Rahman, M. M. (2011). Development Agenda and Policy
Ownership: Mapping Civil Service’s Contribution to
PRSP in Bangladesh, JOAAG, Vol. 6. No. 1
Development Agenda and Policy Ownership:
Mapping Civil Service’s Contribution to PRSP in Bangladesh1
Md. Mizanur Rahman2
Abstract:
Lack of policy ownership was considered the main reason for failure of the development policies
of the World Bank-IMF in loan receiving countries during the structural adjustment regime. In
response to previous failures, the Bank-Fund introduced a new policy recipe called poverty
reduction strategy paper PRSP where policy ownership was a major ingredient. Ownership was
supposed to be institutionalized through participation of stakeholders in loan receiving countries,
including the civil service. The civil service in Bangladesh like other countries arguably is an
important constituent in development policy formulation process. While the article principally
aims to explore the contribution of the civil service to Bangladesh’s PRSP to examine policy
ownership in development agenda taking PRSP a case in point, it also establishes the merit of
exploring civil services’ role in development agenda setting citing examples from Southeast
Asian nations.
Key Words: PRSP, Civil Service, Policy Ownership, Bangladesh
1
2
The article is generated from the PhD dissertation of the author. See for details Rahman, 2009.
A career civil servant in Bangladesh and currently works in the Ministry of Industries.
Email: mizan.civilservice@gmail.com
43
Rahman, M. M. (2011). Development Agenda and Policy
Ownership: Mapping Civil Service’s Contribution to
PRSP in Bangladesh, JOAAG, Vol. 6. No. 1
Introduction
The issue of policy ownership of development agenda emerged as an important aspect in
international development cooperation during the 1990s. The issue came to the forefront of
development agendas in the face of the failures of donor, particularly multilateral donors such as
the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), led development strategies in
developing countries including Bangladesh. The evident failure of structural adjustment programs
(SAP), introduced as a loan condition by the WB-IMF in early 1980s contributed to the rise of
interest in policy ownership. The World Development Report 2000/2001 (World Bank, 2001)
argued that local conditions and the ownership of aid receiving country should be taken into
account while maintaining development cooperation3.
The issue of policy ownership was emphatically promoted in the comprehensive development
framework (CDF) announced by the World Bank under the leadership of J Wolfensohn in 1999.
This was following changes of the WB in the understanding of poverty discourses and the failures
of the WB’s development approaches. Based on new understanding, the Bretton-Woods twins i.e.
the WB-IMF opted for introducing a new strategy replacing previous SAP, under the principles of
CDF. The new approach called for developing a strategy paper, known as poverty reduction
strategy paper (PRSP), with explicit aim of poverty reduction in loan receiving countries. The
CDF incorporated four principles for aid flows: 1) long term and holistic, 2) country ownership
and stakeholders’ participation, 3) result oriented, and 4) country led partnership.
A PRSP emphasized ownership that could be achieved through participation of major
stakeholders during the formulation process ranging from common public to civil service to
national parliament to civil society organizations. Any developing country of either highly
indebted poor country (HIPC)4 of the WB or a poverty reduction and growth facility (PRGF)5 of
the IMF category willing to receive concessional loans had to develop a PRSP and it was
supposed to be approved by the Bank-Fund. Bangladesh as a loan recipient under PRGF category
of IMF had committed to preparing a PRSP as the major development strategy for poverty
reduction replacing the traditional five year plan. PRSPs became key policy instruments through
which the world’s major donors were related with low-income countries and countries
undergoing economic crises (WB, 2002; Guttal & Mallaluan, 2003).
Since independence Bangladesh has been struggling to consolidate democratic institutions and
has been exposed to military and quasi-military regimes several times. The impact has been that
participatory policy making is yet to emerge in Bangladesh. While it is popularly perceived that
the lack of participatory policymaking process has paved the way for civil servants to play an
overriding role in development agenda setting, however contrary to this public perception donor
3
The issue of policy ownership was however put forward before WB-IMF by some economists of developing countries
(see for example Sobhan, 1982) including Bangladesh.
4 The HIPC initiative entails coordinated action by the international financial community, including multilateral
institutions, to reduce to sustainable levels the external debt burden of heavily indebted poor countries that pursue IMF
and WB-supported adjustment and reform programs, but for who traditional debt relief mechanisms are insufficient
(http://www.imf.org/external/np /sec/pr/1999/pr9957.htm).
