ZIRN - Interdisciplinary
research unit on risk
governance and
sustainable technology
development
University of Stuttgart
Institute for
social sciences
dep. for environmental
sociology
DIALOGIK
non-profit institute for
communication and
cooperation research
Stuttgart contributions to risk
and sustainability research
Picking A Winner?
Innovation in Photovoltaics
and the Political Creation
of Niche Markets
Gerhard Fuchs / Sandra Wassermann
No. 13 / August 2009
Institute for Social Sciences
Department for Environmental Sociology
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Ortwin Renn
University of Stuttgart
Picking A Winner?
Innovation in Photovoltaics
and the Political Creation
of Niche Markets
Gerhard Fuchs / Sandra Wassermann
No. 13 / August 2009
Report
ISSN 1614-3035
ISBN 978-3-938245-12-5
Institute for Social Sciences
Department for Environmental Sociology
University of Stuttgart
Seidenstr. 36, 70174 Stuttgart, Germany
Tel: ++49 (0)711 685 83971, Fax: ++49 (0) 711 685 82487
Email: ortwin.renn@sowi.uni-stuttgart.de
Internet: http://www.uni-stuttgart.de/soz/tu
DIALOGIK, ltd.
Lerchenstrasse 22, 70176 Stuttgart, Germany
Tel: ++49 (0)711/3585-216 8, Fax: ++49 (0)711/3585-216 0
Email: info@dialogik-expert.de
Internet: www.dialogik-expert.de
ZIRN
International Center for Cultural and Technological Studies
Interdisciplinary Research Unit on Risk Governance
and Sustainable Technology Development
Seidenstr. 36, 70174 Stuttgart, Germany
Tel: ++49 (0)711 685 83971, Fax: ++49 (0)711 685 82487
Email: ortwin.renn@sowi.uni-stuttgart.de
Internet: http://www.zirn-info.de
Contact: Dr. Gerhard Fuchs
Tel: ++49 (0)711 685 83890
gerhard.fuchs@sowi.uni-stuttgart.de
Contents
Abstract ..................................................................................... 1
List of figures ........................................................................... 2
List of tables ............................................................................. 2
1
Introduction ....................................................................... 3
2
Innovation and Sectoral Systems of Innovation ........ 5
2.1
Innovation Policy .................................................................. 5
2.2
Innovation .............................................................................. 8
2.3
Innovation and Uncertainty................................................. 9
2.4
Electric Power Generation as an Industrial Sector ......... 10
3
Photovoltaics: Technology Characteristics .................... 13
3.1
Technologies ........................................................................ 13
3.2
Applications ......................................................................... 14
4
Promoting Photovoltaics ............................................... 17
4.1
The Formative Stage ........................................................... 18
4.2
Take-Off ................................................................................ 26
4.3
Success Indicators................................................................ 32
5
Photovoltaics and Its Contenders ................................ 39
6
A Future for Photovoltaics? .......................................... 49
References ............................................................................... 51
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
1
Abstract
Innovation theory has pointed to the complex, non-linear character of
innovation processes. Heterogeneous networks of actors that include
a mixed spectrum of academic, economic, and governmental actors
and agencies combine to achieve innovations. Is there any role for
innovation policy beyond influencing framework conditions in such a
situation? The article analyses the case of a successful innovation in
the energy sector: Photovoltaics. It argues that - given the special
characteristics of the energy sector – successful innovation depended
on strong political support and an advocacy coalition which achieved
institutional backing. The method chosen to realize the innovation
was the creation of a niche market with the help of regulatory instruments.
2
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
List of figures
Fig. 1: PV - Degree of efficiency (classical silicon technology). ........... 16
Fig. 2: PV power installed in Germany (MWp)..................................... 33
Fig. 3: Solar cell production in Germany (Mw). .................................... 34
Fig. 4: Sales of the German photovoltaics industry. ............................. 34
Fig. 5: Export sales of the German photovoltaics industry.................. 35
Fig. 6: PV-price index in €. ....................................................................... 35
Fig. 7: Global patent applications in photovoltaics. ............................. 36
Fig. 8: First filing of photovoltaic patents. ............................................. 37
Fig. 9: Additional construction of wind power plants in Germany. .. 42
Fig. 10: Annually and total installed power in Germany. ................... 43
Fig. 11: Annually installed power in Germany. .................................... 44
Fig. 12: Installed power in Germany. ..................................................... 44
Fig. 13: Sales (in Mio. €). ........................................................................... 45
Fig. 14: Export sales (in Mio. €). .............................................................. 46
Fig. 15: Export ratio (manufacturer and supplier). ............................... 46
Fig. 16: Numbers of employees. .............................................................. 47
Fig. 17: Average values of electricity generation costs of new plants.48
Fig. 18: Average values of electricity generation costs of total plant
stock. ................................................................................................... 48
List of tables
Table 1: Degree of efficiency of various technologies .......................... 15
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
3
1 Introduction
The energy provision system in industrialized nations is changing in
what is conceived as an example of a technological and institutional
regime change. Victor (2002) sees the sector in its third structural
transformation. The exact outcome of this regime change is uncertain
as of yet, but one element of a future governance structure will be the
increased importance of decentralized forms of electric power generation, a shift towards more environmentally sustainable technologies, e.g. renewable energy technologies, which in the past were
pushed forward by a diverse coalition of actors. This article will focus
on one of the most innovative developments in the area of renewable
energy technologies: photovoltaics (PV).
We will use a broad lens in order to examine the growth of
PV both as a source of electric power generation and as a business
sector in Germany. PV can be considered an unusual success story in
which political actors’ ability to make a significant impact on renewable energy production and the associated economic activity looms
large.
It will be argued that the growth of renewable energy takes
place within networks of governance comprising formal regimes at
multiple levels, informal norms and practices as well as market structures and processes. Actors within these networks include national
and sub-national authorities, multilateral institutions, firms and
NGOs. Technological development and market growth of PV are thus
viewed as embedded in a broad social, economic, and political system of governance. Corporate strategies, social movements and public policy interact within, as well as constitute, the essential elements
of governance in this sector. We will further argue that policy on PV
in Germany is characterized by a specific mission orientation, the
concertation of main actors, a long term orientation and substantive
subsidies. Insofar PV can be seen as a successful as well as a
4
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
“planned” innovation, something quite uncommon in the literature
on innovation. Caniels/Romijn (2008: 246) have argued that within
the literature on strategic niche management there is a shortage of
analysis focussing on success stories, i.e. a lack of understanding
about the processes by which (policy and technological) experiments
can culminate in viable market niches that ultimately will contribute
to a regime change in a specific sector. This article attempts to fill that
gap.
What will we be doing in the article step by step? To start
with, we will clarify our concept of innovation and describe the elements of the technological system PV. Based on this we will discuss
the factors responsible for its success. At the moment it would be
foolish to claim that PV will remain a success story in the future and
that PV will eventually play a dominant role in the development of a
new energy regime. PV is growing but it is still not in a settled and
stable state – albeit already bigger than many “established” sectors.
Only few publications have focused on the particular technological
and institutional prerequisites, which enabled photovoltaics to become such a success story, and beating – from an innovation perspective – other energy technologies, such as fuel cell technologies. Since
the success of specific technologies in a system as complex as the
energy supply system at least partly depends on the interaction with
and the development path of competing systems, we will shortly
review some of the other renewables at the end of the article, just to
get some ideas on what might have been the particular comparative
advantages of photovoltaics.
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
5
2 Innovation and Sectoral Systems
of Innovation
Before discussing German innovation policy focussing on the development and market expansion of photovoltaics, we have to lay down
the conceptual framework of our analysis. We start with some general reflections on innovation and innovation policy, drawing on the
literature on systems of innovation and strategic niche management
on the one hand and the advocacy coalition approach on the other.
2.1 Innovation Policy
Since the 1990s a global shift in policies towards research and technology can be observed: the promotion of innovation has become the
centre piece of official national as well as of supra- and sub-national
policies. This shift in emphasis reflects discussions on the role of the
state in promoting technology as well as new ideas about how new
technologies become successful on the markets.
The traditional model in research and technology policies either centred on the support of basic research which eventually should
bring about new technologies ripe for the markets (technology push)
or opted for a mission oriented approach deciding to support a specific technology and financing its development through specific companies or research laboratories. (cp. Hiskes/Hiskes 1986) Innovation
research, however, has shown that there is no linear development of
technological innovations towards success (on the market). Support
of basic research does not guarantee the eventual development of
products that become widely accepted and thus achieve commercial
success. But specifically “market success” appears to have become the
6
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
top priority in times of increasing worldwide competition on
crowded markets. The introduction of new, innovative products is
considered to be a precondition for maintaining a competitive edge.
In order to be commercially successful, it is of vital importance to
reach a critical mass of usage within a comparably short time frame
(cf. Rogers 1995: 313ff.).
In parallel discussions on the state’s influence on technological innovation processes a dire picture was painted, accentuating the
conviction that the state is unable to chose technologies which will
later be a success on the market. Along with an increasingly prevalent
attitude that markets are the best innovators and should be left alone,
policy instruments worldwide seemed to converge (cf.
Holzinger/Jörgens/Knill 2007). This neoliberal understanding, the
support of market dominance and “the retreat of the state” (Strange
1996) emerged in the 1990s and was accompanied by new types of
policies and policy instruments which also affected the design of
technology policy. Research and technology policy now became
transformed into innovation policy and mainly focused on funding
basic research and network activities as well as joint projects between
firms and research institutes in order to stimulate knowledge flows
and to ensure that the results of scientific research can be used and
adopted commercially (cf. Nooteboom 1999, Edquist 2001:18). Public
actors – however, were not supposed to select a certain technology in
advance and would rather abstain from market stimulation programmes. Networks instead were looked upon as potentially facilitating producer-customer relationships or creating advocacy coalitions
for new technological applications. Advocacy coalitions are considered by most experts to be an important pre-condition for successful
radical innovations (cf. Weimer-Jehle/Fuchs 2007).
Although the market discourse had achieved nearly universal
legitimacy, counter tendencies have always been visible as well.
