Abstract: Our reply is in four parts. The first part addresses objections to our claim that there... more Abstract: Our reply is in four parts. The first part addresses objections to our claim that there might be" unknowable" color facts. The second part discusses the use we make of opponent process theory. The third part examines the question of whether colors are causes. The fourth part takes up some issues concerning the content of visual experience.
Joseph Levine, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.... more Joseph Levine, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. 204. This much-anticipated book is a detailed elaboration and defense of Levine's influential claim that there is an “explanatory gap” between the mental (specifically, consciousness) and the physical.
The Opacity of Mind is a terrific book. In a nutshell, the plot is this: Gilbert Ryle meets conte... more The Opacity of Mind is a terrific book. In a nutshell, the plot is this: Gilbert Ryle meets contemporary cognitive science, and together they produce a novel and exciting theory of self-knowledge. That might seem an improbable partnership, but the book shows that the two were made for each other.
Our question is: how do things look to the color-blind? But what does that mean? Who are the “col... more Our question is: how do things look to the color-blind? But what does that mean? Who are the “color-blind”?
By using my eyes, I can come to know that there is a hawk perching on the fence post. Cognitive s... more By using my eyes, I can come to know that there is a hawk perching on the fence post. Cognitive science has made enormous progress in understanding how we have this sort of perceptual knowledge. Any textbook on perception will go into detail about the receptors in the eye, the detection of low-level features such as edges, the recovery of 3D shape, and theories of object recognition.
When one turns a corner, going from direct sun into a street lit only by skylight, the significan... more When one turns a corner, going from direct sun into a street lit only by skylight, the significant change in the illuminant does not lead to a correspondingly large shift in the perceived color of one's clothing, automobiles, and the surrounding buildings. On the other hand, it is not as if there is no perceptible change—the dimmer, bluer character of the illuminant is also clearly visible.
This book is one of the latest in what is now a rather long line of attempts to 'naturalize'pheno... more This book is one of the latest in what is now a rather long line of attempts to 'naturalize'phenomenal consciousness. The theory on offer is a dispositionalist version of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory: simplifying a bit, an experience E is phenomenally conscious just in case it is disposed to cause the belief that the subject is having E (p.). Carruthers does a lot of useful spadework before the theory gets a full-dress defence.
Abstract The typical kind of color realism is reductive: the color properties are identified with... more Abstract The typical kind of color realism is reductive: the color properties are identified with properties specified in other terms (as ways of altering light, for instance). If no reductive analysis is available–if the colors are primitive sui generis properties–this is often taken to be a convincing argument for eliminativism. That is, realist primitivism is usually thought to be untenable.
Star Trek–style teleportation may one day become a reality. You step into the transporter, which ... more Star Trek–style teleportation may one day become a reality. You step into the transporter, which instantly scans your body and brain, vaporizing them in the process. The information is transmitted to Mars, where it is used by the receiving station to reconstitute your body and brain exactly as they were on Earth. You then step out of the receiving station, slightly dizzy, but pleased to arrive on Mars in a few minutes, as opposed to the year it takes by old-fashioned spacecraft.
As it is silly to ask somebody,'How do you know you are in pain?'it is equally foolish to ask,'Ho... more As it is silly to ask somebody,'How do you know you are in pain?'it is equally foolish to ask,'How do you know that you want to go to the movies?'Vendler, Res Cogitans Knowing that one wants to go to the movies is an example of self-knowledge, knowledge of one's mental states. It may be foolish to ask the man on the Clapham Omnibus how he knows what he wants, but the question is nonetheless important—albeit neglected by epistemologists. This paper attempts an answer.
In theorizing about perception, philosophers have often multiplied qualities. To perceptible qual... more In theorizing about perception, philosophers have often multiplied qualities. To perceptible qualities of external objects, like colors and shapes ('sensible'qualities), have been added qualities of experiences ('sensory'qualities) or of sense-data ('sensational'qualities). Start with sensory qualities. The phrase 'sensory quality'is not much in use these days, having lost out to 'phenomenal character,''phenomenal property,''qualitative character,'or 'quale.'But whatever sensory qualities are called, pinning them down is no easy matter.
In the Prelude to Matthen's marvellous Seeing, Doing, and Knowing—'The New Philosophy of Vision'—... more In the Prelude to Matthen's marvellous Seeing, Doing, and Knowing—'The New Philosophy of Vision'—he welcomes a comparatively recent development in theorizing about perception. Vision (for example) is not now treated as merely presenting the subject with a 'sensuously given mosaic of color spots'(David Lewis's phrase, quoted at p. 2), the relevance of which to the scene before the eyes is obscure, but rather as 'delivering an interpreted message'(p.
