Ethics of Cinematic Experience

Ethics of Cinematic Experience Ethics of Cinematic Experience: Screens of Alterity deals with the relationship between cinema and ethics from a philosophical perspective, finding an intrinsic connection between film spectatorship and the possibility of being open to different modes of alterity. The book’s main thesis is that openness to otherness is already found in the basic structures of cinematic experience. Through a close examination of the ethical relevance of the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Stanley Cavell, Emmanuel Levinas and Gilles Deleuze to cinema studies, Ethics of Cinematic Experience: Screens of Alterity pursues the question of how film can open the viewer to what is not her and so bring her to encounter otherness in a way that is unique to cinematic experience. The book sees ethics as not just the subject, content or story of a film but part of its aesthetic structure. Accompanied by readings of films mainly from mainstream cinema, each chapter focuses on a different aspect of the encounter with alterity through cinema. The book gives particular attention to how theoretical discussion of the cinematic close-up can lead to ethical insights into the status of both the human and the non-human in film, and thus lead to an understanding of the relationships the viewer makes with them. The book is a helpful resource for students and scholars interested in the relationship between philosophy, film and ethics, and is appropriate for students of philosophy and media and cultural studies. Orna Raviv is a filmmaker and a film theorist. She teaches on the MA program in the Cultural Studies Department at the University of Haifa, and at the Unit for History and Philosophy of Art, Design and Technology, at Shenkar College. Routledge Advances in Film Studies Emotion in Animated Films Edited by Meike Uhrig Post-Production and the Invisible Revolution of Filmmaking From the Silent Era to Synchronized Sound George Larkin New Approaches to Cinematic Space Edited by Filipa Rosário and Iván Villarmea Álvarez Melancholy in Contemporary Cinema A Spinozian Analysis of Film Experience Francesco Sticchi Found Footage Horror Films A Cognitive Approach Peter Turner Affect and Embodied Meaning in Animation Becoming-Animated Sylvie Bissonnette Classical Hollywood Film Cycles Zoë Wallin Re-reading the Monstrous-Feminine Edited by Nicholas Chare, Jeanette Hoorn and Audrey Yue Ethics of Cinematic Experience Screens of Alterity Orna Raviv For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com Ethics of Cinematic Experience Screens of Alterity Orna Raviv First published 2020 by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Orna Raviv The right of Orna Raviv to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-138-37068-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-42789-3 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by codeMantra Visit the [companion website/eResources]: [insert comp website/ eResources URL] Contents List of Figures Acknowledgements Introduction vii ix 1 1 Perspectivalism and Beyond 10 2 Point of View 27 3 The Cinematic Type 47 4 The Face and the Close-Up 66 5 The Face and the Close-Up Take 2 87 6 Becoming-Machine 113 7 Cinema’s Responsibilities 132 Index 155 Figures 1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1 5.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 7.1 7.2 Still from A Trip to the Moon [Le voyage dans la lune] (1902), directed by Georges Méliès. Photofest Still from Or (My Treasure) (2004), directed by Keren Yedaya. Photo by Anna Morfasca. Transfax Film Productions Ltd. Still from Rear Window (1954), directed by Alfred Hitchcock. Paramount Pictures/Photofest Still from Inside Llewyn Davis (2013), directed by Joel and Ethan Coen. CBS Films/Photofest The Villain Foiled (1911), directed by Henry Lehrman and Mack Sennett Still from Shane (1953), directed by George Stevens. Paramount/Photofest Still from No Country for Old Men (2007), directed by Joel and Ethan Coen. Miramax Films/Photofest Still from His Girl Friday (1940), directed by Howard Hawks. Columbia Pictures/Photofest Still from Screen Test: Ann Buchanan (1964), directed by Andy Warhol. The Andy Warhol Museum Still from Apocalypse Now (1979), directed by Francis Ford Coppola. Paramount Pictures/Photofest Still from Blade Runner (1982), directed by Ridley Scott. Warner Bros/Photofest Still from 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968), directed by Stanley Kubrick. MGM/Photofest Still from Ryan (2004), directed by Chris Landreth. Copper Heart Cut Inc. and the National Film Board of Canada Still from Ryan (2004), directed by Chris Landreth. Copper Heart Cut Inc. and the National Film Board of Canada Still from Arrival (2016), directed by Denis