Professor Xu Jialing BYZANTIUM IN CHINA: STUDIES IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR XU JIALING ON THE OCCASION OF HER SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY edited by Sven Günther, Li Qiang, Claudia Sode, Staffan Wahlgren, and Zhang Qiang in cooperation with Thomas Ford (English-language editing) Changchun 2019 Institute for the History of Ancient Civilizations Supplements to the Journal of Ancient Civilizations, vol. 6 1. Sven Günther, Li Qiang, Claudia Sode, Staffan Wahlgren, and Zhang Qiang (eds.), Byzantium in China: Studies in Honour of Professor Xu Jialing on the Occasion of her Seventieth Birthday. 2019. ISSN 1004-9371 中国的拜占庭： 徐家玲教授七秩祝寿文集 斯文•君特、李强、克劳迪娅•索德 斯塔凡•瓦尔格伦、张强 主编 托马斯•福德 英文编辑 长春 2019 世界古典文明史研究所 CONTENTS Preface.........................................................................................................................IX Xu Jialing’s Publications (1980–2019).....................................................................XIII GÜNTHER, SVEN: Augustus, the Inheritance Tax, and Elite Networks.....................1 SCHREINER, PETER: Constantinople – A Large City..............................................13 KRALLIS, DIMITRIS: Liquid Memories: Oceanic Allusions and Greek Imagery in the Forum of Constantine............31 KORDOSIS, MICHAEL: The Identification of the “Great” Western or “Crooked Sea” of the Chinese Chronicles en route to “Daqin” and the Tigris-Euphrates River System.........................................................49 CAMERON, AVERIL: Justinian and the Sixth Century Now....................................57 SCOTT, ROGER: Byzantium’s Neighbours in the Sixth Century..............................71 HOWARD-JOHNSTON, JAMES: The Formation of Byzantium...............................85 GUO, YUNYAN AND CHEN, ZHIQIANG: Four Byzantine Gold Coins from the Shoroon Bumbagar Tomb in Mongolian Bayannuur...................123 LI, QIANG: From China to Byzantium: Tracing Paper’s Westward Journey...........137 LIN, YING: Standing Feng Huang: Some Notes on How Chinese Feng Huang Patterns Spread into Middle Byzantium (843–1204).................................155 SODE, CLAUDIA: Reaching beyond the Borders of the Byzantine Empire: The Seals of the epi ton barbaron...............................................................173 CHEYNET, JEAN-CLAUDE: Employing Barbarians against the Barbarians.........195 VIII PAPAYIANNI, APHRODITE: Flexible Pragmatist or Innocent Bystander? Pope Innocent III’s Reaction to the Diversion of the Fourth Crusade to Constantinople before the Latin Conquest of the City...........................207 KORDOSIS, STEFANOS: Brigandage War Tactics in the Tocco Chronicle and Ottoman Warfare.................................................................................225 WAHLGREN, STAFFAN: Late Byzantine Knowledge of, and Attitudes towards, Foreigners and their Lands: Evidence from the Writings of the Grand Logothete Theodore Metochites (1270–1332)..........................233 AUGUSTUS, THE INHERITANCE TAX, AND ELITE NETWORKS Sven Günther IHAC, NENU, Changchun “Many do not want to pay taxes.” This aversion is true not only in modern times but also in antiquity. Although it is possible to identify a basic set of justifications for collecting taxes, as the recent overview of pre-modern fiscal regimes by Monson and Scheidel (2015) has convincingly shown, it must be noted that motivations, purposes, and processes of enforcement of, and negotiations about, taxes vary greatly. That some of the intents and purposes are open and announced publicly while others are kept secret is also no surprise – every day we learn that, for instance, lobbyism or networks are generally kept in the background or behind the scenes. It reflects the widespread opinion that politics is the art of hiding what is really at stake by offering a set of official reasons that distract to a certain degree from real issues, in all political systems. The narratives from ancient sources also face, and tackle, this problem. The “critical” method of, for example, Thucydides or Polybius who both try to reveal the underlying cause and reasons of certain events or the plenty of comments and remarks by other ancient authors venturing to guess the reasons behind a certain measure, indicate a high level of critical awareness, or at least their search for finding the “dark” side of the respective political system. However, sometimes a political measure seems to be quite clear, responding to a real necessity, and the introduction of the inheritance