Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
Cutting Corners
World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
Kate Dooley, Tom Griffiths, Helen Leake, Saskia Ozinga
November 2008
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Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
Authors: Kate Dooley, Tom Griffiths, Helen Leake, Saskia Ozinga
Cover photo: Many government proposals for REDD include requests to support logging
operations to become ‘sustainable’, rather than support for clarification of tenure rights and
forest sector reform. Photo Carol Yong
Photo credits: Tom Griffiths, John Nelson, Dorothy Jackson, Carol Yong
Design: Daan van Beek
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© FERN / Forest Peoples Programme, November 2008
This material is offered free of charge for personal and non-commercial use, provided the
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Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
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Contents
Executive Summary
5
Background to the FCPF
6
The importance of recognising land and tenure rights
8
Main findings of FERN-FPP analysis
9
Analysis of the different R-PiN’s
14
Conclusions
18
Recommendations
20
Annex I
Some Key FCPF standards and operating principles
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Annex II
The stages of the FCPF
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Annex III
Who wrote the R-PiNs?
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Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
Small scale logging for local use is an important part of local economies. Large scale
industrial logging has not provided much development benefits in Africa and has
exacerbated poverty.
Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
Executive Summary
In December 2007 the World Bank launched its Forest Carbon Partnership Facility to act as
a ‘catalyst’ to promote public and private investment in ‘REDD’ (Reduced Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation) and to support demonstration pilot projects for
developing and implementing national REDD strategies. To access the funds gathered by the
Facility countries had to submit Readiness Project Idea Notes (R-PINs).
This briefing analyses nine of the first 25 R-PINs1 approved to try to assess the extent to which
the Facility is fulfilling some key social commitments set out in its Charter, and to determine
whether or not it is addressing some of the main concerns raised by indigenous peoples and
civil society organizations relating to REDD, including governance, human rights, land tenure,
and Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC)2.
Overall, this review finds the process to date has been rushed, implicitly directed towards a
market based REDD and dominated by centralized government, with little to no consultation
with indigenous peoples, local communities or civil society organizations. The poor quality of
some R-PINs that have been approved suggests that the Bank’s carbon finance unit is keen to
get the Facility up and running as quickly as possible, and this accelerated approach has meant
that approval of R-PINs has been rushed and corners have been cut. Furthermore, the review
finds that the FCPF is not meeting some of the key social commitments it has made.
This briefing recommends that in the next phase of its operations the Facility must take urgent
measures to ensure that it fulfills its commitments to indigenous peoples, forest dwellers,
forest dependent communities and to the public, and adheres to its own rules.
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As of November 2008, the following 25 countries have had their R-PINs approved and been selected as FCPF REDD participants: Latin America:
Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guyana, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru. Africa: Cameroon, DRC, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana,
Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Republic of Congo and Uganda. Asia and Pacific: Lao PDR, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and Vietnam
For more information on FPIC please see: http://www.forestpeoples.org/documents/law_hr/bases/fpic.shtml
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Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
Background to the FCPF
The World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility was developed by the Bank’s carbon
unit. The Facility was launched amid international public controversy in December 2007 in
Bali largely because the Bank had failed to adequately consult with indigenous peoples and
Southern governments. In responding to this criticism, in 2008 the World Bank belatedly held
three meetings with indigenous people on three different continents and duly documented
their concerns.3 In October 2008, the Facility also agreed to establish a one million USD fund
to support forest peoples participation in FCPF-assisted REDD activities. The stated aim of the
Facility is to act as a ‘catalyst’ to promote public and private investment in REDD and to support
demonstration pilot projects for developing and implementing national REDD strategies.4
FCPF participants
Countries become ‘REDD country participants’ in the FCPF once they have submitted a concept
note of their preparation plans for REDD and the note is approved by the FCPF. Country
participants may then form part of the FCPF governing bodies. These initial concept notes are
known as Readiness Plan Idea Notes (R-PINs). As of October 2008 the following 23 countries
have had their R-PINs approved and been selected as participant countries:
•
Latin America: Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guyana, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru.
•
Africa: Ghana, Gabon, Liberia, Kenya, Madagascar, Cameroon, DRC, Republic of Congo,
Ethiopia.
•
Asia and Pacific: Lao PDR, Nepal, PNG, Vanuatu, Vietnam.
Once fully operational, the FCPF will have a maximum of 30 developing country participants.5
FCPF Funds
The Facility consists of a Readiness Fund and a Carbon Fund. The Readiness Fund is designed to
support countries in developing and implementing Readiness Plans (R-Plans) that will result in
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5
Three workshops were held in late February through mid March in Asia, Latin America and then Africa. For the workshop reports and the
response of the Facility please see http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=FCPF&FID=34267&ItemID=34267&ft=FeaturedResources&Fe
atResID=40587
World Bank (2008) Forest Carbon Partnership Facility: information memorandum June 13, 2008, World Bank Washington DC
http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=FCPF&FID=34267&ItemID=34267&ft=DocLib&ht=42500&dl=1
World Bank (2008) High demand prompts FCPF to expend beyond original 20 developing countries World Bank Press Release No. 2008/124/
SDN
Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
national REDD strategies and country systems for monitoring, measurement and verification of
emission reductions from deforestation against a national reference baseline. Once a country is
deemed ‘ready’ (i.e. with its REDD strategy, baseline and monitoring framework), it may submit
‘Emissions Reduction Programs" (ERPs) to the Facility. Once these ERPs are approved then the
Carbon Fund will pay countries for these programmes through Emission Reduction Program
Agreements (ERPAs) – agreements between the REDD country participants (i.e. national
governments) and the World Bank. At the end of 2008, the FCPF is entering the phase where
REDD country participants are beginning to prepare Readiness Plans (see Annex II).
The significance of the FCPF
When compared with other World Bank funds, notably the forthcoming Forest Investment
Programme, the FCPF is small. However, the operations of the facility are important because
it will act as a catalyst for the formulation of national REDD strategies that could shape
national forest, conservation, and land use policies in forest countries for years to come. These
strategies will determine what can and cannot happen in forest areas in the future and as such
it is difficult to overstate its importance to the lives and livelihoods of indigenous and forestdependent peoples.
