Viktor Ilievski

Ever since antiquity, the presence of evil has been considered incompatible with the existence of God. This apparent contradiction gave rise to the argument from evil, which turned into a formidable weapon against theism. Faced with this challenge, theists of all creeds have been proposing theodicies, or justi cations of God's ways. This monograph is the rst book-length treatment of the subject from a Platonic perspective. Its essential message is that Plato devised a noteworthy and in uential theodicy comprised of several theodicean strategies, some of which remain relevant even today. Hence, Plato's pioneering contribution to the eld of theodicy deserves the attention of both philosophers and theologians.

This book focuses on two central topics. The first one is the Platonic concept of time. What is it, how is it defined, what is it not, and how does it help us describe the changing realities surrounding us? The second one is Plato’s understanding of the perceptible world. How is it related to Forms, and how exactly does it work? These are central, wide-ranging, and highly contested questions that have been garnering attention in recent Platonic scholarship. We have ensembled an international team that aims to offer bold, innovative, and thought-provoking answers to these questions. The contributions represent a diverse range of starting points, methodologies, and interpretative traditions whose collective aim is to challenge your assumptions about Plato’s philosophy and help you rethink and revisit the Platonic corpus with fresh eyes.

This chapter's main objective is to explore the meanings of Plato's notions of chance (tychē), necessity (anankē), and demiurgic cause as employed in the Timaeus , while occasionally referring to other dialogues as well. An attempt is made here to demonstrate that they-as far as their cosmologically relevant conceptual sides are concerned-approximate progressively one another, to the e ect that chance, in one of its aspects, ultimately becomes identifi able with necessity, and necessity, in yet another of its semantic features, may be associated with the principal cause of the Timaeus. More precisely, the analysis embarked upon here aspires to show (1) that the Timaean tychē , in its pertinent cosmological sense, is related to a cause that produces necessary but purposeless e ects; (2) that Plato in the Timaeus explicates the material causal necessity known from the Presocratics and named anankē , which is ultimately identifi able with tychē ; and (3) that Plato in the same dialogue also implicitly evokes a di erent, novel kind of teleological anankē , embodied in the fi gure and the exploits of the Demiurge, who is a nous characterized by goal-directed, e cient causal powers that actively strives for the best and represents the prime necessity of the unfolding of the creation.

This chapter’s point of departure is the postulate that the Demiurge of the Timaeus, which also appears in the Republic and in most of the late dialogues, should not be taken lightly or dismissed as a mere pedagogical device. Instead, he must play a substantial role in Plato’s cosmology and metaphysics. The first two section of the chapter provide a concise outline of the most important views on the Demiurge that were circulated among the Ancients as well as in recent times. Their goal is to follow the history of the Platonists’ interpretation of the Demiurge, to map the most important contributions, to emphasise those who ascribe him the status of an independent nous, and thus set the stage for the concluding discussion, covered in section three. In it it is argued that the text of the Timaeus makes best sense under the presumption of the Demiurge separateness from the World-Soul, the Paradigm and the Forms in general, and his unique cosmogonical role of a cause that combines within itself the aspects of efficiency and goal-directedness is briefly explored. The analysis of the relevant passages of the Timaeus – but also of the Sophist, Politicus, Philebus and the Laws – undertaken in the last section of this chapter culminates with the conclusion that Plato envisioned his divine craftsman as a transcendent Intellect which is not only the productive cause, but also the supreme God and the highest principle of his late metaphysics.

This article discusses the theological implications of the terms logos and tropos. In it, I examine
the four types of arguments (i.e., the four tropoi) for the existence of God (i.e., Logos),
relying mostly on Cicero’s classification given in the De Nature Deorum, all the while drawing
comparisons with and using the material from Sextus’ work Pros Physikous, where the term
tropos as applying to a type of argument for the existence of God was first used. The four
tropoi in Cicero and Sextus, respectively, are the following: (a) ex operibus dei, (b) е consensu
omnium, (c) argument from recorded epiphanies, (d) argument from predictions and oracles;
and (a) е consensu omnium, (b) ex operibus dei, (c) reductio ad absurdum, (d) argument from the
absurdities that follow from the conclusions of the opponents. I also touch upon some of the
arguments that Cicero expounds out of the framework of his four tropoi. Next I turn to the
Socratic and Platonic arguments for the existence of God, compare them with the Stoic ones
and briefly explore their possible influence on the latter. Finally, I try to point out what the
Stoics are actually trying to prove with their arguments. As far as the issue of the plausibility
and the efficiency of the Stoics' theological arguments is concerned, it is being addressed
here only sporadically, in course of presenting the tropoi themselves.

