Egypt Suzan Gibril The history of Egyptian football is deeply rooted in nationalism, struggle and pride that goes beyond the limited sporting arena. More than just one of the most popular sports in the country, football can be understood as a “multi-faceted mirror”, revealing certain complexities and struggles present within Egyptian society, especially in a context where the ruling power has a close grip on its population. This chapter examines how Egypt adapted the historically English game to its social, economic and political realities and interests at different times in its history. It further aims at exploring the multi-levelled use of sport both at national and local levels, by the different actors at play. Specifically, it examines football as a space used both by the regime as an instrument of legitimacy and by the organised groups of football supporters—along with other portions of the population—as one of the few spaces that allows for the expression of opinions and grievances that cannot be voiced in the public arena. The material used in this article is part of a thesis research on the new spaces of contention that have emerged in revolutionary and post-revolutionary Egypt. This particular entry is based on interviews conducted with supporters of the two main football clubs in Cairo, namely Ahly and Zamalek, as well as participatory observation conducted between 2013 and 2015. S. Gibril (*) Centre d’Etude de la Vie Politique (CEVIPOL), Université libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium e-mail: sgibril@ulb.ac.be © The Author(s) 2018 J.-M. De Waele et al. (eds.), The Palgrave International Handbook of Football and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78777-0_18 347 348 1 S. Gibril The Origins of Football in Egypt The history of modern Egyptian football began at the end of the nineteenth century, introduced to the country by the British in 1882. Though first practised within the confines of military camps, the game quickly spread outside those boundaries and onto the streets, encouraged by local Egyptians, as well as by the introduction of physical education (PE) as a mandatory activity in all Egyptian schools (Russell 2013). Football was most commonly used by the British colonial powers as a means of moral education and sense of unity among the student population of elite colleges in Cairo and Alexandria. Sport was then a key instrument in the colonial apparatus, allowing for the expansion of a “Westernised civilization”, and the spreading of discipline and respect for authority (El-Zatmah 2011). For instance, between 1913 and 1932, matches were organised between the different schools (from elementary level to University) in Cairo with the purpose of disseminating the interest for the game of football to the rest of the country. During this period, the Law School team won the competition seven times, while the Engineering School won it six times, the Police School twice and both the Agriculture and Commerce schools once (Thabet 2013). The competition was, however, postponed in 1919 due to the revolution led by Saad Zaghloul.1 Following the same logic, the birth of the first local football clubs coincides with the inauguration of private leisure and sporting clubs in Egypt in the late nineteenth century. These private clubs were established for the purpose of creating elite havens around Cairo and Alexandria solely for Europeans, where all types of sports were practised (cricket, football, squash, tennis, swimming, horse races, etc…). Access to these private clubs was granted to a select number of Egyptians from the upper classes of society at the beginning of the twentieth century, although rigorous admittance procedures were maintained such as high membership fees, annual dues and having to be backed by an existing member, thus excluding an important part of the Egyptian population (Russell 2013, 303). In the face of such discrimination, elite Egyptians initiated their own clubs whose purpose was to serve as networking grounds for students after graduating as well as to instil the values of health, fitness and nationalism. The first and oldest club to be established in Egypt—and the Arab World—is al-Sekka al-Hadid (known as the Railway Club).2 Founded in 1903 by British and Italian engineers affiliated with the Railway Authority at that time (El-Sayed 2012), it was closely followed by others such as al-Ahly—“National” (1907), al-Mokhtalat—“Mixed” (who eventually became Zamalek) and al-Tersana—Arsenal (1911) in Cairo; Egypt 349 and al-Olympi (1905) and al-Ittihad (1914) in Alexandria (Raspaud and Lachheb 2014). The birth and development of the different club rivalries will be discussed at a later stage. After the First World War, football became so popular that an EgyptianEnglish Football Association (EEFA) was created in 1916. The EEFA was responsible for organising the first official competition between Egyptians and foreign teams, the “Sultani Cup” under the patronage of Sultan Hussein Kamel (Sultan of Egypt between 1914 and 1917). In the first years of the competition, the British teams dominated, until al-Mukhtalat club (the Mixed club, later known as Farouk Club) won the title in 1921 (El-Sayed 2012). Around the same time, a conflict arose between the different sporting associations in the country, sparked by criticism addressed to the committee in charge of appointing the team that participated in the 1920 Olympics in Belgium. According to the EEFA among others, the team that was sent did not offer a realistic image of Egypt or the sport. This resulted in the establishment of the Egyptian Football Association (EFA) in 1921 (El-Sayed 2012). In 1923, two years after its founding, the EFA was officially recognised and allowed to become a member of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), thus becoming its first Arab and African representative. After joining FIFA, the EFA carried out the terms of membership acceptance for local clubs, forming a specific department in charge of developing competition at a local level, such as the Cup of Egyptian Excellence (commonly known today as Egypt Cup) (Lopez 2012). The interest in the game of football itself fuelled its growth and revenue, despite the change of regimes (from a British protectorate to an independent nation in 1922). For example, the most significant impact of the 1952 revolution on the football arena turned out to be the renaming of the King Farouk Cup to Egypt Cup, as well as the renaming of Farouk Club to Zamalek. Egyptian football has been used both as a tool of struggle and as a tool of control. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the football arena was used as a primary space of resistance to British rule, especially after Egypt’s participation and success in the 1928 Olympic Games where the team reached the semi-finals. This performance was welcomed by the population as a confirmation that equality should be extended to all areas (Raab 2013). Even though football was first practised by the higher social classes, it rapidly expanded throughout Egypt, regardless of socio-economic status and class, which translated into a growing number of players from the poorer working classes being drafted and asked to play on the different local teams. What is more, certain affinities with political ideologies such as socialism, 350 S. Gibril Marxism as well as the religious ideology linked to the Muslim Brotherhood school of thought were developed around the pitch (among other areas), the stadium being one of the only spaces that was not constricted to colonial control (Goldblatt 2006). As we will see in the latter sections of this paper, the establishment of the different local clubs, as well as the development of rivalries, coincides with the different political and historical stages of Egypt’s development and shows a clear connection and intertwinement between the sporting and political arenas. The different successes of the Egyptian national football team throughout the 1920s and 1930s played an important role in the formation and consolidation of national identity. Football competitions provided an efficient space that highlighted performance at an international level, but it also allowed for different peoples to interact, not only with the Western powers, but also with countries that had only just recently gained their independence (Lopez 2009). Whereas the first half of the twentieth century was characterised by the use of sport, and more specifically football as a tool of anti-colonial struggle, it soon became a powerful tool of propaganda for the subsequent dictatorial regimes. Indeed, since the abdication of King Farouk in 1952, the Egyptian political system has been characterised by a succession of authoritarian regimes. Several indicators account for this lack of political plurality, including the absence of a real national project since 1920s, the pre-eminence of personal interests over national interests as well as the proliferation of a high level of corruption and monopoly of power and wealth in the hands of a small ruling elite. By setting up complex institutional mechanisms to regulate access to the public service, along with the promise of career advancement, the ruling party managed to generate a sense of “security” among the different power holders, that their “immediate and long-term interests were better served by staying within the party” (Brownlee 2007, 39). Although authors do not fully agree on the analysis of the current political situation in Egypt, they agree that the combination of a lack or absence of a clear national project, the priority given to Western interests rather than the interests of its people as well as the priority given to privatisation gives way for a “marriage between power and wealth” (Shorbagy 2009, 529). These authoritarian regimes, dating back to the time Nasser and his Free Officers movement3 took power (Nasser followed Naguib as president of Egypt between 1956 and 1970), have long been interested in promoting mass and elite sport, using it both as a national construction strategy and as a means to maintain legitimacy on the international stage. Following this logic, the Egyptian national team was used as a tool to disseminate his vision Egypt 351 of Arab nationalism and counter the remnants of British rule. Although not a big football fan himself, Nasser made sure to attend as many games as possible as he believed it would reflect positively on the army and bring in more popular support (Nauright and Parrish 2012). After the six-day war of 1967, however, football competitions were banned in Egypt, Nasser claiming that it had become “a distraction” (Raspaud and Lachheb 2014, 104). Sadat (president between 1970 until his assassination in 1980) and his government on the other hand viewed a successful football team as a possible panacea, especially at a time when national pride and sentiment were declining (Bloomfield 2010, 23). Notwithstanding certain punctual episodes in Egypt’s history, football was a tool used for political advantage by Nasser and his successors. All successes of the national team competing on an international level were the concrete example of the president’s leadership skills, benevolent and nurturing spirits, leading to the establishment of these leaders as “fathers of the nation” (Koch 2013). This, in turn, favoured a state of dependency and stimulated a feeling of gratitude, which eventually led to a heightened sense of patriotism and nationalism, “mobilizing citizens in ways that create an illusion of participation, without allowing any citizen input in the process” (Adams 2010, 96). Through sport, and more so through football, Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak and also Sisi have all succeeded in shifting the attention of the Egyptian people, using it both as a distraction and as an instrument of legitimisation of their grandeur and power: distraction from the social and political reality of what was going on (control over the executive and legislative bodies, centralisation of power in the hands of a small and faithful political, economic and social elite, high levels of corruption within the administration, etc.), and instrument of legitimisation as football was massively used to gage the success (or failure) of the Raïs. The absolute control of the footballing arena by the different leaders in Egypt is crucial to their power, mainly because it is the only space where the ruler and the public share the same kind of passion that is only paralleled by religion. For instance, Mubarak (president from 1981 until the uprisings of 2011) took the habit of personally congratulating the players and coaches after each victory of the Egyptian national team. In this sense, the team’s triumph becomes an expression of his leadership and success, which was widely used to counter the growing popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood, the leading Islamist and opposition group in Egypt (Dorsey 2016). During the 2005 elections, Mubarak used football as a political strategy, focusing all the attention on the al-Ahly-Zamalek derby as well as on the National team’s campaign (commonly known as the Pharaohs). This was a way for 352 S. Gibril the regime to promote itself as well as identify with the people, stimulating nationalistic sentiment (Bloomfield 2010). The peak of nationalistic fervour was reached in 2009, during the qualification phase of the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, which will be discussed at a later stage. 