[final submission in October 2020 as a book chapter to the forthcoming (2021)
Routledge Handbook of Environmental Politics, edited by M. Grasso and M.
Giugni]
Environmental Movements in Asia
Fengshi Wu
Abstract
The central inquiry of this chapter is the relationship between political liberalization
and the rise and development of environmental movement. The selection of the eight
cases (China, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Japan, Mongolia, Singapore, South Korea, and
Vietnam) is guided by both the call for broad coverage of Asia and the logic of
comparative politics so that this research will be able to generate a level of theoretical
discussion, in addition to empirically mapping out environmental movements in Asia.
In addition to outlining the main patterns of the environmental-political dual
transformation, this research also discusses possible reasons for the initial synergy
between political liberalization and environmental movement to fade away and the
challenges of environmental protection for both young democracies and authoritarian
regimes.
Introduction
As in other regions across the globe, public awareness of environmental degradation
and climate change and social mobilization for environmental protection has been on
the rise in Asia in recent decades. The Goldman Environmental Prize, a most
reputable award to honor “grassroots environmental heroes”, has since 1990
recognized 180 distinguished environmentalists around the world such as Wangari
Muta Maathai from Kenya (winner of 1991), who later became the first African
woman Nobel prize winner in 2004. By 2019, one-sixth of the Goldman awardees are
from the greater Asia region. 1 As a result, an increasing number of publications have
emerged, which either explore environmental activism and movements in a single
Asian country, or compare such movements across countries within the Asian region.
However, scholarly effort is still limited in conceptualizing environmental movements
in Asia – their origins, developments, and impacts – as a whole and possibly
identifying an “Asian way” of environmental struggle and policy advocacy. This
lacuna in the existing literature in a way is not surprising and may accurately indicate
the high level of intra-regional diversity in Asia. As the largest continent on the
planet, Asia is home to diverse cultures, peoples, polities, and eco-systems. Therefore,
it makes theoretical sense to study a sub-region, or a cluster of countries in Asia. For
example, the Northeast Asia cluster (Japan, South Korea, mainland China, and
1
Asia here includes geographic Central, Inner and Western Asian regions (e.g., Siberia, the Russian
Far East, and the Asian parts of the Middle East): https://www.goldmanprize.org/about/, last accessed
15 August 2020.
Taiwan) and the Central Asia cluster (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan).
Given this research background, this chapter focuses on the impact of political
liberalization on the rise of environmentalism as a main form of broad social
mobilization in contemporary Asia and approaches the topic by the following steps. It
first introduces a theoretical inquiry on the relationship between political regime and
transition and the development of modern environmental movements in the Asian
context. Keeping the intra-regional diversity in mind, case selection for this research
is guided by both the call for broad coverage of Asia and the logic of comparative
politics so that findings from the cases will be able to generate a level of theoretical
discussion. After presenting the empirical evidence from the specific Asian countries,
the chapter endeavors to offer discussion of not only the shared patterns of the dual
transition of politics and environmental movement in the focused countries, but also
the key intervening factors that contribute to the incongruent development of on the
one hand, the opening-up of the political system and on the other hand, of the
development of environmental movements. The chapter concludes with suggestions
for future studies on the topic.
Environmental movement and political liberalization: research context
Political liberalization in this research is conceptualized as a continual spectrum, not
defined by the presence or lack of democratization (Brynen et al. 1995: 3-6).
Essentially, political liberalization entails the expansion of the public sphere where
ordinary citizens can become self-organized and participate in public affairs and
collective decision making without substantial interference by the state and political
authorities, which can include a broad range of activities and informal institutional
formations. Democratization, in comparison, is marked by more definite and formal
political events and institution-building such as general elections and independence of
the judicial system. It is particularly important for students of social mobilization in
the Asian context to note that political liberalization and public participation in
policy-making can happen without the concomitant ticking all of the conceptual boxes
of democratization occurring; and, vice versa, having general elections and formal
democratic institutions in some contexts does not lead to better protection of civil or
political liberties (Bell et al. 1995). As following case analysis of some long-standing
non-democratic states in Asia will show, public space for activism, policy advocacy
and social mobilization in the name of nature conservation and mitigation of
environmental crisis has been opened up, which in turn has led to significant changes
in politics and policy-making in a broader scope.
To compare environmental movements across cases more systematically, the research
emphasizes two aspects: one, the scope of the movements, particularly whether there
is any form of linking-up across localities and small-scale initiatives or protests that
transcend specific social ties, causes, and victimhood or solidarities; and, the other,
the transformative potential of such movements, which could lead the movement to
aspire for and achieve broader public and environmental goods. A transformative
environmental movement, as a type of “new social movement” broadly defined
(Inglehart 1977; Offe 1985, cited in Ku 1996: 159-161), promotes new political ideas
and ideologies that aim at comprehensive and sustainable changes in politics,
economics, and culture, while not limited to solving the immediate environmental
problems and assisting pollution victims.
