Professor Xu Jialing
BYZANTIUM IN CHINA:
STUDIES IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR XU JIALING
ON THE OCCASION OF HER SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY
edited by
Sven Günther, Li Qiang, Claudia Sode,
Staffan Wahlgren, and Zhang Qiang
in cooperation with
Thomas Ford (English-language editing)
Changchun 2019
Institute for the History of Ancient Civilizations
Supplements to the Journal of Ancient Civilizations, vol. 6
1. Sven Günther, Li Qiang, Claudia Sode, Staffan Wahlgren, and Zhang Qiang (eds.),
Byzantium in China: Studies in Honour of Professor Xu Jialing on the Occasion of
her Seventieth Birthday. 2019.
ISSN 1004-9371
中国的拜占庭:
徐家玲教授七秩祝寿文集
斯文•君特、李强、克劳迪娅•索德
斯塔凡•瓦尔格伦、张强 主编
托马斯•福德 英文编辑
长春 2019
世界古典文明史研究所
CONTENTS
Preface.........................................................................................................................IX
Xu Jialing’s Publications (1980–2019).....................................................................XIII
GÜNTHER, SVEN: Augustus, the Inheritance Tax, and Elite Networks.....................1
SCHREINER, PETER: Constantinople – A Large City..............................................13
KRALLIS, DIMITRIS: Liquid Memories:
Oceanic Allusions and Greek Imagery in the Forum of Constantine............31
KORDOSIS, MICHAEL: The Identification of the “Great” Western or
“Crooked Sea” of the Chinese Chronicles en route to “Daqin”
and the Tigris-Euphrates River System.........................................................49
CAMERON, AVERIL: Justinian and the Sixth Century Now....................................57
SCOTT, ROGER: Byzantium’s Neighbours in the Sixth Century..............................71
HOWARD-JOHNSTON, JAMES: The Formation of Byzantium...............................85
GUO, YUNYAN AND CHEN, ZHIQIANG: Four Byzantine Gold Coins
from the Shoroon Bumbagar Tomb in Mongolian Bayannuur...................123
LI, QIANG: From China to Byzantium: Tracing Paper’s Westward Journey...........137
LIN, YING: Standing Feng Huang: Some Notes on How Chinese Feng Huang
Patterns Spread into Middle Byzantium (843–1204).................................155
SODE, CLAUDIA: Reaching beyond the Borders of the Byzantine Empire:
The Seals of the epi ton barbaron...............................................................173
CHEYNET, JEAN-CLAUDE: Employing Barbarians against the Barbarians.........195
VIII
PAPAYIANNI, APHRODITE: Flexible Pragmatist or Innocent Bystander?
Pope Innocent III’s Reaction to the Diversion of the Fourth Crusade
to Constantinople before the Latin Conquest of the City...........................207
KORDOSIS, STEFANOS: Brigandage War Tactics in the Tocco Chronicle
and Ottoman Warfare.................................................................................225
WAHLGREN, STAFFAN: Late Byzantine Knowledge of, and Attitudes towards,
Foreigners and their Lands: Evidence from the Writings of
the Grand Logothete Theodore Metochites (1270–1332)..........................233
AUGUSTUS, THE INHERITANCE TAX, AND ELITE NETWORKS
Sven Günther
IHAC, NENU, Changchun
“Many do not want to pay taxes.” This aversion is true not only in modern times
but also in antiquity. Although it is possible to identify a basic set of justifications
for collecting taxes, as the recent overview of pre-modern fiscal regimes by
Monson and Scheidel (2015) has convincingly shown, it must be noted that
motivations, purposes, and processes of enforcement of, and negotiations about,
taxes vary greatly. That some of the intents and purposes are open and announced
publicly while others are kept secret is also no surprise – every day we learn
that, for instance, lobbyism or networks are generally kept in the background
or behind the scenes. It reflects the widespread opinion that politics is the art of
hiding what is really at stake by offering a set of official reasons that distract to a
certain degree from real issues, in all political systems.