Villeneuve. Paramount Pictures/Photofest Still from Arrival (2016), directed by Denis Villeneuve. Paramount Pictures/Photofest 13 30 36 42 50 52 53 58 81 94 117 120 123 124 143 147 Acknowledgements I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Hagi Kenaan, my doctoral advisor, for his excellent guidance, care and support. Special thanks to Vivian Sobchack, whose work inspired me, for her generosity and willingness to share her thoughts with me. I owe a debt of gratitude to many colleagues and friends for their help, insight, advice and feedback on aspects of this research: Meirav Almog, Marie-Luise Angerer, Nitza Ben-Dov, Lucy Bolton, Mauro Carbone, John Caruana, Cristian Ciocan, Salah el Moncef, Christian Ferencz-Flatz, Gregory Flaxman, Eli Friedlander, Sandra Gaudenzi, Yvonne Kozlovsky Golan, Shai Ginsburg, Gerard Greenway, Julian Hanich, Galen Johnson, Assaf Krebs, Yair Lev, Lior Levi, Joel Pearl, Yoav Shiber, Robert Sinnerbrink, Jane Stadler, Yanai Toister and Moshe Zuckermann. I would like to thank my editor Mark Joseph, who committed to this work as if it was his own. My editors at Routledge are owed warm thanks for supporting this project, as are Eleanor Catchpole Simmons, Richa Kohli, and Jeanine Furino, and my anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and advice. I am grateful to my colleagues in the MA program in the Cultural Studies Department at the University of Haifa, and at the Unit for History and Philosophy of Art, Design and Technology at Shenkar College, for providing a creative philosophical environment for writing this book. Thanks are also due to my students, who stimulated me with ideas and questions. A thank you to Keren Yedaya and Transfax film productions, to Chris Landreth, Copper Heart Cut Inc. and the National Film Board of Canada, for giving me permission to use images from their films; also to the people from Photofest and the Andy Warhol Museum, for their help in securing the rights for their photos. My love to my two daughters, Shay and Roni; to my husband, Johanan; and to my whole extended family, who gave me huge support. Permission was gratefully received for using sections from previously published articles: “The Cinematic Point of View: Thinking Film with Merleau-Ponty,” Studia Phaenomenologica Journal. Volume 16, 2016. “Andy Warhol’s Screen Tests: A Face to Face Encounter.” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities. Volume 21, Issue 2, 2016. Introduction This book deals with the relationship between cinema and ethics from a philosophical perspective, finding an intrinsic connection between film spectatorship and the possibility of openness to modes of alterity. There has been growing interest in the film studies of the last two decades in the possible link between cinema and ethics, in what Jinhee Choi and Mattias Frey recognize as an “ethical turn” (2014, 1), a development this work aims to contribute to. The broadening of the discussion of the relationship between cinema and ethics, where the emphasis is on the idea of cinema as an ethical experience (Sinnerbrink 2016, 13–14), seems to me to be very important, today more than ever. Given the major role played by films in shaping our conception and experience of the everyday, I believe that it is vital to elucidate the nature of film as an ethical medium. Among the many film theorists who have in recent years considered the ethical dimension of film, not a few have focused on the potential implications of the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Stanley Cavell, Gilles Deleuze and Emmanuel Levinas for cinematic ethics. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology has been brought to bear on film spectators’ ethical engagement with screen characters, Cavell’s approach to the issue of skepticism and to moral perfectionism has been linked to both the ethics of self-transformation and existential questions about our relationships with an external world and others’ minds, Deleuze’s approach to cinema has been seen as a response to Friedrich Nietzsche’s problem of nihilism or as an immanent ethics of evaluation, and Levinas’s concept of radical otherness has been found applicable to cinema. This book also takes up these philosophers but from a new set of perspectives. Its main thesis is that openness to otherness is already found in the basic structures of cinematic experience: cinematic point of view, the film character and the close-up. I give particular attention to how theoretical discussion of the appearance of the face in the cinematic close-up can lead to insights into the ethical significance of humans and non-humans on the screen, both bound up in intersubjective relationships with the viewer. How is cinematic point of view constructed, and how does it relate to ordinary