Unlike their counterparts in post-World War II Western democratic societies, leaders
of environmental activism and movements in the rest of the world often find
themselves caught in more complex political struggles against several interconnected
fundamental issues such as decolonialization and nation building, economic
development and global market integration, and political stabilization and postconflict reconciliation. Environmentalist narratives do not always synchronize well
with the chorus of multiple concurrent socio-political transformations. Existing
scholarship on the topic outlines at least three possible trajectories of environmental
movements and governance building in the vast developing world: ecological
modernization, authoritarian environmentalism, and environmental democracy.
Scholars of ecological modernization theory emphasize the possible synergy between
the state, regardless of its regime type, and civil society and the balance between
economic taking-off and environmental protection for newly independent and/or postconflict countries (e.g., Carter and Mol 2006). It is not just possible but also
necessary that state-led reforms and bottom-up activism go in tandem to reshape and
modernize a country’s environmental governance. In sharp contrast, scholars of
environmental authoritarianism remain cautious, if not doubtful, about the
governments in developing countries, especially under authoritarian regime, and their
initial acceptance of environmental activism and willingness to enhance
environmental governance. For example, some observe that taking a lead in
developing renewable energy and constructing a domestic narrative on climate change
has made the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) more resilient at home, more assertive
on the global stage, and even more popular in neighboring countries (Beeson 2010;
Gilley 2012). Finally, the framework of environmental democracy highlights that
environmental protection is hinged on social justice, human rights, rule of law, and
other key elements of modern democratic system; and, therefore a full-fledged
environmental movement will eventually usher more fundamental political
development and demand of democratization. Case evidence of regime change and
social mobilization from the former Soviet Union, South Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil in
the past decades suggests that environmental activism in authoritarian regimes
ultimately converge with broad resistance and pro-democracy movements (Weiner
1999; Hochstetler 2000; Schreurs 2002). The environmental democracy theory and
authoritarian environmentalism challenge, from two angles, the hypothesis that
environmental movement can co-exist and co-evolve with authoritarian rule in the
long run, which is highly relevant to understand the current trends in Asia.
Instead of testing or eliminating any of the above theoretical lenses, this research
incorporates all three lines of logic in the following comparative analysis to best
present the status of ongoing political struggles related to environmental movements
in Asia. Given the high level of diversity in political, economic, historic, and cultural
terms, the “Asian experience” may well be plural and represent variations and various
combinations of the three noted patterns. Limited in length, this research selected
eight cases to both broaden geographical coverage and control political structural
variation (Table 1). Cases were first selected across three main sub-regions of Asia –
East Asia, Central and Inner Asia, and Southeast Asia. Then, for each sub-region, one
or two representative case(s) of both authoritarianism and democracy were chosen.
Most of the democratic cases are young, fresh out of pro-democracy movement and
transition, and they offer unique a research opportunity to observe the co-evolvement
of political liberalization and environmental movement.
Table 1. Political context of environmental movements in contemporary Asia
Sub-region
Cases
Political context
Northeast Asia China
Communist regime, political liberalization without democratization
(mainland)
since 1978
Japan
Democracy with one dominant party since 1945
South Korea
Democratic transition and consolidation since late 1990s
Southeast Asia Indonesia
Democratic transition since 1998
Singapore
Electoral authoritarian regime since 1965
Vietnam
Communist regime, political liberalization without democratization
since 1986
Inner and
Kazakhstan
Electoral authoritarian regime since independence in 1991
Central Asia
Mongolia
Democratic transition since early 1990s
From South Korea to Mongolia: many fates of environmental movement
The case analysis for this research starts with South Korea as it demonstrates the coevolution of environmental movement and political structural change to a great
extent. Politics in the southern half of the Korean peninsula has experienced sea
change from authoritarian rule after the devastating war in the 1950s to a consolidated
democracy in the new millennium. Environmental protesters and activism leaders,
first triggered by internationally reported pollution and health crises in Seoul such as
the case of “Onsan illness”, later became a crucial force in the broad spectrum of
social resistance and the pro-democracy movement from 1980s to 1990s. Umbrella
organizations such as the Anti-Pollution Movement Association and Korean
Federation for Environmental Movement and critical non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) such as the Pollution Research Institute provided necessary leadership (e.g.,
Yul Choi, 1995 Goldman Prize Awardee) for the environmental movement and antiregime resistance as well.
According to Ku (1996), environmental movement in South Korea had already
achieved structural transformation, expanded beyond victim-based social
organization, and transcended to incorporate more broad political claims and goals by
the end of 1980s. After the democratic transition, like their counterparts in other
young democracies such as Taiwan and Brazil, Korean environmental activists
gradually got elected or appointed into the governing administration. Nevertheless,
new generations of movement leaders have emerged and the original bottom-up
mobilizational momentum has been retained. In December 2005, the news of farmers
from South Korea jumping in the waters at the Victoria Harbour, Hong Kong, made
frontpage around the world and marked the history of a global-scale anti-WTO, antiglobalization, and pro-environment movement. Korean activists have creatively used
public spectacles to popularize their environmental causes, from local river
conservation and anti-nuclear power plants, to climate change and green lifestyle (Wu
and Wen 2015: 109-110). It can be argued that the push and pull from both proenvironment politicians within the state system and broad-based environmental
activism and resistance outside of the state together contribute to the rise of
“developmental environmentalism” and “green economy,” as new national-level
policy narratives, in contemporary South Korea (Death 2015; Kim and Thurbon
2015).