tax by Augustus is commonly judged to be such a case. The story, produced in several surveys of the Augustan Age or in biographies of the first princeps himself (e.g. Eck 2007, 118–120), can be told briefly. In the succinct words of Suetonius in his Augustus-vita, the method and purpose of this and other tax-introduction were as follows (Suet. Aug. 49.2): So that he would always have ready funds available to maintain them [sc. the soldiers] and give them their benefits, he established a military treasury to be supplied by new taxes. (trans. Edwards 2000) The military treasure (aerarium militare) was a special treasury, used mainly for financing veterans, despite Suetonius’ description (cf. Eck 2007, 119). It is said to have been established by the emperor with new taxes (vectigalia nova) as its funding source. However, more can be said about the actual context of both, the creation of the military treasury as well as the new taxes as revenue1 2 GÜNTHER, SVEN sources. It takes us deep into the financial and military history of the Augustan Age, and through in-depth analysis of the extant sources we can explore to what extent Augustus played with the traditional structures of upper-class thinking and behavior to overcome senatorial opposition in particular, and to create (together with other measures), an alternative elite at the end of his reign. Thus, this paper deals with the effects the introduction of the inheritance tax caused on the social structure and behavior of the elite, and asks about any intentions beyond the obvious necessity of financing the veterans. The establishment of the aerarium militare was the consequence of the change in the ways and means of financing that huge imperial army which stood at Augustus’ disposal after the end of the Civil Wars. Depoliticizing the soldiers (who had been a decisive, but also a challenging factor, during the era of the Civil Wars), and reducing their maintenance costs were his concerns, especially during the second half of his reign when costly wars in Germany and the Balkans led to economic and financial depression.1 Hence, the gradual reduction of the legions, the professionalization of the army with career plans, along with – last but not least – the enactment of reforms in military salaries and pensions. Augustus made a major step in 13 BC with the implementation of fixed service times – 16 years for legionaries, 12 years for praetorians, and four additional years for both as reserve units. In addition, he reformed the payment system – moving away from assigning plots of land which had heavily disturbed social peace in Italy, to salaries and pensions in cash (Suet. Aug. 49.2; Cass. Dio 54.25.5–6; RGDA 16). The emperor financed these costs himself in the years 7, 6, 4 and 2 BC, presumably from his patrimonium (RGDA 16.2); in other years, however, the costs were probably covered by the state treasury, the aerarium Saturni. In AD 5, a second wave of reforms arrived, targeting the service conditions of the army: by a decree of the Senate, the service time was raised about 25% (Cass. Dio 55.23.1). With 20 years of service for normal legionaries and 16 years for praetorians, fewer of the soldiers acquired the one-time veteran’s pay of 20,000 or 16,000 HS respectively (ibid.).2 Furthermore, Augustus changed the modalities of the payout of the praemia. In his Res Gestae, he states (RGDA 17.2): And in the consulship of Marcus Lepidus and Lucius Arruntius [AD 6], when the military treasury was founded on my advice for the purpose of paying compensation to soldiers who have served twenty or more years, I transferred 170,000,000 sesterces from my own patrimony. (trans. S. A. Takács in Eck 2007, 178) 1 On the financial and economic policy of Augustus, see Kienast 1999, 379–407 (with further literature); cf. ibid., 401–402 on financial and economic crises; cf. also Eck 2007, 116–120; Günther 2008, 33–34 (with further literature). 