structures of vision? How does the viewer experience a film 2 Introduction character? What is the ethical significance of seeing faces on the screen? Is a cinematic ethics of otherness necessarily only about the human other, or can one broaden it to include an other who is not human? In seeking answers on these matters, I focus on how cinematic experience can open an ethical space that allows the Other to appear, pursuing the question of how film can lead the viewer to what is not her and how such a movement is not fully given to or controlled by the viewer. I examine how the viewer’s encounter with otherness can be promoted by the film narrative, its temporality and other cinematic means; these means are responsible for making the cinematic experience unique. In focusing on aspects of the film experience, my methodology can be understood as phenomenological, although this term should be taken in a broad sense. From a philosophical perspective, the roots of a phenomenological approach to cinema can be traced to Jean Paul Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Mikel Dufrenne. These philosophers were interested in the arts in general and showed at least some interest in cinema. Building on their writing between 1945 and 1966, a large number of film theorists began delving into an incipiently phenomenological perspective. And yet this did not lead, as might have been expected, to the development of a fully-blown phenomenological approach to film. As Dudley Andrew explains, there were no substantial academic film studies programs before 1963 and therefore no academic film tradition within which the phenomenologies of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Dufrenne could be developed. By the time film studies began to enter universities in France and America, it was much influenced by structuralism, then a dominant force in academia. For many years, structuralism remained unchallenged and, indeed, seemed to have superseded the earlier movement. As cinematic discourse became more established, phenomenology almost disappeared from the mainstream of cinematic thought (Andrew 1978, 45). It was not until the beginning of the 1990s that it was reintroduced to the cinematic sphere. With the work of Allan Casebier on Edmund Husserl Film and Phenomenology: Toward a Realist Theory of Cinematic Representation (1991), and Vivian Sobchack on Merleau-Ponty The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience (1992), phenomenology began to assume an important role in thought about film. In Sobchack’s work she argues that what is unique about cinema is that, mediated on the one hand by the camera and on the other hand by the screen, it creates for the viewers a visual experience that allows them to see with and through somebody else’s point of view (1992, 307). Sobchack’s revolutionary thought is that she considers the film to be a viewing subject with its own perceptive and expressive organs. The encounter between the viewer and what is presented on the screen is, for her, an encounter between three independent and yet embodied viewing subjects: the film viewer, the filmmaker and the film itself (1992,24). Cinema, therefore, can enable its viewers to see in a way that is embodied with the other’s gaze. Introduction 3 But cinema, I argue, not only enables us to see as someone else saw; it also makes possible the appearance of the other on the screen. In order to think philosophically about the ethical implications of the appearance of the other within cinematic experience, I foreground the ethics of Levinas. Levinas, who comes out of the phenomenological tradition, puts ethics at the center of his thinking. For him, it is prior to any philosophical reflection, any other metaphysical thought. Levinas’s ethical thinking develops as a thinking of otherness or alterity, seeing in the ethical relation a demand to maintain the Other’s radical alterity without erasing it. What makes possible the defense of such an alterity is, he says, “the face” (1969). The human face signifies for Levinas the possibility that the Other resists the subject’s tendency to understand know, and represent who and what she encounters, in doing so erasing their alterity. The face should not be thought of only in terms of an object given to perception and knowledge for there is in the face another dimension that refuses such powers. In Levinas’s thought, the encounter with the face enables an ethical encounter with the Other, an encounter that is radically different from a day-to-day encounter between two people. The encounter with the face of the Other is an encounter with the singularity of each person, with what makes one person different from the next and what cannot recognized and understood. The turn to Levinas in the context of thinking