Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 78903 February 28, 1990 SPS. SEGUNDO DALION AND EPIFANIA SABESAJE-DALION, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND RUPERTO SABESAJE, JR., respondents. Francisco A. Puray, Sr. for petitioners. Gabriel N. Duazo for private respondent. MEDIALDEA, J.: This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals rendered on May 26, 1987, upholding the validity of the sale of a parcel of land by petitioner Segundo Dalion (hereafter, "Dalion") in favor of private respondent Ruperto Sabesaje, Jr. (hereafter, "Sabesaje"), described thus: A parcel of land located at Panyawan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, declared in the name of Segundo Dalion, under Tax Declaration No. 11148, with an area of 8947 hectares, assessed at P 180.00, and bounded on the North, by Sergio Destriza and Titon Veloso, East, by Feliciano Destriza, by Barbara Bonesa (sic); and West, by Catalino Espina. (pp. 36-37, Rollo) The decision affirms in toto the ruling of the trial court 1 issued on January 17, 1984, the dispositive portion of which provides as follows: WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment. (a) Ordering the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff the parcel of land subject of this case, declared in the name of Segundo Dalion previously under Tax Declaration No. 11148 and lately under Tax Declaration No. 2297 (1974) and to execute the corresponding formal deed of conveyance in a public document in favor of the plaintiff of the said property subject of this case, otherwise, should defendants for any reason fail to do so, the deed shall be executed in their behalf by the Provincial Sheriff or his Deputy; (b) Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and P 500.00 as litigation expenses, and to pay the costs; and (c) Dismissing the counter-claim. (p. 38, Rollo) The facts of the case are as follows: On May 28, 1973, Sabesaje sued to recover ownership of a parcel of land, based on a private document of absolute sale, dated July 1, 1965 (Exhibit "A"), allegedly executed by Dalion, who, however denied the fact of sale, contending that the document sued upon is fictitious, his signature thereon, a forgery, and that subject land is conjugal property, which he and his wife acquired in 1960 from Saturnina Sabesaje as evidenced by the "Escritura de Venta Absoluta" (Exhibit "B"). The spouses denied claims of Sabesaje that after executing a deed of sale over the parcel of land, they had pleaded with Sabesaje, their relative, to be allowed to administer the land because Dalion did not have any means of livelihood. They admitted, however, administering since 1958, five (5) parcels of land in Sogod, Southern Leyte, which belonged to Leonardo Sabesaje, grandfather of Sabesaje, who died in 1956. They never received their agreed 10% and 15% commission on the sales of copra and abaca, respectively. Sabesaje's suit, they countered, was intended merely to harass, preempt and forestall Dalion's threat to sue for these unpaid commissions. From the adverse decision of the trial court, Dalion appealed, assigning errors some of which, however, were disregarded by the appellate court, not having been raised in the court below. While the Court of Appeals duly recognizes Our authority to review matters even if not assigned as errors in the appeal, We are not inclined to do so since a review of the case at bar reveals that the lower court has judicially decided the case on its merits. As to the controversy regarding the identity of the land, We have no reason to dispute the Court of Appeals' findings as follows: To be sure, the parcel of land described in Exhibit "A" is the same property deeded out in Exhibit "B". The boundaries delineating it from adjacent lots are identical. Both documents detail out the following boundaries, to wit: On the North-property of Sergio Destriza and Titon Veloso; On the East-property of Feliciano Destriza; On the South-property of Barbara Boniza and On the West-Catalino Espina. (pp. 41-42, Rollo) The issues in this case may thus be limited to: a) the validity of the contract of sale of a parcel of land and b) the necessity of a public document for transfer of ownership thereto. The appellate court upheld the validity of the sale on the basis of Secs. 21 and 23 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. SEC. 21. Private writing, its execution and authenticity, how proved.-Before any private writing may be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the writing executed; (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or (c) By a subscribing witness xxx xxx xxx SEC. 23. Handwriting, how proved. — The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person, and has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court) And on the basis of the findings of fact of the trial court as follows: Here, people who witnessed the execution of subject deed positively testified on the authenticity thereof. They categorically stated that it had been executed and signed by the signatories thereto. In fact, one of such witnesses, Gerardo M. Ogsoc, declared on the witness stand that he was the one who prepared said deed of sale and had copied parts thereof from the "Escritura De Venta Absoluta" (Exhibit B) by which one Saturnina Sabesaje sold the same parcel of land to appellant Segundo Dalion. Ogsoc copied the bounderies thereof and the name of appellant Segundo Dalion's wife, erroneously written as "Esmenia" in Exhibit "A" and "Esmenia" in Exhibit "B". (p. 41, Rollo) xxx xxx xxx Against defendant's mere denial that he signed the document, the positive testimonies of the instrumental Witnesses Ogsoc and Espina, aside from the testimony of the plaintiff, must prevail. Defendant has affirmatively alleged forgery, but he never presented any witness or evidence to prove his claim of forgery. Each party must prove his own affirmative allegations (Section 1, Rule 131, Rules of Court). Furthermore, it is presumed that a person is innocent of a crime or wrong (Section 5 (a), Idem), and defense should have come forward with clear and convincing evidence to show that plaintiff committed forgery or caused said forgery to be committed, to overcome the presumption of innocence. Mere denial of having signed, does not suffice to show forgery. In addition, a comparison of the questioned signatories or specimens (Exhs. A-2 and A-3) with the admitted signatures or specimens (Exhs. X and Y or 3-C) convinces the court that Exhs. A-2 or Z and A-3 were written by defendant Segundo Dalion who admitted that Exhs. X and Y or 3-C are his signatures. The questioned signatures and the specimens are very similar to each other and appear to be written by one person. Further comparison of the questioned signatures and the specimens with the signatures Segundo D. Dalion appeared at the back of the summons (p. 9, Record); on the return card (p. 25, Ibid.); back of the Court Orders dated December 17, 1973 and July 30, 1974 and for October 7, 1974 (p. 54 & p. 56, respectively, Ibid.), and on the open court notice of April 13, 1983 (p. 235, Ibid.) readily reveal that the questioned signatures are the signatures of defendant Segundo Dalion. It may be noted that two signatures of Segundo D. Dalion appear on the face of the questioned document (Exh. A), one at the right corner bottom of the document (Exh. A-2) and the other at the left hand margin thereof (Exh. A-3). The second signature is already a surplusage. A forger would not attempt to forge another signature, an unnecessary one, for fear he may commit a revealing error or an erroneous stroke. (Decision, p. 10) (pp. 42-43, Rollo) We see no reason for deviating from the appellate court's ruling (p. 44, Rollo) as we reiterate that Appellate courts have consistently subscribed to the principle that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial courts are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons, since it is undeniable that the trial court is in a more advantageous position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case (Chase v. Buencamino, Sr., G.R. No. L-20395, May 13, 1985, 136 SCRA 365; Pring v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41605, August 19, 1985, 138 SCRA 185) Assuming authenticity of his signature and the genuineness of the document, Dalion nonetheless still impugns the validity of the sale on the ground that the same is embodied in a private document, and did not thus convey title or right to the lot in question since "acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinction of real rights over immovable property must appear in a public instrument" (Art. 1358, par 1, NCC). This argument is misplaced. The provision of Art. 1358 on the necessity of a public document is only for convenience, not for validity or enforceability. It is not a requirement for the validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of land that this be embodied in a public instrument. A contract of sale is a consensual contract, which means that the sale is perfected by mere consent. No particular form is required for its validity. Upon perfection of the contract, the parties may reciprocally demand performance (Art. 1475, NCC), i.e., the vendee may compel transfer of ownership of the object of the sale, and the vendor may require the vendee to pay the thing sold (Art. 1458, NCC). The trial court thus rightly and legally ordered Dalion to deliver to Sabesaje the parcel of land and to execute corresponding formal deed of conveyance in a public document. Under Art. 1498, NCC, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof is equivalent to the delivery of the thing. Delivery may either be actual (real) or constructive. Thus delivery of a parcel of land may be done by placing the vendee in control and possession of the land (real) or by embodying the sale in a public instrument (constructive). As regards petitioners' contention that the proper action should have been one for specific performance, We believe that the suit for recovery of ownership is proper. As earlier stated, Art. 1475 of the Civil Code gives the parties to a perfected contract of sale the right to reciprocally demand performance, and to observe a particular form, if warranted, (Art. 1357). The trial court, aptly observed that Sabesaje's complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action to compel Dalion to execute a formal deed of sale, and the suit for recovery of ownership, which is premised on the binding effect and validity inter partes of the contract of sale, merely seeks consummation of said contract. ... . A sale of a real property may be in a private instrument but that contract is valid and binding between the parties upon its perfection. And a party may compel the other party to execute a public instrument embodying their contract affecting real rights once the contract appearing in a private instrument hag been perfected (See Art. 1357). ... . (p. 12, Decision, p. 272, Records) ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the ruling of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur. SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 115402. July 15, 1998] LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, and LEE TEK SHENG, respondents. D E C I S I O N MARTINEZ, J.: After his mothers death, petitioner[1] filed a complaint against his father, herein private respondent, to partition the conjugal properties of his parents.[2] In his answer with counterclaim, private respondent alleged that four (4) parcels of land registered solely in petitioners name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 8278 are conjugal properties. Private respondent contends that the lots are owned by the conjugal regime but was registered in petitioners name only as a trustee considering that at that time, the latter was then the only Filipino citizen in the family. Accordingly, private respondent prayed for the dismissal of the partition case and for the reconveyance of the lots to its rightful owner the conjugal regime. Meantime, to protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the pendency of the case, private respondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT 8278. Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said annotation which was denied by the trial court ruling that (a) the notice was not for the purpose of molesting or harassing petitioner and (b) also to keep the property within the power of the court pending litigation.[3] Petitioner assailed the denial of his motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens via petition for certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals (CA), but to no avail.[4] Resorting to this Court, petitioner primarily contends that in the resolution of an incidental motion for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens (a) it was improper to thresh out the issue of ownership of the disputed lots since ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case, otherwise, (b) it would amount to a collateral attack of his title obtained more than 28 years ago. He argues that his sole ownership as shown in the TCT would be improperly assailed in a partition case and should be done through a separate suit. On the contrary, private respondent posits that evidence of ownership is admissible in a partition case as this is not a probate or land registration proceedings when the courts jurisdiction is limited. Though the postulates respectively proffered by both parties are not at point, luckily for private respondent, petitioners claim is not legally tenable. There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked[5] but that rule is not material to this case. The annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not in any case amount nor can it be considered as equivalent to a collateral attack of the certificate of title for a parcel of land. The concept of no collateral attack of title is based on Section 48 of P.D. 1529 which states that: Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack.- A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.[6] (Emphasis Supplied). What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land.[7] Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.[8] Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. In this case, contrary to petitioners fears, his certificate of title is not being assailed by private respondent.[9] What the latter disputes is the formers claim of sole ownership. Thus, although petitioners certificate of title may have become incontrovertible one year after issuance,[10] yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar private respondent from questioning his ownership.[11] It should be noted that what is being challenged in this case is the denial of the motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens. But whether as a matter of procedure[12] or substance,[13] a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds, which are: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was convincingly shown to concur in this case. It would not even be fair to justify the cancellation of the notice on the legally untenable grounds that such annotation amounts to a collateral attack of petitioners certificate of title or that ownership cannot be adjudicated in a partition case. It must be emphasized that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is only for the purpose of announcing to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.[14] Here, the parties are still locked in a legal battle to settle their respective claims of ownership. The lower court allowed the annotation pending litigation only for the purpose of giving information to the public that that parcel of land is involved in a suit and that those who deal with the property is forewarned of such fact. On the contention that ownership cannot be passed upon in partition case, suffice it to say that until and unless ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect partition of the property.[15] For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules which requires the party seeking annotation to prove that the land belongs to him.[16] Besides, an action for partition is one case where the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is proper.[17] Further, contrary to petitioners argument, one of the issues agreed upon by the parties at pre-trial is to determine what are the properties acquired by the spouses during their marriage.[18] In addition, private respondent in his answer with counterclaim prayed for the reconveyance of the disputed lots. Accordingly, the issue of ownership has been put in issue and each claimant must present their respective evidence to substantiate their respective allegations.[19] Considering that this is a partition case, the court is required to inquire into the nature and extent of title of the supposed claimant.[20] The title referred to by the rule is the purported ownership of the claimants and not the certificate of title mentioned in Section 48 of P.D. 1529, although the latter may be considered in the determination of the former. WHEREFORE, by virtue of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Regalado, (Chairman), Melo, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. Nos. L-46626-27 December 27, 1979 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, A & A TORRIJOS ENGINEERING CORPORATION, FRANCISCA S. BOMBASI, HERCULINO M. DEO, FRUCTUOSA LABORADA and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALOOCAN CITY, respondents-appellees. Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner. Gonzalo D. David for respondents. AQUlNO, J.: These two cases are about the cancellation and annulment of reconstituted Torrens titles whose originals are existing and whose reconstitution was, therefore, uncalled for. 1. Lots Nos. 915 and 918 of the Tala Estate, with areas of more than twenty-five and twenty-four hectares, respectively, located at Novaliches, Caloocan, now Quezon City, are registered in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as shown in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34594 and 34596 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal both dated April 30, 1938. The originals of those titles are on file in the registry of deeds in Pasig, Rizal. They were not destroyed during the war. Even the originals of the preceding cancelled titles for those two lots, namely, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 15832 and 15834 in the name of the Philippine Trust Company, are intact in the registry of deeds. 2. The reconstitution proceeding started when Fructuosa Laborada, a widow residing at 1665 Interior 12 Dart Street, Paco, Manila, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Caloocan City a petition dated November, 1967 for the reconstitution of the title covering the above-mentioned Lot No. 915. She alleged that she was the owner of the lot and that the title covering it, the number of which she could not specify, was "N.A." or not available (Civil Case No. C-677). The petition was sworn to on November 16, 1967 before Manila notary Domingo P. Aquino (48-52, Consolidated Record on Appeal). 