Transparency and the Structure of Consciousness Abstract: In the recent philosophy of mind and perception the phenomenon of transparency of appearing (as I shall call it) has attracted much attention. The debate about this phenomenon revolves mainly around the following questions: Is there such a phenomenon as the transparency of appearing at all? Given there is, how is it correctly characterized? What are the conclusions to be drawn from the occurrence of this phenomenon? Since I am dissatisfied with the answers commonly given to these questions, I will address them anew in this paper. After a short introduction (section 1) I will take a stand regarding the first and the second question (section 2). I will put forward what I take to be the correct characterization of the phenomenon of transparency and I will defend the assumption that states of appearing are indeed transparent in the sense given by this characterization. In addition to this, I will critically examine some alternative characterizations of the phenomenon of transparency. In section 3, then, I will offer a partial answer to the third question. I will set forth in some detail what I take to be the implications of the transparency of appearing regarding the nature of the phenomenal consciousness of states of appearing (the peculiar talk of states of appearing will be introduced in the course of the paper). The outcome will be that accounts that are usually taken to be supported by the transparency of appearing are in fact incompatible with it while at least one account that is often taken to be incompatible with the transparency of appearing is in fact compatible with it. Keywords: Appearing; Transparency; Phenomenology; Consciousness; Inseparatism; Hallucination. 1. Introduction Recently, the phenomenon I shall call the transparency of appearing or just transparency has attracted much attention in the philosophy of mind and perception.1 The ensuing debate about 1 This is not least due to Gilbert Harman’s seminal paper The Intrinsic Quality of Experience (1990). The discovery of the phenomenon, however, is usually attributed to G.E. Moore (1903, 450). 1 this phenomenon revolved mainly around the following questions: Is there such a phenomenon as transparency at all? Given there is, how is it correctly characterized? And, what are the conclusions to be drawn from the occurrence of this phenomenon? With regard to the questions considered, my paper is completely in line with this debate. It is, for the main part, an attempt to answer these three questions, at least partially. My motivation to tackle these questions once more is my dissatisfaction with most of the answers commonly given to them. I agree with the majority of the participants in the debate that there is a phenomenon that deserves to be called transparency of appearing. But, to my mind, the usual characterizations of this phenomenon fail to grasp it adequately. And, not least as a consequence of this, the conclusions usually drawn from its existence are in part too weak and in part too strong, or so I will try to show. My investigation will proceed as follows: In section 2 I will take a stand regarding the first and the second question. That is, I will put forward what I take to be the correct characterization of the phenomenon of transparency and I will try to establish that states of appearing2 are indeed transparent in the sense given by this characterization. Furthermore, I will critically examine some alternative characterizations of the phenomenon of transparency. In section 3 I will try to give a partial answer to the third question – the question of the conclusions to be drawn from the transparency of states of appearing. I will set forth in some detail what I take to be the implications of the transparency of states of appearing regarding the nature of the phenomenal consciousness of those states. The outcome will be that two popular accounts of consciousness – the accounts I shall call Modeof-re-presentationalism and Contentualism (see below) – that are usually taken to be supported by the transparency of states of appearing are in fact incompatible with it while at least one account – the account I shall call Phenomenalist Presentationalism (see below) – that is often taken to be 2 The peculiar talk of states of appearing will be introduced below. 2 incompatible with the transparency of states of appearing is in fact perfectly compatible with it. 2. The transparency of appearing To get straight to the point: I take the following to be an adequate characterization of the transparency of appearing: The phenomenal quality of a particular state of appearing is fully exhausted by the sensible properties present to the subject of the state and their distribution over the respective field of appearance.3 I shall call this the Transparency-Thesis. Like any other thesis it has to be properly understood before it can be evaluated. And, as it happens, different concepts contained in it are in need of elucidation. I take this, moreover, as an opportunity to introduce large parts of the conceptual framework my investigation is embedded in. The concept of a state of appearing: the best way to introduce this concept is by way of paradigm examples. Paradigm examples of states of appearing are just the states of our five senses (states of seeing, hearing, tasting…). Throughout this paper I will remain neutral regarding the question of whether the class of these states exhausts the class of states of appearing or whether the latter outruns the former. 4 In any case, according to the way I understand the concept of a state of appearing, for a mental state to be a state of appearing it is necessary as well as sufficient to have a specific phenomenology. For the time being, I use the phrase “phenomenology of a mental state” in the way it is commonly used, as an expression of the way the mental state referred to seems to be from – and only from – the first-person3 The characterization most similar to this one I know of is Frank Jackson's: 'That experience is diaphanousness (or transparent) is a thesis about the phenomenology of perceptual experience. It is the thesis that the properties that make an experience the kind of experience it is are properties of the object of experience.' (2007, 55). 4 If I were addressing this question, I would argue that there are in fact states of appearing that are not states of our five senses. In particular I would argue that this is true of pains and other sensations. 3 perspective. 5 So, if, for example, two mental states are indistinguishable, from the firstperson-perspective, and one of them is a state of appearing, it follows that the other one is a state of appearing too. This understanding of the concept of a state of appearing has the advantage – relative to the purposes of my investigation – that, necessarily, all the states usually classified as illusions or hallucinations are states of appearing. 6 On the usual classification, illusions and hallucinations are states that are indistinguishable from the firstperson-perspective from veridical states of appearing without being themselves veridical. I shall say that a state of appearing is a hallucination if and only if there is no concrete, physical object that appears in it 7 and an illusion if and only if the concrete, physical object that appears in it is not the way it appears in it to be. The concept of a field of appearance: according to the way paradigmatic states of appearing seem to be from the first-person-perspective, they are constituted by threedimensional fields spread out before their subjects. These fields are fields of appearance. It is useful to distinguish, corresponding to the different (sense) modalities, between different kinds of fields of appearance. So, one gets visual fields, auditory fields, tactual fields and so on. With regards to the concept of a field of appearance and its relatives it is most important to note that they are purely phenomenological concepts. That is, the ontological commitments imposed by the use of these concepts never go beyond the ontological commitments imposed by the fact that a particular state of appearing has the phenomenology specific for states of appearing.8 5 It will turn out, however, that this characterization is quite misleading. Next to this advantage, it also bears a somewhat strange consequence: strictly speaking, it does not entail that a state of appearing is an appearing of something. A mental state is an appearing of something only if it is, in a way characteristic of states of appearing, about something. To be sure, there is no reasonable doubt that nearly all states that have the phenomenology specific for states of appearing are about something in this sense, but whether this is true for all states of this kind depends in the end on the correct theory of perception and appearing. And which theory this is, is underdetermined by phenomenology. However, since this possibility will be immaterial for my investigation, I can live with this consequence. 7 Note that this characterization neither implies nor rules out that the hallucination is about something. 8 However, this caveat is less strong than it may look at first glance. For, below, I will give some arguments to the effect that ontological commitments imposed by the phenomenology specific for states of appearing are stronger than they are usually taken to be. 6 4 The concept of presentation: Still phenomenologically speaking, the field of appearance of a state of appearing is constituted by instances of certain qualities. The relation the subject of a state of appearing bears to these instances of qualities as well as to the objects that bear these instances shall be called the relation of presentation or just presentation. This notion is to be distinguished from the notion of appearing. As stated above, the latter refers to the relation one bears to the objects one’s state of appearing is about. And it is an open question whether both relations coincide or not. Let me, furthermore, state the following terminological conventions: The relata of the relation of presentation, insofar and only insofar as they are the relata of this relation, are subjects of appearing and presentational objects and a subject of appearing is presented with something while a presentational object is presented to someone.9 10 11 The concept of sensible properties: This concept is explicable with the help of the concepts just introduced. A very intuitive way to do this is as follows: Sensible properties are the properties the instantiations of which constitute the fields of appearance of states of appearing or, to put it slightly differently, the properties whose instantiations are properly presented to subjects of appearing. A more elaborated proposal reads as follows: A property F is a sensible property for a subject S of a state of appearing M if and only if, at least one of the presentational objects presented to S in M is presented to S in M in virtue of S’s being 9 Consequently, the concept of subjects of appearing and of a presentational object are interdefinable: An entity is a subject of appearing, at a point of time t, if and only if, at t, it is presented with a presentational object and an entity is a presentational object, at a point of time t, if and only if, at t, it is presented to a subject of appearing. 10 The talk of presentational objects and subjects of appearing may convey the impression that it is about entities that are essentially presented to subjects of appearing – as it would be true for sense data for example – and essentially presented with presentational objects. This impression is mistaken. The concepts of a subject of appearing and of a presentational object are neutral with respect to the question whether the entities falling under them do so essentially or contingently. In order to diminish the wrong impression just mentioned, I will usually talk about instantiations of the property of being a subject of appearing or of being a presentational object instead of just presentational objects and subjects of appearing. 11 It is time to vindicate some idiosyncrasies of my terminology. The term 'state of appearing' is unusual and at least the phrase 'being presented with' is bad English, at best. So, why do I not make use of well-established terms and phrases like 'experience' or 'perceptual state' and 'being given to', 'being aware of' or 'being acquainted with'? The reason is two-fold. For one thing, I would like to hold on the terms 'presentation' and 'appearing' since they strike me as perfectly well suited. For another thing, I aim at a high degree of terminological unity. The aforementioned terminological idiosyncrasies are the outcome of the combination of both ambitions. 5 presented with an instance of F; whereas the phrase “in virtue of” expresses the relation of constitution. For reason of space, I have to refrain from arguing for this explication at length. But, since, as far as I know, it is original to some extent. I should say, at least, some words on its behalf. Note at the outset that presentational objects can never be presented to someone as pure, featureless substrates. A subject of appearing can never be presented with a presentational object without being presented with certain properties at this presentational object. So, apparently, there exists a specific relation of dependence between the presentation of presentational objects and the presentation of properties at these objects. And this is a relation of constitution. However, obviously, not all properties of a presentational object about which one can truthfully say, in one or another sense,12 that they appear to the corresponding subject are such that their presentation constitutes the presentation of the relevant presentational object. Imagine a person that is in a state of appearing which it can truly self-ascribe through both of the following sentences: (1) ‘The wall appears visually to me as red’ (2) ‘The wall appears visually to me as built from red-bricks’ This person is in a state of appearing of the wall as being built from red-bricks and as being red. Now think about the presentation of the property redness at the wall.13 Obviously, the wall is presented to the person in question only in virtue of the property of redness being presented to this person. It is in virtue of the fact that redness is somehow instantiated in the visual field of the person that the wall is presented to her. In contrast, think about the property of being built from red-bricks: It is equally obvious that nothing similar is true for this property. It is certainly not the case that the wall is presented to the person in virtue of its property to be built from red-bricks being presented to this person. It is rather the other way 12 As is well known, the term 'appearing' in ascriptions of states of appearing comes in different senses (see Chisholm [1957] and Jackson [1977] and Fn. 15 below). 