about film is not at all obvious. Levinas mistrusts the visual arts (1998), claiming that vision and representation hinder the possibility of an ethical relation to the Other. This could explain why his thought was not taken into account in film theory, even when he had become popular elsewhere, and became prominent in cinematic thinking only at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It is not until 2001 that, in their The Tarantinian Ethics, Fred Botting and Scott Wilson investigate the possibility of connecting Levinas’s ethics, psychoanalytic theories and Quentin Tarantino’s films. In his 2004 The Subject of Documentary, Michael Renov explores Levinas’s relevance to documentaries. Sarah Cooper’s 2006 Selfless Cinema? reads French documentary films in light of the ethics of Levinas. In 2007, a special issue of the journal Film-Philosophy was devoted to Levinas. The issue, edited by Cooper, covers a number of approaches towards the possible links between Levinas and film by thinkers including Cooper herself, Simon Critchley, Libby Saxton, Lisa Downing and Sam Girgus. Additionally, in 2010, Girgus published his Levinas and the Cinema of Redemption. The question of Levinas’s relevance to film thinking continues to occupy many theorists. However, since, for Levinas, images are visual objects, and as such are the product of an objectification that inherently closes off the domain of the ethical, any attempt to relate his ethics to cinema cannot be entirely direct. Most thinkers who want to bring Levinas’s notion of the face—the possibility of encountering otherness—to bear on cinema 4 Introduction see it as incompatible with the cinematic representation of a face onscreen. Fully aware of this position, I offer a reading of Levinas’s face together with theory of the close-up. As I demonstrate, this is to recall his discussion of expression. Expression, for Levinas, contradicts plastic manifestation (1969, 296). It is constant development, continuous change, never resting or becoming a fixed outline or structure, and so, it cannot be represented. With expression, therefore, the face involves us in a visual experience of something essentially not given to representation. I show that the insights of film theorists on the ability of the close-up to reveal facial expressions entail that the close-up allows the viewer to perceive the face beyond what is given to the gaze. This then sheds new light on the relevance of Levinas’s ethics for cinema, leading to my claim that, despite his declared hostility towards the visual, his philosophical articulation of the notion of the face means that we can associate the cinematic close-up with an ethical space where alterity can appear. Chapter 1 begins with a historical examination of conceptions of cinematic experience. These previously definitive conceptions are in thrall to models of human perception that do not do justice to the nature of the different modes of our visual and emotional engagements, as viewers, with film characters and the screened world. The chapter sets out the predominant view in critical discourse of cinema as a manipulative apparatus, controlling the unaware cinemagoer (Baudry 2009, 179). Against this construction of a cinema based on deception and fraud, and thus inhospitable to ethical experience, Deleuze (1986) and Merleau-Ponty (1964), despite some difficulties, and although from what seem to be completely different perspectives, offer an alternative. Both Deleuze’s discussion of Henri Bergson on the relationships between bodies, movement and images, and Merleau-Ponty’s work on perception as a holistic (gestalt) experience recognize the importance of the film medium for our understanding of human perception. Meanwhile, Sobchack’s claim (1992) that the uniqueness of the cinematic experience lies in the manner in which it allows the viewer to see as someone else saw serves as a starting point for the path I wish to take in viewing cinematic experience as essentially ethical. Chapter 2 discusses how the experience of watching films can offer the viewer different modes of engagement with characters through diverse cinematic points of view and how this diversity of points of view creates the context in which the ethical space of cinema is realized. My point of departure is Merleau-Ponty’s previously unknown remarks on cinematic movement, published in Chiasmi International (2010). Here, Merleau-Ponty proposes that we see cinema as a non-mimetic art that does not represent the visible but allows it to appear, acknowledging its ontological novelty as a convergence between the seer and the seen (Carbone 2014, 228–229). My thesis is that when these remarks are taken together with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological Introduction 5 understanding