5 On November 22, 1999, the enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) was renamed the Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility (PRGF), and its objectives were changed to support programs to strengthen substantially and in a
sustainable manner balance of payments positions, and to foster durable growth, leading to higher living standards and
a reduction in poverty. The PRGF is a concessional IMF facility for assisting eligible members that are undertaking
economic reform programs to strengthen their balance of payments, and improve their growth prospects. PRGF loans
carry an interest rate of 0.5% and are repayable over 10 years with a 5½-year grace on principal payments.
(http://www.imf.org/external /np/sec/pr/1999/pr9957.htm)
Rahman, M. M. (2011). Development Agenda and Policy
Ownership: Mapping Civil Service’s Contribution to
PRSP in Bangladesh, JOAAG, Vol. 6. No. 1
influence over policy formulation is strongly evident in Bangladesh (Muhammad, 1998 & 2007).
PRSP demanded participation of all major stakeholders including political party, national
parliament, civil society and civil service, but again it was globally argued that the role of the
Bank-Fund was instrumental in developing PRSP in aid receiving countries (Guttal & Mulaluan,
2003). Despite multilateral donors’ crucial role and scope of engagement of other stakeholders,
role of civil service as a major stakeholder in development agenda setting still remains important
in Bangladesh. To be more realistic, at the end of the day civil service is required to play the big
role as political institutions take little interest in articulating development policy. Nevertheless,
civil service seemed to have played very little role in PRSP. Standing at such a critical point, it is
thus important to examine civil service’s role in setting development agenda in Bangladesh taking
PRSP as a case study.
Policy Ownership, Civil Service and National Development: An Analytical Framework
Conceptualizing ‘Policy Ownership’
By early 1990s marginal impact of Bank-Fund development strategies was looming large to the
Bretton-Woods Institutions (BWIs) i.e. the WB and the IMF, although much earlier than BankFund’s findings various civil society organization (CSOs), recognizing the failure, demanded
reversal of BWIs approaches. In reference to the failures Wolfensohn, the president of the World
Bank, suggested a comprehensive development framework where he clearly stated the notion of
policy ownership that appeared in his analysis as the root cause of failure of earlier economic
reforms.
It is also clear to all of us that ownership is essential. Countries must be in the
driver’s seat and set the course. They must determine goals and the phasing,
timing and sequencing of programs. …In some countries the long and short-term
goals will be set by a process of public debate and consensus building led by the
government with all sections of society…. What is new is an attempt to view our
efforts within a long-term, holistic and strategic approach where all the
component parts are brought together. Such development should, in our
judgment, be a participatory process, as transparent and as accountable as
possible within the political climate prevailing in each country... It is a holistic
and strategic approach to development based on country ownership and
partnership (Wolfensohn, 1999 in Rahman, 2009, p 25).
While Wolfensohn defined ownership as saying that the country must set the agenda through a
fruitful public debate where stakeholders participated and the entire process of agenda setting was
transparent, Shimomura and Ohno (2005) moved further stressing ‘true ownership’ (Box 1). The
argument was a three-dimensional phenomenon and qualitatively more comprehensive than
Wolfensohn’s definition.
Rahman, M. M. (2011). Development Agenda and Policy
Ownership: Mapping Civil Service’s Contribution to
PRSP in Bangladesh, JOAAG, Vol. 6. No. 1
Box 1 Basics of True Ownership
• Strong will and commitment of national leaders
to build a self-reliant economy.
•
Based upon a concrete vision and realistic
measure economic strategies and policies should
indicate an exit plan from aid.
•
Independent execution of development i.e.
agenda setting, implementation strategy and
timetable should be done without donor
influence.
•
Mapping development strategies in line with
local condition and in doing so trial and error
approach may be practiced to reach the best
option.
•
Using of indigenous expertise, holding
consultation with stakeholders and drawing upon
consensual political support within the country.
Thus the first dimension of true
ownership could be implied as the
goal of aid. Ownership should be
translated through strong will and
commitment of national leaders to
build a self-reliant economy.
Development strategies and policies
should
assume
eventual
“graduation” (or an “exit plan”)
from aid and be supported by a
concrete vision and realistic
measures for growth promotion and
domestic resource mobilization.
Policies, being beyond mere slogan,
also should be truly imbued with
equitability
and
growth
sustainability.
The second is the scope of
ownership. It is expressed by two
distinct capacities of aid receiving
• Avoiding “blue print” approach in pursuing
countries: 1) donor management and
development strategies.