13 For the sake of simplicity, I assume here without argument that it is the real, physical wall that is presented to the person and not some kind of mental representation of it. 6 around: This property appears to the person in virtue of the wall being presented to her.14 This is precisely the difference depicted by my explication of the concept of sensible properties.15 A point most important to emphasize is that, on this explication, sensible properties are properties of the presentational objects of states of appearing, not properties of states of appearing or their subjects. They are properties of what appears, not of the appearing. In order to forestall any misunderstanding in this respect, I may be helpful to introduce the complementary concept of sensing properties. Sensing properties are the properties in virtue of which a subject of appearing is presented with instances of sensible properties. They are, thus, properties of the appearing, not of what appears. The concept of a phenomenal quality: I will follow the common practice and explicate this concept as well as the closely related concept of phenomenal consciousness with the help of Thomas Nagel’s famous phrase “what it is like” (1974). That a state of appearing is phenomenally conscious, means that there is a way it is like for its subject to be in this state (or just that it is somehow for its subject to be in this state). And the phenomenal quality of a state of appearing is just the specific way it is like for its subject to be in this state. These conceptual preliminaries should give us a thorough understanding of the TransparencyThesis. Recall: 14 That I use the word 'appears' instead of 'is presented to' in the first part of this sentence is, of course, no accident. For, according to the way I use the latter expression, it would be wrong to say that the property of being built from red-bricks is presented to the person in question. But it would not be wrong – at least not necessarily – to say that the property of being built from red-bricks appears to the person in question. 15 Note in passing some of the virtues of the above explication of the concept of sensible properties. It provides a plausible interpretation of ascriptions of states of appearing like (1) and (2). Sentence (1), but not sentence (2), allows for what I shall call, following Chisholm, a phenomenal reading (see [1957]). The reason is that redness, but not being built from red-bricks, is a sensible property. According to the phenomenal reading, sentence (1) is roughly tantamount to: 'An instance of redness is among the instances of properties the presentations of which constitute the presentation to me of the wall or the object representing the wall.' A merit, at least from my point of view, of this interpretation of the phenomenal reading is that it does not support the assumption that the subject of a state of appearing truthfully ascribed by sentence (1) has to possess the concept of redness. Furthermore, the explication of the concept of sensible properties provides a useful and plausible criterion of individuation for states of appearing. Roughly speaking, states of appearing are exhaustively determined by the presentation of sensible properties. That is, every aspect of the overall mental state of a subject over and above the presentation of sensible properties to this subject is not an aspect of this subject’s state of appearing but of one of its other mental states. 7 The phenomenal quality of a particular state of appearing is fully exhausted by the sensible properties presented to the subject of the state and their distribution over the respective field of appearance. According to the Transparency-Thesis, there are no other properties, next to the sensible properties, that have any bearing on the phenomenal quality of a state of appearing. The presentation of sensible properties is just all there is to the phenomenal quality of a state of appearing. No properties of the subject (insofar as it is the subject of this state) or of the state itself contribute to this phenomenal quality. Even sensing properties – whatever they may be – do so only indirectly, that is, through the sensible properties presented in virtue of them. Before I start considering the adequacy of the Transparency-Thesis, let me make an important methodological point. I assume in what follows that the Transparency-Thesis is a purely phenomenological thesis. With this I do not mean that it is a thesis about the way states of appearing seem to be from the first-person-perspective. I mean, rather, that it is a thesis stated from – and only from – the phenomenological or first-person-perspective. To put it more precisely: it is a thesis the truth of which is implied by the way states of appearing seem to be from the first-person-perspective and the assumption that states of appearing are in fact the way they seem to be from the first-person-perspective. 16 Moreover, I will take this as a condition of adequacy for any characterization of the phenomenon of transparency. 17 In accordance with this assumption, I will adopt in this paper a broadly phenomenological point of view. That is, I will restrict myself by and large to phenomenological considerations and the conclusions to be drawn from these considerations. 16 To whom this, incidentally, looks like a triviality, may keep in mind that the way a state of appearing seems to be from the first-person-perspective is neutral with regard to the sweeping majority of the properties of states of appearing. The thesis, for example, that states of appearing are brain states (assume for the moment that they are indeed brain states) is not a phenomenological thesis in the sense determined above, for the way states of appearing seem to be from the first-person-perspective is completely neutral with respect to the question of whether states of appearing are brain states. From the first-person-perspective states of appearing neither seem to be brain states, nor not to be brain states. 17 As far as I can see, an analogous assumption is shared – at least implicitly – by all proponents of one or another version of the thesis of the transparency of states of appearing. This is suggested, at least, by the significant lack of argumentation on behalf of the relevant theses. 8 This said, let us address the question of the truth-value of the Transparency-Thesis? Is it really so evident that the phenomenal qualities of our states of appearing are exhausted by the sensible properties that are presented to us in these states, as the Transparency-Thesis says? In case you are not convinced, it may help to have a look on the obvious alternative view. We find a particularly clear expression of it in the following passage from David Chalmers: ‘I look at a red apple, and visually experience its colour. This experience instantiates a phenomenal quality R, which we might call phenomenal redness. It is natural to say that I am having a red experience, even though of course experiences are not red in the same sense in which apples are red Phenomenal redness (a property of experiences, or subjects of experiences) is a different property from external redness (a property of external objects), but both are respectable properties in their own right. I attend to my visual experience, and think I am having an experience of such-and-such quality, referring to the quality of phenomenal redness. (2003, 223)’18 Let me try to make plain what Chalmers is saying here: Chalmers distinguishes between two kinds of redness: external redness and phenomenal redness. External redness is the physical property of redness and is instantiated in the physical object, the apple, the state of appearing is about.19 Phenomenal redness, on the other hand, is a property of the state of appearing of the apple. Furthermore, Chalmers claims to “visually experience” the external redness of the apple and to “attend to” the phenomenal redness of his state of appearing. Given that one can attend to something only if one is (somehow) aware of it, it follows from the conjunction of both claims that Chalmers (or whoever the subject of the state of appearing described is) is 18 To be fair, the passage serves merely as an introductory remark for the proper issues of the paper. So, we should not give too much weight to it when it comes to the question of Chalmers' definite position regarding the phenomenology of states of appearing. And, indeed, other passages in other papers indicate that this reservation is well in place (see [2004] and [2006]). However, since I am not concerned with the interpretation of Chalmers work here, the passage is useful for my purposes all the same. 19 The state of appearing is, of course, what Chalmers calls the experience. Here and in what follows I use the former expression to ensure terminological homogeneity. 9 coincidentally aware of instances of both kinds of redness: external redness and phenomenal redness. If this were an adequate (phenomenological) description of a state of appearing, the Transparency-Thesis would indeed be wrong, for among the two kinds of redness Chalmers is talking about only external redness can be a sensible property, since only external redness is instantiated in a presentational object of the state of appearing. And if the subject of the state of appearing were, next to instances of external redness, also aware of instances of phenomenal redness, as Chalmers claims, it could not be the case that the phenomenal quality of the state of appearing was exhausted by the sensible properties instantiated in its presentational objects. However, if one thinks about it, it is obvious that Chalmers (phenomenological) description of the relevant state of appearing is not adequate. Given there is only one object that appears red in the relevant state of appearing; in this case it is just plain wrong that the subject of the state is presented with two (correlated) instances of redness. There is just the instance of redness in its visual field which is an instance of a sensible property. And, as far as the property of being a red-experience is concerned, the phenomenal quality of the state is exhausted by this instance of redness. No other property contributes to this ‘segment’ of the phenomenal quality – just as the Transparency-Thesis has it.20 This strong evidence notwithstanding, the truth of the Transparency-Thesis is not beyond dispute. In what follows, I will consider three possible objections against the Transparency- 20 Note that this criticism of Chalmers’ description of the phenomenology of a state of appearing does not rest on a preoccupation with what Martine Nida-Rümelin has called the perceptual model of phenomenological reflection. Nida-Rümelin offers the following description of this model: ‘[…] experiences are individual objects floating around in some inner space. […] the person who concentrates upon the phenomenal character of her own experience engages in an activity that may be described like this: she concentrates her attention upon the experience that appears to be there within some inner space and she concentrates her attention upon its apparent qualitative properties, upon its quasi-color or ‚mental paint’.’ (2007, 446) In her elaborated attack on the thesis of the transparency of experience Nida-Rümelin assumes that the main reason for the widespread belief in this thesis is the fallacious background assumption that, if this thesis were not true, something along the lines of this, obviously absurd, picture would have to be true. Be this as it may, my defense of the Transparency-Thesis against Chalmers rests on a far weaker background assumption – namely that, if the Transparency-Thesis were not true, subjects of appearing would have to be presented with additional properties, next to the good old sensible properties. Nothing in this assumption implies that these additional properties would have to be instantiated in “objects floating around in some inner space”. See Zemach (1991, 173) for a very similar consideration. 10 Thesis.21 The first objection proceeds in two steps. The first step concerns the evidential status of the Transparency-Thesis. It starts from an assumption I have explicitly conceded above: the assumption that the evidence for the Transparency-Thesis is purely phenomenological or firstpersonal. On this basis the reasoning runs as follows: First-personal or phenomenological evidence with respect to our states of appearing consists in those states’ seeming to us to be a certain way. But we all know from everyday situations that things sometimes seem to us to be a certain way even though they are not this way and there is no convincing reason to assume that the same cannot happen with respect to our states of appearing. They, too, can sometimes seem to us to be a certain way even though they are not this way. Consequently, the evidence for the Transparency-Thesis is not conclusive. It may be the case that some (all…) of our states of appearing seem to us to be transparent in the sense specified by the TransparencyThesis while, in fact, they are not transparent in this sense. Well, this consideration alone, even if it were correct, would fall short of a conclusive objection to the Transparency-Thesis. The lack of conclusive evidence for a claim is compatible with the truth of this claim. At this point the second step of the objection takes place. It consists in the giving of independent reasons to deny the Transparency-Thesis. The most obvious reason comes from the possibility of hallucinations. Hallucinations are, by definition, states of appearing in which no ordinary physical objects are presented to the subjects. So, if the subjects of hallucinations were presented with any objects, these objects would have to be something different from ordinary physical objects.22 And this consequence is to be avoided, if possible. However, in order to avoid it, one must reject the assumption that the subjects of hallucinations are presented with any objects in the first place. And, unfortunately, this assumption is precisely what the Transparency-Thesis implies. For if the phenomenal quality of a state of appearing is exhausted by the sensible properties of the 21 It is telling that these objections do not rest on observations of concrete states of appearing, like the one put forward by Chalmers, but, broadly speaking, on theoretical assumptions. 