Marcus Licinius Crassus Kathleen Toohey 1 Marcus Licinius Crassus (cos.70, 55). Of the members of the ‘first triumvirate’; Pompey, Crassus and Caesar; Crassus is the man we know least about. Our knowledge of the career of Crassus has been limited by several factors:1     his preference to act often through agents while keeping a low profile; his own membership of the ‘triumvirate’; his premature death in a campaign against the Parthias; and the impact the above factors had on the assessment of later historians who had seen both the consequences of the ‘first triumvirate’, and the way those events had contributed to the development of the Principate. These factors have led later scholars to see conspiracies built around Crassus that either may not have existed, or were not as deliberate as later interpreters chose to see them. The case of the supposed ‘first Catilinarian conspiracy’ is a good example of this. Here, the evidence for conspiracy in the sources is in such open conflict that Seager, I think rightly, has concluded that these are largely insubstantial speculations stemming from the conspiracy of 63.2 As well, there are large gaps in our accounts of Crassus’ life and career.3 Such issues make it necessary to manage an assessment of Crassus’ career with caution. Our knowledge of the early aspects of his career is fragmentary. His father had been among those who had stood forward to oppose Marius and Cinna with the threat of military action.4 By the end of 87, his father and brother were dead as a result of the consequent purges of Marius and Cinna.5 Crassus, himself, however, was left unharmed. He remained in Rome for over a year before, apparently from simple fear, he fled to hide in Spain.6 It would be interesting to know why he waited so long, and I cannot help wonder if it was some covert action of his that put him in more immediate jeopardy. Unfortunately, Plutarch is very vague on this. Crassus remained in Spain for eight months till 84 when Cinna was dead.7 Despite the absolute secrecy that Plutarch has Crassus clothing his hiding place with, Crassus, given the force of 2,500 men he is said to have raised, does not seem to have been idle in canvassing support during those eight months.8 Also, since it was the news of the death of Cinna that apparently prompted him to come out of hiding, I wonder if there was not some more 1 Scullard, H.H., From the Gracchi to Nero, (4th. edit.), London, Methuen, 1976, pp. 97, 123. Seager, R., “The First Catilinarian Conspiracy”, Historia, Vol. 13, 1964, pp. 339 – 342, 346 – 347. 3 On these, see for example, Rex Warner’s Introduction to his translation of the “Life of Crassus”, Plutarch, Fall of the Roman Republic, (tr. R. Warner), Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972. p. 113. 4 Appian, Civil Wars I. 69. Plutarch, Crassus 4. The background to these events is too complex to try to address here. For a summary of them, including the rivalry between Marius and Sulla over the command of the campaign against Mithridates, Sulla’s consequent capture of Rome, and the rise of Cinna, see Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, pp. 71 – 74. 5 Appian, Civil Wars I. 72. Plutarch, Crassus 4 4. 6 Crassus’ father had been the Governor of Further Spain in 96 (Broughton, T. R. S., Magistrates of the Roman Republic: 99 B.C. – 31 B.C., New York, American Philological Society, 1951, p. 96), and Crassus clearly had clients there. 7 Plutarch, Crassus 4 – 6. 8 Plutarch, Crassus 6.1 – 3. 2 2 personal enmity acting between the two. Indeed the motivations for the whole sequence of events during this period are obscure, but seem to focus on Cinna and his death. Crassus, hearing of it, raises a force, crosses to join Metellus Pius in Libya. Then, according to Plutarch, he has a disagreement with Metellus, and crosses to Greece to join Sulla who, having by then also heard of Cinna’s death, invades Italy.9 But why did Crassus not go to Metellus or Sulla from the start, and why did the news of Cinna's death prompt Sulla to invade, if it was meant as an invasion. In respect of the second point, according to Appian it was the news of Cinna’s death, together with the ensuing confusion in the Senate that prompted Sulla to bring his army back to Italy following the defeat of Mithridates.10 But Appian had previously presented Sulla hastening “to meet his enemies” as the cause of Cinna and his fellow consul Carbo11 efforts to raise an army to face Sulla. After describing this, Appian then reports on Sulla’s negotiations with the Senate. Plutarch’s account in his life of Sulla, paints a very different picture.12 His account of Sulla bringing his army back from Asia, is full of anecdotes that could suggest that Sulla was actually delaying his return to Italy, probably because he is reluctant to risk a confrontation with Cinna. This is reinforced by his concern that his army will disperse as soon as it reached Italy.13 Then, according to Plutarch, when Sulla was about to transport his men back to Italy, he made his soldiers take an oath to “stand by him and to do no damage in Italy except by his orders”. 