Japan, the next-door neighbour of South Korea, is a rare case of stable constitutional
monarchy and democracy, though dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party, in
Asia. After World War II, Japan’s industrialization took off swiftly and, in turn,
environmental accidents and pollution soared to the degree that Tokyo once suffered
the world’s worst air pollution in early1960s. Resistance by pollution victims and
mass protests, sometimes highly contentious, against pollution broke out in Tokyo
and across the country at that time. 2 The Japanese state eventually responded by the
1970 “pollution Diet”, a package of multiple national-level laws, and the
establishment of the State Environmental Agency in the following year. This wave of
social mobilization not only engendered a generation of environmental activists and
movement leaders, but also led to the transformation of the overall governance
structures in the post-war Japan (Schreurs 2003). Furthermore, Japanese
environmentalists such as Ui Jun, who attended the NGO forum and staged
demonstrations to expose Japan’s domestic pollution problems at the United Nation’s
Conference on Human Development in Stockholm in 1972, also pioneered
transnational advocacy networks in Asia after they learned from fellow Asian NGO
leaders and activists at the Conference about the environmental damages created by
Japanese industries overseas (Avenell 2017).
However, the transformative power of the first wave of environmental movement in
Japan gradually receded and public contestation against state and corporate power
evolved into other forms of activism led by community-based associations, local
environmentally friendly politicians, and a pro-environmentalism circle of “soft elite”
– technocrats and academicians – embedded in all levels of formal environmental
governance, most of whom took part in the environmental protests in the 1960s (Wu
and Wen 2015: 106-108). The downside of Japan’s “quiet”, though “far from
impotent”, environmentalism is that at the national level it has become “politically
marginalized” over the time (Mason 1999: 188). This partially explains why even
after the Fokushima nuclear disaster, which spurred anti-nuclear protests around the
world and led to major policy shifts in Germany, environmental civil society and
protests in Japan were not able to thwart then Prime Minister Abe who authorized the
resumption of the nuclear power sector. Although the anti-nuclear movement sustains,
it would require more than “business as usual” type of social mobilization in post-Abe
Japan to break down the pro-nuclear state-corporate coalition, which has a long
history in the country (Valentine and Sovacool 2010).
In contrast to South Korea and Japan, the political structure in China for the past
seven decades has remained authoritarian and centered on the CCP nomenklatura.
Nevertheless, civil society and social activism were sprouting after the death of
chairman Mao in 1976 and during the early years of the “Open and Reform” era,
which became evident with all the events leading to the Tian’anmen anti-corruption
and pro-democracy protests in 1989. In the wake of the state’s repression, resulting in
international embargo and diplomatic freeze, the Chinese society was silenced, and
the space of civil society shrunk. It was not until the year of 1994, that a group of
Beijing-based university professors, intellectuals, and environmentalists established
the first environmental NGO, Friends of Nature, to openly conduct public education
2
Four major public campaigns broke out in the 1960s against the construction of the Narita Airport,
and demanded compensation for the victims of Itai-Itai cadmium poisoning, Minamata and Niigata
mercury disease and Yokkaichi asthma incidents.
programs on wildlife conservation, recycling, and environmental protection. In the
next 25 years, the environmental activism community has not only survived the
Communist rule, but also, in relatively terms, thrived with a broad geographic spread
of NGOs and networks, a high level of international support, and a large number of
successful cases of public campaign and policy advocacy (Steinhardt and Wu 2016;
Dai et al. 2017; Dai and Spires 2018). According to the China Environmental
Organization Map, there are over 2,000 active grassroots environmental NGOs across
the country. 3 The anti-large dam campaign to protect the Nu river (upstream of the
Mekong river), led by an internationally award-winning Chinese environmentalist,
Wang Yongchen, and a transnational network of activists from China, Southeast Asia,
Japan, North America and Europe, is one of the most reported example of the
expanding environmental movement in China, which started in 2004 and continues
until today. 4
A main quality of the environmental NGO community in China is the high level of
inter-organizational connections and a relatively strong sense of “having peers” and
social belonging across localities and/or issue specializations (Wu 2017). There are by
now tens of nationwide and broadly focused networks, such as the China Zero Waste
Alliance – targeting recycling and sustainable urban civil waste management (Lu and
Steinhardt forthcoming), the public pollution monitoring network centered around the
Institute for Public and Environmental Affairs, the mangrove alliance along China’s
southern coastal regions, and the loose alliance of various “river stewardship” groups
along the Yangtze river supported by the Alibaba Foundation. Membership of these
resourceful alliances and networks often overlap, which further strengthens social
solidarity within the environmental activism community. A connected and effective
NGO community with leadership and shared visions has been argued as a major
explanation for the emergence of public interest oriented large-scale environmental
protests, and partially explains why and how the Chinese environmental movement by
large has been able to sustain its capacity and relevance in spite of a series of
restrictive regulations and policy changes since Xi Jinping took power in 2012 (Wu
and Martus 2020).
