Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 1/201 1 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 2 ATENAS EDITORES ASOCIADOS 1998-2016 www.thegermanarmy.org Tittle: The Eastern Front 1941-1943 © Atenas Editores Asociados 1998-2016 © Gustavo Urueña A www.thegermanarmy.org More information: http://www.thegermanarmy.org/kriegsmarine/index.html First Published: January 2016 We include aditional notes and text to clarify original and reproduce original text as it in original book All right reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmited in any form or by any mens, electronic, mechanical, photocopyng or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the autor or publisher. Design: Atenas Editores Asociados 1998-2016 © Atenas Editores Asociados 1998-2016 The Editors welcome all comments and observations: 1939europa@gmail.com ISBN-13:978-1535599092 ISBN-10:153559909X 2/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 3/201 3 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 4 Admiral Graf Spee Admiral Graf Spee was a Deutschland-class heavy cruiser (originally termed Panzerschiff or armoured ship, sometimes referred to as "pocket battleship") which served with the Kriegsmarine of Nazi Germany during World War II. The vessel was named after Admiral Maximilian von Spee, commander of the East Asia Squadron that fought the battles of Coronel and Falkland Islands in World War I. She was laid down at the Reichsmarinewerft shipyard in Wilhelmshaven in October 1932 and completed by January 1936. The ship was nominally under the 10,000 long tons (10,000 t) limitation on warship size imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, though with a full load displacement of 16,020 long tons (16,280 t), she significantly exceeded it. Armed with six 28 cm (11 in) guns in two triple gun turrets, Admiral Graf Spee and her sisters were designed to outgun any cruiser fast enough to catch them. Their top speed of 28 kn (52 km/h; 32 mph) left only a handful of ships in the Anglo-French navies able to catch them and powerful enough to sink them. The ship conducted five non-intervention patrols during the Spanish Civil War in 1936 1938, and participated in the Coronation Review for King George VI in May 1937. Admiral Graf Spee was deployed to the South Atlantic in the weeks before the outbreak of World War II, to be positioned in merchant sea lanes once war was declared. Between September and December 1939, 4/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 5 Introduction.............................................................................5 Speech by Herr Hitler at Wilhelmshaven on April 1, 1939 .....5 Anglo-German Naval Agreement .......................................... 16 Washington Treaty ................................................................27 War at Sea ..............................................................................37 Battle of the River Plate .........................................................47 Pocket Battleship Admiral Graf Spee ................................... 58 Hans Langsdorff ................................................................... 93 HMS Exeter........................................................................... 98 Heavy cruiser .......................................................................102 HMNZS Achilles .................................................................. 110 HMS Ajax ............................................................................. 112 Leander class cruiser (1931) ................................................ 118 Admiral Sir Henry Harwood Harwood ............................... 121 Annexes................................................................................ 124 Jutland ................................................................................. 124 Development and Construction of the Panzerschiffe.......... 127 Deutschland class cruiser .................................................... 139 Arado Ar 196 ........................................................................ 152 Washington Naval Treaty .................................................... 155 London Naval Treaty ........................................................... 162 Anglo-German Naval Agreement ........................................ 163 Naval Warfare ...................................................................... 174 Bibliography......................................................................... 193 Index ....................................................................................198 Introduction Speech by Herr Hitler at Wilhelmshaven on April 1, 1939 GERMANS! Volksgenossen und Volksgenossinnen! Whoever wishes to estimate the decline and regeneration of Germany must look at the development of a city like Wilhelmshaven. A short time ago it was a dead spot almost without any title to existence, without any prospect of a future; to-day it is filled again with the hum of work and production. It is good if one recalls again to memory this past. When the city experienced its first rise to prosperity, this coincided with the regeneration of the German Reich after its battle for unification. This Germany was a Germany of peace. 5/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 6 At the same time as the so-called peace-loving virtuous nations were carrying on quite a number of wars, the Germany of that time had only one aim, namely, to preserve peace, to work in peace, to increase the prosperity of her inhabitants and thereby to contribute to human culture and civilisation. This peace-time Germany tried with unceasing industry, with genius and with perseverance to set up its inner life and to assure for itself a proper place in the sun through participation in peaceful rivalry with other nations. In spite of the fact that this Germany was for decades the surest guarantor of peace and devoted herself only to her own peaceful business, other nations, and particularly their statesmen, could not refrain from persecuting this regeneration with envy and hate and finally answering it with a war. We know to-day from historical records how the encirclement policy of that time had been systematically pursued by England. We know from numerous established facts and publications that in that land one was imbued with the conception that it was necessary to crush Germany militarily because its annihilation would assure to every British citizen a larger measure of this world s goods. Certainly Germany at that time committed errors. Its worst error was to see this encirclement and to take no steps in time to avoid it. The only reproach which we can level at the regime of that day is the fact that it had full knowledge of the devilish plan for a surprise attack on the Reich, and even so was unable to make up its mind to avoid in time such an attack, but allowed this encirclement to mature right up to the outbreak of the catastrophe. The result was the World War. In this war the German people, although they were in no way armed the best, fought heroically. No nation can claim for itself the glory of having beaten us to our knees, least of all those whose statesmen to-day are boasting. Germany at that time remained unbeaten and unvanquished on land, sea and in the air. And yet we lost the war. We know the power which at that time vanquished Germany. It was the power of falsehood, the poison of a propaganda which did not shrink from distortion and untruthfulness and which caught the German Reich because it was unprepared and defenceless. 6/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 7 When the Fourteen Points of President Wilson were announced, many German