2 Historical Club Rivalries While the successes of the national team acted as a compelling argument in the struggle for independence, local clubs emerged as powerful hubs of nationalistic sentiment and anti-colonial struggle, developing into prime sites for the establishment of Arab nationalist movements (Amara 2012, 20). Unlike various European countries where the rivalries can be based on socio-economic, political or religious cleavages (Roma–Lazio, Celtic– Rangers, Arsenal–Chelsea, Real Madrid–Atlético Madrid, etc.), Egyptian club rivalries are mainly anchored in historical and/or regional divisions. While some follow a centre-periphery logic (an opposition between the main cities against the Capital), other are more rooted in an opposition based on performance, or as a result of historical rivalries dating back to the clubs’ inception. The Ahly-Zamalek rivalry is unique in the sense that it is rooted in political and historical opposition between liberal and conservative ideologies. The main clubs in Egypt include al-Ahly and Zamalek in Cairo, al-Ittihad in Alexandria, al-Masry in Port Said (near the Mediterranean opening of the Suez Canal) and Ismaily in Ismailia (in the middle of the Suez Canal region, South of Port Said). Besides the Ahly-Zamalek derby, other eminent rivalries are to be mentioned at the national level, for instance the derby between the two clubs of the Suez Canal region, al-Masry of Port Said and Ismaily of Ismailia. Also known as the Canal derby, the opposition between Masry and Ismaily dates back to their creation, both clubs sharing the top spots in their region. In this sense, their rivalry is mostly centred on performance and their ability to shine as the leaders in the Suez Canal area. Despite some isolated clashes between fans, both clubs share good relations, mostly because of the strong ties between the residents of the region, as well as the unity of the clubs and their fans who fight against the domination of the two clubs of Cairo. Other prominent derbies include the Zamalek-Tersansa derby, the Ittihad-Ahly derby or more significantly the Masry-Ahly derby, rooted in a strong sporting rivalry between both clubs, as well as a long-standing animosity between the clubs’ fans linked to the centre-periphery divide. This rejection of the capital is at the centre of most rivalries between either Cairo clubs and the Egypt 353 other prominent clubs of Alexandria and the Canal region. Fans explain their rejection by accusing the regime of favouring both Cairene clubs when allocating the budgets (Dorsey 2016). The most prominent rivalry in Egyptian football, however, remains the Cairo derby, opposing al-Ahly and Zamalek sporting clubs, both sharing the top spots in the Egyptian Premier League performance leader board (39 victories for al-Ahly against 12 for Zamalek since 1948), as well as having become the most popular and decorated clubs in the Middle East and North Africa (Hawkey 2010). The Cairo derby is followed by millions in Egypt and North Africa, making it one of the most popular derbies in football (Lopez 2009). More than being just about sport, the Ahly-Zamalek rivalry divides not only their fan base, but also the whole of Egypt4: “In this country, you are Ahlawy or Zamalkawy. The rest can change […] your wife, your religion, but never your club!”.5 This division between Ahly and Zamalek structures the entire Egyptian society. While al-Ahly was historically supported by nationalists and liberals, and represented the post-revolutionary era (post-1919 revolution) and the struggle against British colonial authority, Zamalek (formally al-Mokhtalat and Farouk) was historically backed by the royalists and the conservatives (Darby 2002), thus representing privilege and the bourgeoisie. However, these were not the only clubs to materialise around political cleavages. For instance, the al-Masry club6 (which translates to “the Egyptian”) of Port Said was founded a year after the 1919 revolution, as a way to assert Egyptian identity and resist British colonisation. This translated in the club only accepting players of Egyptian nationality in its early years, thus pinning it as a symbol of national identity and independence (Darby 2002). The birth and development of al-Ahly date back to the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1907, a group of Egyptian pashas (men with titles, land and political connections) led by Omar Lotfi, president of the students union, established al-Nadi al-Ahly (the National Club) with the objective of using it as a backbone of struggle against colonialism. It was incidentally the only leisure club to allow Egyptians to have membership cards at the time of its creation (Darby 2002). Paradoxically, however, the Steering Committee elected a Briton, Mitchell Ince, as its first president. This turned out to be an effective strategy intended to take advantage of the Briton’s influence and relationship with the authorities (Raspaud and Lachheb 2014, 102). The club additionally chose the red and white colours of the pre-colonial flag, as well as the eagle adorning a crown, symbolising strength (Bloomfield 2010, 21). Zamalek, on the other hand, was founded in 1911 by Georges Merzbach, a Belgian lawyer established in Cairo. Originally known as Qasr el-Nil club 354 S. Gibril (which referred to the name of the Palace along the Nile that was made available to build the clubhouse), it was the first club in Cairo to be initiated by non-British foreigners (Raspaud and Lachheb 2014, 102). The club changed its name to al-Nadi al-Mukhtalat (The Mixed Club) in 1913. It was named that way because of its ambition and aspiration to be open to Europeans and Egyptians alike, allowing them to socialise and mix within the same playing ground. In 1941, it was changed again to Farouk al-Awal (King Farouk Club) following the royal sponsorship (Jacob 2011). It ultimately changed to Zamalek (using the name of its district location) after the 1952 revolution which saw the exile of King Farouk after the coup orchestrated by Nasser and his Free Officers (Woodward 1992). One of Zamalek’s key traits resided in the fact that it did not restrict admittance to any particular social, economic or ethnic group, while al-Ahly quickly