14 I would suggest the following sequence. After the war with Mithridates ended, Sulla began negotiations with Rome for his return in safety.15 Cinna and his fellow consul, Carbo, had been raising an army against him. And Cinna had also obstructed any negotiations between Sulla and the Senate.16 Following Cinna’s death,17 Sulla felt that there was now a reasonable chance of winning the Senate to him. So he prepared to cross to Italy. The reference in Plutarch to Sulla’s fears his men would desert him to return to their homes on reaching Italy, shows, I believe, he had not conveyed to them any intention of taking further military action against Rome. Quite possibly, he was hoping to avoid this. At the same time, he saw himself in grave danger if Cinna’s party prevailed, and so, as a precaution which was to prove necessary, he extracted the oath from his men. The clause about doing no damage was probably inserted to try to prevent an accidental generation of hostilities caused by the uncontrolled actions of his men. Crassus thoughts were, I think, similar. The men he raised in Spain were largely a bodyguard. And, for extra protection, he tried to attach himself to a larger force whose commander was in a similar position to his own. First he tried Metellus, and here the quarrel may have been because Metellus, at the time, feared to compromise his own position by harbouring Crassus. Then 9 Plutarch, Crassus 6.1 – 3. Appian, Civil Wars I. 79. 11 who had been appointed after the death of Marius. 12 Appian, Civil Wars I. 76 – 77. 13 Plutarch, Sulla, 26 – 27. 14 Plutarch, Sulla, 27.3 15 Appian, Civil Wars I. 77. 16 Appian, Civil Wars I. 76 – 77. 17 Cinna was in the process of sending troops to Illyria for training, when some of his own men mutinied and killed him. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, pp. 74, and in particular 414 – 415, n. 26, for a discussion of the issues and some conflicting modern opinions. 10 3 Crassus fled to Sulla. Once Sulla had committed himself, others came forth to support him. Metellus came over from Libya, and Pompey brought to him a legion he had raised in Picenum.18 Whether Sulla hoped to win a peaceful settlement by bluff, or was now committed to war, cannot be known. But his enemies expected and, prepared for the latter and war became inevitable Once war was joined, Crassus was given the opportunity to distinguish himself in subordinate commands.19 It is to this period that Plutarch dates the beginnings of rivalry between Crassus and Pompey,20 and certainly here Pompey stands out over Crassus, being given the task of dealing with Carbo and clearing anti-Sullan elements from Sicily and Africa.21 We next here of Crassus reaping the benefits of Sulla’s proscriptions, and Plutarch’s account of this is heaped with criticism of his greed, seeing that as his prime motivation.22 I would suggest two other factors that may have directed his actions at this time, a motive of revenge, and a certain harsh, even cruel, practicality in his nature. The faction of Marius and Cinna had been responsible for the death of his father and brother. That he could still be moved by this and thoughts of revenge may be shown by Sulla’s rejoinder to remember them when he asked Sulla for an escort to accompany him to the Marsi.23 As for the practicality of his nature, its brutality can best be seen in Plutarch’s account of how Crassus dealt with a display of cowardice by the men under Mimmius in the war with Spartacus, by reviving the old punishment of decimation, executing one man in ten.24 The proscriptions were going on. Crassus probably had no reason to regret much of it. He could not stop it anyway, so, as he probably saw it, why not make a profit from it. After this, we have an unfortunate long gap of about ten years in which Crassus remained politically active, at least in the background, though Plutarch gives us few specific details.25 Then Crassus, who was Praetor in either 72 or 73, was given a special command to deal with the slave rebellion of Spartacus.26 But, though he was