M E L I S S A B . G U T W O R T H
L IL Y C U SH E N BE R Y
S A M U E L T . H U N T E R
Creativity for Deliberate Harm: Malevolent
Creativity and Social Information Processing
Theory
ABSTRACT
Both popular press and academic research laud the benefits of creativity. Malevolent creativity, however,
is the application of creativity to intentionally harm others. This study examines predictors of malevolent
creativity, considering both contextual and individual difference influences. Social information processing
theory suggests that situational cues might be more influential in shaping malevolent creativity. Two experimental laboratory studies test the effects of both formal and informal situational cues and find that these
factors are predictive of malevolent creativity components above and beyond individual differences such as
personality and cognitive ability. Implications of these findings for research and practice are discussed.
Keywords: creativity, deviance, social information processing theory.
Creativity is valued for solving complex problems and increasing productivity, and research has largely
focused on how to increase creativity to accomplish these outcomes. Recent work, however, has begun to
acknowledge malevolent creativity, or creativity used to intentionally harm others (Cropley, Kaufman, &
Cropley, 2008; Harris, Reiter-Palmon, & Kaufman, 2013). Examples of creativity gone awry have been identified in various fields such as the arts, science, and technology and this problem is predicted to become
increasingly widespread as society advances (McLaren, 1993). More specific cases of dark creative applications can be seen in instances of terrorism, where the Nazis used creative methods to gain followers, and in
the workplace, where employees used creativity to steal from employers in innovative, difficult to detect
ways (Gill, Horgan, Hunter, & Cushenbery, 2013; James, Clark, & Cropanzano, 1999; McLaren, 1993).
Although there has been a great deal of research on the predictors of traditional benevolent creative applications, the motivations behind the use of creativity for deliberate harm remain less clear.
Researchers have recently begun theorizing about how novel ideas can be used in dark ways. Malevolent
creativity has been defined as the act by which an individual produces a product that involves (a) originality, (b) usefulness, as defined within a social context, and (c) malevolence (Harris et al., 2013). Originality
indicates whether the idea is novel or surprising (Bessemer & O’Quin, 1999), usefulness refers to whether
the idea is applicable to the problem and effective as a solution (Amabile, 1983), and malevolence is the
intention to deliberately harm people, processes, property, and/or symbols (Cropley et al., 2008; Harris &
Reiter-Palmon, 2015).
This behavior differs from more traditional forms of creativity, which are not expressed with malevolent
intentions. Furthermore, malevolent creativity differs from other deviance in that it must satisfy the requirements of a creative product by being original and useful. Deviance such as aggression may be malevolent,
but may not be executed in an original and useful way. An example of malevolent creativity is an individual
designing a new gun that is undetectable by metal detectors to shoot individuals in a high security building.
This act intends to harm others, is novel, and is useful from the user’s perspective. Malevolent creativity
causes harm in innovative ways and is therefore difficult to detect and prevent. Research identifying predictors of this behavior is therefore vital for preventing and containing malevolent creativity.
The Journal of Creative Behavior, Vol. 0, Iss. 0, pp. 1–18 © 2016 by the Creative Education Foundation, Inc. DOI: 10.1002/jocb.155
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Creativity for Deliberate Harm
Although it may be simpler to discount malevolent creativity as a personality flaw, in general, creativity
can be influenced by environment (Alencar & Bruno-Faria, 1997; Amabile, 1983; Hennessey, 2015). The
mechanisms by which malevolent creativity is derived and the roles of individual and situational factors
remain unclear. Some theorists believe that understanding the motivations behind this phenomenon requires
a consideration of environmental influences that may trigger malevolent creativity (Cropley, 2010; Harris
et al., 2013; Runco, 2010).
Social information processing theory, which focuses on the influence of environmental aspects on behavior, may help explain the application of creativity to achieve dark aims. Specifically, Runco (2010) advances
a perspective of dark creativity that separates the creative process from moral components. He states that
the creative process itself simply provides the fuel to the resultant output in the form of novel ideas and the
dark side component is a result of deliberate dark decision making. Social information processing theory,
which states that individuals are shaped by their social context (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978), may explain how
and when an individual decides to apply the neutral process of creativity to a malevolent application. Furthermore, this theory supports the idea that context enables individuals to learn acceptable attitudes and
actions, which can include both desirable and undesirable behaviors (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). Although
social cues have been found to shape traditional, more desirable forms of creativity (Goncalo & Duguid,
2012), it remains unclear if this effect holds for malevolent creativity.
Consistent with recommendations by Cropley (2010) and others (e.g., Amabile, 1983), we rely on social
information processing theory to guide predictions across two experimental studies examining malevolent
creativity antecedents. As extensions of social information theory posit that both formal and informal situational cues can guide behavior (e.g., Fulk, 1993; Morrison, 1994; Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998), we
explore the effect of both types in addition to examining individual differences known to predict more traditional forms of creativity. Together, the results of these studies can provide a better understanding of
when and why creativity is used to harm instead of help.
STUDY 1: THE EFFECT OF FORMAL SITUATIONAL CUES
Although most studies analyzing context and creativity have focused on applications of creativity that do
not intentionally harm others (e.g., Goncalo & Duguid, 2012), it may be that situation can also drive creativity to be applied more malevolently. Specifically, social information theory posits that individuals are
shaped by social context (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). Although researchers have explored the effect of context
on traditional, more benign creativity (e.g., Zhou, Hirst, & Shipton, 2012), and have called for a focus on
context when examining deviant behavior (Oh, Charlier, Mount, & Berry, 2014), little is known about how
contextual cues can influence malevolent creativity.