22 In section 3 we will come to know different proposals on what kind of things those objects may be. 11 objects presented to the subject, a state of appearing can have no phenomenal quality if there are no objects presented to its subject. And, since hallucinations have phenomenal qualities, it follows from the Transparency-Thesis that there are objects presented to the subjects of hallucinations. So, in order to avoid the aforementioned consequence, it is necessary to reject the Transparency-Thesis. And this is, no doubt, a strong reason to do so, if possible. My answer to this objection addresses its first step, the consideration to the effect that the phenomenological evidence for the Transparency-Thesis is inconclusive. As indicated above, I am happy in principle to concede the assumption the consideration starts from, that the evidence for the Transparency-Thesis is purely phenomenological or first-personal. But, as it stands, this assumption allows for different interpretations. And, to my mind, just in the interpretation the objection rests upon, it is not true. The interpretation in question is embedded in a natural but erroneous picture of phenomenology and the first-personperspective. The core of this picture is the assumption that the seeming from the first-personperspective is or incorporates some kind of cognitive state directed toward the relevant mental state which, in turn, provides the main or even the sole evidence for phenomenological judgements about the mental state. The first step of the objection suffers from two closely related deficiencies directly or indirectly stemming from this very picture of phenomenology and the first-person-perspective. In order to notice the first deficiency, one has to take into account what the Transparency-Thesis is about. It is about a (structural) feature of the phenomenal consciousness of states of appearing. According to my Nagelian explication, the phenomenal consciousness of states of appearing is the feature of these states to be such that there is a way it is like for its subject to be in this state (or just that it is somehow for its subject to be in this state). To be sure, it is not obvious from the outset how exactly this phrase is to be understood. And the same is certainly true for the talk of a seeming of a state of appearing from the firstperson-perspective. But, whatever the correct understanding of these phrases may be, it 12 sounds odd, to say the least, that a state of appearing could seem to its subject to be different from the way it really is with respect to the way it is like for the subject to be in it. And, most importantly, the reason for this is not, as some authors seem to think, that the seeming of the state of appearing from the first-person-perspective possesses an extraordinary high reliability with regard to the what-it-is-likeness of these states. The reason is rather that it is a mistake in the first place to construe the relation between the seeming of the state of appearing from the first-person-perspective and the what-it-is-likeness of these states as a relation between a seeming and a feature that the object of this seeming seems to have. For, in fact, even if both aspects might not fully coincide, there is no doubt that they are, so to speak, located at the same level. And this is true, regardless of what this level is. That is, it is true, regardless of whether they are located at the level of the state itself or at the level of a seeming of the state. However, the very idea, contained in the consideration against the reliability of phenomenology, that one’s seeming of one’s own states of appearing is misleading with respect to the phenomenal consciousness of these states, rests precisely on the failure to notice this fact. It rests on the presupposition that the former is related to the latter like a cognitive state to an object – or a feature of an object – it is directed towards. The second deficiency of the consideration at issue is closely related to the first. Note at the outset that the result that it is a mistake to construe the relation between the seeming of a state of appearing from the first-person-perspective and the what-it-is-likeness of this state as a relation between a seeming and a feature that the object of this seeming seems to have, is not incompatible with the general picture of phenomenology this mistake rests upon. To repeat: The core of this picture is the assumption that the seeming from the first-personperspective is or incorporates some kind of cognitive state directed upon the relevant mental state which, in turn, provides the main or even the sole evidence for phenomenological judgements about the mental state. As against this, the result just mentioned merely rules out that phenomenal consciousness is among the features that states of appearing seem to have 13 through this seeming. However, and this is the second deficiency, there are strong reasons to reject this general picture as well. Let me explain: It is part of the picture in question that the seeming from the first-person-perspective that is directed onto the relevant mental state provides the main or the sole evidence for phenomenological judgements about these states. The concept of evidence is crucial here. On the way I understand this concept, an evidence for a judgement or a belief has, at least, the following characteristics: it is something different from the judgement or the belief it is an evidence for and it is somehow located at the personal-level. Accordingly, the aforementioned assumption bears two notable implications. First, the seeming from the first-person-perspective has to be something different from the phenomenological judgement to which it provides evidence and, second, it has to be located at the personal-level. What does this come up to in the context of the general picture under consideration? Well, broadly speaking, there are two kinds of personal-level states: belief-like states and observation-like states. And since we can readily rule out that the seeming that provides the evidence for phenomenological judgements is a (further) belief-like state, we are entitled to assume that it has to be an observation-like state. What does this mean? To my mind, a personal-level, observation-like state is a state in which whatever it is directed upon is somehow present or ‘given’ to its subject. If this is right, it is entailed by the picture of phenomenology we are dealing with that states of appearing are somehow present or ‘given’ to their subjects. But this consequence is incompatible with the results reached in connection with the discussion of Chalmers’ phenomenological description. What we have learned there, is precisely that there is nothing present or ‘given’ to the subject of a state of appearing apart from the sensible properties it is presented with through being in this state. So, if there is something like a seeming of something at all, it is just the appearing or the being present of these sensible properties in the relevant state of appearing. These considerations do not only undermine the first objection, they also prompt a fundamental restatement of the common picture of phenomenology and the first-person14 perspective. The distinction usually made between a state of appearing and it’s seeming to be somehow just does not exist. And, accordingly, the evidential basis of phenomenal judgments about states of appearing cannot be provided by seemings directed onto states of appearing, it has to be provided by the states of appearing themselves.23 This restatement of the picture of phenomenology and the first-person-perspective bears an absolutely crucial consequence: Since all one is presented with in being in a state of appearing are the objects of the relevant state, these objects gain, from the first-person-perspective, epistemic priority over the state of appearing itself. And, even more remarkable, this epistemic priority goes along with an ontological dependence of the state on the objects: The first-person epistemic relation to the objects of a state of appearing that establishes this epistemic priority just is the presentation of these objects in the state of appearing. And just as the epistemic relation cannot persist in the absence of the relevant objects, the presentation of these objects (and, with it, the whole state of appearing) cannot persist in the absence of these objects either. To put it succinctly, if one removes the objects presented to the subject of a state of appearing one removes the state of appearing itself. This is why we should not, as it habitually happens, claim without hesitation that there can be states of appearing without something that is presented to its subjects.24 All this gives rise to a second, less fundamental, objection against the Transparency-Thesis. Many authors feel that the Nagelian characterization of phenomenal consciousness as a state’s being such that it is somehow for its subject to be in it entails that the subject of a state of appearing stands in one or another kind of acquaintance-like relation to the relevant state of appearing. In this sense, Dan Zahavi, to cite only one example, maintains: ‘[…] insofar as 23 To be sure, this assumption, inevitable as it is, gives itself rise to intricate questions. The following one is particularly pressing: given there is nothing like an observation-like seeming of our states of appearing, what could provide the evidential basis of our phenomenological judgments and our self-knowledge in general? The answer of this delicate question goes well beyond the scope of this paper. And so I have to leave it for another occasion. Let me just emphasize that, even though the Transparency-Thesis is itself a phenomenological judgment, the lack of an answer to this question does not, by itself, undermine the Transparency-Thesis. It is perfectly possible that we are fully justified in believing this thesis even though we do not entirely understand the way we are justified in believing it. 24 This point will be of major importance in the argumentation in section 3. 15 there is something it is like for the subject to have the experience, the subject must in some way have access to and be acquainted with the experience.’ (2005, 14) However, this is incompatible with the statement just made that states of appearing are in no way present or ‘given’ to their subjects. So, if Zahavi is right and if we want to adhere to our Nagelian characterization of phenomenal consciousness, we have to abandon this statement. But Zahavi is not right. The objection rests on one particular reading of Nagel’s phrase. But this reading is neither the only possible nor the most plausible one. Take the following instance of Nagel’s phrase as an example: (a) ‘There is a way it is like for me to be in state of appearing M’ According to one reading, (a) amounts to something like: (a)* ‘There is a way my state of appearing M is like for me’ In this reading the phrase 'a way it is like for me' denotes some kind of – putatively acquaintance-like – cognitive relation between me and my state of appearing M. This is the reading underlying the intuitions of Zahavi and others. However, (a) allows for another reading commonly overlooked by these authors. According to this alternative reading, (a) is roughly equivalent to: (a)** ‘There is a way it is like for me in virtue of being in state of appearing M’ In this reading the phrase 'a way it is like for me' denotes something that is true for me in virtue of my being in state of appearing M. The truth of this has no tendency to support the assumption of an acquaintance-like cognitive relation between me and my state of appearing M. The answer to the question 'What, then, is it that is like for me?', if it needs an answer, is something like: the sensible properties presented to me in state M. Read this way, Nagel’s characterization of phenomenal consciousness is perfectly compatible with the assumption that states of appearing are in no way present or ‘given’ to their subjects.25 25 Fred Dretske has captured the spirit of this understanding of phenomenal consciousness very well: ‘Experiences […] are conscious, not because you are conscious of them, but because, so to speak, you are conscious with them.’ (1993, 281) 16 A final suspicion against the Transparency-Thesis may come from a concept I have ignored so far, the concept of a mode of appearing. Modes of appearing are seeing, hearing, feeling and so on. According to the standard approach, the mode of a state of appearing is to be distinguished from its content. Both are said to be independent from each other, at least to a certain degree. It is possible, the idea goes, that the same content appears to us under different modes of appearing and that different contents appear to us under the same mode of appearing. Given this is right, the Transparency-Thesis seems to be incompatible with the existence of modes of appearing, for there is no doubt that the mode of a state of appearing has an impact on the phenomenal quality of the relevant state of appearing. But, on the Transparency-Thesis, the phenomenal quality is exhausted by the sensible properties presented to the subject, which are obviously part of the content. Against this, I reject the standard approach and my argument for doing so is quite simple. As far as I can see most of the appeal of the standard approach comes from the fact that sentences like the following ones can be coincidentally true: (3) ‘I hear the dog (as) barking’ (4) ‘I see the dog (as) barking’ In these sentences the expressions denoting aspects of the contents of the states of appearing ascribed are the same (‘barking’ / ‘barking’), while the expressions denoting the respective modes of appearing are different (‘hear’ / ‘see’). This prompts the suggestion that the states of appearing ascribed by both sentences eventually have the same content, but differ in their modes of appearing, which would be a confirmation of the standard approach. However, this reasoning is fallacious. The states of appearing ascribed in (3) and (4) do not have the same content, for the sensible properties appearing in these states, which are obviously part of their contents, are not the same. A suggestive way to point this out is by saying that the fields of appearance of both states are constituted by sensible properties of very different kinds. It is just that this difference is not visible in the sentences (3) and (4) for 17 the simple reason that barking is not a sensible property.26 But if we were describing both states of appearing with regard to the sensible properties appearing in them, the resulting descriptions would differ from each other.27 So, examples like these provide no evidence for the independence of modes of appearing from contents of states of appearing. This raises the question, what the relation between modes of appearing and contents of states of appearing really look like. Well, apparently, modes of appearing vary as functions of the sensible properties appearing. Roughly speaking, if the field of appearance is constituted by colors, the mode of appearing is visual. If the field of appearance is constituted by sounds or properties of sounds, the mode of appearing is auditory and so on. And this already gives us the answer to our question: A mode of appearing is just a particular set of sensible properties. And a state of appearing has this mode if and only if the field of appearance presented to its subject is constituted by these sensible properties. Consequently, the mode and the content of a state of appearing are not independent of one another. The former is, rather, reducible to the latter. 