successful, the glory he won was dulled by Pompey’s intervention in the final phase of the war.27 However they both then stood for and won the consulship of 70,28 but, having won it, they are reported to be in constant disagreement. Crassus is reported to have accomplished little. Indeed the only acts of his consulship that we have definite record of, are the giving of a feast to the people, and a corn distributions.29 Adcock disagrees with this view of hostilities between the two consuls and attributes the relative inactivity of their consulship to other factors that are not wholly convincing, such as that Pompey was simply tired, and that Crassus was preoccupied with private business problems. 30 18 Ibid. I. 80. Appian, Civil Wars 1.90. Plutarch, Crassus 6. 20 Plutarch, Crassus 6.4. 21 Appian, Civil Wars 1.95. 22 Plutarch, Crassus 6.6 – 7. 23 Plutarch, Crassus 6.2 – 3. 24 Plutarch, Crassus 10. Lintott, A. W., Violence in Republican Rome, London, Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 41 – 42. 25 Plutarch, Crassus 7. 2 – 4. 26 Appian, Civil Wars I. 118. Plutarch, Crassus 10 – 11. Livy, Summaries, XCVI-XCVII. 27 Plutarch, Crassus 11; Life of Pompey 21. Appian, Civil Wars I 119 – 121. 28 Plutarch, Crassus 12; Life of Pompey 22. Appian, Civil Wars I 121. 29 Plutarch, Crassus 12. 30 Adcock, F.E, Marcus Crassus, Millionaire, Cambridge, Heffer, 1966, pp. 28 – 29. 19 4 The problem is that there are just so many problematical points in Crassus’ career, and so much contemporary and later speculations, even to the present day. I think Stanton and Marshall are right in seeing Crassus and Pompey as political rivals from 60 forwards.31 I would suggest though that the political rivalry was only symptomatic of a broader personal rivalry that need not have manifested itself in an actual enmity between them. This rivalry probably dates back to Sulla’s return to Italy, and it certainly extends from the war against Spartacus. In particular, Pompey’s intervention in that war, and the ensuing diminishment of the acclaim that should have belonged to Crassus, convinced Crassus that he could not compete for military glory with Pompey. Both, I think, were aiming for a position of pre-eminence in the natural order of the State. Pompey, through his military exploits, was already well on his way, in the public eye. Crassus had probably already been using the wealth he had accrued under Sulla’s proscriptions, to extend his influence. Both now turned their attention to the consulship. As to the vexed question of what sort of deal or compromise was made in gaining the consulship, I think that is of secondary importance. The most definite thing that can be said is that each was prepared to accept the other as his consular colleague. Indeed Crassus may have welcomed it, and even sought it, seeing in it a possibility to publicly outdo Pompey on the same ground. Whether Pompey saw the coming consulship as open competition, is another matter, though, as his interference in the war with Spartacus and the spectacular way he displayed his discharge from military service, indicates he was always looking to enhance his prestige. It is significant that all the measures passed in their consulship can be seen as moves to win popularity. Crassus, as we have seen, gave a feast and a corn distribution. During the consulship, legislation was passed restoring the Tribunate and including members of the Equestrian Order in the juries. Plutarch attributes both these actions to Pompey but Taylor has argued that Crassus was involved in both and, in particular, was behind the jurist law.32 Again, I do not think that the question of who actually sponsored the measures is particularly important. More importance lies in their purpose, to win popularity. In this, as a whole, they do not seem to have been very effective for either of them, because directly after this year both men seem to have withdrawn from public life.33 The next public involvement by Pompey is in 67, when he takes the command against the Pirates,34 while Crassus does not emerge again on the political scene until his Censorship in 65.35 (Dio does report that in 66 the Tribune Manilius attempted to pass legislation granting “freedmen the right to vote with those who had freed them’. The motion apparently caused outrage among the plebs and was promptly overturned by the Senate. Manilius then, because of the anger he now faces, sought to ascribe “the idea to Crassus and some others; but … no one believed him”.36 The possibility Crassus may have been involved is certainly consistent with his preferred mode of political manipulation. And such an act could have been intended to given a 31 Stanton, G. R., and Marshall, B. A., “The Coalition between Pompeius and Crassus”, Historia, Vol. 24 (1975), pp. 205 – 219. 