2) policy autonomy and content
• Giving local institutions opportunities to prove
(substance of national development
and excel ability (Rahman, 2009).
strategies and policies). Donor
management refers to the capacity
to own the relationship with the
donor community and requires leadership in policy dialogue, coordinating of diverse requests,
selectively adopting donor advice, and handling friction with diplomatic grace. Policy autonomy
and content are concerned with owning development policies and require the government to set
national development goals and implement strategy and timetable independently. It is, in other
words, carrying out the development by the country itself—a far broader vision than donor
management. In this type of development cooperation:
“…the government is capable of managing the entire development process and
hence coordinates aid as part of its own coherent development effort. The
government initiates and formulates a national development strategy, identifies
specific needs to be financed by aid, presents its aid requests and negotiates with
donors, matches aid programs and projects with its own internal resources,
implements various developmental activities, and monitors and evaluates results”
(Shimomura & Ohno, 2005, p4).
Another kind of donor management also exists where the donors assume joint responsibility to
guide development process and they intervene in the process in the plea of capacity constraints of
loan receiving governments to formulate and present policy content. In this type of management
they together set goals, allocate money and monitor activities and eventually, it becomes a
process of donor coordination rather than government coordination of aid resources.
The East Asian development “miracle”, for example, is of the first category of donor management
where indeed the aid receiving East Asian countries led their development activities— from
inception to implementation. Under strong political leadership, governments tried to build their
Rahman, M. M. (2011). Development Agenda and Policy
Ownership: Mapping Civil Service’s Contribution to
PRSP in Bangladesh, JOAAG, Vol. 6. No. 1
own institutions to compensate whatever institutional incapacity they might have. For these
governments the aid relationship was just one component of development management. It was a
means to achieve a national goal of promoting growth and establishing wealth-sharing
mechanisms on a nation-wide scale (shared growth).
Referring to the present aid relationship in most developing countries where donors enjoy
substantial authority and constrain genuine autonomy of the countries, Shimomura and Ohno
(2005) stress that government must be at the center of the development process to establish true
ownership. Developing vision for promoting shared growth, building national systems for
mobilizing financial and human resources, and nurturing local expertise in managerial and
technical skills are also recommended to attain true ownership.
The third dimension of true ownership can be conceptualized as the creativity of ideas. It is the
ability of the countries to make development strategies in line with their own situations. The
countries should not implement a copy of a particular strategy(s) floated by donors. Even if
exogenous models are considered, it should be ‘translative adaptation’. This means the relevant
elements in any exogenous model should be reinterpreted ensuring that the locus is situated in the
country where the strategy is implemented. True ownership eventually means the capacity of a
developing country to choose from alternative policy prescriptions—even if they are not
recommended by the international aid community. Indeed it is precisely the point that
differentiates true ownership from “nominal ownership” (Shimomura, 2005). When a country
decides to rely on external advice or foreign models, policymakers and technocrats must conduct
a thorough assessment of alternatives and carefully adapt the policy content and sequencing to the
country-specific context in both design and implementation stages.
Ishikawa (2003) identifies four determinants to explore the actual ex ante processes of a specific
socio-economic system transforming itself to another: (1) economic issues (trigger), (2)
exogenous models, (3) Koku-jo (study of local scenarios) and (4) scenario. Economic issues deal
with the motivation of leaders or main group of people of a country to change the regime—
‘emergence of a change trigger’. However, the outcome of the change or the scenario of regime
transition may not be foreseen. At this stage they may opt for analyzing exogenous models and
their relevance to local reality. It requires a thorough evaluation and study of local scenarios
(Koku-jo). The repeated interaction following a ‘trial and error’ method between exogenous
models and Koku-jo contributes to the emergence of an effective scenario for a new regime. The
implementation of this scenario may further produce a new series of economic issues, but these
should be dealt with as second-generation issues.
The determinants provide clearly an autonomous scenario in development strategy setting. The
motivation for change occurs first in the mind of the national leadership and it is not an outcome
of any external actors. The local reality should motivate the leadership for a change and a copy of
exogenous model is not required rather its relevance as a guideline may help the local situation.
The important issue is that there may be some trial and error processes by which developing
countries arrive at the point of identifying an effective reform scenario. The second-generation
issues suggest that development scenario may not be constant and travel through different
experiences.
Capturing the local need and situation, adaptation relevant to local scenario and trial and error are
important aspects to ensure true policy ownership in international development cooperation rather
than having the donors set the scope for policy choice and interpretation. Sobhan (2002) argues
that the reform process needs to be domestically owned through the use of indigenous expertise,
consultation with stakeholders and drawing upon consensual political support within the country.