28 Hence, the existence of modes of appearing gives us no reason to abandon the Transparency-Thesis. This should suffice to regard the Transparency-Thesis as confirmed. In the remainder of this section I will, against the background of this result, consider three alternative 26 To be sure, this is not to say that the barking of the dog is not at all part of the content of both states of appearing. It certainly is – even if maybe in a different sense than the respective sensible properties are. But this does not save the argument for the standard approach, since in order for this argument to go through the contents of both states must not differ in any respect. And this at least has been shown not to be the case. 27 We should not withhold that there are examples that are less easily overruled. Take for example the sentences (5) ‘I see the table as angular.’ (6) ‘I feel the table as angular.’ With respect to these sentences it is not far-fetched that the content-expression 'angular' may denote a sensible property. However, I think, fundamentally we can stand by our reasoning, even in light of this example. For, here, too, it is obvious that the fields of appearance constituting the states ascribed in the sentences are ‘filled’ with properties of different kinds. The question to be answered is whether, in light of this fact, we should concede to angularity the status of a sensible property. I think we should not – at least not the status of a visual sensible property. Angularity, while it can be, so to speak, fully present in one’s visual field is not among the properties the presentation of which constitutes the presentation of its bearers in the first place. It is rather that its presentation supervenes on the presentation of these properties. 28 Note that I have here tacitly used the concept mode of appearing as a phenomenological concept. This is certainly disputable. Maybe it is not phenomenology alone that determines whether a state of appearing is, say, a visual state of appearing. Maybe, for example, questions of the functional integration of the state are also relevant. But be this as it may, it is certainly undeniable that modes of appearing have essentially a phenomenological aspect. And accordingly, my arguments can be read as arguments concerning this aspect. 18 characterizations of the phenomenon of transparency and explain why I take them to be inadequate. In doing so, I will rely on the assumption made above that any adequate characterization of the transparency of appearing has to be purely phenomenological, in the sense defined there. The first characterization to be considered comes from Christopher Hill. He states: ‘When we examine visual experience introspectively, we do not encounter images of any kind, nor do we encounter anything that could be described as a sensation. In general nothing presents itself to introspection as an internal private object or occurrence. It appears to us that we ‘see through’ the experience, or in other words, that the experience provides us with direct access to external objects and their properties. I will refer to this doctrine as the transparency principle […] [emphasis added]. (2006, 252)’29 What Hill wants to say here seems to be, roughly, that the objects that are presented to us in states of appearing are presented to us not as private and internal, but as public and external. However, while there may be a sense in which this is right, this sense obviously outruns the limits of the phenomenology of states of appearing. The phenomenology of states of appearing is determined by the way things appear as the bearer of sensible properties. So, Hill is certainly right in claiming that objects that are presented to us in states of appearing are not presented to us as private or as internal. But this is not, as Hill seems to think, due to the fact that they are presented to us as public and as external. It is rather due to the fact that being private and being internal are not sensible properties. But precisely the same is true for the properties of being external and of being public as well. Hence, contrary to Hill’s suggestion, the objects presented to us in states of appearing are no more presented to us as external or public as they are presented to us as private or internal. The phenomenology of states of 29 See also Martin (2002, 380f), Rowlands (2001, 161) or Tye (2000, 45f). 19 appearing is completely neutral in this respect. Accordingly, this cannot be part of the transparency of states of appearing. The second example is by Uriah Kriegel. According to Kriegel, the thesis that states of appearing are transparent is tantamount to the following claim: ‘The only introspectively accessible aspect of a phenomenal experience is its world-directed representational content.’ (2009b, 371) To begin with, the notion of “introspection” used by Kriegel has a wide and a narrow sense. The wide sense is aptly characterized by Fred Dretske: ‘[…] “introspection” is just a convenient word to describe our way of knowing what is going on in our own mind […].’ (2003a, 7) On the narrow sense, on the other hand, it stands for some kind of inner, observation-like representation of mental states.30 If Kriegel uses 'introspection' in the wide sense, his characterization of transparency does not differ from mine in any interesting way. So, for the sake of argument, I will read ‘introspection’ in Kriegel’s characterization in the narrow sense. However, even on this assumption, the characterization allows for two interpretations. This is due to an ambiguity in the expression 'world-directed representational content'. The world-directed representational content of a state of appearing is either that which appears to the subject of the state or that in virtue of which something appears in this state.31 If Kriegel uses the term in the former sense, he is wrong in saying that the worlddirected representational content of the state of appearing is introspectively accessible. For, in this case, the world-directed representational content of the state of appearing is not a property of the state of appearing at all. However, if he uses the term in the latter sense, in the sense of a property in virtue of which something appears in a state of appearing, he would likewise be wrong in assuming that the world-directed representational content of the state of appearing 30 I take it to be uncontroversial that introspection in the wide sense is at least conceptually compatible with the absence of introspection in the narrow sense. 31 For a lucid exposition of this commonly neglected difference see Thompson (2008). 20 were introspectively accessible. This is so for two reasons. The first reason is fundamental and all too commonly missed. Recall that the talk of an introspective observation of certain properties of states of appearing makes sense only if it is meant to entail something like the presentation of these properties to the subject of the introspection. However, intentional properties of states of appearing, that is, properties in virtue of which something appears in a state of appearing, are just not the kind of properties that can be present in the required way. Let me explain: Such a property is or incorporates the relevant subject’s property of being presented with something. Hence, being presented with such a property would amount to being presented with the relevant subject’s (be it oneself or someone else) being presented with something. And such a thing is just impossible.32 The second reason we have already encountered in connection with the passage cited from Chalmers. The claim that we are presented with properties of our states of appearing in addition to properties of the presentational objects of these states is phenomenologically inadequate. And this is no less true for intentional properties than it is for the kind of intrinsic phenomenal qualities Chalmers presumably has in mind. A third example is due to Michael Martin. Martin maintains: ‘When my attention is directed out at the world, the lavender bush and its features occupy center stage. It is also notable that when my attention is turned inwards instead to my experience, the bush is not replaced by some other entity belonging to the inner realm of the mind in contrast to the […] street […]. I attend to what it is like for me to inspect the lavender bush through perceptually attending to the bush itself while at the same time reflecting on what I am doing.’ (2002, 380) According to Martin, the phenomenon of transparency consists in the fact that a subject cannot attend to its state of appearing, but through attending to the objects of this state. 32 Not to mention the problem that, according to many approaches the representational properties of states of appearing are external properties. 21 Characterizations of the transparency of appearing along these lines are remarkably widespread. 33 But, given a literal reading of phrases like ‘my attention is turned inwards instead to my experience’ or ‘I attend to what it is like for me’, it is not better off than Kriegel’s characterization. For, given such a literal reading, ones attending to ones state of appearing presupposes that the relevant state of appearing is somehow presented to one (that is, that it is introspected in the narrow sense). And this presupposition is not only incompatible with the phenomenology of states of appearing,34 it also leaves unintelligible the question of how one could attend to one's state of appearing through attending to an object of this state. The lesson to be drawn from the failures of the relevant readings of Kriegel’s and Martin’s characterizations parallels the result of the discussion of the first objection against the Transparency-Thesis. The transparency of appearing is not, as some authors seem to think, a fact about introspection (in the narrow sense). It is precisely the fact of the absence of introspection (in the narrow sense). That states of appearing are transparent means that we cannot observe them, but can only be in them.35 3. The consciousness of states of appearing As advertised above, in this section I will set forth in some detail what I take to be the implications of the transparency of appearing, understood along the lines of the TransparencyThesis, regarding the nature of the phenomenal consciousness of states of appearing. Recall 33 See for example Harman (1990), Rowlands (2001) or Tye (2000). See above. 35 At this point a widely missed connection comes into view: the connection between transparency and transcendence (but see Rowlands [2003, 2008]). Let us say that a property is transcendent if and only if it is impossible that it is presented to any subject. And let us assume, moreover, that states of appearing are not only actually transparent but necessarily so. Then, the transparency of states of appearing implies the transcendence of its intentional features. For, if the intentional features of states of appearing could be presented to the subject of the state, they would, in being so, also contribute to the phenomenal quality of these states. And this is precisely what is ruled out by the transparency of the states. 34 22 once again, the phenomenal consciousness of states of appearing is the property of a state of appearing to be such that there is a way it is like for its subject to be in this state (or just that it is somehow for its subject to be in this state). I have already established that this is not to be read as an indication of any kind of inner seeming or appearing of the respective states of appearing: It is not somehow for a subject to be in a state of appearing because the state of appearing is somehow present or ‘given’ to the subject, but because there is something presented to the subject through being in the state of appearing. Given this, what are the conclusions to be drawn from the transparency of appearing regarding the phenomenal consciousness of states of appearing? In answering this question I will proceed in two steps. In the first step, I will, on the basis of the Transparency-Thesis, establish a condition of adequacy for accounts of the phenomenal consciousness of states of appearing. This condition of adequacy will allow me to exclude a number of customary accounts immediately. Then, in the second step, I will investigate three possible accounts that are not obviously ruled out by the condition of adequacy and consider whether they are compatible with the TransparencyThesis. First, to the condition of adequacy just mentioned. Here is the Transparency-Thesis once again: The phenomenal quality of a particular state of appearing is fully exhausted by the sensible properties presented to the subject of the state and their distribution over the respective field of appearance. The Transparency-Thesis straightforwardly implies that the phenomenal qualities of states of appearing coincide with the sensible properties instantiated in the presentational objects presented in this state. And this is already the condition of adequacy I am after. I shall call it the Inseparatism Condition. As a matter of course, the choice of this name is not arbitrary. The term 'inseparatism' is due to George Graham, Terence Horgan and John Tienson, who use it to expresse the view that the phenomenal and the intentional properties of mental states are 23 inseparable from each other.36 The Inseparatism Condition confirms a variety of this view. This is evident as soon as one realizes that the sensible properties presented to a subject in a state of appearing, together with their specific distribution over the relevant field of appearance, coincide with one kind of intentional content of this state of appearing. Let us call this kind of content sensible content.37 Note first how well the Inseparatism Condition squares with our intuitions. Think about one of your own visual states of appearing. In this state – whatever it might be – you are presented with instances of sensible properties distributed over your visual field and these sensible properties and their distribution over your visual field make up the sensible content of your state of appearing. Given this, think about the way it is like for you to be in this state of appearing. If you are like me in this respect it will strike you as obvious that the way it is like for you to be in this state of appearing also coincides with the sensible properties you are presented with and the way they are distributed over your visual field, that is, with the sensible content of your state of appearing. This becomes particularly evident if one thinks about a change of one or the other of these factors. Imagine any change in the sensible properties you are presented with or in the way they are distributed over your visual field. Obviously, this will go along with a change in the way it is like for you to be in this state of appearing. And the same is true when it goes the other way around. Imagine any change in the way it is like for you to be in this state of appearing. The only way this change could take place is in virtue of a change in the sensible properties you are presented with or in the way they are distributed over your visual field. So, apparently, the phenomenal qualities of states 36 See Graham, Horgan and Tienson (2009) or Horgan and Tienson (2002). Note that the fact that a state of appearing has this kind of content is compatible with its having further kinds of intentional contents. And, I think, this is exactly the way things are. We should follow Chalmers in being content pluralists (see Chalmers [2006]). Applied to states of appearing, content pluralism says that every state of appearing exhibits different aspects that deserve to be called intentional content of this state and that there is no point in choosing one of them to the detriment of the others and call it the intentional content of the state of appearing. 