Corporate Ownership and Control Journal / Volume 13, Issue 2, 2016
AUDIT,
ACCOUNTING
& REPORTING
SECTION 2
THE EFFECT OF THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
CHARACTERISTICS ON FIRM PERFORMANCE IN
OMAN: EMPIRICAL STUDY
Ebrahim Mohammed Al-Matari*, Ali Saleh Al_arussi**
* School of Accountancy (SOA), College of Business (COB), Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM), Malaysia. Amran University, Yemen
** School of Accountancy (SOA), College of Business (COB), Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM), Malaysia
Abstract
This study attempts to investigate the effect of the ownership structure characteristics
(ownership concentration, managerial ownership and government ownership) on firm
performance (ROA) among non-financial Omani companies during 2012-2014. For achieving the
objective of this study, 81 firms were taken as a sample to test the above relations. The
sampling was obtained from annual report of the companies for three years with a total
sampling equal to 243 firms. Multiple regression analysis was employed to test the relationship
between independent variables and dependent variable. In addition, this study tried to fill the
gap in the existing literature concerning the relationship between ownership structure and firm
performance in the developing countries such as Oman. This study found a positive and
significant association between ownership concentration and government ownership to firm
performance (ROA). The study provides some suggestions for future researchers before the
conclusion.
Keywords: Agency Theory, Resource Dependence Theory, Ownership Concentration, Managerial
Ownership, Government Ownership
1. INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance is one of the most widely
researched topics as a mechanism to minimize
conflicts of interests between managers and
investors. Its objective is to safeguard the capital
owners from opportunistic activities (Abdurrouf,
2011; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Pandya, 2011;
Pfeffer, 1972; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) and to
make sure that management exert effort to achieve
the shareholders’ and stakeholders’ interests.
Consequently, corporate governance mechanisms
and regulations have been provided significant
attention on a global scale as they improve the
overall economic capability to produce public
benefits
to
stakeholders
(individuals
and
organizations) (Hsu and Petchsakulwong, 2010).
More importantly, both local and foreign investors
will be considerably attracted to the companies
where the corporate governance mechanisms are
applied. The proper implementation of corporate
governance code can prevent the financial disputes
and reduce the corruption and thus enhances the
overall firm growth that collectively stimulates the
country’s overall economic growth and development
(Al-Matari et al., 2012). There are many researchers,
organizations and institutions, interests indicating
that the role of corporate governance reduces the
problem of conflict of interest as this study often
mentions.
Effective corporate governance reduces the
right of control and gives managers more leverage in
a way that investment decisions managers improve
the maximization of shareholder wealth. Corporate
governance gives directors' rights to make the right
decision which services a shareholders’ target
whereas at the same time this decision seeks to
achieve shareholder and managers goals (Shleifer &
Vishny, 1997). This, however, suggests that firms
have adjusted better corporately improved operating
performance (Irina & Nadezhda, 2009). Therefore,
this study attempted to build a comprehensive
model to investigate the factors that enhance the
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Corporate Ownership and Control Journal / Volume 13, Issue 2, 2016
effectiveness
of
the
corporate
governance
mechanisms and firm performance in Oman.
One of the primary corporate governance
mechanisms is ownership structure. It has been
extensively examined by analysts as well as scholars
throughout the years. The pioneering study within
the firm theory in light of Modern Corporation was
done by Berle and Means (1932) who debated over
conflicts of interest between management and
controllers. According to them, with the increasing
ownership diffusion, the shareholder’s power to
control management is minimized. In a related study
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) stated that the ownership
structure concept indicates that ownership is often
endogenously determined for the maximization of
the performance of the company as this benefits all
owners.
CG mechanisms are developed to minimize
agency costs arising from the ownership and control
separation (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling,
1976). Prior studies evidenced that governance
mechanisms improve firm value to a certain level
(Weir et al., 2002). Moreover, the ownership and
management separation is what exists in today’s
public corporations (Sing & Sirmans, 2008).
From
the
resource
dependence
theory
perspective, ownership is considered as a source of
power that can be utilized to reinforce or go against
management according to how concentrated it is
and how it is used (Pfeffer & Slanick, 1979). As a
result Fazlzadeh et al. (2011) stated that ownership
structure has a key role in corporate governance and
provides insights to policy makers who are
expending efforts to improve the system of
corporate governance. In the context of majority of
developed countries, ownership structure is greatly
dispersed. Contrarily, in the developing countries
where weak legal systems exist for the protection of
investors’ interest, the structure of ownership is
highly concentrated (Ehikioya, 2009). Although the
essence of ownership structure is to improve
performance, studies have largely ignored the
testing of the role of ownership structure on firm
performance. There are many studies that have
confined their examination to only board
characteristics, audit committee, CEO with firm
performance (Abdurrouf, 2011; Dar et al., 2011;
Yasser, Entebang & Al Mansor 2011)
Despite the ample attention it is getting, there
are no empirically findings concerning the
ownership structure-firm performance relationship.