Extensions of social information theory suggest that cues that shape behavior can be both formal and
informal (Fulk, 1993; Morrison, 1994; Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998). Formal cues such as rules and standards influence expectations for accepted behavior and some preliminary support exists for the influence of
formal cues in shaping both traditional creativity and destructive rule-breaking separately. For example, formal instructions regarding creativity have enabled individuals to demonstrate higher creativity (Shalley,
1991; Torrance, 1962). James and Taylor (2010) theorize, however, that if creative goals are dark, resulting
creative ideas may become destructive.
In this first study, we examine two formal situational cues: goal nature and means for goal accomplishment. When assigned a task, individuals’ reactions and solution strategies may be influenced by formal cues
such as the nature of the goal and instructions for how to accomplish the goal. With goal nature, we are
interested in whether benevolent or malevolent goals influence malevolent creativity. Goal nature influences
behavioral expectations and some preliminary support exists for this effect on traditional creativity (Shalley,
1991; Torrance, 1962). Whether this effect also applies to darker creative applications, however, remains
unclear.
In addition to the goal itself, formal expectations for task achievement may also influence attitudes and
behaviors (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). Although the situational goal may be malevolent, the mechanisms for
accomplishing the goal may not be. For example, an employee can plot to harm a coworker by improving
performance to steal the employee of the month title. Although the goal itself is negative (harming the coworker’s reputation), the means of achieving that goal (higher work performance) are not inherently malevolent. It is therefore important to consider how formal cues communicated through both goal nature and the
means for goal achievement affect malevolence and creativity aspects. In our first study, we explore the effect
of formal sense-making cues on malevolent creativity components. First, we predict that providing formal
2
Journal of Creative Behavior
instructions about the goal and specific means for goal achievement can shape aspects of this phenomenon
above and beyond individual differences.
H1: The nature of the goal and the means for goal achievement are predictive of usefulness,
originality, and malevolence above and beyond individual differences.
Although our main focus is on whether situational cues predict malevolent creativity components above
and beyond individual differences, we additionally seek to conduct exploratory analyses on the interactive
effect of these cues. Specifically, we predict that originality, usefulness, and malevolence will be highest when
both goal nature and means for goal achievement are malevolent. When multiple formal cues signal that
rule breaking is not tolerated (i.e., multiple security measures), counterproductive work behavior is reduced
(Greenberg, 1997). It may be, therefore, that the opposite effect is also true, and that the strength of two
formal malevolent cues can signal that malevolent expression is allowed. The combination of two formal
malevolent cues may reinforce the acceptance of malevolent solutions, clarifying acceptable behavior, and
allowing participants to focus on more useful and novel solutions.
H2: Usefulness, originality, and malevolence will be highest when both the goal nature and the means
for goal achievement are malevolent.
METHOD
Participants and design
Participants (N = 213) from a U.S. northeastern university participated in a study in exchange for course
credit (157 women, Mage = 19.01 years). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four cells created by
crossing goal nature (malevolent or benevolent) by means for goal accomplishment (malevolent or benevolent) in a between-participants design.
Procedure and materials
Participants worked at individual computer stations. After completing an online survey containing
demographics, cognitive ability, and personality measures, participants were presented with an ambiguous,
ill-defined problem to solve similar to those used in traditional creativity research studies (Guilford, 1950;
Mumford & Gustafson, 2007). Participants were asked to plan an event on campus that included either a
goal to increase university pride (benevolent) or harm a rival university (malevolent). Furthermore, to
accomplish their goal, participants were asked to either plan a prank (malevolent means for goal achievement) or a rally (benevolent means for goal achievement). For example, the condition with a benevolent
goal and malevolent means for goal accomplishment tasked participants to “plan a prank designed to
increase university pride.” This prompt was chosen as university pride is widespread, the rivalry with the
other university is well-known, and the situation is therefore more realistic for students, enabling us to better generalize our results to how participants would respond outside of the laboratory.
Gender, cognitive ability, and personality
To examine the influence of social context on malevolent creativity components above and beyond individual differences, we measured gender, cognitive ability, and personality factors shown to relate to creativity
and dark behavior. Women perform higher on creativity tests, and gender differences additionally exist in
rule-breaking behavior (Baer & Kaufman, 2006; Eagly & Steffen, 1986). Furthermore, although the relationship between creativity and intelligence is often debated, researchers generally agree that a basic level of
intelligence is needed to produce and analyze creative ideas (Barron, 1969; Sternberg, 1997). Cognitive ability has also been linked to malevolence, suggesting that individuals with greater ability may better recognize
deviance opportunities and construct successful rule-breaking strategies to capitalize on these opportunities
(Gamman & Raein, 2010; Grubb & McDaniel, 2007).
A variety of personality traits have also demonstrated relationships with creativity and malevolence. We
included the Big 5 personality traits as they have been linked to a number of rule-breaking and creativity
outcomes such as a tendency to be imaginative, prefer variety, disagree with others, and engage in criminal
behavior (Barron & Harrington, 1981; Bolton, Becker, & Barber, 2010; Feist, 1998; Ma, 2009). In addition,
we examined dominance as this characteristic is more directly affiliated with malevolence. Dominant individuals may feel entitled to control others, ignore rules, and be less fearful of repercussions (Aquino, Galperin, & Bennett, 2004).