37 24 of appearing do indeed coincide with the sensible properties instantiated in the presentational objects present in this state – just as the Inseparatism Condition has it.38 As indicated above, the Inseparatism Condition straightforwardly rules out a number of familiar accounts of the phenomenal consciousness of states of appearing. Let me give you a short overview over these accounts and the reasons for their incompatibility with the Inseparatism Condition. If one focuses on the main features one can distinguish three accounts. I shall call them Fichteanism, Non-structuralism and Modeofpresentationalism. Fichteanism, as I understand it, is the thesis that for a mental state to be phenomenally conscious is for it to be the object of a kind of fundamental self-consciousness, whereas a state of fundamental self-consciousness is to be understood as a state that is directed towards a current mental state and contains or immediately justifies or gives rise to a first-person selfascription of this mental state.39 Fichteanism comes in different forms. We can distinguish between higher-order and one-level versions of Fichteanism. According to the former, the state that is made phenomenally conscious and the state that makes it phenomenally conscious (i.e. the state of fundamental self-consciousness) are independent of one another. According to the latter, this is not the case. 40 With respect to higher-order versions of Fichteanism incompatibility with the Inseparatism Condition is straightforward. The independence of all kinds of intentional contents of a state from its phenomenal consciousness – as characterized by Fichteanism – is entailed in the independence of this state from the state that makes it conscious. With respect to one-level versions of Fichteanism, however, the incompatibility with the Inseparatism Condition is less obvious. To be sure, it is hard to understand how the aspect of a mental state that makes it play the role of the fundamental (self-directed) self- 38 For a consideration along the same lines see Tye (2000, 48). The choice of the term ‘Fichteanism’ is, of course, due to the fact that this conception is most intimately associated with Johann Gottlieb Fichte. 40 For higher-order approaches see Armstrong (1968, 1997) or Lycan (1987, 1996). For one-level approaches see for example Drummond (2006), Janzen (2005, 2006), Kriegel (2009a) or Zahavi (1999, 2005). 39 25 consciousness could as well coincide with (a kind of) its intentional content. But there is certainly room for dispute here – a dispute, however, I will not engage in.41 The idea of Non-structuralism is best revealed by Ned Block’s famous metaphor of mental paint. On this metaphor, the relation of a state of appearing to its phenomenal consciousness is in important respects analogous to the relation between an object and its color or, to be more precise, to this relation as we take it in our naïve, pre-scientific picture of colors to be. Due to this picture, the color of an object is intrinsic to it and is itself purely qualitative and unstructured. Above that, it makes no contribution to the structure of the object. According to Non-structuralism, something similar holds for consciousness. The consciousness of a state of appearing is an intrinsic, purely qualitative and unstructured feature of this state that is independent of its intentional features.42 This characterization already makes apparent that the incompatibility with the Inseparatism Condition is built into the idea of Non-structuralism from the very beginning. Finally, the account I call Modeofpresentationalism rests on the widespread picture of intentional states I have already argued against.43 To repeat, applied to states of appearing this picture is as follows: every state of appearing consists of an intentional content and an intentional object, on the one hand, and a mode of appearing, on the other hand, whereas the mode of appearing is to be understood as the way the subject of a state of appearing is related to the content of this state. Accordingly, modes of appearing and contents of states of appearing are different and, to a certain degree, independent of one another. 41 This idea is particularly widespread among proponents of the view known as phenomenal intentionality. Phenomenal intentionality is a version of Inseparatism. It differs from Intentionalism, the other main version of Inseparatism, in the assumption that Intentionality is to be assimilated to phenomenal consciousness and not the other way around. This order of priority may explain the minor inclination among proponents of phenomenal intentionality to give up Fichteanism regarding phenomenal consciousness (see for example Horgan and Tienson [2002], Graham, Horgan, and Tienson [2004] as well as Kriegel [2009a, 2011a]). 42 Non-structuralism, understood this way, comes in two varieties. According to the first variety it is sufficient for a state of appearing to be conscious to have a feature of the kind described. According to the second variety this is only necessary for a state of appearing to be conscious. In addition to that, the subject of the state has to be aware of this feature (in a way yet to be determined). The latter version of Non-structuralism differs from Fichteanism only in letter, not in spirit. 43 See section 2. 26 Modeofpresentationalism, now, is the thesis that the phenomenal quality of a state of appearing is wholly or partly determined by its mode of appearing, understood in this sense. For Modeofpresentationalism the incompatibility with the Inseparatism Condition is less obvious than it is for Fichteanism and for Non-structuralism since, as against the latter, Modeofpresentationalism complies with the Inseparatism Condition to the extent that it incorporates phenomenal consciousness into the intentional structure of states of appearing. But this is not yet sufficient for compatibility with the Inseparatism Condition. The Inseparatism Condition, as defined above, is not neutral with respect to the aspect of the intentional structure of a state of appearing that is said to coincide with its phenomenal quality. On the Inseparatism Condition, the phenomenal quality of a state of appearing coincides with its sensible content – and nothing but its sensible content. And this is very well incompatible with Modeofpresentationalism, for the latter identifies the phenomenal quality with the way the subject of a state of appearing is related to the content of this state. Having settled this, I shall turn to the second step of my argument. As advertised above, in this step I will investigate three possible accounts that seem to meet the Inseparatism Condition at first glance and consider whether they do so in fact and whether they also meet other constraints imposed by the Transparency-Thesis. I shall call them Modeof-representationalism, Contentualism and Presentationalism.44 Modeof-re-presentationalism The account I call Modeof-re-presentationalism is a close relative of Modeofpresentationalism. According to Modeof-re-presentationalism, the sensible contents 44 One might miss the account known as Adverbialism on this list. After all, Adverbialism meets the Inseparatism Condition insofar as it makes no distinction between sensible properties and phenomenal qualities. Nonetheless I abstain from taking Adverbialism into account for it is too obviously incompatible with the phenomenology of states of appearing. Proponents of Adverbialism straightforwardly deny the relational structure of states of appearing. According to them, even sensible properties are just intrinsic properties of the respective subjects of appearing themselves or, as Chisholm puts it, ‘”affections” or “modifications” of the person who is said to experience them.’ (Chisholm, 1969, 17). But the relational structure is certainly an essential aspect of the phenomenology of states of appearing and, beyond that, a condition of the truth of the Transparency-Thesis. 27 of states of appearing are something similar to what modes of appearing are usually taken to be. They are ways subjects of states of appearing are related to the objects these states are about. Let me set out more perspicuously what this amounts to. Remember first that the relation subjects of appearing bear to the objects states of appearing are about is the relation of appearing and that the objects states of appearing are about are just plain physical objects. So, on Modeof-re-presentationalism, the sensible content of a state of appearing – the content that coincides with the phenomenal quality of a state of appearing – is taken to be nothing but an aspect of the relation the subject of this state bears to the physical objects this state is about. As such it has, so to speak, no bearing whatsoever on the object-side of the state of appearing. It is an aspect of the way something appears, not of that which appears in this way. Moreover, the relation of appearing is taken to be direct. That is, when the physical object a state of appearing is about appears to the subject of this state this does not happen in virtue the subjects being presented with another – putatively mental – object. There is just the physical object standing in the appearing relation to the subject.45 Thus, we can conclude that Modeof-re-presentationalism avoids the mistake of its close relative, Modeofpresentationalism. In contrast to the latter, it takes the phenomenal quality of a state of appearing to coincide with nothing but the sensible content of this state – just as it is required by the Inseparatism Condition. But, apart from this advantage, Modeof-representationalism, too, faces serious problems. The most obvious problem comes, as it is so often the case in this area, from the possibility of states of appearing in the absence of any physical objects appearing in them (from hallucinations, for short). But before I address this problem let me point out two less familiar, but equally remarkable problems. First, as indicated above, according to Modeof-re-presentationalism, the relation of appearing is direct. That is, when a physical object appears to a subject there is nothing else the subject is aware of than just this physical object. Proponents of Modeof-re45 The purest example of Modeof-re-presentationalism I know of is William Alston’s recent version of the so called theory of appearing (1999). 28 presentationalism take this to be a merit of their theory. But there is a problem arising from this assumption: The directness of the appearing relation prompts the assumption that, at least in veridical states of appearing, it is the sensible properties of the appearing physical object itself that determine the sensible content of the state (the way this object appears, as Modeofre-presentationalists would say). However, the sensible properties of the physical object, whatever their appearing may consist in, are properties of the object of appearing, they are not aspects of the relation of appearing. They are entities that appear, not ways of appearing. But since Modeof-re-presentationalists distinguish, for good reasons, between the way something appears and that which appears in this way, it seems that in veridical states of appearing the sensible content cannot be what Modeof-re-presentationalism wants it to be: an aspect of the relation of appearing. Proponents of Modeof-re-presentationalism can react to this argument in two ways. For one thing, they can accept the conclusion, but insist that in non-veridical cases the sensible content is very well an aspect of the relation of appearing – as Modeof-representationalism has it. As it were, this reaction is not very promising. One of its consequences would be that the sensible contents of veridical and non-veridical states of appearing would not only (possibly) be different, but different in kind. While the former would be an aspect of objects that stand in the appearing relation to subjects the latter would be an aspect of instances of just this appearing relation itself. This is certainly hard to accept. For another thing, proponents of Modeof-re-presentationalism can reject the conclusion. The most reasonable way to do so is by denying the premise that in veridical states of appearing it is the sensible properties of the physical object that determine the way this object appears (i.e. the sensible content). Instead they could insist that even in these states the sensible content is an aspect of the relation of appearing. This reaction may go through – given that it is possible in the first place that sensible contents are aspects of the relation of appearing. Whether the latter is the case will be the matter of the subsequent argument. For the moment, let me just 29 stress that the reaction under consideration disperses a good deal of the support from common sense that proponents of the theory hope to gain through their emphasis of the directness of the appearing relation. The second argument aims directly at the characterization of sensible content offered by Modeof-re-presentationalism. What does the sensible content of a state of appearing seem to be from the first-person-perspective? As we have said, the sensible content of a state of appearing coincides with the sensible properties the subject of the state is presented with and the way they are distributed over its field of appearance. Given this, the evidence from phenomenology is unambiguous: the sensible properties as well as their distribution over the field of appearance are aspects of the object-side of the state. They are not aspects of the subject’s relation to the appearing objects. Just ask yourself: What does it mean that an object appears red to you? It means that an object is presented to you and that there is redness at this object. Considered from the first-person-perspective, the notion of a way an object appears to one, understood as distinct from the object and its properties, gets no grip at all.46 47 48 Finally, to the problem mentioned at the outset, the problem from the possibility of hallucinations: Hallucinations are states of appearing that obtain in the absence of physical objects appearing in them. But, according to Modeof-re-presentationalism, the phenomenal consciousness of (veridical) states of appearing consists precisely in the direct appearing to 46 The considerations at work here are more or less the same that led us to reject Modeofpresentationalism. In both cases we reject the idea that something like aspects of our relations to the objects that appear to us are phenomenologically manifest. But since both accounts characterize different aspects in this way, our diagnoses are correspondingly different. Modeofpresentationalism describes modes of appearing incorrectly and Modeofre-presentationalism describes sensible contents incorrectly. 