Sharing many political structural features with neighbouring China, Vietnam also
embarked on systematic reforms, “Doi Moi”, in 1986 and subsequently witnessed the
revival of associational lives and proto-type civil society organizations (Wells-Dang
2012). Locally rooted and single-incident focused protests at the community level, in
a way, are not something completely new to Vietnamese society, partially due to a
long history of labor activism. The anti-bauxite campaign in 2009, which emerged
rather incidentally as a response to the central government’s planning, led to the
widespread criticism and activism by ordinary citizens, religious communities, and
even political elites. Despite its little policy impact, this campaign is viewed by many
as “one of the most significant expression of public dissent against the sing-party state
since the end of the Vietnam War” (Morris-Jung 2011, as cited in Ortmann 2017:
154) and marked a new page of environmentalism in the country. Between 2010 to
2015, at least 14 protests against various pollution incidents and development projects
took place across the country, ranging from landfill construction, cement plants, coal
3
http://www.hyi.org.cn/go/, last accessed 1 September 2019.
https://gt.foreignpolicy.com/2016/profile/wang-yongchen?df8f7f5682, last accessed 9 September
2020.
4
power plants, to steel and textile mills took place, all of which amassed hundreds,
sometimes thousands, local participants (Ortmann 2017: 139).
However, establishing NGOs outside of the Vietnamese Communist Party system and
developing independent environmental and professional capacities is new to the
Vietnamese society. With support from international donors and NGOs and
occasional empathy from the reformist-wing of the Vietnamese state, environmental
NGOs and activism networks have emerged and continued to grow in numbers in the
last decade (Wells-Dang 2010). Like their counterparts in China, many of these
NGOs seek formal and informal ties with the authorities to survive and be exempted
from political suppression and devote most energy in developing expertise in specific
areas, such as the Vietnam Association for Conservation of Nature and Environment –
one of the oldest of its kind established in the 1980s (Vu 2019).
In more recent years, the introduction of Facebook and other types of social media has
ushered a new wave of environmental activism and social mobilization, where crosslocality networking and collective actions become more possible. The “tree
movement” in Hanoi in 2015, sharing many characteristics with the new social
movements in other parts of the world where young netizens and social media play a
critical role and no specific social movement organization can be identified as the sole
leader, has prompted scholars such as Vu (2017) to argue for “more deliberative and
accountable politics in the same country [Vietnam] in the long run.” The ongoing
anti-Formosa steel plant movement, triggered by the massive fish death along
Vietnam’s central coasts in 2016, is the most significant case so far and in many ways
has pushed the political redlines with multiple large scale protests taking place in
main cities across the country including both Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh city. Although
the government reacted to the protests and activism harshly by quickly arresting over
100 environmentalists, Catholic priests, bloggers, and concerned citizens, the
movement has able to maintain parts of its momentum and even inspired other antipollution protests over the years (Nguyen and Datzberger 2018).
Moving onto the other side of the Southeast Asian region, the archipelago country,
Indonesia, has gone through a crisscross process of political liberalization and
democratization in the past decades. Social mobilization and localized resistance
already were on the rise at the peak of the authoritarian rule by Suharto in the 1970s,
similar to the South Korean case. However, more than their Korean counterparts,
Indonesian environmental activists and technocrats were able to carve out more
political space and in many ways aided resistance in other social sectors, particularly
the agrarian movements and student movements which became critical forces in the
ousting of Suharto at the end of 1990s (Peluso et al. 2008).
Much of the start of environmentalism in post-independence Indonesia can be
attributed to a single politician and environmentalist, Emil Salim (Minister of
Development Supervision and the Environment, 1978-1983; Minister of Population
and the Environment, 1983-1993), who founded the first nationwide environmental
NGO in the country, Indonesian Forum for Environment (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup
Indonesia, WALHI). Since its beginning, WALHI has been the flagship organization
for all environmentalists and NGOs and played the critical role of providing
leadership and protection for bottom-up initiatives. In the broad context that the
American government was tolerant towards Suharto’s regime during the Cold War,
environmental NGOs from the West such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) were
permitted to operate in Indonesia since the end of 1970s, which incidentally provided
an extra boost to the emergence of domestic environmentalism in the country
(Nomura 2007: 500). By late 1990s, environmental NGOs and activism have
developed in Indonesia far beyond major cities and reached out to the Outer Islands.
Environmental civil society has grown steadily in the post-1998 reformasi era in
Indonesia not merely in quantity but also in quality, measured by their increasing
presence in formal politics and policy-making processes and, more importantly, their
commitment to public accountability, representation and intra-organizational
democracy (Nomura 2007: 508-513).
