Plato’s Theaetetus

This paper offers a detailed reconstruction of the so-called Self-Refutation Argument against Protagoras' "Measure Doctrine" (MD) for which "every appearance is true" (Theaet. 169e8-171c7): the relevant textual and theoretical issues are critically considered such as: whether the argument is meant to refute an "infallibilist" MD (every appearance is true simpliciter) or a relativist MD (every appearance is true for the subject who has it); whether the argument is meant to refute a "qualified" relativism (MD is true) or a global relativism (MD itself is true for those who believe it); whether the argument is generally successful or not, and how its logical, dialectical, rhetorical and phenomenological dimensions are deeply interwoven; which relations connect MD with the epistemological doctrine that knowledge is perception and with the ontological doctrine that "everything is becoming"; how the "broadening" of MD into the thesis that "all beliefs are true" is crucial for the success of the argument; how the many steps of the argument are inferentially related. Theaetetus's first 'baby' is the idea that knowledge is perception (= KP). 1 Socrates congratulates him and suggests that Protagoras said the very same thing but in a different way, as he literally wrote that «man is the measure of all things (of those which are, that they are, of those which are not, that they are not)» 2 , by which he meant roughly that «any given thing is for me the way it appears to me, and for you the way it appears to you» (151e8-152a8) (Measure Doctrine = MD); 3 for example, the same gust of wind will appear (and so be) cold to me and appear (and so be) hot to you (b2-7). Such an assimilation between KP and MD is not an identity, but a strong theoretical connection: it is grounded first on the equivalence between a subject S perceiving something a certain way and something appearing to S a certain way (S's αἴσθησις of F = F's φαίνεσθαι to S); 4 through this equivalence, MD becomes "X is to S the way S perceives it", so perception is always «of what is» and is never false/mistaken, 5 just as knowledge is supposed to be, and indeed as KP makes explicit. Then the Secret Doctrine (= SD) comes into the picture: whilst MD was what the letter of Protagoras's homo-mensura sentence in his Truth purportedly meant in spirit, SD was "secret", so-net of irony or dramatic purpose-it is a doctrine that Socrates suggests Protagoras could have shared or assumed but which he did not share apertis verbis or even "mean", as in a climax from a literal to a more 1 151e1-3: though cautiously proposed (δοκεῖ οὖν μοι… ὥς γε νυνὶ φαίνεται), KP is meant to be a proper definition (οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις)-the smart Theaetetus has been methodologically "trained" by Socrates beforehand about the inadequateness of providing examples or incomplete characterizations-so definiens and definiendum are supposed to be co-extensive: if KP is true, any case of knowledge is a case of perception and the other way round. 2 152a2-4. 3 I take λέγει at 152a6 as meaning "means" rather than "says", as it is an explicitly Socratic interpretation of what Protagoras wrote. 4 Just below (152c1-3) the equivalence between αἴσθησις and φαντασία is explicitly stated, but it is also limited to cases of stricto sensu sensory perception (i.e. of properties like [cold], [warm] and the like). 5 One comes to be perceiving, you come to be perceiving something (160a9-10), perception cannot be objectless.

2012

Plato is a unique character among the dramatis personae in the history of philosophy. No other thinker arouses so much emotion and dissent among readers and interpreters. Passions are inevitably stirred when one tries to answer a simple question: What does Plato want to say, and what does he actually say? Plato wrote dialogues, which are fine pieces of literature and reasoning but which may always be read and interpreted differently, especially since the speakers often do not commit themselves to any particular philosophical position and the question discussed frequently remains unanswered and sometimes not even explicitly asked. Moreover, it is neither easy to discern Plato’s own position at any given moment in the discussion, nor who is speaking behind his characters. When Socrates is engaged in a dialectical debate of a subject (such as wisdom, courage, love, friendship, temperance, etc.) does he really mean what he says, if one takes into account his undeniably ironic stance? An...