3
Creativity for Deliberate Harm
To measure cognitive ability, participants were asked to indicate their grade-point average (GPA) and
scholastic assessment test (SAT) standardized test scores. GPA and SAT scores were used as a measure of
general intelligence based on previous research supporting a strong correlation between these measures and
cognitive ability tests (Frey & Detterman, 2004). Furthermore, correlations ranging from .80 to .92 have
been found between self-reported and verified SAT scores and grade-point averages (Cassady, 2001; Kuncel,
Crede, & Thomas, 2005). Dominance and Big 5 personality variables were assessed using 10-item scales from
the International Item Pool and responses ranged from 1 = disagree to 5 = agree (Goldberg, 2007). Consistent with other studies, alphas for all personality scales were above .80.
Usefulness, originality, and malevolence
By breaking down the various components of malevolent creativity (originality, usefulness, and malevolence), we can better understand how situational antecedents may differentially affect aspects of the overall
malevolent creativity phenomenon. It may be, for example, that a certain variable influences malevolence
but not usefulness. To capture usefulness, originality, and malevolence, participants’ task responses were
coded by three independent raters. For ratings, usefulness was defined as the extent to which the response
was applicable to the problem and effective as a solution, originality was defined as the extent to which the
response was unexpected and novel, and malevolence was defined as the extent to which the response
included harm to people (i.e., rival team players), property (i.e., rival university property), symbols (i.e.,
rival mascots), and/or process (i.e., stopping rival team members from playing sports) (Cropley et al., 2008;
Harris & Reiter-Palmon, 2015).
Raters underwent extensive training on study variables totaling 20 hours and engaged in practice ratings
on sample responses to better ensure accurate and valid scores. Disagreements in sample ratings were clarified
before actual responses were rated. Usefulness, originality, and malevolence were each rated on a scale from
1 = poor to 5 = excellent and benchmarking was conducted to identify poor-to-excellent responses. An
inter-rater reliability analysis produced ICC(2,3) of above .85 for usefulness, originality, and malevolence and
ratings were aggregated across raters to produce composite measures on each variable for each participant.
RESULTS
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations between study variables. It is of note
that a significant correlation exists between originality and malevolence. This finding provides additional
support for the hypothesized link between components of creativity and dark side applications. Although a
correlation of .48 exists between these variables, these outcomes were predicted differently by the various
antecedents in our study and are therefore meaningful and interesting to examine as separate constructs.
Nevertheless, readers should exercise caution so as not to over-interpret our results.
We tested our hypotheses using ordinary least-squares moderated regression (Aiken & West, 1991). To
examine incremental effects of specific antecedent types, we used a hierarchical multiple regression analysis
(Table 2). After starting with gender (step 1), we then entered cognitive ability (step 2), personality (step 3),
situational antecedents (step 4), and the product term (step 5). Goal nature and means for goal achievement
were dummy coded and the two were multiplied to create the interaction term. Furthermore, we used
regression analyses instead of ANOVA to examine both the amount of variance in our outcomes predicted
by each antecedent block and the amount of change in variance resulting from the addition of each antecedent group.
Our first hypothesis stated that situational variables, specifically, goal nature and the means for goal
achievement, would predict usefulness, originality, and malevolence above and beyond the effect of individual differences. Hierarchical regression analyses support this hypothesis. For all three aspects of malevolent
creativity, the addition of situational variables (in step 4) explained significantly more variance than previous
models including solely gender, cognitive ability, and personality.
For usefulness, only 2% of the variance was predicted by individual differences. The addition of the two
formal situational cues, however, explained 14% of the variance in usefulness (∆R2 = .13, p < .01). For originality, gender, cognitive ability, and personality factors explained 10% of the variance, whereas the addition
of situational cues explained a total of 32% (∆R2 = .22, p < .01). Finally, for malevolence, the individual difference variables predicted 3% of the variance and 57% after the inclusion of situational variables
(∆R2 = .54, p < .01). These findings provide support for social information processing theory by finding
that formal situational cues shape malevolent creativity components above and beyond variables that are
inherent in individuals such as gender, cognitive ability, and personality factors.
4
TABLE 1.
Means, SD, and Intercorrelations Among Study Variables—Study 1
1. Gender
2. GPA
3. SAT math
4. SAT verbal
5. Openness
6. Conscientiousness
7. Extraversion
8. Agreeableness
9. Neuroticism
10. Dominance
11. Meansa
12. Goalb
13. Usefulness
14. Originality
15. Malevolence
M
SD
–
3.46
600.90
582.77
3.59
3.73
3.70
3.95
2.11
2.61
1.52
3.46
3.33
2.93
2.08
–
.38
96.61
79.33
.62
.68
.66
.51
.56
.61
.50
.50
.84
.94
.82
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
.07
.14
.05
.11
.06
.06
.22
.12
.17
.04
.03
.03
.03
.07
.11
.18
.07
.17
.08
.21
.05
.02
.06
.10
.08
.08
.03
.54
.16
.05
.00
.02
.06
.07
.06
.03
.04
.05
.06
.10
.07
.11
.01
.04
.12
.11
.05
.02
.21
.08
.05
.18
.19
.03
.14
.02
.11
.00
.01
.01
.14
.38
.22
.13
.07
.07
.02
.01
.08
.01
.25
.21
.06
.02
.08
.00
.11
.31
.56
.00
.13
.00
.01
.06
.09
.02
.17
.01
.02
.02
.06
.02
.01
.16
.02
.04
.02
.51
.73
.33
.03
.12
.19
.05
.48
Notes. GPA = grade point average. Correlations at or above .14 are significant at p < .05; Correlations at or above .18 are significant at p < .01.