Complexity theory and the literature on governance aimed at a new
understanding of the role of politics (cf. Kappelhoff 2000;
Werle/Schimank 2000): On the one hand social developments are
unpredictable and evolutionary, but on the other hand these evolu-
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
7
tionary dynamics have always been accompanied by conscious planning and shaping (cf. Czada/Schimank 2000). Thus political actors are
interpreted as actors interacting in governance networks, together
with other actors who also try to influence social developments. One
of the policy measures relying more on the activities of public actors
is the politically supported creation of niche markets. This new form of
innovation policy selects a certain technology (or its pre-stage) in
advance and tries to speed up its development, and even might help
to shape the mode of its application. Such politically created niche
markets work through market stimulation programmes, such as subsidies or the provision of soft loans for prospective customers, as well
as through modes of legitimising the developing technology in order
to raise its public acceptance (cf. Edler 2007). Especially in the area of
environmental technologies, strategic niche management has increasingly become accepted as an instrument of innovation policy (cf.
Kemp et al 1998; Kemp 2002; Coenen 2002) in the hopes that even the
transformation of entire technological regime is a viable option (cf.
Berkhout et al 2003: 4; Caniels/Romijn 2008).
The actual design of national policies has to consider existing
institutional frameworks and socio-cultural conditions. Work in the
tradition of the Varieties of Capitalism approach claims, that if national innovation policy stresses and uses national comparative institutional advantages, it can be more successful. In other words a system dominated by non-market coordination will have difficulties
pushing new technologies dependent on a flexible and quick functioning of market mechanisms. While on the other hand the support
of technologies which require the non-market coordination of various
actors will be difficult to put into effect in liberal market economies.
Based on this highly stylised interpretation we argue that the creation
of (sheltered) niche markets can be a successful policy instrument
especially in coordinated market economies (hypothesis 1).
Considering the fact, that photovoltaics can be seen as a technological innovation that is supported in order to transform the energy sector, the existence of political and social forces strongly opposing photovoltaics for ideological as well as economic (rent seeking)
8
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
reasons can be assumed. As Jänicke has shown, changes in actor constellations have resulted in improved conditions for innovation in
environmentally friendly products (cf. 1997: 7). With regard to actor
constellations and situational factors enhancing policy change, the
policy analysis literature refers to the role of advocacy coalitions that
are crucially important in order to spur institutional or cultural
changes (cf. Litfin 2000). We will argue that the success of innovation
policy depends on its ability to create and mobilise an advocacy coalition supporting the technology in question, especially if strong incumbent actors (such as the established energy provision system)
exist (hypothesis 2).
2.2 Innovation
Changes in innovation policy are linked to a better understanding of
processes of innovation. Innovation can be defined as artefacts, processes, ideas, strategies, which successfully change routines and are
embedded in specific contexts of development and usage. Innovation
as such is not just a new idea or technical system, but one which is
being successfully implemented. Including the processes of implementation, however, it becomes difficult to disentangle e.g. the technical artefact from the way it is being developed and used.
Innovation in this sense is not a linear process but occurs by
interactive relationships and feedback mechanisms between institutional and organisational elements of science, technology, learning,
production, policy, firms and potential or actual market demand.
Some technologies may only become innovations due to interactions
between producers and users or the specific way, customers use and
apply new technical artefacts (cf. Malerba 2004: 24). The acceptance
and the use of a new technology at any rate play a crucial role in the
innovation process. Thus new – better – technologies in our context
are only referred to as innovations, if their development is embedded
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
9
and accompanied by the establishment of a successful industry and if
they find their way to the market.
2.3 Innovation and Uncertainty
It is generally acknowledged that every (economic) activity has to
face the problem of uncertainty (Beckert 1996). This is even more so
the case for innovations, particularly if potential new products would
have to cope with incumbent products and existing infrastructures
and routines supporting them. Proven ways to cope with uncertainty
are the development and reliance on routines, customs, regulations,
established institutions etc.
Innovating firms may not know which application or design
a new technology should be given in order for it to be successful on
the market. This can lead firms to become hesitant when implementing significant changes, even as they face a volatile environment that
increases pressures to introduce new products, seek new markets and
introduce new technologies, practices and organisational methods
into their production processes. Uncertainty can also make it more
difficult for firms to obtain external funding for their innovation projects. Customers may not trust a new and unproven technology. This
leads to another blocking mechanism for the diffusion of a new technology, which is lack of legitimacy.
Here we are confronted with the paradox that innovation as a
routine changing mechanism, nevertheless also depends on routines,
albeit newly developing ones. Innovation policy can attempt to reduce uncertainty by establishing a mix of policy instruments along
with a viable support coalition. Whenever, e.g. innovation policy can
provide technological developments with legitimacy, the financial
system will become more willing to invest in innovative firms and
potential customers may feel securer and be more inclined to purchase new technologies (cf. Carlsson/Jacobsson 1997: 285).
10
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
The role of uncertainty can be seen very clearly when looking
at the developments in the 1990s. At one point the German PVindustry was close to extinction and production facilities were
moved, since producers had no certainty as to whether the institutional framework in Germany would provide favourable conditions
for the further development of the PV industry.
As Edquist suggests, a systemic view on innovation policy
should not only analyze the role of the state but also include feedback
mechanisms on how the rest of the system, social structures, routines
or even discrete occurrences influence innovation policies (cf. 2001:
17). As German governance has always been characterized by close
linkages and the reliance on common interests between the governments, industry, business associations and unions (cf. Hall/Soskice
2001; Harding 2000), this established form of governance has also
shaped German innovation policies and most probably will also do
so in the case of PV.
2.4 Electric Power Generation as an Industrial Sector
Photovoltaics are treated as an innovation within and for the industrial sector of electric power generation. As already briefly mentioned
this sector is undergoing severe changes in nearly all industrialized
nations. The dynamics leading to these changes are also important in
order to understand the case of PV, because they opened a window of
opportunity which helped to push forward the new option PV.
The traditional electric power system can be looked upon as a
large technical system (cf. Mayntz/Hughes 1988), tightly coupled and
run by a few, powerful incumbent actors. Energy generation is highly
centralized in big power stations, open markets hardly exist. Price
regulation and fixation is common and huge subsidies for the development of old and new technologies (e.g. coal, nuclear energy) make
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
11
it difficult to determine “real” prices. There are suggestions that the
costs of producing electricity, gained out of coal or oil would double,
if hidden external costs were taken into account (cf. Milborrow 2002:
32). Incumbent energy technologies have received direct and indirect
subsidies for decades (cf. Jacobsson/Bergek 2004: 210). R&D expenditures in these closed markets are nevertheless low and innovation is
slow-moving and incremental. R&D expenditures depend to a very
large degree on the interpretation of political signals regarding the
regulation of technology.
Two trends are now changing the traditional ways: the liberalisation of infrastructures and environmental issues, namely “global
warming”. Hopes for an effective regime to address climate change
have shifted from the emphasis on a mandatory multilateral agreement, the Kyoto protocol, towards a plethora of regional, national,
and sub-national programs and initiatives. Policy responses include
carbon emission limits and trading systems, direct subsidies for renewable and Renewable Portfolio Standards that mandate the use of
specific volumes of renewable energy in electricity generation. Such
policy responses are required because the market will not, by itself,
respond adequately to the environmental challenge. Given the rapid
growth expected in global markets for low-emission technologies, the
policy agenda is also driven by economic development goals, as
countries vie for competitiveness and market share in these emerging
fields. Liberalisation can have differing effects for renewable energies. If energy prices fall as a result of liberalisation and increased
market competition (as economic theory would make us believe) the
price targets that renewables must meet become more challenging
and liberalisation might prove to be an impediment for their further
spread. On the other hand, policies and systems such as quotas and
renewable energy certificates can be compatible with more competitive market structures as the experiences of the last years has shown –
supported e.g. by a general increase in energy prices. In fact, many of
the policies which have been implemented for the support of renewables operate within the framework of a transition to market liberalisation (Cf. OECD 2008).
12
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
Finally, beyond the problems of lacking transparency and the
prevalence of risk-averse actors, there is the constraining factor of
centralised energy infrastructures, as they have developed and have
become established over decades. National grids are mainly tailored
to the operation of centralised power plants and thus support their
existence. Alternative technologies like photovoltaics follow an opposite decentralised logic that does not easily fit the established technological concepts and thus faces difficulties competing with incumbent
technologies (cf. Stern 2006: 355).
In sum this has led to the widely accepted conviction that
policy instruments which aim to create niche markets for renewable
energies were needed. Even the European Commission, which traditionally favours market instruments and is rather critical towards
demand side policy actions, has opted for market stimulation programmes for renewable energy technologies (cf. European Commission 2005; Directive 2001/77/EC). This is true in spite of the fact that
until recently the European Commission and the OECD both disapproved the German model of market stimulation and instead had
favoured quota models which use market signals in order to increase
the supply of renewable energy (cf. Busch 2005: 235).
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
13
3 Photovoltaics: Technology Characteristics
3.1 Technologies
Before analyzing photovoltaics as a successful case of innovation, we
need to provide a short introduction to the technologies and applications we are talking about. Photovoltaics use solar cells to produce
electric power 1. The most common type of solar cell consists of either
mono-crystalline or poly-crystalline silicon, which is conventionally
produced and used in the electronics (semiconductor) industry. Crystalline silicon technologies represent 93 % of the photovoltaics world
market (cf. Solarbuzz 2007). Mono-crystalline silicon cells are characterised by their ability to convert a relatively large section of the light
spectrum into electricity with an efficiency of up to 24,7 % under
ideal laboratory conditions (cf. Solarserver 2007). Poly-crystalline
silicon cells do not achieve such high efficiency rates, but they compensate by being less costly. The same holds for amorphous and
other ‘thin film’ technologies that consist of cadmium telluride
(CdTe) or copper indium dieseline (CIS). Due to silicon shortages
since the turn of the century, research and development on nonsilicon thin film technologies has become increasingly popular and
remarkable reductions in production costs have been achieved.
Photovoltaics should not to be mixed up with solar-thermy, which
uses solar radiation to produce heat.