FCPF standards and procedures
The Facility has affirmed that it is committed to applying the World Bank’s social and
environmental policies and to ensuring a ‘participatory and inclusive process early on’ in all
FCPF activities. This is of particular importance in regards to the Facility’s support of so-called
‘Readiness’ activities that will pave the way for future national programmes for REDD operations.
Annex I details some key FCPF standards and operating principles.
Recognition of the rights of local peoples is a pre-requisite for any effective REDD
agreement. The DRC R-PiN does, however, not even acknowledge land tenure conflicts.
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Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
The importance of recognising land
and tenure rights
REDD initiatives of various forms, both under the FCPF and others, promise to be the biggest
change in national and international forest management ideas and methods in generations. It
is hard to overestimate the importance of this tidal wave of policy change, promised money and
ideological change to the lives and livelihoods of peoples living within, around and dependent
on forests. The social and human rights risks are clear and they are large. The increased
monetary value placed on standing forest resources and new forest growth, opens the door
for corruption in countries where this is already rife in the forest sector. Centralized planning
as promoted under the FCPF where the national government creates plans, receives payments
and disburses the new funds only adds to the marginalisation of forest peoples. Without clear,
secure and comprehensive recognition of the customary and collective rights of the peoples
who depend on forests, the REDD process will only serve to create incentives for others to deny
these land rights and claim benefits for themselves. Without Free, Prior and Informed Consent
of indigenous peoples and the full support and involvement of local communities the REDD
process would repeat the mistakes of past experiments with centralized forest management
strategies based on enforcement and would lead to the same outcome: increased levels of
deforestation and corruption while indigenous peoples and local communities face increased
levels of poverty and alienation from their lands.
in many parts of the tropics, remaining intact and healthy forests are located in the
territories of indigenous peoples and local communities. This photo shows old growth
forest on the eastern Atlantic coast of Panama located in the indigenous territory of Kuna
Yala. Photo: Tom Griffiths
Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
Main findings of FERN-FPP analysis
For a detailed description see the table with content of the different R-PINs on page 14
An analysis of a sample of nine Readiness Plan Idea Notes (R-PINs), shows that the quality of
the R-PIN contents and the quality of the reviews of the R-PINs by the World Bank’s Technical
Advisory Panel is highly variable. This review finds that key criteria for assessing the quality and
for approving RPINs have been disregarded or rubber-stamped; especially the FCPF criteria
(see Annex I) that advises that these documents should be ‘owned’ by both governments and
‘relevant stakeholders’. FERN and FPP conclude that the FCPF is not following its own rules and
in its first phase has failed to ensure that the concerns of indigenous peoples and civil society
are being addressed in its operations. Specific issues the review has identified include:
World Bank FCPF at odds with World Bank standards and procedures
The World Bank has useful binding standards for protection of indigenous peoples’
rights, forests and land tenure, and consultation procedures embedded in its social and
environmental policies. Furthermore, the Bank has publicly stated that these policies will be
reviewed to see how they can be improved to ensure consistency with the UN Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. However in the development of the FCPF none of these
standards has yet been applied and they have only been partially integrated into FCPF rules
and procedures. Furthermore the approved R-PINs do not conform with agreed principles,
standards and commitments, detailed in Annex 1. This FPP-FERN analysis shows that most of
the R-PINs reviewed do not give adequate treatment to the rights of indigenous peoples and
local communities. Overwhelmingly, indigenous peoples and communities have not been
consulted properly or have not been involved at all in the development of the R-PINs. This is
despite the fact that the FCPF Charter makes clear that Bank social and environmental policies
apply and that FCPF operations must be conducted in a participatory manner with relevant
rights holders and stakeholders.6
FCPF appears to facilitate carbon trading
In its 2005 paper entitled ‘The role of the World Bank in Carbon Finance: an approach to further
engagement’ the Bank states that its objectives in this sector are to ‘assist in building, sustaining
and expanding the international market for carbon emission reductions and its administrative
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It should be noted that in the FCPF Information Memorandum, the Bank specifies that its safeguard policies only apply once a country has
signed a grant agreement with the Bank, therefore being at odds with the Bank’s FCPF charter. See http://wbcarbonfinance.org/Router.cfm
?Page=FCPF&FID=34267&ItemID=34267&ft=DocLib&CatalogID=40801 for the Memorandum and the Charter, which is an annex to the
Memorandum.
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Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
structure’. The Bank’s pro-market approach is therefore clear. The FCPF is more ambiguous
about carbon markets. In the FCPF Charter it is suggested that the FCPF is a temporary fund
aimed at jump starting international efforts to attract private finance and that it will remain in
operation only until 2020 after which the Bank expects the market in REDD certificates will have
matured. Nonetheless, the Bank’s FCPF Memorandum states that ‘emission reduction purchase
agreements’ will be the key payment mechanism of the Carbon Fund thereby bringing trading
schemes into the heart of the Facility.
Human Rights and Land Tenure not being addressed
Despite the fact that recognition of land tenure rights and clarification of ownership rights
has been pointed out by various scientists7 and research institutes8 as a basic condition for
any effective REDD Programme, in only a few of the R-PINs reviewed is this critical issue being
highlighted, nor is a process outlined regarding how to establish these rights. Furthermore,
no mention is made in any of the R-PINs of relevant international standards under human
rights instruments such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).
Several countries did not acknowledge existing land tenure conflicts, or as in the Lao PDR and
DRC R-PINs, have emphasized state ownership of forests. Paraguay’s R-PIN noted that many
communities do not have secure tenure, and Liberia and Vietnam noted the need to clarify and
strengthen land tenure arrangements – though explanation about what this means in practice
is not provided.
No requirements for Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC)
Although recognized by international law as a pre-condition for any project or programme
affecting indigenous and tribal peoples9, the notion of FPIC did not surface in any of the R-PINs
analyzed. Whilst most countries recognized the need for future consultation with indigenous
peoples and forest dependent communities, none extended that as far as recognizing the
need to seek consent. Consultation was inadequate in most R-PINs, with several apparently
relying on prior consultations on general environmental issues rather than specific public
consultations on REDD and the R-PIN (e.g., Panama, Guyana). Some countries do not even
propose establishing specific participation and consultation mechanisms for REDD and will
rely instead on existing mechanisms. At the same time, many other countries have identified
consultation as a next step for which they are requesting financial support (Guyana, Paraguay,
Liberia, Ghana, Nepal), although the length of time required for extensive stakeholder
consultations raises doubts as to whether this is achievable within the World Bank timelines
and there is a lack of clarity as to precisely when and at what stage such consultation would be
conducted (during the preparation of the R-Plan or national REDD strategies?). In Ghana the
Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA)10 with the EU has had a positive impact on building
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Including Chhatre, A. and Agrawal,A. in ‘Forest commons and local enforcement’/ 13286-13291/PINAS/September 9, 2009/Volume 105/No 36;
Rights and Resources Initiative/ Seeing peoples through the trees/ no date; a collection of scientific presentations on www.rightsandclimate.
org.