Rahman, M. M. (2011). Development Agenda and Policy
Ownership: Mapping Civil Service’s Contribution to
PRSP in Bangladesh, JOAAG, Vol. 6. No. 1
In view of Bangladesh’s huge policy exposure to donors, he further mentions that the past record
suggests that government’s commitment either remained shallow or insincere to reforms
orchestrated by expatriate consultants and eventually all major reform agendas proved
counterproductive. Referring to personal experience in Bangladesh in 1991 as an adviser
(minister equivalent) in charge of finance and planning to the caretaker government of Justice
Shahbuddin, he emphasizes the political intention to carry forward indigenous initiatives and
thinking. During that regime 29 task forces on various issues of socio-economic development of
Bangladesh involving 250 best available professionals were to prepare policy recommendations
to assist the then newly elected government and parliament to establish domestic ownership over
the policymaking process. Unfortunately, the subsequent elected political regimes preferred
listening to the sermons of donors than to the independent thinking of the four volumes of task
force reports.
Sobhan (2003) further stresses the study of the aid relationship between the donors and the
recipients rather than the policies associated with aid. Capturing the relationship is important
because it impinges on the political economy of developing countries, which determines the
distributive outcomes of policy.
Helleiner (2000) defines ownership as the widest possible participation of beneficiaries in
development actions that essentially the process of planning, design, implementation, monitoring,
and evaluation has to be driven by the recipients. Yet, the recipient should be highly committed
and try to seize ownership, as it cannot be given. Country ownership develops such quality of a
State that people can understand that their representatives have freely chosen the strategies or
programs to be implemented. The country then seems confident to risk the failure of a program
and strategy and thus acts consistently with this belief and acceptance of responsibility (Johnson,
2005).
Stiglitz (1998) provides a comprehensive view of development strategy with special reference to
the past few decades of global development pursuit. While a development strategy must be aimed
at facilitating the transformation of society by identifying the barriers as well as potential
catalysts for change, it requires to be more ambitious to set out a vision of the transformation of
society rising beyond the nominal role of accumulation of capital and the deployment of
resources that what the society will look like ten to twenty years.
Such a transformative development strategy calls for a transparent and participatory process to
ensure ownership, policy consensus and to reach and motivate all. Ownership is important
because he says,
“…effective change cannot be imposed from outside. Indeed, the attempt to impose
change from outside is as likely to engender resistance and give rise to barriers to
change... At the heart of development is a change in ways of thinking, and
individuals cannot be forced to change how they think. They can be forced to take
certain actions. They can be even forced to utter certain words. But they cannot be
forced to change their hearts or minds” (Stiglitz, 1998, p, 20).
He is highly critical of policy imposition, as policy conditionality not only undermines the
interest of the recipient county to acquire capacity but also the confidence to exploit the ability for
development. If policies are accepted in view of aid conditionality it is obvious that they are
going to be superficial and equally be implemented half-heartedly. Eventually, such policy
generates counterproductive result. He views “thus, key ingredients in a successful development
strategy are ownership and participation” (Stiglitz, 1998). While successful social transformation
Rahman, M. M. (2011). Development Agenda and Policy
Ownership: Mapping Civil Service’s Contribution to
PRSP in Bangladesh, JOAAG, Vol. 6. No. 1
demands policy ownership, greater degree of ownership can be achieved only when the strategies
and policies are developed and driven by the major stakeholders of the country.
Thus it is imperative in order for development to be a transformative process that influences
every institution and individual of the society including political institutions the major
stakeholders need to be involved in the process of analysis of local situations, identifying
adaptive strategies, determining strategies and goals and equally so in implementation. While
partnership, as imbued with the definition of the WB styled ownership, may provide space for
policy influence to key international actors, true ownership that negates partnership on the ground
of developing countries’ inability to frame their own development model is more applicable to
underwriting homegrown development strategies. The success of the Southeast Asian nations
endorses the defiant attitude of the countries regarding external policy advocacy. True ownership
gives opportunity to local institutions to prove their quality and ability, as the country does not
opt for external support in managing development which usually happens in donor-supported
interventions. Ability of local institutions is important because incapacity of institutions in many
poor countries inhibits the development process to run independently and eventually paves the
way of donors influence.
Civil Service and National Development
Professor Ha-Joon Chang (1998) illustrates the role of institutions in economic development with
special reference to East Asian countries and the success stories of those nations. Chang argues
that pure market economies cannot explain the success of the Southeast Asian nations’ economic
progress. Rather it needs to be looked through the contribution of institutions. He identifies three
types of institutions: 1) institutions of coordination and administration; 2) institutions of learning
and innovation; and 3) institutions of income redistribution and social cohesion.