1
14
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
3.2 Applications
The photovoltaic effect was first discovered by the French physicist
Alexandre Becquerel in 1839. Albert Einstein’s theoretical work on
the photovoltaic effect won the Nobel Prize in 1921. Thus basic research on photovoltaics has been conducted for quite some time. Yet
the first applications did not appear before the 1950s, when Bell
Laboratories invented the first solar cell and the US government
started to use solar cells on satellites.“The satellite market became the
first significant commercial market and annual production rose to
about 0, 1 MWp per year in the late 1960s” (cf. Jacobsson et al 2002:
10). It is striking that the first satellite project using solar power, was
under US Navy management and monitored by the Department of
Defense. Some authors therefore pointed out that the case of photovoltaics was one of many technological developments in which the
military played a crucial role (cf. Clark/Juma 1987: 142, Jacobsson et al
2002: 10). Due to US export restrictions the European Space Agency
had to rely on German companies such as Siemens and Telefunken to
get involved in photovoltaics research and production for space programs in the 1960s (cf. Jacobsson et al 2002: 16). Since the 1970s and
largely due to the oil crises, interest in the development of various
terrestrial applications grew and led to further R&D activities, mainly
in the USA and Japan. A range of off-grid applications emerged, that
were mainly used for consumer electronics like calculators and
watches or as stand-alone ‘power stations’ for SOS telephones and for
remote places like buoys, yachts, alpine huts and camping. Furthermore the idea of solar home systems to be employed in developing
countries came up. Rather distinct from these off-grid photovoltaics
are newer forms of applications which supply electricity to the grid
just as conventional power technologies. Grid-connected applications
can be found as roof-top systems, ground-mounted systems or as
systems integrated into house façades. However, demonstration
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
15
projects which employed photovoltaics in order to supply electricity
to the grid were not implemented before the 1990s. Thus gridconnected photovoltaics are a rather new development. It is therefore
striking that since 1999 grid-connected photovoltaics have rapidly
outpaced other forms of application in IEA (International Energy
Agency) reporting countries (cf. IEA 2005).
The degree of efficiency of the modules depends on the specific technology used. For all technologies it can be stated that huge
differences exist between laboratory values and values that are
achieved using products for the market:
Table 1: Degree of efficiency of various technologies.
CulnSe2
poly-Si
mono-Si
(CIS techno(Silicium
(Silicium
technology) technology) logy)
Lab cells
small area, 1
24,7%
20,3%
19,3%
cm2
large area, 150
21,5%
17,6%
cm2
Current module
production
Optimum value 17%
14,5%
12%
Typical
13,5%
13%
11%
Future module
production
In 10 years
20%
In 30-40 years
22%
Source: Krewitt et al 2005: 25
18%
22%
15%
20%
CulnS2 (CIS
technology
13%
-
8,5% (projected)
15%
-
16
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
Fig. 1: PV - Degree of efficiency (classical silicon technology).
PV: Degree of efficiency
(classical silicon technology)
R&D (Lit) %
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
30
20
10
0
commercial %
Source: own illustration based on data from: Surek (2003) and Nemet
(2005)
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
17
4 Promoting Photovoltaics
In the following we will analyse the development of Photovoltaics
based on the hypothesis that an advocacy coalition is a crucial mechanism behind the formulation and implementation of innovation
policies. “Private firms, state agencies and other organisations often
act with the objective to influence innovation policies in order to get
them designed and implemented in their own interest” (cf. Edquist
2001: 20). So called advocacy coalitions supporting environmental
policies consist of administrative and academic environmentalists as
well as members of environmental social movements who cooperate
with industrial actors, such as manufacturers of renewable energy
technologies (cf. Jänicke 2007: 140). But since lobbyism is often a conservative mechanism, as it requires that the lobbyists be in a position
of economic power, one would not assume that environmentalists
were able to form an effective advocacy coalition, since interest
groups that support emerging technologies normally are not well
positioned financially, neither do they have the ability to influence
powerful political actors.
Although the photovoltaics advocacy coalition was not
formed by very powerful actors and groups, it intelligently managed
to use external events to gain strong social backing for its ideas,
which was needed, as it faced powerful opponents in form of incumbent energy provision systems. “Substituting established technologies implies, (…), that new interest groups will challenge existing
ones, and a realignment of the institutional framework, and a transformation of the energy provision system cannot be expected to be
achieved without overcoming considerable opposition from vested
interests involved with the incumbent technologies.” (Jacobsson et al
2002: 3)
We will show how in the formative stage, the PV advocacy
coalition aimed to support the diffusion of the technology in order to
reach a critical mass, which was needed for a substantial change in
the energy sector. Once this critical mass had been reached, selfstabilizing effects occurred. As a consequence, the critical mass itself
18
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
accounted for a further consolidation of the advocacy coalition and
contributed to its success.
4.1 The Formative Stage
The story of PV began like many other cases of German research policy. From the early eighties on, common instruments of public research and development funding such as financing research departments conducting basic research on PV were employed. The external
trigger for early research had been the oil crisis in the 1970s. At that
time the ministry of research and technology (BMFT) was in charge of
photovoltaics policy programmes. Initially the support for new technology had been integrated into the unit for non-nuclear energy
technologies. In 1976 a unit of its own was created (cf. Ristau 1998:
40). Interestingly, many of the programmes financing photovoltaics
projects were carried out by the ministry of economic cooperation
and development, since during the 1970s the future of photovoltaics
applications was seen in solar home systems for developing countries, i.e. the focus was on off-grid applications.
When oil prices had settled down again and as the conservative-liberal coalition under Chancellor Kohl came into power, policy
actions promoting photovoltaics declined severely. In 1985 public
funding of photovoltaics related research and development projects
accounted to less than 53 Mio DM. Albeit institutional actors involved in research on photovoltaics had been established. When external events such as the Chernobyl accident and the discussions on
environmental problems and climate change emerged, these actors
together with environmentalist groups, managed to set the agenda
for photovoltaics. When political actors gave environmental problems
a higher priority, the Green party on the one hand and highly motivated researchers on the other hand acted as transmission belts between external events and political and social discourses.
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
19
In the 1980s specialized photovoltaics departments and research institutes had been created, such as the Fraunhofer Institute
for Solar Energy Systems ISE in Freiburg (in 1982), the Centre for
Solar Energy and Hydrogen Research Baden-Württemberg in Stuttgart/Ulm (in 1988) or specialised physics departments, for example at
the Carl von Ossietzky University in Oldenburg. The latter can be
seen as a typical example of how the formation of the photovoltaics
advocacy coalition depended on highly committed individual actors.
They were influenced by the experiences made by early anti-nuclear
power activists, who were criticised for their lack of reasonable alternatives for energy provision (cf. Gabler 2007). The formation of research groups and departments dedicated to the development of
alternatives to nuclear power became the first strategic step towards
the formation of an advocacy coalition supporting photovoltaics.
Furthermore, the creation of specialised departments and institutes
attracted environmentally committed scientists. On this foundation
local networks consisting of environmentalists and researchers
emerged. This was especially the case in Freiburg, where the Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems ISE had been created and
merged with a vivid environmental scene, that positively influenced
network activities and enabled local strategies of niche management
(cf. Niewienda 2006).
Federal innovation policy at that time became mainly direct
project funding. The main recipients were the Fraunhofer Institute for
Solar Energy Systems, the Hahn-Meitner-Institute, the Institute for
Solar Energy Supply Techniques and two industrial actors, AEGTelefunken and Siemens Solar. The early photovoltaics programmes
“…provided opportunities for universities, institutes and firms to
search in many directions, which was sensible given the underlying
uncertainties with respect to technologies and markets” (cf.
Jacobsson/Lauber 2006: 262). Research funding was not only given to
one technology, but competing technologies, such as crystalline silicon and thin-film technologies. Additionally, research and development of inverters (to make grid-connected applications work) had
begun.
20
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
Interestingly, these research projects on the one hand, and the
absence of market stimulation programmes on the other hand, led to
the odd situation, that the big two German companies engaged in
photovoltaics production were able to develop internationally competitive products, and German research on photovoltaics achieved a
leading position in the world, but the technologies developed could
not be sold at home due to a lack of domestic demand (cf. Ristau
1998: 45). Actually, photovoltaic technologies developed in Germany
were ready for testing. However, owing to the characteristics of the
energy sector, coupled with the difficulties of creating private demand and the absence of political interest and financial support, at
that time it looked very unlikely that photovoltaics could succeed on
the German market. The supporting advocacy coalition was in its
infancy, consisting only of highly committed scientists, environmental groups (cf Gabler 2007) and the newly founded German association for Solar Energy. In these early days the advocacy coalition
was too weak, particularly as it had not yet incorporated more powerful industrial lobbies. On the other hand, very influential lobby
groups supporting fossil fuels and nuclear power worked hard to
prevent competition from renewable energies. They joined forces
with the ministry of economics (cf. Ristau 1998: 46), and heavily relied on old research and development contacts and networks within
the ministry of research (cf. Ristau 1998: 44).
But eventually external events, such as the nuclear accident in
Chernobyl in 1986 changed public opinion and the attitudes towards
nuclear power substantially and opened up a window of opportunity
for a general discussion on a transformation of the energy sector.
Within two years opposition against nuclear energy increased from
50% to over 70% (cf. Jahn 1992). Whereas before only the Green party
had argued against nuclear power, this position was now also
adopted by the Social Democrats, who opted for phasing out nuclear
power plants. In addition to the national antipathy towards nuclear
energy the influence of a growing Green party as well as powerful
environmental movements were important factors. Considering all
these ‘external events’, the German government – compared to other
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
21
European governments – at a relatively early stage felt compelled to
support research, development as well as diffusion of renewable energy technologies, such as photovoltaics.
Market stimulation programmes are traditionally policy instruments of the ministry of economics and were not used before
1991. As we have mentioned before, the ministry of economics deliberately refused to support the photovoltaics research and development projects of the ministry of research. And since the new technology was definitely not economically competitive in Germany, it either
had to fail, find its markets abroad (in Southern regions, as off grid
applications in the developing world) or supported domestically via
an artificial niche market. Finally in 1991, the situation changed when
the first feed-in-law was developed and passed. The law had been
initiated by Green Party and CDU/CSU parliamentarians and it could
finally pass due to cross-factional support (cf. Ohlhorst et al. 2008:
16). In the run-up to the adoption, lobbying activities of a range of
different associations had been of vital importance. Besides the newly
founded renewable energy associations, the incumbent association of
hydropower plants was active, so that especially Bavarian parliamentarians supported the law. In retrospect, analysts assumed that at the
time the future impact of the law had been underestimated, which is
why it was passed without much difficulty (cf. Ohlhorst et al. 2008:
17). The law described a mechanism which required utilities to remunerate energy of renewable sources fed into the grid. Producers of
renewable electric power received 90% of the average revenue per
kilowatt hour from the utilities. Even though the first feed-in-law was
sort of a market stimulation programme, it contained a market
mechanism, which at the beginning was not seen as critical, but with
energy prices declining throughout the 1990s (mainly due to European deregulation policies), this policy instrument ended up being
too weak to trigger market expansion for photovoltaics.