Notably IIED in its publications related to the Forest Governance and Learning Programme and CIFORin ‘Does money grow on trees?’.
See for more information on latest judgment on tribal and indigenous peoples’ rights to land and FPIC: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/
articulos/seriec_185_ing.pdf
The EU adopted a FLEGT (Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade) Action Plan in 2003, to improve forest governance and control illegal
logging. As part of this Plan the EU is negotiating bilateral agreements with a number of timber exporting countries, including Cameroon,
Congo, Ghana, Indonesia and Malaysia to support these countries to improve forest governance, recognise tenure rights and regulate the
timber trade.
Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
goodwill and consultation processes with local communities. Several R-PINs mentioned
engaging in the EU FLEGT (Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade) Programme11 as
part of their strategy to improve forest governance and qualify for REDD funding.
No way forward to address governance problems
Although improving forest governance is recognised as a key pre-requisite for improved
forest management by the EU FLEGT Programme12, the treatment of this key issue in the
R-PINs is patchy and of variable quality. Several Latin American and Asian countries noted
the problem of forest law enforcement in very remote areas and recognized challenges with
corruption among forest officials (e.g., Paraguay and Lao PDR), but there were few adequate
outline strategies to address governance reforms. Some R-PINs apply a very narrow concept of
governance e.g., the DRC R-PIN noted that increased security of timber concessionaries is an
example of ‘improved governance’.
No proper analysis of underlying causes of deforestation
There is a disturbing level of attention placed on ‘slash and burn agriculture’ and the collection
of fuel wood as the primary drivers to deforestation (Panama, Guyana, Paraguay, DRC, Liberia,
Ghana, Lao-PDR, Vietnam). This emerges in the R-PINs developed in every global region
analyzed in this briefing, with negative views taken about traditional and small farmers. This
raises serious concerns regarding potential rights violations and the the risk of unjust REDD
policies targeting forest peoples. A few R-PINs did pay attention also to industrial agriculture,
plantations, cattle ranching and urban development as drivers of forest loss (e.g., Panama,
Vietnam and Lao PDR), and several also identified the negative role of infrastructure projects,
especially roads (Paraguay and Guyana). In the case of Panama, infrastructure (roads, dams,
electricity grids etc.) and mines are surprisingly not identified as drivers of deforestation,
despite studies which clearly show these are significant drivers to deforestation in Panama (as
in many other countries)13
Although the R-PINs refer to shifting and ‘traditional’ agriculture, none of them discuss
the different types of agriculture or their sustainability in relation to carbon emissions and
sequestration over the medium term (which science proves is usually neutral or even positive
over time in the case of rotational (swidden) farming and agro-forestry systems).14 There is
likewise no discussion of the obligation under the CBD to protect sustainable traditional
practices that include shifting agriculture (CBD Article 10c).
In terms of the identification of underlying causes, several African countries’ R-PINs briefly
mention the expansion in global markets as a threat to deforestation. High prices for soya,
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The EU FLEGT Programme, presented by the EU in 2003 and currently being implemented, sets out a range of measures that aim to tackle
illegal logging by improving forest governance, strengthening local peoples’ land tenure rights, developing a licensing scheme that assures
timber has been legally produced and creating a system for independent monitoring. For more information see www.loggingoff.info and
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/forests/flegt.htm
Council of the European Union (2003) Council Conclusions 13 October 2003, 2534 Council meeting and http://ec.europa.eu/environment/
forests/flegt.htm
Arias, M (2005) ‘An assessment of the implementation of international commitments on traditional forest-related knowledge in Panama’
pp.3-41 in IAITPTF (2005) Our Knowledge for our survival Volume II, IAITPTF, Chiang Mai
See Counsell, S (2008) ‘Monitoring, permanence, and indigenous peoples’ Presentation to the conference ‘Rights, Forests and Climate Change’
convened by The Rainforest Foundation Norway and the Rights and Resources Initiative Oslo, Norway | October 15-17, 2008
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Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
dairy products and beef coupled with high value of agricultural export markets are seen as
major underlying factors in forest conversion in Paraguay. Similarly the rising value of timber
exports is recognized as an underlying cause in Vietnam, leading to Vietnam exporting four
times the amount of timber that it legally harvests from its forests.
However, at this stage the R-PINs suggest that the main policy frameworks for actions under
national REDD strategies will not address underlying causes of deforestation but will tend to
focus instead on reducing the proximate drivers. As noted above, the way these direct drivers
have been identified is questionable on both legal and scientific grounds. In the R-PIN for the
DRC for example, increasing structural factors such as roads and the recent Chinese purchase
of three million hectares for palm oil are acknowledged, but are not addressed in the outline
policy response.
No rigorous risk analysis and identification of monitoring needs and benefit sharing
Risks were not identified in a rigorous manner in any of the R-PINs though some do discuss
‘challenges and constraints’. Many countries focus on the need for access to high quality
satellite images for forest monitoring, although Ghana points out that these can take several
days to download in areas with restricted broadband access. However, other than DRC and
Nepal, very few of the R-PINs discuss the need to monitor social impacts – though some plan
to continue existing governmental surveys of rural livelihoods (e.g., Guyana, Paraguay).
The bulk of the R-PINs reviewed acknowledge the need for benefits to reach local communities,
but most are vague on how this would occur (Paraguay, Lao PDR) or confine benefit sharing to
indirect benefits such as providing training in forest management (Guyana). Several countries
mention the need for public access to monitoring data to increase transparency.