Mid-twentieth century witnessed a renewal of the interest in the problem of evil, presented by Mackie et al. in the form of the logical argument from evil. However, this argument was proven ineffective in securing victory over theism. A more successful strategy was devised by Rowe and Draper-the so-called evidential argument from evil. I believe that the current responses to it fail to defend God. In this paper, I try to face the evidential argument by embracing a triple strategy, which involves an alternative theology. First, a shift of focus regarding suffering from the prevalent anthropocentrism to the perspective of soteriological teleology is proposed. Second, I present a theodicy in line with Plato's approach in the Timaeus, as well as with some aspects of the theodicy in the Vedānta-sūtra II.1.32-36. Third, I argue that, if the previous two steps contribute towards a plausible answer to the problem of evil, the modified concept of the deity and the associated cosmogonical account should be brought close to the picture of Plato's demiurge and his act of creation. If it is to provide a successful defense of theism against the problem of evil, that price should not be considered too dear.

The aim of this paper is twofold: a) to identify the Stoics' attempted solutions to the
problem of evil, allegedly appropriated by Plotinus and made use of in his main work
on theodicy, which was divided by Porphyry into two treatises and published under
the titles On Providence I. and II. (Ennead III. 2 and 3); and b) to demonstrate that
the most significant theodicean strategies applied by the Stoics and later utilized by
Plotinus are either of direct Platonic origin, or else might have been inspired by certain
passages from Plato’s dialogues. As a side issue, it will be shown that the Stoic answers
to the problem of evil that do not concur with the Platonic approach – with a single
exception – are not taken into consideration by Plotinus. This is not to say that the
Stoics’ contributions to the field of theodicy exerted no influence on Plotinus, but that
in the counterfactual scenario where they never wrote on providence and theodicy,
Plotinus would have nevertheless been able to compose a theodicy that is very similar to
the present one, relying chiefly, if not exclusively, on Platonic sources and his own ideas.

In this paper I hope to demonstrate that the answer to the question posed in the title, somewhat predictably, should be in the negative. To achieve this goal, I shall attempt to examine Plato’s statements in the Phaedrus and the Laws X, where he writes that the soul is the autokinetic source of all motion and the cause of everything that exists, put, however, within the context of a particular interpretation of his outlook on the origin of evil.  More precisely, my intention is to argue for a somewhat restricted view of the soul’s power to produce motion and change, by denying that it is the source of the primordial disorderly motion in the Timaean χώρα. If this is true, then the soul cannot be called the source of all motion without qualification. In a very restricted, but nevertheless relevant sense, it is not. Consequently, it should not be taken to be the universal cause either; there is a grey area that remains out of its purview: the soul has no claim over the unwanted role of being the cause of evil. I thus hope to provide some support to the so-called ‘material theory of the origin of evil’.

This paper focuses on Plato's compressed theodicy in the Republic's Myth of Er, which stems from the famous αιτία λομένου· θεος αναίτιος verdict, found at 617e4–5. Its direct implication is the understanding that the souls of the Myth are autonomous in making their choices, and therefore morally responsible for their decisions and actions. God is thus exonerated of all blame for the disappointments and sufferings they are going through, and his beneficent nature is defended, at least within the confines of the Myth's rudimentary theodicy. It is my opinion that Plato is indeed justified in upholding such views. In order to demonstrate that, I shall try to argue that the claim of individual responsibility – upon which Plato's theodicy in the Myth of Er is exclusively founded – withstands the charges of determinism and infinite regress of accountability, leveled against it by Annas, Halliwell, et al., and McPherran, Inwood, et al., respectively. I shall also try to make a case against Annas' and Thayer's allegations that the memory loss, which is one of the consequences of the reincarnation process, absolves the agent from culpability for the mistakes committed in his/her previous lives, because such loss implicates discontinuity of personal identity. Before engaging with this issues, however, I shall attempt to provide a possible Platonic account of the concept of freedom of choice – the basic precondition for moral responsibility – as employed in the Myth of Er.