The narratives from ancient sources also face, and tackle, this problem. The
“critical” method of, for example, Thucydides or Polybius who both try to reveal
the underlying cause and reasons of certain events or the plenty of comments and
remarks by other ancient authors venturing to guess the reasons behind a certain
measure, indicate a high level of critical awareness, or at least their search for
finding the “dark” side of the respective political system. However, sometimes
a political measure seems to be quite clear, responding to a real necessity, and
the introduction of the inheritance tax by Augustus is commonly judged to be
such a case. The story, produced in several surveys of the Augustan Age or in
biographies of the first princeps himself (e.g. Eck 2007, 118–120), can be told
briefly. In the succinct words of Suetonius in his Augustus-vita, the method and
purpose of this and other tax-introduction were as follows (Suet. Aug. 49.2):
So that he would always have ready funds available to maintain them [sc. the
soldiers] and give them their benefits, he established a military treasury to be
supplied by new taxes. (trans. Edwards 2000)
The military treasure (aerarium militare) was a special treasury, used mainly
for financing veterans, despite Suetonius’ description (cf. Eck 2007, 119). It is
said to have been established by the emperor with new taxes (vectigalia nova)
as its funding source. However, more can be said about the actual context of
both, the creation of the military treasury as well as the new taxes as revenue1
2
GÜNTHER, SVEN
sources. It takes us deep into the financial and military history of the Augustan
Age, and through in-depth analysis of the extant sources we can explore to what
extent Augustus played with the traditional structures of upper-class thinking and
behavior to overcome senatorial opposition in particular, and to create (together
with other measures), an alternative elite at the end of his reign. Thus, this paper
deals with the effects the introduction of the inheritance tax caused on the social
structure and behavior of the elite, and asks about any intentions beyond the
obvious necessity of financing the veterans.
The establishment of the aerarium militare was the consequence of the change
in the ways and means of financing that huge imperial army which stood at
Augustus’ disposal after the end of the Civil Wars. Depoliticizing the soldiers (who
had been a decisive, but also a challenging factor, during the era of the Civil
Wars), and reducing their maintenance costs were his concerns, especially during
the second half of his reign when costly wars in Germany and the Balkans led to
economic and financial depression.1 Hence, the gradual reduction of the legions,
the professionalization of the army with career plans, along with – last but not
least – the enactment of reforms in military salaries and pensions. Augustus
made a major step in 13 BC with the implementation of fixed service times –
16 years for legionaries, 12 years for praetorians, and four additional years for
both as reserve units. In addition, he reformed the payment system – moving
away from assigning plots of land which had heavily disturbed social peace in
Italy, to salaries and pensions in cash (Suet. Aug. 49.2; Cass. Dio 54.25.5–6;
RGDA 16). The emperor financed these costs himself in the years 7, 6, 4 and 2
BC, presumably from his patrimonium (RGDA 16.2); in other years, however,
the costs were probably covered by the state treasury, the aerarium Saturni. In
AD 5, a second wave of reforms arrived, targeting the service conditions of the
army: by a decree of the Senate, the service time was raised about 25% (Cass.
Dio 55.23.1). With 20 years of service for normal legionaries and 16 years for
praetorians, fewer of the soldiers acquired the one-time veteran’s pay of 20,000
or 16,000 HS respectively (ibid.).2 Furthermore, Augustus changed the modalities
of the payout of the praemia. In his Res Gestae, he states (RGDA 17.2):
And in the consulship of Marcus Lepidus and Lucius Arruntius [AD 6], when the
military treasury was founded on my advice for the purpose of paying compensation
to soldiers who have served twenty or more years, I transferred 170,000,000
sesterces from my own patrimony. (trans. S. A. Takács in Eck 2007, 178)
1
On the financial and economic policy of Augustus, see Kienast 1999, 379–407 (with further
literature); cf. ibid., 401–402 on financial and economic crises; cf. also Eck 2007, 116–120; Günther
2008, 33–34 (with further literature).
2
On the military reforms, cf. Günther 2008, 34–35 (with further literature); cf. also Scheid 2007, 53
in his commentary on RGDA 17.2.
AUGUSTUS, THE INHERITANCE TAX, AND ELITE NETWORKS
3
With the subordinate clause “when the military treasury was founded on my
advice” (quod ex consilio meo constitutum est), we can fix the establishment of
the aerarium militare to before his huge endowment3 of 170 million HS from his
patrimonium. According to Cassius Dio, that special treasury was set up in AD 5
(55.24.9–25.3) under the following circumstances:
Now Augustus lacked funds for all these troops, and therefore he introduced a
proposal in the senate that revenues in sufficient amount and continuing from
year to year should be set aside, in order that the soldiers might receive without
stint from the taxes levied their maintenance and bonuses without any outside
source being put to annoyance. The means for such a fund were accordingly
sought. Now when no one showed a willingness to become aedile, some men
from the ranks of the ex-quaestors and ex-tribunes were compelled by lot to take
the office—a thing which happened on many other occasions.