Being one of the most climate vulnerable countries and home to some of the last
remaining large-scale rainforests on the planet, Indonesia has become a hot
destination for international donors and funding agencies in recent two decades. Some
of these funding opportunities, e.g., WWF mentioned above and the Small Grant
Programme of the Global Environment Facility, in the 1990s (or even earlier) have
provided much needed support to local environmental activism. However, experts
observe double-sided impact of the significant flow of zest and funds from
international realms to local Indonesian communities, channeled through
decentralized, sometimes excessively fragmented and contradictory, domestic
political institutions (Gellert 2010). Furthermore, Jokowi’s leadership, coupled with
the resurgent political Islam, has introduced new twists to post-transition Indonesian
politics, which will affect the future trajectories of environmentalism in the country.
For example, based on interview evidence, Nilan (2020) has found that many young
Indonesian environmental activists base their environmentalist commitments “firmly
on their Muslim faith,” seeing themselves as khalifah – God’s lieutenants on earth.
The deep impact on environmental governance and outcomes of this companionship
between Islam faith and environmentalism in Indonesia remains to be seen.
Singapore, a city state situated at the heart of Southeast Asia, may seem to be an
outlier case in this study; nevertheless, it exemplifies a few underlining patterns of
environmental politics shared by many Asian societies. The concept of electoral
authoritarian state – repeated incumbent successes enabled by unfair elections and
sustained by mostly authoritarian political institutions (Morse 2012: 162) – best
captures politics in Singapore under the continuous rule by the People’s Action Party
(PAP) with the premiership passed from the father to the son of the Lee family since
1965. Given this context, there are three different types of environmentalism, not
necessarily merged yet, active in contemporary Singapore. First, an ultimately antiauthoritarian, moral-environmental movement started by the Nature Society
Singapore (NSS), that has protested many of PAP developmentalist ideologies and
policies since the late 1980s. Back then, concerned with government-led large-scale
infrastructure projects, a group of NSS members, including scientists and amateur
naturalists “embarked on detailed area surveys, drew up conservation proposals and
lobbied the government.” These initiatives marked the policy advocacy turn of the
organization (Goh 2001). Second, resembling the government organized and
sponsored NGOs (GONGOs) in China and Vietnam, particularly at the local levels,
Singapore has a vast network of residential community based “people’s associations”
that are becoming more proactive in implementing environmental related policies.
Some even argue that these community associations have pushed environmental
protection beyond what the policy makers may have originally envisioned, when
conditions are met (Han and Tan 2019). Last not least, mirroring the trends in other
parts of the world, a new wave of social activism mainly driven by the youth and
facilitated by social media is fast growing and calls for fundamental change in
environmental thinking and policy-making, which has the potential to mobilize across
sectoral boundaries and bring about more abroad socio-political transformations (LJY
2019).
Student movements have a strong track record of tipping off authoritarian figures and
shaking existing politics systems in Singapore’s neighboring regions, including
China, Taiwan, South Korea, Philippines, Indonesia, and most recently Hong Kong.
Therefore, experts shall watch closely whether and how young greenies in Singapore
will grow their social outreach and merge with both the senior generation of
environmental activists and community rooted associational leaders. A first public
demonstration for more progressive climate actions took place on 21st September
2019, and over 2000 citizens attended with enthusiasm, which could be a milestone in
Singapore’s environmental movement or even the beginning of the dual
transformation exemplified by the South Korean experience, as the general election in
the following July ushered in a batch of non-PAP, young, women, minority, and
progressive politicians to become the newest members of the parliament and marked a
historically low popular vote for PAP.
During the first decade after it independence in 1991, the environmental NGO
community, which share the origins with the anti-nuclear movement in the former
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, thrived in Kazakhstan with sufficient support from
UN, EU, and international NGOs (Weinthal and Luong 2002). As Nazarbayev’s
government evolved, the green civil society in Kazakhstan shrank in terms of overall
scale and quality. According to the director of the Association for the Conservation of
Biodiversity of Kazakhstan (ACBK) – the largest conservation NGO in the country,
despite significant decline, there is still a decent sized, loosely connected community
of environmental NGOs and activists in today’s Kazakhstan, particularly in Almaty
and Astana. 5 These NGOs such as GS and ACBK have reached out to local
communities and victim groups and successfully leveraged their resources to not only
alter the outcomes of state-backed development projects but also contributed to
environmental law enforcement and policy implementation. In some specific policy
areas, environmental NGOs have been invited and/or permitted to participate in
formal policy-making and implementation processes (Soltys 2013).