Volksgenossen, particularly the leading men of the time, saw in those Fourteen Points not only the possibility for ending the World War but for a final pacification of all nations of this world. There would come a peace of reconciliation and understanding, a peace which would recognise neither victors nor vanquished, a peace without war indemnities, a peace of equal rights for all, a peace of equal distribution of colonial territory and of equal consideration for colonial desiderata. A peace which would finally be crowned with a league of free nations. A peace which, by guaranteeing equal rights would make it appear superfluous for nations in future still to endure the burden of armament which, as is known, previously weighed down so heavily on them. Disarmament, therefore, and in fact disarmament of all nations. Germany was to give a good example by taking the lead and all undertook to follow her disarmament. The era of so-called secret diplomacy was to come to an end as well. All problems were to be discussed and negotiated openly and freely. The right of self-determination for nations was to be finally established and be regarded as the most important factor. Germany believed these assurances. Relying on these declarations Germany laid down her weapons. And then a breach of faith began such as world history has never seen. At the moment when our people had laid down their arms a period of blackmail, oppression, pillage and slavery began. No longer any word of peace without victors and vanquished, but a sentence of condemnation for the vanquished for time without end. No longer any word of equal rights, but rights for one side and absence of rights and injustice for the other. One robbery after another, one blackmail after another were the results. No man in this democratic world bothered about the suffering of our people. Hundreds of thousands fell in the war, not through enemy action, but through the hunger blockade. And when the war came to an end this blockade was continued still for months in order to bring still further pressure on our nation. Even the German prisoners of war had to remain in captivity for indefinite periods. The German colonies were 7/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 8 stolen from us, German foreign securities were simply confiscated, and our mercantile marine was taken away. Then came financial pillage such as the world has never up to this day seen. Payments were imposed on the German people which reached astronomical figures, and about which English statesmen said that they could only be effected if the whole German nation reduced its standard of living to the utmost and worked fourteen hours a day. What German spirit and German diligence had created and saved in decades was now lost in a few years. Millions of Germans were torn away from the Reich, others were prevented from returning into the Reich. The League of Nations was made not an instrument of a just policy of understanding, but a guarantor of the meanest dictate that human beings had ever thought out. A great people was thus raped and led towards the misery that all of you know. A great people was deprived of its rights by breach of promise and its existence in practice was made impossible. A French statesman gave sober expression to this by declaring: There are 20 million Germans too many in the world! There were Germans who, in despair, committed suicide, others who lethargically submitted to their inevitable fate, and others again who were of the opinion that there was nothing left to do but to destroy everything; others again ground their teeth and clenched their fists in impotent rage, others again believed that the past must be restored as it had been. Every individual had adopted some sort of attitude. And I at that time, as the unknown soldier of the World War, took up my position. It was a short and simple programme; it ran: removal of the domestic enemies of the nation, termination of the internal division of Germany, co-ordination of the entire national force of our people in a new community, and the smashing of the Peace Treaty in one way or another (so oder so!) For as long as this dictate of Versailles weighed upon the German people, it was actually doomed to go under. When other statesmen talk about the necessity of justice reigning in this world, then I may tell them that their crime is not justice, that their dictate was neither rightful nor legal, and that the permanent vital rights of peoples come before this 8/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 9 dictate. The German people was created by Providence, not in order to obey a law which suits Englishmen or Frenchmen, but to stand up for its vital right. That is what we are there for! I was determined to take up this struggle for standing up for German vital rights. I took it up first of all within the nation. The place of a number of parties, classes and associations has now been taken by one single community, the community of the German people! It is the duty of us all to realise this community and to continue to intensify it. In the course of this time I have had to hurt many an individual. But I believe that the happiness shared to-day by the entire nation must more than compensate every individual for the things which were dear to him and which he individually had to give up. You have all sacrificed your parties, your clubs, your associations, but you have instead received a great and strong Reich! And this Reich is to-day, thank God, sufficiently strong to take under its protection your rights. We are now no longer dependent upon the favour or disfavour of other States or their statesmen. When over six years ago I came into power, I took over a pitiful heritage. The Reich appeared to possess no possibilities for existence for its citizens. At that time I began work with the only capital which I possessed. It was the capital of your power to work! It was your power to work, my Volksgenossen, that I began to put into use. I had not foreign exchange and no gold; I only had one thing: my faith and your work! We have now founded a new economic system, a system which is called: capital is power to work, and money is covered by our production. We have founded a system based upon the most noble principle in existence, namely, form your life yourself! Work for your existence! Help yourself, then God will also help you! We thus began a gigantic work of reconstruction, supported by the confidence of the nation, filled with faith and confidence in its permanent values. In a few years we tore Germany from its despair. The world did not help us in doing so! If an English statesman to-day believes that all problems can and must be solved by frank discussion and negotiations, then I would like to say to this statesman: an opportunity to 9/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 10 do so existed for fifteen years before our time! If the world today says that one must divide the nations into virtuous and non-virtuous categories-and that the English and French belong in the first place to the virtuous nations and the Germans and Italians to the non-virtuous-then we can only answer: the decision as to whether a nation is virtuous or not virtuous can hardly be made by a mortal human being, and should be left to God! Perhaps this same British statesman will reply: God has already delivered judgment, for he has given to the virtuous nations