became a rallying point for anti-colonialists, anti-monarchists and nationalists. After the newly foundindependence, Nasser was appointed al-Ahly’s honorary president (the official president of the club being Ahmed Aboud Pasha at that time) while Field Marshal and Head Commander Abdelhakim Amer was named president of the EFA and General Abdelaziz Salem, head of the Confederation of African Football (CAF), among others (Raspaud and Lachheb 2014). The appointment of these revolutionary leaders to strategic and senior positions in sports is symptomatic of the tight political grip of the Nasserite regime and the will to use it as both a means of propaganda and control. What is more, the naming of Nasser as al-Ahly’s honorary president in 1956 shows a fading of the original cleavages, brought on by the independence (Al Mistaki, 1997). Indeed, the main rivalry between both Cairo-based clubs started in the 1920s, at a time where al-Ahly symbolised the anti-colonial sentiment and struggle for independence, which was epitomised by the club restricting membership to people of Egyptian nationality only—as opposed to Zamalek (then al-Mukhtalat), who had a more open policy regarding its membership (Raspaud and Lachheb 2014). This particular clause guaranteed Ahly’s success as well as its status as the “club of the people” at that time, contrasting with Zamalek’s reputation of being the club of the bourgeoisie and foreigners. When al-Mukhtalat club changed its name to Farouk al-Awal, the rivalry between both clubs increased, mainly due to the fact that the change of name suggested its links with the Royal family and its lavish lifestyle, which was a highly criticised matter in Egypt at the time (Russel 2013, 69–70). Even though one could argue that Farouk and Nasser share the common trait of being rulers of Egypt, they symbolised different ideals. While Nasser is depicted as the representative of Pan-Arabism and the Egypt 355 nationalist current (following in the footsteps of Saad Zaghloul, father of Egyptian nationalism), King Farouk is often portrayed as the epitome of privilege and aristocracy, hence accentuating social differences. This is additionally emphasised in the symbols chosen by each club, whether it may be in the name given to the supporters (the Red Devils of al-Ahly and the White Knights of Zamalek), or by the use of the club colours—the red of blood and the people for al-Ahly and the white of purity and aristocracy for Zamalek (Hawkey 2010). So the naming of Nasser as honorary president of al-Ahly, as well as Sadat and Mubarak expressing their loyalty (in the sense of fandom) to al-Ahly club, negated, according to various supporter groups, the former belief that Ahly was “the club of the people” and Zamalek, “the club of the authorities”. This led various Zamalek fans to invert the original premise and to coin al-Ahly as the “club of the regime” during the Sadat and Mubarak years, thus showing the appropriation and use of the concepts such as “people”, “nation” and “struggle” by both sides. They further add that Zamalek has now come to symbolise the struggle against the almighty and corrupt Egyptian Football Federation and government. In the words of a former Zamalek board member, “The federation and the government see Zamalek as the enemy. Zamalek represents the people who express their anger against the system. We view Ahly as the representative of corruption in Egypt ” (Dorsey 2016, 55). This particular antagonistic vision of nationalistic vs. bourgeois values continues to prevail in the minds of a majority of supporters, mainly as a way for each team to discredit and undermine its rivals. In practice, however, this distinction no longer represents the reality of Egyptian society today nor is it a reflection of the socio-economic status of the fan base. Indeed, these divisions are rooted in a sociopolitical history that has faded over time, leaving only imagined representations of social and political groups. Nonetheless, the rivalry between both clubs is so deeply implanted that the Mubarak regime insisted that the matches be played on a neutral ground, at the Cairo International Stadium, going as far as flying in foreign referees to oversee the game. Additionally, riot police are placed inside and outside of stadium grounds and are charged with maintaining security and avoiding clashes between rival supporter groups. Given the nature and extent of the rivalry between both clubs, it is commonplace to witness violent confrontations between members of the rival supporter groups, Ahly’s Ultras Ahlawy (UA07) and Zamalek’s Ultras White Knights (UWK). Each Ultra group “fights to impose its symbolic strength in terms of the beauty and impressiveness of the choreography…and in terms of displaying 356 S. Gibril courage. […] Before or after the match, the stadium and the open spaces surrounding the stadium [is] exclusive territory to be defended against the enemy’s raids” (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994, 85–86). This rivalry between the UA07 and the UWK was put on hold after the events of Port Said on 1 February 2012, in which 74 Ahly supporters were killed in what was presented as a “football riot gone wrong”. Many of them, as well as an abundant portion of the protesters, believe the Port Said clashes to be a way for security forces—and by extension, the government—to take revenge for the supporters’ participation in the uprisings of 2011. One of the respondents explained that in his opinion, “we are a threat to them [the police and regime] because we were there in Tahrir. We know what they did. […] We know who the agents [the undercover agents] are so we mess with their investigations. We can also spot the baltagiyya [armed thugs] who help the police and that is why we get arrested and beaten up. And that is why they killed them in Port Said ”.7 From the Ultras’ point of view, the whole incident raises too many questions to be dismissed as a violent act of hooliganism. Seen as an act orchestrated by the Ministry of Interior, and moving up the hierarchy as high as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the ruling force at the time of the events, the Ultras massively mobilised to voice their discontent, shifting their energy and activities from the stadium to civil society. Ahly and Zamalek’s decision to suspend “all rival activities and unite in support to the victims” can be explained by the fact that the Ultras, as a group, felt under attack. Symbols of this union adorn the walls of Cairo, and other major cities around Egypt, as epitomised by the “Brotherhood in Blood” graffiti, referring to the strong solidary ties that exist between all Ultras groups in times of crisis. Incidentally, these messages were reproduced in other major cities such as Istanbul and Rome, revealing the extent of solidarity between these supporter groups and a strong supporters’ identity which cuts through linguistic, cultural and territorial boundaries. Indeed, the Port Said incident threatened their identity as a social group, independent from their other activities, and explains their mobilisation (Gibril 2015, 317). 