Dossier: Post-religional Paradigm – Original Article
DOI – 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2015v13n37p279
Is Asia a 'Post-Religional' society?
The Post-Religional Paradigm and its others**
A Ásia é uma sociedade pós-religional?
O Paradigma pós-religional e seus outros paradigmas
Daniel Franklin Estepa Pilario, C.M.
Abstract
This article discusses the relevance and applicability of the 'post-religional paradigm' as proposed by
EATWOT (Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians) in the Asian contexts. It also inquires on how
the Asian phenomenon and its interpretations relate to the crisis of religions in Western societies. It
attempts to answer this problematic through four steps: a summary of the theological proposal and its
relationship with the Western sociologies of religion; a search for a viable framework with which to
understand religions in post-secular societies; discussion on the "discourses of Asia" and the corresponding
view on religion; an elaboration of my preferred framework with some examples from the Asian situation. I
argue that a viable theological proposal on post-religional paradigm should start from the analysis of how
religious discourses and practices navigate with concrete socio-historical forces on the ground. Consequent
to this view is the assertion that there is no universal sociology/theology of religion's development but
multiple and complex religious discourses in specific contexts.
Keywords: Asian religions. Sociology of religion. Post-secular religions. Post-religonal paradigm
Resumo
Este artigo discute a relevância e aplicabilidade do "paradigma pós-religional", como proposto pela
Associação Ecumênica de Teólogos do Terceiro Mundo (EATWOT) no contexto asiático. Também indaga
sobre como o fenômeno asiático, e suas interpretações, está relacionado com a crise das religiões nas
sociedades ocidentais. Busca responder a essa problemática em quatro etapas: um resumo da proposta
teológica e sua relação com as sociologias da religião ocidental; a busca de um quadro viável para se
compreender as religiões nas sociedades pós-seculares; a discussão sobre os "discursos da Ásia" e a visão
correspondente sobre a religião; e a elaboração do meu quadro preferido com alguns exemplos da situação
asiática. Defendo que uma proposta teológica viável no paradigma pós-religional deve começar a partir da
análise de como os discursos e as práticas religiosas navegam com as forças sócio-históricas concretas da
realidade. Em decorrência dessa visão pode-se afirmar que não há nenhuma sociologia/teologia universal
do desenvolvimento da religião, mas múltiplos e complexos discursos religiosos em contextos específicos.
Palavras-chave: Religiões asiáticas. Sociologia da religião. Religiões pós-seculares.
Paradigma pós-religional.
Article received on November 03, 2014 and approved on March 04, 2015.
PhD in Systematic theology at the Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium, is currently the dean of St. Vincent School of Theology,
Philippines. Country of origin: Philippines. E-mail: danielfranklinpilario@yahoo.com.
**The author is indebted to the Center for World Catholicism and Intercultural Theology (CWCIT) of De Paul University (Chicago) for the
Senior Research Fellowship it granted during which this article was written. Thanks to Maricor Baytion for her helpful comments and
editorial suggestions.
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Introduction
We are experiencing the advent of a "post-religional" society, proclaims the
proposal-hypothesis of the International Theological Commission of EATWOT Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologian1 (EATWOT, 2012). The task
asked of me in this article is to inquire "whether the post-religional interpretation
of the current crisis of religion operates in the Asian context, at least in some
sectors of society, if not in the majority of the population. What is its prognosis in
Asia? How is this analysis related to the crisis in Western societies?" I would like to
answer these questions in four steps. First, I will try to elaborate the proposal vis-àvis other parallel Western paradigms. Second, I will forward three different
interpretations of the present phenomenon through some representative thinkers
on religion. Third, I will explore the repercussions of these theories in the discourse
of 'Asia'. Finally, in conclusion, I will expound e my preferred framework through
some examples from Asian contexts.
1 The Post-Religional Paradigm
EATWOT's post-religional paradigm describes its theological proposal
through a contemporary metaphor. As an airplane takes off and folds its wheels in,
it begins to rely on a new and totally different system - that of its wings. It is so with
humankind. As the old Neolithic religions cease to exist, human communities
undergo a difficult adjustment to a totally different axiological system. "The duty of
a responsible theology is to foresee these problems and try to accompany the
inevitable 'transit' in which we already find ourselves."(EATWOT, 2012, p. 273).
We can summarize the theological proposal in four main points. First,
religions have not always existed. Religion first appeared at the start of the
Neolithic era when the hunters and gatherers began to settle in agricultural
landscapes, thus, transforming their ways of life in new permanent territories.
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Second, Neolithic religions have recognizable characteristics , two of which are: (a)
an imposed mythical epistemology on believers backed up by "divine revelation" as
seen in its dogmas, morals and laws, turning the whole system into an ideologicalpolitical institution with absolute authority that demands full submission, and; (b)
a monopoly over human thought and spirituality backed up by the "book" with its
distinct interpretation of the world. How the EATWOT proposal defines religion
clarifies these attributes:
Religion is "socio-institutionalized configuration that
human religiosity (spirituality) of all times adopted in the Neolithic [era], through
which it has served as a fundamental system of programming and self-control of
Neolithic agrarian societies." (EATWOT, 2012, p. 264). Third, the present society is
in
transition
towards
the
"post-religional"
context.
Since
religions
are
"constructed", they are not eternal. Neolithic religions fade away with the
civilization that created it. Fourth, the post-religional paradigm is not only
descriptive but also normative. Since dying is a difficult process, we need to help
"religional religions" die well towards a death that gives
life to others
(ars
moriendi). In practical terms, there is a need to reconvert religions' "symbolic
patrimony" in order to adapt to new epistemological constellations. There is a need
to help people feel that they are
free from 'religional' bindings [so as] to unleash our personal and
collective fulfilment, to fully take responsibility for our decisions, our
interpretation at our risk, without any restriction or supposedly external
coercion, although worried to tune up to the Mystery that moves us.
(EATWOT, 2012, p. 267).
The theological proposal has two accompanying caveats on: (a) the
distinction between religion and spirituality, and; (b) the non-applicability of this
paradigm to all religions. First, the proponents are careful to distinguish religion
from spirituality. The terms used are crucial: the proposal is "post-religional" not
"post-religious". While religion is contingent, spirituality is permanent. While
religions come to exist at a certain time in history, spirituality is an intrinsic
characteristic of homo sapiens from the start of their existence (EATWOT, 2012, p.
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268).2 This explains why in the post-religional context, resurgence and revival of
spiritualities abound in what many contemporary thinkers call the 'reenchantment
of the world'. Certain forms of religions go but spirituality survives. The second
warning is that the post-religional paradigm does not apply to all religions. In this
analysis, there are religions that have not undergone agrarian revolutions, thus,
also not possessing Neolithic religion's specific hegemonic characteristics. What is
contemplated here are animist religions and indigenous beliefs (including
Hinduism) which do not display dogmatic-doctrinal dominance.
2 Framing the Discourse in a Wider Context
The theological proposal above is not at all novel in the field of theology and
social sciences. I would like to situate this discourse from the perspective of the
wider debate in the sociology of religions. First, the post-religional paradigm has
affinities with the evolutionary theories of religion. Second, it is also related to the
secularization debate in contemporary Western societies. In fact, the question
whether this phenomenon is happening in Asia or not is in part a Western
preoccupation. I will attempt to locate the post-religional paradigm in these
discourses in order to better understand its underlying assumptions.
2.1 Evolutionary Views of Religion
In recent years, we have seen the emergence of evolutionary theories of
religion, the most prominent proponent of which is the American sociologist,
Robert Bellah. In his latest book, Religion and Human Evolution (2011),3 Bellah
argues that religions evolve with human society as they adjust into its different
stages: tribal, archaic and axial ages. Religious development moves from pure ritual
2
"[R]eligions would be a specific socio-cultural configuration in which spirituality of human beings has been expressed for some time,
while spirituality would continue to be an essential dimension and a characteristic of the human being, that permanently and inevitably
accompanies him [sic] since its emergence as a species." (EATWOT, 2012, p.268).
3
This work that caps his academic career is a development of an earlier article on the same subject of religious evolution. Cf. BELLAH,
1964, p. 358-374. In another article, Bellah classifies religious evolution in five periods: primitive, archaic, historic, early modern,
modern/contemporary - a periodization that was already present in the 1964 article. Cf. BELLAH, 1991.