While some authors reported a positive relationship
like Barontini and Caprio (2006) and Chen et al.
(2006), others confirmed a negative relationship (e.g.
Brown and Caylor, 2004). Still others failed to report
any relationship between the two variables (e.g.
Masood, 2011). These mixed findings prompted
researchers to further examine the relationship
between ownership structure and firm performance
(e.g. Abdurrouf, 2011; Al-Matari et al., 2012; Kajola,
2008; Liang et al., 2011; Millet-Reyes and Zhao,
2010). Moreover, ownership structure is critical in
aligning the relationship between owners and
management. In this regard, the present study
considers some characteristics of ownership
structure
including
concentration
ownership,
managerial ownership, government ownership,
institutional ownership, and foreign ownership.
On the basis of the above findings, the present
study attempts to fill the gap found in literature by
investigating
the
ownership
structure
characteristics-firm performance relationship in
Oman. The next section provides an in-depth
discussion of the study procedures employed.
2. LITERATURE
DEVELOPMENT
2.1
Ownership
Performance
REVIEW
AND
Concentration
HYPOTHESES
and
Firm
Ownership concentration is a reaction to various
levels of legal protection of minority shareholders
throughout countries (Azam et al., 2011). It is
described as the proportion of the firm shares
owned by a certain number of the majority
shareholders (Sanda et al., 2005). Its measurement is
done through the fraction owned by the five
majority shareholders or by the significant number
of shareholders (Karaca & Ekşi, 2012; Obiyo & Lenee,
2011).
Berle and Means (1932) were the first to reveal
a
positive
association
between
ownership
concentration and performance and conceptually,
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) stressed that ownership
concentration and legal protection are considered
the two key CG determinants. Minority shareholders
can benefit from their majority counterparts as the
latter has the power and incentive to stop
expropriation or management asset stripping. In
addition, concentrated ownership of companies may
minimize the freedom of management to carry out
strategic decisions and take risks in taking
advantage of opportunities (Brickley et al., 1997;
Bushee, 1998; Pound, 1988). In other words, a large
total share of equity may lead to the improvement of
the majority shareholders monitoring management
(Clarke, 1995).
Regarding the agency theory perspective, Berle
and Means (1932) claimed that under a corporate
regime, firm ownership is dispersed among
shareholders with the control rights pooled in
management hands. The consequent separation of
control and ownership may give rise to agency
problems (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Moreover,
dispersed shareholders provide no monitoring of
agents or managers. They think it cost-efficient to
monitor management as they have to pay all the
monitoring costs but only receive a meagre part of
the gains (Grossman & Hart 1980; Shleifer & Vishny
1986).
On the other hand, from the resource
dependence theory perspective, company ownership
invest limited resources and this does not assist in
helping the company’s partnership with external
investors and thus reducing the supply of external
resources from other parties like the government or
financial institutions. The investment percentage
between foreign investors and owners should at
least be similar as this helps in achieving the
company’s goals and in establishing different forms
of wealth, which assist firms in minimizing risk.
This may help in providing established experiences
linked to external environment as internal and
external partnership generally helps the firm to
enhance its performance (Pfeffer, 1972).
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Corporate Ownership and Control Journal / Volume 13, Issue 2, 2016
Theoretically, the effects of ownership
concentration on firm performance are still
ambiguous whether in the extensive review in the
developed or developing countries. The next review
explains the presence of mixed results with regard
to agency theory and resource dependence theory.
Although there is widely done empirical studies that
examined the relationship between ownership
concentration and firm performance, the results are
still diversified. For example there many authors
around the world dedicated to reveal the association
between
concentration
ownership
and
firm
performance and confirmed a positive relationship
in developed countries (Siala et al., 2009; Wang &
Oliver, 2009) and in developing ones (Azam et al.,
2011; Karaca & Ekşi, 2012; Obiyo & Lenee, 2011).
On the other hand, many studies confirmed a
negative
relationship
between
ownership
concentration and firm performance in the
developed countries (Hu et al., 2010; Millet-Reyes &
Zhao, 2010) and in the developing countries
(Roszaini & Mohammad (2006).