3. On April 2, 1968, the lower court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on June 14, 1968. The notice of hearing was published in the Official Gazette. Copies thereof were posted in three conspicuous places in Caloocan City and were furnished the supposed adjoining owners (53-54, Consolidated Record on Appeal). The registers of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal were not served with copies of the petition and notice of hearing. 4. State Prosecutor Enrique A. Cube, as supposed counsel for the Government, did not oppose the petition. Laborada presented her evidence before the deputy clerk of court. Judge Serafin Salvador in his "decision" dated July 6, 1968 granted the petition. He found that Lot No. 915 was covered by a transfer certificate of title which was not available and which was issued to Maria Bueza who sold the lot to Laborada. The transfer certificate of title covering the lot was allegedly destroyed during the war. The plan and technical description for the lot were approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration who recommended favorable action on the petition (pp. 53-56, Consolidated Record on Appeal). 5. The lower court directed the register of deeds of Caloocan City to reconstitute the title for Lot No. 915 in the name of Laborada. The order of reconstitution was not appealed. It became final and executory. 6. Acting on the court's directive, the register of deeds issued to Laborada on August 14, 1968 Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N.A.) 3-(R) Lot No. 915 was later subdivided into seven lots, Lots Nos. 915-A to 915-G. The Acting Commissioner of Land Registration approved the subdivision plan. The register of deeds cancelled TCT No. (N.A.) 3-(R) and issued on October 15, 1968 seven titles to Laborada, namely, TCT Nos. 30257 to 30263 (pp. 56-59, 61-83, Consolidated Record on Appeal). 7. In another and later case, Civil Case No. C-763 of the lower court, one Francisco S. Bombast, single, residing at 2021 San Marcelino Street, Malate, Manila filed in the lower court a petition dated November 16, 1967 for the reconstitution of the title of another lot, the aforementioned Lot No. 918. She could not specify the number of the title. She alleged that the title was "N.A" or not available. She claimed to be the owner of the lot and that the title covering it was destroyed during the war. Like the first petition, the second petition was sworn to on the same date, November 16, 1967, before Manila notary Domingo P. Aquino. Why it was not filed simultaneously with Laborada's petition was not explained. (17-21, Consolidated Record on Appeal.) 8. The lower court set the second petition for hearing on January 31, 1969. As in Laborada's petition, the notice of hearing for Bombast's petition was published in the Official Gazette. It was posted in three conspicuous places in Caloocan City and copies thereof were sent to the supposed adjoining owners (22, Consolidated Record on Appeal). But no copies of the petition and notice of hearing were served upon the registers of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal, the officials who would be interested in the reconstitution of the supposed lost title and who could certify whether the original of the title was really missing. 9. Bombast's petition was assigned also to Judge Salvador. It was not opposed by the government lawyers, Enrique A. Cube and Conrado de Leon, Judge Salvador in his order of April 3, 1969 granted the petition. The court found from the evidence that the allegedly missing or "not available" title was issued to Regino Gollez who sold the land to petitioner Bombast. The owner's duplicate of Gollez's title was supposedly destroyed during the war. Taxes were paid for that land by Gollez and Bombast. The technical description of the land the plan were approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration who submitted a report recommending the reconstitution of the title (pp. 22-25, Consolidated Record on Appeal). 10. The lower court ordered the register of deeds to reconstitute the missing title of Lot No. 918 in the name of Bombast. Acting on that directive, the register of deeds issued to Bombast Transfer Certificate of Title No. N.A. 4(R) dated August 27, 1969(pp. 24-27, Consolidated Record on Appeal). 11. On March 25, 1969 or five months before the issuance of the reconstituted title, Francisca Bombast, now Identified as single (not widow) and a resident of 1665 Interior 12 Dart Street Paco, Manila, which was the same address used by Fructuosa Laborada (Bombast used first the address 2021 San Marcelino Street) sold Lot No. 918 to Herculano M. Deo allegedly for P249,880. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34146R was issued to Deo. On October 28, 1969, Deo sold the lot to A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation allegedly for P250,000. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34147-R was issued to the corporation (pp. 10-11, 29-34, Consolidated Record on Appeal). 12. On May 25 and 26, 1970, the State filed two petitions for the cancellation and annulment of the reconstituted titles and the titles issued subsequent thereto (Civil Cases Nos. 1784 and 1785). Judge Salvador, who had ordered the reconstitution of the titles and to whom the two cases for cancellation were assigned, issued on June 5, 1970 restraining orders enjoining the register of deeds, city engineer and Commissioner of Land Registration from accepting or recording any transaction regarding Lots Nos. 915 and 918. 13. The respondents in the two cases, through a common lawyer, filed separate answers containing mere denials. The Commissioner of Land Registration filed pro forma answers wherein he interposed no objection to the issuance of the preliminary injunction sought by the State. After a joint trial of the two cases, respondents corporation and Laborada filed amended answers wherein they pleaded the defense that they were purchasers in good faith and for value. 14. On June 22, 1972, Judge Salvador (who did not bother to inhibit himself) rendered a decision in the two cases holding that the State's evidence was insufficient to establish its ownership and possession of Lots Nos. 915 and 918 and that Laborada and A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation were purchasers in good faith and for value and, consequently, their titles are not cancellable and annullable. Judge Salvador further held that the titles, whose reconstitution he had ordered allegedly in conformity with law, could not be attacked collaterally and, therefore, "the reconstituted titles and their derivatives have the same validity, force and effect as the originals before the reconstitution" (pp. 160-161, Consolidated Record on Appeal). The State appealed. 15. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the lower court's judgment, held that the orders of reconstitution dated July 6, 1968 and April 3, 1969 could no longer be set aside on May 26, 1970, when the petitions for annulment and cancellation of the reconstituted titles were filed, and that if there were irregularities in the reconstitution, then, as between two innocent parties, the State, as the party that made possible the reconstitution, should suffer the loss. The Court of Appeals cited section 101 of Act 496 to support its view that a registered owner may lose his land "by the registration of any other person as owner of such land". The State appealed to this Court. We hold that the appeal is justified. The Appellate Court and the trial court grievously erred in sustaining the validity of the reconstituted titles which, although issued with judicial sanction, are no better than spurious and forged titles. In all candor, it should be stated that the reconstitution proceedings, Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C-763, were simply devices employed by petitioners Laborada and Bombast for landgrabbing or for the usurpation and illegal appropriation of fifty hectares of State-owned urban land with considerable value. The crucial and decisive fact, to which no importance was attached by the lower court and the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals (Reyes, L.B., Domondon and Ericta, JJ.), is that two valid and existing Torrens titles in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines were needlessly reconstituted in the names of Laborada and Bombast on the false or perjurious assumption that the two titles were destroyed during the war. That kind of reconstitution was a brazen and monstrous fraud foisted on the courts of justice. It was a stultification of the judicial process. One and the same judge (1) allowed the reconstitution and then (2) decided the two subsequent cases for the cancellation and annulment of the wrongfully reconstituted titles. The existence of the two titles of the Government for Lots Nos. 915 and 918 ipso facto nullified the reconstitution proceedings and signified that the evidence in the said proceedings as to the alleged ownership of Laborada and Bombast cannot be given any credence. The two proceedings were sham and deceitful and were filed in bad faith. Such humbuggery or imposture cannot be countenanced and cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits. Republic Act No. 26 provides for a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title that are missing and not fictitious titles or titles which are existing. It is a patent absurdity to reconstitute existing certificates of title that are on file and available in the registry of deeds. The reconstitution proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C- 763 are void because they are contrary to Republic Act No. 26 and beyond the purview of that law since the titles reconstituted are actually subsisting in the registry of deeds and do not require reconstitution at all. As a rule, acts executed against the provisions of mandatory laws are void (Art. 5, Civil Code). To sustain the validity of the reconstituted titles in these cases would be to allow Republic Act No. 26 to be utilized as an instrument for landgrabbing (See Republic vs. Court of Appeals, Ocampo and Anglo, L-31303-04, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 453, 480, per J. G.S. Santos) or to sanction fraudulent machinations for depriving a registered owner of his land, to undermine the stability and security of Torrens titles and to impair the Torrens system of registration. The theory of A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation that it was a purchaser in good faith and for value is indefensible because the title of the lot which it purchased unmistakably shows that such title was reconstituted. That circumstance should have alerted its officers to make the necessary investigation in the registry of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal where they could have found that Lot 918 is owned by the State. WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed and set aside. The reconstitution proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C-763 are declared void and are set aside. The reconstituted titles, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N.A. 3-(R) and N.A. 4-(R) and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34146-R, 34147-R and 30257 to 30263 and the survey plans and subdivision plan connected therewith are likewise declared void. The register of deeds is directed to cancel the said titles. The Republic of the Philippines, as the successor of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, is hereby declared the registered owner of Lots 915 and 918 of the Tala Estate, as shown in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34594 and 34596 of the registry of deeds of Rizal. Costs against the private respondents-appellees. SO ORDERED. Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur. Antonio, J., took no part. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-8539 December 24, 1914 MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN, petitioner-appellee, vs. RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., objectors-appellants. Southworth and Faison for appellants. D. R. Williams for appellee. JOHNSON, J.: It appears from the record that on the 12th day of January, 1906, the said petitioner, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the purpose of having registered, under the Torrens system, four parcels of land, known as Parcel A, Parcel B, Parcel C, and Parcel D, all of which were located in the city of Manila. The only one of said parcels to which attention need be given in the present appeal is Parcel A. From an examination of said petition we find that parcel A was described generally and technically. I. General description. — It is a parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located in the district of Binondo of this city between Nos. 84, 90, 92, 94, and 96 Calle Escolta and the northern bank of the Pasig River; bounded on the north by Calle Escolta for 31.08 meters, on the south by the Pasig River for 25.19 meters, on the east by the estate of Pedro P. Roxas for 66.48 meters, and on the west by the estate of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez for 62.10 meters; with an area of 1,817.03 square meters as set forth in the attached plan. II. Technical description. — The undersigned on the 26th of the present month proceeded to survey and fix the boundaries for preparing the topographical plan of a lot occupied by buildings of strong materials one and two stories high belonging to Maria del Consuelo Roxas y Chuidian, located in the district of Binondo of this city between Nos. 84, 90, 92, 94, and 96 Calle Escolta and the northern bank of the Pasig River. The point marked on the plan with the letter "X," located at the vertex of the angle formed by the northeastern side of Calle Escolta and the corner of the Pasaje de Perez was selected as the basic point, whence S. 49º 40' W., 27.75 meters is located Point A, chosen as the point of beginning for the topographical operations, the result whereof is as follows:1awphil.net —————————————————————————————————— | Points or | Directions in | Distances | Boundaries | | stations. | degrees. | in meters. | | —————————————————————————————————— | A to B | S. 44º 30' W | 31.08 | Calle Escolta. | | B to C | S. 46º 15' E | 16.15 | Heirs of Antonio | | C to D | S. 42º 00' E | 32.75 | } Enriquez. | | D to E | S. 40º 50' E | 13.20 | | | E to F | N. 49º 45' E | 14.25 | } Pasig River. | | F to G | N. 52º 00' E | 10.94 | | | G to H | N. 37º 10' W | 24.90 | | | H to I | N. 35º 45' W | 6.56 | | | I to J | N. 50º 30' E | 1.92 | } Pedro P. Roxas. | | J to K | N. 35º 00' W | 7.60 | | | K to A | N. 42º 05' W | 25.50 | | —————————————————————————————————— The lot described has an area of 1,817.03 square meters; all the points specified are marked on the attached plan, the bearings are magnetic, and its boundaries are: on the north, Calle Escolta; on the south, the Pasig River; on the east, the estate of Pedro P. Roxas; and on the west, the estate of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez. The plan to which reference is made in the above technical description and which accompanied the petition is as follows and is marked "Exhibit A." {bmc 029035a.bmp} By comparing the above technical description with the plan presented (Exhibit A), it will be noted that the line A-B in the technical description runs S. 44º, 30' W., and that the distance between A and B was 31.08 meters, while in the plan line A-B runs S. 46º, 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters. Attention is called to this difference between the technical description and the plan at this time, but its importance to the questions presented will be discussed below. Attached to said petition was a number of documents presented as exhibits, showing the chain of title of the petitioner. We find that said petition contains a statement of the names of the adjoining owners of the land in question. The petition gives the names of said persons, as follows: The names, surnames, and post-office addresses of the owners of the parcels of land conterminous with this estate are, according to my information: The heirs of Antonio Enriquez, whose representatives are the attorneys Hartigan, Marple, Solignac & Gutierrez, 7 Anda, Intramuros, Manila, Pedro P. Roxas, 154 Malacañang, San Miguel. Upon the presentation of said petition, the plan, and the documents showing the chain of title of the petitioner, the matter was referred to the examiner of titles of the Court of Land Registration, who made a very careful examination of the title of the petitioner to the land in question, and on the 5th day of March, 1906, presented a very carefully prepared report, in which he sets out in detail the title of the petitioner to said Parcel A, as well as the other parcels, the recommends the registration of said Parcel A, as well as the others, in the name of the petitioner. Upon the issue thus presented we find that the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, on the 23d day of March, 1906, in accordance with the provisions of section 31 of Act No. 496, issued the following notice: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. [Registration of title. Court of Land Registration. Case No. 1895.] To the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing, Nos. 84-88; A. Burke, No. 90; Messrs. Macke and Chandler and F. M. Sousa, these two No. 90 interior; Ramon Genato, No. 142; Tomas Serreno, No. 92; Rosendo Comas, No. 94; Cheng Tao Sang, No. 96; Luciano Cordoba, No. 28; Messrs. Salgado, Gordillo and Martinez, No. 32; Messrs. Greilsammer Bros., No. 36; and Messrs. Williams & Chandler, No. 34, upstairs; these on Calle Escolta; Antonio Vy Chuico, No. 226, and Lim Tinco, No. 200, these two on Calle Rosario; Ang Seng Queng, Calle Nueva No. 149; and Candido Lim, Calle Jaboneros No. 113; all these of the district of Binondo; Messrs. Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez, attorneys of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez, Calle Santo Tomas, corner of Calle Cabildo, district of Intramuros; Carmen Ayala de Roxas, No. 154; and Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa, these two No. 330, the three on Calle Malacañang, district of San Miguel; Francisco Saez, Plaza de Goiti No. 14, Alfonso Tiaoqui, Calle Lacoste No. 122, and Gervasio Rosario Ventura, Calle Dulumbayan No. 111, these three of the district of Santa Cruz; and Enrique Somes, Calle Alix No. 140, district of Sampaloc; all of the city of Manila, P. I., and to all whom it may concern: Whereas an application has been presented to said court by Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, through her attorney in fact Antonio Bonifas, Calle Padre Herrera No. 59, district of Tondo, city of Manila, P. I., to register and confirm her title in the following described land: Four parcels of land with the improvements of strong materials thereon, situated in the district of Binondo, Manila, P. I., more particularly bounded and described as follows: Parcel A. — Situated on the Escolta Nos. 84-96, beginning at a pt. marked "A" on plan, being S. 49º 40' W., 27.75 m. from the W. end of the chaflan at the S. intersection of the Escolta and Pasaje de Perez; thence S. 46º 30' W., 31.08 m. along the SE. line of the Escolta, to pt. "B"; S. 46º 15' E., 16.15 m. to pt. "C"; S. 42º E., 32.75 m. to pt. "D"; S. 40º 50' E., 13.20 m. to pt. "E"; N. 49º 45' E., 14.25 m. to pt. "F"; N. 52º E., 10.94 m. to pt. "G"; N. 36º 20' W., 14.20 m. to pt. "H"; N. 38º 40' W., 17.16 m. to pt. "I"; N. 52º 35' E., 2.27 m. to pt. "J"; N. 38º 50' W., 4.12 m. to pt. "K"; N. 53º 30' E., 0.30 m. to pt. "L"; N. 40º 05' W., 14 m. to pt. "M"; N. 44º W., 15.35 m. to pt. "E" to "G" follow the NW. bank of the Pasig River. Bounded on the NE. by property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; SE. by the Pasig River; SW. by property of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez and NW. by the Escolta. Date of survey, December 26, 1905. You are hereby cited to appear at the Court of Land Registration to be held at the City Hall, Calzada de las Aguadas, city of Manila, P. I., on the 25th day of April, A. D. nineteen hundred and six, at 8 o'clock in the forenoon, to show cause, if any you have, why the prayer of said application shall not be granted; and unless you appear at such court at the time and place aforesaid your default will be recorded and the said application will be taken as confessed, and you will be forever barred from contesting said application or any decree entered thereon. Witness the Hon. S. del Rosario, judge of said court, this 23d day of March in the year nineteen hundred and six. Attest: A. K. JONES, Clerk of said Court. In accordance with said order of publication, the clerk of the Court of Land Registration, on the 28th day of March, 1906, sent a copy of said order to each of the persons mentioned therein, by registered mail. The record shows that each of said persons received a copy of said notice, including the representative of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez (Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez). The record further shows, by the certificate of James J. Peterson, sheriff of the city of Manila, that said notice was posted upon the land in question. The record further shows that said notice had been published in two daily newspapers of the city of Manila. The Manila Times and La Democracia. On the 17th day of April, 1906, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration, made the following certificate relating to the notice and to the publication of the notices required by section 31 of Act No. 496. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION. Case No. 1895. Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, Applicant. I, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands, certify that, in compliance with the order issued by said court, a notice referring to the application for registry No. 1895, presented by Antonio Bonifas, as representative of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, was published once only in the daily newspapers of this city, The Manila Times on March 28, 1906, and La Democracia on the 31st of the same month and year, in English and Spanish respectively, and notice was served upon the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke; Macke & Chandler; F. M. Sousa; Ramon Genato; Tomas Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo & Martinez; Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams & Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim Tinco; Ang Seng Queng; Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala de Roxas; Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa, Francisco Saez; Alfonso Tiaoqui; Gervasia Rosario Ventura; and Enrique Somes, a copy of said notice in Spanish having been sent to each one on March 28, 1906, by registered mail. And for the purposes of the necessary procedure, I issue the present in Manila on the 17th day of April, 1906. A. K. JONES, Clerk of the Court. On the 19th day of April, 1906, the record shows that Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city of Manila (p. 131, record) presented a written statement to the court calling its attention to the fact that there existed an "error of closure" in the plan of said Parcel A, and asked the court to correct the error. The said attorney also called the attention of the other plans of the other parcels of land, included in the original petition. Our attention has not been called to any order made by the lower court, relating to said request of the attorney of the city of Manila. In accordance with said notice to all of the interested parties, the hearing on the said petition was brought on for trial on the 25th day of April, 1906, at 9 o'clock a. m., at the place mentioned in said notice. At the hearing the petitioner was represented. No one appeared to represent the "heirs of Antonio Enriquez." On said date (April 25, 1906, at 9 o'clock a. m.) the cause relating to said Parcel A was brought on for trial. Mr. Antonio Bonifas appeared for the petitioner and My. Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city of Manila, appeared for the city of Manila. Mr. Reyes called the attention of the court again to the fact that there existed certain errors in the measurement of some of the sides of the plan presented by the petitioner. In view of said fact (the existence of errors) the court ordered that said errors be corrected. So far as the record shows no correction whatever was made in the plan of said Parcel A. On the 21st day of July, 1906, the cause having been brought on for hearing, the honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, distated the following order or judgment in default against all persons: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION. No. 1895. Application of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian for registration of the real estate described herein, vs. The Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke: Macke & Chandler; F. M. Sousa; Ramon Geneto; Tomas Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo & Martinez; Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams & Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim Tinco; And Seng Queng; Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala de Roxas; Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa; Francisco Saez; Alfonso Tiaoqui; Gervasia Rosario Ventura; and Enrique Somes; and whomsoever it may concern, defendants. The present case having been duly tried, and Whereas, the clerk of this court caused to be published once only a notice in due from referring to the application mentioned, in two newspapers of general circulation, one printed in the English language and another in the Spanish language, to wit, The Manila Times of this city, and La Democracia of the same city; and 119 days have elapsed since publication of said notice was effected; Whereas, said clerk caused to be sent by registered mail, within seven days after the publication of the said notice, a copy thereof in the Spanish language to each one of the persons named in the application or who appeared to be concerned therein; Whereas, the sheriff of Manila posted in a conspicuous place on each of the parcels of land included in the application a certified copy of the notice in Spanish, and also in a conspicuous place in the principal municipal building of the city of Manila, before the fourteen days preceding that set for the termination of the period fixed; Whereas, all of the persons cited as defendants have failed to appear to impugn the application, within the period fixed by the law; This court orders a declaration of default against all the defendants and other persons who may be concerned in opposing the application, which is granted. Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of Land Registration, in Manila, this 21st day of July, 1906. Attest: A. K. JONES, Clerk of the Court. Later the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario dictated the following order, decreeing that said parcel of land, A, be registered as the absolute property of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas Y Chuidian. Said decree was as follows: Having tried case No. 1895, this court decrees that Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, of Manila, Philippine Islands, applicant, spinster, is the absolute owner of the real property, which is adjudicated to her, located in the city of Manila, the description whereof is hereinafter set forth: A parcel of land, situated at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo; bounded on the NE. by the property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; on the SE. by the Pasig River; on the SW. by the property of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez; and on the NW. by Calle Escolta. Beginning at a point marked A on the plan, which point is 27.75 m. S., 49º 40' W. from the extreme W. of the angle situated at the intersection S. of Calle Escolta and Passage de Perez; and from said point A., S., 46º 30' W., 31.08 m. to point B; thence S., 46º 15' E., 16.15 m. to point C; thence S., 42º E., 32.75 m. to point D; thence S., 40º 50' E., 13.20 m. to point E.; thence N., 49º 45' E., 14.25 m. to point F; thence N., 52º E., 10.94 m. to point G; thence N., 36º 20' W., 14.20 m. to point H; thence N., 38º 40' W., 17.16 m. to point I; thence N., 52º 35' E., 2.27 m. to point J; thence N., 38º 50' W., 4.12 m. to point K; thence N., 53º 30' E., 0.30 m. to point L; thence N., 40º 05' W., 14 m. to point M; thence N., 44º W., 15.35 m. to point of beginning; having an area of 1,817.03 square meters. All the points named are marked on the plan; the bearings are magnetic; date of survey, December 26, 1905. Wherefore this court orders that the said real property be registered in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name of the aforesaid Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, subject however to any of the encumbrances set forth in section 39 of said Act that may be in force and effect. Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of Land Registration, in Manila, this twenty-first day of July, nineteen hundred and six, at eight o'clock and ten minutes ante meridian. Attest: [SEAL.] (Sgd.) A. K. Jones, Clerk of the Court. A copy of this decree was sent to the register of deeds of Manila, September 25, 1906. On the 21st day of July, 1906, the court issued the certificate of title known as No. 742, and delivered to the petitioner the owner's duplicate, and the property became registered under the Torrens system, in the name of the petitioner. After the registration of said Parcel A in the name of the petitioner, on the 21st day of July, 1906, nothing further seems to have been done in the Court of Land Registration until on or about the 19th day of December, 1911, nearly five years and a half after said land had been registered, when we find that the assistant attorney of the city of Manila filed the following petition: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION. Case No. 1895. Roxas y Cuyugan, applicant. MOTION. The city of Manila, through its undersigned attorney, comes now into the court and respectfully represents; I. That the plan of the property with which the present case deals is affected by an error of closure greater than 1/1500; II. That the city of Manila is interested in the correction of said error as it has to expropriate a portion of said land for use as a public street; Therefore, the petitioner prays the court to order a new survey of said property described in the plan filed in this case. Manila, P. I., December 18, 1911. It is not clear whether said petition refers to the incorrections in the plan of Parcel A or to the incorrections in the plans of the other parcels of land (B, C, and D), which were included in the petition of the petitioner. On the 23d date of December, 1911, the honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land Registration, referred the petition of the city of Manila to the chief surveyor of the court. On the 27th day of December, 1911, the said surveyor reported to the court that there existed "errors of closure in said plans." On the 5th day of January, 1912, the judge of the Court of Land Registration ordered the chief surveyor to prepare new plans, in accordance with section 4 of Act No. 1875, and directed that notice be given to the adjoining owners. On the 28th day of February, 1912, the original petitioner, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition for the correction of the certificate issued to her on the 21st day of July, 1906, so as to include the buildings upon the lands included in her petition. Said petition was as follows: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION: Case No. 1895. Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, applicant. Comes now the applicant into the Honorable Court of Land Registration and represents: 1. That on January 10, 1906, Don Antonio Bonifas, in the name and representation of the applicant, sought the legalization of property title to four estates, among them the following: (a) A parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo. (b) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon located at Nos. 28 to 36 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo. (c) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at No. 149 Calle Nueva, corner of Callejon Carvajal, district of Binondo. 2. That the other estate mentioned in the said application refers to a parcel of land, with the buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 222 to 230 Calle Rosario, district of Binondo, which buildings were totally destroyed by the fire that occurred on the 2d of November of the year just past, and it cannot therefore be included in the purpose of the present application. 3. That in the said application it is stated that the land of the estate designated by the letter (a) was assessed at 65,072 dollars and 50 cents United States currency, and the buildings at 18,500 dollars United States currency; that the land of the estate designated by the letter (b) was assessed at 55,020 dollars and 50 cents, United States currency, and the buildings at 15,000 dollars, United States currency; and the land of the estate designated by the letter (c) was assessed at 5,658 dollars Unites States currency, and the buildings at 5,000 dollars United States currency. 4. That both in the property titles to the said estates and in the plans and technical descriptions thereof which accompany said application and are annexed to the above-entitled case, it appears that on the parcels of land which form part of the estates under consideration there are erected buildings, consisting of two houses of strong materials, one behind the other, in the estate designated by the letter (a); a house of stone and masonry in that designated by the letter (b); and another house of stone and masonry in that designated by the letter (c). 5. That in the record of the register of deeds, in the registration entries referring to the said estates, it appears that they consist of the parcels of land and the buildings stated. 6. That in the notice to the Attorney-General, the Municipal Board, the tenants, and owners conterminous with the estates referred to therein, the buildings erected on them are likewise mentioned. 7. That by decree of June 21, 1906, adjudication and registration of the estates were ordered in applicant's favor in the terms set forth in the application; but in the certificate of the decree or resolution under consideration, issued by the clerk of the court, the description of the parcel of land corresponding to each estate was given, but the respective building on each was omitted, and in this form were issued the certificates of title, Nos. 472, 764, and 743, which accompany this application. 8. That on January 12, September 21, October 9 and 22, 1906, the legal representative of the applicant guaranteed by deposit, as assurance fund, the rights of issuance of title and one-tenth of 1 per cent of the assessed valuation, the sum of P943.70 Philippine currency, the receipts and vouchers wherefore do not accompany this application because the applicant destroyed them in the belief that there was no need to exhibit them, but averring that the amounts paid for those purposes are credited in the accounting division of the Court of Land Registration and the office of the register of deeds, as has been ascertained by a person delegated therefor by the applicant. 9. That when applicant attempted to alienate one of the estates mentioned she observed the omission in the corresponding certificate of title of the building existing thereon, the same as in the certificates of title corresponding to the other two estates; and as it is to be supposed that said omission is due solely to a simple clerical error, which nevertheless greatly affects the applicant's right, she appeals to your honorable court with the request that you order the correction of said omission, especially as there at present exist on the said parcels of land, without modification or alteration, the same buildings that existed when legalization of title thereto was applied for and which appear in the titles of acquisition annexed to the above-entitled case, reference whereto has been made in the third paragraph. 10. That for greater assurance and for the purpose of proving that the said estates consist not only in the parcel of land or lot but also in the building erected on each, the applicant attaches hereto the assessment or property-tax receipts for each of the said estates, wherein are stated the two points mentioned. 