one-quarter of the globe and has taken away everything from the non-virtuous! In answer to that, one may be permitted to ask: by what means have the virtuous nations acquired this quarter of the globe? And the answer must be, they have not been virtuous methods! For 300 years this England has acted only as an unvirtuous nation, and now in old age she is beginning to talk about virtue. It was thus possible that during the British non-virtuous period 46 million Englishmen have conquered almost a quarter of the world, while 80 million Germans, on account of their virtue, have to exist at the rate of 140 to the square kilometre. Yes, twenty years ago the question of virtue was not yet quite clear in the minds of British statesmen, in so far as it touched conceptions of property. At that time it was still thought to be compatible with virtue simply to take away from another people the colonies which it had acquired by contract or by purchase because one had the power to do so. A power which now it is true is to count as something disgusting and contemptible. In this respect, I can only say one thing to these gentlemen: we do not know whether they believe that sort of thing themselves or not. We assume, however, that they do not believe it. For if we were to assume that they really believed it themselves, then we would lose every feeling of respect for them. For fifteen years Germany had borne this fate patiently. I also tried at the beginning to solve every problem by discussion. At every problem I made offers, and they were every time refused! There can be no doubt that every people possesses sacred interests, simply because they are identical with its life and its vital right. 10/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 90 Fire Control and Radar Fire Control and Rangfinding Equipment For main armament Foretop 1x10.5 m rangefinder Aft command center 1x105 m rangefinder  A turret 1x10.5 m rangefinder  B turret 1x10.5 m rangefinder For medium armament Forward command center 1x7m rangefinder For Flak Flak control centre battlemast8 and astern 2x3m rangefinders From 1935, both sides of of bat- 2xSL2 in DEutschland; 2xSL4 tlemast in others Aft command centre 1xSL4 (not Deutschland) RADAR Deutschland/Lutzow From 1937 Deutschland carried a Seetakt FuMG 39(go) installation, later converted to a FuMO 22. The demountable 0.8x1.8m aerial was fitted on the cupola of the foretop rangefinder and covered with a tarpaulin when not in use. The equipment was permanently replaced later by a FuMO 22 with 2 x 6m aerial. Bewteen January 1942 and March 1944 a FuMB 7 Timor aerial was located at the right side of the foretop radar centre. Admiral Scheer Fitted with a FuMO 22 ranging radar, initially replaced during the ship's major refit by a FuMO 27 (26?) with a 2 x 4m aerial. This was sited on the foretop rangefinder cupola, and a second FuMO 27 was installed later on the aft command Or, in Western parlance, the forward or bridge superstructure. The German terms are Turmmast ('tower mast'), Gefechtsmast ("battle mast') or Gefechtsturm ('battle tower'). 8 90/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 91 centre rangefinder cupola. An FuMB 7 Timor was fitted at the foretop forward radar post and four FuMB 4 Sumatra dipole aerials were attached to platform extensions below the foretop rangefinder. Admiral GrafSpee Fitted with an experimental FuMO 22 on the foretop rangefinder cupola. FuMO 22 Wavelength 81.5cm, frequency band 500kHz, initial output 8kW, range 14-18km, accuracy +3°, frequency 368MHz. FuMO26 As above but range 20-25km, accuracy ±0.25°. Ships in class Deutschland Deutschland saw significant action with the Kriegsmarine, including several non-intervention patrols, during which she was attacked by Republican bombers. At the outbreak of World War II, she was cruising the North Atlantic, prepared to attack Allied merchant traffic. Bad weather hampered her efforts, and she only sank or captured three vessels before returning to Germany, after which she was renamed Lützow. he then participated inOperation Weserübung, the invasion of Norway. Damaged at the Battle of Drøbak Sound, she was recalled to Germany for repairs. While en route, she was torpedoed and seriously damaged by a British submarine. Repairs were completed by March 1941, and in June Lützow steamed to Norway. While en route, she was torpedoed by a British bomber, necessitating significant repairs that lasted until May 1942. She returned to Norway to join the forces arrayed against Allied shipping to the Soviet Union. She ran aground during a planned attack on convoy PQ 17, which necessitated another return to Germany for repairs. She next saw action at the Battle of the Barents Sea with the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper, which ended with a failure to destroy the convoy JW 51B. Engine problems forced a series of 91/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 92 repairs culminating in a complete overhaul at the end of 1943, after which the ship remained in the Baltic. Sunk in the Kaiserfahrt in April 1945 by Royal Air Force (RAF) bombers, Lützow was used as a gun battery to support German troops fighting the Soviet Army until 4 May 1945, when she was disabled by her crew. Raised by the Soviet Navy in 1947, she was reportedly broken up for scrap over the next two years, according to Western works that did not have access to Soviet documents at the time. The historian Hans Georg Prager examined the former Soviet archives in the early 2000s, and discovered that Lützow actually had been sunk in weapons tests in July 1947. Admiral Scheer Admiral Scheer saw heavy service with the German Navy, including several deployments to Spain during the Spanish Civil War, to participate in non-intervention patrols. While off Spain, she bombarded the port of Almeríafollowing the Republican attack on her sister Deutschland. At the outbreak of World War II, she remained in port for a periodic refit. Her first operation during World War II was a commerce raiding operation into the southern Atlantic Ocean that started in late October 1940. While on the operation, she also made a brief foray into the Indian Ocean. During the raiding mission, she sank 113,223 gross register tons (GRT) of shipping, making her the most successful capital ship surface raider of the war. Following her return to Germany, she was deployed to northern Norway to interdict shipping to the Soviet Union. She was part of the abortive attack on Convoy PQ-17 with the battleship Tirpitz; the operation was broken off after surprise was lost. She also conducted Operation Wunderland, a sortie into the Kara Sea. After returning to Germany at the end of 1942, the ship served as a training ship until the end of 1944, when she was used to support ground operations against the Soviet Army. She was sunk by British bombers on 9 April 1945 and partially scrapped; the remainder of the wreck lies buried beneath a quay. Admiral Graf Spee Admiral Graf Spee conducted extensive training in the Baltic 92/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 93 and Atlantic before participating in five non-intervention patrols during the Spanish Civil War in 1936 1938. She also represented Germany during theCoronation Review for King George VI in May 1937. Admiral Graf Spee was deployed to the South Atlantic in the weeks before the outbreak of World War II, to be positioned in merchant sea lanes once war was declared. Between September and December 1939, the ship sank nine ships totaling 50,089 GRT, in response, the British and French navies formed