Quine and Davidson are the topics of, respectively, parts five and six of volume II of Philosophi... more Quine and Davidson are the topics of, respectively, parts five and six of volume II of Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century.1 In chapter 10, Soames examines Quine's arguments in Word and Object for the indeterminacy of translation; chapter 11 is devoted to the radical consequences of this thesis and an assessment of it. In chapter 12, Soames turns to Davidson's claim that theories of truth are theories of meaning; and in chapter 13, to his argument against alternative conceptual schemes.
The sensible qualities are not a miscellaneous jumble—they form complex structures. Crimson, mage... more The sensible qualities are not a miscellaneous jumble—they form complex structures. Crimson, magenta, and chartreuse are not merely three different shades of color: the first two are more similar than either is to the third. Familiar color spaces or color solids capture, to a greater or lesser extent, these relations between the colors. The same goes for sensible qualities perceived in other modalities: middle C, high C, and D are not merely three different notes, and the taste of lemons, oranges, and sugar cubes are not merely three different tastes.
Let us say that a speaker associates property P with word T iff the speaker believes that the ref... more Let us say that a speaker associates property P with word T iff the speaker believes that the referent of T (if it exists) has P. 1 Here are three roles that associated properties might fill. First, a speaker might be able to know that the referent of word T has certain properties (if it exists), armed only with her understanding of T and a bit of a priori reflection. If so, then let us say that those properties fill the a priori role (for word T).
Imagine a Laplacian demon. He knows everything that is expressed by true sentences of some approp... more Imagine a Laplacian demon. He knows everything that is expressed by true sentences of some appropriate physical language—every physical fact. 1 He knows everything that is a priori. Let ψ be a true sentence composed from any vocabulary whatsoever. 2 Using only the knowledge just stipulated as premises, can the demon deductively infer, and thereby come to know,(the proposition expressed by3) ψ? Borrowing Terry Horgan's delightful neologism, is cosmic hermeneutics possible? 4 That is the topic of this paper.
Traditionally, perceptual experiences-for example, the experience of seeing a cat-were thought to... more Traditionally, perceptual experiences-for example, the experience of seeing a cat-were thought to have two quite distinct components. When one sees a cat, one's experience is" about" the cat: this is the representational or intentional component of the experience. One's experience also has phenomenal character: this is the sensational component of the experience.
Abstract: Our reply is in four parts. The first part addresses objections to our claim that there... more Abstract: Our reply is in four parts. The first part addresses objections to our claim that there might be" unknowable" color facts. The second part discusses the use we make of opponent process theory. The third part examines the question of whether colors are causes. The fourth part takes up some issues concerning the content of visual experience.
Joseph Levine, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.... more Joseph Levine, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. 204. This much-anticipated book is a detailed elaboration and defense of Levine's influential claim that there is an “explanatory gap” between the mental (specifically, consciousness) and the physical.
The Opacity of Mind is a terrific book. In a nutshell, the plot is this: Gilbert Ryle meets conte... more The Opacity of Mind is a terrific book. In a nutshell, the plot is this: Gilbert Ryle meets contemporary cognitive science, and together they produce a novel and exciting theory of self-knowledge. That might seem an improbable partnership, but the book shows that the two were made for each other.
Our question is: how do things look to the color-blind? But what does that mean? Who are the “col... more Our question is: how do things look to the color-blind? But what does that mean? Who are the “color-blind”?
By using my eyes, I can come to know that there is a hawk perching on the fence post. Cognitive s... more By using my eyes, I can come to know that there is a hawk perching on the fence post. Cognitive science has made enormous progress in understanding how we have this sort of perceptual knowledge. Any textbook on perception will go into detail about the receptors in the eye, the detection of low-level features such as edges, the recovery of 3D shape, and theories of object recognition.
When one turns a corner, going from direct sun into a street lit only by skylight, the significan... more When one turns a corner, going from direct sun into a street lit only by skylight, the significant change in the illuminant does not lead to a correspondingly large shift in the perceived color of one's clothing, automobiles, and the surrounding buildings. On the other hand, it is not as if there is no perceptible change—the dimmer, bluer character of the illuminant is also clearly visible.
This book is one of the latest in what is now a rather long line of attempts to 'naturalize'pheno... more This book is one of the latest in what is now a rather long line of attempts to 'naturalize'phenomenal consciousness. The theory on offer is a dispositionalist version of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory: simplifying a bit, an experience E is phenomenally conscious just in case it is disposed to cause the belief that the subject is having E (p.). Carruthers does a lot of useful spadework before the theory gets a full-dress defence.