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(tribal) to the mythical (archaic) and the theoretical (axial). As it goes through
these phases, it conserves what has been developed so that "nothing is ever lost" in
the process (BELLAH, 2014). Crucial to this development is the Axial age which
makes religions universal, theoretical and critical. Axial religions eschew previous
tendencies to dominate as they critique the repressive status quo and advance
ethical ways of life. The four Axial civilizations (and religions) which Bellah
discusses are Ancient Israel, India, China and Greece whose civilizations and
literatures constitute a "breakthrough" in human thinking and cultures.
Other contemporary sociologists of religion follow Bellah's lead. In The
Great Transformation Karen Armstrong (2007) also discusses the development of
the Axial age as the foundation of our religious traditions. "During this period of
intense creativity, spiritual and philosophical geniuses pioneered an entirely new
kind of human experience."(BELLAH, 2007, p. xvi). Recovering this era leads us
to important directions religions should tread in our times. Armstrong is clear on
what these lessons are: personal responsibility and self-criticism to be followed by
effective action and compassion. Contrary to religion's usual emphasis on doctrine,
"what mattered was not what you believed but how you behaved."(BELLAH,
2007, p. xviii).
Bellah and Armstrong's focus on the Axial Age has been adapted from the
periodization put forward by the German philosopher Karl Jaspers (1954, p. 98104; 1953, p. 24-26). Jaspers theorized four basic segments of history: the
Promethean age (the use of language, the kindling of fire, the invention of tools);
the ancient high civilizations in Egypt and Mesopotamia (5000-3000 BCE); the
Axial Age (800-200 BCE); and the age of science and technology (medieval
Europe). What is crucial is the third segment; it is "the axis in history", the pivotal
age of civilization. This is the age of Confucius and Lao Tse in China; of the
Upanishads and Buddha in India; of Homer, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato in
Greece; of Zarathustra in Iran; and of the great prophets Elijah, Isaiah, Jeremiah in
Palestine. All these developments grew independently of one another. Jasper
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argues that during the Axial age, humans became “aware of being as a whole, of
himself and his limits... raised radical questions, approached the abyss in his drive
for liberation and redemption... and experienced the absolute in the depth of
selfhood and in the clarity of transcendence (JASPER, 1954, p. 99).
The evolutionary direction is common to EATWOT's post-religional
paradigm and Bellah's (and Armstrong's) works.4 Except for a change of names,
Bellah generally followed Jasper's periodization in order to bring out his triple
framework (play, myth and theory), the peak moment of which is the Axial period
(BELLAH; JOAS, 2012). The post-religional paradigm, for its part, also adheres to
this evolutionary scheme in its rough periodization from Paleolithic to Neolithic
and beyond. These contemporary directions are not a new trend in the sociology of
religion.
Anthropological and sociological sciences both privileged this
evolutionary worldview in the second half of the nineteenth century (TURNER,
2011, p. 285-301). That society (and its religions) develops from its "primitive"
stages to its more "civilized" ones has been a common refrain from Auguste Comte
to Herbert Spencer, from E. B. Tylor to J. G. Frazer.
Beyond their evolutionary commonalities, however, these two schemes
(Bellah and the post-religional paradigm)
move along divergent paths. First,
Bellah traces the origins of religions to as early as the Big Bang, the emergence of
life up to the point when homo sapiens learned to play, mimic rituals and narrate
cosmic and cultural myths. In Bellah's reflection, all these are stirrings of religion
as their "core processes" are conserved and carried over to the next stage of
development (JOAS, 2012).5 The post-religional paradigm, on the other hand,
thinks that even as spirituality/religiosity is co-extensive with humanity, religions
only began to be practiced during the Neolithic phase when humans started to
4
On Bellah's evolutionary religious paradigm, see WUTHNOW, 1992. Bellah, however, qualifies his position vis-à-vis the evolutionary
paradigm. It is not about the evolution of religion itself as the place of religion in the evolutionary process, thus, the revision of the title
of the work from "Religious Evolution" (BELLAH, 1964) to "Religion in Human Evolution" (BELLAH, 2011). Cf. JOAS, 2014. .
5
In an interview, Bellah explicates what is meant by the formula "nothing is ever lost" which keeps reappearing in his text. "It again
goes all the way back because the subatomic particles in our body were produced by the Big Bang, so parts of our body are 13.7 billion
years old. Every cell in our body is genealogically descended from single cell organisms, which we call familiarly “bacteria.” So even
biologically we haven’t lost anything. We’ve developed enormously new complex structures, but on the basis of things that remain
fundamental for us all around." This is true for cultures as it is for religion - from the way we deal with the body, with our myths and
narratives, with our theological and ethical theories (JOAS, 2012).
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settle in agrarian societies. In short, there was a (long) time when religions did not
exist at all. While Bellah's positive and evolutionary worldview assumes everything
toward the next stage, the post-religional paradigm feels obliged to discard
Neolithic religions when this civilizational phase is over. While Bellah's vision is
cumulative, the post-religional view consists of religio-cultural breaks and shifts.
This difference points to a larger epistemological debate on the notion of scientific
and cultural development. On the one hand, modern science has always been
viewed through the lens of evolutionary progress. Scientific, cultural and
intellectual progress developed through an evolving, continuous and cumulative
process. Like Bellah, "nothing is ever lost". Each new discovery leads to the
unravelling of the nature and truth of reality. On the other hand, Thomas Kuhn
attacked this evolutionary idea and argued that there is "no coherent direction of
ontological development" in science; one does not approach truth in a cumulative
manner. Newton is not a development of Aristotle and Einstein is not an evolution
of Newton. In fact, "Einstein's general theory of relativity is closer to Aristotle
than... to Newton." (KUHN, 1970, p. 206-207). Kuhn thinks that science moves
more through "revolutions" than evolution. In crisis moments, a new paradigm
appears which provides a better explanation for
new scientific, historical and
cultural constellations. This alternative paradigm does not build on old data;
rather, scientists "work in a different world" which is incommensurable with the
old. Science is thus not cumulative. When a new paradigm appears, the previous
one becomes obsolete. Thus, the phenomenon of the "dying of religions" in the
post-religional paradigm is nearer to Kuhn's notion of paradigm shifts than to
Bellah's.
A second observation follows the first. While Bellah views the Axial age as a
pivotal and positive development from which contemporary discussion needs to
learn, the post-religional paradigm assumes that the Axial age only reinforces the
authoritarian and hegemonic tendencies of Neolithic religions. These observations
are crucial because they point to two divergent views with which religions are seen
in these two paradigms. For Bellah and other thinkers like him, religion understood
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as mimetic, mythic and theoretic meaning-making has always been there from the
beginning and just needs to be recovered in order to help us answer questions of
our time. In contrast, the post-religional programmatic scheme hopes that these
religions will fade and die so that new liberating forms of spiritualities can arise.
We shall come back to engage these evolutionary paradigms in a discussion below.
2.2 Religions and Secularization
EATWOT's post-religional paradigm can also be read alongside the ongoing
lively debate on secularization and post-secularization in Western societies. The
words of the proposal-hypothesis sound ambivalent but a closer reading reveals a
parallel analysis.
The present crisis is not due to secularisation processes, or to a loss of
values, or to the dissemination of materialism or hedonism (blaming
interpretation usually held by religions' officers), neither to the lack of
testimony or to the moral scandals of religion, but to [the] birth of a new
cultural situation, that puts an end to the radical transformations of the
knowledge, axiological and epistemological Neolithic structures,
transformation that started with the scientific revolution in the XVI
century, the Enlightenment of the XVIII century and the various waves of
industrialisation. The symptoms that this gradual transformation
produces appear in ways such as certain diffuse agnosticism, loss of
epistemological ingenuity, a more accentuated critical sense, a more
utilitarian conceptualisation of religions as a service to the human being
instead of receptors of full loyalty from their members, the disappearance
of the idea of a “unique true religion” and a revealed moral (EATWOT,
2012, p. 270).