While Chang argues that many non-state institutions such as business corporations, industrial
associations, labor unions, and government–private sector consultation bodies are important
institutions of coordination and acknowledges the importance of non-market, non-state
institutions of coordination, he focuses on two state institutions. The importance these two state
institutions have been emphasized in recent debates on the East Asian experience. They are the
government bureaucracy, which is the central institution that makes up the state, and the
institutions that provide state-business links. According to Chang (1998), central to the
bureaucratic contribution is the provision of entrepreneurial vision, going beyond of popular
belief of running productive enterprise, for the new economy that it wishes to forge out of the
developmental process and to encourage investments in those activities that will help it realize
that vision. An example that he uses is the Japanese government’s success in attracting
information technology industries through their vision of an information age as articulated in a
series of ‘white papers’ (Chang, 1998).
In providing entrepreneurial vision he suggests for some objective conditions for bureaucracy
based on experiences of successful East Asian countries. The first condition is the availability of a
highly competent bureaucratic elite who are not necessarily provided advanced training on
economics, management or some other technical subjects but generalists who can make sensible
judgments on the basis of given information (my emphasis). The second condition is that “this
elite need to have a substantial degree of political insulation, which will enable them to retain a
degree of “autonomy” that is essential in long-range planning” (Chang, 1998, 73). The third
condition is to establish a high-prestige career bureaucracy, where political appointments are
checked through a competitive recruitment system and thus politically motivated hiring and
dismissal is made difficult. However, while Chang highlights the political insulation of
Rahman, M. M. (2011). Development Agenda and Policy
Ownership: Mapping Civil Service’s Contribution to
PRSP in Bangladesh, JOAAG, Vol. 6. No. 1
bureaucracy in the light of successful East Asian nations, he shares the downside of the
insulation. He warns that the overarching influence of neoliberal orthodoxies may itself become a
threat. Thus, in order to have a balance between the neoliberal pressures and political insulation
of bureaucracy an engagement of dialogues with the private sector is necessary.
Chang’s (1998) insights well fit into Bangladesh’s context. The contribution of a generalist civil
service to economic development is heavily demanding on various counts. While the recent
literature strongly advocates the active involvement of parliament and civil society in the
economic agenda, the role of the civil service is again bypassed. But the realities are that since
independence in 1971 the nation has survived only 15 years of continued democratic governance
up to January 2007. The parliament is yet to be a strong political and representative organization
in the face of confronting political culture between two major political parties. However, the
immediate impact of the democratic rule is the rise of a vibrant civil society and free press. There
are some valid arguments in place as to who constitutes civil society and by what terms and most
importantly how the organizations are run6. Reality suggests that most of the civil society
organizations are embedded with Western countries for funds. In such a situation, the
contribution of a career civil bureaucracy to making of and implementing development strategies
can hardly be overemphasized.
With special reference to PRSP one may put forth two fundamental questions – 1) how the civil
service was involved in the process to determine a roadmap for poverty reduction in Bangladesh;
and 2) how PRSP itself focuses on further development of an efficient civil service to spearhead
national economic development. It is convincing that an efficient civil service is needed to
overcome the policy leverage coming with multilateral and bi-lateral development cooperation.
Methodology
Case studies provide a valid methodological context in which to study implementation of
processes but also to analyze the evaluations of that process (Yin, 2003). Further, case studies
allow one to investigate phenomena composed of complex layers of variables (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Yin, 2003). These two reasons underlie the choice of case studies as an appropriate
methodology7.
In order to understand the reality during PRSP the study focuses on the dynamics of policy
formulation in two ministries namely: Ministry of Women and Children Affairs (MWCA) and
Ministry of Establishment. The reason behind selecting the former was that the researcher worked
in MWCA and thus it was convenient to get data. The reason behind selecting the Ministry of
Establishment was that it is the main agency that deals with the professional issues of the civil
service. By analyzing the policies contained in PRSP one can understand how far the principal
actors had taken steps to orient the civil service towards national development. From that
perspective the selection of the Ministry of Establishment was appropriate.
6 In many occasions many well-known members of civil society questioned the existence of true civil society in
Bangladesh. Even many questioned the validity of the urban elite in the name of civil society to represent the people.
Thus many people believe that they are engaged in proxy representation; for without donor funds they rarely undertake
any program.
7
The article employs various tools for data collection. They include: consulting secondary sources, in-depth interview
with various key informants particularly retired and active civil servants. In most cases interviews were tape-recorded
and then transcribed and where interviews were not recorded notes taken during the interview were used.