several hunter-killer groups to track her down. These forces included four aircraft carriers, two battleships, and one battlecruiser. Admiral Graf Spee operated in concert with the supply ship Altmark. Admiral Graf Spee was eventually confronted by three British cruisers off Uruguay at the Battle of the River Plate on 13 December 1939. She inflicted heavy damage on the British ships, but suffered damage as well, and was forced to put into port at Montevideo. Convinced by false reports of superior British naval forces approaching his ship and the poor state of his own engines, Hans Langsdorff, the commander of the ship, ordered the vessel to bescuttled. The ship was partially broken up in situ, though part of the ship remains visible above the surface of the water. Langsdorff committed suicide three days after the scuttling. Hans Langsdorff Dates: 20 March 1894 19 December 1939 Hans Langsdorff entered 1912 in the Imperial Navy. During World War II he took in 1916 at the Skagerrak battle part, and then spent the rest of the war at the mine armed forces. In 1918 he was transferred to the Imperial Navy. In the twenties he became commander of a torpedo boat Half Flotilla 1925 liaison officer to the Army Command. From 1936 to 1938 he served as 1st Admiral Staff Officer on the staff of Admiral Boehm, the commander of the reconnaissance forces. On 1 Januar.1937 Hans Langsdorff was promoted to Captain, and in October 1938 he took command of the battleship Admiral Graf Spee. On August 21, 1939, the Admiral Graf Spee Wilhelmshaven aiming South Atlantic ran out. From September 26, 1939 resulted in the ship in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean trade war, 93/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 94 where 9 freighters were sunk with a total of 50,089 GRT. Even more important than the tonnage losses but was the large number of enemy warships, which was bound to catch the Admiral Graf Spee. On 13 December 1939, the Admiral Graf Spee was in front of the La Plata estuary from cruisers Association of Commodore Henry Harwood, consisting of the British heavy cruiser HMS "Exeter" (flagship) and light cruiser HMS "Ajax" and the New Zealand light cruiser HMNZS "Achilles", asked. During the battle, the "Exeter" was heavily damaged (61 dead and 23 wounded) and incapacitated. But the Admiral Graf Spee was significant hit and had to mourn 36 dead and 60 wounded. Captain Langsdorff broke off the battle and ran into the neutral port Montevideo (Uruguay) at the Rio de la Plata in to leave there to repair the damage. Under international law, the ship would be allowed to stay only 24 hours in port, the period but was extended to 72 hours. Nevertheless, not enough time to repair the damage with standard tools. Meanwhile Harwood blocked with his battered cruisers "Ajax" and "Achilles" and the gain "Cumberland" the La Plata estuary. The "Exeter" ran to repair rate Falkland Islands. Captain Langsdorff went out of the wrong assessment, launched by enemy messages that the blockade squadron was greater. But the alarmed gain, including the aircraft carrier "Ark Royal", for several days was removed. There were three options: the internment, the scuttling or the senseless fight. Captain Langsdorff decided in view of the hopeless situation to sink the ship, rather than sacrifice his crew in the battle against the far superior enemy for the honor of the German flag sake. On 17.12.1939 the Admiral Graf Spee in the port of Montevideo ran out and was scuttled by a skeleton crew in the La Plata estuary. Captain Hans Langsdorff voted on 19.12.1939 to commit suicide with his service weapon. The next morning they found him in full uniform on the Reichskriegsflagge lying. He was buried in the German cemetery of Buenos Aires on 22.12.1939 under large sympathy of the population. The British, he is still regarded as honorable and worthy opponent. 94/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 95 Hans Langsdorff Career Langsdorff was born on 20 March 1894 on the island of Rügen in Bergen. He was the eldest son in a family with legal and religious traditions rather than a naval tradition. In 1898, the family moved to Düsseldorf, where they were neighbours of the family of Count (Graf) Maximilian von Spee, who was to become a German naval hero (while losing his life and entire command) in the Battle of the Falkland Islands in 1914. Influenced by his honoured neighbours, Langsdorff entered the Kiel Naval Academy against his parent's 95/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 96 wishes in 1912. During the First World War, the then-Lieutenant Langsdorff received the Iron Cross 2nd Class at the Battle of Jutland in 1916, and subsequently worked on minesweepers for the rest of the war. He received the Iron Cross 1st Class sometime during the remainder of the war, but the exact date is unknown. In 1923, while posted to the navy office in Dresden, Langsdorff met Ruth Hager. The two were married in March 1924, with their son Johann being born on 14 December. In October 1925, Langsdorff was posted to the Defence Ministry in Berlin to coordinate relations between the navy and the army. In 1927, he was posted to the command of a torpedo boat flotilla, and in April 1930 he was promoted to Lieutenant Commander. In 1931, he was recalled to Berlin, as his administrative abilities had become well-known and appreciated. Following the rise to power of the Nazis, Langsdorff requested duty at sea in 1934, but was instead appointed to the Interior Ministry. 9 In 1936 and 1937, while on board the new Admiral Graf Spee as part of the staff of Admiral Bohen, Langsdorff participated in the German support of the Nationalist side in the Spanish Civil War. On 1 January 1937, Langsdorff was promoted to Captain. He received command of the Admiral Graf Spee in October 1938. On 21 August 1939, Admiral Graf Spee left port with orders to raid enemy commercial shipping in the South Atlantic following the outbreak of the Second World War. For the first three weeks of the war, the ship hid in the open ocean east of Brazil while the German government determined how serious Britain was about the war. On 20 September 1939, Admiral Graf Spee was released to carry out its orders. Over the next 10 weeks, Langsdorff and Admiral Graf Spee were extremely successful, stopping and sinking nine British merchant ships, totalling over 50,000 tons. Langsdorff adhered to the Hague Conventions and avoided killing anyone; his humane treatment won the respect of the ships' officers detained as his prisoners. 9 Hans Wilhelm Langsdorff 96/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 97 Battle of the River Plate Langsdorff's luck ran out on the morning of 13 December 1939 when his lookouts reported sighting a British cruiser and two destroyers. Admiral Graf Spee now suffered engine fatigue that reduced her top speed to 23kn. After Langsdorff had committed his ship to the attack it became apparent that the destroyers were in fact light cruisers (HMS Ajax and HMS Achilles) in addition to the heavy cruiser HMS Exeter. Naval analysts claim that Langsdorff then committed a grievous tactical error. His ship outgunned all his opponents, having 11 inch (280 mm) main guns, to Exeter s 8 inch (200 mm) and Ajax and Achilles s 6 inch (150 mm) guns. Exeter was severely damaged and forced to withdraw within half an hour. But she had sent an 8-inch shell into the German warship that won the day. This shell destroyed steam boilers needed to operate the ship s fuel cleaning system. Langsdorff learned that he had 16 hours of pre cleaned fuel in his ready tanks with no hope of replacement or repairs to the system at sea. Soon, the two light cruisers got into range and scored 20 hits on Admiral Graf Spee, including the food stores and bakeries. Simultaneously, Langsdorff and the British commodore decided to break off the action, Langsdorff heading for the neutral port of Montevideo in Uruguay to make repairs. 