Means coded as Malevolent (1) or Benevolent (2).
b
Goal coded as Helping In-group (3) or Harming Out-group (4).
a
Journal of Creative Behavior
5
Standardized Regression Coefficients for Dependent Variables—Study 1
Step number
Gender
Cognitive ability
GPA
SAT math
SAT verbal
Personality
Openness
Conscientiousness
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Neuroticism
Dominance
Situation
Meansa
Goalb
Interaction
R2
∆R2
Usefulness
1
.03
2
3
.04
.08
.05
.03
.01
.01
Malevolence
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
.05
.04
.06
.03
.01
.02
.00
.01
.07
.09
.06
.03
.12
.06
.03
.11
.09
.06
.12
.08
.27**
.15*
.10
.28**
.09
.10
.22**
.10
.08
.19**
.04
.02
.10
.29
.28
.14
.08
.02
.12
.02
.08
.06
.09
.01
.12
.01
.10
.08
.04
.02
.05
.18
.03
.23**
.01
.02
.09
.14
.01
.21**
.00
.03
.09
.12
.01
.22**
.48**
.07
.71
.45*
1.29**
.35
.03**
.00
.37**
.00
.00
Originality
.02
.01
.14
.13**
1.61**
.34
1.75**
.19
.05**
.00
.00
.06
.06**
.10
.04
.32
.22**
.01
.01
2
3
.08
.05
.04
.07
.02
.01
4
5
.05
.03
.05
.08
.03
.07
.01
.02
.02
.02
.04
.04
.04
.05
.12
.06
.04
.03
.01
.12*
.07
.03
.02
.09
.01
.13*
.07
.05
.01
.08
.74**
.09
.42
.60**
1.26**
.60
.03**
.03
.02
.57
.54**
Notes. GPA = grade point average; DT = divergent thinking. Some of our standardized regression coefficients are greater than 1.0 and researchers have
found that these cases can legitimately occur (Deegan, 1978).
a
Means coded as Malevolent (1) or Benevolent (2).
b
Goal coded as Helping In-group (3) or Harming Out-group (4).
*p < .05, **p < .01.
Creativity for Deliberate Harm
6
TABLE 2.
Journal of Creative Behavior
In addition, we sought to explore whether the two situational variables interacted to predict aspects of
malevolent creativity. Our second hypothesis posited that usefulness, originality, and malevolence would all
be highest when both goal nature and the means for goal achievement were malevolent. Our results were
partially supported and the interaction shapes can be seen in Figures 1–3.
For usefulness (Figure 1), specifically, we found a significant interaction between the two formal cues
(b = 1.75, p < .01). However, usefulness was highest when situational cues both signaled more benevolent
output (helping the in-group by designing a rally) and the mean for usefulness was 3.78 (SE = .10) in this
condition. Posthoc tests reveal that this mean was statistically higher (p < .01) than the mean for harming
an out-group both with a malevolent goal (M = 3.21, SE = .11) and with a non-malevolent goal (M = 2.79,
SE = .11). Overall, these results do not support our hypothesis and instead suggest that usefulness was
higher when formal situational cues were both non-malevolent.
When focusing on originality (Figure 2), however, we found a significant interaction (b = 1.29,
p < .01) that supported our hypothesis. Originality was highest when individuals were given a malevolent
goal and when the means for achieving that goal were also malevolent (M = 3.50, SE = .11). Posthoc tests
reveal that this mean was significantly different (p < .01) from the condition where benevolent means for
4
3.5
Usefulness
Help In-Group
3
Harm Out-Group
2.5
2
Malevolent
Benevolent
Means for Goal Achievement
FIGURE 1. Effect of goal and means of goal achievement on usefulness in Study 1.
4
Originality
3.5
3
Help In-Group
2.5
Harm Out-Group
2
1.5
Malevolent
Benevolent
Means for Goal Achievement
FIGURE 2. Effect of goal and means of goal achievement on originality in Study 1.
7
Creativity for Deliberate Harm
3.5
Malevolence
3.0
Help In-Group
2.5
Harm Out-Group
2.0
1.5
1.0
Malevolent
Benevolent
Means for Goal Achievement
FIGURE 3. Effect of goal and means of goal achievement on malevolence in Study 1.
goal achievement was paired with a benevolent goal (M = 2.70, SE = .10) and a malevolent goal (M = 2.25,
SE = .11). This mean was not significantly different from the condition with malevolent means and a benevolent goal, however, the overall form suggests that usefulness is higher when cues are malevolent, highlighting the connection between dark situational cues and creativity.
For malevolence (Figure 3), we found a significant interaction (b = 1.26, p < .01) and the highest
mean when the goal and the means for goal accomplishment were both malevolent (M = 2.94, SE = .08),
supporting our second hypothesis. Posthoc tests reveal that this mean was significantly higher (p < .01) than
the other conditions: benevolent goal with malevolent means (M = 2.50, SE = .08), benevolent goal with
benevolent means (M = 1.55, SE = .07), and malevolent goal with benevolent means (M = 1.44, SE = .08).
Overall, these trends suggest that malevolent formal cues can influence malevolent creativity components.
One possible explanation for why the usefulness interaction did not support our hypothesis is that
malevolent cues increased stress. Stress has been found to narrow individuals’ attention to more vital task
features and decrease usefulness as a consequence (Kerr & Tindale, 2004). This explanation can also help
explain why originality is higher when malevolent cues are present, as stress induced by malevolent cues
may have increased participants’ focus on generating novel ideas.
Overall, the main focus of this first study was to examine whether situational factors serve as antecedents of malevolent creativity components above and beyond individual differences. Our findings support
the importance of situational cues and suggest that the decision to engage in malevolent creativity is influenced more by situational effects as opposed to certain individual differences. Furthermore, exploratory
analyses demonstrated that goal nature and the means available for goal achievement can interact. Specifically, when goal nature and means for achievement are both malevolent, originality and malevolence may
increase, leading to a potentially dangerous combination of highly original but also highly destructive
ideas.