This first feed-in-law was accompanied by the 1000-roofsprogramme in the early 1990s, which enabled first experiences with
grid-connected photovoltaics applications and thus can be interpreted as a typical instrument of strategic niche management. The
22
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
1000 roof programme that started in 1991 and ended in 1995 was a
mixture of a demonstration and market stimulation programme. It
offered soft loans for private households who were interested in participating in the grid-connected photovoltaics test stage. The programme was not only accompanied by electro-technical and physical
tests on inverters, cell duration etc (cf. Grochowski et al 1997), but
also by social research which studied customers’ motives and social
affiliations (cf. Gennenig/Hoffmann 1996). This first niche programme became crucial for institutional capacity building and symbolized an initial step towards a transformation of the energy sector.
Routines and motives of first movers could be revealed, and thus
enabled the advocacy coalition to improve its diffusion strategy, for
example by better taking into account special needs of potential users. The accompanying social research revealed that ¾ of the participants were academics, and 22% were teachers. The majority declared
environmental reasons as the main motive to participate in the program. Interestingly, only 15% of the participants could be characterized as real energy savers; instead the majority did not intend to
abstain from comfort, for example by changing routines. On the other
hand, 38% of them were extremely interested in technical aspects of
their PV application and carried through technical implementations
on their own. 15% of the participants admitted status reasons as their
main motive when purchasing their PV application. For them it was
extremely important that the technology was widely visible (cf. Genennig/Hoffmann 1996: 111ff.). Additionally, the programme enabled
photovoltaics to gain more public awareness. Backed by the feed-inlaw, which obliged utilities to remunerate energy of renewable
sources fed into the grid, the improvement of inverters laid down the
grounds for structural changes within the energy sector, abandoning
traditional centralised grid systems, giving way for decentralised,
environmental friendly systems, such as grid connected photovoltaics
applications.
When the 1000 roofs programme ended and the German government did not immediately develop follow-up programmes,
“…one could observe a shift in the investment activities of the big
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
23
European PV-companies from Europe towards the US” (JägerWaldau 2002: 40). The ministry of economics started a market launch
programme for renewable energy technologies in 1995. But since it
only provided 4, 5 Mio. DM for photovoltaics, it did not meet the
expectations of the photovoltaics industry (cf. Ristau 1998). So this is
a striking example for the relationship between uncertainty and innovation, since throughout the 1990s the German policy did not systematically aim to reduce uncertainty, as the programmes were inadequately financed and were not based on long-term considerations.
The result was that the development of technical innovations and
marketable products came to a halt. This only changed, when the
Green party together with the Social Democrats came into power on
the federal level in 1998.
Despite its shortcomings, it still has to be acknowledged that
the 1990s can be characterised by early (successful) investments. Publicly funded R&D, as well as the first market stimulation programmes
and the first feed-in law did not only lead to the establishment of an
initial knowledge base, it also led to the creation of an embryonic
advocacy coalition consisting of scientists, an infant industry and its
interest groups, as well as highly committed environmentalists. Some
of them appeared as first movers on the market, which means they
were the first costumers, taking part in the 1000-roof programme.
Even though the programme offered soft loans, and the power produced was remunerated, these first users did not benefit in a monetary sense, which means they did not really get anything out of their
investment, neither did they earn money. Instead they appeared as
‘the hard core’ of the advocacy coalition, mainly acting out of ideological or reputational reasons. But there was positive feed-back from
those early investments, which for example resulted in the ability of
the coalition to shape further institutional change and to initiate sectoral transformation. Taken together these first political programmes
had significant effects. For one thing public awareness of the new
technology rose and photovoltaics received legitimacy. Thus public
and social acceptance of the technology as well as political support,
i.e. subsidising it, found broad approval in public opinion. Further-
24
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
more, a number of new, often small firms entered the market,
“….among these, we find both module manufacturers and integrators
of solar cells into facades and roofs, the latter moving the market for
solar cells into new applications” (Jacobsson/Lauber 2006: 266). Before this, the market had been dominated by the two big players,
Siemens and AEG Telefunken. The following figures provide an indication of the their market dominance. In 1991, when the 1000-roofsprogramme was initiated, 99,5 % of market demand was satisfied by
these two companies. And even in 1993 once the programme was
opened for European competitors like BP-Solar and the Italian firm
Helios, Siemens and ASE still held a market share of 70% (cf. Ristau
1998: 48).
Throughout the 1990s, industrial (solar) associations were
gradually established that aimed to improve and enhance political
support of the infant technology and its commercialisation. Additionally, (local) groups and societies, like the Solar Group Aachen e.
V. , Eurosolar (European Association for Renewable Energies) and
the German Association for the Promotion of Solar Power were
founded and discussed the suitability of political instruments, were
developing blue prints for a new feed-in-law or another roofprogramme and tried to build up political momentum. They were
joined by local politicians that strongly favoured the idea of renewable energies and opted for more decentralised energy systems. For
them, grid-connected photovoltaics applications met both of these
aims. So it was a coalition of local politicians, the Green party, researchers, environmental societies and business associations that
managed to influence the federal government to improve and enhance its innovation policy for photovoltaics. Especially when the
1000-roofs-programme ended, strategic niche management appeared
on the local level: protagonists of the solar scene were successful in
implementing local feed-in-laws, inspired by the Solar Group Aachen
e. V.. In contrast to the federal law, which only regulated the remuneration of photovoltaics power at arm’s length, the concept of the
Solar Group Aachen e. V. worked with cost-covering prices. The development of a policy instrument that aims to convince users pur-
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
25
chasing PV for return on investment reasons can be interpreted as a
change in secondary aspects. Still adhering to its policy core, the PV
coalition learned new ways to achieve its goal. Thus the new mechanism paved the way for the wider diffusion of photovoltaics by making them a financially attractive investment not only for ideologically
motivated environmentalists.
These initiatives were strongly supported by the infant
photovoltaics industry and its associations. The solar industry intensified its lobbying, and in particular due to some of the global players
that were also involved in cell production, such as Siemens and ASE,
becoming part of the advocacy coalition, political pressure became
more effective. As Siemens was already producing in the USA, complaining, that due to the lack of domestic demand in Germany, it
would not make sense, coming back to Germany and ASE threatened
to follow Siemens, in the case that no follow up programme would be
started; the federal government started a debate on the 100.000-roofsprogramme. This long-term-perspective for public funding i.e. creating a niche market was the reason for ASE to stay in Germany and
even build up new production plants. It increased its capacity from
20 to 50 MW by the end of 2002 under the name of RWE-Schott Solar
(cf. Jacobsson/Lauber 2006:268).
In the PV coalition’s formative stage significant opposition
arose. Industrial organizations, especially German utilities strongly
opposed political instruments to support photovoltaics, such as the
early energy-feed-in-law from 1991 (cf. Wong 2005: 135). In 1994
Preussen Elektra lodged a complaint against this law on the European and the federal level. Opposition formed not only due to general criticism towards subsidising renewable energy technologies, but
it was also the specific design of the feed-in law, which indeed disadvantaged some of the utilities. Since renewable energy is mainly produced in the windy regions near the coast (wind power) and photovoltaics applications are concentrated in the sunny South, this bias
meant that some Northern utilities or their customers respectively,
had to finance subsidies for renewable energy technologies. The case
was dismissed in the courts, but the discussion did not recede.
26
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
4.2 Take-Off
Following Sabatier’s argument, policy change can only be achieved
following external perturbations, such as changes in the government
coalition or impacts from other subsystems. This also seems to be true
in the case of PV. When in 1998 the Green party, together with the
Social Democrats formed the federal government, the photovoltaics
advocacy coalition took its chance. Now it did not have to be content
any more with merely influencing the rebuilding of institutional
frames and policy programmes from the outside of political institutions. The Greens took over the ministry of the environment and this
initiated the institutionalisation of the photovoltaics advocacy coalition within the centre of political power. The situation in the late
1990s was accompanied by international and European trends, such
as the liberalisation and deregulation of the energy sector. In the
wake of the Kyoto protocol international organisations as well as the
European Commission made CO2 reduction a top priority political
goal.
As a consequence, the change in political power constellations was linked to a beginning restructuring of the energy sector.
Institutional settings and the infrastructure of the energy sector
started to become more open and fluent. Corporate structures were
being reorganised and became replaced by more competitive management and governance structures. Thus innovation in photovoltaics was accompanied by the re-structuring of the energy sector and
social innovations like new management concepts, new user routines,
“new roles and identities of electricity customers, new policy problems, regulatory concepts, institutions and governance arrangements” (cf. Voß et al. 2003: 4). It can be assumed that these changes
and transformation processes in the sector did not only shape the
background but more fundamentally have been crucial factors in
triggering innovation in photovoltaics. Institutional changes, such as
deregulation in the energy sector and objectives formulated by the
European Union concerning the transformation of the energy sector
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
27
opened up a policy window of opportunity for the success of an advocacy coalition against the opposition of the powerful advocates of
incumbent energy sources.
Two policy instruments were designed and implemented,
which are widely believed as being decisive for the German photovoltaics success story. The actual design of the instruments has been
prepared and debated by solar groups, societies and associations.
Groups like Eurosolar (European Association for Renewable Energies), the German Association for the Promotion of Solar Power and
Greenpeace were extremely important for an adjusted ‘relaunch’ of
the 1000-roofs-programme and the first feed-in-law of 1991. The locally installed feed-in-tariffs could now serve as blueprints for a new
feed-in system on the federal level. Furthermore, the lobbying activities of associations and environmental groups helped to shape a novel roofs-program on a far larger scale. On this basis in 1999 the
100.000 roof programme was started. It was a market stimulation
programme, which offered soft loans with 10 years duration and two
years free of redemption. In 2000 the Renewable Energy Law was
passed. It set a fixed feed-in tariff of around 50 Cent 2 per kWh for 20
years, with a 5% decrease annually for later installations from 2002
on. Compared to the first feed-in-law, which had been heavily opposed by the utilities, the additional costs of renewable energies were
now shared and only five per cent of the financial charges had to be
paid by the utilities. The law was inspired by the local feed-in laws
for solar power. The learning effects that had been achieved on the
local level helped the Green Party to move the concept to the federal
level. For this process it was extremely helpful that one of the main
protagonists of the local groups, who had organised local feed-in
tariffs, was elected as a federal deputy in 1998 and thus could bring
in experiences he had made on the local level (cf. Rosenbaum et al
2005: 79). He was among the Green deputies, who initiated a discurThe exact amount is subject to size and application: electricity from
roof-top systems is reimbursed higher than electricity sourced from ground
mounted systems.