Monitoring systems are also massively under-developed in the reviewed R-PINs with most
countries presenting only a scant picture of how monitoring of emission reductions would
occur. Some countries indicate that existing systems used for monitoring forest cover (Nepal,
Lao PDR and Vietnam) are too infrequent and inaccurate to be applied to the REDD schemes
they propose and large funding requests are made to develop monitoring systems. However,
even the scant details provided of the proposed monitoring systems have little information or
focus on the monitoring of social risks, with the exception of the Nepali R-PIN which recognizes
the need to monitor payment systems to ensure corruption is kept at a minimum.
No critical analysis and lack of knowledge about carbon markets
Several R-PINs like those of Guyana, Panama and Liberia explicitly support national participation
in the carbon market and see the readiness phase as an opportunity to invest in activities to
generate tradable credits. (Liberia’s R-PIN notes a plan to invest in extending the protected
area network to generate REDD credits). The controversies and criticisms of the carbon market
were not acknowledged in any of the R-PINs, although several African countries rejected the
historical baseline approach due to their relatively low deforestation rates.
Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
Next steps: more consultation needed
In general ‘next steps’ were seen as an extensive consultation phase, which is encouraging
considering one of the main criticism of the R-PINs is the lack of consultation outside of
government and international NGOs. Most of the R-PINs reviewed requested financial assistance
for this – though timing and mechanisms are vague. Funds are also requested for numerous
technical and forestry activities, including updating of national forest inventories, establishing
reference levels and monitoring. This focus highlights a growing concern that REDD under
the FCPF may lead to a narrow technical focus on monitoring and measurement rather than
investment in legal and land policy reforms or strengthening governance capacities.
At a conference hosted by Rights and Resources initiative and the Rainforest Foundation Norway
(Norway November 2008), indigenous leaders called for a rights based approach to REDD. For
more information see: www.rightsandclimate.org
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Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
Analysis of the different R-PIN’s
Country
Human Rights
(including indigenous rights)
Land and tenure
FPIC
and public consultation on R-PIN
Governance
Issues addressed
Panama
No mention of human rights.
There is no direct treatment of land tenure
issues.
No mention of FPIC.
Dealt with briefly, noting that remoteness of
many areas is a barrier to forest protection
enforcement.
Refers to prior consultations on general
environmental issues, rather than specific
public consultations on REDD and the R-PIN
Treatment of indigenous peoples is superficial and perfunctory.
R-PIN notes (page 14) that an international
REDD workshop on April 23-24, 2008 was
convened by ANAM, but reports of this
meeting have not been found.
Guyana
No mention of human rights, despite
the fact that the UN CERD human rights
committee has observed that the 2006
Amerindian Act is not compliant with
international human rights standards.
No direct treatment.
Existing land tenure conflicts and unresolved indigenous peoples’ land claims in
Guyana are not discussed.
No mention of FPIC.
The list of individuals and organisations
consulted is dominated by government
agencies and large conservation NGOs.
The R-PIN claims that stakeholder
consultations inclusive of indigenous
communities were held from which views
were incorporated into the R-PIN but no
details are provided.
Paraguay
No explicit mention of human rights.
Land rights of indigenous people is briefly
mentioned
Some useful treatment of land tenure,
which notes that many indigenous communities do not have secure land rights.
Rights are mentioned only a few times,
including a reference to ‘tradable rights’.
Existing external pressures on indigenous
lands are noted, but solutions are not
addressed.
It is noted that existing governance structures
are ‘not directed to controlling deforestation and
degradation.’
The need for improved ‘land use planning and
zoning’ is noted.
A ‘transparent governance structure’ for managing
payments of REDD incentives is proposed (pg 15)
Forestry experts in Guyana have publicly criticised
the R-PIN for being “inaccurate” and for painting
an extraordinarily positive and misleading picture
on the state of progress in achieving SFM in
Guyana. Ref: Bulkan, J (2008) Email letter to the
FCPF management team, November 2008
No mention of FPIC.
Indirect and fragmented treatment.
Indigenous peoples have so far not been
directly
consulted, although planned future consultations are outlined.
Ministerial corruption (causing deforestation)
and the risk of ineffective administration is
acknowledged.
Indigenous peoples’ organisations Paraguay
have comaplained to local World Bank
offices that they were not consulted at all
over the R-PIN.
DRC
No mention of human rights.
The proposal makes it clear that most of
the land is state owned, but does not deal
wit h the historical and current exercise of
customary rights by indigenous peoples and
other forest communities in DRC .
No mention of FPIC
The R-PIN requests capacity building funds
to lead stakeholder consultation as a ‘crucial
point to define REDD policies’.
The key governance commitment is increasing
security of rights to logging concessionaries ( to
promote SFM)
Has opened discussions for FLEGT engagement
Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) (aka
certified or ‘low impact’ industrial logging) is
offered as the best compromise between development, carbon stock protection and conservation.
Liberia
Mentions community rights in reference
to land tenure, but no mention of human
rights or the rights of indigenous peoples.
The need to strengthen land tenure,
including carbon rights, is recognised. The
establishment of a Lands Commission has
been suggested to facilitate reforms in land
policy and clarify carbon ownership.
A new Community Rights Law is being
formulated which will provide increased
role for communities in forest governance.
The R-PIN states that commercial logging
requires prior assessment of local
community issues, but there is no mention
of prior consent.
Forest Development Authority (FDA)
consultation strategies are targeted at forest
dwellers
An intention to scale up capacity and field
presence of FDA?
It is noted that governance strengthening is
required but this is interpreted as strengthening
government departments
Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
15
Underlying drivers
Who is blamed for deforestation?
Risk analysis
Are potential env/social risks addressed
Benefit sharing +
Monitoring and verification
Financing mechanism
‘Traditional’ and mechanized agriculture are
blamed as primary drivers.
None
The R-PIN affirms that the ‘REDD strategy’ is based
on the ‘Integrated management of hydrographic
basins’ which ‘seeks to ensure equity in the
distribution of benefits.’
ANAM advises that it support the concept of direct
payments to ‘the actors that are implementing
actions to avoid deforestation’.
Proposes participation in the ‘Emission reductions market’ and international environmental
markets (pages 2, 11 and 14.)
Cattle ranching, urban development and low
levels of environmental awareness are also
mentioned.
Roads, dams, energy projects and regional
integration plans for infrastructure (Plan Puebla
Panamá) are NOT identified as drivers.
Deforestation is identified as being caused
by mining, logging, ‘agricultural activity’ and
infrastructure development (e.g. roads, dams)
The R-PIN states that an ‘opportunity’ exists
to ‘reduce the incidence of ‘slash and burn’ for
agriculture through providing viable alternatives
to local communities.