3 Football as a Sports Spectacle: Ultras, the Stadium and the Egyptian Revolution The Ultra identity is revealed most frequently during matches, but is not limited to the sporting arena. They are an organised group of football supporters, dedicating their life, time and money to support their respective teams (Armstrong and Giulianotti 1999; Giulianotti 2002). Being an Ultra Egypt 357 in Egypt means “you respect the code and live by it. […] It is about loving football, your team and your people. […] We look out for each other ”.8 Their activities are centred on the team and club and aim at inspiring a sense of belonging among its members, impressing the viewers with their tifos (choreography displayed by fans in the stands) and songs, as well as to intimidate the supporters of rival teams. These groups have a well-established structure and a high degree of organisation: the leadership is centralised, divided into regional structures, and local meetings are planned when important decisions need to be discussed (Woltering 2013, 292). In practice, however, the organisation is both centralised and decentralised. The predominance of a horizontal logic, brought forth by the existence of local and regional sections, helps reinforce group attitudes and reduces the occurrence of potentially divisive issues among members, particularly regarding ideologies, opinions and beliefs (may they be political or religious). The first Ultras groups started forming in the early 2000s via the Internet and through forums before emerging as distinctive organisations in 2007, based on the Italian model (Beshir 2011). However, other forms of organised support existed prior to the establishment of the Ultras. Until the end of the 1990s, football fans were known as Tersos, derived from the Italian word Terzo, meaning “Three”. In Egypt, Terso came to refer to the fans from lower social classes who could only afford to buy third-class tickets to see the games (El-Zatmah 2012, 801). Appearing as early as the 1920s, the Terso fans shaped Egyptian football with their chants and songs, making football an integral part of Egyptian national culture (El-Zatmah 2012, 801). The Terso phenomenon started to disappear at the beginning of the 1980s, mainly due to worsening socio-economic conditions of the lower classes, making it challenging for the fans to buy tickets. The worsening economic conditions, coupled with the rise of greater gender segregation measures limiting the presence and participation of women in the public sphere (brought forth by the rising Islamisation of the culture),9 contributed to the thirdclass ticket seats to be mostly dominated by young males who would later come to form the Ultras (El-Zatmah 2012, 802). Ultras Ahlawy and UWK of Ahly and Zamalek were the first groups to appear in 2007, quickly becoming the largest and most visible organisations in Egypt. Both Ultras Ahlawy and UWK have multiple sections in other major cities and governorates, highlighting the clubs’ popularity around the country. Other groups quickly followed including Ismaily’s Yellow Dragons, the Green Eagles of al-Masry and the Green Dragons of Ittihad among others (Beshir 2011, 192). Ultras live by a code,10 which includes certain obligations such as singing and encouraging throughout the game, 358 S. Gibril whatever the outcome may be, attendance to as many matches as possible (home and away), regardless of distance and cost, and loyalty to the group. Other obligations, maybe more significant and characteristic of the Egyptian Ultra culture, include the obligation not to get involved politically (meaning the obligation to remain neutral with regard to political ideas, understood as referring to “party politics”); treat everyone equally, regardless of gender, religion, class, conviction; and always stand for what is right. Though most Ultras groups claim to be exclusively “supporter groups”, the existence of such rules and codes may imply that their identity exceeds the sole purpose of supporting and conceals another, more deeper dimension. The Ultras groups evolve in a context that strongly relies on “violent, state-based repression” (Earl 2006, 129), often resorting to violence in cases of self-defence, notably in their relations with the police as a consequence of their use of shamarikh (flares) and “politically incorrect” slogans, chants and songs (Beshir 2011, 21). It is commonplace for the police forces to arrest supporters the night before the game—or even on game day—for questioning, to ensure that they do not represent a threat to national security and release them the day after, sometimes in a bad shape (Dorsey 2012, 413). Their use of violence is not only limited to self-defence, however. Some of the more hard-core fans frequently organise street fights with rival supporter groups, bringing their activities closer to those of traditional hooligans. The Ultras’ clashes with the police are cultivated in a long history of violent encounters, of humiliations (the police often use the expression “ya walad ” meaning “you boy”, a condescending way of addressing people, regardless of their age) and harassment (Ismail 2012). One Ultra member explained his encounter with the police in these terms: “I was arrested by the police because he recognised me. The day before we went to Tahrir with the Ultras and he saw us. He feared us when we walked by him. But felt so powerful when I was alone with him and his “friends”. The difference is we didn’t attack him. It’s a question of principle ”. He was released the day after and had been beaten up when he refused to give up information regarding his “suspicious activities” (he implied that they wanted information regarding his activities as an Ultra, but they never said it openly): “It’s easier to attack someone when they are alone and cannot defend himself. They are cowards ” (Gibril 2015, 309). The anger and feeling of humiliation are an important feature of the relationship between the Ultras and the police, as it contributes to the development of a sense of injustice, which in