2
28
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
sive process involving various actors, such as environmental groups,
solar industry associations, the association of the machinery and
equipment producers VDMA, the metal workers trade union, solar
cell producers and politicians from some Länder. This institutionalisation of an intermediate level of conflict can be interpreted along the
lines of Sabatier’s policy learning. The panel did not intend to conduct a general discussion on the future of the German energy provision system (the policy core, still separating the coalitions), instead it
only discussed the issue of financial support for renewable energy
technologies. Hence, in 1998 the Green party acted as a policy broker,
searching for compromises in secondary aspects that could be supported by the majority of actors and thus enlarging and finally stabilising the advocacy coalition in a way that it would survive even
without institutional backing in the future. “The unorthodox coalition
even included a major utility (…); as a result the big utilities were not
united in their opposition.” (Jacobsson/Lauber 2006: 267)
Further innovation in PV was still funded by public research
grants – albeit at a decreasing rate. Public funds were concentrated
more on network and cluster projects, many of which were embedded in structural policies in order to help the economically underdeveloped regions in the East of Germany. Regional cluster and network policy is a rather new policy instrument that aims to create an
innovation friendly environment by fostering collective identities and
trust in order to support the formation and development of local
networks (cf. Dohse 2007). Within the last years, the solar industry
has well understood where to settle down in order to receive subsidies. What we can see nowadays, are photovoltaics clusters in East
Germany, predominantly located near the small town of Thalheim, in
the vicinity of Bitterfeld, Saxony-Anhalt. Particularly small start-ups,
which have emerged after 2000, have settled down in the East. One of
the world leaders in cell production became Q-Cells, a firm, founded
in Berlin in 1999, which soon moved to Thalheim in order to start cell
production in 2001. Q-Cells is one example of Germany’s success
story, i.e. it perfectly reflects the effectiveness of the 100.000-roofs
programme and the Renewable Energy Law. By the end of 2002 it
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
29
employed 82 persons; at the end of 2004 it already had 484 employees, a number which has grown to 1.700 in the year 2007.
Q-Cells also can be used as an example of how the photovoltaics industry is now increasingly able to acquire financing and venture capital from the private sector and the equity market. Since October 2005 Q-Cells is listed on the Frankfurt stock exchange, and since
December 2005 in its technology index TecDax. The first German PV
firm to be listed on the stock exchange was the Solon AG in 1998. It
was soon followed by the Solar World AG in 1999, the Sunways AG
in 2001, the Solar-Fabrik AG in 2002 and many others. All these companies were young start-ups, small and medium sized companies
which considerably differ from the multinational firms such as Siemens and ASE which had been dominating the early PV industry.
The development and success of these new firms can be interpreted
as evidence that the industry has left the formative stage, i.e. the
niche market and has been entering the take off stage, i.e. is ready for
market expansion.
The market expansion and the activities of new actors in the
sector have been accompanied by the significant enlargement and
diversification of the photovoltaics advocacy coalition. This applies to
producers as well as to users. Whereas first producers like the
Freiburg Solar-Fabrik, founded in 1996 by the environmentalist
Georg Salvamoser, were embedded in local solar networks and were
not solely led by return on investment thinking, motives and behaviours of producers like Q-Cells, Solar World or Solon do not differ
from producers in other sectors. Additionally, due to the EEG, users
of photovoltaics are no longer necessarily led by ‘green’ motives, as it
has increasingly become profitable to purchase solar modules, especially for farmers, who have plenty of space on their barn roofs,
which can be used as building ground for the rather cheap thin film
technology (cf. Rosenbaum et al 2005: 85f.). 3 Furthermore, this devel-
The literature on strategic niche management sees the prevalence of
economic motives as an impediment to the success of policies (Hoogma et al.
3
30
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
opment is supported by the wide acceptance of solar energy within
the German public. This trend is vividly reflected in the Christian
Democratic Party, which now has well accepted the policy of supporting photovoltaics. So when in 2005 the Red-Green government
ended and was replaced by the grand coalition of Social Democrats
and Christian Democrats, the new government did not opt to take a
new path. The Renewable Energy Law was not abolished and it is
safe to say, that the recent amendment of the law does not entail
comprehensive changes for PV support.
The take-off stage has also been accompanied by organizational changes, which helped to consolidate the chosen path. In 2002,
after the re-election of the Red-Green government, coalition talks
assigned the ministry of the environment full responsibility for renewable energies. Whereas the beginning of the formative stage had
been characterised by conflicts of competences between the ministry
of economics and the ministry of research, both being rather averse to
substantially supporting photovoltaics, in 2002 the situation had
changed completely. The ministry of the environment is now responsible for the Renewable Energy Law as well as the public financing of
photovoltaics related R&D. 4 Meanwhile the photovoltaics industry in
Germany is highly differentiated, thanks to its ability to employing
diverse methods of production and in its capability to build up important links to supplier industries. Therefore photovoltaics related
R&D is not just research on new materials and cell efficiencies. Especially the German machine building industry has benefited from the
emergence of the photovoltaics industry, much like German solar
2002). We are arguing that exactly the opposite mechanism (addressing economic motives) has been essential for the success of PV policies.
Another form of institutionalisation are the so called ‘Glottertal
talks’, which are strategic talks on photovoltaics related R&D. These talks
originated in 1987, but have gained importance particularly during the last
couple of years. Researchers and representatives of the leading institutes and
companies meet with members of the ministry of the environment in order to
discuss future public R&D activities for PV.
4
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
31
producers gained advantages from the expertise of the machine
building industry nearby – since; as we have stated before, innovations in photovoltaics happen mainly through cost reductions in production processes. For the German machine building sector, a strategic orientation to PV manufacturing equipment can be observed. The
development of ‘turn-key’ facilities helped to enable mass production
and facilitated the standardisation process (cf. Dewald 2007: 132).
These are crucial preconditions in order to achieve economies of scale
and making PV applications more competitive (cf. Auer 2008: 12).
Furthermore architects and craftsmen, especially electricians
have adapted well to the new technology as a growth option for their
businesses and the institutions of vocational education managed to
adjust their curricula. Thus well-known bottle-necks that often constrain the diffusion of new technologies have been overcome.
Looking at the machine building industry, an actor which
cannot be considered to be part of the energy policy subsystem
proper, but is strongly supporting the PV coalition by now, the specific dynamic of the advocacy coalition described in this article can be
illustrated. At the beginning of the formative stage, there was a single
minded coalition supporting renewable energy technologies. At that
time it shared a joint policy core, which was the transformation of the
energy sector, substituting nuclear and fossil power plants for renewable energy technologies. Then learning processes during the course
of this stage, helped to develop new policy instruments. Former radical opposition against the traditional energy sector, based on theories
and visions highlighting worst case scenarios on the one hand and
demonstrations and blockade actions on the other hand, gave way to
more pragmatic considerations and helped the coalition to gain political power. The new PV policy core of the transformed coalition is
now characterised not as pure opposition, but as supporting PV. Its
formation has been accompanied by new theories, visions and ideas
on generating demand for PV by reducing costs, increasing returns,
spreading information and eventually by finding ways to enlarge the
coalition. These dynamics resulted in the integration of actors like the
machine building industry, even some of the utilities, who either do
32
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
not belong to the policy subsystem or explicitly share another policy
core and cross party members from the Eastern part of Germany. At
this time, when the original policy core (transformation) was changed
by the formerly secondary aspect, ‘supporting PV’, the ground was
prepared for the integration of a very heterogeneous set of actors.
4.3 Success Indicators
In a next step we intend to highlight the successful development of
PV with the help of some quantitative indicators. In order to measure
‘success’ we will use the indicators ‘installed PV power’, ‘production’, 'export sales’, ‘employees’ and ‘patents’.
As figure 2 impressively shows, installed PV power was on a
relatively low level, then doubled for the first time in 2000 and has
grown continuously since then. These findings demonstrate the correlation between policy instruments that were applied by the federal
Red-Green coalition government, the regulatory instrument EEG and
the 100.000 roofs programme and the expansion of the market (see
below).
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
33
Fig. 2: PV power installed in Germany (MWp).
PV power installed in Germany (MWp)
5308*
3808
6000
4000
2000
1,4 100 178 258 408
1008
1858
2708
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1990
0
*approximation
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009)
In 2005 “…Germany accounted for more than 93% of the EU
25” (Jäger-Waldau 2006: 75) installations. The data for 2004 and 2005
are not totally reliable though, as there exist huge discrepancies in the
reported data, since after the end of the 100.000 roofs programme in
2003 and the revision of the EEG in 2004, no procedure had been established to register the dramatic increase of installations (cf. JägerWaldau 2006: 77).
Stable political and socio-economic conditions do not only
convince private households to install photovoltaic power installations, but solid markets also stimulate the investment in new production capacities for solar cells and modules.
As figure 3 shows, cell production has grown to almost 1500
MW annually. Sales as well as export shipments of the German
photovoltaics industry have been rising with a comparable rate, as
can be seen in figures 3 and 4.
34
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
Fig. 3: Solar cell production in Germany (Mw).
Solar Cell Production in Germany (MW)
2000
1450*
1500
842
2
6
16 33 54 98 117
1999
2000
500
1998
1000
319
530
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
0
*approximation
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009)
Fig. 4: Sales of the German photovoltaics industry.
Sales of the German PV industry in
Mio. €
7000
8000
5741
6000
4451
4000
2000
2793
1645
201 348 264 492
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
0
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009)
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
35
Fig. 5: Export sales of the German photovoltaics industry.
Export sales in Mio. Euro
5.000*
6.000
2.922
4.000
273
603
2005
1.695
2004
2.000
3.700*
2010
2008
2007
2006
0
*approximation
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009)
Fig. 6: PV-price index in €.
PV-price index (in €)
Q1 2009
Q4 2008
Q3 2008
Q2 2008
Q1 2008
Q4 2007
Q3 2007
Q2 2007
Q1 2007
Q4 2006
6.000
5.000
4.000
3.000
2.000
1.000
0
Average retail price for installed on roof systems with up
to 100 kWp capacity (without VAT)
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar) 2009
36
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
In a relative short time period the German industry was also
able to improve productivity that enabled prices for installed PV
modules to fall by a quarter between 4/2006 and 1/2009. (Cp. Fig. X).