The purpose of this article is to offer analysis of the passage on evil in the Theaetetus 176a4-8. I submit that it stands in an anticipatory relation to Plato's mature theory of evil, as it can be deduced from the Timaeus and the Politicus. My claim is that in the Theaetetus passage two contrary principles are postulated, one of which is the cause of good, while the other is the cause of evil. To support that claim, I shall argue that a) Plato's doctrine of the Forms is present in the Theaetetus Digression; b) the word 'good' at 176a6 refers to Plato's highest entity – αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν; c) τὰ κακά of 176a5 are not to be identified with the opposite of τὸ ἀγαθόν mentioned in the same line; d) the ὑπεναντίον of 176a6, the subordinated opposite of τὸ ἀγαθόν, and the second ἀνάγκη in the passage (176a8) could denote the same entity, i.e. the Timaean Necessity.

Младешки осврт кон Плотиновата теорија на потеклото на злото и неговиот пристап кон проблемот на физичкото и морално зло. Сѐ уште ме чуди фактот што овој текст во 2008 година ја доби втората награда на натпреварот за најдобар философски есеј, во организација на Издавачката куќа Аз-Буки.

The aim of this paper is to challenge the claims that Plato's theodicy, if existent at all, is meager and undeveloped. In it I focus on the Timaeus alone, and after briefly examining the question why would an omnibenevolent God create a sensible world at all, try to extract three theodicean strategies from the dialogue. The first one is known as the Principle of Plenitude, and it professes to explain the abundance of life forms in the universe, some of which seem superfluous or unwanted. In the course of presenting this strategy, I also try to show that it can justifiably be ascribed to Plato, against Sarah Broadie's criticism. The second strategy is the Solution from Personal Responsibility, and it mainly aims at addressing the moral aspect of the problem of evil. The third and the last one I call the Coeval Entity Solution, and it discloses the Timaean Necessity as a cause of natural evils. I try to argue, against David Sedley, that Necessity is indeed of stubborn or recalcitrant nature.

The aim of this paper is to throw some additional light on the lot-casting episode of the Republic’s Myth of Er. It is largely a reaction to McPherran’s views presented in his 2010 chapter entitled “Virtue, Luck and Choice at the End of the Republic.” I agree with his statement that the purpose of the lottery is to somehow absolve the gods from responsibility for each soul’s choice of life and the subsequent happiness and badness attached to it. Unlike McPherran, however, I argue that this strategy is a successful one, and discloses no traces of divine interference, which would endanger its credibility. Nevertheless, although the lot-casting process effectively diverts the responsibility for its outcome from the gods onto tychē, the scope of this strategy is very narrow, and actually limited to the placement of the souls in the choice-queue. By the end of the paper I touch upon the concept of tychē as employed in the Myth, and conclude that it is equivalent to the folk concept of chance.

This article explores the concepts of eternity and time as employed by Plato in his metaphysics and natural philosophy. It focuses on the Timaeus, which is the main source used in the attempts to reconstruct Plato's theory of time and to gain insights into his understanding of time's paradigm and counterpart, i.e. eternity. The chief thesis regarding Plato's concept of eternity presented here is that Plato conceived of it not as infinite duration (sempiternity), but as timeless, unchanging present (eternity proper). It thus, in accordance with the original meaning of the Greek term for eternity (αἰών), signifies the state of being of the Forms. As far as time (χρόνος) and its nature is concerned, an attempt is made here to argue that Plato did not identify time with a) the heavenly sphere in motion, b) number, nor with c) motion in general, motion of the heavenly sphere, or motion of some of its part –as suggested by some ancient, as well as contemporary commentators. In fact, time is inseparable from motion, however not as being motion, but as being characterized by regular motion, through which it enlivens the world of Becoming and makes it what it is. So it turns out that Plato's somewhat poetic description of time as moving image of eternity is more than just a metaphorical expression – eternity, the state of being of the Forms, reflects itself into time, the never-ending-life of the universe in constant motion. Time, as every image, has to be imperfect and therefore, unlike its paradigm, entails permanent change and instability.