Despite its denial that the crisis of religion is not a consequence of
secularization processes, the "radical transformation" of "axiological and
epistemological
neolithic
structures"
starting
with
scientific
revolution,
Enlightenment and industrialization which the post-religional paradigm identifies
as reasons are in fact parallel to the secularization theories that date all the way to
the classical sociologists like Durkheim or Weber and contemporary thinkers like
Peter Berger, Bryan Wilson or Steve Bruce. According to these authors, there are
several processes that make possible the retreat of religions in modern society:
individualism, rationalization, bureaucracy, functional differentiation and religious
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pluralism (WARNER, 2010). The deterioration of the conscience collective in
modern societies as analyzed by Durkheim brings about individualism and
diminishes the practice of communal religion. Modernity's "iron cage of reason"
(bureaucratic rationality) according to Weber leads to efficient but also impersonal
systems that "[reduce] the worker
to a
cog in this bureaucratic machine."
(WEBER, 1978, p. lix). It also demolishes "the authority of magical powers...
which ultimately challenges all systems of belief." (WEBER, 1991, p. xxiv). Max
Weber's "disenchantment of the world" is parallel with what contemporary
thinkers like Peter Berger call the dissolution of the "sacred canopy" that provides a
common frame within which "all of social life receives ultimate meaning binding on
everybody."(BERGER, 1967, p. 134). Several contemporary authors follow Berger's
lead in proclaiming religion's death.6
But the secularization thesis is not without its critics. Many authors argue
for the resurgence of religion in postmodernity.7 Berger himself recanted his earlier
'secularist' position in The Sacred Canopy to the signals of the supernatural in The
Rumor of Angels (BERGER, 1969). He now thinks that "secularization may not be
as all-embracing as some have thought"; it is not absolute and unstoppable
(BERGER, 1969, p. 30). Ordinary life occurrences point us to transcendence ("the
beyond in our midst"): our propensity for order, play and humor, sense of hope,
capacity for moral outrage, etc. This post-secular discourse of the return of religion
has wide and diverse expressions ranging from the denial of secularization to reenchantment with art and cultures, from reappearance of religion in public life to
its engagement with politics, philosophy and theology.8
How does the post-religional paradigm handle the secularization debate? It
manages it by distinguishing religions from spirituality/religiosity. It believes that
agrarian-neolithic religions fade but spirituality is universal.
6
For an updated account of the secularization debate, see WARNER, 2010.
See KEPPEL, 1994; GREELY, 2003; THOMAS, 2005; MARTIN, 2002.
8
Another good overview of the post-secular reflection on religions is found in BECKFORD, 2012, p. 1-19; BERGER, 1999, p. 1-18.
7
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Religions are forms, historical, contingent, and changing, while
spirituality is a dimension that constitutes humanity, permanent, and
essential to the human being. Spirituality may be experienced within or
outside religions. We could do without religions, but we will never be able
to dispense with human being's dimension of transcendence (EATWOT,
2012, p. 266).
This assertion finds parallel expressions in some US-based groups that call
their movement "spiritual but not religious" (SBNR).9 Mostly composed of young
people (72% of Generation Y and Millennials), unchurched and spiritual eclectics,
SBNR bifurcates religion and spirituality into public and private, respectively.
Consequently, the privatization of belief makes institutional affiliation no longer
necessary.
Its European counterpart is called believing without belonging. Gracie
Davies who writes quite extensively on this issue argues that there is a gap between
the hard and soft indicators of religious life in Europe (DAVIE, 1994; 2000). Both
'believing' and 'belonging' have hard and soft dimensions.
For example, if you ask European populations — and here I’m generalizing
— do you believe in God, and you’re not terribly specific about the God in
question, you’ll get about 70 percent saying yes, depending where you are.
If you say, do you believe that Jesus Christ is the son of God, you’ll get a
much lower number. In other words, if you turn your question into a
creedal statement, the percentages go down. The looser your definition of
belief, the higher the percentage of believers (DAVIE, 2005).
The same is true with belonging. In terms of hard indicators like weekly
church attendance, the response would be less. But when the notion of belonging is
softened, as when they are asked r about their preferred place for funeral services,
many would stick to their church's affiliation. Generally, in Europe, "[t]he historic
churches are public utilities, and you expect public utilities to be there when you
need them." (DAVIE, 2005). This prompts another author to reverse the formula:
belonging without believing (HERVIEU-LÉGER, 2004, p. 101-119).
9
See FULLER, 2001; ERLANDSON, 2000; and "Examining the Growth of 'Spiritual but not Religious'," The New York Times, July 18, 2014
(OPPENHEIMER, 2014)..
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In short, while EATWOT's post-religional proposal hails the death of
religions in consonance with secularization theories, it also welcomes different
expressions of religiosities as forms of the new cultural configuration together with
the post-secular discourses. Unlike the post-religional paradigm, however, not all
post-secular discourses clearly distinguish religion from spirituality (i.e., with the
religions 'dying' and spiritualities slowly emerging). While the US version
maintains the public-private spaces for religion and spirituality respectively,
religions do not actually disappear. Traditional religions continue to exist though
no longer popularly practiced in public by the majority of the members. The
European experience also strategically retains public religions when these become
quite helpful for the "rainy days", as it were. Moreover, secular public rituals like
royal weddings or World Cup finals, most of which are well-attended, also take on
new 'religious' forms that demand devout, almost fanatical, allegiance.
Let me summarize my arguments thus far. The plot has continually
thickened in the secularization debate and the post-religional paradigm is complicit
with it. Originally, the secularization thesis purported to have an evolutionary,
universalist and progressive inevitability. With the coming of modernity, religions
were envisioned to eventually disappear. Atheism was supposed to be the end
game. But it is precisely this modern prediction that is put into question by postsecular discourses. Instead of being disenchanted, the world is in fact reenchanted. Instead of being secularized, it is in fact desecularized. Not only are
there multiple "modernities", there are also multiple "secularities" that bring about
multiple "religious identities". There has been no one direction. 10 Religions did not
undergo a radical break caused by one local experience of European Enlightenment
since there were as many modernities as there were cultures. As modernities
interacted with religions, both transformed each other such that a part of each died
10
José Casanova gives this insightful observation: "In our global age, it has become increasingly evident that European secular
developments are not a universal norm for the rest of the world; that, as the rest of the world modernizes, people are not becoming
more secular like us, but are becoming more religious - or, actually, they are becoming simultaneously both more secular and more
religious, which of course only confuses our binary categories. But once it becomes obvious that the secularization of Europe is,
comparatively speaking, rather exceptional, the old theory that explained Europe's secularity in terms of its modernity is no longer
plausible." (CASANOVA, 2013, p.54)
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and another part arose anew. Or, better still (and this point differs from the postreligional praradigm), maybe there was no dying and rising, but instead a mutual
negotiation and transformation in differing contexts. Some call the present
moment a "twilight"; others think of it as the "dawn" of human experience
(CASANOVA, 2010, p. 265-281). Some call it "decline"; others call it "revival" or
"resurgence" of new religions.
From the perspective of the Western experience of monotheistic religions,
this polytheistic phenomenon is viewed either as "crisis" of religions (as the postreligional paradigm calls it) that causes upheaval or it is a trend that is so novel and
postmodern which calls for some celebration. But for non-Western peoples,
immersed as they are in pluralist and multi-religious universes, what is happening
in the West looks like "the old state of affairs." (CASANOVA, 2006). It has always
been this way ever since in their own contexts. Whichever view one takes, however,
depends upon the theoretical paradigm one adapts vis-à-vis both religion and
secularity. This brings me to the next point.
3 Theorizing Religions in a Post-Secular Society
However the present situation is called, all descriptions point to a "postsecular" society. It is this phenomenon that preoccupies the contemporary
academic scene. While the EATWOT theological proposal calls it 'post-religional',
some authors calls it 'post-secular'. Both the post-religional paradigm and
(post)secular theories trace this development to the beginning of Enlightenment
and the modern age. The present state of religious resurgence, i.e., the "rumor of
angels" in the secular city, is viewed either as a break away from or as a
radicalization of previous stages of development. What frameworks do
contemporary thinkers use in order to understand this post-secular phenomenon?
I can recognize three general directions: (a) return to religion in secular modernity;
(b) dialectical confrontation between modernity and religion; and (c) analysis of
actual practices in their power-laden contexts. I will try to elaborate these
directions by discussing some selected thinkers in order to bring out what for me is
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a viable framework in the understanding of this post-religious/post-secular
phenomenon in the Asian context.
