The Return of the Scots: The impact of Scottish raiding of Northern England in the 1330s and 1340s Dr Iain A. MacInnes, University of the Highlands and Islands The impact and legacy of Scottish raiding of Northern England during the First Scottish War of Independence has been the subject of significant study. English record evidence in particular provides detailed accounts of the extent of the raids of Robert Bruce and his commanders, the amount of money and goods taken, and the impact that such raids had on the economy and society of this region. Considerably less analysis has focused, however, on the raids undertaken by Scottish commanders during the next phase of conflict, in particular in the later 1330s and 1340s. In part this is because the Neville’s Cross campaign (1346), which acts as an endpoint for this phase of raiding, casts a long shadow and negatively affects the perception of this period of Scottish warfare. Moreover the relatively short duration of this raiding phase has ensured that it remains a less-appreciated element in discussions of this period of Anglo-Scottish conflict. I would argue, however, that these raids deserve closer examination in order to better understand the nature, extent and impact of these attacks on the English countryside during a period when English focus was increasingly drawn towards France. In particular this paper will consider the depiction of these raids in English sources and the picture that the available evidence presents of these incursions. For it does appear that the English north returned to something like the dark days of the 1310s, that local lords often could not be depended upon to defend the region from Scottish depredations, and that this was a period when the English crown largely abandoned the English north to its fate and northern Englishmen to deal with the Scots as best they could. Physical and Economic Impact The most obvious effects of war in northern England relate to the physical damage caused and the ensuing economic impact of such destruction. Scottish raiding of northern England largely exhibited similar destructive traits to Bruce raids in Scotland around the same time. English chroniclers consistently describe the actions of the Scots in terms which focus upon destruction, with the element of plunder also never far away. Although chronicle sources are invariably hostile to the Scots and their activities the language involved in describing the raids differs little from similar accounts of English raiding in France. Lacking only the triumphalism associated with the English campaigns on the continent chronicle accounts of Scottish raiding remain likely to contain more than an element of truth in their descriptions. K. DeVries, ‘The Use of Chronicles in Recreating Medieval Military History’, The Journal of Medieval Military History, 2 (2004), 1-15; C. Given-Wilson, Chronicles: The writing of history in medieval England (London, 2004), chapter 5. The Scottish raids of 1333, for example, launched in response to the siege of Berwick involved ‘slaying and burning, [and] carrying off prey and booty.’ Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 277; cf. Chron. Anonimalle, 1307-1334, 157; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 307; Chron. Melsa, ii, 367-8. The English administration’s descriptions of the raids were similar, alleging that the Scots had ‘invaded the kingdom with a great army, committing murders, depredations, burnings, and other crimes’ (CCR, 1333-37, 22). In a small-scale attack in 1337 Scottish raiders marched east from Arthuret (Cumberland) burning twenty villages, seizing a large number of cattle and also several prisoners for ransom. All this was accomplished in a single day. Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 304-5. In October 1337 a raid of much grander scale than those launched previously made its way through Cumberland. Having done considerable damage around Carlisle the Scots burned much of Allerdale and sent a detachment south to Copeland to seize cattle. Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 307-8; cf. Scalacronica (King), 125. Following the death of Andrew Murray, who had strongly advocated the raiding of northern England, new leaders such as Alexander Ramsay continued the attacks. Ramsay ‘repeatedly went to England…seized plunder, led away captives, and wasted provinces with fire and sword.’ Chron. Bower, vii, 147-9; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 461. A raid on Cumberland in the summer of 1346 brought ‘slaughter and fire’ to that area, the Scots returning across the border ‘with great droves of cattle.’ Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 326; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333-1381, 19; Scalacronica (King), 136; Knighton’s Chronicle, 55. These literary descriptions of Scottish raiding are supported by administrative evidence produced for the English crown. A letter to Edward III described the 1340 raid on Northumberland. On this occasion the Scots captured ‘a good 2,000 fat beasts and many prisoners.’ CDS, v, no. 809; Scalacronica (King), Appendix i. The recorded number of cattle may be accurate, as the plunder was recovered following the defeat of the Scottish raiders on their return north by the men of Roxburgh and the garrison of Wark Castle (CDS, v, no. 809; cf. Scalacronica (King), 134; Knighton’s Chronicle, 27; Chron. Baker, 69-70). Following the Neville’s Cross campaign inquisitions were set up to investigate claims made by the people of Cumberland and Northumberland that they required relief from taxation because of damage to their lands. CPR 1345-48, 301-2. The inquisition found that the Scots ‘have frequently entered the said parts and have burned and destroyed the lands, depriving the men of the county of their goods and chattels.’ CCR, 1346-49, 448-9. Other examples include Robert Clifford’s manor of Ellingham in Northumberland. An inquisition of 1339 found that the manor house lay in a ruined state, the mill had been burned by the Scots and only a third of demesne lands had been sown for the forthcoming year, ‘the rest lying waste and uncultivated for lack of tenants’ who had apparently fled as a result of the Scottish incursions. NCH, ii, 239-40; E. Miller, War in the North: The Anglo-Scottish wars of the Middle Ages (Hull, 1960), 7. Ellingham was already in decline before Scottish raiding began once more in the later 1330s, a lack of tenants being recorded in a subsidy roll of 1336. This depressed state was only exacerbated by Scottish raiding and the manor only showed signs of recovery by the fifteenth century. NCH, ii, 236-45. Other administrative accounts detail damage and destruction suffered by the estates of monastic houses throughout the English north. In Northumberland Newminster Abbey received respite from the English crown because the Scots burned thirteen of the abbey’s manors, destroyed its grain and wasted its lands. Ancient Petitions, 201-2. The location of these thirteen manors is not altogether clear, but the abbey’s chartulary provides the names of at least three identifiable locations within reach of the Scottish raiders: Caistron, Newton and Rothley, with a potential fourth at Felton (Chartularium Abbathiae de Novo Monasterio Ordinis Cisterciensis (Surtees Society, 66, 1876), 140, 184). The abbot and convent of Newminster received 40 quarters of wheat from the crown in August 1333 as they had ‘suffered especially’ during the attack (CDS, iii, no. 1085; CCR, 1333-37, 69-70). Holystone Priory was granted ten quarters of wheat by the king because its granges had been burned. CDS, iii, no. 1085; CCR, 1333-37, 69-70. For the extent of Holystone’s property in Northumberland, see NCH, xv, 460-4. And Brinkburn Priory was granted twenty quarters of wheat by Edward III ‘as [its] granges, lands, goods and chattels in Northumberland have been destroyed in the last invasion of the Scots [July 1333], so that [the monks’] state is much depressed.’ CCR, 1333-37, 133; Knowles and Neville Hadcock, Medieval Religious Houses, 149-50. Brinkburn was given further assistance the following year, ‘out of compassion for the heavy losses sustained by the prior and convent by the war of Scotland’ (CPR, 1330-34, 551). In this case the geographical scale of the destruction was possible because of the size of the Bruce Scottish invasion force involved prior to the battle of Halidon Hill. Other raids were of smaller scale but the destruction produced by even these could be considerable. For example the Northumbrian lands of Nicholas Menyll were raided before November 1341. An inquisition recorded that at Hethpool he held three cottages, 6s of rents and six acres of meadow from the king which in peacetime were worth 6s 6d a year but now nothing as Hethpool ‘has been for the most part devastated by the Scots.’ CIPM, viii, no. 344. Menyll held lands elsewhere in Northumberland, at Wooler, Belford, Lowick and Cheviot. The lack of damage to these lands suggests that the damage at Hethpool was at the hands of a small-scale incursion across the border that proceeded little further into Northumberland at the time. Further evidence of devastation in the same county appears in the accounts of Knights Hospitaller for 1338. The manor of Chibburn was described as ‘ruined’, rents were reduced because the manor lay ‘on the Scottish march’, and the total return from the manor was much-reduced ‘because the land is destroyed and much depreciated by the war with the Scots.’ The Knights Hospitallers in England, ed. L.B. Larking and J.M. Kemble (Camden Society, 1857), 52-3. Devastation on these estates may have been inflicted during the Scottish raids around Redesdale and Coquetdale in September/October 1337 (see above, 31). At Thornton (Northumberland), just east of Norham and only a few miles from the border, the impact of the war is presented in stark detail. Of 300 acres of arable land, normally worth 6d an acre and returning £7 10s in peacetime, the value had halved to only 3d an acre by 1338. Rents worth £30 when the Templars held the lands previously returned only £12 ‘because of war with the Scots.’ Knights Hospitallers in England, 133-4. The fall in the value of the land likely relates to wartime damage as crops were lost through burning. The fall in rents suggests that tenants had fled their holdings altogether, presumably in search of safer lands out of reach of Scottish raiders, a longer-term impact from which it was more difficult to recover. Financial losses as a result of Scottish raiding led to pleas from both secular and religious communities for reassessment of, or remittance, from taxation. Indeed such claims became commonplace throughout this period. Such pleas must of course be used carefully when analysing the extent of destruction. Once reassessment or remittance of taxation had been secured communities often worked incredibly hard to ensure that this state of affairs persisted whether relief remained appropriate or not. As a brief example the abbey of Rievaulx received a grant of £10 mortmain of land and rent because of losses sustained through Scottish raiding in the 1320s. The abbey continued however to receive rents from these lands until the reign of Richard II even though its estates are not known to have been affected by any raids after 1327. CPR, 1330-34, 47. Instead therefore of looking purely at claims of poverty from English communities, alternative financial evidence is provided by the accounts of ransom payments given to the Scots to purchase safety from future damage. For the Scots did not raid northern England only to cause destruction and deprive the local people of their goods. Greater profit could be acquired through demands for protection money in return for immunity from destruction and plundering. The efficient blackmailing of the English north had of course provided Robert I with large quantities of money. See above, 105, n. 25; cf. McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, chapter 3;Scammell, ‘Robert I and the North of England’, 385-6, 388-90, 393-8. Similar rewards were sought by David II and his commanders and, as before, English communities readily agreed to pay. The people of Carlisle, for example, purchased a truce for 300 marks in 1346 as a result of the Scottish army’s appearance a few miles east at Liddel. Chron. Anonimalle, 1333-1381, 24; Penman, David II, 130; cf. Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, i, 279; Rogers, ‘Scottish Invasion of 1346’, 56. A similar truce had been agreed to cover Westmorland. To avoid Scottish attacks the people of the county paid the sum of £233 6s 8d to secure the safety of their lands. TNA, E101/25/10, f. 2. This sum paid to the Scots was greater than the county’s yearly contribution to the tenth and fifteenth granted to the crown which raised around £180 in each of the two years of the tax. Similarly in 1346 David II reportedly wrote to the bishop of Durham to demand 1,000 marks or enough bread to supply his army for the duration of his campaign in return for not destroying the lands of the Palatinate. BL, Cotton Faustina B, f. 93v; Rogers, ‘Scottish Invasion of 1346’, 57-8; Penman, David II, 127. The Scots had used foodstuffs as an alternative to money when blackmailing areas of southern Scotland in the early 1310s (McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, 130-1). The bishop of Durham had foreseen the need to raise £160 to pay off the Scots as early as 1343 or 1344 to ensure continuing peace (Richard D’Aungerville, of Bury: Fragments of his register and other documents (Surtees Society, 1910), 159-60); cf. S.S. Martin, ‘Richard D’Aungerville de Bury, 1287-1345’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Emory University, 1986), 148-9). Separate agreements were also reportedly negotiated with Durham’s secular landowners and with the monks of Durham. The former agreed to pay specifically to ensure their lands and manors would be spared destruction. BL, Cotton Tiberius A VI, f. 196v. According to this chronicle account, the Scots happily accepted such money, even though they planned to burn the lands on their return north; cf. Rogers, ‘Scottish Invasion of 1346’, 58. And the monks ‘promised to pay an indemnity to the Scots…for themselves and their estates and tenants, that [the Scots] should stay no longer.’ Knighton’s Chronicle, 69-73; Penman, David II, 130-1; Rogers, ‘Scottish Invasion of 1346’, 58. Where the source material provides detail of how much the Scots were able to extract from northern English communities it appears that the amounts were comparable to those raised during the systematic attacks of Robert I during the 1310s and 1320s. The £200 raised from Carlisle and the surrounding district in 1346 is relative to the £400 agreed for the entire county of Cumberland in December 1314. McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, 133. And the combined sum of £422 6s 8d from Carlisle and Westmorland compares favourably to the sum of £400 demanded from both Cumberland and Westmorland in January 1319. McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, 133. Similarly the 1,000 marks demanded from the bishop of Durham, along with the separate agreements made with the Durham monks and the local inhabitants, compares favourably with the 800 