47 This is one of the intuitions that led proponents of indirect realism to insist so stubbornly on the existence of mental objects. As C.F. Broad has put it: ‘When I look at a penny from the side I am certainly aware of something; […]. If, in fact, nothing elliptical is before my mind, it is very hard to understand why the penny should seem elliptical […].’ (1965, 89f) What Broad expresses here, is his inability to understand how a sensible content could be anything other than aspects of objects that are presented to a subject. To my mind, this point is notoriously underestimated by critics of indirect realism. 48 Proponents of Modeof-re-presentationalism use to back up their position by pointing to our ordinary way of speaking. If an object appears (as) red to you, you can truthfully say that the object appears to you in a certain way. Does this not support the Modeof-re-Presentationalist account of sensible content? Not at all! For, notoriously, a look at the surface structure of an assertion does not release one from the obligation to figure out what one does say with this assertion. And this is precisely what I have just tried to do for the case at hand. 30 such physical objects. 49 So, at first glance, Modeof-re-presentationalism seems to be incompatible with the assumption that hallucinations are phenomenally conscious. But, since hallucinations are phenomenally conscious, 50 Modeof-re-presentationalism seems to be untenable tout court. The only way out of this problem for Modeof-re-presentationalists is to subscribe to a version of Disjunctivism, according to which hallucinations are phenomenally conscious in a different way than (veridical) states of appearing are – a way that does not entail the direct appearing of ordinary physical objects. 51 Furthermore, it can be taken for granted that Modeof-representationalists will endorse a strong version of this view, a version according to which the phenomenal consciousness of hallucinations is independent not just of the direct appearing of ordinary physical objects, but of the direct appearing of any kind of objects. Everything else would run counter to the spirit of this position. However, we are already familiar with the mistake in this reasoning: As a phenomenological thesis the Transparency-Thesis holds for hallucinations no less than for veridical states of appearing. And, on the Transparency-Thesis, the phenomenal quality of a state of appearing – the way it is like to be in this state for a subject – is exhausted by the sensible properties presented to the subject. But, if this is right, as I take it to be, neither veridical states of appearing nor hallucinations can ever be phenomenally conscious, as long as nothing is presented to their subjects. Contentualism The view I call Contentualism rests on a specific conception of the content of states of appearing. For reasons that will become apparent soon, I will call the kind of content 49 I use the term ‘direct appearing’ here, instead of the term ‘presentation’, since Modeof-re-Presentationalists would be unhappy with the latter. With respect to the implications relevant for the following argument this makes no difference. 50 This is obvious at least as long as one sticks to Nagel’s characterization of phenomenal consciousness, as I do. Given a more narrow characterization there may be room for dispute. 51 Disjunctivism regarding states of appearing is the view that there is a fundamental difference in metaphysical kind between veridical states of appearing and either illusions and hallucinations or just hallucinations. For an overview over different versions of disjunctivism regarding states of appearing as well as the main arguments for and against them see the papers in Byrne, Logue (2009) and Haddock, Macpherson (2008). 31 corresponding to this conception non-relational content.52 For a state of appearing to have a non-relational content means, first of all, to have certain conditions of satisfaction. 53 The conditions of satisfaction of a state of appearing are the conditions the fulfillment of which makes the state a veridical state. For ordinary states of appearing these conditions are, approximately, that objects at certain space-time locations have certain sensible properties. States of appearing have their respective conditions of satisfaction regardless of whether these conditions are met. What is more, for a state of appearing to have the conditions of satisfaction determined by its non-relational content it is not required that there is something at all that is presented to the subject of this state (in this state).54 It is rather the other way around. If there is something that is presented to the subject of a state of appearing this is partly due to the fact that the state has the conditions of satisfaction determined by its nonrelational content. On the concept of non-relational content, the presentation of something to the subject of a state of appearing is the result of an interplay between two factors: the nonrelational content of the state and the fulfillment of the conditions of satisfaction determined by it. But, while the first factor is essential to the state, the latter is not. Its absence is compatible with the existence of the state at issue. And, as a consequence, the existence of the state at issue is as well compatible with the absence of anything that is presented to its subject. Contentualism, now, is the view that the phenomenal quality of a state of appearing coincides with the non-relational content of this state. Contentualism is not susceptible to the critique against Modeof-re-presentationalism. In contrast to the latter, it does not try to wrangle the sensible content of a state of appearing in 52 Note that this choice of name is misleading in one respect. It prompts the false impression that contents of this kind literally have to be non-relational properties of states of appearing or subjects of appearing. But the conception of a non-relational content, as I shall introduce it, is not entirely incompatible with externalist accounts of content. As will become apparent soon, it is merely incompatible with contents being – or resting on – relations to actually existing entities (see Campbell [2002, ch. 6] and Crane [2006] for classifications along the same lines). I choose the name nonetheless because it automatically draws ones attention to this very incompatibility, which will turn out to be the most critical factor in the concept of a non-relational content. 53 The term 'condition of satisfaction' is taken from John Searle (1983, 10). I adopt it because it is usefully neutral in different respects. 54 Here and in what follows the phrase ‘there is’ is to be understood in the broadest possible sense – a sense according to which even non-existent, meinongian objects are there. 32 the relation between the subject and the object of the state. In addition to that, it seems to account for the possibility of hallucinations and illusions in an elegant way. For, in contrast to Modeof-re-presentationalism, it does justice to the strong intuition that these states are states of the same fundamental kind. According to Contentualism, all of these are essentially states with a certain kind of non-relational content. The sole difference is that in illusions and hallucinations the satisfaction-conditions are, to different degrees, unfulfilled.55 Unfortunately, Contentualism is, as Brad Thompson puts it, ‘[…] too good to be true.’ (2008, 393) To begin with, let me emphasize that Contentualism, as explicated above, is unambiguous in the following respect: the non-relational content of a (veridical) state of appearing is independent from that which is presented to the subject of this state. This is why the former can exist in the absence of the latter. This assumption bears two important consequences. First, properly speaking, Contentualism does not meet the Inseparatism Condition. The sensible content of a state of appearing is explicitly defined in terms of – and only of – the sensible properties presented in this state. And these sensible properties are, by definition, properties of presentational objects, that is, properties of something that is presented to the subject of the states of appearing. The non-relational content, on the other hand, is explicitly defined as something independent of what is presented to the subject. So, it cannot literally coincide with the sensible properties and their distribution over the field of 55 It is not an easy matter to determine who is a Contentualist in this sense and who is not. It is plain that every Contentualist is an Intentionalist. But it is hard to settle which Intentionalist is also a Contentualist. Many Intentionalists talk like Contentualists when characterizing their view in general terms, but turn out to be Presentationalits (see below) when it comes to the treatment of concrete examples (Fred Dretske and Michael Tye seem to me to be examples in point (see Dretske [1999] or Tye [2000]). It is one of the many virtues of Adam Pautz` paper Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence to make the latter point clearly visible. He states: ‘[…] one might think that Intentionalists must reject Item-Awareness [roughly, Presentationalism; D.F.]. On the Intentionalist view, hallucinatory experience represents that something is there; but there is nothing there, and hence there is no object presented to consciousness. […] However, some Intentionalists try to have it both ways. They hold that experience is at once representational and presentational. They aim to accommodate Price’s intuition [the intuition that any experience is genuinely presentational; D.F.] while avoiding the pitfalls of the Sense Datum Theory by replacing sense data with allegedly more innocuous entities.’ (2007, 496). This seems to me a perfectly accurate characterization of what is going on. (Indeed, I disagree with Pautz in the evaluation of the attempt 'to accommodate Price’s intuition'. While he takes it to be resting on a mistake, I take it to be a move in the right direction (see below)). In any case, at least Adam Pautz himself belongs unambiguously to the Contentualist camp (see 2007, 2009, 2010). 33 appearance. At most, it can coincide with the sensing properties of the state of appearing.56 Second, and more importantly, Contentualism is, contrary to first appearance, incompatible with the Transparency-Thesis. That which is presented to the subject of a (veridical) state of appearing are the instances of sensible properties, but since, according to Contentualism, the non-relational content of a (veridical) state of appearing is independent of that which is presented to the subject of this state, it follows from Contentualism that states of appearing with non-relational contents can exist in the absence of sensible properties presented to their subjects. And, as we have already ascertained, this possibility is ruled out by the Transparency-Thesis. To be sure, at this point a Contentualist could simply reject the Transparency-Thesis. However, this would not only violate a thesis we take to be definitely confirmed, it also runs counter to the spirit of Contentualism. For one of the main motivations of Contentualism and other accounts resting on the notion of non-relational content is precisely the prospect of being capable of doing justice to the phenomenology of hallucinations, as is revealed in the Transparency-Thesis, without introducing any entities presented in them. So, what a Contentualist should say, is that what we describe as the presentation of sensible properties in cases of hallucinations is just those states’ being about sensible properties and that that is all there is to the phenomenal quality of hallucinations. Unfortunately, this answer will not do. What the Transparency-Thesis teaches us, is, amongst other things, that we just cannot remove the objects present in a state of appearing without getting rid of the state itself. When it comes to Contentualism, this is manifest in the following dilemma: Assume that the Contentualist ‘two-factor’ treatment of the presentation of sensible properties in veridical states of appearing is adequate. In this case the nonrelational content alone is not sufficient to ensure the presentation of sensible properties. It needs to be supplemented by an external factor – the fulfilment of the conditions of 56 Recall: the sensing properties of a state of appearing are the properties in virtue of which the subject of this state is presented with the sensible properties it is presented with. 34 satisfaction it determines. But this result is incompatible with the Contentualist treatment of the presentation of sensible properties in hallucinations. For, on this treatment, the nonrelational content is sufficient to ensure the presentation of sensible properties. If, on the other hand, the Contentualist treatment of the presentation of sensible properties in hallucinations is right and the non-relational content is, thus, sufficient to ensure the presentation of sensible properties, this is in turn incompatible with the Contentualist treatment of the presentation of sensible properties in veridical states of appearing. For, if the non-relational content is sufficient to ensure the presentation of sensible properties in hallucinations, it has to be so in veridical states of appearing as well. But, as we have seen, this is just what is denied by the ‘two-factor’ treatment of the presentation of sensible properties in veridical states of appearing. As a result, we have to reject Contentualism either. This is a most remarkable outcome. After all there is broad consensus among philosophers concerned with matters of consciousness and perception that the assumption of the transparency of states of appearing strongly supports one or another version of Contentualism. Against this, we now had to learn that at least the Transparency-Thesis does not only fail to support Contentualism, but is, as a matter of fact, incompatible with it. Before I proceed to the next account of the phenomenal consciousness of states of appearing, let me stick with Contentualism for a moment. In the light of the shortcomings just revealed the considerable popularity of Contentualism (at least in letter) asks for an explanation. I will try to give an outline of such an explanation and the failures contained in it. One part of the explanation seems to be that the ready application of the notion