The R-PIN advises that there is a need for Panama
to have a permanent forest monitoring system
and access to ‘high-resolution’ satellite images.
The need for an emissions reductions ‘verification
system’ is likewise noted.
No risk analysis
The discussion of ‘challenges’ and ‘barriers to
success’ (page 11) mainly discusses difficulties
related to achieving SFM (timber).
No explicit risk analysis.
Funding is requested to finance technical monitoring and GIS development, govt. attendance at
UNFCCC meetings, and increased communication
on climate change and REDD activities.
The R-PIN is vague on benefits for indigenous
peoples and local communities – though it clearly
supports payments to those clearing forests (big
farmers (pg.15).
There is no direct mention of carbon trading. It
is planned that REDD will be inserted into the
existing PES scheme. The purchase of land for
private conservation is explicitly endorsed in
the R-PIN.
No mention of monitoring of social impacts.
SEAM notes that the current system of monitoring
in support of the Zero Deforestation Law is
managed by the ENGO sector in Paraguay that
have the leading expertise in GIS systems and
analysis of satellite imagery (page 4).
Insecurity of tenure is identified as a problem,
along with forest and land laws (e.g., Law
422/73) which permit deforestation and allow
the permanent conversion for agricultural use.
The R-PIN blames a high rural pop density for
putting pressure on forests.
The R-PIN is explicit in identifying the market
as the future financing mechanism for REDD
in Guyana. The potential for payments for
ecosystem services is also noted.
Monitoring rural livelihoods is also proposed,
but other monitoring of social impacts is not
mentioned.
The high value of agricultural export markets
(especially beef, dairy products and soya) is
noted as a key underlying factor.
Deforestation is blamed on two main factors:
firewood collection and subsistence agriculture
using shifting cultivation.
The R-PIN notes that Amerindian communities
‘must receive benefits from REDD incentives’
although it seems that these are mainly confined
to indirect benefits (such as training in forest
management) and not direct rewards for forest
protection.
A national system to monitor emissions is
proposed with remote sensing using Landsat and
RADAR images.
Different types of slash and burn and rights of
indigenous peoples to engage in traditional
farming are not discussed.
Direct drivers of deforestation in the western
Chaco region are clearance for cattle ranching
and soya production, as well as improved road
systems financed by MDBs.
The challenges or controversies related to the
carbon market are not acknowledged
No mention of risks other than a note that :
‘socio-economic impact of REDD should not be
ignored and monitoring of these aspects should
be planned’.
Acknowledges need for payments to reach local
stakeholders, but admits that ensuring payments
get to this local level is difficult.
National scale remote sensing combined with
local validation.
Suggest using logging companies forest inventories which cover large areas, but also to entrust
monitoring-assessment and control of flows to an
independent entity and allow NGO access to data
for transparency and verification.
The R-PIN claims that massive industrial deforestation has never occurred in the Congo Basin
and the extent of illegal logging is not known,
and so these are not identified as major drivers.
Readiness funds are requested for outreach to
indigenous and local communities, although
most financial requests relate to technical
monitoring issues and funds for to establish a
‘Special REDD Monitor Task Force’.
The R-PIN rejects the historical baseline
approach, and suggests a commitment must be
made to find the best way of mobilizing REDD
funds.
Funding is requested for a steering unit to
organize stakeholder consultation and establishing inventories and baselines.
There is mention of the need to monitor social
impacts.
The main drivers were identified as slash and
burn farming; fuelwood collection; mining;
migration and excessive commercial logging
during the civil war.
High risk of future pressure on forests from
expanding global economy is recognised.
REDD monitoring will involve remote sensing;
Arial photography and ground based monitoring
as required. Extensive ground based monitoring is
With regards to benefits, the R-PIN notes that
there is an intention to ‘develop carbon, biodiver- already established, with 703 sample plots.
sity and social criteria to target incentives to the
The R-PIN rejects the use of a historical baseline,
highest outcome potential’.
claiming that this does not accurately predict
future emissions, and suggests the use of
It is not made clear what this proposal would
modeling future emissions.
entail.
No risk analysis.
REDD incentives will be used to compensate
communities for foregone forest exploitation.
Equitable distribution of benefits considered
important but examples not given.
Liberia intends to market reduced emissions
credits generated by the PA network, which will
be financed through upfront incentive payments
to extend PAs, particularly in biodiversity
hotspot areas.
Funding requested for a REDD Strategy and
Planning Process; technical strengthening,
including forest inventories and monitoring; and
stakeholder outreach.
16
Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
Country
Human Rights
(including indigenous rights)
Land and tenure
FPIC
and public consultation on R-PIN
Governance
Issues addressed
Ghana
No mention of human rights.
The R-PIN acknowledges that establishing
clear land tenure is important to reduce
deforestation.
FPIC not mentioned
The R-PIN calls for more involvement of stakeholders in the protection of forests resources.
Current legislation includes a negotiated
contract between communities and timber
contractors on social responsibility and
benefits to communities
The R-PIN proposes deploying the VPA
steering committee and forest governance
learning group to ensure participatory and
bottom-up consultation process on REDD
readiness activities
The R-PIN notes that a VPA agreement has been
signed with EU to combat illegal logging – as a
result steady progress in participative consultation and that benefits for communities have been
secured in Ghana.
Public consultations will be set up with all
stakeholders (inc. forest dwellers) to discuss
REDD strategy and the R-PIN.
Lao PDR
No mention of human rights. No mention of
indigenous rights.
‘no data are available on indigenous peoples
in the lands targeted for REDD’
Only mention of choice by or involvement
of communities is "Voluntary participation
of villages in emission reduction plan and
activities based on land use plans and
land titling"
All land is the property of the State. Village
forests may be allocated to villages. State
may also lease forests to investors.
For very remote (no road access) villages
temporary land certificates are granted to
encourage crop production, customary use
of the forest is allowed for these villages.
No mention of consent.
No public involvement in the development
of R-PIN.
To date: Two meetings of the GovernmentDonor Working Group on Forestry (FSWG)
where the draft R-PIN was discussed.
"Weak law enforcement and governance are
common issues in all sectors.’ R-PIN notes the
need to include not only the forestry sector, but
also general actions by the government and
understanding and cooperation of private sector."