There are some researchers who found is no
relationship between ownership concentration and
firm performance whether in the developed
countries (Shan & McIver, 2011) or in the developing
countries (Fazlzadeh et al., 2011; Najjar, 2012; Wahla
et al., 2012). These mixed results call for more
research to re-examine this relationship in the future
research work. Therefore, this study attempted to
contribute to literature by introducing the following
hypotheses to be tested.
H1: There is a positive relationship between the
ownership concentration and firm performance.
2.2 Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance
Managerial ownership is gauged through the
proportion of firm shares owned by insiders and
board members or insider ownership (Liang et al.,
2011; Wahla et al., 2012).
This type of ownership has also been viewed as
a potential effective mechanism of corporate
governance. According to Jensen and Meckling
(1976), it provides a potential incentive to align the
management interests to that of shareholders.
Contrarily, according to Khan et al. (2011) and
Shleifer and Vishny (1986), high managerial
ownership may lead to management entrenchment
because they are less subjected to board of
directors’ governance and to market discipline for
corporate control.
There are theoretical and empirical studies that
have
investigated
the
relationship
between
managerial ownership and firm performance and
they have provided mixed evidences. These
inconclusive findings are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
On the basis of the agency theory perspective,
Jensen and Meckling (1976) claimed that managerial
ownership can assist in improving agency conflicts
between owners and management because a
manager owning a large portion of the company
shares has ample incentives to maximize job
performance to guarantee better performance of the
company.
On
the
contrary,
management
entrenchment has been known to arise in firms with
high managerial ownership and thus worsening
agency problems (Demsetz, 1983; Fama & Jensen,
1983). On the other hand, from the resource
dependence theory perspective, a partnership with
external resources is encouraged because they will
provide the company with multiple sources and
different experiences as it works to maximize
shareholder rights and all parties associated with
the company. It is also focused on the involvement
of all confiscated and merges them together in order
to make the most of the experience and confiscation,
which in turn helps to achieve the goals of the
beneficiaries of the company. Therefore, large
ownership by the managers and members of the
board do not help improve performance of
companies (Pfeffer, 1972).
Based on the previous argument, the result is
still mixed regarding to the relationship between the
managerial ownership and firm performance. Some
studies in the developed countries have confirmed
that a positive association between the two variables
exist (e.g. Juras & Hinson, 2008; Leung & Horwitz,
2010). In the other direction but in the same line of
results, there are many researchers in developing
countries who found a similar finding; for example,
Chung et al. (2008), Ehikioya (2009), Hasnah (2009),
Sing and Sirmans (2008), and Uwuigbe and Olusanmi
(2012).
Some other researchers confirmed a negative
association between managerial ownership and firm
performance in the developed countries such as
Irina and Nadezhda (2009) and Juras and Hinson
(2008). Similarly, the developing countries (e.g Liang
et al., 2011; Mandacı & Gumus, 2010; Tsegba & EziHerbert, 2011; Wahla et al., 2012) obtained similar
results regarding this relationship. Other researchers
however, found no relationship between two
variables either in the developed countries (Juras &
Hinson, 2008; Siala et al., 2009) or in the developing
countries (NazliAnum, 2010; Nuryanah & Islam,
2011; Mohd, 2011). To empirically re-examine this
relationship, this study proposes the following
hypotheses.
H2: There is a positive relationship between the
managerial ownership and firm performance.
2.3 Government Ownership and Firm Performance
Government ownership is measured by the ratio of
the government owned shares in the firm
(NazliAnum, 2010; NurulAfzan & Rashidah, 2011).
According to agency theory, government
ownership holds the solution to the issue of
information asymmetry resulting from the imperfect
information provided to investors concerning the
firm value. Additionally, the state owned shares can
be used to align the owners and management’s
interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1979). The government
generally gathers information from other sources
and they are more privy to various channels of
financing compared to their non-state counterparts
(Eng & Mak, 2003).
Similarly, from the resource dependence theory
perspective, the outsourcing helps to provide
established sources of funding a variety of different
and varied experience qualifications with working to
reduce the cost of capital. It is also working on the
efficient control of several aspects in order to help
create a favourable effective working environment.
This, in turn, works to improve the performance of
the company (Pfeffer, 1972). And hence, the current
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Corporate Ownership and Control Journal / Volume 13, Issue 2, 2016
study expects that the government is one of the
most important effective and efficient outsourcing
in improving the functioning of the company. In the
same context, Rhoades et al. (2001) revealed that the
selection of suitable governance mechanisms among
management and owners ensures the interest
alignment of principal and agent.