of nonrelational content to states of appearing is driven by false analogies. In the literature we find two kinds of examples of intentional or representational states that seem to be in accordance with Contentualism and that Contentualists tend to treat as analogous (in the critical respects) to states of appearing: states of representational systems that lack consciousness and a firstperson-perspective and propositional attitudes. But a closer investigation will reveal that 35 these states are not analogous to states of appearing and that the difference is precisely what makes the notion of a non-relational content inapplicable to the latter. Take states of representational systems that lack consciousness and a first-personperspective first. A nice example in point is the speedometer. It is perfectly plausible to ascribe to speedometers something like non-relational contents in the sense specified above. The states of a speedometer represent the speed of the car the speedometer is fitted into. And as long as everything works properly, they do so correctly. Of course, it is not always the case that everything works properly. In the extreme case the speedometer is entirely removed from the car. But this does not mean that it ceases to represent the speed of the car (at least not immediately). Rather, it continues to represent the speed of the car, but does so in-correctly. In other words: the states of the speedometer retain their representational content while there is nothing left of which it is true that they represent it. So, the representational content of a speedometer corresponds perfectly well to the notion of non-relational content. And, since the features of this content seem to promise an elegant solution of the problem of hallucination, it is only natural that Contentualists are inclined to treat states of appearing as analogous to states of speedometers.57 But to subscribe to this analogy means to lose sight of the phenomenology of states of appearing. Most prominently, states of appearing differ fundamentally from states of speedometers in their having phenomenal qualities. Drawing on the Transparency-Thesis, we can express this difference as follows: While we are presented with instances of sensible properties the speedometer is not in any sense presented with the speed of the car it is fitted into. Or, to put it somewhat differently, while the sensible properties presented to us are somehow for us, the speed of the car is not somehow for the speedometer. And, as we have figured out, it is just this presentational character of states of appearing that resists a Contentualist treatment. 57 Especially Fred Dretske does this quite excessively (see 1995). 36 The second false analogy, mentioned above, is the analogy with propositional attitudes, like beliefs and desires. A particularly clear example of a false analogy along these lines is due to Gilbert Harman. Criticizing classical arguments for the introduction of sense data, he states: ‘In order to see that such arguments are fallacious, consider the corresponding argument applied to searchers: ‘Ponce de Leon was searching for the Fountain of Youth. But there is no such thing. So he must have been searching for something mental.’ This is just a mistake. From the fact that there is no Fountain of Youth, it does not follow that Ponce de Leon was searching for something mental.’ (1990, 35) Harman is obviously right in stating that the argument he cites contains a fallacy. One can search for something even if there is nothing for which it is true that one is searching for it. There is no need to introduce any kind of surrogate for the real object of search. So, the content of one’s searching also seems to be a kind of non-relational content and if the case of appearing were in the crucial respects analogous to the case of searching, as Harman apparently takes it to be, we would, again, have a model for an elegant solution of the problem of hallucination before us – a solution that blocks any arguments for the introduction of sense data. But, again, the cases are not analogous. While states of searching do not lack a phenomenology and phenomenal qualities altogether, as states of speedometers do, they, too, do not have the presentational character distinctive of states of appearing. There is usually nothing presented to a subject of a state of searching – at least, nothing that contributes to the content of this state – as it is essential for being in a state of appearing. And for this reason it is illegitimate to convey the characterization of Ponce de Leon’s search for the Fountain of Youth to cases of hallucinations, as Harman does. That it is easily imaginable that someone is searching for something even though there is nothing he is searching for, does nothing to 37 make it imaginable that someone is in a state of appearing of something even though there is nothing that is presented to her.58 The mistakes revealed in the investigation of both false analogies gives us, moreover, a more general picture of what has gone wrong in the adaption of Contentualism. Contentualists started with the claim to doing justice to an important phenomenological fact, the fact that veridical states of appearing and hallucinations are phenomenologically on a par. But in the course of their efforts they lose sight of just the fact they have claimed to explain. They lose sight of the phenomenology of states of appearing. As a result they offer an account that would explain the commonality of veridical states of appearing and hallucinations precisely if these states did not have the phenomenology they have, that is, the phenomenology that gave rise to the whole enterprise in the first place. Presentationalism Finally, let us come to the fourth account of phenomenal consciousness of states of appearing. I shall call it Presentationalism. It is the account I take to be adequate – even if not in all of its varieties. Presentationalism is quite simple-minded: The phenomenal consciousness of a state of appearing consists just in the subjects being presented with instances of sensible qualities on presentational objects and the specific phenomenal quality of a state of appearing is fully determined by the sensible content of this state of appearing. Or, to put it even more concisely, phenomenal consciousness of states of appearing is just presentation. 59 60 Presentationalism avoids the problems of Modeof-re-presentationalism and Contentualism. In 58 In my opinion, this difference coincides with the difference between conceptual and non-conceptual contents. It seems to be obvious that Ponce de Leon can search for (or think about, or believe in …) the Fountain of Youth precisely because he possesses a concept of the Fountain of Youth and ‘applies’ it in his searching (thinking, believing …) (conceptual content). And it seems equally obvious that we need not possess the concept of a specific sensible property in order for this property appearing to us (non-conceptual content) precisely because its appearing consists in its being presented to us. But this is an issue I cannot settle here. 59 Let me emphasize that Presentationalism is an account of the phenomenal consciousness of states of appearing only. Whether it, or something similar, is applicable to other kinds of mental states as well, is an open question. 60 Presentationalism is akin to what Pautz called, in his already mentioned paper, item awareness (see 2007, 495 and Fn. 55). As indicated above, Pautz himself rejects item awareness (and thus Presentationalism). Unfortunately, space does not suffice to deal with his reasoning. 38 contrast to Modeof-re-presentationalism, it does justice to the fact that the sensible content of a state of appearing is something that is presented to the subject, not a way something is present and, in contrast to Contentualism, it treats the sensible properties presented to the subject of every state of appearing as constituent parts of those states. However, the last point raises a well-known prima facie problem when it comes to hallucinations and illusions, for in both kinds of states the most obvious candidates for presentational objects and their sensible properties are wholly or partly absent. 61 In what follows I will focus on cases of hallucinations. I will present three proposals how to deal with these cases that are posed in the framework of Presentationalism and consider whether they are satisfactory from the phenomenological point of view I have adopted for this paper. I shall call them Platonic Presentationalism, Meinongian Presentationalism and Phenomenalist Presentationalism. Proponents of these views agree, as they have to in order to be Presentationalists, on the thesis that phenomenal consciousness of states of appearing is just presentation of sensible properties, but they disagree regarding the ontological status of the sensible properties present in hallucinations. According to Platonic Presentationalism, they are just uninstantiated properties. According to Meinongian Presentationalism, they are instances of properties, but on non-existent Meinongian objects. And, according to Phenomenalist Presentationalism, they are instances of properties on subjective, mental particulars (sense data). Let us consider these proposals in turn. Platonic Presentationalism First, to Platonic Presentationalism: on Platonic Presentationalism, the subject of a hallucination is presented with the same sensible properties it would be presented with if it 61 This, of course, is why the most natural variety of Presentationalism is ruled out from the outset. On this version of Presentationalism, the objects and sensible properties presented to the subjects of states of appearing are always plain old physical objects and properties. 39 were in a corresponding veridical state of appearing. But, in contrast to the case of the veridical state, these properties are not instantiated in any objects. They are just universals.62 Let me frankly point out that I am astonished by the relative popularity of this account and the significant shortage of serious critique of it.63 As far as I can see, it is more or less obviously false. And the reason is that universals are just not the kind of entities that could stand in the presentation relation to a subject. To see this, it is enough to have a look at the attributes universals are usually characterized by. Wolfgang Künne, for example, mentions, amongst others, non-observability <Nicht-Wahrnehmbarkeit>, uniqueness <Einzigkeit>, non-spatiality <Nicht-Räumlichkeit> and non-temporality <Nicht-Zeitlichkeit>.64 Is it really believable that entities that have these properties could be presented to us in roughly the same way sensible properties are presented to us in veridical states of appearing? I think it is not. Whatever it is that is presented to us in a state of appearing, it exists presumably in space and certainly in time. And, as a consequence, at least the objects of some hallucinations have to be numerically different. So, it seems as if they are neither non-spatial nor non-temporal nor unique. And, as far as the feature of non-observability is concerned, it would be surprising, to say the least, if what makes universals non-observable were not preventing them from being objects of presentation. This should suffice to reject Platonic Presentationalism. Meinongian Presentationalism Next to Meinongian Presentationalism: Proponents of Meinongian Presentationalism avoid the mistake of taking the objects of hallucinations to be abstract. Instead they take them to be fully concrete objects, but ones that, in contrast to ordinary physical objects, do not exist.65 62 A view along these lines is most thoroughly worked out by Mark Johnston (2004), but see also Forrest (2005), Dretske (1999) and Tye (2000). 63 Notable exceptions are Kriegel (2011b), Pautz (2007). 64 See Künne (1983, 63). 65 We find a particularly clear expression of this position in A.D. Smith: ‘Hallucinations, equally with veridical perception, presents us not with sensations, or sense-impressions, or sense-data, but with normal objects […]. […] the only difference between a veridically perceived object and a hallucinated object is that the latter does not exist, or is unreal. When Macbeth hallucinated a dagger, he was not aware of visual sensations. What he was 40 I, for my part, find it difficult to evaluate this position. Despite their concreteness, it is not much easier to believe that non-existent objects can ever be presented to us in roughly the same way objects of veridical states of appearing are presented to us than it is to believe that universals are presented to us in this way. It is not only that, the current revival of Meinongian ideas notwithstanding,66 the introduction of such objects still counts as an extravagancy; it is also that, at least intuitively, non-existent objects do also not seem to be the kind of beings that could stand in the presentation relation to someone. In addition, some of the problems Platonic Presentationalism founders on seem to reappear. Given, for example, two people have indistinguishable hallucinations of a dagger. Are they presented with the same or with different non-existent daggers? However, as far as I can see, all this does not amount to a knock down argument against Meinongian Presentationalism. Thus, we should conclude that, from the phenomenologiucal point of view adopted in this paper, Meinongian Presentationalism is by and large acceptable. Whether we should endorse it in the end depends in the first place on how well its alternatives are off. Phenomenalist Presentationalism The last alternative available is what I have called Phenomenalist Presentationalism. Most prominently, Phenomenalist Presentationalism differs from Platonic and Meinongian Presentationalism in entailing a distinction between the objects a state of appearing is about and the objects presented in this state. According to Phenomenalist Presentationalism, the objects a state of appearing is about are ordinary physical objects, while the objects presented aware of was, I shall […] suggest, a dagger located at some point in physical space before him, though one that was not existent, or un-real.’ (Smith 2002, 234) For further statements of Meinongianism in this sense see, amongst others, McGinn (2004b), Knight (2013). 66 See, amongst others, Chrudzimski (2007), McGinn (2004b), Priest (2005). 