3.1 Return to Religion
The first position is heavily forwarded by the Radical Orthodoxy group with
John Milbank as its representative thinker. His influential book Theology and
Social Theory (MILBANK, 2006)11 attempts to dismantle the works of modernity in
secular politics, capitalist economy, sociology, dialectical philosophy and
postmodernity (all offspring of the Enlightenment) in order to recover the
displaced Christendom and its offer of absolute ontological peace. Milbank begins
his narrative with a programmatic "once upon a time" phrase:
Once there was no secular. And the secular was not latent, waiting to fill
more space with the steam of the 'purely human', when the pressure of the
sacred was relaxed. Instead there was the single community of
Christendom with its dual aspects of sacerdotium and regnum
(MILBANK, 2006, p. 9).
Against the secularization thesis, Milbank thinks that society has no purely
human dimension waiting to be uncovered, obscured as it is with the medieval
religious hegemony. He rightly argues that the "social" of modern social theory
"was in itself as unreal, unhistorical and quasi-theological category."(MILBANK,
2006, p. xii). In agreement with post-secular thinkers, Milbank contends that the
secular actually needed to be invented, constructed and imagined starting from
Hugo Grotius's etsi Deus non daretur to the modern sociological project of
"disenchantment". Milbank maintains that the secular has "positioned" theology.
"If theology no longer seeks to position, qualify or criticize other discourses, then it
is inevitable that that these discourses will position theology.” (MILBANK, 2006, p.
1). His postmodern project thus was a Christian attempt to recover religion from
11
A whole group of theologians called Radical Orthodoxy can be grouped together with Milbank under this heading (return to religion).
Cf. MILBANK; PICKSTOCK; WARD, 1998; MILBANK; OLIVER, 2009. For my full analysis of Milbank's and Radical Orthodoxy's postmodern
project, see PILARIO, 2005.
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such displacement in modern times, or to use Loughlin's metaphor, it is one hero's
"quest of a stolen crown". Once upon a time, theology was the queen of sciences.
But the crown was stolen from her by modern social theory. It is time to recover it
(LOUGHLIN, 1992).12 Even as Milbank thinks his position is in fundamental
agreement with that of Charles Taylor's in his analysis of the secular age, he
(unlike Taylor) still longs for a possible return of Christendom in a global scale.
"One could therefore optimistically conclude that only a more benign, more festive
Christianity could ever hope to re-establish a new and now global Christendom."
(MILBANK, 2010, p. 82). I have shown elsewhere why Milbank's postmodern
theology is in reality a nostalgic return to the premodern and medieval
Christendom. (PILARIO, 2005).
But Milbank is not alone. He aligns his work with the theological project of
Joseph Ratzinger, then to become Pope Benedict XVI. Though Ratzinger is more
nuanced than Milbank on the relationship between faith and political reason by
saying that both reason and faith have their own pathologies (HABERMAS;
RATZINGER, 2006), he also believes that the Christian's special relationship to the
'transcendent truth' through their faith in Christ makes them avoid all modern
political totalitarianism as "they always have a Lord, a task, a standard, that
transcends the party and its norms." (RATZINGER, 2009, p. 56). In the end, the
common thread that runs in the minds of both thinkers (and in agreement with the
secularization thesis) is that the hegemonic dominance of modern secular theory is
responsible for the decline of religion. However, unlike the secularization theory
which sings dirges of religion's demise, Milbank (and Ratzinger) intends to
resurrect religion's influence on its own terms in our post-secular society since it is
only this faith that has affinity to truth.
12
"Once upon a time, it was theology that wore the crown, theology that carried out most of the fundamental reading of all other
interpretations and all other social formations... It was the master narrative. Stolen by secular reason, and worn as 'social theory', the
master-narrative is now sought by its earlier owner." (LOUGHLIN, 1992, p. 366).
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3.2 Dialectical Confrontation
Unlike the first position, the second direction represented by Jürgen
Habermas and Charles Taylor confronts modernity head-on and proposes a
dialectical interaction with it. Habermas was responsible for placing the term
"post-secular" on the academic screen (HABERMAS, 2008).13 In his earlier works,
he rejoiced in the fact the communicative rationality in the secular public sphere
has replaced religion or national sentiments (its irrationality and fanaticism
included) as the integrating factor of the social body. In recent works (HABERMAS,
2006; HABERMAS, 2008; HABERMAS, 2010), however, he argues for a dialogue
between secular reason and religions, recognizing that both religious and secular
mentalities help in the building of a humane society. In this updated view, bringing
religious discourse into the public sphere not only makes religious people feel
"included", but also enlists religious resources in the forging of public life. For this
dialogue to happen, religious citizens should be able to accept the natural
conditions of modern society, e.g., pluralism, the rule of law, the authority of
science, and others. Believers should also be able to translate their religious
language into an understandable secular idiom that can resonate in the public
sphere. The secularists, for their part, also need to acknowledge that religions
possess some truth as their own contribution so social emancipation. "Secular
citizens are expected not to exclude a fortiori that they may discover, even in
religious utterances, semantic contents and covert personal intuitions that can be
translated and introduced into a secular discourse." (HABERMAS, 2008, p. 29).
This complementary learning process frees people from their religious and
cultural closed universes so that all citizens "mutually recognize one another in
civil society as members of one and the same political community." (HABERMAS,
2008, p. 22-23).
13
For the conversation between Ratzinger and Habermas on religion and modernity, see HABERMAS; RATZINGER, 2006. For a critical
commentary on the work of Habermas on religion, see CALHOUN; MENDIETA; VANANTWERPEN, 2013.
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Charles Taylor's celebrated work A Secular Age (TAYLOR, 2007)14 pushes
this argument to its consequences. Although Taylor acknowledges his affinity with
Milbank and the Radical Orthodoxy project, unlike Milbank, Taylor does not wish
to turn the clock back in nostalgia. He analyzes secularity and searches within it the
possibility of transcendence. While Habermas stops in acknowledging the
possibility of truth-contents of religious resources, Taylor sees the possibility of
transcendence in what he calls the "immanent frame". Or, to combine images from
previous authors, Taylor believes that the "rumor of angels" can in fact be heard
within the "secular city". One commentator calls Taylor's position as "immanent
transcendentalism". (MCLELLAN, 2010, p. 52-56). Against modernity's exclusive
humanism or closed immanence, Taylor argues for something "beyond": beyond
human flourishing, maybe a higher power which we call "God" or an extension of
our life beyond birth and death (TAYLOR, 2007, p. 20).
Beyond Milbank's
exclusive Christendom, Taylor is also open to the presence of transcendence in
Hindu, Muslim and Buddhist contexts. Against Habermas, however, Taylor refuses
to use the term 'post-secular'. One of the original contributions of his work is his
notion of Secularism 3: "a move from a society where belief in God is unchallenged
and indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is understood to be one option
among others, and frequently not easiest to embrace." (TAYLOR, 2007, p. 3). For
Taylor, secularization thus does not only refer to the decline of religious practice or
the consignment of religion into the private (which is the main tenet of main
secularization theories), but also to the "conditions of belief", that is, the fact that
"belief" comes to be seen as one mere option among the many. If secularization is
understood this way, the word "post-secular" already becomes superfluous if used
to describe the present situation as the term is already incorporated into
secularism's meaning (WARNER, 2010, p. 22-23). I am aware that summarizing
the complex content of Taylor's magisterial book in a few paragraphs does not do
justice to this voluminous work of a lifetime. But identifying the main directions of
its arguments can help us assess its viability in our theorizing of religions in the
Asian contexts. I will come back to the assessment below but let me just point out
14
For a critical commentary on this work, see WARNER; VANANTWERPEN; CALHOUN, 2010.
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one obvious lacuna in Taylor's work: his silence about other cultures beyond the
European-North American contexts and other religions beyond Latin Christendom,
thus, giving the impression that the otherwise eloquent work is an ethnocentric
discourse.