Sales figures and numbers of photovoltaics power installed
clearly show the market success of photovoltaics. An even more
common way of measuring innovation is patent data, since “...patents
provide a uniquely detailed source of information on inventive activity” (cf. OECD 1994: 9).
Fig. 7: Global patent applications in photovoltaics.
59
54
51
Suisse
Taiwan
Russia
137
WO*
65
149
Australia
Spain
231
Great Britain
86
253
France
Italy
262
China
96
293
European patents
Netherlands
462
2121
Germany
Korea
2570
USA
Japan
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
12249
Numbers and origin of PV-patents in 2007
* World Intellectual
Property Organisation
Source: own illustration based on data from: Beucker und Fichter
(Boderstep Institut für Innovation und Nachhaltigkeit 2007)
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
37
As figure 6 shows, Japan is by far the most active nation in
patent applications, followed by the USA and Germany. 5 As can be
seen from figure 7 German patent activities reflect quite well the
global increase of photovoltaics patents from around 500 in the early
1990s up to around 2000 in 2002. The numbers for Germany do not
differ significantly from those for the USA, and Germany is far ahead
of other industrialised countries, such as its European neighbours.
The data seems to suggest that rather than being a precondition for
the further development of PV the economic success of PV spurred
hectic activities to protect intellectual property.
Fig. 8: First filing of photovoltaic patents.
Global results for firstfilling
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
all
JP
US
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
0
EP+DE+FR+GB+NL+IT
Source: own illustration based on data from: Visentin/Voignier/Königstein 2005
It is striking that Japan accounts for 74% of all patent applications,
but this is mainly due to characteristics of the Japanese patent law system,
which makes the process of applying for a patent easier and cheaper than in
the USA and Germany. Furthermore, in Japan normally one invention is
divided into small elements and for each a patent application is filed (cf.
Siemer 2005: 66). Therefore comparing German patent activities with the
Japanese one has to be careful when drawing conclusions.
5
38
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
These figures clearly demonstrate the (at least short term)
success of the PV industry. It is expanding production in Germany
and off shore, it is increasing the export ratio of its production, it is
employing ever more people, it is operating profitably and continually accumulates intellectual capital. Meanwhile more corporations
are active in this sector and more people are employed in the sector
than in many other established economic sectors.
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
39
5 Photovoltaics and Its Contenders
During the last years quite a number of articles have been published,
describing and analysing the transformation of the energy sector.
Photovoltaics, as one of the renewables, has been described and analysed before. But only few publications have focused on the particular technological and institutional prerequisites, which enabled
photovoltaics to become a real success story. Since the success of specific technologies in a system as complex as the energy supply system
at least partly depends on the interaction with and the development
path of competing or complementary systems, we will shortly review
some of the other renewables, which have be following a slightly
different trajectory, in order to develop some insights on what might
be the particular comparative advantages of photovoltaics.
The fuel cell and wind power technologies, just like photovoltaics have received dedicated financial support schemes and benefit(ed) from R&D programmes. But unlike photovoltaics, in the case
of fuel cells support programmes failed to trigger a sufficient demand, and research and industry had to postpone several times the
availability of a sufficiently stable technology. In the second case,
creating a niche market for wind power technologies was extremely
successful at the beginning. But over the last years, wind power technologies and especially the German industry are increasingly suffering backlashes in the sense of the development of future applications,
when compared with other European countries such as Denmark or
Spain. The domestic market for wind power for some years had less
future potential than the market for photovoltaics applications. Since
the national onshore-market for wind park installations has become
increasingly limited by social non-acceptance of wind power installations: the sight of installations is sometimes considered to damage the
beauty of the landscape, environmental problems are discussed, and
people living next to wind power plants complain about the noise
40
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
caused by wind turbines. For off-shore installations the tourism industry at the North Sea is afraid of losses resulting from wind power
plants mutilating the nature and environmentalists are afraid of the
consequences for animal and plant populations. Surveys show that
the majority of the German population supports wind energy, wanting it to become an important energy resource in the future, its acceptance has always been significantly less pronounced than the support
for photovoltaics. For example in 2003 a survey of the Allensbach
Institute showed that 33 % of the respondents answered that wind
turbines would disfigure landscapes whereas only 6 % of the respondents were of the same opinion concerning photovoltaics installation
(cf. Bundespresseamt 2003: 4). A Forsa-survey in 2008 showed higher
acceptance even for solar parks, compared to wind parks (76 % vs. 55
%) (cf. Agentur für Erneuerbare Energien e.V. 2008: 5). There are also
administrative limits imposed by some federal States concerning the
space between and the height of wind turbines (cf. VDI 2006: 17).
Social and administrative opposition is additionally enforced by
‘natural’ restrictions, since open space in windy regions is limited. As
a consequence, at a quite early stage the idea of alternative applications, so called offshore wind farms became widely accepted by countries like Denmark, Britain and Sweden. In contrast to these lead
markets, the German wind industry initially did not follow this offshore trend and hesitated for a long time to re-direct its research and
development activities. Only recently, the realisation of the first German offshore project (alpha ventus) began. The project is realised by
a huge public-private syndicate, comprising public partners, associations, research institutes as well as commercial actors. Interestingly
incumbent actors of the energy sector, like E.ON and Vattenfall are
also among the partners (cf. BMU/Stiftung Offshore Windenergie
2007). But since activities are in its infancy, at the moment the offshore industry’s technology leaders are Danish and Spanish firms.
Traditional big producers of wind turbines from Germany are lagging behind (cf. Manager Magazin 2007). The reasons are a mixture of
technology specific and social factors, which at the moment constrain
Germany becoming a lead market for off shore wind power tech-
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
41
nologies. First of all the coast of the North Sea is well protected from
becoming a wind farm due to the existence of around 700 citizens
action groups opposing wind power plants. They are supported by
nature societies like the Naturschutzbund, which articulated vehement protest against wind power plants close to the North Sea coast
as they feared that bird sanctuaries and nature reserves will be
threatened. Existing laws on nature conservation that particularly
protect the Wadden Sea at the German North Sea coast back these
apprehensions and resulted in complicated and long lasting approval
procedures. Thus coastal off shore applications comparable to Danish, Swedish or British wind power plants will not be realised in
Germany in the foreseeable future. As an alternative, German offshore applications can be realised far out in the North Sea. This strategy is backed by the renewable energy law, which says that wind
farms that are built after the 1st of January 2005, get only remuneration, if they are located outside of bird sanctuaries and nature reserves (cf. dena 2005: 2). But these particularities raise costs for offshore applications tremendously and request new technological developments. Since there does not exist any experience with wind
farms that are built above 20 to 40 meters deep water one would enter completely new technological territory. Furthermore, when connecting these offshore wind power plants to onshore grids, additionally high extra costs are due. The same already holds for big onshore
wind power plants, as there is the risk, when feeding-in a larger
quantity of wind power into the grid, that grid configurations get
overloaded. So additionally, an expensive expansion and reconstruction of existing grids will be necessary in order to tap the full potential of big wind power plants. In contrast PV resembles more a
“small” decentralized technology with more limited compatibility
problems to the existing grid structure.
Another energy technology, which has been targeted by the
German innovation policy is the aforementioned fuel cell technology.
But in contrast to wind power and photovoltaics, it has not yet managed to enter the large scale market. The reasons are for one technological characteristics that constrain its market expansion. First of all,
42
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
fuel cells need hydrogen as prime energy source, so the creation of a
niche market, and even more the market expansion of the fuel cell
technology depends on the parallel development of the hydrogen
technology. Furthermore, the acceptance and expansion of fuel cells
are heavily dependent on supporting infrastructures like fuelling
stations offering hydrogen. If these do not exist, the technology seems
unhelpful for potential end-users. Until now, the hydrogen technology is lacking innovative leaps which could have led to substantial
cost reductions. Instead, the technology is still very expensive, which
constrains the acceptance and diffusion of fuel cells.
Figure eight and ten show the different trajectory of the wind power
plant sector when compared with PV. After an initial steady increase
– which already predated the introduction of new regulatory instruments, the new construction activities stalled somewhat after 2002.
This might change again in the future given the recent amendments
of the EEG.
Fig. 9: Additional construction of wind power plants in Germany.
Additional construction of wind power
plants in Germany (in MW)
2008
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
4.000,00
3.000,00
2.000,00
1.000,00
0,00
Source: own illustration based on data from: Molly (DEWI GmbH
2008)
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
43
Fig. 10: Annually and total installed power in Germany.
Annually and total installed power in Germany
30.000
annually installed
wind power in MW
25.000
20.000
installed wind power
in MW
15.000
10.000
annually installed PV
power in MWp
5.000
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
0
installed PV power in
MWp
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009) and Molly (DEWI GmbH 2008)
Nevertheless the overall importance of PV is far less than
wind power. The amount of energy one additonal wind installation is
able to produce is much higher when compared to the small,
decentralised PV installations (see fig. 9).
44
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
Fig. 11: Annually installed power in Germany.
Annually installed power in Germany
4.000
2.000
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
0
annually installed wind power in MW
annually installed PV power in MWp
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009) and Molly (DEWI GmbH 2008)
Fig. 12: Installed power in Germany.
Installed power in Germany
installed wind power in MW
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
30.000
25.000
20.000
15.000
10.000
5.000
0
installed PV power in MWp
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009) and Molly (DEWI GmbH 2008)
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
45
Fig. 13: Sales (in Mio. €).
Sales (in Mio. €)
8.000
6.000
4.000
2.000
0
4.217
1.645
2004
5.338
7.190*
6.533
5.741
4.451
2.793
2005
2006
2007
*approximation
German wind power industry
German PV industry
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009) and Bundesverband
WindEnergie e. V. (2007)
With respect to aspects of industrial policy PV is much more
dominated by German producers and German technology. The PV
industry might be able to overtake the wind power industry with
respect to sales (see fig 12). In spite of the increasing exports of the PV
industry, it is less dependent on the export markets than the wind
power industry – given the unclear further development of the market (see fig 13 and 14).
46
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
Fig. 14: Export sales (in Mio. €).
Export sales (in Mio. €)
5.000
3.046
1.847
273
603
3.630
1.695
4.590*
2.922
0
2004
2005
2006
2007
*approximation
German wind power industry
German PV industry
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009) and Bundesverband
WindEnergie e. V. (2007)
Fig. 15: Export ratio (manufacturer and supplier).