11. That in view of what has been set forth and explained, the applicant prays the honorable court to decree, after the necessary legal proceedings, correction of the omission referred to by ordering the free issuance of a new certificate of title to each of the said estates, wherein record be made of the building erected on each, consisting of those enumerated in the third paragraph of this application. Manila, February 28, 1912. MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN. On the 9th of April, 1912, the Masonic Temple Association of Manila sent a communication to Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land Registration, accompanied by a contract, showing that on the 20th day of March, 1912, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian had sold all her rights, title, and interest in said Parcel A, including the buildings thereon, to the said Masonic Temple Association of Manila. Said Masonic Temple Association of Manila requested the judge of the Land Court to attach said contract to the record in the case and issue a new certificate to it. On the 19th day of April, 1912, a new plan of said Parcel A, prepared by Mr. B. W. Hay, surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, was presented, in accordance with the order of the court of the 23d of December, 1911. Said new plan was made for the purpose of correcting the errors in closure in the original plan presented by the petitioner on the 10th day of January, 1906. Said new plan is as follows (see page 48): After the presentation of said new or corrected plan, the motions: (a) That of the city of Manila to have corrected the error of closure in the original plan; (b) That of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, to have included in her certificate of title the buildings located upon the lands registered in accordance with her original petition; and (c) That of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, to have a certificate issued to it in accordance with its contract of purchase of said lands from Maria del Consuelo {bmc 029048.bmp} Felisa Roxas y Chuidian — after notice had been given to all the interested parties, were set down for hearing. For one reason or another, the hearings on said motion were transferred from one date to another from the 22d of April, 1912, until the 24th of August, 1912. During said various hearings, in addition to the appointment of a commission to view the premises, certain proof was taken upon the question of the correctness of the original plan presented by the petitioner, in January, 1906. During said hearings the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez appeared and apparently made some objection to the granting of said motions. They presented no written statement in which their specific objections appear. The nearest approach to a definite and specific statement of their objections appears in the argument of their counsel at the close of said several hearings, in which it appears that their objections to the correction of the original plan and certificate and the issuance of a new certificate to the Masonic Temple Association of Manila was based upon the ground that they claimed easements or servitudes in the land in the question. After hearing all of the parties, the Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land Registration, and his associates, the Honorable James A. Ostrand and the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, auxiliary judges of said court, sitting in banc, on the 24th day of August, 1912, by a unanimous decision, granted the motions of the city of Manila, of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, and of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila. On the 10th day of September, 1912, the attorneys for the objectors presented a motion for new trial, basing it upon the ground that the conclusions of the lower court were manifestly contrary to the proof. After a due consideration of said motion for a new trial and after hearing the respective parties, the Court of Land Registration, sitting in banc, composed of Charles H. Smith, James A. Ostrand, and Norberto Romualdez, denied said motion, and the case was appealed to this court. In this court the respondents presented the following assignments of error: 1. That the court below erred in holding that the proceedings of the Court of Land Registration were valid in entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff and appellee, confirming the title to lot 4, which is in controversy in this suit. 2. That the judgment of the lower court is contrary to law. 3. That the judgment of the court below is against the manifest weight of the evidence. After a careful examination of the argument of the appellants in support of each of said assignments of error, we are of the opinion that they may be discussed together. In the argument of the appellants in support of their assignments of error, there is but little argument against the decision of the court rendered on the 24th of August, 1912. Practically the whole argument of the appellants is based upon the ground that the original certificate (No. 742, issued July 21, 1906) is absolutely void, for the reason that "the appellants had no notice of the pendency of the original action to confirm the title of said property." Appellants now admit that a notice of the pendency of the original action was sent to attorneys Hartigan, Rohde & (Marple?) Gutierrez. Appellants now allege that it affirmatively appears that neither this firm nor any of its members represented the defendants and appellants in that action. The record shows, as we have pointed out above, that the original petition showed that Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez were the representatives of the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez, and that notice was duly sent to them. We have searched the record now in vain to find the slightest denial of the fact that they were the representatives of said heirs, even though one of said attorneys represented them, or at least some of them, in the present proceedings. So far as the record shows there is not even a suggestion found in the various hearings and proceedings taken and had under the above motions, that said attorneys were not the representation of the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez at the time of the original proceedings. Neither does the record show any attempt on their part to deny the fact that they received the notices given in the original action. The appellants assert in their argument that "personal notice was absolutely necessary in order to justify the court below in rendering a decree in favor of the plaintiff and appellee, in the first instance" (the original proceeding). The appellants, by that argument, attempt to show, not that the judgment of the 24th of August, 1912, was invalid, but that the original certificate (No. 742) was void, because they had not been served with personal notice. This brings us to the question whether or not personal notice to all of the persons interested in an action for the registration of real property under the Torrens system, is an absolute prerequisite to the validity of said registration. It will be remembered that we noted above that personal notice of the pendency of the original petition had been given and that a publication of the same had been made in accordance with the provisions of sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496. After the expiration of the period during which notice must be given, the original cause was set down for hearing. The record also shows that the clerk of the Land Court made a certificate showing that that notice had been issued and published in accordance with the law. Section 32 provides, in part, that said "certificate of the clerk that he had served the notice as directed by the court, by publishing or mailing, shall be filed in the case before the return day, and shall be conclusive proof of such service." On the day set for the hearing of said original petition, no one appeared to oppose the granting of the prayer which it contained. Section 35 of Act No. 496 provides: "If no person appears and answer within the time allowed, the court may at once, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded and the application ( petition) be taken for confessed. By the description in the notice. "To all whom it may concern," all the world are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default and order. The court shall not be bound by the report of the examiner of titles, but may require other and further proof." The provisions of section 35 seem to be directly contrary to the contention of the appellants. It seems to directly contradict the requirements of personal notice as an absolute prerequisite to the granting of a valid title under the Torrens system. The same idea is further confirmed by the provisions of section 38 of said Act No. 496. Said section 38 provides that: "Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quite the title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or citations, or included in the general description 'To all whom it may concern.'" There is a further and very strong intimation in the law that personal notice is not absolutely a prerequisite to the validity of title under the Torrens system. Section 32 (Act No. 496) provides that: "The court shall, so far as it deems it possible, require proof of actual notice to all the adjoining owners and to all persons who appear to have an interest in or claim to the land included in the application." It will be noted also that the petitioner in registration cases is not by law required to give any notice to any person. The law requires the clerk of the court to give the notices. (Sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496.) It is true that "the court may also cause other or further notice of the application to be given in such a manner and to such persons as it may deem proper." Thus it is seen that the applicant is by express provision of law relieved from any obligation whatsoever to give motive to any person of the pendency of his application to have his land registered under the Torrens system. That being true, upon what theory may the applicant be subjected to harassment or delay or additional expense, because some person claims that he did not receive actual personal notice? Section 101 and 102 (Act No. 496) seem to contain a remedy for persons who have suffered damages for the failure on the part of court officials to comply with the law. (Noble State Bank vs. Haskell, 219 U. S., 104.) His remedy is not to have the registration and certificate annulled, unless he comes within the provisions of section 38, and even then he is without a remedy against the applicant unless he can show, within a period of one year after the decree of registration and the granting of the certificate, at he has been "deprived of land or any estate or interest therein," by fraud, and not even then, if an "innocent purchaser for the value has acquired and interest." In the present case five years and a half had transpired and negotiations for the sale of the land to an innocent purchaser had been terminated. There is not intimation that the petitioner is guilty of fraud, in the slightes degree. While the Torrens Land Law is a law of modern times, is has been adopted in many States and its provisions have been attacked at almost every point. The requirements relating to notices has been a fruitful source of litigation. The constitutionality of the law has been attacked many times, because of the provision of said law relating to notices. This is not the first time that the question has been presented to this court. The same question was presented to this court in the case of Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz (17 Phil. Rep., 49). In that case the registered title was attacked upon the ground that fraud existed, simply because personal notice had not been given. The existence of fraud was predicated upon the failure of actual personal notice. In passing upon that question, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Trent, said (quoting from the syllabus): In original proceedings for the registration of land under Act No. 496, the appellee herein was made a party- defendant by publication, but was not personally served with notice: Held, That the decree of the Court of Land Registration is conclusive against his as well as all the world. The proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No. 496, are in rem and not in personam. A proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the state or notice by name to those outside of it. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. Such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.) In the present case there is not the slightest intimation that the original applicant (Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidan) was guilty of fraud. The record shows that she named all the persons who might have an interest in the registration of her land, in her petition. The applicant is not charged even with negligence. The record shows that she did all the law required her to do. In discussing the Torrens Land Law we must keep in mind that its primary purpose is the registration of the title which the applicant or petitioner has and to relieve his land of unknown liens or claims, just or unjust, against it. The Torrens system of land registration is a system for the registration of title to land only, and not a system established for the acquisition of land. It is not intended that lands may be acquired by said system of registration. It is intended only that the title, which the petitioner has, shall be registered and thereby cleared of all liens and burdens of whatsoever character, except those which shall be noted in the order of registration and in the certificate issued. If there exists known and just claims against the title of the applicant, he gains nothing in effect by his registration, except in the simplicity of subsequent transfer of his title. The registration either relieves the land of all known as well as unknown claims, absolutely, or it compels the claimants to come into court and to make there a record, so that thereafter there may be no uncertainly concerning either the character or the extent of such claims. The requirement that personal notice shall be a prerequisite to the validity of registration would absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of unknown claims, for the reason that personal notice could never be given to "unknown claimants." The great difficulty in land titles arises from the existence of possible unknown claimants. Known claimants can be dealt with. They furnish no valid impediment, in fact, to the transfer of titles. Courts have held that in actions in rem personal notice to owners of a res is not necessary to give the courts jurisdiction to deal with and to dispose of the res. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. Rep., 49; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; American Land Company vs. Zeis, 219 U.S., 47.) This rule was first established in admiralty proceedings. It was established out of the very necessities of the case. The owner of a ship, for instance, lived in London. His ship was found in the most distant ports of the earth. Its operation necessarily required supplies, such as men, coal, and food. The very nature of its business necessitated the making of contracts. The continuance of its voyage depended upon its capacity to make contracts and to get credit. It might also, perchance, cause damage to other craft, in like conditions. To be able to secure all such necessities, to satisfy all possible obligations, to continue its voyage and its business on the high seas, merchants and courts came to regard the "ship" as a person, with whom or with which they were dealing, and not its real owner. Consequently there came into existence this action in rem. For the purpose of carrying into effect the broader purposes of the Torrens land law, it has been universally considered that the action should be considered as one in rem. Mr. Justice Holmes, then of the Supreme Court of the State of Massachusetts, and now a member of the Supreme Court of the United State, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71), in discussing this question, said: Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice, a proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not encounter any provision of either constitution (of the State of Massachusetts or the United States). Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it hardly would dot to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S., 714, 727; The Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144.) There are many classes of cases where men may be deprived of their property and of their rights, without personal notice of the proceedings in which that may occur. For instance, in attachment cases, notice or service upon the defendant may be had by publication. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S., 714, 727.) So also in divorce proceedings, as well as the rights of claimants against estates of deceased persons, personal notice is not a prerequisite. Notice by publication may be had. Also unknown claimants or owners may be brought into court without personal notice in an action for the condemnation of private property for public use. There exists a multitude of cases in which personal service is not necessary and service by publication is sufficient. The law, even before the Torrens Law, provided means by which title to land might be quited "by notice by publication to all persons." (Hamilton vs. Brown, 101 U.S., 256, 274; Huling vs. Kaw Valley, etc., Co., 130 U.S., 559, 564; Parker vs. Overman, 18 Howard (N.Y.) 137; American Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316; Perkins vs. Wakeman, 86 Cal., 580.) Even before the Torrens Law was adopted, the states had the power and right to provide a procedure for the adjudication of title to real estate. The state had control over real property within its limits. The conditions of ownership of real estate in a state, whether the owner be a stranger or a citizen, are subject to its rules, concerning the holding, transfer, liability to obligations, private or public, and the models of establishing title thereto; and for the purpose of determining these question, it (the state) may provide any reasonable rules or procedure. (Clark vs. Smith, 13 Peters, 195; Barker vs. Harvey, 181 U.S., 481; Mitchell vs. Furman, 180 U.S., 402; Botiller vs. Domingues, 130 U.S., 238; Moore vs. Steinbach, 127 U.S., 70; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316; American Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.) The state possesses not only the power to determine how title to real estate may be acquired and proved, but it is also within its legislative competency to establish the method of procedure. (American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Bertrand vs. Taylor, 87 Ill., 235; Title, Document, etc., Company vs. Kerrigan, 150 Cal., 208, 305; Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580.) The estate, as sovereign over the lands situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem, or in the nature of a proceeding in rem, which shall be binding upon all persons known and unknown. (State vs. McGlynn, 20 Cal., 233; 81 Am. Dec., 118; Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580; 21 Am.t. Rep., 67; McLaughlin vs. McCrory, 55 Ark., 442; 29 Am. St. Rep., 56; People's National Bank vs. Cleveland, 117 Ga., 908; People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; 68 Am. St. Rep., 175; Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep., 662; Ruppin vs. McLaughlin, 122 Iowa, 343; Young vs. Upshur, 42 La. An., 362; 21 Am. St. Rep., 381; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; 51 L.R.A., 571; 57 L.R.A., 297; Rohrer vs. Ader, 124 Mo., 24; Sandiford vs. Town of Hempstead, 90 N.Y. Supp., 76, 79, 97; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316.) If the state can provide for substituted service for the purpose of quieting title to real estate against an unknown resident, it may provide a reasonable method for securing substituted services against residents. The power of the state to provide methods of quieting title should not be limited to known persons. In order to make such a law valuable and effective to its fullest extent, it is necessary that it be made to operate on all interest and persons known or unknown. Mr. Justice Holmes, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71) in discussing this question, said: "If it (the procedure) does not satisfy the Constitution, a judicial proceeding to clear titles against all the world hardly is possible, for the very meaning of such a proceeding is to get rid of unknown as well as known claims — indeed certainly against the unknown may be said to be its chief end — and unknown claims cannot be dealt with by personal service upon the claimant." Mr. Chief Justice White of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss (219 U. S., 47) said: "To argue