Since its independence, Kazakhstan has joined many international environmentrelated agreements (e.g., the Aarhus Convention on the Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters)
and enacted a large body of environmental regulations to formally ensure public
participation in environmental governance (Cherp 2000). This legal-political
background is critical to understand the partial success of some environmental NGOs’
advocacy work and local resistance to large developmental projects. Almaty based
Green Salvation (GS), the largest and most reputable environmental law NGO in the
country, for example, has always exercised its legal rights to access environmental
information, and even initiated and won court hearings and suits against both
governmental agencies and industries, which led to the slowing down or even
5
Interview at the office of ACBK in Astana, 8 July 2016.
cancellation of economic projects that could have significant detrimental ecological
and social impacts. 6 Coalitions of activists inside and beyond the country have used
Kazakhstan’s official membership and signatory status of international environmental
treaties as a leverage to launch transnational policy advocacy and assert pressure on
various governmental agencies (Weinthal and Watters 2010).
Unlike Kazakhstan, the other landlocked inner Asian country, Mongolia, went
through a swift transition to democracy with mass protests and hunger strikes
concentrated in the capital city, Ulaanbaatar, during the period from the end of 1980s
to the first half of the 1990s. However, the old political ecology did not fundamentally
change since then, as the former Communist Party, metamorphosized itself to
Mongolia People’s Party and held onto public appealing and political power. Along
with the regular elections, power shifts between the two leading parties, and
subsequent reshufflings of the central administration, Mongolia has had many rounds
of changes of environmental regulatory agencies, which has fundamentally weakened
the credibility and capacity of environmental law and policy enforcement institutions.
The widespread of corruption and power abuse (Boone et al 1997) further exacerbates
the low effectiveness of governance across board and, in turn, contributes to the
highly contentious forms of environmental activism, yet with little sustaining policy
impact even when the activism and public protest succeeded.
Evidence from Mongolia’s mining and water sectors illustrates this vicious circle
mentioned above. Several different ministries share the responsibility of regulating
water use and conservation in the country, suffering from the lack of effective
horizontal coordination. With rare exceptions, water activism in Mongolia is highly
localized and isolated, carried out usually by lone activists with no support network
and often in highly contentious manner instead of institutionalized public
participation. One of the high-profile cases took place in 2010 when Ts. Munkhbayar
was reportedly to have used firearms at the properties of the (Canadian) Centerra
Gold and (Chinese) Puraam mining companies to protest their violation of local laws
that prohibit mining near water sources. Ts. Munkhbayar was later sentenced to 12
years in jail for his action.
Many international NGOs have worked closely with local nomadic communities
resisting mining projects, contributing to the decline of the total percentage of land
licensed to mining in recent years. However, scholars argue that such transnational
networks have led to unintended consequences that may further fragment Mongolian
society and politics due to the ideological gaps between the local communities and the
international NGOs (Byambajav 2015). This is an ongoing trend, not exclusive to
Mongolia, that needs more systematic studies and will be touched upon again in the
next section.
Comparative discussion
The many routes of environment-related resistance and movements in contemporary
Asia (summarized in Table 2) have offered an opportunity to explore the relationship
between political opening-up and democratic transition and the emergence and
outcome of environmentalism. The main finding of the research is that political
6
Office visit and interview in Almaty, 7 July 2016.
liberalization is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for a broad and
transformative environmental movement to emerge and sustain. While there are
encouraging cases, notably South Korea and Indonesia, where political reforms and
environmental movement have worked out in tandem, majority of the cases studied
here and in Asia in general, present non-optimal co-evolution where strong social
activism and contention over exploitation of natural resource and eco-systems in fact
has led to political stalemate, or made it hard for local environmentalism to grow
broad political relevance. There is strong evidence from post-totalitarian China,
authoritarian Vietnam and electoral-authoritarian Singapore to indicate that, some
level of political reform and opening-up for public participation, NGO development,
and transnational civic linkages has made it possible for environmental activists to
break the taboo and become the frontrunners of social mobilization, pubic campaigns,
and policy advocacy. However, after the initial breakthrough, the trajectory of
environmental movements in these non-democratic countries remain uncertain: it
could further take off like in South Korea and Indonesia, or wither away like in
Kazakhstan and Mongolia.
Table 2. Environmental movements in selected Asian countries
Case
Timeline
Scope
China
Emerged in midNationwide networks,
(mainland)
1990s
campaigns
Japan
Emerged in 1960s
South Korea
Emerged together
with pro-democracy
movement in 1980s
Emerged in early
1970s under
dictatorship
Indonesia
Singapore
Vietnam
Kazakhstan
Mongolia
Became publicly
visible since the
1990s
On the rise since
the 2000s
Shared the origins
with anti-nuclear
and environmental
movement in Soviet
Union and East
European countries
in the 1980s (or
earlier)
Became present
since the 1990s
Notable nationwide
networks with a large
number of strong and
localized environmental
movements
Many nationwide broad
associations and networks
Mostly local movements
and groups, but there are
notable nationwide
associations and networks
Mostly localized initiatives
Transformative impact
Mostly reactive with early
signs of transformative
potential
Significant transformative
impact in 1960s and 1970s, but
now less so
Has been transformative
throughout the democratization
process
Contributing to transformative
politics with movements from
other sectors
Mostly reactive initiatives
Limited nationwide events
Reactive and localized
Mostly locally rooted
protests and campaigns,
some but not many
nationwide networks
Had the potential to be
transformative in the 1990s, but
now mostly reactively and in
decline
Mostly localized, issue
specific initiatives
Not transformative and in
decline
Flipping the equation, mounting evidence from this study points to the pattern that
environmental activism and social mobilization have played a critical role in the long,
often interrupted, journey of political liberalization and democratization in Asian
societies. In pre-transition South Korea and Indonesia and current China, Vietnam,
and Singapore, the environmental sector hosts some of the most vibrant and broad
networks of activists and NGOs to the extent that other dissidents or activists,
promoting more politically sensitive causes such as human rights, minority rights, and
labor rights, would strategize and embed themselves in the environmental activism
circles. Because of their shared roots in the widespread anti-unclear protests in former
Soviet Union, environmental activists were among the most prominent prodemocracy social leaders and organizers in the first decade of the independent
Kazakhstan. Politics in the first few decades of post-war Japan was mostly democratic
by name, and the sweeping anti-pollution protests in the 1960s and effective policy
advocacy achieved by leading environmentalists in the 1970s generated significant
impact on the Japanese political system to allow for more accountability,
transparency, and public participation in the future.
