with the reunited army to the Syrian Gates, not knowing that the Persian army was now also on the move. Conclusions From all the above, we may now reconstruct the sequence of events with reasonable accuracy.101 Sometime after the battle at the Granicus, Darius began to bring together an army at Babylon to deal with the Macedonian invasion. At first this was probably just as a backup plan. Later, perhaps after word reached him of further losses such as Miletus and Halicarnassus, the plan began to evolve, and Darius made the decision not to waste his resources by having his satraps attempt to defend their own territory. Whether this happened before or after he received news of the death of Memnon, on whom he had first rested his hopes, is impossible to say. But soon after that news reached him, he led his army out of Babylon to Syria. Either during that march or possibly even before it began, orders were sent out to the satraps of the western regions to abandon their territories, and bring the troops under their command to him. That was why Arsames ‘fled’ Cilicia, and why Alexander encountered little resistance throughout his march to and through that territory. In Syria, Darius made camp for his assembled forces at a place called Sochi to await the coming of the Macedonian invaders in a place of his choosing. Alexander, meanwhile, after dividing his forces for the winter, had reassembled his army at Gordium and begun his march on Cilicia. He encountered no opposition at the Cilician Gates, and Tarsus fell to him soon after without a fight. But there, Alexander fell seriously ill and took a long time to recover. When the worst of the illness had passed, he presented himself as soon as 99 Castabala in Cilicia, later Hierapolis, lies “3 km north of the (Turkish) town of Cevdetiye”. Zeyrek, Ali Nadir, Hierapolis-Castabala: The Urban Development in A.D. 1 st to 3rd Centuries, Thesis, University of Bologna, 2016, p. 16. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/7243/1/A.N.Zeyrek.Hierapolis-Castabala.pdf 100 Curtius III. 7. 6 – 7. 101 No attempt, however, has been made to establish even a rough chronology of these events, for the reasons discussed above. 66 possible to his troops to reassure his men that he was alright, even though he was still in recovery. He then sent Parmenio off to scout out their intended route to Syria and secure the Syrian Gates and other passes. Which he did, capturing Issus along the way. Sometime after that, Alexander began to test his own mettle by leading his army south to engage in a show of force against Cilician resistance in the mountains behind Soli. At the end of this, reasonably satisfied with his recovery, he returned to Tarsus and marched on Mallus, holding celebratory games and offering sacrifices to the gods as he went. At Mallus he learnt that Darius was at Sochi. Rendezvousing with Parmenio at Castabalum, they then marched south to the Syrian Gates, leaving their sick and wounded at Issus on the way. At about the same time Darius, ignorant of Alexander’s illness, decided to wait no longer. After sending his wealth and baggage off to Damascus, he led his army away from Sochi, up through the Amanian Gates to descend on the Cilician plains from there. What his plans were, is impossible to say, but by the time he reached Issus he knew that Alexander had left the plains, and all he could do was follow him. By then, word had reached Alexander that Darius was behind him. So he turned his own army around to march back and confront Darius on a battlefield that was not the choice of either commander. 67 MAPS Cilicia The above map is my redrafting of a Kinet Höyük Project map included in Gates, Charles, “Kinet Höyük (Classical Issus): A Harbour Town in Southeast Cilicia during the Persian and Hellenistic Periods”, Journal of Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology and Heritage Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2015, p. 96. My own map is intended as a rough guide to locations only, though I have kept the kilometre scale from the original map. I have also made a number of adjustments to simplify the map and to relocate the Cilician Gates to where I consider they should be placed based on my own research. 68 Cilicia – Geographic Map This, and all the following maps are taken from Ramsey, W. M., “Cilicia, Tarsus, and the Great Taurus Pass”, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Oct., 1903), pp. 357 – 410. 69 The Cilician Gates 70 The Amanian Gates The Syrian Gates 71