3.3 Analyzing Discourses in Context
The third position vis-à-vis the post-secular phenomenon is the genealogical
method done by Talal Asad, a New York-based anthropologist with Saudi Arabian
and Pakistani roots. Two of his crucial works that bring about his analysis are the
Genealogies of Religion (ASAD, 1993) and Formation of the Secular (ASAD,
2003). While Milbank proclaims that the 'secular' is an invented category, Asad
argues that 'religion' is also a constructed concept. Not that religion did not exist
ever since but that the notion of 'universal' religion is a modern category and is not
helpful at all in the realistic analysis of its movement in the social body. Let me
summarize Asad's complex work in three crucial points: (a) universalist and
transhistorical notions of "religion" are not viable; (b) "modernity" and "secularity"
are not univocal and homogenous realities, and; (b) in order to understand both,
we do not analyze universal "values and meanings", but particular "religious" and
"modern" sentiments and practices in their actual power-laden social and historical
contexts.
First, Asad takes issue with Clifford Geertz's universalist but also dualistic
definition of religion as external "systems of symbols" which effect internal "moods
and motivations" in the participants (GEERTZ, 1973). This interpretivist and
psychological approach to religion, Asad claims, is forgetful of the fact that power
creates religion.
How does power create religion? To ask this question is to seek an answer
in terms of the social disciplines and social forces which come together at
particular historical moments, to make particular religious discourses,
practices and spaces possible... Universal definitions of religion hinder
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such investigations because and to the extent that they aim at identifying
essences when we should be trying to explore concrete sets of historical
relations and processes (ASAD, 1983, p.252).
Transhistorical notions of religion, because of its universalizing and
essentializing mode,15 detach us from the cognition of the domains of power
inherent in religious practices and discourses.
Second, the notion of the "secular" and the "modern" prevalent in
secularization theories and post-secular discourses also falls into the same trap. For
instance, "modernity" (which is often contrasted with "tradition") has always been
understood as homogeneous reality with some common identifiable elements that
hang together. In terms of social structures, these would be elements of
industrialization, secularization, democracy. Modernity is also identified as one
philosophical project from Descartes to Habermas. Or, it consists of specific
psychological or aesthetic experiences (e.g., Kant's universal taste and aesthetic
judgment, etc.). And since these aspects of Western modernity have come together
historically in Europe (and North America), "all these things must and should fall
together in the rest of the world." (ASAD, 1996).16 Like religion, values then become
essentialized and get to be contrasted with each other, e.g., "modernity"
(progressive, evolving and scientific) vs. "tradition" (unchanging, repetitive and
non-rational), and the mixing of the two in any social order is viewed as either as
"pathological" (reactionary) or "still in the process" of development towards the
Promised Land of modern Paradise. A parallel problem is found in the contrast
between the "secular" and the "sacred". Asad argues that the secular is not a
development of or a break from the religious because the secular and the religious
have always co-existed in time. (ASAD, 2003).17
In a sense, modernity and
15
The movement towards universalization of religion is traced by Asad to Immanuel Kant: "But there can only be one religion which is
valid for all men and at all times. Thus the different confessions can scarcely be more than the vehicles of religion; these are fortuitous,
and may vary with differences in time or place." (KANT, 1991, p. 114; apud ASAD, 1993, p. 42).
16
See also ASAD, 2003.
17
"The secular, I argue, is neither continuous with the religious that supposedly preceded it (that is, it is not the latest phase of sacred
origin) nor a simple break from it (that is, it is not the opposite, an essence that excludes the sacred). I take the secular to be a concept
that brings together certain behaviors, knowledges, and sensibilities in modern life. To appreciate this it is not enough to show that
what appears to be necessary is really contingent - that in certain respects the 'secular' obviously overlaps the 'religious'. It is a matter
of showing how contingencies relate to changes in the grammar of concepts - that is, how the changes in concepts articulate changes in
practices." (ASAD, 2003, p. 15).
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tradition (as with the secular and the religious) are not mutually exclusive states of
society's cultural evolution but different aspects of its grounded historicity.
Third, Asad thus proposes an analytical approach which begins not by
identifying the prevalence or absence of some universal essences, symbolic
meanings or transhistorical values, but "by asking what are the historical
conditions (movements, classes, institutions, ideologies) necessary for the
existence of particular religious [and other] practices and discourses." (ASAD,
1983, p. 252). Thus, in analyzing rituals, beliefs or practices, there is a need to
reconstruct the actual historical conditions that make possible the existence of
these realities and how social power sanctions some meanings and marginalizes or
excludes others. This means that what is 'religious' and what is 'secular' can never
be understood outside the actual context of social forces that constitute it. Until
this happens, Asad argues, "We shall not make much headway in understanding
agency." (ASAD, 1993, p. 167). True to his non-essentializing project, Asad
decouples the binaries with which 'religion' has been paired in prevalent scientific
discourses: sacred vs. profane, transcendent vs. immanent, religious vs. secular.
These binary categories are constant in most theories we have discussed above from Bellah to Berger, from Milbank and Ratzinger to Habermas and Taylor. If
what is 'religious' or 'secular' depends on the socio-historical powers that construct
them at specific historical moments, these binaries do not lend themselves to
universal meanings, thus, making it impossible to inquire about their constant
interrelation outside of their concrete social conditions. Asad can doubtlessly agree
with José Casanova's observation:
The sacred tends to be immanent in pre-axial cultures; the transcendent is
not necessarily ‘religious’ in some axial civilizations. The secular is by no
means profane in our secular age. One only needs to think of such
sacralized secular phenomena as nation, citizenship and human rights
(CASANOVA, 2009, p. 1062-1063).18
18
Though there is a debate between Talal Asad and José Casanova, I think their positions are complementary as Casanova himself
acknowledges. Cf. CASANOVA, 2006, p. 12-30.
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To summarize, we have outlined three approaches to understand the decline
and resurgence of religions in post-secular society. The first position is critical of
the modernization-secularization process as it causes the retreat of religion.
Milbank's project (and to some extent Ratzinger's) is to recover religion's
(understood as Christianity) leading position it once had in the social space. Even
as it effectively analyzes the power of modernity to impose its hegemony over
religion and to enlist the faith towards its secularist project, its option to re-assert
religious hegemony is not viable in contemporary pluralist and global universes.
Worse, it can be seen as a last-ditch attempt to regain a hopelessly losing battle to
re-establish once more a new metanarrative that will outplay the rest. The second
position seeks a direct confrontation with modern secularity proposing an honest
negotiation between religious and secularist worldviews (Habermas) at the same
time seeking transcendence in the "immanent frame" (Taylor). Though laudable,
this originally European Enlightenment project also seeks to impose its modern
narrative on the rest of the world. In short, it is saying, if the West has undergone
this, the rest of the world will follow suit. The third position refuses to essentialize
the social realities it analyzes - be it religion, secular modernity, etc. Asad believes
that these phenomena, their concrete practices and their narratives are
constructed, products as they are of intersecting power relations in specific
historical contexts. If we want to assess the state of religion vis-à-vis modernity, for
instance, we need to appraise its specific socio-historical conditions of possibility. I
feel that this last position is crucial to the question posed at the start: "Is Asia a
post-religional society?"
4 The Discourse of Asia
Despite the theories' divergences, (post)secularization, as we have shown
above, is very much a Western debate. The main task of this article is to investigate
whether this is also an ‘Asian’ phenomenon. 19 But which Asia? There are practically
19
I have used this specific mapping of the 'Asian' discourses in a previous article and adjusted the discussion to fit the present
problematic. Cf. PILARIO, 2007, p. 24-53.
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two ways of looking at Asia: the imperialist discourse of "Orientalist Asia" and the
"Asianist Asia" of the Asian values discourse. The answer to the question of postreligionality of Asia heavily depends on the position one takes in the "discourse of
Asia".
4.1 (Neo)Orientalist Asia: Imperial Discourse
The ‘idea of Asia’ did not first come from Asia. It was a European invention
(HUI, 2005; HUI, 2006; MILNER; JOHNSON, 1997; MCLNNES, 1998). In the 18th
and 19th century, the human sciences (linguistics, historiography, political
philosophy, geography, etc.) upheld a teleological vision of history consistent with
modern enlightenment and the colonial project. The idea of Asia that this project
produced is what I call ‘Orientalist Asia’. ‘Orientalism,’ as Edward Said describes it,
is the imperial West’s manner of writing about the Orient – its colonized other
(SAID, 1995). The main problem of Orientalist discourse is its essentialized
binarism – a way of describing the East as a total contrast of the West.20 Thus,
thinkers like Adam Smith, Hegel and Marx viewed Asia as a binary opposite of (but
also as mere preparation for) the achievements of Europe: Asian multi-ethnic
empires against the European sovereign monarchy; Oriental political tyranny vs.
the Western rationalized juridical system; Asian agrarian mode of production vs.