10 The Uruguayan authorities followed international treaties and, although granting an extra 72 hours stay over the normal 24 hours, required that Admiral Graf Spee leave port by 20:00 on 17 December 1939 or else be interned for the duration of the war. Langsdorff sought orders from Berlin, and was given instructions that the ship was not to be interned in Uruguay (which was sympathetic to Britain); he could try to take the ship to the friendlier Buenos Aires in Argentina although it was thought that the channel was not sufficiently deep for the ship; he could take the ship out to sea to battle the British forces again (though British propaganda was trying to persuade people that a large British force already lay in wait for him though in fact it would not be able to arrive for five days); or he could scuttle the ship. However, on reaThe marker on the grave of Graf Spee captain Hans Langsdorff at a cemetery in Buenos Aires, Argentina. 10 97/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 98 ching the limit of Uruguayan territorial waters she stopped, and her crew was taken off by Argentine barges. Shortly thereafter, planted charges blew up Admiral Graf Spee and she settled into the shallow water (today she has settled in the mud and lies in 7 8 meters of water, depending on the tide). Suicide Langsdorff was taken to the Naval Hotel in Buenos Aires, where he wrote letters to his family and superiors. He wrote on the 19 December 1939: I can now only prove by my death that the fighting services of the Third Reich are ready to die for the honour of the flag. I alone bear the responsibility for scuttling the pocket-battleship Admiral Graf Spee. I am happy to pay with my life for any possible reflection on the honour of the flag. I shall face my fate with firm faith in the cause and the future of the nation and of my Führer. He lay on Admiral Graf Spee's battle ensign and shot himself, forestalling any allegations that he had avoided further action through cowardice. Another motivation was Langsdorff's desire to go down with the Graf Spee. He was talked out of such an action by his officers, who convinced him that his leadership was still needed in seeking amnesty for his crew. Once the fate of the Graf Spee's crew was decided, Langsdorff killed himself over her ensign as a symbolic act of going down with his ship. Hans Langsdorff was buried in the German section of the La Chacarita Cemetery in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and was honoured by both sides in the battle for his honourable conduct. HMS Exeter HMS Exeter (68) was a York class heavy cruiser of the Royal Navy that served in World War II. She was laid down on 1 August 1928 at the Devonport Dockyard, Plymouth, Devon. She was launched on 18 July 1929 and completed on 27 July 1931. She fought against the German pocket battleship Graf Spee at the 1939 Battle of the River Plate, suffering extensive damage that caused a long refit. Having been rebuilt, she was sent to the East Indies where she was sunk by the Japanese in 1942. 98/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 99 Design Exeter was ordered two years after her sister York and therefore her design incorporated improvements in the light of experience with the latter. Her beam was increased by 1-foot (30 cm) to cater for increases in topweight, and the boiler uptakes were trunked backwards from the boiler rooms, allowing for straight funnels removed from the bridge rather than the raked funnels necessary in York to ensure adequate dispersal of the flue gasses. As a result, the masts were stepped straight, and the after funnel was thickened, to aid appearance. As the roof of the 8-inch (203 mm) gun turret had proved not to be strong enough to accommodate the catapult intended for York, Exeter had a pair of catapults angled out from amidships, with the associated crane stepped to starboard. Consequently, the bridge could be lowered (that of York being tall to give command over the intended aircraft arrangements), and was of a modern, enclosed design that was incorporated into later cruiser designs. Modifications In 1932, Exeter had side plating added amidships to the upper deck to enclose her open main deck as far as the after funnel (unlike the County class, the Yorks were not flush-deckers). This provided additional enclosed spaces for accommodation and working. In 1935, the intended multiple Vickers machine guns were finally added, single QF 2-pounder guns having been fitted in lieu. Early war modifications/post battle damage repairs (from her engagement with the Graf Spee) and a general refit saw the bridge rebuilt and enlarged, replacement of the single 4-inch (102 mm) guns with modern twin Mark XVI models on the ubiquitous mounting Mark XIX and an enclosure ('tub') for a single 20 mm Oerlikon gun added to the roof of both 'B' and 'Y' turrets. Type 286 air warning radar was added requiring the pole masts to be replaced by heavy tripods, this primitive metric set had separate transmitting (Tx) and receiving (Rx) aerials, one at each masthead. Type 284 radar was fitted to the director control tower atop the bridge to provide ranging information and spot fall of shot. A larger catapult arrangement and crane were fitted 99/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 100 for handling the Supermarine Walrus amphibious aircraft. 11 Service On completion, Exeter joined the 2nd Cruiser Squadron with the Atlantic Fleet, where she served between 1931 and 1935. In 1934 she was assigned to the America and West Indies Station and remained there, with a temporary deployment to the Mediterranean during the Abyssinian crisis of 1935 and 1936, until 1939. At the outbreak of the Second World War, she formed part of the South American Division with Cumberland, under Commodore Henry Harwood. Together with the Leander class light cruisers Ajax and Achilles she engaged the German pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee in the Battle of the River Plate on 13 December 1939, which culminated in the scuttling of the Admiral Graf Spee several days later. Exeter operated as a division on her own, Achilles and Ajax as the other, in order to split the fire of Graf Spee. Exeter was hit by seven 11-inch shells and several near misses caused significant splinter damage. HMS Exeter Sixty-one of her crew were killed and another twenty-three wounded. All three 8-inch turrets were put out of action and her speed was reduced to 18 knots (33 km/h), forcing her to 11 HMS Exeter 100/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 150 Scharnhorst and Geneisenau also carried four single MPL C/35 mounts that weighed 26.71 tonnes (26.29 long tons; 29.44 short tons) with armor between 6 2 cm (2.4 0.79 in) thick. Each mount could depress -10° and elevate to 35°; this gave a maximum range of 22,000 metres (24.000 yd). The MPL C/28 mount used in the Deutschland-class pocket battleships was virtually identical to the newer mount except its gun shield was smaller so it weighed only 24.83 tonnes (24.44 long tons; 27.37 short tons). The Graf Zeppelin class aircraft carriers were going to carry eight twin-gun Dopp MPL C/36 casemate mountings. These weighed 47.6 tonnes (46.8 long tons; 52.5 short tons) and had an armored shield 30 millimetres (1.2 in) thick. The mount elevated at a speed of 6° per second and trained at a rate of 8° per second. Seetakt radar The shipborne Seetakt radar was developed in the 1930s and was used by the German Navy during World War II. In Germany during the late 1920s, Hans Hollmann began working in the field of microwaves, which were to later become the basis of almost all radar systems. In 1935 he published Physics and Technique of Ultrashort Waves, which was picked up by researchers around the world. At the time he had been most interested in their use for communications, but he and his partner Hans-Karl von Willisen had also worked on radar-like systems. In 1928 Hollmann, von Willisen and Paul-Günther Erbslöh started a company called GEMA. In the autumn of 1934, GEMA built the first commercial radar system for detecting ships, similar to a system developed by Christian Hülsmeyer. Operating in the 50 cm range it could detect ships up to 10 km away. This early version of the system only provided a warning that a ship was in the general vicinity of the direction the antenna was pointed, it did not provide accurate direction or any sort of range information. The purpose was to provide an anti-collision system at night, in fog, and other times of limited visibility. By order of the German navy, in the summer of 1935 they developed a pulse radar with which they could spot the cruiser Königsberg at a distance of 8 km, with an accuracy of up to 150/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 151 50 m, enough for gun-laying. The same system could also detect an aircraft at 500 m altitude at a distance of 28 km. The military implications were not lost this time around, and construction of land and sea-based versions took place as Freya radar and Seetakt. The navy's priority at that time was ranging. Detecting targets and obstacles by night or in bad weather were secondary objectives. Actually using it for gun laying, like the Würzburg radar developed for the German army, was initially not a priority for the Kriegsmarine. The two systems were generally similar, although the early Seetakt systems worked on a 50 cm wavelength (600 MHz), while Freya was designed for much longer ranges and used a 2.5 m wavelength that could be generated at high power using existing electronics. These early systems proved problematic, and a new version using improved electronics at 60 cm wavelength (500 MHz) was introduced. Four units were ordered and installed on the Königsberg, Admiral Graf Spee and two large torpedo boats (which in German service were the size of small destroyers). The Admiral Graf Spee used this unit successfully against shipping in the Atlantic. In Dec. 1939, after heavy fighting during the Battle of the River Plate, the Admiral Graf Spee was severely damaged and the captain scuttled the ship in the neutral harbor off Montevideo, Uruguay. The ship sank in shallow water such that its radar antenna was still visible. These early-model Seetakt systems were followed in 1939 by a modified version known as Dete 1, operating between 71 and 81.5 cm wavelength (368 to 390 MHz) at 8 kW peak and a pulse repetition frequency of 500 Hz. Maximum range against a ship-sized target at sea was up to 220 kilometers (140 mi) on a good day, though more typically half that. Performance was otherwise similar to the earlier system, with a range accuracy of about 50 m. This was considerably more accurate than the guns they ranged for, which typically had spreads of over 100 m. It was also much better than the optical rangefinding equipment of the era, which would typically be accurate to about 200 m at 20,000 m. Arado Ar 196 The Ar 196 was a shipboard reconnaissance aircraft built by the German firm Arado starting in 1936. The next year it was 151/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 152 selected as the winner of a design contest, and became the standard aircraft of the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) throughout World War II. Design and development In 1933, the Kriegsmarine looked for a standardized shipboard reconnaissance aircraft. After a brief selection period, the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (German Air Ministry, RLM) decided on the Heinkel He 60 biplane. This was one of a line of developments of a basic biplane airframe that appeared as a number of floatplanes, trainers, and fighters. Deliveries started in a matter of months. By 1935, it was found that the He 60's performance was lacking, and the RLM asked Heinkel to design its replacement. The result was the He 114. The first prototype was powered by the Daimler-Benz DB 600 inline engine, but it was clear that supplies of this engine would be limited, and the production versions turned to the BMW 132 radial engine instead. The plane proved to have only slightly better performance than the He 60, and its sea-handling was poor. Rushed modifications resulted in a series of nine prototypes in an attempt to solve some of the problems, but they didn't help much. The Navy gave up, and the planes were eventually sold off to Romania, Spain and Sweden. In October 1936, the RLM asked for a He 114 replacement. The only stipulations were that it would use the BMW 132, and they wanted prototypes in both twin-float and singlefloat configurations. Designs were received from Dornier, Gotha, Arado and Focke-Wulf. Heinkel declined to tender, contending that the He 114 could still be made to work. With the exception of the Arado design, they were all conventional biplanes. That gave the Arado better performance than any of the others, and the RLM ordered four prototypes. The RLM was also rather conservative by nature, so they also ordered two of the Focke-Wulf Fw 62 design as a backup. It quickly became clear that the Arado would work effectively, and only four prototypes of the Fw 62 were built. 19 19 Arado Ar 196 152/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 153 The Ar 196 prototypes were all delivered in summer 1937, V1 (which flew in May) and V2 with twin floats as A models, and V3 and V4 on a single float as B models. Both versions demonstrated excellent water handling, and there seemed to be little to decide one over the other. Since there was a possibility of the smaller outrigger floats on the B models "digging in", the twin-float A model was ordered into production. A single additional prototype, V5, was produced in November 1938 to test final changes. 10 A-0s were delivered in November and December 1938, with a single 7.92 mm (.312 in) MG 15 machine gun in the rear seat for defense. Five similarly equipped B-0s were also delivered to land-based squadrons. This was followed by 20 A-1 production models starting in June 1939, enough to equip the surface fleet. Starting in November production switched to the heavier land-based A-2 model. It added shackles for two 50 kg (110 lb) bombs, two 20 mm MG FF cannons in the wings, and a 7.92 mm (.312 in) MG 17 machine gun in the cowling. The A-4 replaced it in December 1940, strengthening the airframe, adding another radio, and switching props to a VDM model. The apparently mis-numbered A-3 replaced the A-4, with additional strengthening of the airframe. The final production version was the A-5 from 1943, which changed radios and cockpit instruments, and switched the rear gun to the much-improved MG 81Z. In all versions, 541 Ar 196s (526 production models) were built before production ended in August 1944, about 100 of these from SNCA and Fokker 153/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 154 plants. The Ar 196C was a proposed aerodynamically-refined version. The Ar 196C project was cancelled in 1941. Operational history The plane was loved by its pilots, who found it handled well both in the air and on the water. With the loss of the German surface fleet the A-1s were added to coastal squadrons, and continued to fly reconnaissance missions and submarine hunts into late 1944. Two notable operations were the capture of HMS Seal, and the repeated interception of RAF Armstrong-Whitworth Whitley bombers. Although it was no match for a fighter, it was considerably better than its Allied counterparts, and generally considered the best of its class. Owing to its good handling on water, the Finnish Air Force utilized Ar 196 solely on transporting and supplying special forces patrols behind enemy lines, landing on small lakes in remote areas. Several fully equipped soldiers were carried in the fuselage. 