of visual perception as an embodied activity unfolding in time (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 478), and are put in the context of a discussion about the notion of cinematic point of view, they amount to a hint at its ethical importance. They show that the structure of point of view can not only be explained by cinematic convention but is also closely related to and reflected by natural vision. I go on to show how point of view should be seen as a dynamic and irreducibly plural temporal structure. By stressing the importance of a dynamic plurality of points of view in understanding the meaning of film viewing, my analysis sheds light on the ability of the viewing subject to perceive meaning outside of closed frameworks. It allows me to argue that cinematic experience can lead its viewers to what is outside themselves, different from and beyond them. In Chapter 3, I move from analyzing how screen characters see and what it means to see them to discuss the question of cinematic viewing from a different angle in dealing with Cavell’s notion of the cinematic “type” (1979, 29–37). I show that film characters cannot be fully conceived by the viewer and that they always transcend both their presence in the film as actors (and therefore as individual human beings) and their cinematic role. The appearance in films of a person, of a human being, consists, according to Cavell, of a plurality. Film characters transcend their specific role in a certain film. We see in the film character the actor in his or her singularity and individuality: a flesh and blood human being. Watching a film character, we also see the role played by this actor. How we perceive that role is influenced by our own cinematic experience with other characters played by this actor. Thus, for the viewer, a film character appears in a way that cannot be conceived in terms of a fixed and stable identity. Between the viewer and the film character, a gap is opened so that the viewer cannot fully grasp the film character. In Chapter 4, I zoom in to look at a unique image of humanity characteristic of cinema: the close-up of the human face. I examine the tension between the phenomenological and transcendent aspects of the Other by bringing together Levinas’s ethics of the face and the theoretical discourse about the close-up. I begin with film theorists like Jean Epstein (1988), Jean Mitry (1997) and Béla Balázs (1970), who saw the close-up as going beyond the presentation of details unperceived by the unaided eye. The close-up allows the human face to appear in a unique way: it creates close proximity between the viewer and the character’s face, acting on the viewer’s feelings rather than on her perceptions and revealing a dimension of subjectivity that is usually not given to the eye. It is in this context that I consider Levinas’s discussion of facial expression as a mode of alterity. For it was these film theorists who claimed that the close-up discloses the movements of facial expression in a way that prevents the face from being fully analyzed, referred to or thought directly about. By bringing Levinas’s concept of the face into dialogue with the cinematic close-up, I show how cinema can provide a concrete 6 Introduction face-to-face encounter, one in which Otherness shows itself without being objectified. To further explore the link between the Levinasian face and the film close-up, Chapter 5 considers Levinas’s concept of the face (1969) in relation to Deleuze’s discussion of the close-up (1986). For Levinas, the face is a mode of transcending ordinary perception in which the Other exceeds the subject’s tendency to include everything she meets within what he calls “the same.”1 Deleuze’s philosophical analysis, however, conceives of the face in close-up within one plane of immanence. Moreover, while, for Levinas, the face is a human modality, for Deleuze, the face should also be related to what is not human, thus allowing a space of posthuman ethics to emerge. Deleuze recognizes the cinematic screen as a plane where the human face loses its unique status and prestige. He and Félix Guattari’s posthumanist philosophical view (Deleuze and Guattari 2005) challenges the very idea of subjectivity. Following them, film theorists look at the way the human subject can appear on the screen as part of extrahuman assemblages co-evolving with animals, and they find the face, even in landscape. By referring to the notion of affect that Levinas, and Deleuze and Guattari, associate with the unique appearance of the face, I show how what seem to be two unbridgeable philosophical views can be brought close. In Chapter 6, I look at cinematic experience in a broader ethical perspective, going beyond the human body as we know it. The implied ethics is one that