European cosmopolitan-urban trading. Since Europe was ‘the end of history’, Asia
is incorporated to its ‘beginnings’, thus, also relegating it to the realm of
‘prehistory’. In his Philosophy of History, Hegel, for instance, writes:
The history of the world travels from East to West, for Europe is
absolutely the end of history, Asia is the beginning… The East knew and to
the present day knows that One is free; the Greeks and the Roman world,
that some are free; the German world knows that All are free. The first
20
“From its earliest modern history to the present, Orientalism as a form of thought for dealing with the foreign has typically shown the
altogether regrettable tendency of any knowledge based on such hard-and-fast distinctions as ‘East’ and ‘West’: to channel thought
into a West and East compartment. Because this tendency is right at the center of Orientalist theory, practice and values found in the
West, the sense of Western power over the Orient is taken for granted as having status of scientific truth.” (SAID, 1995, p. 46).
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political form, therefore, which we observe in History is Despotism, the
second Democracy and Aristocracy, the third Monarchy (HEGEL, 1956,
p. 103-104)
In the Wealth of Nations (SMITH, 2000), Adam Smith laid out the same
teleological view when he mapped out civilization into four stages – i.e., hunting,
nomadic, agricultural and commercial epochs. The North American Indians were
in the hunting stage – the “lowest and rudest state of society”. The Tartars and
Arabs (Orientals) belong to the nomadic stage; the Greeks and Romans to the
agricultural stage (although he also mentioned China in this level). History thus
ended with Europe as it reached the epoch of modern commerce. Karl Marx was no
exception. He also mapped out history into four phases – Asiatic, primitive, feudal
and capitalist stages. In Asia, there is no revolutionary force to propel the
proletarian revolution. With no private ownership of land, there will be no social
class, thus, no class conflict which for Marx is the motor of history. In Asia, history
thus is ‘stagnant’ as its culture. But all these generalizations about Asia were
already a product of a long intellectual history of European modern thinking about
its dominated ‘other’: the prevalence of common ownership of land, the lack of
legal structures, predominance of religion, absence of aristocratic culture,
prevalence of slavery, isolated village life, importance of agriculture over industry,
stagnant history (ANDERSON, 1979).21 Max Weber, despite his toying around with
Confucianism as the Asian counterpart of the Calvinist ethic, still thinks that the
Asian mind is typically arbitrary and unstable as contrasted to the rational
character of Western law, science and industry (TURNER, 1974). It is this
essentialist idea of an ‘unchanging’, ‘religious’ and ‘mysterious’ Asia that has
become a haven for Western romantics, utopians and vegetarians in quest of an
alternative lifestyle or peace of mind – still a part of a continuing Orientalist
discourse.
21
The contrast between ‘Europe’ and ‘Asia’ has long been a feature of the European imagination. Arnold Toynbee writes that the
Greek historian Herodotus already accounted for the long-standing rivalry between ‘Europe’ and ‘Asia’. See TOYNBEE, 1954. In many
other European writings, ‘Asiatic’ means ‘splendor’, ‘vulgarity’, and ‘arbitrary authority’. Europe was correlated with science, weaponry
and Christianity while ‘Asia’ was connected with ornate vestments, camels and monkeys. The philosophe Montesquieu links Europe
with progress and Asia with stagnation. Cf. HAY, 1957.
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Are these early modern conceptions still being reproduced in contemporary
discourses? Is there such a thing as ‘neo-Orientalist Asia’? In popular culture,
contemporary mass media (e.g., films, TV news reporting, print media, etc.) is
awash in neo-Orientalist images.22 During the Asian ‘economic crisis’ in the late
1990s, the public was bombarded with an image of Asia as ‘naturally’ linked to
“corruption, inefficiency, incompetence” – attitudes which are incompatible with
Western capitalist ethos. This supposedly was the cause of their downfall. The same
Orientalist but also racist perspective has been reinforced in the political field after
9/11 bombing when Asians – mainly of Islamic affiliation – are casually described
as ‘terrorists’.
I argue that the same 'Orientialist' direction can also be discerned in the
sociological discourses of religion. The post-religion paradigm, Bellah's (and
Armstrong's) accounts of religious development and the secularization debates all
share in the evolutionary framework which when applied to Asian religions
necessary bears out an 'Orientalist' analysis. Let us mention three observations.
First, Bellah's concept of "religion" throughout different stages of humankind's
cultural development (that is, from tribal to archaic to axial eras) is rightly pointed
out by José Casanova's as essentialist and universalist (CASANOVA, 2012). The
Latin category religio, which was coined only a little over two thousand years ago,
has constantly changed in the whole of Western history. Most non-Western
cultures do not even have an indigenous equivalent term so much so that
neologisms had to be invented in order to designate an imposed foreign category
(e.g., shukyo in Japanese or zongjiao in Chinese). But hardly does Bellah's analysis
hint at this difficulty. Moreover, human religious sensibilities have been modified,
altered, revised or subverted throughout the ages depending on their encounter
with power and cultures, but the same category called "religion" - no matter how
contradictory or equivocal, in the different phases of the evolution - comes to be
identified as the same essential reality in Bellah's discourse.
22
See analysis of films Gunga Din (1939) and Blood Oath (1988) and samples of contemporary news reporting as expressions of neoOrientalism in BIRCH; SCHIRATO; SRIVASTAVA, 2001, p. 1-13; also IWAMURA, 2011.
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Second, the evolutionary worldview inherent in secularization theories more
obviously exhibits an Orientalist view of Asian religions. The "mystic East", the
"mysterious Asia" or the "Oriental spiritual civilization" are but just few categories
used to describe the Asian religious phenomena (KING, 1999). These essentialist
categories of Oriental religions are posited vis-à-vis the West. While the East is still
mystic, traditional and religious, the West is already scientific, progressive and
rational
-
reminiscent
of
Comte's
evolutionary
categories
('theological',
'metaphysical' and 'positivist' civilizational phases) or of James Frazer's 'magic',
'religion' and science'. The running argument is this: when Asia has reached a
specific stage of modern development, what happened in the West with regard to
religion will also come about.
Third, we have seen how the secularization thesis has been disproven even
by Western post-secular authors themselves. But even these post-secular
discourses exhibit ethnocentric and universalist tendencies. Habermas thinks that
the 'post-secular' is another historical phase that now accommodates religious
voices in the public space, thus, also normative for the whole of history. The
secularist progression of consciousness
that sees modernity - whether or not finished and whether a project or an
achievement - as involving a linear, and irreversible, progress away from
the 'premodern'. This linear temporality is reflected in the - still predominant pictures of scientific progress, societal emancipation, and
functional differentiation that also inform Habermas' writings
(LEEZENBERG, 2010, p. 95).
In the same vein, Charles Taylor's account of secularism in the context of
Euro-Atlantic Christianity in A Secular Age is also assessed as normative
(MAHMOOD, 2010). The focus on "Latin Christendom" and its pair, the "North
Atlantic civilization", as forces of secularity also hint at its universalist claims. Even
as Taylor is critical of Christianity's identification with the civilization project, he
uncritically uses essentialist concepts like "primitive religion" of the "past of
mankind", Karl Jaspers' "axial age" and its progressive notion of history, etc.
"Perhaps what is most surprising is Taylor's consistent movement (or slippage?)
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throughout the book from the particularity of Christianity to its universalist
transcendence." (MAHMOOD, 2010, p. 292). And inasmuch as EATWOT's postreligional paradigm shares in this evolutionary and essentialist directions, its
inquiry into Asian religions almost automatically becomes ‘Orientalist’ starting
from the question itself up to all its attempted responses.