Dialogue, 1985

My purpose in this paper is to investigate the ontological structure of the theory that Plato ascribes to Protagoras in the Theaetetus (152-160). My interest is not just historical-what I wish to do is to explore the contemporary significance of Plato's Protagorean thesis, especially with regard to the theory of truth and the theory of perception. Even so, I shall attempt to say quite a lot about the text-I think that certain recent interpreters (especially M. F. Burnyeat [1982]) are on the wrong track with regard to Protagorean relativism, precisely due to their misjudging the relation of the Theaetetus doctrine to more recent philosophy. My essay falls into two parts: the first explores the text itself; the second deals with philosophical questions arising out of the theory of relativism that Plato ascribes to Protagoras. I must emphasize, to avoid misunderstanding, that in this second part it is my intention to treat of Protagoreanism sub specie aeternitatis, and consequently I shall not restrict myself to issues Plato himself raises-or, for that matter, to issues that Plato cared about. I have, for example, found it useful to stress the parallels between the possible worlds semantics pioneered by Saul Kripke (1963) and the private worlds of Protagoras. We shall see that some of the issues concerning the coherence and consistency of Protagorean relativism are similar in outline to questions about worlds. Because of this parallelism, reflections on both sorts of structures are, as I hope to show, reciprocally illuminating. Because my paper is a hybrid of textual and more purely philosophical investigation, it may be useful for me to say a further word about methodology. There is a tradition developing in analytic philosophy of examining the arguments of ancient philosophers. The methodology of

AJP, 1994

The curious image in which Protagoras' head' pops up at 171d to quibble with the interlocutors is read as alluding to the 'headline' (kephalaion) of his most famous work and part of the case study conducted in the opening of Theaet. on how to do "pre-socratic" philosophy form fragments of thinkers of the past.

Rhizomata, 2018

This volume grew out of a conference held in Brussels on the reception of the Phaedo in antiquity, concentrating on the period before Damascius and Olympiodorus. Its subject-matter fits neatly with the recent trend of following the aftermath of some of Plato's dialogues in antiquity. Aristotle's approach to the themes exposed in Plato's dialogue focuses on not only the theory of the soul (in De anima and in the lost dialogue Eudemus), but also physics. Sylvain Delcomminette draws attention to the fact that Aristotle puts the emphasis elsewhere, on the account of the causes. He argues that Aristotle had the Phaedo in mind when he discussed the material in Phys I, Met. A, and Gen. et Corr. The Aristotelian causal theory was developed with a view to Plato's account. Furthermore, the description of the earlier philosophers' views in Met. A much resembles Socrates' account of the earlier views he encountered in his youth. The important difference is that Aristotle's description is impersonal and fully anti-Platonic in claiming that "all men by nature desire to know". Of course, he also rejects the causal efficiency of the Ideas. However, Aristotle seems to admit the principle of the "second sail", which involves attaining knowledge through λόγοι. Based on the analysis on Phd 105a2-d5, he claims that the passage is the origin of Aristotle's view of scientific syllogism, where the middle term refers to the cause of the conclusion. Causal theory aside, the dialogue was regarded in antiquity as an effort to establish the immortality of the soul. For this reason, critiques of the arguments came quite early. Strato's objections pose specific problems, discussed by Han Baltussen. They were preserved in the Neoplatonic commentary on the Phaedo that is attributed to Damascius. It means that Strato's original possibly went through four or five phases of rewording and therefore appropriate interpretation requires adjusting to the pattern presupposed in Damascius' refutation. Baltussen examines both Strato's arguments and Damascius' responses by pointing to the distinction of different meanings of a term or to the use of generally agreed views as starting points. He shows that Strato's puzzles were focused on arguments which support dualism. Francesca Alesse concentrates on the use of the dialogue by the Stoics. She insists that the Stoics are indebted to the Phaedo for some of their arguments. The

Diacronia, 2022

In this article I will approach and try to clarify an unusual spelling (sumparao) which occurs in a text from the beginning of the 18 th century, attributed to Antim Ivireanul. It is the question of a Romanian translation, made after an intermediate Greek version, of a distant French original. At the same time, I will point out some questionable (or more than questionable) spellings, from a fragmentary modern edition of the respective text, published by Alexandru Duțu in 1968 (ciocotințește for ciocotnițește; ciocotinția for ciocotniția; împărteșuțează for împărteșugează; roscoasă for roscoașă; scutelește for șutelește). I will also point out some unusual, rare lexical units, some of them representing antedatings compared to the oldest attestations registered in the reference works in the field (deletnicie; însoțime; răsfățăciune; soțiime). In so doing, I will propose certain semantic and/or etymological clarifications.