turn encourages an upsurge of violence against police forces and shapes the supporters’ identity (being an Egypt 359 Ultra implies being opposed to any kind of figure of authority), as well as it structures their motives for mobilisation, and cements their sense of belonging to the group. While part of the rivalry between the Ultras and police forces is played around the stadium ground, it took a new turn with the onset of the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 and more so after the events of Port Said in 2012. The implication of the Ultras in the Egyptian uprisings of 25 January 2011 was mainly and specifically aimed at defending the protesters against police brutality. Unlike what is commonly circulated among the population, the Ultras were not one of the driving forces of the movement. They responded to a call from organising social movements such as Setah April (6th of April Movement) and Kefaya (which translates to “Enough”)11 who turned to them because they are notorious for their clashes with police and security forces. Cultivated in a history of violence due to their football-related activities, the Ultras were seen, by the population, as one of the only groups, not only capable of resisting the riot police, but also competent enough to teach them the necessary guerrilla techniques to fight back. The Ultras responded by uploading a video to their YouTube channel where they assured those committed to demonstrate on 25 January, as well as those who feared police repression, that there would be an Egyptian fasil (squadron) present to defend them. In statements on their respective Facebook pages, they also stressed the fact that the Ultras were non-political organisations, but that their members were free, as individuals, to participate in the protests. It is therefore quite difficult to establish the Ultras’ true intentions in the early days of the uprisings, and it seems unlikely that there was any collective decision to participate as a distinguished group. Their role in these uprisings was essentially to bring all of their experience in fighting the police—as well as rival supporter groups—from the stadium to the streets, thus playing a key role both in breaking down the riot police and in major battles including the battle of the Camel and the infamous Battle of Mohammed Mahmoud.12 Their involvement in these clashes was crucial because it marked the first big victory against the oppressive system. More importantly, it exposed the cracks of a declining regime, which, in turn, encouraged current and future demonstrators to take to the streets. One of the leaders of the UWK explains that they “fought the police in the stadium, [they] fought for [their] rights. That prepared [them] for Tahrir [referring to the uprisings]. Failure was not an option ”. He continued by explaining that their positions were “in the front line. When the police attacked, we encouraged the people. We told them not be afraid so people started joining us ”. 360 S. Gibril Their role in the early days of the demonstrations was pivotal in crushing what was described as the “fear and culture of fear created by humiliation, continuous monitoring surveillance and abuse” (Ismail 2006, 165). More than being an independent body, the police in Egypt are seen, by a major portion of the population, as the representative of the Ministry of Interior (commonly referred to as dakhliya ) and the regime’s administrative arm (Chalcraft 2011). In addition to ensuring public and national security, the police’s power covers other areas, such as the market, transport, roads, food supplies, public utilities, taxation and public morality (Ismail 2012). This intrusiveness can be attributable to several political factors that have consolidated the police’s power, notably the role it was assigned in repressing the Islamist opposition, dating back to the 1950s and 1960s. In addition to serving the interests of the ruling elite, security forces developed their own corrupt culture, instating a system of bribes and placing what is known as “plain-clothes” policemen—civilians hired by police and security forces to collect information—in neighbourhoods under the pretence of ensuring stability and peace. To do so without raising suspicion, the police usually position their undercover informants in local communities by providing them with a vending kiosk or by appointing them to the carta system, shuttle buses and vans. A key characteristic of the 25th of January Revolution was the fact that the extent of the protest caught the police off guard, as they were not expecting such an outcome. As their actions against riot police became increasingly visible, and their participation and numbers grew, the Ultras’ reputation changed. They went from “stadium hooligans” to “national heroes” (Dorsey 2016). This newfound image was later heightened by the incidents of Port Said in February 2012. More than a simple “football riot”, the events of Port Said mark a breaking point in the Ultras’ involvement and mobilisation. Even though their participation was undeniable in the early days of the uprisings, it was limited to a passive engagement centred on defence rather than fighting for a cause. Port Said, on the other hand, was interpreted by the Ultras, as a personal attack on the group and its ideals. While the Egyptian uprisings were used as a pretext to unleash anger and frustration fed by years of conflict and violent encounters with the police, Port Said epitomised the struggle of the Ultras to fight injustice. The will of rival camps to call a truce and make peace with one another and fight for the same cause, joined by other Ultras groups from around the country, is symptomatic of the level of identification with the nation. As one respondent put it: “We are the Ultras, we are Egypt”. Egypt 4 361 Egypt’s Pharaohs and the Campaigns for the 2010, 2014 and 2018 World Cups Major sporting competitions are an opportunity to observe a reinforcement or revival of patriotism, and national identification. Being one of the most popular sports, football can be understood as a “multi-faceted” mirror, reflecting the different cultural angles of a society at a given moment in its history. It can additionally be perceived as an effective arena bringing together, reproducing and transforming new or existing identities. As we previously mentioned, the Egyptian regime has actively tried to frame, limit and control the politicisation (or more so the lack thereof ) of its population. If the interest in the country’s political affairs found itself diminished, the passion for