All governance for the proposed programmes will
be run through a Government-Donor working
group.
Future plans: indigenous peoples and forest
dwellers only be involved in the activities,
but not in planning or decision making.
(pg 12)
Consultation (with ‘everyone’) is stated as
an important area where readiness funds
could be used.
Nepal
No mention of human rights directly
although there is a strong emphasis on local
control and local autonomy
Under ‘community based forest management’ a high degree of tenure control is
protected.
Specific tenure agreements in place for:
Community Forest Users Groups
(CFUG), Leasehold Forest Users Group
(LFUG) and Buffer Zone Community Forest
Users Group (BZCFUG).
Consent not referred to.
Consultations on REDD and the R-PIN have
not taken place at all levels. One multi stake
holder consultation has been done for GoN
and for INGOs (no local community).
There are strong avenues for information
sharing and consultation in place in the
forestry sector (since 2006/7) with national
rep of local groups.
Also stated for the future that ‘GoN must
engage with forest dependent communities, civil society and
local organizations to incorporate their
views and promote transparency, people’s
participation and equity’
Political instability and low enforcement of
existing laws addressed as a risk for FLEGT
approach.
Strong focus on decentralized implementation.
"Evidence strongly
suggests that once the forest management
regime is transferred to the local communities,
the degradation and
deforestation is substantially reduced"
Governance of large block (uninhabited) forests
seen as a challenge "defining the roles and
powers of communities, local government and
central government"
Recognized national federations of indigenous peoples will be invited to participate in
the REDD processes
Vietnam
No mention of human rights nor reference
to indigenous peoples, although ethnic
minorities mentioned
The R-PIN notes that allocation of tenure to
rural and ethnic minorities must be accelerated, however only in 2006 did allocation
of tenure over forested lands begin.
The R-PIN notes that ethnic minorities
"have clear historical and de facto tenure
over forest lands"
Lack of tenure is highlighted as a contributing cause of deforestation – tenure
allocation programmes lack money.
Although the REDD programme will
focus on the central highlands and north
central provinces where the population is
overwhelmingly minority groups, there has
been no consultation held in these areas or
with any other section of the public.
Some prior consultations on forest policy
are mentioned, but participant groups are
not indicated, and it is not clear that this
related to the R-PIN and REDD.
‘Existing government infrastructure’ will be
used to make sure voices are heard’
For the prep of the REDD Plan a consultation
process will be established (including only
central gov bodies).
Management of REDD will take place under a
Steering Committee for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation under the MARD.
Lack of enforcement capacity is emphasized.
Lack of (and a need for) robust independent
monitoring
Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
17
Underlying drivers
Who is blamed for deforestation?
Risk analysis
Are potential env/social risks addressed
Benefit sharing +
Monitoring and verification
Financing mechanism
The main drivers are considered to be agricultural expansion (including permanent and
shifting cultivation and cattle ranching) and
fuelwood harvesting.
No risk analysis
The R-PIN notes the need to Involve civil society
in monitoring operations to contribute to forest
law compliance.
Payment for environmental services schemes
are mentioned.
The R-PIN contains a brief mention that avoiding
negative social implications which may arise
needs to be addressed.
Population pressure and mining are also
mentioned.
In relation to benefit sharing, there is a clear
proposal for funds disbursement from national
down to community level. (inc. timber industry,
community based organisations and civil society.
National level monitoring of forest cover changes
Remote sensing and satellite data analyzed
using GIS technology, but satellite images which
take days to download is a barrier to this type of
analysis.
No mention of monitoring social impacts.
Deforestation factors are presented as four-fold:
swidden farmers, commercial tree plantations,
illegal logging and infrastructure.
No
Underlying causes identified include poverty,
the desire of neighboring countries for timber
products, lack of application of current laws (lack
of resources) and corruption.
Monitoring of forest cover currently on a 10 year
cycle, this will be changed under the proposal,
to what is unclear. In the current plan there are
19 components, all of which will have different
monitoring systems. REDD is section 6 of the 19,
and monitoring will be done by participating
villages ‘according to agreed emission reduction
plans’.
Very few details mentioned. It appears to be
a single payment to the National Committee
(under the government) who would then
distribute the payment to all contributing
programmes. The process for establishing
estimates of which programme contributed how
much is not given.
Distribution of payments will be done to all
programmes, monitored ones and non-monitored
ones. How the division of payments will be done
is not discussed.
Monitoring of livelihood benefits are ‘being done
by NGOs‘, and the R-PIN states that they should be
monitored in the future, no mention of by whom.
Identified as different for high altitude and
middle altitude forests. High altitude factors
include poverty, political instability, lack
of appropriate management institutions,
inadequate incentives for managing forest, lack
of clearly defined tenure structure and illegal
felling for smuggling across the borders. Midaltitude has less deforestation due to ‘success of
the community forestry programme’.
The social risk of REDD being diverted through
corruption is acknowledged, required that
excluded groups must be empowered to address
discriminatory practices in society to ensure
benefits reach the poorest.
Also in developing a national REDD strategy, GoN
would look at the first generation REDD pilots
in terms of (i) impact on carbon retention; (ii)
implications for social justice.
The R-PIN notes that when civil society ‘empowers
indigenous minority groups’ then they are more
able to claim a fair share of benefits.
Monitoring systems are very unclear, new forest
inventories need to be taken, new methods of
accounting and monitoring need to be developed.
Use of community forest groups as part of the
monitoring system is mentioned.
National Forest Inventories are taken every ten
years, this baseline would need to be redone.
The R-PIN also notes that nationalization of
forests in 1957 led to a massive increase in
deforestation rates.
Unclear how disbursements and payments
would take place. A portion would supplement
the direct revenues communities get as part of
the PA network.
Other than this, the R-PIN states that
institutional structures within the government
will need to be designed to deal with financial
arrangements.
The R-PIN seems to view large scale payments
as being received by the government then
disbursed, but this is not clearly stated.
Monitoring will also take into account the impact
of the REDD process on livelihoods in rural areas,
although local monitoring of this is strong a
national collation of the data from local areas
needs to be developed.
Monitoring of biodiversity would also be expected
of community forest management groups.