DISCUSSION
Results from our first study highlight the predictive power of formal situational cues. Our findings are in
accordance with social information theory in that formal contextual aspects were predictive above and
beyond individual differences. In addition, we found that multiple malevolent cues led to solutions that were
both original and malevolent.
With the knowledge that situational influences are predictive of malevolent creativity components,
researchers and practitioners can manipulate formal cues to reduce this dark expression. For example,
groups requiring creative output can make sure to formally state how goals should be accomplished using
benevolent means. Although we discovered that goal nature and the means for goal achievement interacted
to predict aspects of malevolent creativity, these factors represent only a small subset of potential situational
malevolent creativity antecedents. According to extensions of social information processing theory, attitudes
and behavior are shaped not only by formal sense-making cues but also informal cues (Fulk, 1993;
8
Journal of Creative Behavior
Morrison, 1994). In our next study, we test this theoretical claim and explore the effect that informal cues
have on malevolent creativity components. Specifically, we focus on informal interpersonal cues: dissenter
presence and the nature of ideas expressed during brainstorming. In addition, we attempt to replicate our
findings concerning the power of situation above and beyond individual differences.
STUDY 2: EXAMINING THE ROLE OF INFORMAL SITUATIONAL CUES
In our second study, we seek to test the effects of informal cues on malevolent creativity components.
Informal cues can provide information about what is valued, acceptable, and even what consequences might
follow from certain actions (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). In addition, informal cues may be more prevalent
than formal cues in daily interactions and may therefore have a greater influence on behavior (Dabos &
Rousseau, 2004; Rice & Aydin, 1991).
One of the informal cues through which interpersonal influences have been found to affect creativity is
brainstorming (Paulus & Paulus, 1997). Brainstorming is one of the most studied cognitive processes of creative problem-solving (Reiter-Palmon, Wigert, & de Vreede, 2012). It may be that malevolent brainstorming,
however, decreases traditional aspects of creativity such as usefulness and originality. When negative emotions are discussed and sad moods induced during brainstorming, fewer creative products may be produced
(Isen, 2000). Furthermore, the discussion of malevolent solutions may induce feelings of threat, eliciting
self-protective responses, discouraging creativity, and leading individuals to follow previously established
idea patterns (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981; West, 2002). It is therefore likely that aspects of creativity
will suffer when brainstorming entails malevolent ideas.
Malevolent cues, however, will likely increase malevolence. Employees, for example, engage in more rule
breaking when they perceive that group members have also engaged in or promoted deviance (Ferguson &
Barry, 2011; Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998). It may seem intuitive that informal malevolent cues can
increase malevolent expression, but the effect of these cues on malevolent creativity as a whole is less clear.
As malevolent creativity must meet both the requirements of being a creative product and must also include
intentional harm, malevolent cues may either increase or decrease this overall behavioral expression. It may
be that malevolent brainstorming may decrease usefulness and originality and we therefore test the effect of
brainstorming nature on all aspects of malevolent creativity.
Dissenter presence is another informal cue that has been found to influence creativity. The experience of
conflict can enable individuals to explore multiple perspectives and spark further idea generation (Anderson,
De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2004; Nemeth, 1986). Simply the presence of idea variety has led to greater creativity,
as the possibility of groupthink is decreased (Paulus & Nijstad, 2003). Based on these findings, it is likely
that usefulness and originality will be greater when a dissenter is present.
In addition, dissenter presence may also influence malevolence. Dissenters are often labeled as “bad
apples” because they can “spoil the barrel” by eliciting distrust, conflict, and aggression (Furnham & Taylor,
2011). It may be, therefore, that dissenter presence encourages malevolence by expanding the set of solutions
deemed appropriate by the group.
As in Study 1, our main focus is to test whether situational factors predict malevolent creativity components above and beyond individual differences. As we found that formal cues were incrementally predictive
of our outcomes in Study 1, we hypothesize the same regarding informal cues:
H3: Informal situational cues are predictive of usefulness, originality, and malevolence above and
beyond individual differences.
Our second focus is on the interaction effect that informal cues may have on shaping malevolent creativity components. We hypothesize that usefulness and originality are highest when benevolent ideas are
discussed during brainstorming and a dissenter is present. Dissenter conflict can increase the diversity of
ideas presented and enable more creative thinking. Although the dissenter is expressing a malevolent idea,
which can potentially induce self-protective behaviors, the focus of the brainstorming is on benevolent
ideas.
H4: Usefulness and originality are highest when benevolent solutions are discussed during
brainstorming and a dissenter is present.
Malevolence, however, may be highest when mainly malevolent solutions are discussed during brainstorming and only one dissenter expressing a benevolent idea is present. In this situation, malevolent ideas
are expressed by the majority of the group, sending the informal cue that malevolent solutions are
9
Creativity for Deliberate Harm
acceptable and even welcomed. Furthermore, dissent, created by the one benevolent idea expressed, can elicit
more aggressive and defensive responses in individuals.
H5: Malevolence is highest when malevolent solutions are discussed during brainstorming and a
dissenter is present.
METHODS
Sample and procedure
Participants were recruited from a U.S. northeastern university to complete a laboratory study in
exchange for credit in undergraduate Psychology courses. Mean age of participants was 22.39 (SD = 6.77)
and the sample was 61.2% female representing a variety of majors.