Returning to the three conceptual trajectories of political-environmental dual
development particularly in an authoritarian context, case evidence presented above
could suggest that all three are relevant to understanding environmental movements in
Asia; and, within a single case, it is often the case that a particular trajectory is more
visible at a time, but subject to changes. Having mapped out this character of the
environmental-political dual transformation, this research encounters a more
intriguing question: Why would the initial synergy between political liberalization
and environmental movement evolve and diverge into two different paths? (Figure 1)
For example, this synergy has sustained and produced a mutually reinforcing
relationship between democratic institutional building and continuation of effective
environmental movement in the case of South Korea, and to a less degree also in
Indonesia. However, in other cases, particularly Kazakhstan, China and Singapore, or
even Japan, elements of authoritarian environmentalism can be found where the
authoritarian state or anti-reform political forces have been able to absorb social
pressure and reap parts of the success made by the environmental movement to
strengthen their own legitimacy and social control, which in turn has taken a heavy
toll on the further growth of the environmental activism community. In some most
disappointing scenarios, such as Mongolia, there is a vicious circle between political
reform and activism, where successful environmental activism has little impact on
policy and institutional changes, and constant reshuffling of environmental
bureaucracies cancels out policy modifications made by previous environmental
activism and advocacy.
Figure 1. Two pathways of the dual evolution of political liberalization and environmental
movement
regression
Political liberalization
and/or democratization
Resilience
of authoritarianism &
marginalizing
weakening
weak environmental governance
suppression
Environmental movements
mutually reinforcing
Ecological
modernity
(e.g., South Korea)
the mutually reinforcing pathway
the deviated pathway
Borrowing a literary metaphor in the opening line of the novel Anna Karenina,
“happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way,” this
research has found that environmental movement and political liberalization can go
well in tandem, but when they fall out, as very often the case in contemporary Asia,
the causes are quite different. The rest of this section will discuss two relevant factors
that could break the initial co-evolvement of the opening-up of political participation
and the rise of environmental activism and lead to a deviant and regressive pathway
drawing upon the case evidence from Asia.
First and foremost, the pressure of economic growth and the environmental costs of
joining the global markets. Most Asian countries are over-achievers in economic
growth measured by global standards, for example, the “dragons and tigers” in the
second half of the 20th century 7 and China, to some extent Kazakhstan, and
increasingly Vietnam since the new millennium. However, they lag behind when it
comes to environmental protection. According to the Environmental Performance
Index (EPI) published periodically by the Yale Centre of Environmental Law and
Policy, five out of the eight cases highlighted in this chapter on average in the past
two decades are among the bottom 50 percentile (Table 3).
Table 3. Global rankings of environmental performance
Country
2006
2010
2020
China (mainland)
94
121
120
Indonesia
79
134
116
Japan
14
20
12
Kazakhstan
70
92
85
Mongolia
115
142
147
Singapore
n/a
28
39
South Korea
42
94
28
Vietnam
99
85
141
Note: Data extracted from Environmental Performance Index (EPI) 2006, 2010 and 2020 report
(available at https://epi.yale.edu/downloads). For each round of survey, both the total number of
countries and the measurements vary.
To reduce poverty, embarking on industrialization, and compete in global markets has
dominated not only most Asian governments’ agenda but also became an quasiideology and mega-narrative affecting Asian societies’ collective consciousness,
which divert public attention from any other major socio-political tasks including but
not limited to environmental protection. Moreover, this developmentalist mindset
does not give way to democratic transition (Kim and Thurbon 2015). As their main
mandate is to respond to what the voters want, politicians in young democracies often
find themselves even more pressed to boost up economy and find themselves
less incentivized to strengthen environmental protection or align with
environmentalists and pollution victims. When the massive fish death happened in
2016, local governments and politicians in central costal Vietnam reacted to protests
with harsh suppressive measures, fearing the resistance would lead to the departure of
large foreign investments from Taiwan and in turn economic loss for the whole
province. Many local governments across China, particularly in the rural area, are
caught in the same quandary and in between lucrative business deals and development
projects and environmental disasters and community grievances in the aftermath.