The present text is mainly concerned with exposition of the diverse approaches of the eminent medieval Indian scholars to the celebrated Vedic intuition, namely the TAT TVAM ASI mantra, which is originally found in Chandogyopanisad, probably the most important of the eleven principal Upanishads. Herein, a brief outline of the Upanishad is given, and due attention is paid to its sixth chapter, traditionally entitled SAD VIDYA (Knowledge of the Absolute), where the TAT TVAM ASI mantra itself appears. Before presenting the interpretations and commentaries of Sankara, Ramanuja, Madhva and Baladeva Vidyabhusana, short sketches of their respective philosophies are given. They, being archons of four out of the six main Vedanta philosophical successions, through their teachings and example have greatly influenced, and are still influencing the spiritual and intellectual being of India.

The argument of Plato’s Cratylus is conducted along the lines of examination of two conflicting theories of correctness of names, namely conventionalism and naturalism; in the course of the dialogue Socrates demonstrates that none of the theories provides truly accurate account of the names-objects relation. His own standpoint is that language is unreliable and that things should be investigated and learned about through themselves, rather than through their images, the names. This conclusion pushes the phonetic and semantic investigations aside, and establishes the supremacy of eidetic epistemology over its onomatic counterpart. The main objectives of this paper will be: a) to follow the interplay of Socrates’ arguments by which he challenges both theories of correctness of names, and b) to briefly investigate the implications and the impact of the eidetic epistemology thesis on Plato’s general attitude toward language. In order to accomplish the second objective, I shall turn to the Seventh Letter and point out some affinity between its philosophic digression and the conclusions of the Cratylus. Thus it will be shown that Plato’s attitude toward language was not very favorable, and that his method of dialectic was devised in such a way as to ultimately avoid and overcome the pitfalls of language.

The parts of these PhD dissertation related to the issue of Plato´s theodicy have been thoroughly reworked and recently published by Brill, under the title Plato´s Theodicy: The Forgotten Fount. I would ask any interested reader to consider that work, instead of this thesis, which is still full of numerous imperfections. Thank you.

The problem of evil, or the seeming contradiction involved in simultaneously holding the beliefs in the existence of an omnibenevolent Deity and the reality of evil present in the world he created, has been engaging the minds of philosophers and theologians for centuries. Many theists have tried to face this problem by defending God’s cause, or by justifying the presence of badness in the world created and managed by a supremely good Being. These attempts are called theodicies. Coupled with and inseparable from the theodicean efforts are the investigations of the philosophers and the theologians aimed at isolating the original cause of all evil, so that the responsibility for it could be transferred from God to that entity or phenomenon. Exactly these are the issues with which I occupy myself in this dissertation, although from a specific viewpoint. More precisely, my research interest lies in the theodicy and the theory of evil as conceived and presented by Plato.
However, no statement concerning the content of the phrases ‘Platonic theodicy’ and ‘Platonic theory of evil,’ would be readily acceptable to anyone, or totally divorced from the aura of contentiousness and controversy. Some critics will find the first more-or-less elaborate theodicy in the fragments of the Early Stoics, while others will credit Plotinus or St. Augustine with the introduction of the main theodician strategies, prevalent and popular even today. Many others will hold that Plato’s theory of evil, if he had one at all, was rather impromptu and inconsistent. Therefore, the overarching aim of this work is to demonstrate that none of the above beliefs fully corresponds to the truth. 
My dissertation consists of two parts. In Part One I focus on specific sections and passages of the Republic, the Timaeus and the Laws, in order to demonstrate that Plato was indeed seriously engaging with the problem of evil, and that he devised a much wider variety of theodicean strategies than it is usually thought. Among them are the Freedom of choice solution, the Principle of plenitude, the Rival substance solution, the Aesthetic theme. In Part Two I explore passages from a group of Latter Middle and Late dialogues, namely the Theaetetus, the Timaeus, the Politicus and the Laws, from which most of Plato’s mature theory of evil may be extracted. There I argue for the so-called ‘material theory’ of the origin of evil, and try to demonstrate that Plato never wavered between a corporeal and psychic cause of evil.       
Thus the two basic theses which I wish to put forward in this dissertation are: a) that Plato did his best to provide a relatively comprehensive theodicy; b) that despite appearances to the contrary, he had a consistent theory of evil, and that he identified the corporeal constituent of the universe as the cause of its existence. My hopes are that this dissertation will offer at least a small contribution to the investigation of Plato’s theory of evil, and especially to the question of Plato’s theodicy, which is one of the rare underdeveloped areas in the field of Platonic studies.