In this study, 115 participants completed a battery of personality and cognitive ability measures. Next, a
video of a group of students brainstorming solutions to a college internet censorship campaign was presented. Two independent variables were manipulated in this video—whether brainstorming involved malevolent or non-malevolent ideas and whether a dissenter was present. These manipulations resulted in a 2
(malevolent or non-malevolent brainstorming) 9 2 (dissenter or no dissenter) design.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. After watching the video, participants
were asked to generate a creative solution to a University budgeting problem, which was a separate but
related controversial university issue. This final creativity task was scored for usefulness, originality, and
malevolence.
Manipulation
To manipulate each experimental condition, participants viewed a video of a group of five undergraduate
students who were videotaped discussing a new university policy. Actors in the video were university students to ensure that the social information cues were relevant to the participants’ context. The policy being
discussed entailed administrators blocking access to social networking sites on campus computers. Before
the video, participants were informed of the problem that the students in the video would be discussing.
In the benevolent condition without a dissenter, students expressed ideas in response to the policy that
entailed a peaceful exchange with university administrators. The plan of action included a petition, a letter
writing campaign, and a blog to raise awareness and no dissenting opinions were expressed. In the benevolent brainstorming and dissenter condition, the same ideas were presented except a dissenter suggested a
protest instead of a petition. In the malevolent condition, students attempted to stop the new policy by
holding a protest, convincing students to skip their classes, and sending viruses to administrators and no
dissenting opinions were expressed. In the malevolent brainstorming condition with a dissenter, the same
ideas were presented except a dissenter suggested a petition instead of a protest.
Measures
After watching the video, participants were asked to generate a creative solution to a university bus fare
increase which was another controversial proposal that could potentially be suggested by university administration and was relevant to participants’ everyday experiences. The use of an open-ended task allowed us to
capture multiple aspects of creativity, and open-ended tasks have been cited as being vital to capturing creative performance (Amabile & Mueller, 2008). Although participants were asked to generate one solution,
there was no single right answer to this prompt and the freedom to be creative was therefore afforded.
Qualitative responses were coded by three independent raters for usefulness, originality, and malevolence.
All dependent variables were again rated on a scale from 1 = poor to 5 = excellent and were defined to
raters using the same definitions in Study 1. Raters also participated in the same training procedures as in
Study 1, which included benchmarking and sample rating exercises. For usefulness, originality, and malevolence, ICC(2,3) was above .85 and ratings were aggregated across raters. Participants also completed the
same individual differences measures administered in Study 1. Alphas for all scales were above .80.
RESULTS
Table 3 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations between study variables. We again tested
our hypotheses using ordinary least-squares moderated regression (Aiken & West, 1991) and hierarchical
linear regression results are shown in Table 4. Although we found little support for individual differences in
Study 1, we tested these effects again to see if they replicated for informal situational cues. Similar to Study
10
TABLE 3.
Means, SD, and Intercorrelations Among Study Variables—Study 2
1. Gender
2. GPA
3. SAT math
4. SAT verbal
5. Openness
6. Conscientiousness
7. Extraversion
8. Agreeableness
9. Neuroticism
10. Dominance
11. Brainstorming naturea
12. Dissenter presenceb
13. Usefulness
14. Originality
15. Malevolence
M
SD
–
3.09
600.24
613.83
3.82
3.50
3.71
3.75
2.36
2.91
1.39
1.59
2.48
2.52
2.45
–
.53
106.26
103.90
.65
.70
.72
.62
.69
.72
.49
.49
1.23
1.12
.90
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
.09
.15
.12
.17
.26
.13
.21
.14
.16
.05
.05
.16
.01
.18
.19
.10
.16
.23
.05
.14
.16
.14
.14
.06
.09
.22
.03
.43
.07
.16
.03
.01
.03
.04
.07
.05
.10
.06
.15
.11
.12
.07
.02
.07
.15
.03
.10
.32
.23
.25
.10
.18
.32
.02
.24
.11
.05
.07
.03
.14
.31
.34
.26
.01
.10
.05
.06
.00
.01
.12
.39
.25
.29
.02
.15
.00
.08
.29
.50
.12
.05
.01
.15
.09
.08
.04
.03
.05
.05
.05
.14
.04
.10
.01
.06
.02
.18
.17
.15
.36
.41
.01
.67
.28
.33
11
Journal of Creative Behavior
Notes. GPA = grade point average. SAT = Scholastic Assessment Test.
Correlations at or above .18 are significant at p < .05; Correlations at or above .25 are significant at p < .01.
a
Brainstorming Nature coded as Malevolent (1) or Non-Malevolent (2).
b
Dissenter Presence coded as Dissenter (1) or No Dissenter (2).
Standardized Regression Coefficients for Dependent Variables—Study 2
Step number
Gender
Cognitive ability
GPA
SAT math
SAT verbal
Personality
Openness
Conscientiousness
Extraversion
Agreeableness
Neuroticism
Dominance
Situation
Brainstorminga
Dissenterb
Interaction
R2
∆R2
Usefulness
Originality
1
2
3
4
5
.16
.20*
.13
.12
.12
.04
.03
.36**
.09
.05
.37**
.09
.00
.30**
.09
.00
.31**
.08
.04
.26*
.06
.15
.13
.05
.02
.19
.07
.11
.14
.05
.02
.19
.07
.11
.13
.15
.31**
.09
.25
.08
.31
.00
.03
.03
.15
.12**
.20
.05
.31
.11**
Malevolence
1
2
3
4
5
.01
.01
.02
.03
.02
.21*
.08
.24*
.28**
.07
.21
.28**
.00
.12
.26**
.02
.16
.02
.04
.11
.27*
.07
.18
.02
.02
.01
.28*
.01
.19
.00
.01
.00
.23
.04
.15
.20*
.39**
.36
.11
.76*
.35
.03*
.00
.00
Notes. GPA = grade point average.
a
Brainstorming Nature coded as Malevolent (1) or Non-Malevolent (2).
b
Dissenter Presence coded as Dissenter (1) or No Dissenter (2).