32 Plutarch, Pompey 22. Sallust, Cat., XXXVIII. Taylor, L. R., Party Politics in the Age of Caesar, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1949, p. 20. 33 Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, p. 99. 34 Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, pp. 99 – 100. Plutarch, Pompey 23-24. Dio XXXVI. 24. 35 Plutarch, Crassus 13. 36 Dio XXXVI. 42 2 – 4. 5 somewhat stronger vote in the assemblies. However, on the available evidence, Crassus’ involvement here can only remain a possibility.) I have concentrated so far on the early career of Crassus because it sets the direction for the rest of his career. Having found both warfare and open political channels to be less than suitable for his talents, he seems to have turned to subtler ways, generally drawing on his wealth to extend his influence. For the next four years, the sources are totally silent. Adcock can only suggest one negative involvement by Crassus in that period, that of not opposing the Lex Gabinia.37 It seems likely that in these gaps, Crassus was expanding his business connections, but the first direct evidence of his concern with financial matters, apart from his activities during the proscriptions, does not come till late 61, when Cicero in a letter to Atticus, reports that Crassus is encouraging the tax gatherers for the province of Asia to ask that their lease be annulled. 38 But we do not know how long Crassus had had interests in Asia. Nor can we say with certainty, where else his interests lay. Spain stands as almost certain. His interests there could have stemmed from his father, and their existence may help to explain why he fled there in 86/5, and the ease with which he raised support.39 His continued interest in Spain may be indicated by his sponsorship of the appointment of Piso as quaestor with praetorian powers, to Spain, but this must be suspect as the evidence for it is closely entwined with Sallust's account of the first Catilinarian conspiracy.40 65 is the year in which Crassus next emerges in Public life for a short time as Censor. During the holding of this office he failed to have a proposal that Rome annex Egypt adopted by the State.41 It has also been suggested that at this time Crassus proposed the enfranchisement of the peoples living between the Po and the Alps.42 Unfortunately, Dio, the source for this legislation does not name the Censors, or give any indication of which one proposed, and who opposed the measure, though the circumstances of the censorship are distinctly reminiscent of Plutarch’s account of Crassus’ censorship.43 And it does seem more likely that Crassus would sponsor the measure. But, we cannot be certain. At best, this may indicate that Crassus was trying to win support and influence in that region. The attempt to annex Egypt may have been aimed at winning popularity in Rome, as annexation would give Rome a better control of the corn supply. It may also be significant that Caesar at this time, may have tried to have Egypt made a province under with him as Governor with extraordinary imperium.44 If so, he would have been supporting Crassus. In any event, the attempt failed. After this, Crassus again withdraws from public life for a time, though not to the same extent as before. Some modern scholars have also argued that Crassus provided the financial backing for Caesar to stage expensive gladiatorial games, public banquets and other public indulgences during his 37 Adcock, Marcus Crassus, Millionaire, p.32 Cicero, Letters to Atticus, I xvii. 39 Adcock, Marcus Crassus, Millionaire, p. 32 40 Sallust, Cat., XVIII – XIX. 41 Plutarch, Crassus 13. Pliny, Natural History, XXXIII, xvi, 53. 42 Adcock, Marcus Crassus, Millionaire, p.35 – 36. 43 Dio XXXVII. 3. 44 Through an act of some Tribunes, that was unsuccessful, Suetonius, Divus Julius 11. 