sees the other not only in human beings, animals and the environment but also in cyborgs and machines. I begin with a critical view of science-fiction films, claiming that although they seem to promote screen encounters with the Other in its most radical phase—as a non-human— they mostly tend to stay within an anthropocentric approach. Nevertheless, I consider examples of the cinematic appearance of posthuman figures that succeed in presenting an unfixed identity. The ethical implications of such appearances is that the viewer experiences an encounter with alterity, not as a threat to his or her identity but as an opportunity to meet an Other in a way that manages not to fall into human-machine distinctions. While most of this research looks at cinematic ethics from a metaperspective, discussing the grounding conditions through which cinema, as an aesthetic form of expression, constitutes the possibility of incorporating alterity, Chapter 7 ends the book with an attempt to move from a largely metaethical inquiry to a more concrete interrogation. I look at the ethical implications of my analysis in terms of the responsibility for the cinematic other evoked in the film viewer from the perspectives of Levinas, Cavell and Deleuze. And in returning to the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, I suggest how his awareness of cinema as an embodied activity implies a new kind of responsibility, outside traditional oppositions of subject and object, same and other, human and non-human, and immanent and transcendent. Introduction 7 To theorize responsibility as a part of cinematic experience, I look into the way the film viewer is embodied with the filmmaker, sharing with her responsibility for screen others. The book ends with an examination of how the viewer can also be aligned with film characters’ emotional responses in such a way as to feel responsible with them. I show that we can extend the film viewer’s scale of embodied responses and reactions to film characters from one of care and compassion toward them (Stadler 2008, 38) to include feeling responsibility with them. We can see, then, this kind of responsibility aroused in the viewer whenever the screen character feels responsible for other characters, animals or the world. I show how various cinematic concerns and strategies bring about correspondingly different kinds of responsibilities. Moreover, as I demonstrate, cinema allows us to conceive these responsibilities not as fixed, determined by the dichotomy of viewer and viewed, but on a dynamic temporal spectrum involving subjectivity and objectivity, activity and passivity, perception and response, emotion and reason. In this way, I hope to open up new possibilities for the field of ethics in cinema studies. Over the course of this book, I discuss some films at length and many examples from other films that, although not analyzed in detail, are nevertheless relevant to my case. Most of these films belong to popular narrative cinema and succeed in attracting vast audiences. Without overlooking the importance of independent films outside the mainstream, I believe that in asserting the ethical importance of cinema, it is vital to relate to films that are part of the experience of many people all over the world. For me, cinematic ethics cannot be restricted to a select group of art films shown mostly at film festivals and cinemateques: although such films get a lot of attention from critics and gather many rewards, and although they might meet high artistic standards, they are not widely distributed. To make a claim for the ethical importance of cinema, one should, I believe, show that at the heart of mainstream cinema, there is already an openness to ethics. This is not, of course, to say that the films I have chosen to discuss are not good or artistic or that just any mainstream film can serve as a good example of the ethical side of cinema. But I would still insist that at a certain level, any experience of film viewing is, at least to some degree, potentially ethical. I have chosen films that in my view satisfy the criteria of being high-quality films as well as having been widely seen across different cultures and social classes. There are some exceptions to my choice of genre and films. Two of Andy Warhol’s Screen Tests, of Ann Buchanan (1964) and of Bob Dylan (1965), were chosen for their unique treatment of people’s faces. These shorts help me reinterpret my claim about the complex relationship between the face in a film and the idea that facial expressions can reveal a mode of alterity. I find the British television series Humans (2015) to be an interesting attempt to show androids as part of the contemporary everyday. Although not fully successful, the series tries to break the conventional 8 Introduction