Abstract The typical kind of color realism is reductive: the color properties are identified with... more Abstract The typical kind of color realism is reductive: the color properties are identified with properties specified in other terms (as ways of altering light, for instance). If no reductive analysis is available–if the colors are primitive sui generis properties–this is often taken to be a convincing argument for eliminativism. That is, realist primitivism is usually thought to be untenable.
Star Trek–style teleportation may one day become a reality. You step into the transporter, which ... more Star Trek–style teleportation may one day become a reality. You step into the transporter, which instantly scans your body and brain, vaporizing them in the process. The information is transmitted to Mars, where it is used by the receiving station to reconstitute your body and brain exactly as they were on Earth. You then step out of the receiving station, slightly dizzy, but pleased to arrive on Mars in a few minutes, as opposed to the year it takes by old-fashioned spacecraft.
As it is silly to ask somebody,'How do you know you are in pain?'it is equally foolish to ask,'Ho... more As it is silly to ask somebody,'How do you know you are in pain?'it is equally foolish to ask,'How do you know that you want to go to the movies?'Vendler, Res Cogitans Knowing that one wants to go to the movies is an example of self-knowledge, knowledge of one's mental states. It may be foolish to ask the man on the Clapham Omnibus how he knows what he wants, but the question is nonetheless important—albeit neglected by epistemologists. This paper attempts an answer.
In theorizing about perception, philosophers have often multiplied qualities. To perceptible qual... more In theorizing about perception, philosophers have often multiplied qualities. To perceptible qualities of external objects, like colors and shapes ('sensible'qualities), have been added qualities of experiences ('sensory'qualities) or of sense-data ('sensational'qualities). Start with sensory qualities. The phrase 'sensory quality'is not much in use these days, having lost out to 'phenomenal character,''phenomenal property,''qualitative character,'or 'quale.'But whatever sensory qualities are called, pinning them down is no easy matter.
In the Prelude to Matthen's marvellous Seeing, Doing, and Knowing—'The New Philosophy of Vision'—... more In the Prelude to Matthen's marvellous Seeing, Doing, and Knowing—'The New Philosophy of Vision'—he welcomes a comparatively recent development in theorizing about perception. Vision (for example) is not now treated as merely presenting the subject with a 'sensuously given mosaic of color spots'(David Lewis's phrase, quoted at p. 2), the relevance of which to the scene before the eyes is obscure, but rather as 'delivering an interpreted message'(p.
Quine and Davidson are the topics of, respectively, parts five and six of volume II of Philosophi... more Quine and Davidson are the topics of, respectively, parts five and six of volume II of Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century.1 In chapter 10, Soames examines Quine's arguments in Word and Object for the indeterminacy of translation; chapter 11 is devoted to the radical consequences of this thesis and an assessment of it. In chapter 12, Soames turns to Davidson's claim that theories of truth are theories of meaning; and in chapter 13, to his argument against alternative conceptual schemes.
The sensible qualities are not a miscellaneous jumble—they form complex structures. Crimson, mage... more The sensible qualities are not a miscellaneous jumble—they form complex structures. Crimson, magenta, and chartreuse are not merely three different shades of color: the first two are more similar than either is to the third. Familiar color spaces or color solids capture, to a greater or lesser extent, these relations between the colors. The same goes for sensible qualities perceived in other modalities: middle C, high C, and D are not merely three different notes, and the taste of lemons, oranges, and sugar cubes are not merely three different tastes.
Let us say that a speaker associates property P with word T iff the speaker believes that the ref... more Let us say that a speaker associates property P with word T iff the speaker believes that the referent of T (if it exists) has P. 1 Here are three roles that associated properties might fill. First, a speaker might be able to know that the referent of word T has certain properties (if it exists), armed only with her understanding of T and a bit of a priori reflection. If so, then let us say that those properties fill the a priori role (for word T).
Imagine a Laplacian demon. He knows everything that is expressed by true sentences of some approp... more Imagine a Laplacian demon. He knows everything that is expressed by true sentences of some appropriate physical language—every physical fact. 1 He knows everything that is a priori. Let ψ be a true sentence composed from any vocabulary whatsoever. 2 Using only the knowledge just stipulated as premises, can the demon deductively infer, and thereby come to know,(the proposition expressed by3) ψ? Borrowing Terry Horgan's delightful neologism, is cosmic hermeneutics possible? 4 That is the topic of this paper.
Traditionally, perceptual experiences-for example, the experience of seeing a cat-were thought to... more Traditionally, perceptual experiences-for example, the experience of seeing a cat-were thought to have two quite distinct components. When one sees a cat, one's experience is" about" the cat: this is the representational or intentional component of the experience. One's experience also has phenomenal character: this is the sensational component of the experience.
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