20 Washington Naval Treaty In the Washington Naval Treaty, also known as the Five-Power Treaty, the nations that won World War Iagreed to prevent an arms race by limiting naval construction. It was negotiated at the Washington Naval Conference, which was held in Washington, D.C. from November 1921 to February 1922, and signed by Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy. It limited the construction of battleships, battlecruisers and aircraft carriersby the signatories. The numbers of other categories of warships, including cruisers, destroyers and submarines, were not limited by the treaty but were limited to 10,000 tons displacement. The treaty was followed by a number of other naval arms limitation conferences that sought to extend or tighten limitations on warship building. The terms of the treaty were modified by the London Naval Treaty of 1930 and theSecond London Naval Treaty of 1936. By the mid-1930s, Japan and Italy withdrew from the treaties, making naval arms limitation an increasingly untenable position for the other signatories. 20 Admiral Graf Spee in http://www.kbismarck.com/ 154/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 155 Background In the aftermath of World War I, the United Kingdom had the world's largest and most powerful navy, followed by the United States and more distantly by Japan. The three nations had been allied in the First World War, but a naval arms race appeared to be beginning in the next few years. This arms race began in the US. The Wilson administration announced successive plans for the expansion of the US Navy in 1916 and 1919 that, if completed, would result in a massive fleet of 50 modern battleships; currently it was engaged in building six battleships and six battlecruisers. In response, the Japanese parliament finally authorised construction of warships to enable the Japanese Navy to reach its target of an "eight-eight" fleet programme, with total of sixteen modern battleships and battlecruisers. To this end, the Japanese started work on four battleships and four battlecruisers, all much larger and more powerful than the preceding classes. While the British Royal Navy retained numerical superiority prior to the treaty, most of its ships were old and deteriorated from battle after heavy use in the War; very few matched the new US or Japanese designs. In the 1921 Naval Estimates, the British planned four battleships and four battlecruisers, with another four battleships to follow the subsequent year. This arms race was widely unwelcome. The US Congress in fact voted down Wilson's 1919 plan, and in the 1920 presidential election, US politics resumed the prewar isolationist tone, with little support for continued naval expansion. Britain could ill afford any resumption of battleship construction, given the £84 million price-tag of naval construction. In late 1921, the US became aware that Britain was planning to call a conference to discuss the strategic situation in the Pacific and Far East. To forestall this British move and to satisfy domestic pressure for a global disarmament conference, the Harding administration called the Washington Naval Conferencein November 1921 Negotiations At the first plenary session held November 21, 1921, the US Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, presented the US proposals. Hughes provided a dramatic opening for the con- 155/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 156 ference by stating with resolve: "The way to disarm, is to disarm.» The ambitious approach received enthusiastic public support and likely shortened the conference while helping ensure the US proposals were largely adopted. He subsequently proposed the following: A ten-year pause or "holiday" in the construction of capital ships (battleships and battlecruisers), including the immediate suspension of all capital ship building. The scrapping of existing, or planned, capital ships so as to give a 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 ratio in tonnage between the US, Britain, Japan, France and Italy. Ongoing limits on both capital ship tonnage, and the tonnage of secondary vessels, in the 5:5:3 ratio. Capital ships The proposals regarding capital ships were largely accepted by the British delegation, though they were controversial with the public. The Hughes plan meant the abandonment of Britain's long dominance of the sea. In particular, it would no longer be possible for Britain to have adequate fleets in the North Sea, the Mediterranean and the Far East simultaneously. These facts provoked outrage from parts of the Royal Navy. Nevertheless, there was huge pressure on Britain to agree. The risk of war with the US was increasingly regarded as theoretical, as there were very few points of difference between the two countries. Neither was increasing naval spending popular in either Britain or its dominions. Furthermore, Britain was inflicting major cuts on its budget due to the economic crisis created by the end of the War. The Japanese delegation was divided. Japanese naval doctrine required the maintenance of a fleet 70% the size of that of the US, which was felt to be the minimum necessary to defeat the US in any subsequent war; (the Japanese envisaged two separate engagements, first with the US Pacific Fleet, then with the Atlantic Fleet and calculated that a 7:5 ratio in the first battle would produce a big enough margin of victory to be able to win the subsequent engagement) thus accepting a 5:3 ratio, or 60%, was unacceptable. Nevertheless, the leader of the delegation, Kat Tomosabur, favoured accepting a 60% ratio to the prospect of an arms race with the US, as the relative industrial output of the two nations would cause Ja- 156/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 157 pan to lose such an arms race and might cause an economic collapse as a consequence. His position faced very serious opposition from Kat Kanji, the president of the Naval Staff College, who acted as his chief naval aide at the delegation, who represented the influential "big navy" school of thought. This school of thought held that in the event of war the USA would be able to build indefinitely more warships, given its huge industrial power, and Japan thus needed to prepare as thoroughly as possible for the inevitable conflict with America. Kat Tomosabur was finally able to persuade the Japanese high command to accept the Hughes proposals, but the outcome of the Treaty was a cause of friction in the Japanese navy for many years to come. The French delegation initially responded angrily to the idea of reducing their capital ships tonnage to 175,000 tons and demanded 350,000, slightly above Japan. In the end, concessions on cruisers and submarines helped persuade the French to agree to the limit on capital ships. There was much discussion about the inclusion or exclusion of individual warships. In particular, the Japanese delegation was keen to retain their newest battleship, Mutsu, which had been funded with great public support, including donations from schoolchildren. This resulted in provisions to allow the US and Britain to construct equivalent ships. Cruisers and destroyers Secretary Hughes proposed to limit secondary ships (cruisers and destroyers) in the same proportions as capital ships. However, this was unacceptable to both the British and the French. The British counterproposal, in which the British would be entitled to 450,000 tons of cruisers in light of their global imperial commitments but the US and Japan only 300,000 and 250,000 respectively, proved equally contentious. Thus, the idea of limiting cruiser tonnage or numbers was rejected entirely. Instead, the British suggested a qualitative limit on future cruiser construction. The limit proposed, of a 10,000 ton maximum on displacement and 8-inch calibre guns, was aimed to allow the British to retain the Hawkins class then under construction. This coincided with US requirements for crui- 157/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 158 sers for Pacific operations, and also with Japanese plans for the Furutaka class. So this suggestion was adopted with little debate. Submarines A key British demand in the negotiations was the complete abolition of the submarine, the weapon that had nearly defeated Britain in World War I. However, this proved impossible, particularly in the light of French opposition; the French demanded an allowance of 90,000 tons of submarines, and the conference ended with no agreement on restricting submarines. Pacific bases Article XIX of the Treaty also prohibited Britain, Japan and the US from constructing any fortifications or naval bases in the Pacific. This was a significant victory for Japan, as fortified British or American bases would pose a serious problem for the Japanese in the event of any future war. This clause of the Treaty essentially guaranteed Japan would be the dominant power in the Western Pacific and was crucial in gaining Japanese acceptance of the limits on capital ship construction. Terms The Treaty put strict limits on both the tonnage and construction of capital ships and aircraft carriers, and also contained limits on the size of individual ships. The tonnage limits defined in Articles IV and VII (tabulated) gave a strength ratio of approximately 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 between Britain, the USA, Japan, Italy and France. The qualitative limits on each type of ship were as follows: Capital ships (battleships and battlecruisers) were limited to 158/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 159 35,000 tons standard displacement and guns of no larger than 16-inch calibre. (Articles V and VI) Aircraft carriers were limited to 27,000 tons and could carry no more than 10 heavy guns, of a maximum calibre of 8 inches. However, each signatory was allowed to use two existing capital ship hulls for aircraft carriers, with a displacement limit of 33,000 tons each. (Articles IX and X) All other warships were limited to a maximum displacement of 10,000 tons and a maximum gun calibre of 8 inches. (Articles XI and XII) The Treaty also detailed in Chapter II which individual ships were to be retained by each Navy, including the allowance for the USA to complete two further ships of the West Virginia class and for Britain to complete two new ships in line with the Treaty limits. Chapter II, part 2, detailed what steps were to be taken to adequately put a ship beyond military use; in addition to sinking or scrapping, a limited number of ships could be converted as target ships or training vessels, so long as their armament, armour and other combat-essential parts were completely removed; some could also be converted into aircraft carriers. Part 3, Section II of the Treaty laid out which ships were to be scrapped to comply with the Treaty, and when the remaining ships could be replaced. In all the USA had to scrap 28 existing or planned capital ships; Britain, 23; and Japan, 16. The Washington Treaty marked the end of a long period of growth in battleship construction. Many ships currently under construction were scrapped or converted into aircraft carriers. The Treaty limits were respected, and then extended in the 1930 London Naval Treaty. It was not until the mid1930s that navies began to build battleships once again, and the power and size of new battleships began to take off once again. The 1936 London Naval Treatysought to extend the Washington Treaty limits until 1942, but in the absence of Japan or Italy was largely ineffective. The effects on cruiser building were less fortunate. While the Treaty specified 10,000 tons and 8-inch guns as the maximum size of a cruiser, in effect this was also treated as the minimum size cruiser that any navy was willing to build. The Treaty sparked a building competition of 8-inch, 10,000 ton "treaty cruisers» which gave rise to further cause for con- 159/201 Battle of the River Plate 13 December 1939 160 cern. Subsequent Naval Treaties sought to address this, by limiting cruiser, destroyer and submarine tonnage. Japanese denunciation The naval treaty had a profound effect on the Japanese. With superior American and even British industrial power, a long war would very likely end in a Japanese defeat. Thus, gaining parity on the strategic level was not economically possible. Many Japanese saw the 5:5:3 ratio of ships as another way of being snubbed by the West (though it can be argued that the Japanese, having a one-ocean navy, had a far greater concentration of force than the two-ocean United States Navy or the three-ocean Royal Navy). It also contributed to a schism in high ranks of the Imperial Japanese Navy between the Treaty Faction officers on the one hand and on the other those opposed to it, who were also allied to the ultranationalists in the Japanese army and other parts of the Japanese government. For Treaty Faction opponents, the Treaty was one of the factors which contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between the United States and the Japanese Empire. The perception of unfairness led to Japan's renunciation of the Naval Limitation Treaties in 1936. Isoroku Yamamoto, who later masterminded the Pearl Harbor attack, held that Japan should remain in the treaty and was therefore regarded by many as a member of the Treaty Faction. His view was more complex, however, in that he felt the United States could outproduce Japan by a greater factor than the 5:3 ratio because of the huge US production advantage, on which he was expert, having served in the Japanese Embassy in Washington. He felt that other methods would be needed to even the odds, which may have contributed to his advocacy of the plan to attack Pearl Harbor. However, he did not have sufficient influence at Navy headquarters or in the government. On 29 December 1934, the Japanese government gave formal notice that it intended to terminate the treaty. Its provisions remained in force until the end of 1936, and it was not renewed, Japan effectively leaving the treaty in 1936. Cryptanalytic influences on the treaty What was unknown to the participants in the Conference was that the American "Black Chamber" (the Cypher Bureau, a 160/201