anthropocentric frame and show the androids as a complex mix of human and machine characteristics. I look at Steven Shaviro’s analysis of Chris Cunningham’s video to Bjork’s song “All Is Full of Love” (1999), finding further ways of bringing humans and machines together (Shaviro 2002, 21–31). Chris Landreth’s short animated documentary Ryan (2004) was chosen as a good example of how digital cinema leads the viewer to encounter an Other as an assemblage of the human and the non-human. What is common to all these exceptional examples is that although they are not narrative films, they have still been viewed by large audiences, whether at their personal computer or on TV. Note 1 The production of “the same” is, according to Levinas, a consequence of how the subject usually configures and mobilizes understanding and recognition; this allows her to erase the Other’s alterity. References Andrew, J. Dudley. 1978. “The Neglected Tradition of Phenomenology in Film Theory.” Wide Angle 2, no. 2: 44–49. Balázs, Béla. 1970. Theory of the Film: Character and Growth of a New Art. Translated by Edith Bone. New York: Dover. Baudry, Jean-Louis. 2009. “The Apparatus: Metapsychological Approaches to the Impression of Reality in Cinema.” In Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings, edited by Leo Braudy and Marshal Cohen. 171–188. New York: Oxford University Press. Botting, Fred and Scott Wilson. 2001. The Tarantinian Ethics. London: Sage Publications. Carbone, Mauro. 2014. “The Philosopher and the Moviemaker: Merleau-Ponty and Cinema Between Historical Convergence and Ontological Novelty.” In Corporeity and Affectivity: Dedicated to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, edited by Karel Novotny, Pierre Rodrigo, Jenny Slatman, and Silvia Stoller, and translated by Marta Nijhis, 219–232. Leiden: Brill. Casebier, Allan. 1991. Film and Phenomenology: Toward a Realist Theory of Cinematic Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cavell, Stanley. 1979. The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film – Enlarged Edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Choi, Jinhee and Mattias Frey. 2014. “Introduction.” In Cine-ethics: Ethical Dimensions of Film Theory, Practice and Spectatorship, edited by Jinhee Choi and Mattias Frey. 1–14. New York and London: Routledge. Cooper, Sarah. 2006. Selfless Cinema? London: Legenda. Cooper, Sarah (editor). 2007. Film Philosophy Journal 11, no. 2 (June). Deleuze, Gilles. 1986. Cinema 1: The Movement-Image. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Heberjam. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. 2005. A Thousand Plateaus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Translated by Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Introduction 9 Epstein, Jean. 1988. “Magnification.” In French Film Theory and Criticism: A History/Anthology, 1907–1939, vol. 1, edited by Richard Abel, 235–240. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Girgus, Sam B. 2010. Levinas and the Cinema of Redemption: Time, Ethics, and the Feminine. New York: Colombia Press. Levinas, Emmanuel. 1969. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press. Levinas, Emmanuel. 1998. “Reality and its Shadow.” In Collected Philosophical Papers, translated by Alphonso Lingis. 1–14. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1964. “The Film and the New Psychology.” In Sense and Non Sense, translated by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus. 48–59. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 2005. Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Colin Smith. London and New York: Routledge. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 2010. “The Sensible World and the World of Expression: Extract from the Fourteenth Lecture.” Translated by Bryan Bannon. Chiasmi International 12: 32–37. Mitry, Jean. 1997. The Aesthetics and Psychology of the Cinema. Translated by Christopher Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Renov, Michael. 2004. The Subject of Documentary. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Shaviro, Steven. 2002. “The Erotic Life of Machines.” Parallax 8, no. 4: 21–31. Sinnerbrink, Robert. 2016. Cinematic Ethics: Exploring Ethical Experience through Films. London and New York: Routledge. Sobchack, Vivian C. 1992. The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Stadler, Jane. 2008. Pulling Focus: Intersubjective Experience, Narrative Films, and Ethics. New York: Continuum. Filmography All Is Full of Love. 1999. Directed by Chris Cunningham (UK). Humans. 2015. AMC, Channel 4 and Kudos (USA, UK). Ryan. 2004. Directed by Chris Landreth (USA). Screen Test: Ann Buchanan. 1964. Directed by Andy Warhol (USA). Screen Test: Bob Dylan. 1965. Directed by Andy Warhol (USA).