the game of football, to the contrary, was reinforced, or at least has remained steady over the years. This heightened devotion to football, along with the public investment in sport, came at a time when Egypt’s influence in the region was slowly deteriorating in areas such as science, art, literature, music and technology. The importance of a successful national team, in such a context, was all the more important, as it was the concrete proof of the president’s ability to embody national pride, which was an argument that was massively used during the 2010 World Cup qualifying campaign. The Egyptian national team has participated twice in the World Cup (in 1934 and 1990), which contrasts with the success of local clubs like Zamalek or al-Ahly, which are references on the continent. It is therefore interesting to analyse these discrepancies and examine the ambiguities of the support towards the national team. The first decade of the new millennium symbolised the golden era of Egyptian football, with Ahly and Zamalek winning the CAF Champions League, respectively, eight and five times and the national team, under coach Hassan Shehata, winning the Africa Cup of the Nations (CAN) in 2006, 2008 and 2010 (Rommel 2014). Football was, at that time, at the centre of public discourse and popular culture, with expanding media coverage of matches, as well as an increase in the number of broadcasts and websites (such as Fil.com or yallakora.com ) devoted to football, not to mention a significant increase in patriotic popular songs, praising the merits of the national team (Tawfiq 2010). In an Egyptian context dominated by corruption and personal favours, football embodied one of the few spaces based on a certain form of merit and was an important source of pride for a large portion of the Egyptian population: “When the [national] team plays, it’s an opportunity for all Egyptians 362 S. Gibril to come together and watch the game. You sing the national anthem with your neighbours, and that cousin you hate! It’s one of the rare times you see the [Egyptian] flag float with pride. When the match is over, you go back to your life, your team, your problems […] but for 90 min, it’s a whole country, 80 something million behind eleven players… ”.13 It acted as a substitute to mainstream politics under the Mubarak era. But it also served as a powerful instrument of propaganda, mobilised by the regime to ensure its preservation—even partially. In November 2009, Egypt played against Algeria in an attempt to qualify for the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. The match was described by the media as the most important match in Egyptian football history, Egypt having failed to qualify since 1990 (Alegi 2010). The team needed either a three-goal margin to qualify, or two goals to equal Algeria’s points. The stakes were high, which forced the teams to play the match on “neutral ground”. Egypt won the match by a two-goal margin, resulting in nationwide celebrations where men, women, young, old, Muslims and Christians joined together to celebrate in the streets. Concurrently, however, violent clashes broke out between Egyptian and Algerian fans after the Egyptians attacked the Algerian’s team bus. The decisive game was held on 20 November 2009 in Khartoum and resulted in an Algerian victory, thus ending the Egyptian team’s World Cup ambitions. What started out as a simple football game rapidly developed into a full-blown political crisis: the Algerian embassy in Cairo was attacked; violent confrontations broke out between frustrated demonstrators and security forces; the Egyptian Olympic Committee threatened to boycott any sporting exchange with Algeria; and al-Ahly made plans to sell its only Algerian player among others. The first few days following the match were marked by a vivid expression of hatred towards Algeria. The media and the ruling power (Mubarak and especially his son Alaa spoke out on public television) used this opportunity to magnify national pride in an exacerbated and chauvinistic manner, going as far as spreading fake information such as alleged Algerian attacks on “Egyptian citizens” (Rommel 2014). Nevertheless, this emotionalism died down rapidly giving way to severe criticism from the media and the population, regarding the exploiting of football by the regime, thus creating a “empty” sense of nationalistic pride, as well as justifying a number of political decisions, including Mubarak’s ambition to hand over power to his son, Gamal (Tawfiq 2010, 188). Aside from the numerous debates that stemmed from the Egypt–Algeria match, there seems to have been a consensus regarding the significance of Egypt 363 the defeat. Indeed, it appears that this particular event emerged as a breaking point in the history of Egyptian football. It marked the end of the golden era, as well as the moment after which interest in the national team performance declined and a form of apathy and fatalism developed. After the failure to qualify for the World Cup, the support to the national team appears to have become more of an obligation, a duty to be fulfilled as an “Egyptian citizen” rather than the source of excitement: “You have to support your team because you’re Egyptian. It would be absurd to support another team. […] But our team is not what it used to be. It is about time we focus on other, more important problems, like our future and trying to find a job ”.14 The Egyptian campaign for the 2014 World Cup took place in a completely different context, with the 2011 Revolution as a backdrop. The support to the national team was, at times, ambiguous and contrasted, and the Revolution amplified this schizophrenia characterised both by a clear attachment to the country and a deep-rooted belief that the national team and its successes were used by the regime to assert and legitimise its power. This vision is exemplified by some of the Ultras, declaring their refusal to support the national team: “The [national] team is Mubarak’s team. If you support it, you support him … The victories of the national team, are his victories. The national team is only a diversion to make us forget the injustice ”.15 The popular uprisings contributed to changing the relations between local clubs, as epitomised by the collaboration between Ahly and Zamalek Ultras, as well as the relation towards the national team and its core supporter base: “After Port Said, things changed. Egyptians started to see the cruelty of the regime, […] able to kill its own people for revenge. They understood that the world of football was dirty [to be understood in