Export ratio
(manufacturer and supplier)
100,0%
50,0%
69,0%*
62,0%
61,0%
50,0%
47,0%
35,5%
25,0%
22,0%
0,0%
2004
2005
2006
2007
*approximation
German wind power industry
German PV industry
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009) and Bundesverband
WindEnergie e. V. (2007)
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
47
Fig. 16: Numbers of employees.
Numbers of employees
100.000
52.200
50.000
17.200
65.800
22.300
74.200
80.100*
29.600
42.600
0
2004
2005
2006
2007
*approximation
German wind power industry
German PV industry
Source: own illustration based on data from: Bundesverband
Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar 2009) and Bundesverband
WindEnergie e. V. (2007)
Both industries, however, are developing into important employers with the dynamic again being more pronounced in the PV
than in the wind power industry (see fig. 15). This dynamic can also
be seen in the development of costs of electricity generation. At the
moment electricity generated by PV modules is much more expensive
than wind energy. But while the costs of wind energy will decrease
only slightly over next years, great cost reductions are expected in the
PV industry.
48
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
Fig. 17: Average values of electricity generation costs of new plants.
Average values of electricity generation costs
of new plants in the particular year (in €/kWh)
0,800
0,600
0,400
0,200
wind power industry
2040
2020
2018
2016
2014
2012
2010
2008
2006
2004
2002
2000
0,000
PV industry
Source: own illustration based on data from: BMU (2008)
Fig. 18: Average values of electricity generation costs of total plant
stock.
Average values of electricity generation costs
of total plant stock ( 6%/yr interest) (in €/kWh)
wind power industry
PV industry
Source: own illustration based on data from: BMU (2008)
2040
2020
2018
2016
2014
2012
2010
2008
2006
2004
2002
2000
1,000
0,800
0,600
0,400
0,200
0,000
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
49
6 A Future for Photovoltaics?
In the beginning we claimed that the creation of niche markets can be
a successful policy instrument in coordinated market economies (hypothesis 1), if a powerful advocacy coalition can be mobilised (hypothesis 2). Our analysis has shown that the support of PV after 1998
was successful in establishing a growing and profitable economic
activity. The PV industry can produce and sell its products both in
Germany and abroad. The story, however, has also proven that the
success of such a policy depends on many favourable circumstances.
It does not only need broad political and public support that goes
beyond the initial policy core, but also a delicate architecture of instruments that are geared towards the special characteristics of the
system to be supported. The policy instruments are mostly not generic, but geared towards the specific problems of the PV industry.
The success of PV is also linked to frame conditions, offering
a window of opportunity for change. The electric power sector over
the last years faced new challenges. These challenges came from a
move to liberalize markets, the expectation that the sector should
contribute to environmental aims and the development of new technologies (e.g. renewable energies) hard to integrate into the dominant
regime of the sector. PV as an innovation successfully exploited the
chances offered. A form of decentralized, small technology which
could be connected to the grid without severe difficulties and compatibility problems, it achieved nearly unanimous support by a public in favour of clean technologies. It was supported by an advocacy
coalition comprising scientists, politicians, environmentalists and
increasingly economic actors. PV could build on the already existing
scientific strengths in this area as well as the expertise of suppliers
(e.g. machine building industry). Insofar some elements of path dependency are to be seen even in this case.
50
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
The political instruments developed offered long term security for the
industry as well as incentives to build new production units in the
disadvantaged regions of the new German Laender. The users of PVmodules were guaranteed a 20 year security on their investments.
Insofar PV could serve many masters. The present strength of the
coalition has only recently been proven when the federal government
amended the Renewable Energy Law without implementing important changes. It achieved nearly unanimous support by a public in
favour of clean technologies; it was supported by an advocacy coalition comprising of scientists, politicians, environmentalists and increasingly economic actors.
Taken together the many beneficial factors and the very specific composition of the advocacy coalition also point towards the
difficulties in imitating this successful experiment in other areas. The
lesson being not necessarily that the same policy should be and can
be pursued in other cases as well. The general message rather is that
customized innovation policies need to reflect the specific conditions
and opportunities in the targeted areas.
As Rammert (1997) states, post-modern reflexive innovation
policy intends to connect heterogeneous actors by avoiding negative
externalities that may result from hierarchical or market forms of
coordination. Such network activities are looked upon as being more
suitable to innovation processes, especially under the auspices of
globalisation and ongoing deregulation processes. „Initiatives must
be taken to foster experiments with the new technology; these must
give rise to entrepreneurial activity by either new or existing entities;
economic and technological competence must be built and diffused
among suppliers and users; capital must be supplied; and bridging
functions must be developed – institutions and networks need to be
built and knowledge must be transferred“(cf. Carlsson/Jacobsson
1997: 272). Policy effectiveness thus builds on a challenging combination of diverse activities.
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
51
References
Agentur für Erneuerbare Energien e.V. (2008): Hintergrundinformation:
Bevölkerung wünscht mehr Erneuerbare Energien – hohe Akzeptanz
auch im eigenen Wohnumfeld. Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen
http://www.unendlich-vielUmfrage
in
Deutschland,
in:
energie.de/uploads/media/Hintergrundinfo-forsa08_laender.pdf,
zugegriffen am 17. April 2009.
BINE Informationsdienst (2005): Photovoltaik – Innovationen bei Solarzellen
und Modulen, themeninfo III/05.
Beckert, Jens (1996): Was ist soziologisch an der Wirtschaftssoziologie? In:
Zeitschrift für Soziologie 25: 125-146.
Berkhout, Frans/Smith, Adrian/Stirling, Andy (2003): Socio-Technological
Regimes and Transition Contexts, Working Paper Series 2003/3,
Brighton: University of Sussex – Science & Technology Policy Research
Unit.
Beucker, Severin/Fichter, Klaus (2007): Trends und Rahmenbedingungen für
das Innovationssystem Farbstoffsolarzelle – Perspektive 2020.
http://www.colorsol.de/Images/InnovationssystemPV_tcm294101482.pdf, last accessed 16th of April 2009.
BMU (2001): Windenergienutzung auf See. Positionspapier des BMU zur
Windenergienutzung im Offshore-Bereich, Berlin.
BMU/Stiftung Offshore Windenergie (2007): Entwicklung der OffshoreWindenergienutzung in Deutschland, in: http://www.offshorestiftung.de/, zugegriffen am 18. April 2009..
BMU (2008): Leitstudie 2008. Weiterentwicklung der Ausbaustrategie
http://www.bmu.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/
Erneuerbarer
Energien.
application/pdf/leitstudie2008.pdf, last accessed 9h of July 2009.
Bundespresseamt (2003): Allensbach-Studie zu Energieversorgung und
Energiepolitik (Zusammenfassung des BPA), in: http://www.windenergie.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Themen_A-Z/
Akzeptanz/
Allensbach_energiepolitik.pdf, zugegriffen am 18. April 2009.
52
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
Bundesverband Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSW-Solar) (2009): Statistische Zahlen
der
deutschen
Solarstrombranche
(Photovoltaik).
http://www.solarwirtschaft.de/fileadmin/content_files/faktenblatt_pv_0
309.pdf, last accessed 16th of April 2009.
Bundesverband WindEnergie e. V. (2007): Hintergrundinformation:
http://www.windWindkraft
schafft
Arbeit,
energie.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Presse_Hintergrund/HG_Arbeitsplaet
ze.pdf, last accessed 7h of July 2009.
Busch, Per Olof (2005): Institutionalisierter Politiktransfer mit
Nebenwirkungen:
Die
Ausbreitung
von
Quoten
und
Einspeisevergütungen, in: Tews, Kerstin/Jänicke, Martin (eds.): Die
Diffusion umweltpolitischer Innovationen im internationalen System,
Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag: 233-255.
Caniels, Marjolein C.J./Romijn, Henny A. (2008) : Strategic niche
management : towards a policy tool for sustainable development. In:
Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 20: 245-266.
Carlsson, Bo/Jacobsson, Staffan (1997): Diversity Creation and Technological
Systems: A Technology Policy Perspective, in: Edquist, Charles (ed.):
Systems of Innovation. Technologies, Institutions and Organizations,
London: Pinter: 266-294.
Casper, Steven (1999): National Institutional Frameworks and HighTechnology Innovation in Germany. The Case of Biotechnology, WZB
discussion paper, FS I 99-306, Berlin: WZB.
Chaminade, Cristina/Edquist, Charles (2006): Rationales for public policy
intervention from a systems of innovation approach: the case of
VINNOVA, Lund: Lund University CIRCLE Electronic Working Paper
No 2006/04.
Clark, Norman/Juma, Calestous (1987): Long-Run Economics, London:
Pinter.
Coenen, Reinhard (2002): Umlenken auf nachhaltige Technologiepfade, in:
Grunwald, Armin (ed.): Technikgestaltung für eine nachhaltige
Entwicklung, Berlin: edition sigma: 389-405.
dena (2005): dena-info Offshore Wind 1/2005, Berlin.
Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 27
September 2001 on the promotion of electricity produced from
renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market.
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
53
Dohse, Dirk (2007): Cluster-Based Technology Policy – The German
Experience, in: Industry and Innovation, 14,1: 69-94.
Edler, Jakob (Hrsg.) (2007): Bedürfnisse als Innovationsmotor. Konzepte und
Instrumente nachfrageorientierter Innovationspolitik. Berlin: edition
sigma.
Edquist, Charles/Johnson, Björn (1997): Institutions and organisations in
systems of innovation, in: Edquist (ed.): Systems of Innovation:
Technologies, Institutions and Organizations, London: Pinter: 41-61.
Edquist, Charles (2001): The System of Innovation Approach and Innovation
Policy: An account of the state of the art, Lead paper presented at the
DRUID conference, Aalborg, June 12-15, 2001.
Edquist, Charles (2005): Systems of Innovation: Perspectives and Challenges,
in: Fagerberg, Jan/Mowery, David C./Nelson, Richard R. (eds.): The
Oxford Handbook of Innovation. Oxford:Oxford University Press: 181208.
European Commission (2005): Communication from the Commission. The
support of electricity from renewable energy sources, Brussels: COM.
Gabler, Hansjörg (9th of January 2007) Interview at the Zentrum für
Sonnenenergie- und Wasserstoff-Forschung.
Genennig, Bernd/Hoffmann, Volker U. (1996): Sozialwissenschaftliche
Begleituntersuchung zum Bund-Länder-1000 Dächer PhotovoltaikProgramm, Abschlussbericht, Leipzig: Umweltinstitut Leipzig e.V.