The findings in literature regarding this
relationship lack conclusiveness. Some researchers
found the relationship between government and
firm performance to be positive in the developed
countries (Irina and Nadezhda, 2009) and the
developing countries (Aljifri & Moustafa, 2007;
MoIlah
&Talukdar,
2007;
NazliAnum,
2010;
NurulAfzan & Rashidah, 2011). On the other hand,
some other evidence confirmed negative association
between
government
ownership
and
firm
performance such as Al Farooque et al. (2007) and
Al-Hussain & Johnson (2009). The present study
attempts to contribute to literature regarding this
relationship by proposing the following hypotheses.
H3: There is a positive relationship between the
government ownership and firm performance.
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Our sampling was comprised of 81 non-financial
sectors (industry and service sectors) per year so
that all sampling was 243 companies for three years
(2012 to 2014). This data was collecting form annual
reports that listed companies in the Muscat stock
exchange. Move over, the measurement and model
will provide as follow:
ROA=α0+ β1*OWCONCE+β2* MANAGOW+β3*
GOVEROW +β4* LEVERAG + ε
Table 1. Summary of Variables Measurement
No
VARIABLES
Dependent Variables (DV)
ACRONYM
OPERATIONALISATION
1
Return on Assets (%)
ROA
Earnings before tax divided by total assets of
the company.
OWCONCE
The fraction owned by the five largest
shareholders.
Managerial Ownership (%)
MANAGOW
The proportion of shared owned in the firm by
insiders and board members.
Government Ownership (%)
GOVEROW
The ratio of shares owned by the government in
the firm.
Control Variables (CV)
Leverage (%)
LEVERAG
Independent Variables (IV)
2
3
4
5
Ownership Concentration (%)
The ratio of total liabilities to total assets.
4. DATA ANALYSIZ AND RESULTS
The descriptive statistics of the continuous variables
including the mean, standard deviation, and
minimum, maximum, skewness and kurtosis.
4.1 Descriptive Statistic
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables
Variable
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std. Deviation
Statistic
Statistic
Statistic
Statistic
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
-0.34
0.98
0.73
0.89
1.72
0.32
0.45
0.05
0.09
0.48
0.06
0.33
0.13
0.18
0.28
0.10
Unit
Ownership Concentration (OWCONCE)
Managerial Ownership (MANAGOW)
Government Ownership (GOVEROW)
LEVERAGE (LEVERAG)
Return On Assets (ROA)
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
4.2. Correlation Analysis
This study ran the correlation analysis via the
multiple regression analysis. According to Pallant
(2011), correlation analysis is used to describe the
linear relationship between two variables in terms of
strength and direction. Moreover, According to the
results, the correlations did not exceed 0.90
indicating that Gujarati and Porter’s (2009)
recommendation was met. They contended that to
ensure the absence of multicollinearity, the
correlation matrix should stay below 0.90.
Table 3. Results of Pearson Correlation Analysis
Variable
Ownership Concentration (OWCONCE)
Managerial Ownership (MANAGOW)
Government Ownership (GOVEROW)
LEVERAGE (LEVERAG)
Return On Assets (ROA)
***:p<0.001; **:p<0.01; *:P<0.05
1
2
3
4
0.145***
0.017
0.033
0.076
-0.040
0.059
-0.064
-0.293***
0.275***
-0.449***
96
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Corporate Ownership and Control Journal / Volume 13, Issue 2, 2016
4.3 Testing the Normality of the Error Terms
Two analyses namely skewness and kurtosis were
carried out to test the normality of data distribution.
The former analysis displayed normality of data
with output values between ±3 while the kurtosis
analysis also displayed normality with the output
values of between ±10 (Kline, 1998). Table 4 shows
that the value of skewness is located between the
ranges of ±3. Moreover, the values of kurtosis lie
between ±10. Consequently, the data of the study as
it shows normal outcome through kurtosis analysis
regardless of the skewness analysis.