Commercial timber industry "Vietnam currently
exports 4 times more processed timber products
by volume than it officially harvests from its
own forests"
Conversion to cash cropping
Poor people, especially ethnic minorities,
clearing the forest for cropping, exacerbated by a
lack of legal tenure.
Infrastructure development for economic gain,
including electrical generation.
[forest cover in Vietnam is actually increasing
due to massive increase in plantation forests of
low quality cover]
None
Only a brief discussion of local benefits
The R-PIN states that "REDD will directly contribute to Vietnam’s obligations under the UNFCCC,
CBD, UNCCD and to the economic development of
remote, upland and ethnic minority areas"
The R-PIN also notes that the payment system
would require a robust independent monitoring
system to ensure payments are made correctly.
Existing monitoring systems are fragmented
across government departments.
Future monitoring is planned to be done by local
community groups to feed into national statistics
(to be audited by a national REDD group) once
land tenure allocation to minorities has occurred.
The monitoring system should also receive
payments for their services.
The national REDD strategy will be opened up to
sub-project developers to bid for inclusion.
The REDD strategy aims to channel payments to
three groups " forest-dependent rural communities, natural forest management boards and
local forest protection enforcement agencies"
Disbursement of payments to communities will
be linked to inventory work and REDD success.
All payments appear to be directed towards
officially recognized groups (government bodies)
including down to the community level.
18
Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
Conclusions
•
This review finds the process has been rushed, implicitly directed towards a market based
REDD and dominated by centralized government, with little to no consultation with
indigenous peoples, local communities or civil society organizations.15
•
The FCPF is not following its own rules (see Annex I) and is violating some of the World
Bank’s safeguard policies it is meant to adhere to.
•
Large international conservation NGOs have been key authors or informants of R-PINS in
most of the reviewed countries revealing a lack of national ownership of the RPINs. See
Annex III.
•
Plans for future consultations are vague or countries simply plan to use existing national
mechanisms (Panama, Guyana, DRC, Lao PDR, Vietnam).
•
None of the R-PINs deal explicitly with human rights issues (Nepal’s is the only RPIN which
contains an outline analysis of social risks), nor with the need to clarify land ownership
and tenure rights as a pre-condition for any REDD agreement.
•
None of the R-PINs discusses the issue of Free, Prior and Informed Consent.
•
Only a few R-PINs mention international obligations and standards (the main focus is
on existing national forest and conservation laws and regulations) and none mentions
the landmark international instrument protecting indigenous peoples’ rights, the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
•
Nearly all the R-PINs identify ‘traditional agriculture’ and/or ‘shifting agriculture’ as a driver
of deforestation (Panama, Guyana, Paraguay, DRC, Liberia, Ghana, Lao-PDR, Vietnam).
These practices are often protected under international law and are usually ‘carbon’
neutral or even positive over time in the case of traditional rotational (swidden) farming
and agro-forestry systems.16
15
This was the case for all R-PINs evaluated by this study, as well as for the R-PIN of Peru, where the FCPF approved the R-PIN despite serious
criticism from its own Technical Advisory Panel (TAP), leading some critics and TAP experts to conclude that FCPF decision-making is based
mainly on political considerations. Ref: World Bank (2008) Summary Assessment of the Quality and Completeness of the R-PIN: FCPF External
review Form: Peru, September 28, 2008 http://wbcarbonfinance.org/docs/Peru_TAP_Consolidated_PIN_Review.doc
See Counsell, S (2008) ‘Monitoring, permanence, and indigenous peoples’ Presentation to the conference ‘Rights, Forests and Climate Change’
convened by The Rainforest Foundation Norway and the Rights and Resources Initiative Oslo, Norway | October 15-17, 2008
16
Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
•
Most R-PINs propose to use REDD funds to stop ‘slash and burn agriculture’ and provide
‘alternative livelihoods’ for forest communities.
•
Land tenure and customary rights are only given superficial treatment in some R-PINs and
existing land tenure conflicts and unresolved issues are not discussed (Panama, Guyana,
DRC).
•
Most of the R-PINs examined are vague about how forest peoples might benefit from
future REDD programmes and control of the distribution of benefits appears to remain
in the hands of central government to be distributed through unidentified channels
according to unstated criteria.
•
More positively, several R-PINs propose independent monitoring of REDD (e.g, DRC,
Paraguay, Vietnam) and all propose some form of future consultation with forest peoples
and civil society on REDD.
Conservation and sustainable use should be a result of REDD. Securing community rights is a
pre-requisite for sustainable use and effective conservation.
19
20
Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
Recommendations
The Facility and relevant sections in the World Bank must:
•
Make sure FCPF operations are fully consistent with mandatory standards contained in
the Bank’s relevant safeguard policies (e.g., Indigenous Peoples Policy, Forests Policy and
others) during Phase II (R-Plan preparation) and in all subsequent phases.
•
Refrain from rushed timelines for preparation of the R-Plans and ensure adequate time
and space for meaningful consultation. The EU FLEGT process has shown that a proper
consultation process takes years and cannot be rushed.
•
Require participation of relevant rights holders and civil society organisations in the
formulation of the mandatory R-Plan ‘Consultation and outreach plan’.
•
Require informed participation of indigenous peoples, forest dependent communities
and civil society organizations in the formulation and finalization of terms of reference
for all REDD related studies and programmes.
•
Ensure future FCPF plans and documents fully address critical issues, including human
rights, free, prior and informed consent, land tenure issues, measures to recognize and
respect customary rights, avoidance of negative social impacts and equitable benefit
sharing.
Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
Annex I
Some Key FCPF standards and
operating principles
As a result of intense advocacy by indigenous peoples and civil society organizations, the final
Charter of the Facility affirms that:
‘The operation of the Facility, including implementation of activities under Grant Agreements
and Emission Reduction Programs, shall: … Comply with the World Bank’s Operational
Policies and Procedures, taking into account the need for effective participation of forest
dependent indigenous peoples and forest dwellers in decisions that may affect them,
respecting their rights under national law and applicable international obligations’
(Operating Principles, 3.1(d)) (emphasis added) 17
The FCPF Information memorandum affirms that:
‘the FCPF will adhere to several principles of engagement, including ‘inclusiveness and
broad stakeholder participation’ at the national and international levels. ‘At the national level,
the relevant stakeholders and right-holders will be consulted and participate in the readiness
process […] it is important that these actors participate early on in the readiness process.