that the provisions of the statute are repugnant to the due process clause (of the Constitution) because a case may be conceived where rights in and to property would be adversely affected without notice being actually conveyed by the proceedings is in effect to deny the power of the state to deal with the subject. The criterion is not the possibility of conceivable injury, but the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having reference to the subject with which the statute deals." The court of appeals of the State of New York, in the case of In re Empire City Bank (18 N.Y., 199, 215) in speaking of the right of the state to prescribe in suitable cases for substituted service, said: "Various prudential regulations are made with respect to these remedies by it may possibly happen, notwithstanding all these precautions, that a citizen who owes nothing, and has done none of the acts mentioned in the statutes, may be deprived of his estate without any actual knowledge of the process by which it has been taken from him. If we hold, as we must, in order to sustain this legislation, that the Constitution does not positively require personal notice in order to constitute a legal proceedings due process of law, it then belongs to the legislature to determine in the particular instance whether the case calls for this kind of exceptional legislation, and what manner of constructive notice shall be sufficient to reasonably apprise the party proceeded against of the Legal steps which are taken against him. (American Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Title, Document, etc., Company vs. Kerrigan, 150 Cal., 289.)" The only case cited by the appellants in support of their argument, is the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss (219 U.S., 47). In view of the facts and the decisions of the different courts which are cited in that case, it is difficult to understand how it is authority in support of the contention of the appellants here. The facts in that case are as follows: Zeiss, on the 22d of August, 1906, commenced an action in the superior court of the country San Francisco, alleging in substance that on the 18th and 19th days of April, 1906, a material part of the public records contained in the office of the county recorder of the city and county of San Francisco was destroyed by fire; that on the 18th day of April, 1906, and at the time of the filing of the complaint, he was the owner and in the actual and peaceable possession of the parcels of land in controversy: that his estate, title, interest in and to said parcels of land, and each of them, was that of owner in fee simple, absolute, free from all encumbrances, liens, defect, claims or demands of any kind or nature whatsoever. Under these facts the plaintiff, Zeiss, prayed that the be adjudged to be the owner of and entitled to the possession of said parcels of land, and each of them, was that of owner in fee simple, absolute, free from all encumbrance, liens, defects, claims or demands of any kind or nature whatsoever. Under these facts the plaintiff, Zeiss, prated that he be adjudged to be the owner of and entitled to the possession of said described parcels of land in fee simple, and that no one else had any estate, rights, title, interest or claim in or to the same, or any part thereof, either legal or equitable, present or future, vested or contingent. Upon the presentation of the petition by Zeisss, a summons was issued and notice of the pendency of the action was published in certain newspaper, as was required by law. Notice was also posted upon the property, as required by the statute. No one having appeared and opposed the granting of the petition of the complaint, or claimed any interest in or lien upon the property described in the complaint, a default was ordered against all persons, and on the 19th days of December, 1906, a decree was entered in favor of Zeiss, adjudging that he was the owner in fee simple, absolute, and entitled to the possession of the land described in the complaint and that no other person had any right title, interest, or estate in and to the same, or any part thereof, either legal or equitable, present or future, vested or contingent. Nothing else seems to have transpired after said decree was issued in favor of Zeiss, until the 26th day of May, 1908, or one year and five months after the entry of the decree of the superior court, in the city and county of San Francisco. On that date (the 26th of May, 1908) an action was brought in the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of California, in which the plaintiffs claimed title to the parcels of land, as owners in fee simple, absolute, which had theretofore been decreed to Zeiss. The plaintiff alleged that the decree issued by the superior court of the city and county of San Francisco was void and of no force and effect and was made and maintained without due process of law, and that said superior court, in said action and proceedings never had any jurisdiction over the persons holding the title during such proceedings, and that said court did not have or obtain jurisdiction to divest the right, title, interest or estate of plaintiff . The complaint alleged that "Zeiss had no right whatever in said parcels of land, other than his rights of possession and occupation." The bill further alleged that the plaintiffs had been at all times citizens and residents of California, not seeking to evade, but ready to accept service of summons and easily reached for that purpose; that, notwithstanding that fact, no service was made upon them nor did they in any way receive notice of the pendency of the action (Zeiss vs. All persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property herein described); nor did they gain any knowledge of existence of the decree until more than a year after its entry. To the complaint the defendant, Zeiss, demurred. Upon the issue thus presented, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth District certified the question involved to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court of the United States, after a careful analysis of the facts and of the law, in a very lengthy and instructive opinion (219 U. S., 47), decided each of the question submitted by the Circuit Court of Appeals against the contention of the plaintiff and returned the cause to the court below. The original action by Zeiss was brought to quiet the title to two parcels of land for the purpose of registrating his title to the same under an act of the legislature of the State of California, entitled "An act to provide for the establishment and quieting of title to real property in case of loss or destruction of public records." Said law is known as the McEnerney Law. It was intended by said act to provide a method whereby owners in possession of real estate, where records had been destroyed to such an extent as to make it impossible to trace a record title, might secure a degree in the court which would furnish public, authenticated evidence of title. The special occasion for the law was the fact that practically all of the public records of title in several counties in the State of California had recently theretofore been destroyed as the result of an earthquake and fire. Said law provided that whenever the public records in the office of the county recorded had been, or shall hereafter be lost or destroyed, in whole or in any material part, by flood, fire, or earthquake, any person who claims an estate of inheritance or have title in, and who had by himself or his tenants, or other persons holding under him, in actual and peaceable possession any real property in said county, may bring and maintain an action in rem, against all the world, in the superior court for the county in which said real property is situate, to establish his title, and to determine all adverse claims thereto. The law further provides that an action shall be commenced by the filing of a verified complaint, in which he shall name the defendants as "all persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property herein described, or any part thereof." He was required to give in his complaint a particular description of the property. The law provided that upon the filing of the complaint, a summons or notice was required to be issued, containing the names of the court and the country in which the action was brought, the name of the plaintiff, and a particular description of the property involved, which notice was directed to "all persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property herein described, or any part thereof," as defendants. The law further provided that said summons or notice should be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the action was brought, at least once a week for a period of two months. The law further provided that personal notice should be given to any person claiming an interest in the property or a lien thereon adverse to the plaintiff. The said law further provided that upon the publication and posting of the summons and its service upon and mailing to the person, if any, upon whom it is herein directed to be specially served, the court shall have full and complete jurisdiction over the plaintiff and said property and of the person and every one claiming any estate, right, title, or interest in or to or lien upon said property, or any part thereof, and shall be deemed to have obtained the possession and control of said property, for the purpose of the action, and shall have full and complete jurisdiction to render judgment therein, which is provided for in the law. In the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss, cited and relied upon by the appellants, the validity of said law was attacked and the legality of the title granted to Zeiss was impugned for the reason that the law was unconstitutional and void, and because the plaintiff had not received actual notice of the application to Zeiss to have his title quieted, under said law. The Supreme Court of the United States (219 U.S., 47) held, as has been above indicated, that the law was constitutional and that a compliance with the requirements of the notice provided for in said law was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction over the res and to enter a valid decree. There seems to be but little in the decision in the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss to support the contention of the appellants. Considering that the Legislature of the Philippine Islands had full power to adopt the procedure provided for in Act No. 496, for the registration of the title of lands; and Considering that the court in the original action followed strictly the procedure adopted by said law; and Considering that there is no claim of fraud, actual or constructive, upon the part of any of the parties connected with said action, we are forced to the conclusion that the appellants here are not now entitled to have that judgment or decree of registration and certificate amended or set aside. There remains another question, however, which the appellants have not discussed and which we deem of importance. It is the question of the right of the Land Court to correct an error of closure in a plan or of a statement contained in a certificate. A plan is prepared and is presented with the petition for the registration of a parcel of land. No opponents appear. No opposition is presented to the registration. All the steps in the procedure required by law have been taken. The land is registered. It is then discovered for the first time that by reason of a wrong direction given to one of the lines in the plan, said plan will not close — that if a wall were built upon the lines of the plan, one of the four corners of the wall would not meter. We believe that an error of the character may be corrected by the court, provided that such correction does not include land not included in the original petition. Upon the question whether the amended plan (p.252, record) included more or different lands than were included in the original petition, we find the following statements made by one of the judges who ordered said plan amended. The statements is: At this stage of the proceedings and on his particular point nothing further is incumbent upon the court than to determine the property as it was adjudicated in this case. Therein no new portion was either added or subtracted, and this court finds that such should be the holding on this particular point. We have a further statement made by one of the judges, the Honorable Charles H. Smith, relating to the same question, in an answer presented by him to a petition for a writ of prohibition, presented by some the appellants herein, to the Supreme Court. That petition for a writ of prohibition involved practically the same question presented by the appellants here now. Upon the question whether or not additional lands had been included in the new plan (p.252, record), Judge Smith, in answering for himself and his associates (Ostrand and Romualdez) said: Respondents deny that a new dividing line between the premises in question (premises of the plaintiff and appellant) was determined and established by an order of the court issued at the conclusion of said proceedings, but, on the contrary, respondents charge the truth to be that the dividing line between said properties was not changed but simply approved and so indicated upon the record title. For instance, the line between said properties beginning on the south side of the Escolta is exactly at the same point indicated in the original description and approved by the court; in other words, the premises in question of the said Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian have not been enlarged; the boundary lines thereof have not been changed; the real descriptions of the properties have been left undisturbed; the adjoining land owned by the petitioners is undiminished, except possibly as to alleged easements claimed to have been created by the projection of some of the roots of the petitioners' building over the aforesaid registered property of the said Roxas. That matter is settled clearly by the provisions of the last paragraph of section 39 of Act No. 496." We called attention above to the fact that the petitioner alleged that the line A-B of her property ran S., 44º 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters, while the plan accompanying said petition (see Exhibit A, page 35, ante) made said line to run S., 46º 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters An examination of the certificate issued to the petitioner (see page 39, ante) also states that the line A-B runs S., 46 30' W., for a distance of 31.08 meters. The record contains no application why the original plan (see Exhibit A, page 35, ante) did not conform to the description of the land given in the petition. That error, in our judgment, seems to have constituted the real difficulty with the closure of the plan. Under said conditions we are of the opinion that the Land Court is entirely justified in ordering the plan corrected for the purposes above indicated. There is still another question involved in the case, which the appellants have not discussed, and that is the right of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian to have her original certificate of registration corrected, for the purpose of showing that she was the owner of the buildings located upon the parcel of land in question. It will be remembered that in her petition presented January 12, 1906, she alleged that she was the owner of the parcel of land in question, together with the buildings thereon. No opposition was presented. No objection was made to the registration of the land as described in her petition. The record shows no reason why the buildings should have been omitted in the certificate of registration. The omission must have been an errors. on the part of the clerk. We find that Act No. 496 contains an express provision for the correction of such errors. Section 112 provides that the registered owner may, at any time, apply by petition to have corrected any "error, omission, or mistake made in entering a certificate, or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate." We think the petition presented by Miss Roxas for the correction of such original certificate was entirely within her right under the law. It might be claimed, and we believe that the proposition is sustained by law, that the registration of a parcel of land, unless the record contains something to the contrary, necessarily includes the buildings and edifices located thereon, even though they are not mentioned. Without relying upon that proposition of law, however, and in view of the petition of the plaintiff, it is hereby ordered that the original certificate be amended so as to include not only the land described in the original petition, but the buildings located thereon as well. With reference to the petition of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, the record contains no sufficient reasons for not granting the same. Therefore, and in view of all of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the court below should be and it is hereby affirmed, with costs. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915 CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee. Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants. D.R. Williams for appellee. JOHNSON, J.: From the record the following facts appear: First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila. Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs. Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall. Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall. Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant. Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall. Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it? The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.) While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law. For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons. The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration. The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237). Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that way. We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail. In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application. Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts". As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him. We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate. We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections. May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]). When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.) Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation. While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record. In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence. The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land. It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected. In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued. Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-13479 October 31, 1959 MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET AL, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, ET AL., defendants-appellees. Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for appellee UP. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: This is an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land located in Quezon City containing an area of about 430 hectares. On October 11, 1957, plaintiffs filed an action before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City alleging that for many years prior to March 25, 1877 and up to the present they and their ancestors have been in actual, adverse, open, public, exclusive and continuous possession as owners of the land in litigation; that they have been cultivating the land and enjoying its fruits exclusively; that from time immemorial up to the year 1955, they have been paying the land taxes thereon; that in 1955 defendant People's Homesite & Housing Corporation began asserting title thereto claiming that its Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 embraces practically all of plaintiff's property, while the other defendant University of the Philippines began also asserting title thereto claiming that its Transfer of Certificate of Title No. 9462 covers the remaining portion; that defendants are not innocent purchasers for value, having had full notice of plaintiff's actual possession and claim for ownership thereof; and that the inclusion of plaintiff's property within the technical boundaries set out in defendants' titles was a clear mistake and that at no time had defendants' predecessors in-interest exercised dominical rights over plaintiff's property. On October 31, 1957, defendant University of the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the complaint states no cause of action; that it is barred by the statute of limitations; that the court has no jurisdiction over the case; and that in the event the motion is not granted, defendant is separated from the case and be impleaded in a separate action. To this motion plaintiffs filed a reply alleging that the complaint on its faces alleges a valid and sufficient cause of action upon which the court could render a valid judgment. Defendant People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, on the other hand, filed a motion for bill of particulars to which plaintiffs filed also a reply. On November 20, 1957, Leonila G. de Perucho and Jose Peñaranda filed a motion for intervention which was likewise opposed by plaintiffs. On December 11, 1957, the trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action and that it is already barred by the statute of limitations, leaving unresolved the other points raised in the pleadings for being unnecessary. From this order plaintiffs took the present appeal. Appellants contend that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of sufficient cause of action for the reason that on its face said complaint alleges sufficient facts on which a valid judgment could be rendered against defendants. Thus, it is claimed that the complaint alleges the following facts: that plaintiffs are the sole heirs of Eladio Tiburcio who died intestate in 1910; that upon his death Eladio Tiburcio left to plaintiffs as his sole heirs a tract of land located in Quezon City; that said plaintiffs have always been actual, open, notorious and exclusive possession of the land as owners pro indiviso; that sometime in 1955 defendants began asserting title to the land claiming that the same is embraced and covered by their respective certificates of title; that defendants acquired their respective titles with full notice of the actual possession and claim of ownership of plaintiffs, and as such they cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value. It appears, however, that the land in question has been placed under the operation of the Torrens system since 1914 when it has been originally registered in the name of defendant's predecessor-in-interest. It further appears that sometime in 1955 defendant People's Homesite & Housing Corporation acquired from the original owner a parcel of land embracing practically all of plaintiff's property for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 was issued in its favor, while defendant University of the Philippines likewise acquired from the same owner another portion of the land which embraces the remainder of the property for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 was issued in its favor. It is therefore, clear that the land in question has been registers in the name of defendant's predecessor-in-inters since 1914 under the Torren's system and that notwithstanding what they now claim that the original title lacked the essential requirements prescribed by law for their validity, they have never taken any step to nullify said title until 1957 when they instituted the present action. In other words, they allowed a period of 43 years before they woke up to invoke what they now claim to be erroneous when the court decreed in 1914 the registration of the land in the name of defendant's predecessor-in-interest. Evidently, this cannot be done for under our law and jurisprudence, a decree of registration can only be set aside within one year after entry on the ground of fraud provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired the property (Section 38, Act No. 496; Apurado vs. Apurado, 26 Phil., 581; Salmon vs. Bacando, 40 Off. Gaz., 13th Supp. 1607; Rivera vs. Moran, 48 Phil., 836). On the other hand, our law is clear that upon the expiration of the one-year period within to review the decree of registration, the decree as well as the title issued in pursuance thereof becomes incontrovertible (Section 38 Act No. 496). The purpose of the law in limiting to one year the period within which the decree may be reviewed is to put a limit to the time within which a claimant may ask for its revocation. If after title to property is decreed an action may be instituted beyond the one-year period to set aside the decree, the object of the Torrens system which is to guarantee the indefeasibility of the Title would be defeated (Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds, 40 Phil., 520). Plaintiffs likewise contend that since the complaint alleges that defendants acquired their respective titles with full notice of the actual possession and claim of ownership of plaintiffs with respect to the land in question, it is error to dismiss the complaint for such averment is sufficient to establish a cause of action against defendants. This contention overlooks the fact that the land in question is covered by Torrens title. Thus, it appears that defendant People's Homesite & Housing Corporation bought the portion of the property in question from its predecessor-in-interest sometime in 1955 for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 was issued in its favor. There is nothing in the complaint to show that when it acquired the property said defendant knew of any defect in the title appearing on its face in the form of any lien or encumbrance. The same thing is true with regard to defendant University of the Philippines. It likewise acquired the portion of the property on question sometime in 1955 from its predecessor-in-interest for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 was issued in its favor. There is also nothing in the complaint to show that when it acquired the property it knew of any defect in the title appealing on its face in the form of any lien or incumbrace. Said defendants are therefore, presumed to be purchasers for value and in good faith and as such are entitled to protection under the law. The foregoing finds support in the following well-settled principle: "A person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens System." (William H. Anderson vs. Garcia, 64 Phil., 306; Castillo vs. Sian, 105 Phil., 622; Paraiso vs. Camon, supra, p. 187, 1959). Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs' action for reconveyance had not yet prescribed as contended, their right however to bring the instant action may be considered barred by laches for not having taken the action seasonably after title to the property had been issued under the Torrens system. It appears that the property in question was originally registered on May 3, 1914 and it was only on October 11, 1957 that appellants asserted their claim thereto when they brought the present action. In the recent case of Domingo vs. Mayon Realty Corporation, 102 Phil., 32; 54 Off. Gaz., 4954), September 30, 1957 this Court said: "Like Ciriaco Allingag in the previous case, appellants herein could have raised the issue of the validity of the certificate of title issued to Valle Cruz since 1928, when the foreclosure sale in her favor was confirmed. They failed to do so until 18 years afterwards, and their action (if any) now should be held by their own laches and negligence." Appellants finally claim that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata by taking judicial notice of its own records in Land Registration Case No. L-3 invoking in support of their contention the principle that a court cannot take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other case even when such case had been tried by the same court and notwithstanding the facts that both cases may have been tried before the same judge. While the principle invoked is considered to be the general rule, the same is not absolute. There are exceptions to this rule. Thus, as noted by former Chief Justice Moran: In some instance, courts have taken judicial notice of proceedings in other causes, because of their close connection with the matter in the controversy. Thus, in a separate civil action against the administrator of an estate arising from an appeal against the report of the committee on claims appointed in the administration proceedings of the said estate, to determine whether or not the appeal was taken on time, the court took judicial notice of the record of the administration proceedings. Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration. Moreover, appellants' objection to the action of the trial court on this matter is merely technical because they do not dispute the fact that appellant Marcelino Tiburcio, who instituted the present case, is the same person who filed the application in Land Registration Case No. L-3 for the registration of the same parcel of land which application was denied by the court. It appears that in the registration case the oppositors were the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, Tuason and Co., and the Bureau of Lands. Although the University of the Philippines was not an oppositor in that case, in effect it was represented by its predecessor-in-interest, Tuason and Co. from which it acquired the property. It may therefore be said that in the two case there is not only identity of subject matter but identity of parties and causes of action. Indeed, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata. Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants. Paras. C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 114299 September 24, 1999 TRADERS ROYAL BANK, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PATRIA, RUBY ANN, MARGARITA, ROSARIO, CYNTHIA, LINDA JOY, all surnamed CAPAY and RAMON A. GONZALES, respondents. G.R. No. 118862 September 24, 1999 PATRIA, RUBY ANN, MARGARITA, ROSARIO, CYNTHIA, LINDA JOY, all surnamed CAPAY, and RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioners, vs. SPS. HONORATO D. SANTOS and MARIA CRISTINA S. SANTOS, SPS. CECILIO L. PE and JOSEFINA L. PE, FLORA LARON WESCOMBE, SPS. TELESFORO P. ALFELOR II and LIZA R. ALFELOR, SPS. DEAN RODERICK FERNANDO and LAARNI MAGDAMO FERNANDO, REMEDIOS OCA, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and TRADERS ROYAL BANK, respondents. KAPUNAN, J.: The present controversy has its roots in a mortgage executed by the spouses Maximo and Patria Capay in favor of Traders Royal Bank (TRB) pursuant to a loan extended by the latter to the former. The mortgage covered several properties, including a parcel of land, the subject of the present dispute. 1 The loan became due on January 8, 1964 and the same having remained unpaid, TRB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings upon the mortgaged property.1âwphi1.nêt To prevent the property's sale by public auction, the Capays, on September 22, 1966, filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. Q-10453) before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging that the mortgage was void since they did not receive the proceeds of the loan. The trial court initially granted the Capays' prayer for preliminary injunction. On March 17, 1967, the Capays caused to be filed in the Register of Deeds of Baguio City a notice of lis pendens over the disputed property. Said notice was entered in the Day Book, as well as in the Capays' certificate of title. Subsequently, the injunction issued by the trial court was lifted thus allowing the foreclosure sale to proceed. Foreclosure proceedings were initiated and on October 17, 1968, the property was sold to TRB which was the highest bidder at the auction sale. A sheriff certificate of sale was issued in its name on the same day. On February 25, 1970, the property was consolidated in the name of TRB, the sole bidder in the sale. TCT No. T-6595 in the name of the Capay spouses was then cancelled and a new one, TCT No. T-16272, 2 was entered in the bank's name. The notice of lis pendens, however, was not carried over in the certificate of title issued in the name TRB. Thereafter, the Capays filed with the CFI a supplemental complaint praying for the recovery of the property with damages and attorney's fees. Trial in Civil Case No. Q-10453 proceeded and, on October 3, 1977, the CFI rendered its decision declaring the mortgage void for want of consideration. The CFI ordered, among other things, the cancellation of TCT No. T-16272 in the name of TRB and the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of the Capay spouses. TRB appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, TRB on March 17, 1982 sold the land to Emelita Santiago in whose name a new certificate of title, TCT No. 33774, 3 was issued, also, without any notice of lis pendens annotated thereon. Santiago in turn divided the land into six (6) lots and sold these to Marcial Alcantara, Armando Cruz and Artemio Sanchez, who became co-owners thereof. 4 Alcantara and his co-owners developed the property and thereafter sold the six (6) lots to seperate buyers who issued seperate titles, again, bearing no notice of lis pendens. 5 On July 30, 1982, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision modifying the decision of the trial court as to the award of damages but affirming the same in all other respects. For having been filed out of time and for lack of merit, the petition for certiorari filed by TRB before this Court 6 was denied in a Resolution dated September 12, 1983. TRB's motion for reconsideration was similarly denied in a Resolution dated October 12, 1983. The Court's September 12, 1983 Resolution having become final and executory on November 9, 1983, the trial court issued a writ of execution directing the Register of Deeds of Baguio City to cancel TCT No. 16272 in the name of TRB, and to issue a new one in the name of the Capay spouses. Said writ, however, could not be implemented because of the successive subsequent transfers of the subdivided property to buyers who obtained separate titles thereto. Thus, a complaint for recovery of possession ownership dated 8 June 1985 was filed before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court against TRB and the subsequent transferees of the property, the respondents in G.R. No. 118862 (hereinafter, "the non-bank respondents"). Plaintiffs in said case were Patria Capay, her children by Maximo 7 who succeeded him upon his death on August 25, 1976, and Ramon Gonzales, counsel of the spouses in Civil Case No. Q-10453 who become co-owner of the property to the extent of 35% thereof as his attorney's fees (collectively, "the Capays"). On March 27, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendants and ordering the Register of Deeds for Baguio to cancel TCT No. T-36177, Books 198, Page 177 in the names of defendants Spouses Honorato D. Santos and Maria Cristina Santos; to cancel TCT No. 36707, Book 201, Page 107 in the names of defendant Spouses Cecilio Pe and Josefina L. Pe; to cancel TCT No. T-36051, Book 198, Page 51 in the name of Flora Laron Wescombe, married to Kevin Lind Wescombe (now deceased); to cancel TCT No. 36147, Book 198, page 147 in the names of Spouses Telesforo P. Alfelor II and Liza R. Alfelor; to cancel TCT No. T-36730, Book 201, Page 130 in the names of Spouses Dean Roderick Fernando and Laarni Magdamo Fernando; to cancel TCT No. 37437, Book 205, Page 37 in the name of Remedios Oca, and issue new ones free from all liens and encumbrances, together with all the improvements therein in the names of plaintiffs sharing pro indiviso as follows: 35% to Ramon A. Gonzales, married to Lilia Y. Gonzales, of legal age, with postal address at 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon City 37.92% to Patria B. Capay, of legal age, widow, Filipino; 5.41% each to Ruby Ann Capay, of legal age, Filipino married to Pokka Vainio, Finnish citizen; Chona Margarita Capay, of legal age, Filipino, married to Waldo Flores; Rosario Capay of legal age, Filipino, married to Jose Cuaycong, Jr.; Cynthia Capay, of legal age, Filipino, married to Raul Flores; Linda Joy Capay, of legal age, Filipino, married to Pedro Duran, all with postal address at 37 Sampaguita St., Capitolville Subd., Bacolod City, ordering said defendants to vacate the premises in question and restoring plaintiffs thereto and for defendant Traders Royal Bank to pay each of the plaintiffs moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, P40,000.00 in exemplary damages and P40,000.00 as attorney's fees, all with legal interest from the filing of the complaint, with costs against defendants. SO ORDERED. 8 TRB and the non-bank respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision promulgated on February 24, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33920, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. 9 It ruled that the non-bank respondents cannot be considered as purchasers for value and in good faith, having purchased the property subsequent to the action in Civil Case No. Q-10453 and that while the notice of lis pendens was not carried over to TRB's certificate of title, as well as to the subsequent transferees' titles, it was entered in the Day Book which is sufficient to constitute registration and notice to all persons of such adverse claim, citing the cases of Villasor vs. Camon, 10 Levin vs. Bass 11 and Director of Lands vs. Reyes. 