*p < .05, **p < .01.
.10
.10*
.15
.06
.33
.18**
1
.18*
.03
.03*
2
3
4
5
.16
.18
.18
.17
.02
.03
.22**
.03
.07
.20
.01
.08
.19
.03
.05
.24
.19
.11
.05
.14
.01
.02
.18
.10
.02
.13
.02
.02
.15
.09
.01
.06
.02
.07
.10
.02
.70*
.70*
1.09**
.21
.06**
.09
.06
.14
.05
.15
.01
Creativity for Deliberate Harm
12
TABLE 4.
Journal of Creative Behavior
1, we tested the incremental effects of each antecedent type. We began with gender (step 1), adding in cognitive ability (step 2), personality factors (step 3), main effects (step 4), and the interaction term (step 5).
For our third hypothesis, we posited that informal cues would predict malevolent creativity components
above and beyond individual differences. Supporting our hypothesis and replicating our results from Study
1, we found that informal cues predicted significant variance in usefulness, originality, and malevolence. For
usefulness, the addition of dissenter presence and brainstorming nature predicted a total of 31% of the variance (∆R2 = .11, p < .01). The same effect was found for originality where a total of 33% of the variance
was predicted (∆R2 = .16, p < .05). Finally, although the addition of the situational factors alone did not
significantly predict variance in malevolence, the addition of the interaction term explained a total of 21%
of the variance in malevolence (∆R2 = .06, p < .01). Overall, these results highlight the fact that situational
factors can influence aspects of malevolent creativity.
Our fourth hypothesis was that usefulness and originality would be highest when brainstorming was
benevolent and a dissenter was present. Although the interaction term for usefulness was not significant,
failing to support Hypothesis 4, we found that dissenter presence was a significant predictor of usefulness
above and beyond individual differences. Specifically, when a dissenter was present, solutions produced were
of higher usefulness (b = .31, p < .01). This finding indicates that informal cues signaled by a dissenting
opinion could enable solutions that are of higher usefulness.
For originality, our hypothesis was also not fully supported but we did find a significant interaction
(b = .76, p < .05). Based on the interaction form (Figure 4), it appears that dissent of any kind, regardless
of whether ideas shared previously were benevolent or malevolent, led to an increase in originality. Interestingly, posthoc tests reveal that the only significant mean difference between conditions was between the condition with benevolent brainstorming and no dissenter and the other three conditions. Solutions generated
were of lower originality (M = 1.68, SE = .20) in this condition than the other three conditions: malevolent
brainstorming without a dissenter (M = 2.47, SE = .16) and with a dissenter (M = 3.03, SE = .19) and
benevolent brainstorming with a dissenter (M = 3.04, SE = .19). Although these results do not fully support
our hypothesis, it is interesting to note that the condition without informal malevolent cues produced the
least original ideas. It appears that even the presence of one malevolent informal cue is enough to increase
originality.
For our fifth hypothesis, we predicted that malevolence would be highest when malevolent brainstorming
and a dissenter were present. Although we found a significant interaction (b = 1.09, p < .01), results failed
to support our hypothesis. When graphing the interaction (Figure 5), however, it appears that, even when
benevolent brainstorming is occurring, one dissenter voicing a malevolent opinion is enough to increase
malevolence. Our results show that the presence of only one informal malevolent cue is enough to increase
all malevolent creativity components: originality, usefulness, and malevolence.
4
Originality
3.5
3
2.5
Dissenter
No Dissenter
2
1.5
1
Malevolent
Benevolent
Brainstorming Nature
FIGURE 4. Effect of brainstorming nature and dissenter presence on originality in Study 2.
13
Creativity for Deliberate Harm
3.00
Malevolence
2.75
2.50
Dissenter
2.25
No Dissenter
2.00
1.75
1.50
Malevolent
Benevolent
Brainstorming Nature
FIGURE 5. Effect of brainstorming nature and dissenter presence on malevolence in Study 2.
Overall, these results advance our understanding of malevolent creativity antecedents by showing the predictive power of informal cues. Reaffirming the results of Study 1 and social information processing theory,
it appears that individuals draw information from situational cues. Furthermore, these cues are predictive of
usefulness, originality, and malevolence above and beyond individual differences.
DISCUSSION
The results from our second study extend our previous findings by examining the effect of informal cues
on malevolent creativity. Specifically, this study tested whether brainstorming nature and dissenter presence
influenced usefulness, originality, and malevolence. Findings suggest that solutions are of higher usefulness
and originality when a dissenter is present. Furthermore, only one malevolent situational cue seems to be
needed to produce malevolent solutions. Although these interaction effects help us to better understand the
specific nature of situational influences on malevolent creativity components, our main focus was on exploring the overall effect of situational antecedents. Replicating our results from Study 1, our findings suggest
that informal situational cues can predict usefulness, originality, and malevolence above and beyond individual difference antecedents, supporting the idea that this phenomenon is not simply engaged in by “malevolently creative individuals” and that anyone in the right situation can express this dark, creative behavior.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our results represent a foundational understanding of what leads creative individuals to apply their ability in malevolent ways. Although the actual cognitive process of creativity is considered to be devoid of any
moral implications (Runco, 2010), social information processing theory helps to explain the circumstances
under which this process is applied with malevolent intentions. We find that situational cues serve to predict
the expression of malevolent creativity above and beyond individual differences. Not only do formal goals
and the means provided for goal achievement influence whether malevolent creativity occurs, but also the
informal cues surrounding solution generation. Our findings dispel the idea that certain individuals are
more prone to engaging in malevolent creativity and instead suggest that anyone in the right situation can
be motivated to engage in this dark creative expression.