Rahman, M. M. (2011). Development Agenda and Policy
Ownership: Mapping Civil Service’s Contribution to
PRSP in Bangladesh, JOAAG, Vol. 6. No. 1
One component is that a PRSP is supposed to entail policies to develop an effective civil service.
Thus current and former civil servants were interviewed. The civil servants interviewed had
invariably more than eight years experience in public sector. They were professionally competent
to draw educative comments and inferences. To gain appropriate feedback the initial results were
presented to a group civil servants and civil society members.
Bangladesh and PRSP
Bangladesh accepted the PRSP requirements of the WB-IMF to obtain credit under a PRGF
program of the IMF following the decision taken in the Bangladesh development forum (BDF)
meeting 2000. In October 2005 Bangladesh released officially the full PRSP prepared under the
leadership of the general economics division (GED) of the Planning Commission. The
Bangladesh PRSP, tilted Unlocking the Potential: National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty
Reduction8, claims to have outlined a comprehensive medium-term strategy in a sound
macroeconomic environment for implementing pro-poor growth, effective safety-net programs
and human development. The strategy asserts that it has been made broad-based and operational
by emphasizing social inclusion and empowerment, promoting good governance, highlighting
better service delivery practices and brining the environment and sustainable development to
center stage.
Like many other developing countries PRSP in Bangladesh also received serious criticism. Many
academics challenged the whole PRSP process (Ahmad, 2002; Hossain, 2004; Titumir, 2002;
Rahman, 2003; Sobhan, 2002; Sobhan, 2002a, 2002b, 2003). The major criticisms attributed to
the PRSP development were: 1) lack of political will to eradicate poverty; 2) imbalanced
distribution of wealth; and 3) lack of ownership over the national poverty reduction strategy
(Akash, 2002). On the other hand the government claims that the PRSP was prepared through
proper consultations with stakeholders at different levels ranging from upazilla9 to divisional/
national levels (GoB, 2005). It was also argued that the preparation of the PRSP in Bangladesh
was directly linked to the entry of the Bank-Fund program assistance under a medium-term policy
framework. The timing of the finalization of interim-PRSP (I-PRSP) was significant because
immediately after the formulation of I-PRSP and its joint assessment by the Bank-Fund, the
government successfully applied for the IMF’s program lending under the PRGF and the World
Bank’s Development Support Credit (DSC) under the PRSP umbrella. Both lending arrangements
were linked to a medium-term policy framework involving disbursements of funds in series of
installments (Mahmud, 2006).
Bangladesh government made special institutional provisions to make a full-blown PRSP. It
designated the general economics division (GED) of the Planning Commission as the national
poverty focal point (NPFP) in July 2003 (Ahmed, 2004). Moreover, the national steering
committee (NSC), a high-powered committee to guide and monitor the activities of the PRSP
preparation, was formed. The NSC was formed on 18 September 200310 with the Principal
Secretary to the Prime Minister as Chair and the Member, GED of the planning commission as
member secretary. In the beginning it had 17 members but later was expanded to 2211.
8
It is also considered the first PRSP as Bangladesh prepared second PRSP in 2009.
lower tier of administrative unit in Bangladesh
10
Vide memo number PD/Admn-2/17-34/2003/607 of the Planning Division, Ministry of Planning, Government of
Bangladesh
11
The decision of expansion was taken in the second NSC meeting held on 13 November 2003. The total 22 members
were: principal secretary to the PM, secretaries in the ministries/ division of finance, economic relations, environment
and forest, agriculture, education, health and family welfare, local government, disaster management and relief, women
and children, social welfare, power, planning, fisheries and livestock, commerce, science and ICT, water resources,
land, rural development and cooperatives, member, programming division, and general economics division in the
9
Rahman, M. M. (2011). Development Agenda and Policy
Ownership: Mapping Civil Service’s Contribution to
PRSP in Bangladesh, JOAAG, Vol. 6. No. 1
Secretaries of various ministries and divisions served as members on the committee. In order to
provide technical support to various ministries and national poverty focal point (NPFP), in the
first meeting of NSC constituting of various sectoral thematic groups (TGs) were proposed and
finally the NSC formed 12 thematic groups.
PRSP and the Role of Civil Service
The engagement of civil servants in a country like Bangladesh in public policy formulation
process is very important as the country lacks strong political institutions to represent the public
voice. Civil servants with wider exposure to national reality and development demand can
significantly contribute to national development strategy. Moreover, in absence of a proactive
engagement of political leadership civil servants’ professional mastery demands they lead the
process. The other significant point is that they are the very instruments of the state that
contribute to the implementation of development strategies.