4.2 ‘Asianism’: Asian Values Debate
Beyond Orientalist and neo-Orientalist discourses, a distinctly ‘Asian idea of
Asia’ started in Japan during the later part of the 19 th century. “Asia is one,”
declares Okakura Tenshin (1862-1913), a Japanese art historian. He claims that the
‘Asiatic race’ (i.e., Indian and Chinese civilizations) aspires for the ‘ultimate and
universal’ while, in contrast, the Mediterranean and Baltic maritime peoples strive
for the ‘particular’, for the means rather than the end (MILNER; JOHNSON, 1997,
p. 1). However, another group of Japanese writers under Yukichi Fukuzawa (18351901) popularized what came to be known as “Departure from Asia” program
(MIWA, 1968). He wanted to establish Japan like the European nation-states by
separating itself from the tributary system of the Confucian China. But this plan
was not to Europeanize Asia. It was in reality an act of confronting Europe within
the terrain of its own discourse (the nation-state), as it were. It is also in this
context that we can understand a latter-day Japanese ideology on the “East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere” during World War II. It also aimed to recover the "ancient
glory of the spiritual life of Asian peoples", "eschew dependence on Europe and
America" and foster a "new Oriental capitalist culture" (TEIJI, 1975).
In India, two writers stand out: Vivekanda (1863-1902) and Rabindranath
Tagore, the Nobel Prize-winning Indian poet. Vivekanda claims that while the West
produces giants in science and politics, Asia is well-known for its giants in
spirituality. All throughout his life, Tagore was devoted to the promotion of
the ‘spiritual civilization of the East’. In China, Sun Yat-Sen (1866-1925) launched
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his “Great Asianism” project in 1924 as he praised the Japanese victory over Russia
as reawakening the hope of independence of all Asian nations from Europe (YATSEN, 2014). The ‘Asian way’ departs from the idea of a culturally homogenous
Confucian Asia. What was aimed at was a heterogeneous and multicultural Asia
consisting of independent and equal nation-states accommodating all religious,
cultural and economic differences. Therefore, Sun Yat-Sen’s “Great Asianism” (or
Pan-Asianism) posed itself as a critique to the Japanese “East Asianism” project. In
other words, even as Sun Yat-Sen’s notion of Asia is essentialist, it was in fact more
open to internationalism than the distinctly Japanese Confucian dream.
This same direction plays itself again in our times: the “Asian values
debate”.23 The ‘Asian values’ proponents believe in this basic tenet – that a set of
‘Asian values’ is shared by peoples in the East Asian and Southeast Asian region.
Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Mahathir Mohammad of Malaysia are two of its
passionate proponents. These ‘Asian values’ roughly are: (1) importance of the
community over the individual; (2) stress on order and harmony over personal
freedom; (3) religion as an inherent dimension of society; (4) thrift, frugality and
hard work; (5) family loyalty, respect for authority, etc (HOON, 2004). The
proponents also believe that these mainly Confucian values are the reasons behind
the ‘Asian economic miracle’ and the rise of ‘Asian tigers’. The above enumeration
is not an innocent assertion. The binaries are made in contradistinction to ‘values
of the West’ which are excessive individualism, lack of discipline, individualized
religion, hedonism and low regard for authority and family. In other words, it is
now Asian’s turn to critique the West in an act of self-assertion. Against
Fukuyama's "end of history" discourse, ‘Asian values’ proponents argue that
capitalism can also flourish without subscribing to liberal democracy. The West
should not go about imposing its version of democratic values and human rights.
Liberal democracy and Western decadence, as practiced in the West today, are in
fact harmful to capitalist modernity. ‘Asian values’ are then called upon to save it.
23
For some literature on the development of this debate, see, among others, SUBRAMANIAM, 2000, p. 19-35; HARPER, 1997, p. 507517; BARR, 2000, p. 309-334.
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In order to assert Asian values, ancient religions in Asia are summoned to
provide some religious horizons. For instance, values like family orientation, selfcultivation, and respect for authority, discipline and harmony are traced back to
Confucian ethics. Confucianism is viewed in a threefold manner - as a philosophy,
popular source of everyday values, and political ideology. In Singapore, for
instance, academic discourse focuses on the first two backed up by the third (i.e.,
State ideology) (CHONG, 2002). In China, there has been an observed Confucian
renaissance among the population: worship of Confucius in local governments,
revival of Confucian classics and Confucian academies, popularity of traditional
folk festivals. Though not as systematic as in Singapore and Malaysia, it (?) gains
currency because of the tacit support of the Communist party which shifted its
discourse from a hardliner Marxist ideology to notions of "harmonious society" and
"peaceful rise" (CHEN, 2012). In all these cases, Confucianism has been
constructed so as to counter Western influence on Asian societies - a move parallel
to Orientalism, but in reverse mode. Some authors call it "Occidentalism". To take
another example, going back to Islamic roots means putting up a strong resistance
to the inroads of Western modernity in some Middle Eastern and Asian societies.
But the summoning of these values also runs parallel to essentialist
Orientalist discourse. The Asian ideal of a "heroic revolutionary" is contrasted with
the Western carefree and rootless bourgeois; the Asian faith-filled community
against a Western civilization which is "all reason without a soul"; the Asian
organic vision against the Western mechanical worldview, etc. (BURUMA;
MARGALIT, 2005). Such movements of return to Asian religions prove no
different from Milbank's and Ratzinger's project of selective recovery of
Christendom as defense against the threat of plural nihilist and inimical
(post)modern forces that come knocking at its gates. The Hindutva (Hindu-ness)
as an ideology that defines Indian identity through Hindu values is another
case in point. Articulated as an ideology in 1920s, it became popular when it was
assumed by a political party (BJP). Hindutva calls upon Hindu values and
marshals them against Muslims, Christians and other minorities considered as
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"invaders". The Hindutva nationalist movement is considered as rightist, fascist,
and encourages violence as acts of self-defense against these foreign aggressors
(ILAIAH, 1996; BIDWAI, 2008; RATAN, 1998). We recall that the EATWOT postreligional paradigm exempts Hinduism from the list of doctrinally controlling
Neolithic religions. Hinduism, it says, is "a religion without truths" (EATWOT,
2012, p. 271). In fact, EATWOT's bifurcation of "religions" and "spirituality"
reminds us of Geertz' dualistic and essentialist definition of religion as external
symbols vs. internal motivations and meanings. Insofar as the post-religional
paradigm essentializes "religion" and "spirituality" in its discourse and forgets an
actual analysis of power that makes the discourse possible, it falls into the same
trap as these strategic religious and cultural revivals.
4.3 Beyond (Neo)Orientalism and Asianism
Let me summarize the arguments made thus far. When we wanted to ask if
Asia is a 'post-religional society’, we first determined which ‘Asia’ we are talking
about. We have identified two main discourses on the ‘idea of Asia’: neo-Orientalist
Asia and Asianist Asia. The first is a Western discourse about its colonized peoples;
the second is Asia’s self-representation vis-à-vis its (neo)colonizers. These
discourses exercise real consequences on which religions are discussed, mobilized
and classified. Different as these two positions are, they in fact converge on some
common glaring difficulties.24 First, both of them came to be used as ideological
tools to maintain some sense of dominance over its ‘other’. The Orientalist and
neo-Orientalist discourse on Asia is an inherent function of the imperial and neoimperial enterprise. The imperial power needs to construct its other in a way that is
profitable to the (neo)colonial project, that is, the continuous subjugation of its
colonies – both in social as well as mental structures. The ‘Asianist’ discourse, on
the other hand, has been also blamed as an ideological strategy to keep some
structures of cultural and political dominance in place. Second, both positions are
engaged in essentializing the other. Such a discourse forgets that all assertions of a
24
For a critical assessment of the ‘Asian values’ discourse in the Southeast Asian context, see SOUCHOU, 2001.
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cultural group about itself (i.e., values, traits, identities) are constructed under
specific socio-historical conditions. It is not so much the values themselves
considered metaphysically and transhistorically as those social conditions that
provide the key to our understanding of these realities. The Orientalist discourse
freezes Asian identity as ‘unchanging’, ‘mysterious’, ‘religious’ – one which is not
(yet) comparable with the modern Enlightenment the West was trying to promote.
The 'Asianist' discourse likewise pegs Asian identity into its essentialist
characteristics, while being consistent with its program of combating the onslaught
of Western decadence that comes with capitalism and modernity (HOON, 2004).