12 As regard TRB, the Court of Appeals said that the bank was in bad faith when it sold the property knowing that it was under the litigation and without informing the buyer of that fact. On April 26, 1994, TRB filed with this Court a petition for review to set aside the CA decision, docketed herein as G.R. No. 114299, invoking the following grounds: I. THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN PROMULGATING THE DISPUTED DECISION AND THEREBY DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHOLLY CONTRARY TO SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND TOTALLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH APPLICABLE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT. II. THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS COMMITTED SO GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN SANCTIONING A DEPARTURE FROM THE USUAL AND ACCEPTED COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDING AS TO CALL FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT. a) The public respondent has plainly and manifestly acted whimsically, arbitrarily, capriciously, with grave abuse of discretion, in excess of jurisdiction tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. xxx xxx xxx b) The public respondent erred in not finding that it was not the fault of petitioner when the notice of lis pendens was not carried over to its new title. xxx xxx xxx c) The public respondent erred in not finding that PD No. 1271 had legally caused the invalidation of the Capay's property and the subsequent validation of TRB's title over the same property was effective even as against the Capays. 13 Meanwhile, the non-bank respondents moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision. Convinced of the movants' arguments, the Court of Appeals in a Resolution promulgated on August 10, 1994 granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the complaint as against them. The dispositive portion of the resolution states: ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions and finding merit in the motion for reconsideration, the same is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the decision of this Court, promulgated on February 24, 1994, is hereby RECONSIDERED. The complaint filed against defendants-appellants with the court a quo is hereby ordered DISMISSED, and the certificate of titles originally issued to them in their individual names are hereby ordered restored and duly respected. We make no pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 14 The Capays thus filed with this Court a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 118862 to set aside the resolution of the Court of Appeals raising the following errors: I THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT TUAZON VS. REYES, 48 PHIL. 814 AND RIVERA VS. MORAN, 48 PHIL. 836 ARE NOT APPLICABLE HEREOF, WHILE PINO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 198 SCRA 436, IS APPLICABLE. II THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT ATUN VS. MUNOZ, 97 PHIL. 762 AND LAROZA VS. GUIA, 134 SCRA 34, ARE NOT APPLICABLE. III THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT LEVIN VS. BASS, 91 PHIL. 419 VILLASOR VS. CAMON, 89 PHIL. 404 AND DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. REYES, 68 SCRA 73, ARE NOT APPLICABLE HEREOF. IV THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE GUILTY OF LACHES. V THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO DISTINCTION IN THE REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTARY INSTRUMENTS VIS-A-VIS INVOLUNTARY INSTRUMENTS. VI THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS WHO ARE LAWYERS, RESPONSIBLE CITIZENS AND WELL-RESPECTED RESIDENTS IN THE COMMUNITY, ARE EXEMPTED FROM THE EFFECTS OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE ARISING FROM REGISTRATION. VII THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF WITH REGARDS TO TRADERS ROYAL BANK, AFTER THE LATTER HAS PERFECTED ITS APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT. VIII THE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE COUNTER-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THAT: B) THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS ARE BOUND BY THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-10453. Subsequently, G.R. No. 118862 was consolidated with G.R No. 114299, pursuant to this Court's Resolution dated July 3, 1996. 15 The consolidated cases primarily involve two issues: (1) who, as between the Capays and the non-bank respondents, has a better right to the disputed property, and (2) whether or not TRB is liable to the Capays for damages. On the first issue, we rule for the non-bank respondents. I First, when TRB purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, the notice of lis pendens that the Capays caused to be annotated on their certificate of title was not carried to the new one issued to TRB. Neither did the certificate of title of Emelita Santiago, who purchased the property from TRB, contain any such notice. When Santiago caused the property to be divided, six (6) new certificates of title were issued, none of which contained any notice of lis pendens. Santiago then sold the lots to Marcial Alcantara and his co-owners who next sold each of these to the non-bank respondents. The non-bank respondents, therefore, could not have been aware that the property in question was the subject of litigation when they acquired their respective portions of said property. There was nothing in the certificates of title or respective predecessors-in-interest that could have aroused their suspicion. The non-bank respondents had a right to rely on what appeared on the face of the title of their respective predecessors-in-interest, and were not bound to go beyond the same. To hold otherwise would defeat one of the principal objects of the Torrens system of land registration, that is, to facilitate transactions involving lands. The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied. 16 Second, the foregoing rule notwithstanding, the non-bank respondents nevertheless physically inspected the properties and inquired from the register of Deeds to ascertain the absence of any defect in the title of the property they were purchasing — an exercise of diligence above that required by law. Thus, respondent Aida Fernando Meeks, who bought Lot 5 for her son Dean, testified: Q How did you come to live in Baguio City, particulary in Kim. 2.5 San Luis, Baguio City? A In one of my visits to my sister who has been residing here for twelve (12) years now, I got interested in buying a property here. Q How did you come to know of this property at Asin Road where you now reside? A My sister, Ruth Ann Valdez, sir. Q When this particular property was bought by you, when was that? A I do not remember the exact date, but it was in 1984, sir. Q At the time when you went to see the place where you now reside, how did it look? A This particular property that I bought was then a small one (1) room structure, it is a two (2)-storey one (1) bedroom structure. Q What kind of structure with regards to material? A It is a semi-concrete structure, sir. Q And aside from this two (2)-storey one (1)-room structure, how did the surrounding area look like at the time you visited? A There were stone walls from the road and there were stone walls in front of the property and beside the property. Q At the time you went to see the property with your agent, rather your sister Ruth Ann Valdez did you come to know the owner? A We did because at the time we went there, Mr. Alcantara was there supervising the workers. Q And who? A Amado Cruz sir. Q After you saw this property, what else did you do? A My first concern then was am I buying a property with a clean title. Q In regards to this concern of yours, did you find an answer to this concern of yours? A At first; I asked Mr. Alcantara and I was answered by him. Q What was his answer? A That it was a property with a clean title, that he has shown me the mother title and it is a clean title. Q Aside from being informed that it is a property with a clean title, did you do anything to answer your question? A Yes, sit. Q What did you do? A Well, the first step I did was to go to the Land Registration Office. Q Are you referring to the City Hall of Baguio? A Yes, the City Hall of Baguio. Q And what did you do in the Registry of Deeds? A We looked for the title, the original title, sir. Q When you say we, who was your companion? A Mr. Alcantara and my present husband, sir. Q The three (3) of you? A Yes, sir. Q What title did you see there? A We saw the title that was made up in favor of Amado Cruz, sir. Q And what was the result of your looking up for this title in the name of Amado Cruz? A We had to be reassured that it was a genuine one, so we asked Atty. Diomampo who heads the office. We showed him a copy of that title and we were also reassured by him that anything that was signed by him was as good as it is. Q Did this Atty. Diomampo reassure you that the title was good? A He did. Q After your conversation with the Register of Deeds, what did you do? A The second step we did was to confer with our lawyer, a friend from RCBC Binondo, Manila this is Atty. Nelson Waje. Q What is your purpose in going to this lawyer? A We wanted an assurance that we were getting a valid title just in case we think of buying the property. Q What was the result of your conference with this lawyer? A He was absolutely certain that was a valid title. Q Mrs. Meeks, after looking at the place, going to the Register of Deeds, looking at the title and seeing your lawyer friend, what decision did you finally make regarding the property? A We wanted more reassurances, so we proceeded to Banaue, as advised by that same lawyer, there is another office of the Bureau of Lands. I cannot recall the office but it has something to do with registration of the old. Q What is your purpose in going to this Office in Banaue? A I wanted more reassuances that I was getting a valid title. Q What was the result of your visit to the Banaue Office? A We found the title of this property and there was reassurance that it was a clean title and we saw the mother title under the Hilario family. Q Mrs. Meeks, when you say Banaue, what particular place is this Banaue? A It is in Banaue Street in Quezon City, sir. Q And when you saw the title to this property and the mother title, what was the result of your investigation, the investigation that you made? A We were reassured that we were purchasing a valid title, we had a genuine title. Q When you were able to determine that you had a valid, authentic or genuine title, what did you do? A That is when I finally thought of purchasing the property. 17 Telesforo Alfelor II, the purchaser of Lot 4, narrated going through a similar routine: Q How did you come to know of this place as Asin Road where you are presently residing? A It was actually through Mrs. Flory Recto who is presently the Branch Manager of CocoBank. She informed my wife that there is a property for sale at Asin Road, and she was the one who introduced to us Mr. Alcantara, sir. Q When you were informed by Mrs. Recto and when you met with Mr. Alcantara, did you see the property that was being offered for sale? A Yes, sir. Q When did you specifically see the property, if you can recall? A I would say it is around the third quarter of 1983, sir. Q When you went to see the place, could you please describe what you saw at that time? A When we went there the area is still being developed by Mr. Alcantara. As a matter of fact the road leading to the property is still not passable considering that during that time it was rainy season and it was muddy, we fell on our way going to the property and walked to have an ocular inspection and physical check on the area, sir. xxx xxx xxx Q What was the improvement, if any, that was in that parcel which you are going to purchase? A During that time, the riprap of the property is already there, the one-half of the riprap sir. Q Do you know who was making this improvement at the time that you went there? A I would understand that it was Marcial Alcantara, sir. Q After you saw the place riprap and you were in the course of deciding to purchase this property, what else did you do? A First, I have to consider that the property is clean. Q How did you go about determining whether the title of the property is clean? A Considering that Marcial Alcantara is a real estate broker, I went to his office and checked the documents he has regarding the property. Q And what was the result of your checking as to whether the title of the property is clean? A He showed me the copy of the title and it was clean, sir. Q Aside from going to Mr. Alcantara to check up the title of the property, what else did you do? A Well, the next thing is I requested his wife to accompany me to the Bureau of Lands or rather the Registry of Deeds, sir. Q What registry of Deeds are you referring to? A The Registry of Deeds of Baguio City, sir. Q And were you able to see the Register of Deeds regarding what you would like to know? A Yes, and we were given a certification regarding this particular area that it was clean, sir. Q What Certification are you referring to? A It is a Certification duly signed by the employee of the Registry of Deeds Adelina Tabangin, sir. Q Do you have a copy of that Certification? A Yes, I have, sir. 18 The testimonies of Honorato Santos 19 and Josefina Pe 20 were to the same effect. The non-bank respondent predecessor-in-interest, Marcial Alcantara, was less thorough: Q And will you give a brief description of what you do? A I normally acquire land, quite big tract of land and subdivide it into smaller lots and sold it to some interested parties. Q Specifically, Mr. Alcantara will you please inform the Court in what place in Baguio have you acquired and subdivided and sold lots? A Dominican Hill, Leonila Hill, Cristal Cave and Asin Road, sir. Q You mentioned Asin Road, what particular place in Asin Road are you referring? A That property I bought from Emelita Santiago, sir. Q When you say you bought it from Emelita Santiago, how did you come to know that Emelita Santiago is disposing of the property? A Because of the father, he is the one who offered me the property, sir, Armando Gabriel. Q Is he also a resident of Baguio? A He is from Buyagan, La Trinidad sir, Q How did you come to know of this Armando Gabriel wanting to sell a property in Asin? A He approached me in the house, sir. He has acquired a title from the Traders Royal Bank. Q Can you inform the Honorable Court when you had this conversation with Armando Gabriel on the sale of the property at Asin Road? A Later part of March, 1983, sir. Q Now, when this Armando Gabriel informed you that he wants his property to be sold, what did you do? A I went to the place with the agent, sir. Q When you say you went to the place with the agent, what place? A Kilometer 2, Asin Road sir. Q And when you went there to see the place, did you actually go there to see the place? A By walking, I parked my car a kilometer away, sir. Q Is it my understanding that when you went to see the property there were no roads? A None, sir. xxx xxx xxx Q Mr. Alcantara, when you went to see this place at Asin Road last week of March, 1983, will you please briefly describe how this place looked like at that time? A The place was mountainous, grassy, there were cogon trees, some of the roads were eroding already, so we cannot possibly enter the property, sir. Q At the time you entered the place, was there any visible sign of claim by anyone? A None, sir. Q In terms of fence in the area? A There is no such, sir. xxx xxx xxx Q Aside from looking or going to the property, what else did you do to this property prior to your purchase? A I investigated it with the Register of Deeds, sir. Q What is your purpose in investigating it with the Register of Deeds? A To see if the paper in clean and there are no encumbrances, sir. Q To whom did you talk? A To Atty. Ernesto Diomampo, sir. Q And when you went to the Registry of Deeds to investigate and check, did you have occasion to talk with Atty. Diomampo? A Yes, sir. Q And what was the result of your talk with Atty. Diomampo? A The papers are clean except to the annotation at the back with the road right of way, sir. Q After making this investigation with the Register of Deeds and talking with Atty. Diomampo, what else transpired? A We bought the property, sir. Q After purchasing the property from Emelita Santiago, could you please tell the Honorable Court what you did with that deed of sale? A We registered it with the Register of Deeds for the Certificate of Title because at that time when we bought the property, Emelita Santiago had it subdivided into six (6) lots, sir. Q Is it our understanding that prior to your purchase the property was subdivided into six (6) parcels? A Yes, sir. Q Could you please inform the Honorable Court if you have any buyers in the subdivision of this property prior to your purchase? A Yes, I have. Q This subdivision of this property, to what office was it brought for action? A Bureau of Lands, San Fernando, La Union, sir. Q Now, Mr. Alcantara, at the time that you had this property subdivided by the owner, could you please inform the Court if there was any claim by any other party opposing the subdivision or claiming the property? A None, sir. Q When the Deed of Sale was executed and you said that you presented it to the Register of Deeds and after the subdivision already, what action did the Register of Deeds have regarding the matter? A They approved it and registered it already in six (6) titles, sir. Q In whose names? A One (1) title under my name, Amado Cruz and Dr. Sanchez, sir. Q Initially, Mr. Alcantara, you said that you are the sole purchaser of this entire area of One Thousand Five Hundred Ninety One (1,591) Square Meters. Now, you are informing this Honorable Court that one Amado Cruz and one Dr. Sanchez were also issued two (2) titles. Could you explain how these titles came into their possession? A Actually, two (2) are our co-owners, sir. Q So, is it our understanding that the Deed of Sale from Emelita Santiago is in favor of these two (2) Atty. Cruz and Dr. Sanchez? A Yes, sir. 21 Third, between two innocent persons, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss. 22 The Capays filed the notice of lis pendens way back on March 17, 1967 but the same was not TRB's title. The Capays and their counsel Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales knew in 1968 of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the property to TRB and the consolidation of title in the bank's name following the lapse of the one-year period of redemption. But in the next fifteen (15) years or so, they did not bother to find out the status of their title or whether the liens noted on the original certificate of title were still existing considering that the property had already been foreclosed. In the meantime, the subject property had undergone a series of transfers to buyers in good and for value. It was not until after the land was subdivided and developed with the buyers building their houses on the other lots when the Capays suddenly appeared and questioned the occupants' titles. At the very least, the Capays are guilty of laches. Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could nor should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting presumption that the party entitled to it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 23 Verily, the principle on prescription of actions is designed to cover situations such as the case at bar, where there have been a series of transfers to innocent purchasers for value. To set aside these transactions only to accommodate a party who has slept on his rights is anathema to good order. Independently of the principle of prescription of actions working against petitioners, the doctrine of laches may further be counted against them, which latter tenet finds application even to imprescriptible actions. . . . 