However, seemingly the presence of senior bureaucrats in the NSC and in the TGs in various line
ministries may impress upon observers that the entire process was civil servants’ led. Having long
discussions with civil servants at various levels it appears that the presence of civil servants on
the committees may not mean true engagement. Civil servants did not have the leadership in most
of the cases.
In the beginning there was a proposal for constituting a high powered national poverty reduction
council (NPRC) with the Prime Minister as chairman and the Finance Minister as executive
chairman. It proposed to include a number of ministers, senior civil servants, private sector and
civil society representatives but in the end it did not come into effect. The purpose of mentioning
the NPRC is that in absence of NPRC the NSC virtually became the most significant body to
spearhead the activities concerning the PRSP. A strategic document to deal with poverty (the
number one problem of the country) necessarily would expect some strategic and visionary thrust
from the NSC. Having analyzed the minutes of nine consecutive meetings from the first the highpowered NSC no strategic guidelines and vision in regards to the poverty reduction agenda was
found. It appeared that NSC was mostly engaged in facilitating the activities to be done by the
consultants. Then obviously the intrinsic deficiency of Bangladesh’s PRSP is that it never
received any visionary guidelines from either the political policy makers nor from the senior
policy makers in the civil service.
The NSC was powerful in terms of getting things done12 but not in terms of setting the vision.
During the interview with staff members of the Planning Commission who used to attend the
meetings as aides it was disclosed that civil servants/NSC were not even encouraged to play a
critical role. One such staff member said "NSC was powerful but not participatory. Excepting a
few secretaries, most participants did not speak out”. A secretary who was a member of NSC also
expressed his frustration that their presence was required just to validate the process.
The dynamics in terms of engagement in different ministries may be more illustrative to
understand the depth of ownership and participation in the PRSP development process. The TGs
in the ministries played critical role of developing background papers on the themes they were
planning commission.
12
The NSC did many things compromising the existing rules in the plea that they have to complete the PRSP within
the stipulated time. The recruitment of consultants may be a good example. They did not bother about the official
procedures. However, why they remained so tensed to complete the document within a timeframe that was presumably
not given by the political authority is a valid question. However, the total analysis proved that all those were for PRGF
loans.
Rahman, M. M. (2011). Development Agenda and Policy
Ownership: Mapping Civil Service’s Contribution to
PRSP in Bangladesh, JOAAG, Vol. 6. No. 1
assigned to. Based on the experience and insights of the civil servants in the Ministry of Women
and Children Affairs and Ministry of Establishment gained through the in-depth interviews a
deeper understanding of the magnitude of ownership and engagement was achieved. The issues of
the TGs occupied a huge importance in the meetings of NSC, which was primarily because of the
involvement of consultants. By interpreting the minutes of NSC meetings it appears that the NSC
wanted the consultants to prepare the PRSP. A mid level career civil servant said,
“Desk officers were not involved in the preparation rather the consultants
involved in the TG did it. Thus, the implementation of PRSP has been
automatically weak. To me PRSP is just a book. I don’t know what it contains. I
don’t have any interest even. I don’t feel any sense of a new start due to PRSP for
poverty reduction. The targets set in PRSP are ambitious; they are not set in the
perspective of the capacity of the state. We wanted to have done all things. In
other word we have set so many indicators and targets just to give the sense of
getting so many things. To me most of them are junks”.
Government officials invariably exposed that there were truly no major discussions at the
ministry level involving various stakeholders. The experience in the Ministry of Women and
Children Affairs suggests that in some social issues, such as gender, the contribution of civil
society was substantial but the leadership resided with the consultants. Consultants primarily
prepared the documents, set the matrices and targets and the Ministry only played the role of
getting policies approved from the higher authority such as the Minister or the Secretary through
the routine channel of bureaucracy. The resultant impact was that the civil servants could not own
the PRSP as their own agenda that would be implemented by them. Statements made by officials
from midlevel to senior level during the interviews illustrated the overall lack of involvement of
political leadership and civil servants. A joint secretary commented,
“PRSP is conditionality from the WB- the IMF. Some people are doing business
with it. This is bogus and is not our plan. Leadership in policy development is
important. The political government did not desire the development of
institutions that are crucial for policy autonomy”.
In the Ministry of Establishment (the principal ministry to deal with human resource issues of
civil servants and public governance) there was no discussion at all as to how governance could
be improved by ensuring qualitative changes in civil service13. While it was evident that the
involvement of the civil servants was reasonably nominal, the perception of the officials
regarding the PRSP was remarkable. Every one of those interviewed confidently believed that
PRSP was an imposition of the Bank-Fund. They were not convinced that a document prescribed
by multilateral donors would come to the aid of poverty reduction. A deputy secretary
commented “We have not seen it. We do not know much about it. The document is very clumsy.
We are not clear that it was developed for greater national development. Truly we are not
informed”.
The predominance of consultants in both the TGs and in the NPFP exposed a scenario of the
incapacity of civil servants in leading the formulation of public policy and in ensuring ownership
overt it in Bangladesh. The amount of participation and engagement was low for many reasons
but the question that stands out is what could justify the ignorance of civil servants regarding
PRSP? It is important to note that the civil service unfortunately has always been a victim of
populist politics in both elected and authoritative regimes. The nation did not apply any
13
The member secretary, NSC and the lead consultant admitted the omission during interviews with the researcher.
Rahman, M. M. (2011). Development Agenda and Policy
Ownership: Mapping Civil Service’s Contribution to
PRSP in Bangladesh, JOAAG, Vol. 6. No. 1
comprehensive plan to streamline civil service to cope with changing environment (CPD, 2007).
A former cabinet secretary in the interview justified the situation as saying,
“…here in Bangladesh civil service was willfully destroyed in the assumption
that an efficient and strong civil service would create trouble to the political
leadership. We were exposed to martial law for many years and they also took
the opportunity. Everything was done to make civil service ineffective”.
The failure of civil service may be attributed to the inaction to make civil service innovative,
enterprising and efficient of successive political regimes. Civil servants reported that indeed they
were not ready to prepare a PRSP. More importantly while the Bank-Fund encountered serious
resistance in the global scenario, in Bangladesh the civil servants tended to see PRSP in isolation.
From the interviews no civil servant was found who was aware of the evolution of PRSP from the
structural adjustment program (SAP). The lack of research based policy formulation has also
undermined the scope of the engagement of the civil service. Rarely does any ministry maintain
relevant data on development issues. And consultants on behalf of the government with support
from donors usually prepare reports, documents, mission statements for presentation either in
national or international forums. Culturally, bureaucracy has been dependent on donors and their
consultants and eventually, civil service has lost its self-esteem and leadership role.
Conclusion
The study points out that the top leadership of the Bangladesh civil service has failed to
contribute to formulating PRSP. The civil service seemed low-spirited and lacked innovativeness
in guiding the national development agenda. The comments of the public servants interviewed
testify that the Bangladesh civil service has not been critical in regards to the political economy of
development cooperation. However one would believe that they should have been very aware of
the seemingly arrogant dealings of donors including the Bank-Fund since independence.
In this highly complicated globalized world where the influences of the major powers are open
and aggressive and while the country has a struggling democracy, Bangladesh must opt for a
highly enterprising and proactive civil service. Civil servants in reality leased out the
responsibility of articulating development agenda including the PRSP to consultants. The civil
service failure in Bangladesh can be attributed to the national failure of making a streamlined
civil service. Unfortunately, civil service in Bangladesh has never ever been given due attention
to allow it to play important role in national development process. The country during her 40
years existence was ruled nearly two decades by military dictators and the military regimes
deliberately weakened the civil service so that it could not be a threat to political ambitions. This
military hangover even continued during the elected regimes.
Of late, the West backed civil society enjoys huge influence and authority over national public
policy in Bangladesh but they also do not have an agenda for the reform of the civil service. The
reasons could be that in poor countries, in terms of political and economic development, an
enterprising and strong civil service may be a threat to the vested interest groups. Despite ample
evidence from around Southeast Asia concerning civil service contribution to development,
Bangladesh has unfortunately opted for remaining silent about a pro-people and result oriented
civil service.
Rahman, M. M. (2011). Development Agenda and Policy
Ownership: Mapping Civil Service’s Contribution to
PRSP in Bangladesh, JOAAG, Vol. 6. No. 1
Acknowledgement
The views expressed in the article are of the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the
position of Bangladesh government or the ministry of industries. The author wishes to recognize
the brilliant comments of Dr. Fahim Quadir, York University, Canada and Dr. S. Bruce Thomson
St. George’s University, Grenada, West Indies on an earlier draft of the article. I would like to
expresses my sincere indebtedness to the anonymous reviewers who made some substantive
comments and strengthened the academic contributions of the article.
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