Table 4. Results of Skweness and Kurtusis for Normality Test
Variable
Statistic
Skewness
Std. Error
Kurtosis
Statistic
Std. Error
Ownership Concentration (OWCONCE)
-0.31
0.16
-1.40
0.31
Managerial Ownership (MANAGOW)
2.77
0.16
8.30
0.31
Government Ownership (GOVEROW)
2.64
0.16
6.73
0.31
LEVERAGE (LEVERAG)
0.74
0.16
1.09
0.31
Return On Assets (ROA)
-1.01
0.16
3.23
0.31
5. REGRESSION RESULTS BASED ON ACCOUNTING
MEASURE
5.1 Regression Results of Model
Based on the result obtained concerning the
adjusted coefficient of determination (R2), 0.233% of
the variation of the dependent variable is explained
by that of the independent variable. Stated
differently, the firm performance variation, with
ROA as a proxy, was explained and accounted for by
the regression equation. The results listed in Table 4
shows the model’s significance with F value equals
to (F=18.113, p<0.01), which shows the validity of
the model. Additionally, the Durbin-Watson (DW)
test is employed as a statistical test to detect
autocorrelation and in this regard, the rule of thumb
follows that the acceptable range of autocorrelation
is 1.5-2.5. In the present study, the Durbin-Watson
value was found to be 1.810 – a value that falls in
the acceptable range, indicating independence of
observations. Moreover, the Tolerance value and VIF
was run to test the collinearity, after which no issue
was reported. With regards to the results of the
hierarchical multiple regression analysis, they are
explained and presented in Table 5.
Table 5. Regression Results of Model (Dependent= ROA)
Variables
Ownership Concentration (OWCONCE)
Managerial Ownership (MANAGOW)
Government Ownership (GOVEROW)
LEVERAGE (LEVERAG)
R2
Adjusted R2
F-value
F-Significant
Durbin Watson statistics
Collinearity Statistics
Standardized
Coefficients
t-value
Sig.
Beta
0.094
-0.048
0.153
-0.404
1.638
-0.832
2.568
-6.795
0.103*
0.407
0.011***
0.000***
0.233
0.220
18.113
0.000
1.810
Tolerance
0.977
0.975
0.913
0.911
VIF
1.023
1.025
1.096
1.098
***:p<0.001; **:p<0.01; *:P<0.05
6. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the results related to the
relationship
between
ownership
structures
characteristics (ownership concentration, managerial
ownership and government ownership) and ROA.
This study found a positive and significant
association between Ownership Concentration and
ROA. This result is similar with previous studies that
found positive and significant relationship between
ownership concentration and firm performance
whether in the developed countries (Siala et al.,
2009; Wang & Oliver, 2009) or in the developing
countries (Azam et al., 2011; Karaca & Ekşi, 2012;
Obiyo & Lenee, 2011). In addition, we found no
relationship between managerial ownership and
ROA. This finding is similar with prior studies that
found no relationship between the two variables
either in the developed countries (Juras & Hinson,
2008; Siala et al., 2009) or in the developing
countries (NazliAnum, 2010; Nuryanah& Islam, 2011;
Mohd, 2011). Moreover, this study revealed
significantly
positive
association
between
Government Ownership and ROA. This outcome is
similar with previous studies that got a positive and
significat
association
between
Government
Ownership and ROA in both the developed countries
(Irina and Nadezhda, 2009) and the developing
countries (Aljifri & Moustafa, 2007; MoIlah
&Talukdar, 2007; NazliAnum, 2010; NurulAfzan &
Rashidah, 2011).
7. CONCLUSION
This study aimed to achieve many objectives. Firstly,
it targeted to examine the direct relationship
between ownership structure characteristics and
firm performance. Secondly and most importantly,
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Corporate Ownership and Control Journal / Volume 13, Issue 2, 2016
this study attempted to examine the relationship
between
corporate
governance
and
firm
performance among non-financial in Omani listed
companies. The sample was comprised of 243 firms
in three years (2012 to 2014). This study used
multiple regression analysis to test the relationship
between independent variables and dependent
variable. The results found a positive and significant
relationship between ownership concentration and
government ownership to ROA. On the other hand,
this study revealed a negative correlation between
managerial ownership and ROA but not significant.
This study, like any study has limitations and
suggestions for future research. This study
concentrated on ownership structure such as
ownership concentration, government ownership
and managerial ownership with firm performance
and hence, it is suggested for future research to add
other ownership structure like foreign ownership
and institutional ownership that maybe help in
improving firm performance. Moreover, this study
focused on ownership structure such as ownership
concentration,
government
ownership
and
managerial ownership with firm performance and
therefore, it is advised for future research to add
some internal corporate governance mechanisms
such as, board of directors, audit committee, risk
committee,
executive
committee,
corporate
governance committee, remuneration committee,
nomination committee and others and their role in
improving firm performance. Besides, this study
considered three-year duration (2012-2014), and
therefore future research should extend this period
and cover all sectors in order to improve firm
performance. Finally, this study only used one
accounting measurement of firm performance and
therefore, it is suggested that future research should
take other measurements into account such as, ROE,
ROI, Tobin’s-Q among others.
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