The problem with these essentialized characteristics is that they become
monolithic labels of what otherwise are heterogeneous Asian cultures and religious
practices. For instance, we may ask if there is a real common set of values in Asia
when we know that this region is a product of equally contending religious and
cultural traditions (Confucian, Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu and Christian).25 Since
identities and religions are essentialized against the ‘other’, what come to existence
are binary opposites with their corresponding hierarchies - West vs. East,
Christianity vs. Oriental religions, modernity vs. tradition, etc. What proves to be
problematic in binary thinking is its hierarchy, that is, the assertion of one side of
the pole automatically demonizes or degrades the other. Thus, while the Orientalist
discourse privileges the West and denigrates the East, the ‘Asianist’ discourse also
enthrones the so-called Oriental values and religions at the expense of other
paradigms.
EATWOT's post-religional paradigm needs to be cognizant of these
loopholes if it wants to effectively contribute to the analysis of religions in these
changing times. As it is tentatively articulated, the theological proposal displays a
sense of theoretical ambivalence. On the one hand, its evolutionary directions as
seen in its commonalities with Bellah's project, the secularization thesis and post25
Against the emphasis on authority-centeredness present in the ‘Asian values’ discourse, Amartya Sen, for instance, has consistently
argued that the democratic tradition, tolerance, personal freedom is inherent in the tradition of Asian countries. See SEN, 1999, p. 3-17;
SEN, 1997.
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secular discourses lead it to an Orientalist discourse of Asian religious sensibilities
and essentialized views of religions and spiritualities. On the other hand, its noncumulative view of cultural evolution (i.e., the disappearance of old Neolithic
religions and maybe future religions for that matter) which we assessed as parallel
to Thomas Kuhn's notion of "paradigm shifts" in science gives the theologian a
reflexive sensibility to the emerging but still inchoate forms of spiritualities,
religious experiences and practices that proceed from and make real sense in the
lives of people on the ground. But it is also this strength which turns itself into
weakness when the search for the 'spiritual' and 'religious' becomes a pursuit of the
essential and the universal (most often equated with the human) beyond those
which it considers as the transitory forms of 'religions' (EATWOT, 2012, p. 263).26
5 Religions: Back to the Rough Grounds
In the end, we are thus led back to the first question: "Is Asia a postreligional society?" The query does not possess one single answer; or, if we push
our established assumptions to their logical conclusions, it is impossible to answer
it at all. Following Talal Asad, it is imperative to situate the inquiry on religions in
the context of socio-historical conditions (movements, classes, institutions, and
ideologies - all vehicles of social power) that make religious experience possible.
And these power-laden contexts are complex, diverse and multiple. Only through
such process can we avoid essentialist views of religion applicable to all locations
and epoch. What comes to mind is an image which the neo-Marxist philosopher,
Raymond Williams, uses for "art": the notion of art as "practice". Translating it to
our concerns, religions are not only "mediums" - "objects, things, which men [sic]
take up and arrange into particular forms to express or communicate information"
like doctrines, rituals, practices defined in abstraction and isolated from the sociohistorical powers that produced them. No, religious dogmas, beliefs and practices
must be inevitably seen as "social practices" by bringing them back to the social
26
The EATWOT theological proposal is extra careful (and suspicious) about accepting the term "spirituality" because of its dualistic tone
and the inadequacy of its definition/conceptualization. Yet its search for adequate universal definition by summoning synonyms and
parallels still smacks of essentialism.
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processes of their "material production" (WILLIAMS, 1978, p. 163-164). Only in the
context of these grounds shall we see their effectively historical meanings,
development and interrelations.
Let me illustrate this point with some examples. Although the prevalent
religious dualisms "transcendence-immanence", "sacred-profane", "spiritualmaterial" continue to be universalized in many discourses, the meaning of the
binaries in fact does not remain constant. Some socio-historical contexts consider
that the spirits can be material or the sacred does not at all mean transcendental, as
evidenced by the early colonial encounters between the Spanish missionaries and
Filipino 'natives'.27 While the Spanish missionaries proclaimed the traditional
Catholic doctrines of God, spirits and souls as transcendent, the Filipino natives
thought of them as "this-worldly". The kaluluwa (souls) of our ancestors are always
with us. They also "eat" as we offer them food on their graves and on family altars
on special occasions; or we send them their favorite drink or cigar on their coffins
as provisions for their "journey". The nono (spirits) are not transcendental sacred
figures but "indeterminate auras emanating from certain objects in nature - trees,
rocks, rivers, fields, even crocodiles." (RAFAEL, 1993, p. 113). They reside with us
in the same world so much so that when people urinate in the fields or pass big
trees on forests, they need to ask their permission by saying "tabi po" (let us
through). We can haggle and bargain with them, offer oblations but also send pleas
to and coax them into granting special favors. All these tendencies are still present
in contemporary Filipino spirituality. Its linguistic residues still abound: the
Tagalog word for asking for forgiveness is "tawad", for instance, as it is used in
sacramental confession. But this same root word also means "to bargain, haggle or
to use evasions (in Spanish regatear)" (RAFAEL, 1988, p. 91-109). Such a
discourse can only be understood from the perspective of pre-colonial social
structures characterized by "forms of indebtedness and servitude that were
transferable and negotiable" and where social positions were not fixed but
27
See among others: BOLASCO, 1994, p. 219-234; RAFAEL, 1988; PERTIERRA, 1988.
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alterable. In these social universes, rendering tribute to the nono or kneeling down
in confession was not seen as total submission to immutable transcendental power
but were "ways of bargaining... plugging into a circuit of indebtedness in which one
could hope to accumulate the means to shift social registers." (BOLASCO, 1994, p.
228). Of course, there were also some whose spirituality largely leaned toward the
other side of the binary, i.e., the transcendent dimension. But this direction was
only "particularly appealing to those 'natives' who had a special stake in the
preservation of relations of inequality" - the ruling classes (the principalia). Such
specific nuances as these can only be understood on the ground and are absent in
the essentialist rendering and universal application of these binary relations.
The shifting meaning of purdah as religious and social practice is another
example (SHEHABUDDIN, 2008). Purdah is a custom among Muslim or Hindu
women of dressing in enveloped clothes or living behind curtains or separate rooms
in order to segregate them from men and strangers. In dominant secular
discourses, the practice has been criticised as an instrument of oppression, a way to
domesticate women by limiting their movement, thus, also their agency and
possibilities. On the one hand, it is an act of perpetuating male domination and
reproducing gender inequality: "the male being self-reliant and aggressive, the
female weak, irresponsible, and in need of protection." (WHITE, 1977). On the
other hand, purdah is practiced to protect women from harassment, from being
portrayed as sex objects and securing their mobility and safety in public spaces.
Moreover, others think that purdah becomes an assertion of subaltern gender and
cultural identities toward some heightened status and visibility in contemporary
social spaces (FELDMAN, MCCARTHY, 1983). How are these discursive battles
wrestled with on the ground? In Bangladesh, there are poor rural women working
in factories who discard the practice neither by rejecting the Islamic injunction
outright nor by exhibiting total agreement with the secularist agenda, but through
re-defining purdah as "a state of mind, a purity of thought, something that they
carry inside them rather than an expensive outer garment"(SHEHABUDDIN,
2008, p. 4). The same act is both a critique of gender domination in Islamic
universes and the pretensions of class in modern societies done through a clever
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reinterpretation of Islamic theology. In the process, these poor women have
navigated dexterously between the Islamist and secularist agenda by reinventing
themselves as "pious Muslim women", but also securing spaces necessary for the
survival of their families. This analysis is not quite accessible in the easy essentialist
application of "modern-traditional" or "secular-religious" binary categories. In this
actual negotiation of power on the ground, the modern is not necessarily secular
nor the religious always traditional.
Conclusion
I would like to conclude with a famous passage from Ludwig Wittgenstein:
We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain
sense the conditions are ideal, but also just because of that, we are unable
to walk. We want to walk, so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!
(WITTGENSTEIN, 1958, p. 46).
Wittgenstein was critiquing the crystalline purity of logic that does not work
in real life. I am transposing its relevance to the study of religions. 28 Essentialist
and universalist accounts detach concepts from the grounds of their material
production. On the one hand, they do not produce friction. These concepts and
definitions can enter and leave different historical epochs intact and unscathed. On
the other hand, they are also deceptive and ineffective. With them, to use the words
of Asad, "we shall not make much headway in understanding agency." (ASAD,
1993, p. 167). Without friction, we cannot walk. But we want to walk. So back to the
rough grounds!
28
I have employed this central text elsewhere in order to propose a viable theological methodology. Cf. PILARIO, 2005.
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