Countries will, for example, make special efforts to ensure that forest-dependent indigenous
peoples and other forest dwellers meaningfully participate in decisions that may affect them
and that their rights are respected consistent with national law and applicable international
obligations’ (emphasis added) 18
R-PIN selection criteria:
The FCPF Information Memorandum and the FCPF Charter (annexed to the same document)
set out a series of criteria, principles, rules and standards to be followed by the Facility. The
FCPF criteria for approving or rejecting R-PINs include:
•
•
•
•
Ownership of the proposal by both government and relevant stakeholders
Consistency between national and sectoral strategies
Completeness of information and data provided
Clarity of REDD responsibilities
17
It should be noted, however, that the Information Memorandum states that ‘without a World Bank grant agreement with the REDD Country
Participant, the World Bank’s safeguard policies will not apply (page 27). This raises the important question of which standards will apply (if
any) if a RED=ry chooses to obtain support from donors outside the World Bank (e.g., Indonesia).
World Bank (2008) Forest Carbon Partnership Facility: information memorandum June 13, 2008, World Bank Washington DC.
18
21
22
Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
•
Feasibility and likelihood of success
Consultation on the R-Plan:
The R-Plan template document advises that:
“The FCPF expects the R-Plan formulation and implementation process to be a significant,
inclusive, forward-looking and coordinated effort to consult all major affected parties
in the country about their ideas and concerns regarding REDD....This effort should
include national consultation with stakeholders about REDD on a continuous basis for
each component of the R-Plan, a review of previous efforts to change land use practices
and patterns and their effectiveness or why they succeeded or failed, and a cooperative
identification of a set of planned measures to change land-use behavior, polices, and
implementation in the future (i.e., a REDD Strategy)”19
The FCPF has also produced guidance on the preparation of the required ‘Consultation and
Outreach Plan’. Unfortunately, this guidance is not in conformity with World Bank safeguard
policies and best practice on meaningful public consultation. For example, it does not
conform to the mandatory consultation standards set out in the Bank policy on Indigenous
Peoples (OP.410)20 and related best practice guidance.21
R-Plan selection criteria:
These are similar to the R-PIN criteria with an additional criterion for a broad and innovative
approach, which should include:
a
innovative and/or comprehensive strategies or programs…;
b
innovative and/or advanced concepts of monitoring, reporting and remote sensing,
including for forest degradation, biodiversity protection and social benefits;
c
proposals that will test new mechanisms and distribution methods of REDD revenues;
d
provide regionally important leadership…; and
e
demonstrate approaches that are inclusive and focus on REDD in combination with
poverty reduction, livelihood enhancement, and/or land tenure rights, including
alternative forest sector or other governance arrangements.
19
20
21
R-RIN Template (page 2, paragraph 6)
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentMDK:20553653~menuPK:64701637~pageP
K:64709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:502184,00.html
Davis, SH and Soeftestad, L T (1995) Participation and Indigenous Peoples Social Development Paper No. 9, June 1995, ESSD, World Bank
Washington D.C.
Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
Annex II
The stages of the FCPF
Phase I = Preparation of R-PIN (no funding available)
The R-PINs (REDD concept notes) are meant to ‘provide an overview of land use, deforestation
causes, stakeholder consultation and institutional issues for addressing REDD’ and to
summarize country request for assistance to prepare for their REDD programmes.22
Phase II = Preparation of an R-Plan (grant of up to $200,000 USD)
The Readiness Plan is a document that will set out the steps and ‘minimum requirements’ for
a country to achieve ‘Readiness’. It is meant to build and expand upon the R-PIN. The R-Plan
must contain a completed ‘consultation and outreach plan’ and a rapid analysis of ‘Land use,
Forest Policy and Governance Quick Assessment’ . Crucially, it must also contain detailed
or outline terms of reference for, inter alia, the establishment of a ‘National REDD working
Group’, a risk assessment a national REDD Strategy, a REDD Implementation Framework and
also TORs for social and environmental impact assessment of the REDD strategy.23
The Bank does not stipulate a time-line for preparation of R-Plans, but notes that they will be
completed ‘over a number of months’.
Phase III = Implementation of R-Plan to Produce R-Package (grant of between $1 and $3
million USD)
This refers to activities to formulate and finalize a package of detailed plans, including (i) a
National REDD Strategy (ii) national REDD monitoring systems, and a national baseline for
deforestation rates.
Phase IV = Preparation and submission of Emissions Reductions Program(s)
Phase V = Negotiation and approval of Emission Reduction Payment Agreements (ERPAs)
22
23
World Bank (2008) FCPF Readiness Plan (R-Plan) Template and Guidance: working version 2: October 16, 2008
http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=FCPF&FID=34267&ItemID=34267&ft=DocLib&CatalogID=44010
R-PIN Template
23
24
Cutting Corners World Bank’s forest and carbon fund fails forests and peoples
Annex III
Who wrote the R-PINs?
Country
Date submitted
Authors
Panama
July 2008
National Environmental Agency (ANAM)
Guynana
July 2008
Government of Guyana
Conservation International-Guyana
Paraguay
October 2008
SEAM (government Secretary of the Environment)
INFONA (National Forestry Institute)
WWF
Nature Conservancy
Birdlife International
The R-PIN states that The main source of information for the R-PIN was a 2006 WWF document on SFM
DRC
May 2008
Liberia
Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation and Tourism.
FRM team: GIS; legality/governance ; forest experts
External Consultant.
Consultation occurred with Woods Hole research centre and other government departments
FDA (Forest Development Authority )
Conservation International
Consultations with several international agencies
Ghana
May 2008
The Forestry Commission
Remote sensing specialist from University of Ghana
IUCN
Lao PDR
June 12, 2008
Working Group on R-PIN set up in the Department of Forestry, including the Wildlife Conservation Society
in Lao PDR, IUCN in Lao PDR, Sustainable Forestry and Rural Development Project (SUFORD; MAF/WB/
Finland), Forestry Strategy Implementation Promotion Project(MAF/JICA/Sida), Upland Research Capacity
Development Program (MAF/Sida)
Nepal
April 2008
Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation, Department of Forest Survey and Research
Vietnam
March 8, 2008
Department of Forestry and International Cooperation Department, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development (MARD)
Fauna and Flora International (FFI)
– SNV
– Independent Consultant
– IUCN