marks extracted from the bishopric in 1314 and 1317 and the 1,000 marks paid in 1327. McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, 135-9; cf. Scammell, ‘Robert I and the North of England’, 395-401. These blackmail payments from the 1340s pale somewhat in comparison to the sum of 2,200 marks demanded of Cumberland in 1313-14. McNamee, ‘Buying off Robert Bruce’, 79-80; McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, 133-4. Even though Robert I received only around 1,290 marks of this sum from the county this example is indicative of the sums demanded by a confident Scottish monarch when the Scots held a dominant military position. The Scots were once again militarily ascendant in the 1340s and thus were able to extract some considerable financial gain from northern English communities. That this was not as financially rewarding in the long-term is a result of the more piecemeal nature of similar demands in the 1330s and 1340s. Interrupted by truces and then ended by the Scottish defeat at Neville’s Cross, the raiding of this period could not replicate the ceaseless recurrence of demands for money exhibited in the 1310s. But the ease and rapidity with which northern English communities paid up suggests that they at least feared that it could. Social and Political Impact The consequences of the damage and loss described already were reflected somewhat in northern English society and politics. It was during the Anglo-Scottish wars that relations between the people of the two kingdoms became, perhaps unsurprisingly, increasingly hostile and negative perceptions of the ‘other’ began to develop. Macdonald, Border Bloodshed, 239-41; Ditchburn, Scotland and Europe, 275-80. In November 1336 protection was granted to Andrew le Bowyer of York, citizen of that city, who had resided there for twenty-eight years and lived there still with his wife and children. He feared that having been born in Scotland ‘he may be injured by those that are jealous of him.’ CPR, 1334-38, 330. Cynthia Neville has argued that people such as Bowyer were forced to insure themselves against claims of treacherous behaviour based upon little evidence other than questionable claims over their place of birth and perceived ‘Scottishness.’ Neville, ‘Local Sentiment’, 424-31; cf. J.A.F. Thomson, ‘Scots in England in the Fifteenth Century’, SHR, 79 (2000), 1-16, at 1-6. The level of fear demonstrated towards Scots living amongst the English population is perhaps overstated but there is evidence of a concern at times of a Scottish ‘fifth column.’ Invasion fears, for example, exacerbated bouts of anti-Scottish sentiment and in late 1345 these prompted Edward III to order the expulsion of any Scots found living north of the Trent. Rot. Scot., i, 666. English fears were at their greatest with regard to Scots residing in occupied towns. Berwick troubled the English administration most. It was feared for example that the town’s Scottish population would collude with the enemy to allow its capture. As a consequence in February 1335 John Swayn of Berwick, John Moigne and Thomas Dorchester were sent to Newcastle having been arrested in the town on suspicion of association with the Scots. Rot. Scot., i, 325. A John Derchester and an Adam Moigne are on the list of men of Berwick granted protections by Edward III in 1333. Moigne was a burgess, and an Adam Moigne imported hides at Edinburgh in 1336 (Rot. Scot., i, 255-6; CDS, iii, p. 344). A John Swayn was importing hides at Edinburgh in 1337 (CDS, iii, p. 392). Two months later the new custodian of the town was granted powers to banish suspicious persons whether English or Scottish. Rot. Scot., i, 334. These powers were utilised before October 1335 when twenty men were released having previously been arrested as ‘suspicious persons.’ Rot. Scot., i, 381. Following confinement in various Northumbrian castles they were released on condition that they would not return to Berwick or to any other part of Scotland. English fears were not without foundation. At English-held Roxburgh there may have been an attempt to overthrow the town’s administration involving members of the castle garrison. In February 1339 Edward III ordered the arrest of certain men whom, he was informed, had been involved in a plot to capture Roxburgh Castle for the Bruce Scots. Amongst those arrested were Hugh and Thomas Sampson, both men-at-arms who had been part of William Felton’s castle garrison in 1336. CPR, 1338-40, 275; TNA, E101/19/27, f. 9. Robert Darreys was ordered to arrest Hugh Sampson, Thomas Sampson and John son of David Baxter, and imprison them in Nottingham Caste, as they were ‘suspected of plotting with Hugh son of David le Bakestere, who has lately become an adherent of the Scots, for the loss of the king’s castle of Rokesburgh, and other felonies’ (CPR, 1338-40, 275). Fears of collusion were only increased when Edward III’s attentions were focused increasingly on France and northern English nobles were left in charge of border defence. Indeed there were even fears of conspiracy between northern English nobles and the Scots. In response to at least three Scottish raids during September-October 1337 the Lanercost chronicler suggested that an unnamed noble had in fact assisted the Scots. He wrote that ‘it had been commonly, but secretly, reported for a long time that a certain noble in the north country was unduly favourable to the Scottish side, and that he did on that occasion, as on other occasions, inform them beforehand at what time they might safely invade England with their army, and afterwards sent them word when they should leave it.’ Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 307-8. Henry Knighton expressed similar views when describing the Scottish raids of 1346. He stated that the raids earlier in the year were ‘to the great scandal of the northern magnates, who were believed by many to have been [the Scots’] accomplices in those evils, and to have consented to them.’ Knighton’s Chronicle, 67-9. Fears over the loyalty of the northern nobility may also have affected Edward III. As late as 1358-63 many northern estates escheated to the crown based on claims of past disloyalty and co-operation with the Scots by members of the northern nobility and gentry. See, for example, CPR, 1358-61, 22, 121-2, 130, 140-2, 233-4, 245, 496. Those who were affected by the activities of William Nessfield, escheator north of the Trent, included notables such as John Stirling, William Dacre and John Coupland. It has been argued that through these escheats, and the redistribution of the same northern territories, Edward III sought to place loyal crown servants in strategically important areas, create greater stability in northern England while he campaigned on the continent, and ensure the loyalty of his northern nobles. For those men who were able to regain their forfeited territories the escheats were a blunt reminder that the king was able and willing to punish them if they did not fulfil their defensive duties. M.C. Dixon, ‘Restrospective Treason?: The Nessfield escheats’, Archaeologia Aeliana, 5th series, 29 (2001), 257-268, at 264-7. The resumption of Scottish raiding from 1333 played on northern English fears of a return to the dark days of the 1310s and 1320s. One response to the renewed attacks was the payment of protection money, as already discussed. See above, 104-5, 107-9. Another was to move goods and possessions to safety further south and away from the raiding Scots. In late 1355, for example, when the Scots captured Berwick town and laid siege to the castle, Adam Prendergast took the precaution of moving his wool and hides from Prenderguest (Berwickshire) to Haggerston (Northumberland) for its safety. CDS, iii, no. 1630. At times the English crown ordered the entire population of northern England to take similar action and remove livestock to safer locations. See above, 60-1. The aristocracy in particular were at pains to ensure the safety of their horses and possessed the wherewithal to remove them to a safer location should the Scots threaten an attack. In light of the renewed warfare of 1332-3, and likely in response to the Bruce Scottish raiding of 1333, Ralph Neville sent his horses south from sites at Inglewood and Raby in Cumberland and Ulgham in Northumberland to Coverdale in the North Riding and Evenwood in Durham ‘because of the Scots.’ TNA, E101/507/14. Even the king’s own royal stud in northern England was moved south in 1336-7 from Inglewood Forest in Cumberland to a safer location further south at Knaresborough in the North Riding. This was also done ‘for fear of the Scots.’ TNA, E101/101/23. The impact of war on the political situation in northern England was much less pronounced than in Scotland but the region provided an ongoing problem for Edward III. Unrest in the north was an issue that had spilled over from the reign of Edward II and Edward III faced difficulties in organising northern England’s defence as a result. See for example, A. King, ‘Bandits, Robbers and Schavaldours: War and disorder in Northumberland in the reign of Edward II’, in M. Prestwich, R. Britnell and R. Frame (eds), Thirteenth Century England IX: Proceedings of the Durham conference, 2001 (Woodbridge, 2003), 115-29. He was, for example, forced to negotiate with his magnates at various times to ensure their commitment to border defence. King, ‘Military Service and Obligation’, 25-6. Moreover the arraying of forces in the north at times stirred up local antagonism. This is evident from as early as 1333 when the English king summoned an army to repel the Scots. Instructions were sent subsequently to the commissioners of array in the East Riding ‘to arrest any in rebellion there’ who refused to obey the king’s order to muster. CPR, 1330-34, 412. Similar orders were issued to the commissioners of Cumberland and Westmoreland stating that anyone resisting their authority was to be imprisoned. CPR, 1330-34, 415. For further examples, see CPR, 1330-34, 416; CCR, 1333-37, 23; Rot. Scot., i, 235-6, 495, 496. Indeed the resumption of Scottish raids in Cumberland in 1337 may have led to an additional decline in the number of local men willing to join the king’s armies, choosing instead to remain at home to defend their lands and possessions. This prompted Edward III to send out orders to arrest those who failed to perform military service or who had deserted. Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, i, 266. Although such problems affected army summonses throughout England the reaction of northern England was particularly dangerous. If Edward III was to divert an increasing amount of time, money and manpower to the continent, then the burden of expectation fell upon the northerners to provide for their own defence. If they were unwilling, or indeed unable, to act then the English king faced difficulties that the Scots were likely to exploit. Goodman has argued that English defence against Scottish raids was best performed by a series of fortified residences belonging to northern barons. Alongside the royal castles of northern England they provided bases for local troops who could respond quickly to Scottish action, supported in turn by the men of neighbouring garrisons. Goodman, ‘Defence of Northumberland’, 162-7. If this was indeed Edward III’s plan, it was not however always successful. Alexander Ramsay’s raid into Northumberland during the siege of Dunbar (1338) was met by the combined forces of Robert Manners and William Heron, probably accompanied by men from their respective garrisons at Etal and Ford. There appears, however, to have been no assistance from Thomas Gray at nearby Norham and the English forces were defeated. Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 461-2; Chron. Bower, vii, 149; Scalacronica (King), 127. Gray himself suffered defeat in 1355 when faced by a Scottish raiding force at Nisbet where he appears to have fought the Scots devoid of any support from his neighbours. Scalacronica (King), 140-1; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 485-7; Chron. Bower, vii, 281. And an ability to mount defence in depth is also questioned by the Scottish invasion of Cumberland in October 1337. On this occasion the Scots were met by Anthony Lucy and men from the West March. Henry Percy and Ralph Neville also gathered troops from Northumberland to assist in countering the Scottish incursion but they arrived too late, after the Scots had retreated, to successfully defend Cumberland. Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 307-8. The chronicler was critical of Percy and Neville’s tardiness, especially as ‘the leading men [of Cumberland] had written to them to move with speed, because the Scots had sent their booty and wounded men before them into Scotland, the armed troops following soon after.’ In contrast to the successful muster of northern England’s resources in response to the Neville’s Cross invasion, these examples demonstrate that the defence of the English north was far from full proof. Popular unrest was also visible in northern England and manifested itself in various ways. There was upheaval within key northern English towns that, although not necessarily caused by wartime events, occurred at a dangerous time as Scottish incursions of England became more frequent. There were riots in Newcastle in 1341 over the election of the town’s mayor and disturbances broke out in the town once more in 1345. Fraser, ‘Medieval Trading Restrictions’, 142. In the same year Carlisle, which Summerson describes in the 1340s as existing ‘in a state of complete demoralisation’, witnessed riots as well as fighting between the garrison and the townsmen. Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, i, 272, 275-8; M.R. McCarthy, H.R.T. Summerson and R.G. Annis (eds), Carlisle Castle: A survey and documentary history (London, 1990), 141-2. This general state of disorder was only resolved in the spring of 1346. During this period of instability the Scots actively raided Cumberland on more than one occasion and these disturbances affected the ability of the West March to defend itself. Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, i, 277-8. There were also problems at English-held Berwick. In 1341 the keepers of the town gates were accused of extorting money from merchants who passed into the town and of helping themselves to some of the produce. Edward III wrote to the local administration around the same time and ordered the constable of Berwick and his ministers to desist from seizing the goods and property of merchants and burgesses. Instead they should ‘conduct themselves honourably.’ Rot. Scot., i, 613-5. In November 1342 orders were despatched that the burgesses and merchants of Berwick should no longer be retained in the defence of the town. The response of the English administration in Berwick only succeeded in provoking further unrest. Felons were apparently pardoned and employed to provide adequate defence. This upset Berwick’s burgesses and merchants, some of whom had been robbed by the very men now serving to protect them. The burgesses in turn were rebuked by Edward III and ordered not to interfere with the work of the king’s ministers in the town. Rot. Scot., i, 634. Unrest at Berwick, like that at Carlisle, was a direct threat to the safety of northern England, and failure to deal with it successfully only led to further concerns over the stability of the English frontier region. Unrest in northern England was also exhibited in the apparently lawless nature of the border counties. Although a problem for many years, renewed war conditions from 1332 created opportunities for men to flout the law and escape punishment. H. Summerson, ‘Crime and Society in Medieval Cumberland’, TCWAAS, 82 (1982), 111-24, at 121. And although not purely a border problem, the wartime situation again made such behaviour particularly dangerous for the English crown and the war effort. A favourite tactic employed by northern criminals was kidnapping. In 1332 it was reported that Roger Kirkpatrick, who had fled Scotland for his own safety, was abducted not long after arriving in England. The king ordered an inquisition to look into the matter as Kirkpatrick had been captured whilst under a royal safe conduct. CPR, 1330-34, 440. In 1340 Edward III appointed Gilbert Umfraville, Henry Percy and Ralph Neville to ‘put down the evil-doers who infest the passes and woods in Northumberland (and) make prisoners of and rob and slay his lieges both Scots and English.’ A similar commission was given to Thomas Wake of Liddel, Anthony Lucy and Peter Tilliol in Cumberland and Westmorland. CDS, iii, no. 1334; CPR, 1338-40, 555. In August 1341 Robert Parvyng, Thomas Fencotes, Peter Tilliol and Clement Skelton were ordered to deliver various Cumberland men to Carlisle gaol who were accused of kidnapping men from the county and taking them to Scotland where they extorted ransoms from their prisoners. CPR, 1340-43, 322. They were also said to have been in league with certain Scots in this venture. And in October 1341 the bishop of Durham and the sheriffs of York and Northumberland were ordered to seek out malefactors who had formed gangs to capture and ransom local people, hunt them down and see that they were brought to justice. CPR, 1340-43, 328. Duties such as these were far from straightforward, however, and Thomas Lucy, Warden of the West March, informed the king in October 1351 that he himself had been seized while carrying out similar orders in Gilsland. He was imprisoned while his servants were assaulted. CPR, 1350-54, 202; Summerson, ‘Crime and Society’, 121. If the king’s officers were not safe in their own localities there was little chance that lesser men could avoid the dangers posed by thieves and kidnappers. Again, although such behaviour was perhaps not a direct consequence of the war, criminality in the north flourished in wartime conditions. The crown’s inability to control lawlessness, coupled with renewed Scottish raiding, led to ever-growing unrest in northern England. For the crown this state of affairs endangered the stability of the area of the kingdom that served as its front-line in the war with Scotland. For the northerners themselves it appeared that the crown was more interested in events on the continent and that northern England was increasingly being abandoned to a state last seen during the reign of Edward II. For it was the combination of these various impacts that ensured that Scottish raiding, though of relatively short duration, was nonetheless keenly felt. It produced, moreover, an important psychological impact. For the return of Scottish raiding appears to have been greeted with a sense of resignation by the people of northern England. Fear of Scottish attack, spread in part by the English crown as it sought to ensure an almost permanent northern English military presence in the Marches, gave rise to further concerns. Suspicions of a Scottish ‘fifth column’ in England developed alongside fears over the ability and desire of the English nobility to provide adequate resistance against Scottish attack. An acceptance that Scottish raiding was again to become a regular part of life is evident in examples such as the movement of goods and livestock out of range of raiding soldiers, as well as the ease with which some areas adopted once more a system of paying off the Scots. A feeling of the instability of the region is perhaps best represented in the political problems faced by the English crown in dealing with its own subjects. Increasing agitation in the northern counties as local men fought their own war against the invading Scots while Edward III fought in France was demonstrated in local upheaval and a determined attempt to avoid paying the many forms of taxation expected by the English crown. The fears of those most affected by the conflict were only likely to grow as an immediate resolution to the conflict appeared more remote, and as Thomas Gray wrote of the 1350s, ‘King Edward was so distressed with his affairs beyond the sea, that he took little regard to the Scottish matters.’ Scalacronica (King), 139; cf. King, ‘War, Politics and Landed Society’, 18-19. That northern England was effectively saved by the Scottish defeat at Neville’s Cross should not detract from the grim reality that several years of Scottish raiding brought once more to the region. 20