Hage, Jerald/Meeus, Marius (Hrsg.) (2006): Innovation, Science, and
Institutional Change, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hall, Peter/Soskice, David (eds.) (2001): Varieties of Capitalism: the
institutional foundations of comparative advantage, New York: Oxford
University Press.
Harding, Rebecca (2000): Resilience in German Technology Policy:
Innovation through Institutional Symbiotic Tension, in: Industry and
Innovation 7,2: 223-243.
Hoogma, Remco/Kemp, René/Schot, Johan/Truffer, Bernhard (2002):
Experimenting for sustainable transport. The approaches of strategic
niche management. London: Spon Press.
54
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
Holzinger, Katharina/Jörgens, Helge/Knill, Christoph (Hg.): Transfer,
Diffusion und Konvergenz von Politiken. Politische Vierteljahresschrift,
Sonderheft 38, Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag
IEA (2004): Renewable Energy. Market and Policy Trends in IEA Countries,
Paris: International Energy Agency.
IEA (2005): Total photovoltaic power installed in IEA PVPS countries,
http://www.iea-pvps.org/isr/22.htm, last accessed 12th of June 2007.
Jacobsson, Staffan/Andersson, Björn A./Bangens, Lennart (2002):
Transforming the energy system – the evolution of the German
technological system for solar cells, SPRU Paper No 84, Brighton: SPRU.
Jacobsson, Staffan/Bergek, Anna (2004): Transforming the energy sector: the
evolution of technological systems in renewable energy technology, in:
Jacob, Klaus/Binder, Manfred/Wieczorek, Anna (eds.): Governance for
Industrial Transformation. Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference on
the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change,
Environmental Policy Research Centre, Berlin: 208-236.
Jacobsson, Staffan/Lauber, Volkmar (2006): The politics and policy of energy
system transformation – explaining the German diffusion of renewable
energy technology, in: Energy Policy 34 (2006): 256-276.
Jäger-Waldau, Arnulf (2002): Status of PV Research, Solar Cell Production
and Market Implementation in Japan, USA and the European Union,
Ispra: Institute for Environment and Sustainability, Renewable Energy
Unit.
Jänicke, Martin (1997): Umweltinnovationen aus der Sicht der PolicyAnalyse: vom instrumentellen zum strategischen Ansatz der
Umweltpolitik, Papier, vorgelegt im Rahmen des BMBFProjektverbundes
‚Abschätzung
der
innovativen
Wirkungen
umweltpolitischer Instrumente’ am 9.12.1996 in Königswinter, Berlin:
Freie Universität Berlin: Forschungsstelle für Umweltpolitik.
Jänicke, Martin (2007): Trendsetter im ‚regulativen Kapitalismus’: Das
Beispiel umweltpolitischer Pionierländer, in: Holzinger, Katharina /
Jörgens, Helge / Knill, Christoph (Hrsg.): Transfer, Diffusion und
Konvergenz von Politiken. Politische Vierteljahresschrift Sonderhefte
38/2007. Wiesbaden, VS Verlag: 131-149.
Jahn, Detlef (1992): Nuclear power, energy policy and new politics in Sweden
and Germany, in: Environmental Politics 1,3: 383-417.
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
55
Kemp, René/Schot, Johan/Hoogma, Remco (1998): Regime Shifts to
Sustainability Through Processes of Niche Formation: The Approach of
Strategic Niche Management, in: Technology Analysis & Strategic
Management, 10,2: 175-195.
Kemp, René (2002): Environmental Protection through Technological Regime
Shifts, in: Jamison, Andrew/Rohracher, Harald (eds.): Technology
Studies and Sustainable Development, München/Wien: Profil: 95-126.
Krewitt,
Wolfram/Nast,
Michael/Nitsch,
Joachim
(2005):
Energiewirtschaftliche Perspektiven der Fotovoltaik. Langfassung,
Stuttgart: Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V. Institut für
Technische
Thermodynamik
Abteilung
Systemanalyse
und
Technikbewertung.
Litfin, Karen T. (2000): Advocacy Coalitions Along the Domestic-Foreign
Frontier: Globalization and Canadian Climate Change Policy, in: Policy
Studies Journal 28,1: 236-252.
Malerba, Franco (2004): Sectoral Systems of Innovation. Concepts, Issues and
Analyses of Six Major Sectors in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Manager Magazin (2007): Deutschland von Skandinavien abgehängt,
http://www.manager-magazin.de/geld/artikel/0,2828,503703,00.html,
last accessed 5h of September 2007.
May, Hanne (2008): Runde Sache, in: Neue Energie Spezial. Das Magazin für
http://www.winderneuerbare
Energien,
energie.de/fileadmin/ne/ne_inhalte/dokumente/ne0806_EEG.pdf,
last
accessed 28 th of August 2008.
Mayntz, Renate/Hughes, Thomas P. (eds.) (1988): The Development of Large
Technical Systems. Frankfurt a.M.: Campus
Milborrow, David (2002): External costs and the real truth, in: Windpower
Monthly 18,1: 32.
Molly, Jens-Peter (2008): Status der Windenergienutzung in Deutschland Stand
31.12.2008
(DEWI
GmbH),
http://www.windenergie.de/fileadmin/dokumente/statistiken/WE%20D
eutschland/DEWI-Statistik_gesamt_2008.pdf, last accessed 7h of July
2009.
Nemet, Gregory F. (2005): Technical Change in Photovoltaics and the
Applicability of the Learning Curve Model (IIASA International
56
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis Interim Report IR-05-029),
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/TNT/WEB/PUB/IR/IR-05029_nemet.pdf, last accessed 27 th of July 2009.
Nelson, Richard R. (ed.) (1993): National Innovation Systems: A Comparative
Analysis, New York: Oxford University Press.
Niewienda, Andreas (17th of December 2006), Interview at DS-Plan, Stuttgart.
Nooteboom, Bart (1999): Innovation and inter-firm
implications for policy, in: Research Policy 28: 793-805.
linkages:
new
OECD (1994): The Measurement of Scientific and Technological Activities.
Using Patent Data as Science and Technology Indicators. Patent Manual
1994, Paris.
OECD (1997): Oslo Manual: The Measurement of Scientific and Technological
Activities. Proposed Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting
Technological Innovation Data, 2nd ed., Paris: OECD.
Rammer, Christian (2006): Trends in Innovation Policy: An International
Comparison, in: Schmoch, Ulrich/Rammer, Christian (eds.): National
Systems of Innovation in Comparison. Structure and Performance
Indicators for Knowledge Societies, Dordrecht: Springer: 265-286.
Rammert, Werner (1997): Innovation im Netz. Neue Zeiten für technische
Innovationen: heterogen verteilt und interaktiv vernetzt, in: Soziale Welt
48: 397 – 416.
Ristau, Oliver (1998): Die solare Standortfrage. Der technologische Wettstreit
zwischen den USA, Japan und Deutschland, Bad Oeynhausen: Bröerund-Witt-Solarthemen.
Rosenbaum, Wolf/Mautz, Rüdiger/Byzio, Andreas (2005): Die soziale
Dynamik der regenerativen Energien – am Beispiel der Fotovoltaik, der
Biogasverstromung und der Windenergie, Göttingen: SOFI.Sabatier,
Paul A./Jenkins-Smith, Hank (eds.) (1993): Policy Change and Learning:
An Advocacy Coalition Approach, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Sabatier, Paul A. (1998): The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and
relevance for Europe, in: Journal of European Public Policy 5,1: 98-130.
Siemer, Jochen (2005): Das Orakel vom Amt. Patentanmeldungen für
Photovoltaik, in: Photon 2005-10: 66-70.
Solarbuzz (2007): Solar Cell Technologies, http://www.solarbuzz.
com/Technologies.htm, last accessed 6h of August 2007.
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
57
Solarserver (2007): Dünnschicht-Solartechnik: Neue Technologien zur
Kostensenkung
der
Photovoltaik,
http://www.solarserver.de/solarmagazin/artikeljuni2006.html,
last
accessed 6h of August 2007.
Stern, Nicholas (2006): Review on the Economics of climate change, London:
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
HM
Treasury,
independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/stern_re
view_report.cfm, last accessed 24th of April 2007.
Surek, Tom (National Renewable Energy Laboratory) (2003): Progress in U.S.
photovoltaics: looking back 30 years and looking ahead 20. In:
Proceedings of 3rd World Conference on Photovoltaic Energy,
http://www.nrel.gov/pv/thin_film/docs/surek_japan_talk_2003.ppt, last
accessed 27 th of July 2009.
VDI (2006): Regenerative Energien in Deutschland – Stand 2006 –
Statusreport des VDI-Fachausschusses FaRE, Düsseldorf.
Victor, David G. (2002): Electric Power, in: Steil, Benn et al (eds.)
Technological Innovation and Economic Performance. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 385-415.
Visentin, Alberto/Voignier, V/Königstein, C (2005): Technology Trends in
Photovoltaics for the last decade: an analysis on the basis of patent
application filing data, paper presented at the photovoltaics conference.
Voß, Jan-Peter/Fischer, Corinna/Schumacher, Katja/Cames, Martin/Pehnt,
Martin/Praetorius, Barbara/Schneider, Lambert (2003): Innovation. An
integrated concept for the study of transformation in electricity systems,
TIPS Discussion Paper 3, Frankfurt a.M.: Sozialökologische Forschung.
Weimer-Jehle, Wolfgang/Fuchs, Gerhard (2007): Generierung von
Innovationsszenarien mit der Cross-Impact Methode, in: Forum für
Energiemodelle und Energiewirtschaftliche Systemanalysen in
Deutschland (ed.), Energiemodelle zu Innovation und moderner
Energietechnik. Berlin:Lit, 37-90 .
Whitley, Richard (2000): The Institutional Structuring of Innovation
Strategies: Business Systems, Firm Types and Patterns of Technical
Change in Different Market Economies, in: Organization Studies 21,5:
855-886.
Woditsch, Peter (2000): Kostenreduktionspotenziale bei der Herstellung von
PV-Modulen, in: ForschungsVerbund Sonnenenergie (ed.): Sonne – die
58
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: Picking A Winner?
Energie des 21. Jahrhunderts. Strategien zur Kostensenkung von
Solarzellen, Berlin.
Wong, Shiu-Fai (2005): Obliging Institutions and Industry Evolution: A
Comparative Study of the German and UK Wind Energy Industries, in:
Industry and Innovation 12,1: 117-145.
Gerhard Fuchs