38 6 term as Aedile in 65.45 In consequence, Caesar is then seen as being in debt to Crassus for some time afterwards. However, from the cited evidence would appear to have been more complex. According to Plutarch, Caesar was already heavily in debt outlaying money to advance his career “before he entered upon any public office”, and that he had also spent “vast sums of his own money” as curator of the Appian Way, prior to his aedileship.46 While there are several references in the sources to Caesar’s debts,47 his debtors are never clearly identified. Instead, it appears that Caesar was not pressed to repay his debts until after his term as Praetor in 62, when he was about to depart for an appointment as the governor of Spain. At this point Caesar finds himself detained by his creditors, demanding that he pays his debts. Only then, according to Plutarch, does Crassus come to Caesar’s aid by standing surety for Caesar’s debts.48 The timing is significant, given how close this date is to the establishment of the first triumvirate. In 63, Crassus is implicated in Catiline’s conspiracy but the charge is rejected as false by the Senate.49 In the same year, he also spoke in defence of the consul-elect, Murena, who was charged with electoral bribery.50 In 62, he made a trip to Asia.51 Adcock thinks it was to see Pompey,52 but I think it can be explained equally well by saying that he was going to have a look at the workings of his investments in that province, also deal with some specific matter involving them. If he did go to see Pompey, they do not seem to have reached any agreement because in early 61 Cicero describes them as competing for popularity in Public Speaking.53 And, by the end of 61, Crassus is encouraging the call of the Asia tax-gatherers, for an annullment of their lease.54 Beyond my comments above regarding the date Crassus paid out Caesar’s debts, I do not propose to look closely at the origins of the first triumvirate. The triumvirate enabled Crassus to achieve his objective of getting a renegotiation of the Asian tax lease. I do not think that this brought all that much of a gain in his popularity with the Equites, nor increased his influence. Rather, I think it was more of a desperate move to prevent loss of that influence, and to try and keep faith with his clients who had had to wait for over a year for their grievance to be settled.55 And the alliance was not an harmonious one, particularly between Crassus and Pompey, once Caesar had left for Gaul.56 45 Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, pp. 109, 111. Cowell, F. R., Cicero and the Roman Republic, (2nd edit.), Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1962, pp. 229 - 230. See also Stanton and Marshall, “The Coalition between Pompeius and Crassus”, pp. 208 – 209. 46 Plutarch, Caesar 5. 47 Sallust, Cat., 49.3. Pliny, N. H., 33.16.53. Cassius Dio 37.8.1 – 2. Plutarch, Caesar 5. Suetonius, Julius, 10. 48 Appian, Civil Wars, II.8. Plutarch, Caesar 5.8, 11.1-2, Crassus 7.6. 49 Sallust, Cat., XLVIII 5 – 9. 50 Cicero, Pro Murena. XXIII 48. 51 Cicero, Pro Flacco, XIV 32. 52 Adcock, Marcus Crassus, Millionaire, pp. 41 – 42. 53 Cicero, Letters to Atticus, I xiv. 54 Cicero, Letters to Atticus, I xvii. 55 Appian, Civil Wars, II. 13. 56 Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar, p. 141. 7 From the formation of the triumvirate, Crassus began to lose control of his own career. The problem of the tax gatherers, in particular, had shown that his money and influence were not enough to enable him to act fully in his role of patron. In the past he had tried military and magisterial positions with too little gain, if any. Now, circumstances had forced an alliance, and circumstances would direct what was left of his career. Fear of having his command revoked prompted Caesar to call the conference at Luca.57 Crassus came. The military power that Caesar was building behind him in Gaul probably bothered Crassus and Pompey and prompted them both to seek military appointments after their consulship in 55.58 Crassus would have also by then felt he needed to re-establish his military credentials. It was in the pursuance of his command against that Crassus was killed and his army defeated.59 57 Appian, Civil Wars II. 17. Plutarch, Crassus 14, Plutarch, Pompey 51. 3 – 4. Suetonius, Divus Julius 24. Luibheid, C., “The Luca Conference”, Classical Philology, Vo1. 65 (1970), p.88. 58 Appian, Civil Wars II. 18. Plutarch, Crassus 14, Pompey 52. 59 Plutarch, Crassus 18 – 33. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, pp. 128 – 129. 8 Bibliography Appian Civil Wars I, II, III, (tr. H. White), London, Heinemann, 1913 (Loeb Classical Library, Vol. III). Caesar, The Conquest of Gaul, (tr. S.A. Handford), Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1951. Caesar, The Gallic Wars, (tr. H. J. Edwards) London, Heinemann, 1917 (Loeb Classical Library). 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(Cover Photo: Bust of Crassus in the Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek, Copenhagen https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Crassus_Kopenhagen.jpg) 10