2 On the military reforms, cf. Günther 2008, 34–35 (with further literature); cf. also Scheid 2007, 53 in his commentary on RGDA 17.2. AUGUSTUS, THE INHERITANCE TAX, AND ELITE NETWORKS 3 With the subordinate clause “when the military treasury was founded on my advice” (quod ex consilio meo constitutum est), we can fix the establishment of the aerarium militare to before his huge endowment3 of 170 million HS from his patrimonium. According to Cassius Dio, that special treasury was set up in AD 5 (55.24.9–25.3) under the following circumstances: Now Augustus lacked funds for all these troops, and therefore he introduced a proposal in the senate that revenues in sufficient amount and continuing from year to year should be set aside, in order that the soldiers might receive without stint from the taxes levied their maintenance and bonuses without any outside source being put to annoyance. The means for such a fund were accordingly sought. Now when no one showed a willingness to become aedile, some men from the ranks of the ex-quaestors and ex-tribunes were compelled by lot to take the office—a thing which happened on many other occasions. [25] (1) After this, in the consulship of Aemilius Lepidus and Lucius Arruntius [AD 6], when no revenues for the military fund were being discovered that suited anybody, but absolutely everybody was vexed because such an attempt was even being made, (2) Augustus in the name of himself and of Tiberius placed money in the treasury which he called the military treasury, and commanded that three of the ex-praetors, to be chosen by lot, should administer it for three years, employing two lictors apiece and such further assistance as was fitting. (3) This method was followed with the successive incumbents of the office for many years; but at present they are chosen by the emperor and they go about without lictors. Now Augustus made a contribution himself toward the fund and promised to do so annually, and he also accepted voluntary contributions from kings and certain communities; but he took nothing from private citizens, although a considerable number made offers of their own free will, as they at least alleged. (trans. Cary 1917/1955) Although Cassius Dio stresses the necessity of such a special treasury advanced by Augustus in the Senate (55.24.9),4 in AD 5, there was no immediate result (ibid.: καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐζητεῖτο). For the following year, i.e. AD 6, Cassius Dio reports the discontent of all senators about the quest for revenues (55.25.1: … ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ πάντες ὅτι καὶ ἐζητεῖτο ἐβαρύνοντο) hence the endowment in the name of Augustus and Tiberius (55.25.2) along with the grant, 3 On the question whether detuli is to be understood as an advance, only lent by the emperor (and nominally Tiberius, cf. Cass. Dio 55.25.2), cf. the discussion in Günther 2008, 36, n. 189. In comparison with Cass. Dio 55.25.2 it becomes clear that an initial endowment is meant here. 4 Thus, the claim of Suet. Aug. 49.2 that the emperor constituted the aerarium militare is only a short version of what really happened; see also Augustus’ own view in RGDA 17.2 (… ex consilio meo constitutum est). Cf. Brunt 1984, 435. For a similar back projection in Cass. Dio 55.25.5, see below. 4 GÜNTHER, SVEN and promise of a yearly subvention by the emperor followed (55.25.3). Essential are the next sentences about further subsidies (ibid.): only those by foreign kings and people were permitted by Augustus, while those from “private” Roman citizens, so Cassius Dio in reporting their claims, were refused. Here, we find a first hint that the measure not only raised concerns among the senators about possible financial burdens but also touched on one of the core principles of their elite status: the establishment of vertical and horizontal networks, the former in the form of patron-client-relations, the latter in terms of amicitia-connections. By forbidding local subsidies for the military, Augustus tried to prevent the emergence of new connections between other members of the Roman elite and members or veterans of the armed forces; obviously, such links would have been potentially volatile, bound up with the risk of those sustained threats familiar to any sovereign claiming exclusive responsibility for all imperial achievements and yet relying on the soldiers’ quid pro quo. Clearly an army based on this principle could not be relied upon to support the emperor exclusively if it owed debts to other benefactors within the res publica. Furthermore, according to Cassius Dio, Augustus even played with the traditional decision-making processes of the Senate and finally replaced them through his own decision based on his auctoritas, a basic principle of his reign, at least in his own view (RGDA 34.3). Cassius Dio states with regard to the permanent financing of the aerarium militare (55.25.4–5): But as all this proved very slight in comparison with the amount being spent and there was need of some permanent supply, he ordered each one of the senators to seek out sources of revenue, each independently of the others, to write