[25] (1) After this, in the consulship of Aemilius Lepidus and Lucius Arruntius
[AD 6], when no revenues for the military fund were being discovered that suited
anybody, but absolutely everybody was vexed because such an attempt was
even being made, (2) Augustus in the name of himself and of Tiberius placed
money in the treasury which he called the military treasury, and commanded
that three of the ex-praetors, to be chosen by lot, should administer it for three
years, employing two lictors apiece and such further assistance as was fitting.
(3) This method was followed with the successive incumbents of the office for
many years; but at present they are chosen by the emperor and they go about
without lictors. Now Augustus made a contribution himself toward the fund
and promised to do so annually, and he also accepted voluntary contributions
from kings and certain communities; but he took nothing from private citizens,
although a considerable number made offers of their own free will, as they at
least alleged. (trans. Cary 1917/1955)
Although Cassius Dio stresses the necessity of such a special treasury advanced
by Augustus in the Senate (55.24.9),4 in AD 5, there was no immediate result
(ibid.: καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐζητεῖτο). For the following year, i.e. AD 6, Cassius Dio
reports the discontent of all senators about the quest for revenues (55.25.1:
… ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ πάντες ὅτι καὶ ἐζητεῖτο ἐβαρύνοντο) hence the
endowment in the name of Augustus and Tiberius (55.25.2) along with the grant,
3
On the question whether detuli is to be understood as an advance, only lent by the emperor
(and nominally Tiberius, cf. Cass. Dio 55.25.2), cf. the discussion in Günther 2008, 36, n. 189. In
comparison with Cass. Dio 55.25.2 it becomes clear that an initial endowment is meant here.
4
Thus, the claim of Suet. Aug. 49.2 that the emperor constituted the aerarium militare is only a short
version of what really happened; see also Augustus’ own view in RGDA 17.2 (… ex consilio meo
constitutum est). Cf. Brunt 1984, 435. For a similar back projection in Cass. Dio 55.25.5, see below.
4
GÜNTHER, SVEN
and promise of a yearly subvention by the emperor followed (55.25.3). Essential
are the next sentences about further subsidies (ibid.): only those by foreign kings
and people were permitted by Augustus, while those from “private” Roman
citizens, so Cassius Dio in reporting their claims, were refused.
Here, we find a first hint that the measure not only raised concerns among
the senators about possible financial burdens but also touched on one of the
core principles of their elite status: the establishment of vertical and horizontal
networks, the former in the form of patron-client-relations, the latter in terms of
amicitia-connections. By forbidding local subsidies for the military, Augustus
tried to prevent the emergence of new connections between other members of
the Roman elite and members or veterans of the armed forces; obviously, such
links would have been potentially volatile, bound up with the risk of those
sustained threats familiar to any sovereign claiming exclusive responsibility for
all imperial achievements and yet relying on the soldiers’ quid pro quo. Clearly
an army based on this principle could not be relied upon to support the emperor
exclusively if it owed debts to other benefactors within the res publica.
Furthermore, according to Cassius Dio, Augustus even played with the
traditional decision-making processes of the Senate and finally replaced them
through his own decision based on his auctoritas, a basic principle of his reign,
at least in his own view (RGDA 34.3). Cassius Dio states with regard to the
permanent financing of the aerarium militare (55.25.4–5):
But as all this proved very slight in comparison with the amount being spent and
there was need of some permanent supply, he ordered each one of the senators
to seek out sources of revenue, each independently of the others, to write them
in books, and give them to him to consider. This was not because he had no
plan of his own, but as the most certain means of persuading them to choose the
plan he preferred. (5) At all events, when different men had proposed different
schemes, he approved none of them, but established the tax of five per cent, on
the inheritances and bequests which should be left by people at their death to
any except very near relatives or very poor persons, representing that he had
found this tax set down in Caesar’s memoranda. It was, in fact, a method which
had been introduced once before, but had been abolished later, and was now
revived. In this way, then, he increased the revenues; as for the expenditures, he
employed three ex-consuls, chosen by lot, by whose help he reduced some of
them and altogether abolished others. (trans. Cary 1917/1955)
The actual introduction of the 5% tax on inheritances and bequests, known
in Latin as the vicesima hereditatium, as a permanent and abundant source of
revenue is thus accompanied by a, at first sight, strange maneuver of Augustus.