the sense of rotten, corrupt]. Not enough players have stepped up and expressed solidarity with us, […] the supporters, and for those who died supporting them … Not a single boss … Not a single coach … Is that football today? And what about us? ”.16 The play-off match for a place in the 2014 World Cup resulted in a major loss against the Ghanaian team (1-6). The reaction, however, was different to the one of 2009. Contrary to what the regime feared after the events of 2009 and 2012 (Port Said), very little violence broke out after the match, leaving the country in a state of apathy, or, in some cases, rejoicing over the team’s defeat. Through the disapproval and criticism of the national team, one perceives a deeper challenge to the abuses of the regime as well as a denunciation of the corruption at all levels of Egyptian society, including football. This disapproval was expressed in various ways, may it be through a certain form of bitterness, very present on the banners (“You collect millions but you do 364 S. Gibril not care about the poverty of Egyptians” in 2013, or “We have followed you everywhere but when times are hard, we do not find you” in 2014), or by invoking some sort of divine punishment: the idea that the defeat and the inability for the team to produce good results is understood as a divine sign proving the illegitimacy of the regime. So the Egyptian national team’s mission for the 2018 World Cup campaign was to restore a sense of karama, of dignity, as well as redeem itself in the eyes of the Egyptian people. The qualification of the Egyptian national team was met with great enthusiasm in the Egyptian media, propelling qualifying goal scorer, Mohamed Salah, to the status of Egyptian hero. Independently of the national feeling of pride resulting from this victory, the identification with the Egyptian national team remains somewhat problematic as it symbolises, in the collective representation of a majority of the population, an agent of the regime on the pitch—unlike the local teams, who continue to reap considerable support, especially because these are not values embodied by power, but rather the values of the group that supports the team. Notes 1. The Saad Zaghloul revolution was carried out by Egyptian and Sudanese citizens as a response to the British-ordered exile of nationalistic leader, Saad Zaghlul, and a number of other members of the Wafd Party (nationalist liberal political party that came into existence after the First World War). It was more generally an uprising against the British occupation of Egypt and Sudan (Gerges 2013). This revolution later led to the recognition of Egyptian independence in 1922, as the Kingdom of Egypt. British troops did not, however, withdraw from Egypt, which would later be seen as one of the factors leading to the Egyptian revolution of 1952. For more information on the Saad Zaghlul uprisings and Egyptian nationalism, see Fahmy (2011) and Gerges (2013). 2. El-Sekka el-Hadid still exists to this day and is currently playing in the Egyptian Second Division. 3. The “Free Officers” (Harakat ad-Dubbat al-Ahrar ) movement represented a group of nationalist officers in the Egyptian and Sudanese armed forces that prompted the Revolution of 1952. The core group stemmed from Brotherhood cells, though the ideological ties with the group were superficial. They joined the Muslim Brothers because they provided a structured framework (the most organised at the time) for political expression in the army. Ultimately, the Free Officers founders swore ultimate loyalty to Egypt 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 365 a movement in which religion would not play a role. They took power in 1952, General Mohamed Naguib becoming the first president until Nasser’s election in 1956. For more on Nasserism and the Free Officers Movement, see Gordon (1992) and Woodward (1992). This divide is so prominent that al-Ahly and Zamalek are often nicknamed “the true parties of Egypt”. This can be partially explained by the fact that members are allowed to participate in the election of the club board, attracting a lot of media attention. Indeed, given the low level of opportunity for political transition in regimes such as the Egyptian one, the election of club presidents—and particularly for al-Ahly and Zamalek—gives the voters a true sense of power in the decision-making process. Interview with an Ahly supporter, Cairo, 2014. It is said that the club’s name was derived from the song by popular Egyptian singer, Sayed Darwish, “Oum Ya Masry ” (Rise, you Egyptian). Interview, June 2013. Interview with al-Ahly Ultra, Cairo, June 2013. For more information on the underlying causes of the rise of Islamic movements in the 1970s and 1980s in Egypt, see Snow and Marshal (1989), Burgat and Dowell (1993), Ibrahim (1980), Kepel (1986). This “Ultra Code” is a set of unwritten rules established, recognised and followed by the supporters of al-Ahly. A similar code exists for the Zamalek Ultras and other groups around Egypt. The respondents (one, Zamalek, interviewed on 1 June 2013; and one al-Ahly interviewed on 29 May 2013) both listed the same kinds of rules and emphasised the importance of abiding by those rules in order to be a part of the group. The 6th of April Movement and Kefaya are two social movements in Egypt. At the grassroots of the 2011 Revolution, they were among the main platforms for protest against the Mubarak regime denouncing the transfer of power to his son Gamal, the political corruption, and the regime’s repressive and coercive ways in dealing with opposition. For more information on Kefaya and other social movements in Egypt, see Beinin and Vairel (2013), and Shorbagy (2007). The Battle of the Camel (February 2011) and later, the Battle of Mohammed Mahmoud street (November 2011) were two major battles of the Egyptian Uprisings and two major victories for the demonstrators of Tahrir square. Other important confrontations between security forces and demonstrators include the Maspero massacre. For more information on the day-to-day timeline of the Revolution and footage of the different battles, consult: www.858.ma. Interview, Cairo, April 2014. Interview, Cairo, February 2015. Interview, Skype, January 2015. Interview, Cairo, April 2014. 366 S. Gibril References Adams, L. 2010. The Spectacular State: Culture and National Identity in Uzbekistan. Durham: Duke University Press. Alegi, P. 2010. African Soccerscapes: How a Continent Changed the World’s Game. Athens: Ohio University Press. Al-Mistaki, H. 1997. 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