7
Dragons – Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong; Tigers – Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore,
and Thailand.
The tale of the two central and inner Asian cases, Kazakhstan and Mongolia, further
sheds light on the significant impact of the drive to jump-start national economy by
fast selling natural resources to the global markets on process of establishing
regulatory institutions both effective and responsive to the demands of environmental
movements, especially in newly independent or transitioned developing countries.
Even though Mongolia has seen some of the most courageous “water worriers” and
impressive campaigns again mining pollution, these efforts have not been fruitful in
terms of producing institutional changes to actually halt polluting practices mainly
due to the rampant corruption and close ties between political elites and the mining
industry and, probably more devastatingly, the fact that Mongolia’s national economy
is heavily dependent on mineral exports. A similar pattern can be found in
Kazakhstan’s petroleum and increasingly hydropower industries, but to a much less
extent as its national economic structure is much more diversified and growth less
contingent on resource extraction and export. For example, with increasing
investment from China in leasing agricultural lands and food production eventually
urged Kazakhstan central government to withdraw a law that permits foreigners to
lease land (Sternberg et al. 2017).
Another important, yet so far under-studied factor that has contributed to the
divergent patterns of environmental movements in Asia is transnational advocacy and
global civil society networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In the context of climate
change and ecological degradation in the 20th century, environmental activism in
individual countries and societies is increasingly linked to the global level
mobilization, governance building, and narrative construction. Asia is not an
exception in this respect. In fact, external non-state agencies and donors have been
present and even influential in some Asian communities for a relatively long period of
time due to the colonial history and great power penetration during the Cold War.
More recent decades have seen the rise of transnational advocacy networks where
local activists and small-scale community resistance have reached out to form new
partnership and solidarity with well-endowed and positioned NGOs, foundations and
other institutions in Washington D.C., New York, Oxford, Tokyo, Taipei,
Amsterdam, and more.
Related to rise of such solidarity-based and value-laden transnational advocacy
networks, at least two issues have emerged that further complicate the relationship
between the political authorities and the environmental civil society in Asian
countries. One, in the wake of the Colour Revolutions in the former Soviet space and
the Arab Spring in 2012, many governments in the developing world are becoming
suspicious, if not antagonistic, of foreign NGOs, charities and foundations. Political
authorities in China, India, Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, and more recently Hong
Kong, have introduced news laws, regulations, visa policies and more to tighten up
the monitoring and control over international NGOs’ activities, seeing international
NGO networks as one source of anti-regime, pro-democracy public sentiments and
social mobilization. The other, internal disparities, in terms of either materialistic
power or discursive knowledge, within the transnational networks between local and
international NGOs further affect domestic state-society relations. At times, such
disparities can have unintended ramifications that are detrimental to local
communities. For example, the “brain drain” of local experts as observed in
transnational environmental networks working in China (Litzinger 2004) and divisive
impact caused by external donors on local communities in Indonesia (Gellert 2010)
and Mongolia (Byambajav 2015) as discussed above.
Conclusions
Environmental movements and environmental activism are on the rise in Asia even
though majority of the states in the region are not stable democracies. This research
has found that opening up the political system and deepening public participation in
politics is critical for the early development of environmental movement, yet not
enough for the movement to sustain and become effective in the long-run. Only few
Asian societies, markedly South Korea and Indonesia, have seen continuous growth
of the environmental movement after the fundamental political regime shift. For
countries like Kazakhstan, Mongolia, or even Japan, the initial golden opportunity for
the environmental movement and broad social mobilization to push for more
sustained political liberalization has been missed and environmental activism has
been either mostly absorbed into the formal state apparatus or sidelined.
The research further found that the ideological urgency of economic development has
contributed to the divergence of political reform and environmental movement in
many Asian countries, even more so in young democracies. With rare exceptions,
marketalization and integration into the global economic system, managed by often
unstable, if not corrupted elected politicians, has taken a toll on the environment.
Outstanding as a region, Asian countries are overachievers in economic development,
while lagging in environmental performance. In addition, attention and assistance
from international agencies and environmental NGOs to Asian countries has not been
consistently effective in supporting bottom-up activism and facilitating collaboration
between the state and society in environmental protection. Instead, well-intended
international NGOs often find themselves caught in problematic political
entanglements, which can result in unintended weakening of environmental
governance in the recipient country.
Limited by space, this research cannot explore in greater depth and more
systematically the intertwined relationship between political liberalization, economic
development, transnational activism and bottom-up environmental movement. Further
studies on the topic could employ various methods, qualitatively or quantitively, to
expand case number and enhance the understanding of the relationships across these
important factors.
Acknowledgement
Interviews conducted in Kazakhstan for this chapter were supported by the Ministry
of Education, Singapore, under Tier-1 Grant number RG154/15.
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