them in books, and give them to him to consider. This was not because he had no plan of his own, but as the most certain means of persuading them to choose the plan he preferred. (5) At all events, when different men had proposed different schemes, he approved none of them, but established the tax of five per cent, on the inheritances and bequests which should be left by people at their death to any except very near relatives or very poor persons, representing that he had found this tax set down in Caesar’s memoranda. It was, in fact, a method which had been introduced once before, but had been abolished later, and was now revived. In this way, then, he increased the revenues; as for the expenditures, he employed three ex-consuls, chosen by lot, by whose help he reduced some of them and altogether abolished others. (trans. Cary 1917/1955) The actual introduction of the 5% tax on inheritances and bequests, known in Latin as the vicesima hereditatium, as a permanent and abundant source of revenue is thus accompanied by a, at first sight, strange maneuver of Augustus. He lets the senators seek and propose (separately) sources of revenue for funding AUGUSTUS, THE INHERITANCE TAX, AND ELITE NETWORKS 5 the newly established aerarium militare. The reasoning provided by Cassius Dio (55.25.4: … οὐχ ὅτι οὐκ ἐπενόει τινά, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτοὺς πείσῃ ὃν ἐβούλετο ἑλέσθαι) reveals that the historian is also astonished about the logic behind that move, as no further explanation follows. However, appealing to the senators individually fragmented senatorial unity as the interests of the individuals prevented concerted action as might have been possible through, for instance, the nomination of a senatorial committee opposing the (interests of the) emperor; this is a reasonable interpretation and may even have been the one intended by Cassius Dio’s apparent surprise (the simulation of which is implied through the lack of alternative explanations), and fits well to his contemporary experience of how the emperor dealt with senators in Severan times.5 Nevertheless, this explanation seems odd when we read, further on, that Augustus afterwards introduced the vicesima hereditatium against other proposals brought forward by the senators, through an imperial decree (Cass. Dio 55.25.5: … κατεστήσατο), and even justified it with the acta Caesaris (ibid.: ὡς καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Καίσαρος ὑπομνήμασι τὸ τέλος τοῦτο γεγραμμένον εὑρών): he could hardly have given his opponents a better cause for complaint and opposition against such an act of king-like tyranny. While the frequent call of former proposals or even acts of the dictator Caesar to reason and implement certain measures is judged heterogeneously in research,6 the purported enactment of the tax by a decree of Augustus can be clearly marked as a projection of imperial decision-making that occurred in the life-time of the historian Cassius Dio; as other contemporary or earlier sources prove, the vicesima hereditatium became law as a formal statute (lex), so it was not just an imperial edict.7 Furthermore, Cassius Dio (55.25.6) does not reveal the concrete circumstances of the first tax measure of similar kind during the Civil Wars, moving quickly to the narration of expense-saving measures, and then to the more threatening hunger crisis and consequent measures (55.25.6–26.1). Such tactics are mentioned by Cassius Dio, e.g. Cass. Dio 56.28.4–6 (see below) in other situations, too. On opposition against the first emperor, see Dettenhofer 2000. On the crises of AD 5–7 and the opposition in AD 13, cf. ibid., 190–195. 6 Kienast 2001 stresses against older positions, in particular R. Syme, that Octavian used the concept even after he became Augustus. Whether the frequent call of acta Caesaris by Mark Antony (e.g. Cic. Phil. 2.38–39.97–98, 100; Cass. Dio 44.53; 45.23, 41; App. BC 2.17.125.524) ruled out their use by his opponent Octavian/Augustus, is however dubious. On the problem of the acta Caesaris in general, see Günther 2008, 27–30 (with further literature). 7 Gai. inst. 3.125; Macer Dig. 2.15.13; 11.7.37; 28.1.7; 35.2.68; 50.16.154; cf. Brunt 1984, 436. The concrete procedure towards, and after, the supposed senatūs consultum remains unclear, and also the definite name of the statute. Here, I follow traditional scholarship, naming it lex <Iulia de> vicesima hereditatium, conscious that <Iulia de> is a modern emendation. See Günther 2008, 37–38 with n. 201 on the naming. 