He lets the senators seek and propose (separately) sources of revenue for funding
AUGUSTUS, THE INHERITANCE TAX, AND ELITE NETWORKS
5
the newly established aerarium militare. The reasoning provided by Cassius Dio
(55.25.4: … οὐχ ὅτι οὐκ ἐπενόει τινά, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτοὺς
πείσῃ ὃν ἐβούλετο ἑλέσθαι) reveals that the historian is also astonished
about the logic behind that move, as no further explanation follows. However,
appealing to the senators individually fragmented senatorial unity as the interests
of the individuals prevented concerted action as might have been possible
through, for instance, the nomination of a senatorial committee opposing the
(interests of the) emperor; this is a reasonable interpretation and may even have
been the one intended by Cassius Dio’s apparent surprise (the simulation of
which is implied through the lack of alternative explanations), and fits well to
his contemporary experience of how the emperor dealt with senators in Severan
times.5
Nevertheless, this explanation seems odd when we read, further on, that
Augustus afterwards introduced the vicesima hereditatium against other
proposals brought forward by the senators, through an imperial decree (Cass. Dio
55.25.5: … κατεστήσατο), and even justified it with the acta Caesaris (ibid.:
ὡς καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Καίσαρος ὑπομνήμασι τὸ τέλος τοῦτο γεγραμμένον
εὑρών): he could hardly have given his opponents a better cause for complaint
and opposition against such an act of king-like tyranny. While the frequent call
of former proposals or even acts of the dictator Caesar to reason and implement
certain measures is judged heterogeneously in research,6 the purported enactment
of the tax by a decree of Augustus can be clearly marked as a projection of
imperial decision-making that occurred in the life-time of the historian Cassius
Dio; as other contemporary or earlier sources prove, the vicesima hereditatium
became law as a formal statute (lex), so it was not just an imperial edict.7
Furthermore, Cassius Dio (55.25.6) does not reveal the concrete circumstances
of the first tax measure of similar kind during the Civil Wars, moving quickly
to the narration of expense-saving measures, and then to the more threatening
hunger crisis and consequent measures (55.25.6–26.1).
Such tactics are mentioned by Cassius Dio, e.g. Cass. Dio 56.28.4–6 (see below) in other situations,
too. On opposition against the first emperor, see Dettenhofer 2000. On the crises of AD 5–7 and the
opposition in AD 13, cf. ibid., 190–195.
6
Kienast 2001 stresses against older positions, in particular R. Syme, that Octavian used the concept
even after he became Augustus. Whether the frequent call of acta Caesaris by Mark Antony (e.g.
Cic. Phil. 2.38–39.97–98, 100; Cass. Dio 44.53; 45.23, 41; App. BC 2.17.125.524) ruled out their
use by his opponent Octavian/Augustus, is however dubious. On the problem of the acta Caesaris in
general, see Günther 2008, 27–30 (with further literature).
7
Gai. inst. 3.125; Macer Dig. 2.15.13; 11.7.37; 28.1.7; 35.2.68; 50.16.154; cf. Brunt 1984, 436. The
concrete procedure towards, and after, the supposed senatūs consultum remains unclear, and also the
definite name of the statute. Here, I follow traditional scholarship, naming it lex <Iulia de> vicesima
hereditatium, conscious that <Iulia de> is a modern emendation. See Günther 2008, 37–38 with n.
201 on the naming.
5
6
GÜNTHER, SVEN
However, the first tax on inheritance and legacies in 40 BC (cf. Günther 2015)
is very instructive about the thoughts and acts of its modified re-introduction 45
years later. It followed, and is connected with, the lex Falcidia of 41 BC. The
Triumvirs, being at war with Sextus Pompeius and despite a famine in Rome
due to the cutting-off of provisions by sea, established a tax on inheritance and
legacies, and thereby evoked huge protests (App. BC 5.8.67–68.280–289).
Though no further details about the regulations of this tax are known, one can
certainly connect it with the lex Falcidia; that statute secured one quarter of the
whole inheritance for heirs while three quarters could be given as legacies; along
with other financial burdens introduced by the triumvirs in that period, it becomes
evident that all these measures affected mainly the upper-class (Günther 2015,
esp. 222–225); hence their protests, mentioned by the aforementioned Appian and
Cassius Dio (48.31.1–6), by activating their clientelae. The restriction on giving
(part of the) heritage to those outside the inner family, either by institution of a
foreign heir or via legacies – a popular measure to stabilize or augment amicitiae
and necessitudines among the elite –, not only brought money into the wartreasury but also injured (as a welcome side-effect) the aristocratic and equestrian
networks beyond the range of the Triumvirs. Thus the strong opposition could
only be overcome violently (App. BC 5.8.68.287–289). Later, in 36 BC, Octavian
abolished these measures (App. BC 5.13.130.540), seeking support from the very
group he had targeted earlier.
We can observe similar purposes, effects and consequences in the matter of
the inheritance tax in AD 6 when we analyze the practices of collection and
regulation. As a vectigal, a so-called indirect tax,8 the vicesima hereditatium
– together with the second source of the aerarium militare, the centesima
rerum venalium (cf. Tac. ann. 1.78.2) – was not raised according to a censuslist because these kinds of tax revenues could not be calculated in advance.
Collected by private tax farmers, still at that time mainly organized in societates
publicanorum, the costs and efforts had to be calculated against the actual
influx: therefore, small inheritances were exempted as mentioned by Cassius
Dio (55.25.5: … πλὴν τῶν … πενήτων), perhaps 1,000 HS (cf. Günther
2008, 46–48); and a strong “incentive” for a public opening of the testament
was established, enforced at that time not only by the lex <Iulia de> vicesima
hereditatium but also by the lex Papia Poppaea of AD 9; both leges guaranteed
a non-actionable testament – however, with the aim to make the publicly
commissioned and authorized tax-farmers acquainted of “worthy” deceases (cf.
Günther 2008, 40–42).
8
Contrary to the tributum, often called direct tax, that was collected on the basis of a census-list or
other regular records. On the definition, see Günther 2008, 14–21.
AUGUSTUS, THE INHERITANCE TAX, AND ELITE NETWORKS
7
The second exemption mentioned by Cassius Dio can likewise be explained
within the same framework: tax exemptions were granted if the inheritance went
to close relatives (55.25.5: πλὴν τῶν πάνυ συγγενῶν …). While the lex Iulia
de maritandis ordinibus of 18 BC, and later the lex Papia Poppaea, encouraged
the passing of any heritage within the sixth family-degree, to avoid capacityrestrictions for the unmarried or childless (for details, see Mette-Dittmann
1991, 151–161; on the intention and impact, see also Eck 2007, 100–107), the
lex <Iulia de> vicesima hereditatium probably went even further in terms of
achieving reasonable income. From later reforms concerning new Roman citizens
by the emperors Nerva and Trajan, mentioned by Pliny the Younger (Plin. paneg.
37–40.1; for an interpretation, see Gardner 2001; Günther 2008, 45–46, 49–51),
one can safely conclude that it were probably only the so-called decem personae
as heredes domestici, i.e. the second family-degree (father, mother, children,
grand-children, siblings), who were really exempted from paying the inheritance
tax.
However, all of these details confirm intended side-effects, reaching far beyond
the mere generation of revenue. The main impetus for bequeathing a testamentary
good to someone outside the family lay in the desire of the elite to create or to
strengthen social bonds in the form of reciprocities and beneficences (via munera,
beneficia, and gratiae) among equals, or between patron and clients (cf. Eck
2007, 119). The Augustan cutting of these traditional forms of networking was
therefore visible, and drastic. It resulted, for a short time, in opposition against
this and many other measures9 promulgated by the first emperor to monopolize
these traditional forms that aristocrats and other elites employed to generate
political, social and economic standing, a constant of the old Republic. So, the
resistance to the inheritance tax occurred not only at the time of its introduction
but also later, in AD 13, when Augustus was already bedridden. According to
Cassius Dio, the following happened (56.28.4–6, text in italics from Xiphil.
118.3–6):
When, now, nearly all felt burdened by the five per cent tax and an uprising
seemed likely, he sent a communication to the senate bidding its members
to seek some other sources of revenue. He did this, not with the intention of
abolishing the tax, but in order that when no other method should seem to them
better, they should ratify the measure, reluctantly though it might be, without
Cf. e.g., the selection of the senate in 18 BC (Cass. Dio 54.13.1–14.5, 15.7–8; Suet. Aug. 35.1–4,
54); the complicated regulations regarding the destinatio of consuls and praetors, laid down in the
Tabula Hebana (AE 1949, 215), should be interpreted in the same way. Also the different phases
of the moral legislation of Augustus which can now be better understood by the fragments of the
municipal statute of Troesmis; see Eck 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016a/b.
9
8
GÜNTHER, SVEN
bringing any censure upon him. (5) He also ordered both Germanicus and Drusus
not to make any statement about it, for fear that if they expressed an opinion
it should be suspected that this had been done at his command, and the senate
would therefore choose that plan without further investigation. There was much
discussion and some proposals were submitted to Augustus in writing. (6) When
he learned from these that the senators were ready to submit to any form of tax
rather than to the one in force, he changed it to a levy upon fields and houses;
and immediately, without stating how great it would be or in what way imposed,
he sent men out everywhere to make a list of the property both of private
individuals and of cities. His object was that they should fear even greater losses
and so be content to pay the five per cent tax; and this is what actually happened.
(trans. Cary 1924/1955)
The astonishing parallels to the procedure in AD 6 and the possibility of a literary
doublet notwithstanding (cf. Günther 2008, 39), the credible threat of forcing the
re-introduction of a tributum in form of a land-tax – at that time payable only
by subordinated people in the provinces and abolished for Romans long before
in 167 BC, after the Third Macedonian War (cf. e.g. Val. Max. 4.3.8; Plin. NH
33.17.56; Plut. Aem. 38.1) – worked well to keep the vicesima hereditatium as
the lesser of two evils; and moreover, the status and patronage of the elite was
undermined.
In the long run, all these measures undertaken by the first emperor, who had
learned quite well the thinking, functioning, and reactions of the elite, brought
forth, firstly, a concentration of the elite in favor of the emperor – a relationship
that has been recently well described as the “magnetic field” of the princeps (cf.
Hartmann 2016, esp. 11–34: “Magnetfeld”) and finally found its expression in
the idea of pater patriae, whereby Augustus gradually transformed his private
patron-client-relations to a public role as a preeminent, objective and just father
(see Jehne 2015). Secondly, and in the even longer term, the solidarity of the
senatorial and equestrian classes was eroded. Substituting these amicitiae- and
patron-client relations (which had to be maintained constantly) with proximity
to the emperor, closeness and accessibility to the princeps became the decisive
factor in the competition for honors and distinction (see Wolkenhauer 2014;
cf. Hartmann 2016, 89–121, speaking of “transforming the elite into clients”
(“Klientelisierung der Elite”) (ibid., 100)). Thirdly, the rise of a class of
nouveaux riches occupied, and gradually transformed, traditional spheres of
“aristocratic” munificence (cf. Hartmann 2016, 146–183). However, all these
three developments generated, fourthly, new, alternative forms of elite life, selfrealization and social ties, for instance, in new forms of benefactions, particularly
outside the center Rome (and partly Italy), in political careers directed and
AUGUSTUS, THE INHERITANCE TAX, AND ELITE NETWORKS
9
controlled by the emperor or in terms of juridical, literary or economic activities
(see esp. Page 2015). Within a century, this gradual usurpation of the imaginary
old republican ideals and mores maiorum by imperial patronage gave birth to
an elite discourse among Tacitus, Pliny the Younger, and Co. They were, on
the one hand, bold to recall republican concepts that had already been filled
with new content, but were, on the other hand, now part of an elite that had
already accepted the institutionalized role of the Principate and the emperor’s
monopolization of soldiers and public revenues. And both were far more
important for the exercise of power than any reverence to the republican past
as a palliative for senators who had to follow the political agenda and imperial
rhetoric, as long as the emperor also cannily (ful)filled the various roles he was
supposed to play; to what extent these roles were still at play in Byzantine times,
I have been glad to learn from our dear IHAC-honorand, Professor Xu Jialing.
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