24 In De La Calzada-Cierras vs. Court of Appeals, 25 we held: While it is true that under the law it is the act of registration of the deed of conveyance that serves as the operative act to convey the land registered under the Torrens System (Davao Grains, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 171 SCRA 612), the petitioners cannot invoke said dictum because their action to recover Lot 4362 is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. The act of registering the conveyance to Rosendo was constructive notice to the whole world of the fact of such conveyance (Heirs of Maria Marasigan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 253). But the petitioners' complaint to recover the title and possession of Lot 4362 was filed only on July 21, 1981, twelve (12) years after the registration of the sale to Rosendo. The petitioners failed and neglected for an unreasonably long time to assert their right, if any, to the property in Rosendo's possession. Being guilty of laches, the Capays cannot invoke the ruling in Villasor vs. Camon Levin Bass and Director of Lands vs. Reyes 26 to the effect that entry of the notice of lis pendens in the day book (primary entry book) is sufficient to constitute registration and such entry is notice to all persons of such adverse claim. Certainly, it is most iniquitous for the Capays who, after sleeping on their rights for fifteen years to assert ownership over the property that has undergone several transfers made in good faith and for value and already subdivided into several lots with improvements introduced thereon by their owners. In the same vein, the cases cited by the Capays in their first two (2) assignment of errors, do not help them any, as the transferees in said cases were not innocent purchasers for value and in good faith. In Tuazon vs. Reyes and Siochi, 27 where the land involved therein was sold by Petronilo David to Vicente Tuazon, it was with a deed containing the recital that the land was in dispute between the vendor and Roberto Siochi. Tuazon, who was merely subrogated to the rights of the vendor was aware of the dispute and, furthermore, David did not warrant the title to the same. In Rivera vs. Moran, 28 Rivera acquired interest in the land before the final decree was entered in the cadastral proceedings. Rivera, the transferee, was aware of the pending litigation and, consequently, could not have been considered a purchaser in good faith. Similarly, in Atun, et al. vs. Nuñez, et al. 29 and Laroza vs. Guia, 30 the buyers of the property at the time of their acquisition knew of the existence of the notice of lis pendens. In contrast to the cited cases, the non-bank respondents in the case at bar acquired their respective portions of the land with clean title from their predecessors-in-interest. II We come now to TRB's liability towards the Capays. The Bank unconvincingly tries to wash its hands off the present controversy, and attempts to shift the blame on the Capays, thus: xxx xxx xxx 23. The petitioner Bank, during all the time that it was holding the title for over fourteen (14) years that there was no legal impediment for it to sell said property, Central Bank regulations require that real properties of banks should not he held for more than five (5) years: 24. The fault of the Register of Deeds in not carrying over the Notice of Lis Pendens to the new title of the petitioner Bank should not be absorbed by the latter considering that in all good faith, it was not aware of the existence of said annotation during all the time that said title was in its possession for almost fourteen (14) years before the property was sold to Emelita G. Santiago. . . . 31 TRB concludes that "(t)he inaction and negligence of private respondents allowing ownership to pass for almost 15 years constitute prescription of action and/or laches." 32 Sec. 25 of the General Banking Act, 33 provides that no bank "shall hold the possession of any real estate under mortgage or trust, deed, or the title and possession of any real estate purchased to secure any debt due to it, for a longer period than five years." TRB, however, admits hoding on to the foreclosed property for twelve (12) years after consolidating title in its name. The bank is, therefore, estopped from involving banking laws and regulations to justify its belated disposition of the property. It cannot be allowed to hide behind the law which it itself violated. TRB cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the lis pendens because when the property was foreclosed by it, the notice of lis pendens was annotated on the title. But when TCT No. T-6595 in the name of the Capay spouses was cancelled after the foreclosure, TCT No. T-16272 which was issued in place thereof in the name of TRB did not carry over the notice of lis pendens. We do not find the Capays guilty of "inaction and negligence" as against TRB. It may be recalled that upon the commencement of foreclosure proceedings by TRB, the Capays filed an action for prohibition on September 22, 1966 against the TRB before the CFI to stop the foreclosure sale. Failing in that attempt, the Capays filed a supplemental complaint for the recovery of the property. The case reached this Court. Prescription or laches could not have worked against the Capays because they had persistently pursued their suit against TRB to recover their property. On the other hand, it is difficult to believe TRB's assertion that after holding on to the property for more than ten (10) years, it suddenly realized that it was acting in violation of the General Bank Act. What is apparent is that TRB took advantage of the absence of the notice of lis pendens at the back of their certificate of title and sold the property to an unwary purchaser. This notwithstanding the adverse decision of the trial court and the pendency of its appeal. TRB, whose timing indeed smacks of bad faith, thus transferred caused the property without the lis pendens annotated on its title to put it beyond the Capays' reach. Clearly, the bank acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy and should be held liable for damages. 34 Considering however, that the mortgage in favor of TRB had been declared null and void for want of consideration and, consequently, the foreclosure proceedings did not have a valid effect, the Capays would ordinarily be entitled to the recovery of their property. Nevertheless, this remedy is not now available to the Capays inasmuch as title to said property has passed into the hands of third parties who acquired the same in good faith and for value. Such being the case, TRB is duty bound to pay the Capays the fair market value of the property at the time it was sold to Emelita Santiago, the transferee of TRB. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated Frebruary 24, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33920, as modified by its Resolution dated August 10, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED. In addition, Traders Royal Bank is ordered to pay the Capays the fair market value of the property at the time it was sold to Emelita Santiago. This Decision is without prejudice to whatever criminal, civil or administrative action against the Register of Deeds and or his assistants that may be taken by the party or parties prejudiced by the failure of the former to carry over the notice of lis pendens to the certificate of title in the name of TRB.1âwphi1.nêt SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 165427 March 21, 2011 BETTY B. LACBAYAN, Petitioner, vs. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR., Respondent. D E C I S I O N VILLARAMA, JR., J.: This settles the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Betty B. Lacbayan against respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. assailing the September 14, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596. The CA had affirmed the February 10, 2000 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 224, of Quezon City declaring respondent as the sole owner of the properties involved in this suit and awarding to him P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees. This suit stemmed from the following facts. Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in 1978. Despite respondent being already married, their relationship developed until petitioner gave birth to respondent’s son on October 12, 1979.3 During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company.4 Five parcels of land were also acquired during the said period and were registered in petitioner and respondent’s names, ostensibly as husband and wife. The lands are briefly described as follows: 1. A 255-square meter real estate property located at Malvar St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 303224 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty Lacbayan."5 2. A 296-square meter real estate property located at Main Ave., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 23301 and registered in the name of "Spouses Bayani S. Samoy and Betty Lacbayan."6 3. A 300-square meter real estate property located at Matatag St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. RT-38264 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty Lacbayan Samoy."7 4. A 183.20-square meter real estate property located at Zobel St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 335193 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty L. Samoy."8 5. A 400-square meter real estate property located at Don Enrique Heights, Quezon City covered by TCT No. 90232 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty L. Samoy."9 Initially, petitioner lived with her parents in Mapagbigay St., V. Luna, Quezon City. In 1983, petitioner left her parents and decided to reside in the property located in Malvar St. in Project 4, Quezon City. Later, she and their son transferred to Zobel St., also in Project 4, and finally to the 400-square meter property in Don Enrique Heights.10 Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways sometime in 1991. In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement.11 Initially, respondent agreed to petitioner’s proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties will go to respondent.12 However, when petitioner wanted additional demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent refused.13 Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition14 of the said properties before the RTC in Quezon City on May 31, 1999. In her complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent started to live together as husband and wife in 1979 without the benefit of marriage and worked together as business partners, acquiring real properties amounting to P15,500,000.00.15 Respondent, in his Answer,16 however, denied petitioner’s claim of cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired out of his own personal funds without any contribution from petitioner.17 During the trial, petitioner admitted that although they were together for almost 24 hours a day in 1983 until 1991, respondent would still go home to his wife usually in the wee hours of the morning.18 Petitioner likewise claimed that they acquired the said real estate properties from the income of the company which she and respondent established.19 Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the properties were purchased from his personal funds, salaries, dividends, allowances and commissions.20 He countered that the said properties were registered in his name together with petitioner to exclude the same from the property regime of respondent and his legal wife, and to prevent the possible dissipation of the said properties since his legal wife was then a heavy gambler.21 Respondent added that he also purchased the said properties as investment, with the intention to sell them later on for the purchase or construction of a new building.22 On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.23 In resolving the issue on ownership, the RTC decided to give considerable weight to petitioner’s own admission that the properties were acquired not from her own personal funds but from the income of the manpower services company over which she owns a measly 3.33% share.24 Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is the pro indiviso owner of one-half of the properties in dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial court’s decision subjected the certificates of title over the said properties to collateral attack contrary to law and jurisprudence. Petitioner also contended that it is improper to thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for partition.25 Unimpressed with petitioner’s arguments, the appellate court denied the appeal, explaining in the following manner: Appellant’s harping on the indefeasibility of the certificates of title covering the subject realties is, to say the least, misplaced. Rather than the validity of said certificates which was nowhere dealt with in the appealed decision, the record shows that what the trial court determined therein was the ownership of the subject realties – itself an issue correlative to and a necessary adjunct of the claim of co-ownership upon which appellant anchored her cause of action for partition. It bears emphasizing, moreover, that the rule on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title applies only to original and not to subsequent registration as that availed of by the parties in respect to the properties in litigation. To our mind, the inapplicability of said principle to the case at bench is even more underscored by the admitted falsity of the registration of the selfsame realties in the parties’ name as husband and wife. The same dearth of merit permeates appellant’s imputation of reversible error against the trial court for supposedly failing to make the proper delineation between an action for partition and an action involving ownership. Typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners, an action for partition may be seen to present simultaneously two principal issues, i.e., first, the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned and, second – assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first – the issue of how the property is to be divided between plaintiff and defendant(s). Otherwise stated, the court must initially settle the issue of ownership for the simple reason that it cannot properly issue an order to divide the property without first making a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties. This is precisely what the trial court did when it discounted the merit in appellant’s claim of co-ownership.26 Hence, this petition premised on the following arguments: I. Ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case. II. The partition agreement duly signed by respondent contains an admission against respondent’s interest as to the existence of co-ownership between the parties. III. An action for partition cannot be defeated by the mere expedience of repudiating co-ownership based on self-serving claims of exclusive ownership of the properties in dispute. IV. A Torrens title is the best evidence of ownership which cannot be outweighed by respondent’s self-serving assertion to the contrary. V. The properties involved were acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.27 Noticeably, the last argument is essentially a question of fact, which we feel has been squarely threshed out in the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts. We deem it wise not to disturb the findings of the lower courts on the said matter absent any showing that the instant case falls under the exceptions to the general rule that questions of fact are beyond the ambit of the Court’s jurisdiction in petitions under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The issues may be summarized into only three: I. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership; II. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally attacked in the action for partition; and III. Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over the subject realties. We find the petition bereft of merit. Our disquisition in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia28 is definitive. There, we explained that the determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. Thus: The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x x29 (Emphasis supplied.) While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.30 More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.31 Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack? Most definitely, it would not. There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked,32 but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself.33 The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that document.34 Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.35 Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.36 In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.37 Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the best evidence thereof.1avvphi1 Finally, as to whether respondent’s assent to the initial partition agreement serves as an admission against interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have admitted the existence of co-ownership between him and petitioner, we rule in the negative. An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him.38 Admission against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. – The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitter’s interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.39 A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioner’s argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.40 Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to sign. As to the award of damages to respondent, we do not subscribe to the trial court’s view that respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. Unlike the trial court, we do not commiserate with respondent’s predicament. The trial court ruled that respondent was forced to litigate and engaged the services of his counsel to defend his interest as to entitle him an award of P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees. But we note that in the first place, it was respondent himself who impressed upon petitioner that she has a right over the involved properties. Secondly, respondent’s act of representing himself and petitioner as husband and wife was a deliberate attempt to skirt the law and escape his legal obligation to his lawful wife. Respondent, therefore, has no one but himself to blame the consequences of his deceitful act which resulted in the filing of the complaint against him. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. is hereby declared the sole owner of the disputed properties, without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have filed or may file against him. The award of P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees in respondent’s favor is DELETED. No costs. SO ORDERED. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice