On the Rise of Gaius Marius Kathleen Toohey If C. Marius had followed the precedents that generally governed the course of Roman politics, and relied simply on the patronage of the Metelli, to whom his family were clientela,1 his career would have been unexceptional. But Marius possessed both ambition and an ability of command that was to make him stand out in a military career. The question is, were these factors alone sufficient to account for Marius’ rise to power against the conservatism of the Senate, and the likely open hostility of his former patrons that his ambition and tactlessness must have generated.2 And can they also explain the exceptional circumstances of his being elected to the consulship six times in the space of eight years,3 a sequence of events that ignored both law and convention.4 The answer, I believe, is that they cannot. Firstly, with regard to his ambition, as a novus homo this was undoubtedly satisfied by the preeminence that his consulships gained for him. It is this, rather than the “lack of political ability and ambition” which Scullard claimed,5 that stopped him from abusing his position to his own advantage. He went no further because he had already achieved his goal. For him, as a novus homo, it was important that, although he might bend the rules, he beat the system from within the system. To have overthrown it, if he could have done so, would have been a personal defeat. In this he strongly resembles Cicero, also a novus homo, who, once he attained the consulship, became a strong defender of the Republican system. In Marius, the factor of ambition that drove Marius to rise above his station was therefore limited, and had things been different he would probably have been happy to simply win the consulship in his forty-third year.6 It was the circumstances of his times that gave him the chance to win his extra consulships. And it is not surprising that this man of humble background should seize his opportunity to gain extra dignitas, though he probably also sincerely believed that he was the best, and perhaps the only man to save the State. Secondly, can Marius’ career be explained by his prior demonstrations of military abilities. The earliest instance reported of these abilities winning recognition, is Scipio Africanus’ commendation, reported by Plutarch.7 But the qualities of personal bravery and cheerful acceptance of duty that Plutarch relates to explain this, while admirable in a soldier, are, in themselves, not key factors in the expected make-up of an exceptional general. Indeed, in looking at Marius’ career as the exceptional general his reputation portrays, an expected factor is missing; tactical innovations.8 Instead, the innovations we can reasonably attribute to Marius, are largely modifications to the army he led, which are points of strategic importance. 1 Plutarch, Marius 4. Particularly during his Tribuneship and his clash with Caecilius Metellus in Africa. Plutarch, Marius 7-8, 16. Scullard,H.H., From the Gracchi to Nero, London, Methuen, 1976; 4th edit., pp.47, 50-51. 3 Scullard, Op. Cit. p. 55. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. p.62. Kildahl, P.A., Caius Marius, New York, Twayne Publishers, 1968, p.128. 6 In fact Marius had to wait until he was at least 50 to win his first consulship in 107 BC. This delay, with its implied slight, will have only fuelled his ambition to prove himself further. (citation) 7 Plutarch, Marius 6. 8 Scullard, Op. Cit. pp. 214-215. Webster, G. The Roman Imperial Army, London, Adam &Charles Black,1969, p.39. 2 Marius’ first reform was to enrol in his army citizens who could not fill the minimum property requirements set down by law.9 There has been a lot of debate about what this actually involved, because, from the time of the Punic Wars, the practice of accepting volunteers into the army had been followed.10 Yet the importance that Plutarch and Sallust both place on Marius’ action11 seems to imply that what Marius did was essentially different from the actions of his predecessors. One possibility is that he may have enrolled those not eligible by property, without the permission of the Senate. Such an action would fit in well with his other usurpation of Senatorial prerogatives, through his agent Saturninus, in granting land to his veterans. 12 Or possibly, the difference was that he publically called for volunteers,13 where previously they were not openly solicited. There may be some truth in both of these suggestions, but the explanation of Aulus Gellius, admittedly writing 250 years after these events,14 may come closer to the truth. He points to a fine division of the citizens not eligible for military service, into the slightly better off proletarii, who, he says, had been accepted at State expense, as volunteers during times of crisis, and the capite censi, who, he says, were first enrolled by Marius.15 What effect this had on Marius’ career, if any, is not apparent and it does not seem to have been adverse. His purpose was probably simply to strengthen his army, though the idea that these volunteers might make better soldiers, as career soldiers, might also have guided him. But he took this action after his first consulship had been secured. His other innovations came after his second consulship had been secured. They include his making the Eagle the sole badge of each legion16 and the modification of the pilum.17 But these innovations are not really a satisfactory way of explaining Marius’ rise to power. They undoubtedly helped to give him a good army, as far as the loyalty, training and discipline of his men were concerned. But the problem is he did not win a major victory until his fourth year as consul. His ending of the Jugurthine war had been accomplished through the betrayal of Jugurtha.18 9 For a contrary position, see Taylor, Michael, “Tactical Reform in the Late Republican Army”, passim, https://www.academia.edu/s/d686fb9f60 In a note to me, Taylor has commented: “On the Gellius passage, I am inclined to believe that AG is in fact confused, and that the capite censi and the proletarii are in fact one and the same. Gellius says that proletarii have less than 1500 asses while capite censi need less than 375. But 375 HS was 1500 asses, so it is not hard to see Gellius making an antiquarian error in creating two classes from one by mixing up his currency units.” 10 Smith, P.E., Service in the Post Marian Army, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1958, pp. 5 & 44-45. 11 Plutarch, Marius 9. Sallust, Jugurthine War. (tr. S.A. Handford) Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1963, pp. 116 & 122. 12 Brunt, P.A., “The Army and the Land in the Roman Revolution”, J.R.S. Vol. 52 (1962) p.79. Sallust, Op. Cit. p. 116. Plutarch, Marius 9. Sallust states that Marius had permission to strengthen his army with volunteers, but indicates an uncustomary, and to the Senate, perhaps unexpected use of this permission. It could be that the Law itself contained ambiguities that Marius used, and, if so the legality of his actions would have been questionable. 13 Sallust, Op. Cit. 14 Gellius, The Attic Nights, (tr. J.C.Rolfe),Vol. I. Introd. pp. xiii-xiv. 15 Gellius, Op. Cit. Vol. III, pp. 169-171. 16 Pliny, Natural History 10.5. 17 Plutarch, Marius 25. 18 Ibid. 10. There are therefore no grounds to say that it was Marius’ demonstrated military ability that guided and shaped his career. Rather, its course must be attributed to the circumstances of the times. In particular, the people’s dissatisfaction with the Senate’s conduct of affairs in both the north, where five defeats had previously been experienced.19 And in the south, where the war with Jugurtha had also not been going well, and that had generated a number of charges of corruption and misconduct.20 Since most of the men apparently responsible for these failures belonged to the Senatorial class, it is not surprising that the people looked outside the Senate for someone to save the State. Marius was intensely ambitious.21 But whether Marius deliberately gauged his career to suit this situation, or whether his own natural style and background just happened to fit what the people were looking for, can never be known. Whichever is correct, Marius went on to prove himself capable of the charge. Either way, the prime mover of his career remains the circumstances of the times in which he lived. 19 Scullard, Op. Cit. pp. 53 – 54. Ibid. pp. 49 – 50. 21 To quote from my tutor at the time, Peter C., noted in his own comments on my paper. “He had built up a massive political machine and there is reason to believe he would have pushed for further high offices even without a military emergency. Not that he was a threat to the old political system of course: he wanted the traditional things such as dignitas, wealth, influence, acceptance by the ‘boni’, etc. (As you noted p. 1.)” 20 BIBLIOGRAPHY Kildahl, P.A., Caius Marius, New York, Twayne Publishers, 1968. Scullard, H.H., From the Gracchi to Nero, (4th edition) London, Methuen, 1976. Smith, R.E., Service in the Post Marian Army, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1958. Webster, G. The Roman Imperial Army, London, Adam &Charles Black, 1969. Aulus Gellius, The Attic Nights, (tr. J.C.Rolfe) (Loeb Classical Library, Vol.I.) London, Heinemann, 1927. Aulus Gellius, The Attic Nights, (tr. J.C.Rolfe) (Loeb Classical Library, Vol.III.) London, Heinemann, 1927. Pliny, Natural History, (tr H.Rackham) (Loeb Classical Library, Vol.III.) London, Heinemann, 1940. Plutarch, Fall of the Roman Republic, (tr. R. Warner), Harmondsworth, Penguin,1958. Sallust, The Jugurthine War, Conspiracy of Cataline, (Tr. S. A. Handford) Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1963. Bell, M. J. V., “Tactical reform in the Roman republican army”, Historia, Vol. 14.4, 1965, pp. 404 - 422 Brunt, P. A., “The Army and the Land in the Roman Revolution”, J.R.S. Vol.52 (1962) pp,6986. (Cover Photo: Bust of Marius in the Glyptothek, Munich – https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Marius_Glyptothek_Munich_319.jpg)