Furthermore, our findings suggest that some situational antecedents are not only predictive of more traditional aspects of creativity but also darker innovative applications. Specifically, malevolence was highest
when individuals were given a malevolent goal and malevolent means for goal achievement. Although this
finding may seem intuitive, solutions with higher originality were also produced under these conditions.
Similarly, the informal malevolent cue of dissenter presence influenced usefulness, originality, and malevolence. This paradox is worrisome, as these cues can increase aspects of creativity, outcomes often highly
desired, but also involve malevolence which can be dangerous and destructive. Overall, our results across
two studies depict the power of situational antecedents in predicting malevolent creativity components.
14
Journal of Creative Behavior
IMPLICATIONS
Although our results are preliminary, our findings have implications for both research and practice. For
researchers, our study serves as a starting point for understanding malevolent creativity antecedents. As situational factors exert a significant influence, even when accounting for gender, cognitive ability, and personality, future research can begin exploring how to manipulate situational cues to deter malevolent creativity
and encourage more benevolent creative applications.
In addition, our studies serve as empirical tests of social information theory (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978).
Across both studies, social context affected behavior above and beyond individual differences, explaining
when and why individuals decide to apply the creative process in malevolent ways. Furthermore, extensions of the theory posit that sense-making cues are signaled both formally and informally. Our studies
support that both formal and informal cues can shape the expression of usefulness, originality, and malevolence.
Although our main focus was on determining if situational variables were more predictive of malevolent
creativity components above and beyond individual differences, the interaction effects between situational
cues depicted interesting results. In Study 1, the presence of two cues signaling acceptable malevolent behavior was the strongest predictor for originality and malevolence. Furthermore, in Study 2, a single dissenter
with malevolent ideas can seemingly increase malevolence even when the majority of the group is discussing
benevolent ideas. Our results contribute to the understanding of how social cues may shape malevolent creativity components.
In practice, groups and organizations may be able to shape situations to prevent malevolent creativity.
As the connection between traditional forms of creativity and dark side applications becomes clearer, it may
be possible to recognize and regulate creative expression so that malevolent creativity has less of a destructive impact. One recommendation from our results is that goals are clarified as being benevolent and the
use of benevolent means to achieve goals are valued and rewarded. For example, it might be better to frame
a goal as “increasing group success” instead of “getting ahead of competitors”.
In addition, as groups are tasked with fast-paced, relentless innovation, leaders may be tempted to lift
limits to brainstorming to encourage creativity. Our studies suggest that malevolent goals set by leaders and
malevolent ideas discussed by team members can encourage malevolent idea expression even without high
stakes rewards as motivation. For groups desperately seeking the next big idea, these studies serve as a warning that some limits should be put on creative expression.
LIMITATIONS
Our studies are not without limitations. One limitation is that both samples consisted of college students
and our results may therefore have limited generalizability. By conducting experimental laboratory studies,
we hoped to gain foundational insight into a complex phenomenon. In addition, research on the relationship between findings in laboratory studies versus field studies have found correlations between effect sizes
to be as high as .73, providing support for the use of laboratory studies in examining psychological phenomena (Anderson, Lindsay, & Bushman, 1999; Colquitt, 2008; Mook, 1983). Although we were able to
observe significant effects in the laboratory, research conducted with diverse populations may increase generalizability of our results.
In addition, as malevolent creativity is multidimensional (usefulness, originality, and malevolence) we
sought to examine the effects of antecedent types on these specific dimensions. In both studies, participants
were instructed to generate a single solution to an open-ended prompt that was then coded separately for
these three different dimensions. It may be, however, that using a remote association test (Mednick, 1962)
could have provided participants with more opportunities to express creative thought and future studies
should examine malevolent creativity using these tasks to see if our results replicate.
Furthermore, we chose to analyze these dimensions separately to see whether certain personality and situational factors differentially predicted these dimensions based on Harris and Reiter-Palmon’s (2015) call
for examining subfactors of personality traits to better understand conflicting results relating to the prediction of malevolent creativity. We believe that by examining dimensions of the malevolent creativity phenomenon, we are better able to understand how antecedents may influence distinct aspects of malevolent
creativity. Future studies conceptualizing malevolent creativity as a composite variable, however, can test the
effect of situational influences on these aspects combined.
Although we found little to no effects of personality, it may be that other personality traits, such as
psychopathy, hold more direct relationships with malevolent creativity. Furthermore, researchers should
15
Creativity for Deliberate Harm
also consider other cues that may influence malevolent creativity. It may be that other situational variables such
as justice climate and role ambiguity provide additional insight into malevolent creativity motivations.
CONCLUSION
Malevolent creativity can be found in a host of contexts and can have widespread, destructive consequences. Our results show that both formal and informal situational cues influence the expression of malevolent creativity above and beyond individual differences. Future research should continue to explore the
antecedents and outcomes of this dark phenomenon to better understand how it could possibly be prevented. As our knowledge of malevolent creativity increases, researchers and practitioners alike can take
measures to encourage the positive benefits of creativity while decreasing the potentially dark side effects.
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Creativity for Deliberate Harm
Melissa B. Gutworth, Pennsylvania State University
Lily Cushenbery, Stony Brook University
Samuel T. Hunter, Pennsylvania State University
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Melissa B. Gutworth, Department of Psychology, Industrial &
Organizational Area, Pennsylvania State University, 142 Moore Building, State College, PA 16802. E-mail: mbg164@psu.edu
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Samuel T Hunter