41 in the state – regardless of whether it is veridical or hallucinatory – are subjective mental particulars (in what follows: sense data) that, in turn, represent the objects the state is about.67 The problems of this kind of approach are all too familiar. However, for the most part they lie outside the scope of the phenomenological attitude I adopted for the course of this paper.68 So, while it is important to hold them in mind, I will ignore them for the time being. Instead I will focus on the question of the compatibility of Phenomenalist Presentationalism with the Transparency-Thesis. Since Phenomenalist Presentationalism is not least motivated by phenomenological considerations,69 and since the Transparency-Thesis is a phenomenological claim, it is to be expected that the former fits very well with the latter. And that is exactly what we find. For one thing, sense data differ from so called qualia in being objects, not properties of states of appearing. Accordingly, Phenomenalist Presentationalism has no tendency to support the assumption of a kind of inner observation.70 Quite the contrary, since the existence of sense data is compatible with the absence of any physical object a given state of appearing is about, Phenomenalist Presentationalism makes it particularly easy to explain the possibility of phenomenal consciousness in the absence of such objects without making recourse to some kind of inner observation. For another thing, as we have already learned in connection with Christopher Hill’s characterization of transparency, there is no 67 This is, of course, more or less the theory usually known as indirect realism or sense-datum theory. For classical versions of this theory see Broad (1965), Price (1932), Russell (1912). For more recent versions see Jackson (1977), Maund (2003), Perkins (1983), Robinson (1994). 68 Let me mention just the two most notable of these problems. First, in introducing subjective mental particulars into one’s ontology, one does not only increase the number of fundamental kinds of entities in this ontology, one also offends against Common Sense and Naturalism. The weight of this point will, of course, partly depend on the degree of problematicity of the ontological commitments connected with alternative accounts. And as it happens, Meinongian Presentationalism, the only available alternative so far, is itself connected with a quite problematic commitment (even if not with an ontological commitment in the strict sense [see Smith 2002, 240]). It is connected with the commitment to non-existing objects. Everyone may decide for herself which commitment is more harmful. Second, through the assumption that we are presented with subjective mental particulars in veridical states of appearing proponents of Phenomenalist Presentationalism posit what has been called a veil of perception – a barrier, built from the mental particulars in question, that forever deprive us of direct perceptual contact with the world. This is, no doubt, an undesirable consequence. It is, however, a matter of dispute whether it is undesirable only in virtue of its intuitive implausibility or whether it has, in addition to that, problematic epistemic consequences. The latter would be the case if it bore the implication that our perceptual knowledge about real-world objects rests on inferences from truths about mental particulars. But, while this consequence was not at least drawn by many early indirect realists (see Russell [1912]), I think, it does not indeed follow from indirect realism (for a convincing line of argument to this end, see Maund [2003, 79-86]). 69 Another important source of motivation are causal considerations (see Robinson [1994], Sollberger [2007]). 70 This point is frequently missed (see for example Shoemaker [1996, 8]). 42 phenomenological evidence for or against the assumption that the objects presented to us in states of appearing are private, mental particulars. So, we can conclude that with Phenomenalist Presentationalism we have before us a second variety of Presentationalism, next to Meinongian Presentationalism, that is apt to meet the conditions posed by the Transparency-Thesis. And it seems to meet them even somewhat more perspicuously. Remember that, despite our acceptance in principle of this possibility, we found it hard to imagine that non-existent objects might stand in the presentation relation to subjects of states of appearing. Similar problems do not arise with respect to the mental particulars introduced by Phenomenalist Presentationalism. It may be hard to believe that those mental particulars exist, but it is not hard to believe that they are presented to us, if they exist. So we have to conclude that, from our phenomenological point of view, Phenomenalist Presentationalism is better off than any other account we have considered. How well it is off with respect to other criteria is, of course, another matter. This is again a highly remarkable result. It militates against both, the almost universal condemnation of all versions of Phenomenalist Presentationalism 71 and the widespread assumption that Phenomenalist Presentationalism is incompatible with the transparency of appearing.72 4. Summary Starting from the assumption that the transparency of appearing is a purely phenomenological feature, I have established the Transparency-Thesis: 71 As should been apparent, this is not to say that it is entirely incompatible with the rejection of Phenomenalist Presenstationalism. 72 For reasons for this assumption, see Hill’s characterization of the transparency of appearing cited in section 2 and my discussion of it. See also, for example, Harman (1990), Martin (2002), Rowlands (2001). 43 The phenomenal quality of a particular state of appearing is fully exhausted by the sensible properties presented to the subject of the state and their distribution over the respective field of appearance. It has turned out that, it is not only apparent that the Transparency-Thesis is true, but also that it bears some surprising consequences. The first and most fundamental consequence is that one has to give up the idea of the first-person-perspective as a kind of inner seeming or appearing directed onto mental states (at least, if the relevant states are states of appearing). Further consequences, closely related to the first, concern the nature of phenomenal consciousness. On the Transparency-Thesis, the phenomenal quality of a state of appearing is exhausted by the sensible properties presented to the subject of the state. This is incompatible with two assumptions entailed in numerous popular accounts of phenomenal consciousness: first, that phenomenal qualities are properties of states of appearing that are independent or partly independent of the (sensible) properties presented in these states and, second, that there can be phenomenally conscious states of appearing even though there is nothing that is presented to their subjects. As a result, two of the rather disreputable accounts of consciousness – the accounts I have called Meinongian and Phenomenalist Presentationalism – turned out to be best off vis-à-vis the truth of the Transparency-Thesis. References Alston, William. 1999. “Back to the Theory of Appearing.” Philosophical Perspectives 33 (13): 181-203. Armstrong, David M. 1968. A Materialist Theory of the Mind,. London, New York: Routledge. Armstrong, David M. 1997. “What is Consciousness.” In The Nature of Consciousness, edited by Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Güven Güzeldere, 721 – 728. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: MIT Press. Broad, Charles D. 1965, “The Theory of Sensa.” In Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing, edited by Robert Swartz, 85-129. London, Los Angeles, Berkeley: University of California Press. 44 Byrne, Alex and Heather Logue, eds. 2009. Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: MIT Press. Campbell, John. 2002. Reference and Consciousness, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Chalmers, David. 2003. “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief,” In Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Aleksandar Jokic, Quentin Smith, 220-272. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Chalmers, David. 2004. “The Representational Character of Experience.” In The Future for Philosophy, edited by Brian Leiter, 153-181. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Chalmers, David. 2006. “Perception and the Fall from Eden.” In Perceptual Experience, edited by Tamar Gendler, John Hawthorne. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Chisholm, Roderick M. 1957. Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Ithaca New York: Cornell University Press. Chisholm, Roderick M. 1969. “On the Observability of the Self.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 (1): 7-21. Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz. 2007. Gegenstandstheorie und Theorie der Intentionalität bei Alexius Meinong. Dordrecht: Springer. Crane, Tim. 2006. “Is There a Perceptual Relation?” In Perceptual Experience, edited by Tamar Gendler, John Hawthorne. 126-146, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Dretske, Fred. 1993. “Conscious Experience.”Mind 102 (406), 263-283. Dretske, Fred. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: MIT Press. Dretske, Fred. 1999. “The Mind's Awareness of Itself.” Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2),103-24. Dretske, Fred. 2003. “How do you know you are not a Zombie?” In Privileged Access – Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, edited by Brie Gertler, 1-13. Burlington: Ashgate. Drummond, John J. 2006. “The Case(s) of (Self-)Awareness.” In Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, edited by Uriah Kriegel, Kenneth Williford, 199-220. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: MIT Press. Forrest, Peter. 2005. “Universals as Sense-Data.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3), 622-631. Graham, George, Terence Horgan and John Tienson. 2004. “Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat.” In The Externalist Challenge, editeb by Richard Schantz, 297-318. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter. Graham, George, Terence Horgan and John Tienson. 2009. “Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of Mind.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Ansgar Beckermann, Brian McLaughlin, Sven Walter, 512-537. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 45 Haddock, Adriana und Fiona Macpherson, eds. 2008. Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Harman, Gilbert. 1990. “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.” Philosophical Perspectives 4, 31-52. Hill, Christopher. 2006. “Perceptual Consciousness: How it opens directly onto the world, preferring the world to the mind.” In Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, edited by Uriah Kriegel, Kenneth Williford, 199-220. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: MIT Press. Horgan, Terence, John Tienson. 2002. “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.” In Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, edited by David Chalmers, 520-533. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Jackson, Frank. 1977. Perception. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jackson, Frank. 2007. “The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism.” In Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge, edited by Torin Alter, Sven Walter, 52-64. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Janzen, Greg. 2005. “Self-Consciousness and Phenomenal Character.” Dialogue 44 (4), 707-733. Janzen, Greg. 2006. “Phenomenal Character as Implicit Self-Awareness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12), 44-73. Johnston, Mark. 2004. “The Obscure Object of Hallucination.” Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3), 83-113. Knight, Gordon. 2013. “Disjunctivism Unmotivated.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1-18. Kriegel, Uriah. 2009a. Subjective Consciousness. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kriegel, Uriah. 2009b. “Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology.” Philosophical Studies 143 (3), 357-381. Kriegel, Uriah. 2011a. The Sources of Intentionality. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.46 Kriegel, Uriah. 2011b. “The Veil of Abstracta.” Philosophical Issues 21 (1), 245-267. Künne, Wolfgang. 1983. Abstrakte Gegenstände. Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann. Lycan, William G. 1987. Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: MIT Press. Lycan, William G. 1996. Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: MIT Press. Martin, Michael G.F. 2002. “The Transparency of Experience.” Mind and Language 4 (4), 376-425. Maund, Barry. 2003. Perception. Chesham: Acumen Publishing. McGinn, Colin. 2004. “The Objects of Intentionality.” Chap. 10 in Consciousness and its Objects. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Moore, George E. 1903. “The Refutation of Idealism.” Mind 12 (48), 433-453. Nagel, Thomas. 1974. “What is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review 83, 435-50. 46 Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2007. “Transparency of Experience and the Perceptual Model of Phenomenal Awareness.” Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1), 429-455. Pautz, Adam. 2007. “Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence.” Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1), 495-541. Pautz, Adam. 2009. “What Are the Contents of Experiences?” Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236), 483-507. Pautz, Adam. 2010. “An Argument for the Intentional View of Visual Experience.” In Perceiving the World, edited by Bence Nanay, 254-309. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Perkins, Moreland. 1983. Sensing the World. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. Price, H.H. 1932. Perception. London: Methuen Priest, Graham. 2005. Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Robinson, Howard. 1994. Perception. London, New York: Routledge. Rowlands, Mark. 2001. The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rowlands, Mark. 2003. “Consciousness: The Transcendalist Manifesto.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3), 205-21. Rowlands, Mark. 2008. “From the Inside: Consciousness and the First-Person Perspective.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3), 281 – 297. Russell, Bertrand. 1912. The Problems of Philosophy. London: Williams and Norgate. Searle, John R. 1983. Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shoemaker, Sydney. 1996. “Introspection and the Self.” Chap. 1 in The First-Person Perspective and other Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, A.D. 2002. The Problem of Perception. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Sollberger, Michael. 2007. “The Causal Argument Against Disjunctivism.” Facta Philosophica 9 (1), 245-267. Thompson, Brad. 2008. “Representationalism and the Argument From Hallucination.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3), 384-412. Tye, Michael. 2000. Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: MIT Press. Zahavi, Dan. 1999. Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. Zahavi, Dan. 2005. Subjectivity and Selfhood. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: MIT Press. Zemach, Eddy M. 1991. “Perceptual Realism, Naïve and Otherwise.” In John Searle and his Critics, edited by Ernest Lepore, Robert Van Gulick, 169-179. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 47