5 6 GÜNTHER, SVEN However, the first tax on inheritance and legacies in 40 BC (cf. Günther 2015) is very instructive about the thoughts and acts of its modified re-introduction 45 years later. It followed, and is connected with, the lex Falcidia of 41 BC. The Triumvirs, being at war with Sextus Pompeius and despite a famine in Rome due to the cutting-off of provisions by sea, established a tax on inheritance and legacies, and thereby evoked huge protests (App. BC 5.8.67–68.280–289). Though no further details about the regulations of this tax are known, one can certainly connect it with the lex Falcidia; that statute secured one quarter of the whole inheritance for heirs while three quarters could be given as legacies; along with other financial burdens introduced by the triumvirs in that period, it becomes evident that all these measures affected mainly the upper-class (Günther 2015, esp. 222–225); hence their protests, mentioned by the aforementioned Appian and Cassius Dio (48.31.1–6), by activating their clientelae. The restriction on giving (part of the) heritage to those outside the inner family, either by institution of a foreign heir or via legacies – a popular measure to stabilize or augment amicitiae and necessitudines among the elite –, not only brought money into the wartreasury but also injured (as a welcome side-effect) the aristocratic and equestrian networks beyond the range of the Triumvirs. Thus the strong opposition could only be overcome violently (App. BC 5.8.68.287–289). Later, in 36 BC, Octavian abolished these measures (App. BC 5.13.130.540), seeking support from the very group he had targeted earlier. We can observe similar purposes, effects and consequences in the matter of the inheritance tax in AD 6 when we analyze the practices of collection and regulation. As a vectigal, a so-called indirect tax,8 the vicesima hereditatium – together with the second source of the aerarium militare, the centesima rerum venalium (cf. Tac. ann. 1.78.2) – was not raised according to a censuslist because these kinds of tax revenues could not be calculated in advance. Collected by private tax farmers, still at that time mainly organized in societates publicanorum, the costs and efforts had to be calculated against the actual influx: therefore, small inheritances were exempted as mentioned by Cassius Dio (55.25.5: … πλὴν τῶν … πενήτων), perhaps 1,000 HS (cf. Günther 2008, 46–48); and a strong “incentive” for a public opening of the testament was established, enforced at that time not only by the lex <Iulia de> vicesima hereditatium but also by the lex Papia Poppaea of AD 9; both leges guaranteed a non-actionable testament – however, with the aim to make the publicly commissioned and authorized tax-farmers acquainted of “worthy” deceases (cf. Günther 2008, 40–42). 8 Contrary to the tributum, often called direct tax, that was collected on the basis of a census-list or other regular records. On the definition, see Günther 2008, 14–21. AUGUSTUS, THE INHERITANCE TAX, AND ELITE NETWORKS 7 The second exemption mentioned by Cassius Dio can likewise be explained within the same framework: tax exemptions were granted if the inheritance went to close relatives (55.25.5: πλὴν τῶν πάνυ συγγενῶν …). While the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus of 18 BC, and later the lex Papia Poppaea, encouraged the passing of any heritage within the sixth family-degree, to avoid capacityrestrictions for the unmarried or childless (for details, see Mette-Dittmann 1991, 151–161; on the intention and impact, see also Eck 2007, 100–107), the lex <Iulia de> vicesima hereditatium probably went even further in terms of achieving reasonable income. From later reforms concerning new Roman citizens by the emperors Nerva and Trajan, mentioned by Pliny the Younger (Plin. paneg. 37–40.1; for an interpretation, see Gardner 2001; Günther 2008, 45–46, 49–51), one can safely conclude that it were probably only the so-called decem personae as heredes domestici, i.e. the second family-degree (father, mother, children, grand-children, siblings), who were really exempted from paying the inheritance tax. However, all of these details confirm intended side-effects, reaching far beyond the mere generation of revenue. The main impetus for bequeathing a testamentary good to someone outside the family lay in the desire of the elite to create or to strengthen social bonds in the form of reciprocities and beneficences (via munera, beneficia, and gratiae) among equals, or between patron and clients (cf. Eck 2007, 119). The Augustan cutting of these traditional forms of networking was therefore visible, and drastic. It resulted, for a short time, in opposition against this and many other measures9 promulgated by the first emperor to monopolize these traditional forms that aristocrats and other elites employed to generate political, social and economic standing, a constant of the old Republic. So, the resistance to the inheritance tax occurred not only at the time of its introduction but also later, in AD 13, when Augustus was already bedridden. According to Cassius Dio, the following happened (56.28.4–6, text in italics from Xiphil. 118.3–6): When, now, nearly all felt burdened by the five per cent tax and an uprising seemed likely, he sent a communication to the senate bidding its members to seek some other sources of revenue. He did this, not with the intention of abolishing the tax, but in order that when no other method should seem to them better, they should ratify the measure, reluctantly though it might be, without Cf. e.g., the selection of the senate in 18 BC (Cass. Dio 54.13.1–14.5, 15.7–8; Suet. Aug. 35.1–4, 54); the complicated regulations regarding the destinatio of consuls and praetors, laid down in the Tabula Hebana (AE 1949, 215), should be interpreted in the same way. Also the different phases of the moral legislation of Augustus which can now be better understood by the fragments of the municipal statute of Troesmis; see Eck 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016a/b. 9 8 GÜNTHER, SVEN bringing any censure upon him. (5) He also ordered both Germanicus and Drusus not to make any statement about it, for fear that if they expressed an opinion it should be suspected that this had been done at his command, and the senate would therefore choose that plan without further investigation. There was much discussion and some proposals were submitted to Augustus in writing. (6) When he learned from these that the senators were ready to submit to any form of tax rather than to the one in force, he changed it to a levy upon fields and houses; and immediately, without stating how great it would be or in what way imposed, he sent men out everywhere to make a list of the property both of private individuals and of cities. His object was that they should fear even greater losses and so be content to pay the five per cent tax; and this is what actually happened. (trans. Cary 1924/1955) The astonishing parallels to the procedure in AD 6 and the possibility of a literary doublet notwithstanding (cf. Günther 2008, 39), the credible threat of forcing the re-introduction of a tributum in form of a land-tax – at that time payable only by subordinated people in the provinces and abolished for Romans long before in 167 BC, after the Third Macedonian War (cf. e.g. Val. Max. 4.3.8; Plin. NH 33.17.56; Plut. Aem. 38.1) – worked well to keep the vicesima hereditatium as the lesser of two evils; and moreover, the status and patronage of the elite was undermined. In the long run, all these measures undertaken by the first emperor, who had learned quite well the thinking, functioning, and reactions of the elite, brought forth, firstly, a concentration of the elite in favor of the emperor – a relationship that has been recently well described as the “magnetic field” of the princeps (cf. Hartmann 2016, esp. 11–34: “Magnetfeld”) and finally found its expression in the idea of pater patriae, whereby Augustus gradually transformed his private patron-client-relations to a public role as a preeminent, objective and just father (see Jehne 2015). Secondly, and in the even longer term, the solidarity of the senatorial and equestrian classes was eroded. Substituting these amicitiae- and patron-client relations (which had to be maintained constantly) with proximity to the emperor, closeness and accessibility to the princeps became the decisive factor in the competition for honors and distinction (see Wolkenhauer 2014; cf. Hartmann 2016, 89–121, speaking of “transforming the elite into clients” (“Klientelisierung der Elite”) (ibid., 100)). Thirdly, the rise of a class of nouveaux riches occupied, and gradually transformed, traditional spheres of “aristocratic” munificence (cf. Hartmann 2016, 146–183). However, all these three developments generated, fourthly, new, alternative forms of elite life, selfrealization and social ties, for instance, in new forms of benefactions, particularly outside the center Rome (and partly Italy), in political careers directed and AUGUSTUS, THE INHERITANCE TAX, AND ELITE NETWORKS 9 controlled by the emperor or in terms of juridical, literary or economic activities (see esp. Page 2015). Within a century, this gradual usurpation of the imaginary old republican ideals and mores maiorum by imperial patronage gave birth to an elite discourse among Tacitus, Pliny the Younger, and Co. They were, on the one hand, bold to recall republican concepts that had already been filled with new content, but were, on the other hand, now part of an elite that had already accepted the institutionalized role of the Principate and the emperor’s monopolization of soldiers and public revenues. And both were far more important for the exercise of power than any reverence to the republican past as a palliative for senators who had to follow the political agenda and imperial rhetoric, as long as the emperor also cannily (ful)filled the various roles he was supposed to play; to what extent these roles were still at play in Byzantine times, I have been glad to learn from our dear IHAC-honorand, Professor Xu Jialing. Bibliography Brunt, P. A. 1984. “The Role of the Senate in the Augustan Regime.” Classical Quarterly N.S. 44: 423–444. Cary, E. (trans.). 1917/1955. Dio’s Roman History. On the Basis of the Version of H. B. Foster. In Nine Volumes. vol. VI. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. ——— (trans.). 1924/1955. Dio’s Roman History. On the Basis of the Version of H. B. Foster. In Nine Volumes. vol. VII. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. Dettenhofer, M. 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Professor Xu Jialing BYZANTIUM IN CHINA: STUDIES IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR XU JIALING ON THE OCCASION OF HER SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY edited by Sven Günther, Li Qiang, Claudia Sode, Staffan Wahlgren, and Zhang Qiang in cooperation with Thomas Ford (English-language editing) Changchun 2019 Institute for the History of Ancient Civilizations Supplements to the Journal of Ancient Civilizations, vol. 6 1. Sven Günther, Li Qiang, Claudia Sode, Staffan Wahlgren, and Zhang Qiang (eds.), Byzantium in China: Studies in Honour of Professor Xu Jialing on the Occasion of her Seventieth Birthday. 2019. ISSN 1004-9371 中国的拜占庭： 徐家玲教授七秩祝寿文集 斯文•君特、李强、克劳迪娅•索德 斯塔凡•瓦尔格伦、张强 主编 托马斯•福德 英文编辑 长春 2019 世界古典文明史研究所 CONTENTS Preface.........................................................................................................................IX Xu Jialing’s Publications (1980–2019).....................................................................XIII GÜNTHER, SVEN: Augustus, the Inheritance Tax, and Elite Networks.....................1 SCHREINER, PETER: Constantinople – A Large City..............................................13 KRALLIS, DIMITRIS: Liquid Memories: Oceanic Allusions and Greek Imagery in the Forum of Constantine............31 KORDOSIS, MICHAEL: The Identification of the “Great” Western or “Crooked Sea” of the Chinese Chronicles en route to “Daqin” and the Tigris-Euphrates River System.........................................................49 CAMERON, AVERIL: Justinian and the Sixth Century Now....................................57 SCOTT, ROGER: Byzantium’s Neighbours in the Sixth Century..............................71 HOWARD-JOHNSTON, JAMES: The Formation of Byzantium...............................85 GUO, YUNYAN AND CHEN, ZHIQIANG: Four Byzantine Gold Coins from the Shoroon Bumbagar Tomb in Mongolian Bayannuur...................123 LI, QIANG: From China to Byzantium: Tracing Paper’s Westward Journey...........137 LIN, YING: Standing Feng Huang: Some Notes on How Chinese Feng Huang Patterns Spread into Middle Byzantium (843–1204).................................155 SODE, CLAUDIA: Reaching beyond the Borders of the Byzantine Empire: The Seals of the epi ton barbaron...............................................................173 CHEYNET, JEAN-CLAUDE: Employing Barbarians against the Barbarians.........195 VIII PAPAYIANNI, APHRODITE: Flexible Pragmatist or Innocent Bystander? Pope Innocent III’s Reaction to the Diversion of the Fourth Crusade to Constantinople before the Latin Conquest of the City...........................207 KORDOSIS, STEFANOS: Brigandage War Tactics in the Tocco Chronicle and Ottoman Warfare.................................................................................225 WAHLGREN, STAFFAN: Late Byzantine Knowledge of, and Attitudes towards, Foreigners and their Lands: Evidence from the Writings of the Grand Logothete Theodore Metochites (1270–1332)..........................233